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CAMIKA S. JERIDO vs PSS WORLD MEDICAL, 08-001747 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:LaBelle, Florida Apr. 10, 2008 Number: 08-001747 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2008

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 5, 2007.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was hired by Respondent as a temporary employee on January 17, 2005. She continued to be employed by Respondent until she resigned her position on November 7, 2007. Respondent, PPS World Medical (PPS), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. PPS is a distributor of medical supplies from manufacturers to physicians’ offices. Crystal Marx interviewed Petitioner and hired her as a temporary employee in January 2005. Petitioner worked for several months as a temporary employee, and her performance was very good. Ms. Marx recommended to Renee Placette that Petitioner be hired as a regular, full-time employee. Ms. Placette had an opportunity to observe Petitioner’s performance as a temporary employee. Ms. Placette made the final decision to hire Petitioner in a full-time position in May 2006 as a supply chain expediter. Ms. Marx and Ms. Placette are Caucasian females. After three months of employment, Ms. Marx decided to conduct a 90-day performance review of Petitioner. It was not standard procedure in the department where Petitioner worked to receive a 90-day review. However, Ms. Marx made the decision to conduct the review to let Petitioner know about some concerns so Petitioner would have an opportunity to make improvements before her annual review. In a meeting to discuss the 90-day review, Ms. Marx addressed the following issues with Petitioner: work that was not being completed correctly which resulted in Ms. Marx's receiving e-mails concerning mistakes Petitioner was making; issues Petitioner was having with her coworkers; and Petitioner’s practice of skipping lunch and leaving an hour early without prior approval. The score received by Petitioner on her 90-day review did not affect Petitioner’s compensation in any way. When initially hired, Ms. Marx was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. At some point in time, Patricia Barnard was brought in as another layer of supervision. Ms. Barnard worked for Ms. Marx. For a period of time, Petitioner e-mailed Ms. Barnard when she went to, and returned from, her 15-minute break. This issue initially arose when several people asked Ms. Barnard where Petitioner was when she was away on her break. Ms. Barnard discussed this with Petitioner. Petitioner then suggested that she e-mail Ms. Barnard when she left on her break and upon her return. Ms. Barnard did not require Petitioner to do this. When Petitioner stopped sending these e-mails, Ms. Barnard did not instruct Petitioner to resume sending the e-mails or take any action regarding the e-mails. During a period of time when Petitioner was on medical leave, two accounts were reassigned to other employees while she was away. One of the accounts was assigned to another employee, Tracy Hundley, who is African-American. After that, Ms. Barnard and Ms. Marx took over the account for a while, later assigning it to Tara Nelson, another African-American employee. In any event, Petitioner did not receive any extra pay when she handled those accounts, and did not receive any cut in pay when these accounts were reassigned to others. On November 17, 2006, Petitioner received a Documented Verbal Warning for failure to properly notify management of her absence. On August 15, 2007, Petitioner received a Final Written Warning for unprofessional and inappropriate behavior towards an employee relations representative. On May 8, 2007, Ms. Barnard completed a job performance annual review of Petitioner. On her annual review, Petitioner received a score of 80, which is an average score. Ms. Marx approved the review as prepared by Ms. Barnard. Allegations of failure to promote Petitioner applied for the position of “WM Supply Chain Procurement Specialist” in November 2006. Petitioner again applied for the Procurement Specialist position in May 2007. Petitioner received an e-mail from Ms. Placette advising her that three people were hired with “a lot of buying experience.” In July 2007, Petitioner applied for the position of IT Governance Process Analyst. She received a letter from the IT Governance Process Manager of PSS which informed her that she was not selected for the position. There is nothing in the record establishing the qualifications required for these positions, whether Petitioner met these qualifications, or even whether these positions could be considered as promotions. Further, no competent evidence was presented as to the identity, qualifications, or race of the persons who were hired into these positions. Other allegations Petitioner also alleged that she was paid less then what had been promised, $11.54 an hour, in her letter offering employment. Petitioner contends that she was instead paid one cent an hour less, i.e., $11.53 per hour. The official pay stub reflects her rate of pay to have been $11.54 per hour. Further, Petitioner alleged that she was, at some point, given a new wireless headset which was replaced by a used one that she described as “yucky.” Employees who work in “confirmation” received wireless headsets because those employees needed to be able to go to the fax machine and the printer while on the telephone with a vendor. Petitioner was an “expediter” not a “confirmation” person, and did not need to be able to go to the fax machine or the printer as often while on the telephone. Petitioner resigned her position on November 2, 2007. At the time she resigned, she informed her co-workers that she owned her own t-shirt business and resigned to run her own company full time. At hearing, Petitioner asserted that she resigned because there was a “different atmosphere,” that she was stressed, and could not work there anymore. There was no competent evidence presented that establishes or even suggests that any employment action taken by Respondent toward Petitioner was based on race.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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TERRY B. HILLMAN vs CHEM-POLYMER CORPORATION, 01-002904 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jul. 20, 2001 Number: 01-002904 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 2002

The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent initially employed the Petitioner in the maintenance department in January 1996. There is no evidence that the Petitioner’s employment in the maintenance department was unsatisfactory. In May 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the production department. The Petitioner’s supervisor in the production department described his performance as somewhat unsatisfactory but made no written report of any problems. On September 17, 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the laboratory and began work as a lab technician. The transfer in the lab technician position was at the Petitioner’s request. On October 21, 1996, Richard Barnes, an employee of the Respondent, assumed supervisory responsibility for the laboratory operation. On November 8, 1996, Mr. Barnes met with the Petitioner to discuss the job. At the time of the November 8 discussion, the Petitioner had been working in the lab for almost eight weeks. The Respondent’s lab employees are responsible for assuring that the materials produced by the plant comply with the "release specifications" set by the buyers of the materials. During the discussion, the Petitioner was asked about specific tasks assigned to lab employees. His response was incorrect and indicated a lack of familiarity with lab procedures. The Petitioner was informed that his job performance was unsatisfactory. Over the next week, Mr. Barnes continued to monitor the situation, and subsequently decided to terminate the Petitioner’s employment for unsatisfactory performance. On November 18, 1996, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner’s employment on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance. At the time of the termination, the Petitioner was 56 years old. During the time of the Petitioner’s transfer into, and termination from, the lab, the Respondent was in the process of expanding the number of lab employees from six to ten employees. Shortly before terminating the Petitioner’s employment, the Respondent transferred another employee, of similar age as the Petitioner, into the lab. Shortly after the Petitioner’s termination, Respondent transferred another employee, younger than the Respondent, to the lab. The transfer of the younger employee was being processed prior to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. There is no evidence that a transfer of the younger employee was related to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. The evidence fails to establish that termination of the Petitioner’s employment was based on his age. There is no evidence that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age. There is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered any economic injury based on the termination. He became employed shortly after the termination at a salary higher than the Respondent was paying him. Subsequent employment has included additional increases in compensation. The Petitioner asserts that had he remained employed by the Respondent, his compensation would have included promotions and increased compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have received further promotions from the Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Terry B. Hillman. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Terry B. Hillman 2048 Laurel Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Robert E. Tardif, Jr., Esquire Duncan & Tardif, P.A. 1601 Jackson Street, Suite 101 Post Office Box 249 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0249 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (2) 29 U.S.C 62142 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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D`ANGELO A. SULLIVAN vs AUSSIE RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT/OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE, 04-002609 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 21, 2004 Number: 04-002609 Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice as a result of retaliation.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner D'Angelo A. Sullivan is a black male who worked for Respondent from January 14, 1999, until November 2002 as a blooming onion cook at Respondent's restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent Aussie Restaurant Management is a company that operates an Outback Steakhouse in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 people. In a letter dated September 6, 2002, Petitioner requested a paid vacation. Petitioner believed he was entitled to a paid vacation. He departed on vacation on September 23, 2002. Upon returning on September 30, 2002, he was told that he would not be paid during the time he was on vacation. Respondent has a policy that provides paid vacations to employees who have worked 32 hours per week for the six weeks prior to the time requested for a vacation. Petitioner averaged 30.20 hours per week for the six weeks prior to his request for a vacation. He was, therefore, not entitled to a paid vacation. On October 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a Complaint Form with the Escambia-Pensacola Human Relations Commission. In the "Nature of the Complaint" section the blocks "race" and "color" were checked. The "other" block was completed with the words "promotion, pay raise." In this complaint, Petitioner recited that he was not given paid leave, that his work schedule had been reduced, and that he had been given a $.25 per hour pay raise instead of the annual $.50 per hour pay raise that he had received in prior years. The complaint also asserted that only one black had been employed "out front" among the customers. In the complaint he alleged mistreatment by a manager identified as "Donnie." Petitioner suggested as a remedy, that Respondent cease discrimination, that Petitioner be given a pay raise, a paid vacation, and a W-4 tax form. He also suggested that he should be trained so that he could get a promotion. No evidence was offered demonstrating that Respondent was aware of the existence of the complaint. Petitioner testified that he was advised by the person who took his complaint to refrain from telling Respondent he had complained, and that he followed that advice. In November 2002, subsequent to an automobile accident, and upon the advice of the attorney representing Petitioner as plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit arising from the accident, Petitioner determined that he should not continue to work. This decision was based in part upon his belief that working might lessen his chances of prevailing in the ongoing lawsuit. In June 2003 Petitioner approached the manager of Respondent's restaurant, Nicholas Loizos, on at least four occasions and asked to be hired as a "take away" person in the "front of the house." Although his former position of blooming onion cook was offered to him, Petitioner insisted that he wanted the "take away" position. Mr. Loizos told Petitioner that in order to be a "take away" person, he would have to take the "Front-of-the House Selection Test." Petitioner was provided the opportunity to take this test. Petitioner did not avail himself of this opportunity. No evidence was adduced that would indicate that Respondent engaged in racial discrimination against Petitioner, or any of Respondent's employees. No evidence was adduced that would prove that Respondent was aware that Petitioner had filed a discrimination complaint. Because Respondent was unaware of the discrimination complaint, Respondent could not have engaged in retaliation against Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 D'Angelo A. Sullivan 1006 West Hayes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Maria A. Santoro, Esquire George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.5730.20760.02760.10
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JENNIFER HATFIELD vs SOUTHEAST COMPOUNDING PHARMACY, 14-004046 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Aug. 27, 2014 Number: 14-004046 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2015

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10760.11
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SHIRLEY MELTON vs. RUSSELL CORP., 87-004132 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-004132 Latest Update: May 06, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Russell Corporation, has a plant located in Marianna, Florida. The work done at the Marianna plant consists of sewing pre-cut cloth into a finished garment. Shirley Melton is a middle-aged black woman who had been employed at Russell Corporation's, Marianna, Florida plant for 4 years as a sewing machine operator. She was one of the plant's best workers and until this incident, her supervisors had never had any trouble with her. On September 30, 1985, Ms. Melton filed a discrimination complaint against Russell Corporation, alleging that Respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her race. The charge was based on the fact that Ms. Melton did not receive a sewing job she was interested in. The sewing position she sought was a temporary job. Ms. Melton did not know the job was temporary. While the job was originally discussed with Ms. Melton, the decision was made to place Clarice Moats, a white woman in the temporary job. Ms. Moats was chosen because (1) her original job had been eliminated; (2) she had more seniority; (3) little training was required because her prior job was similar; and (4) Ms. Melton was currently in a permanent job. The Human Relations Commission found no probable cause in Ms. Melton's complaint and took no further action regarding the complaint. After that date, but before July 16, 1986, Ms. Melton had gotten in a personal dispute with Carolina Myrick. The dispute was outside of work and did not relate in any way to work. Carolina Myrick was a quality control inspector for Russell Corporation and was related to Ms. Melton. On July 16, 1986, Ms. Melton and Ms. Myrick had worked most of the day without incident. However, beginning about 3:55 p.m., Ms. Melton learned that Ms. Myrick had "red tagged" a bundle of items she had sewn. A red tagged bundle is a bundle of sewn items which have not passed the quality control inspection Ms. Myrick performs on the bundle. Ms. Myrick then returns the rejected bundle to the appropriate employee's supervisor. A red tagged bundle can subject an employee to disciplinary action if the employee receives too many red tags. In this instance, Carol Hall was the floor supervisor over Ms. Melton. Ms. Melton went to see Carol Hall about the bundle "all the women on the line were talking about." While walking to Ms. Hall's desk, she passed Ms. Myrick and stated that she was going to whip Ms. Myrick's tail if she got another red tagged bundle. Upon arriving at Ms. Hall's desk, Ms. Hall informed Ms. Melton that it was her bundle that had been tagged. Ms. Melton left Ms. Hall's desk and began to walk out of the building since the quitting bell had rung. Ms. Melton was quite upset about the red tagged bundle. She believed Ms. Myrick was picking on her because of their earlier personal disagreement. Ms. Melton was in front of Ms. Myrick on the way out when she turned and said that she was an old witch and that "the Lord took the wrong one, it should have been you," referring to Ms. Myrick's sister Christine McGriff, who had suddenly and unexpectedly died of encephalitis a few weeks earlier. Ms. Myrick became upset over Ms. Melton's words and complained to the supervisor, Carol Hall. Carol Hall then took Ms. Myrick in to speak with Doris Durden, the floor supervisor. Ms. Durden then went to talk to Claude Nall, the plant manager. All three people believed that Ms. Melton's action was unusually cruel and it was their policy not to allow such behavior in the plant, particularly where a quality control person was involved. All three individuals testified that they had never had such extreme language used in the plant. The next day, Ms. Melton was suspended, pending an investigation. After a full investigation, during which Ms. Melton admitted making the above statements, it was decided to terminate Ms. Melton for gross insubordination towards a fellow employee and willful verbal abuse by making degrading remarks about the employee's job performance and about her family. It was the willful aspect of this misconduct which formed the basis for the discharge. At the time the termination was decided, Mr. Nall, the plant manager, did not even know about Ms. Melton's earlier complaint, because he had been transferred to the Marianna plant sometime after the earlier complaint had occurred. The decision to terminate was reviewed and approved by the personnel office in Alexander City, Alabama. Ms. Melton was formally terminated on July 21, 1986. Ms. Melton instituted the review proceedings the plant had established for employee disciplinary actions taken by plant supervisors. She appeared before a review board consisting of four (4) people from various other corporate offices and plants. The hearing was held on July 29, 1986. At the hearing, Ms. Melton again admitted making the alleged statements. However, even in the face of these admissions, Ms. Melton, at the hearing, maintained she never said she "would whip Ms. Myrick's tail." Respondent presented sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Melton's denial is incorrect. Ms. Melton asserted at the hearing that there were other incidents of a similar nature at the plant for which termination was not the end result. However, she presented no evidence, other than uncorroborated hearsay, that such incidents had in fact occurred. The witnesses called by Respondent flatly denied that any similar incidents had ever occurred which would be comparable to the extreme nature of Ms. Melton's conduct. Other than these hearsay statements by Ms. Melton, there was absolutely no evidence presented that Respondent discriminated against Ms. Melton in retaliation for her earlier filed discrimination action. Ms. Melton had the right to subpoena the persons involved in the allegedly similar conduct to testify to those matters. However, she did not exercise her right to do so.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition against respondent, Russell Corporation, be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4132 Petitioner did not number her paragraphs in her recommended order. I, therefore, have numbered the paragraphs in her recommended order sequentially and utilize those numbers in this appendix. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact contained in paragraph 1, have been adopted, in so far as material, except the finding regarding Ms. Melton having more experience and the finding regarding retaliation. The evidence did not show these two (2) facts. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact in paragraph 2, have been adopted, in so far as material, except the evidence did demonstrate Ms. Melton said that she would whip Ms. Myrick's tail... and had admitted saying such at least two (2) times prior to the hearing. Because of the prior admissions the evidence demonstrated more than just a swearing match between Ms. Myrick and Ms. Melton. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact contained in paragraph 3 have been adopted as to the admissions. The rest of paragraph 3 is immaterial and uncorroborated hearsay Petitioner's proposed finding of fact contained in paragraph 4 are immaterial and evidence demonstrated admissions by Petitioner. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbers 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 have been adopted, in substance, in so far as material. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 2 was not shown by the evidence. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 3 have been adopted, in substance, except the last sentence in paragraph 3, which was not shown by the evidence. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 5 have been adopted, in substance, except evidence showed Ms. Melton's initial statement to Ms. Myrick was on her way back to supervisor's desk and not outside work area. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbers 7, 8, 16 and 28 are immaterial. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 12 have been adopted, in substance, except for leaving work area. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 14 is immaterial, except as facts relate to one of Ms. Melton's admissions. Respondent's proposed finding of fact number 15 is immaterial, except as facts relate to one of Ms. Melton's admissions. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbers 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Melton Star Route Box 98 Gordon, Alabama 36343 Carol Sue Nelson, Esquire CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH 1015 First National Southern Natural Building Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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ROSE YOUNGS vs TOUCAN`S RESTAURANT, 03-002457 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jul. 03, 2003 Number: 03-002457 Latest Update: Sep. 23, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 16, 2001.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Toucan's Restaurant, as a cocktail waitress. The record is unclear as to when she began her employment there. Her last day on the job was March 18, 2000. The record is not entirely clear as to the exact legal entity that owned Toucan's Restaurant (the restaurant). However, Mary Ann Pistilli was an apparent officer of the corporation which owned the restaurant and acted in the capacity of manager. There is no evidence in the record showing that Mary Ann Pistilli's husband, Craig Pistilli, was an owner or manager of the restaurant. However, he was sometimes at the restaurant. The extent or frequency of his presence at the restaurant is also unclear. According to Rene Brewer, a bartender at the restaurant, Mr. Pistilli "wasn't there a lot." While present at the restaurant, Mr. Pistilli would sometimes give direction to employees on certain issues. For example, he directed Ms. Brewer as to the amount of liquor she put in a customer's drink. It was Ms. Brewer's understanding that Mrs. Pistilli knew that Mr. Pistilli would sometimes direct employees regarding such employment tasks. However, Mrs. Pistilli did not testify as to her knowledge of Mr. Pistilli's actions of giving any direction to employees, and, therefore, the extent of her actual knowledge of Mr. Pistilli's actions regarding directing employees on employment matters was not established. On Friday nights, Karaoke entertainment was offered at the restaurant. During a certain song, Petitioner would perform a dance. Petitioner was not asked to perform this dance by her employer and did so voluntarily. Mrs. Pistilli was opposed to Petitioner dancing in this manner. Petitioner would stand on a chair near the Karaoke machine with her back to the patrons, let down her hair, and unbutton her shirt giving the appearance she was undressing. However, she wore a t-shirt under the shirt she unbuttoned. When she turned to face the patrons, it became clear that she wore the t-shirt underneath the shirt she unbuttoned. Then she would dance around the restaurant and its bar area and patrons would give her money for dancing. The money was given to her by both male and female patrons in various ways. For example, when a male patron would put money in the side of his mouth, she would take it with her teeth. Petitioner's dancing was not sexual in nature but was more in the nature of a fun part of the Karaoke. On March 18, 2000, Petitioner was in the bar area of the restaurant. Petitioner's description of what happened is as follows: I was at work, and Craig had come in with one of his friends. It was his friend's birthday. And the bar wasn't very busy at all. I had two customers that just came in. And he was just being loud, and he came over and asked me if I'd get up on the bar and dance, and I told him no. He set me up--at the end of the bar is like a long, and then there's a little like an L, and that part lifts up. The lift-up part was down, and he set me up on top of that. And I told him, you know, to leave me alone. And when I got down, he slapped me on the rear. And then he backed up, he unbuttoned his shirt, he unzipped his pants and said I ought to go in the dining room and dance around like this….Craig's friend was sitting at the bar, and Craig came over and said I got twenty dollars in my pocket, I want you to dance, it's Chris' birthday, and I told him no. And so a few minutes later he came over, he grabbed my arms, he shoved me against-- lifted my arms over my head, shoved me in the corner of the bar. I told him he was hurting me . . . . After the third time of me telling him that he was hurting me, he finally let go and he backed up and he went 00-00-00. And I was very upset. I went into the kitchen, I was crying very hard . . . . While Petitioner's description of what happened contains hearsay statements purportedly made by Mr. Pistilli, Petitioner's testimony describing Mr. Pistilli's actions and her reaction to the incident is deemed to be credible. Petitioner sustained physical injuries as a result of this incident with Mr. Pistilli.2/ Ms. Brewer was behind the bar on Petitioner's last day of employment. She saw Mr. Pistilli come into the restaurant with a friend. Mr. Pistilli appeared to her to be intoxicated. She saw Mr. Pistilli hug Petitioner in front of the bar. She did not see any other contact between Mr. Pistilli and Petitioner on that day. However, she had seen Petitioner hug Mr. Pistilli on other occasions. She also saw Petitioner hug restaurant patrons on other occasions. Teresa Woods was another bartender who worked at the restaurant. On Petitioner's last day of employment, Ms. Woods briefly saw and spoke to Petitioner in the kitchen of the restaurant. Petitioner was upset and told Ms. Woods that her neck and back were hurt. Petitioner then left the building and did not say anything further to Ms. Woods. Petitioner did not return to work. Mrs. Pistilli was not at the restaurant on March 18, 2000. She did not see any of the events that occurred between Petitioner and her husband. She had heard about the allegation that her husband hugged Petitioner but was unaware of the other allegations: Q: When did you first become aware that Mrs. Youngs had filed a workers' compensation claim? A: I can't recall exactly when it was. They did call me. I can't tell you exactly how long a period of time-- Q: Can you give us your best approximation of how close it was in time to--if you assume that the date-- A: A month. A month maybe. I don't know. It was well after. * * * Q: And did the comp carrier tell you the nature of the injury or how Mrs. Youngs contends that it happened? A: Yes, And he came in and I spoke with him, and they said that they'd be back in touch, and never heard from them. Q: And what did they tell you or what was their understanding of what Mrs. Youngs was contending happened after that conversation? A: All I know is my husband hugging her. This stuff I heard today is all new stuff about zippering pants. I never heard of any of that. I never heard any of that. While Mrs. Pistilli was generally aware of an ongoing workers' compensation claim by Petitioner against the restaurant, she was unaware of the most egregious allegations made regarding her husband until well after the fact. While she understood that her husband hugged Petitioner on March 18, 2000, her knowledge of that was gained approximately one month after the fact when finding out about a workers' compensation claim. Moreover, she had knowledge that during Petitioner's period of employment at the restaurant, Petitioner occasionally hugged her husband and some restaurant patrons. No competent evidence was presented that Mrs. Pistilli knew or should have known that Mr. Pistilli engaged in the behavior described by Petitioner that took place on March 18, 2000. Petitioner acknowledged that other than the incident on March 18, 2000, Mr. Pistilli did not make any references to Petitioner about her body during her employment at the restaurant.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S __ BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2003.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.1090.803
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SHARON MORAND vs. NATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., 86-003521 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003521 Latest Update: May 19, 1987

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes by terminating Petitioner's employment because of her marital status.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Sharon Morand was hired by National Industries, Inc. on July 14, 1985, to work as an assembly line person in the manufacture of doors. Petitioner resided approximately six blocks from the National Industries plant site. At the time of the hiring of Petitioner, her husband, Robert Morand, was also employed by National. Robert Morand was employed in an area of the plant different from the one in which his wife worked. Robert Morand had been employed by National for some time prior to March, 1985. As a part of his employee benefits Robert Morand received a group insurance protection plan with an effective date of May 1, 1985. This plan indicated Mr. Morand's wife to be Sharon Morand. National employees made allegations of sexual harassment, rudeness, obscene language, threats, and potential violence against Robert Morand. To dispel the trouble National perceived Robert Morand to be, Respondent elected to offer Robert Morand either voluntary layoff or involuntary termination. It was hoped that the elimination of Robert Morand from the plant would ease employee concerns. On or about August 23, 1985, Robert Morand voluntarily agreed to be laid off from his employment at National. At the time of his layoff, Robert Morand was advised not to return to the plant property. While it is uncertain how many times Mr. Morand returned, it is clear he returned to the site on at least one occasion between August 23 and August 26, 1985. On Monday, August 26, 1985, Officer Suess of the Ocala Police Department was summoned to the National plant site and was requested to be present during the termination of an employee. Officer Suess was requested to be there because National expected some unspecified problem as a result of the termination. The Petitioner was brought to the office in the presence of Officer Suess, Lee Rector, and Jack Knight. Petitioner was advised by Rector that her employment was being terminated due to her relationship with Robert Morand. On August 26, 1985, Sharon Morand was a probationary employee of the company who had performed all of her job duties in an acceptable manner. At the time of her termination National knew that Sharon Morand was the wife of Robert Morand. National elected to terminate Petitioner to eliminate the likelihood that Robert Morand would be on or near company property. At the time of Petitioner's termination she was earning $4.05 per hour and working a 40 hour week. Subsequent to her termination, Petitioner was employed by Norell Services, Inc. While with Norell, she earned a total in wages, tips and other compensation of $113.20. During 1986, Petitioner was employed by UpJohn Health Care Services, Inc. and earned a total in wages, tips and other compensation of $585.20. Petitioner has been employed by Sears, Roebuck and Company since April 14, 1986, and has earned a total in wages, tips and other compensation in the amount of $3,316.41. The total amount of unemployment compensation Petitioner received subsequent to her termination from National was $414.00. Petitioner was unable to work due to illness or family illness during the period since termination from National for a period of nine (9) weeks. Since Petitioner had not worked for National for three months prior to her termination, she was not eligible for any of the group insurance benefits afforded a permanent employee of the company. Consequently, lost benefits have not been addressed in these findings.

Florida Laws (5) 120.68585.20760.01760.02760.10
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THOMAS C. HUGHES vs MICHAEL'S STORE, INC., 17-001336 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Mar. 01, 2017 Number: 17-001336 Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Michael’s Store, Inc. (“Michael’s”), committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner (“Mr. Hughes”) by discharging him.

Findings Of Fact Michael’s operates a store in Clermont, Florida. During all times relevant to the instant case, Amy Wsol was the manager of the Clermont store. Mr. Hughes was the Clermont store’s operations manager and subordinate to Ms. Wsol. Elisa Griffin was a cashier at the Clermont store. In April of 2015,1/ Ms. Griffin notified Michael’s human resources department that Ms. Wsol was not enforcing or not complying with Michael’s procedures regarding e-mail captures and other cashier practices.2/ Michael’s conducted an investigation during the summer of 2015 and concluded in August or September of 2015 that no action would be taken. Michael’s notified all employees interviewed during the course of the investigation that there would be no retaliation against Ms. Griffin. Nevertheless, immediately after the investigation’s conclusion, Ms. Wsol mandated that the other managers in the Clermont store document all of their interactions with Ms. Griffin and place those documents (“the allegedly retaliatory documents”) in Ms. Griffin’s personnel file. Mr. Hughes had the additional task of using an in-store surveillance system to monitor Ms. Griffin during her shifts. Mr. Hughes felt that Ms. Wsol’s orders regarding the monitoring of Ms. Griffin were contrary to Michael’s directive that Ms. Griffin was to suffer no retaliation because of the investigation. Mr. Hughes also felt that Ms. Wsol’s orders were immoral and unethical. The stress associated with complying with those orders had an adverse effect on Mr. Hughes’ health. Mr. Hughes is an insulin dependent diabetic, and his blood sugars became unmanageable. At one point, his endocrinologist advised him that hospitalization may be necessary if his condition did not improve. In December of 2015 or January of 2016, Mr. Hughes applied for an assistant manager position at a store that Michael’s was about to open in Orlando, Florida. While the position in the Orlando store would have been a lateral move for Mr. Hughes, it appealed to him because the Orlando position would be salaried, and Mr. Hughes was an hourly employee at the Clermont store. In January of 2016, Mr. Hughes reported Ms. Wsol’s orders regarding the allegedly retaliatory documents to Michael’s Human Resources Department. At this time, he also made copies of the documents so that he would have evidence that Ms. Wsol violated the directive that Ms. Griffin was to suffer no retaliation. Mr. Hughes did not have any authorization from Michael’s to copy the contents of Ms. Griffin’s personnel file. In February of 2016, Mr. Hughes met at the Clermont store with Dennis Bailey, one of Michael’s district managers, regarding Mr. Hughes’ allegations about Ms. Wsol. Mr. Bailey told Mr. Hughes that his allegations were being investigated. As for his request to be transferred, Mr. Bailey told Mr. Hughes that he would not be forced by a complaint to transfer Mr. Hughes to a different location. While Mr. Bailey did not completely rule out the possibility of transfer, he stated that Mr. Hughes would probably have to accept a demotion and a loss of benefits. In March of 2016, Ms. Wsol went on medical leave, and Mr. Hughes ran the Clermont store until April Skidmore arrived in April of 2016 to serve as acting store manager. At the end of May 2016, Ms. Griffin asked Mr. Hughes how she could obtain a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes told her that she could request a copy from Ms. Skidmore or from Michael’s Human Resources Department. On June 14, 2016, Mr. Hughes received a call from Leah Frye, who worked in the Human Resources Department. Ms. Frye asked Mr. Hughes if Ms. Griffin had approached him about obtaining a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes responded affirmatively and relayed that he had instructed Ms. Griffin on how she could obtain a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Hughes did not tell Ms. Frye that he had made a copy of the allegedly retaliatory documents in January of 2016. After Ms. Griffin received a copy of her personnel file, she stated to Mr. Hughes on June 15 or 16, 2016, that certain documents were missing. Ms. Griffin made that statement because she had expected to see documentation of compliments paid to her by customers. Ms. Griffin was also expecting to see documentation regarding the investigation of Ms. Wsol. However, none of those documents were in her personnel file. Mr. Hughes then examined Ms. Griffin’s personnel file, and discovered that the allegedly retaliatory documents were not there. Mr. Hughes then told Ms. Griffin about the missing documents and stated that he would transmit a copy of them to her upon receiving a request from her attorney. Mr. Hughes received such a request on June 17, 2016. At that point, Mr. Hughes elected to make a copy of his own personnel file because he was worried that its contents would be altered in an effort to retaliate against him. Accordingly, Mr. Hughes asked Mary Pearman, one of the other assistant managers at the Clermont store, to watch him copy his personnel file and sign a statement indicating that the documents he copied represented its complete contents. On June 29, 2016, Mr. Hughes received a call from Chad Romoser, the Director of Michael’s Human Resources Department. Mr. Romoser asked Mr. Hughes if he had made a copy of his personnel file and if he had asked a coworker to witness him doing so. Mr. Hughes responded affirmatively and stated that he copied the contents of his personnel file because the allegedly retaliatory documents had disappeared from Ms. Griffin’s file. Mr. Hughes then asked Mr. Romoser why the allegedly retaliatory documents were not transmitted to Ms. Griffin after she requested a copy of her personnel file. Mr. Romoser responded by stating that Michael’s Human Resources Department had no knowledge of the documents. Mr. Hughes then inquired about the status of the investigation pertaining to his report about the allegedly retaliatory documents. Mr. Romoser stated that after Mr. Bailey had met with Mr. Hughes in February of 2016, Mr. Bailey reported that Mr. Hughes was a “whiny individual” attempting to force Michael’s to give him a promotion. On June 29, 2016, Michael’s initiated an investigation of Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes was suspended with pay and required to relinquish his keys to the Clermont store. On July 6, 2016, Michael’s discharged Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes learned through a telephone conversation with Mr. Romoser that he had been discharged from Michael’s for intimidating Ms. Pearman3/ and for lying to the Human Resources Department. Mr. Hughes did not learn until filing his Charge of Discrimination with the Commission that Michael’s also discharged him for releasing personal and confidential information. Mr. Hughes was a credible witness. The undersigned finds that his testimony reflected his best recollection of the events pertinent to this case. However and as discussed below, even if all of Mr. Hughes’ testimony were to be accepted as true, Mr. Hughes has failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Thomas C. Hughes’ Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice.5/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2017.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
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MICHAEL D. METZ vs H. B. TUTEN LOGGING, INC., 02-002524 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Perry, Florida Jun. 21, 2002 Number: 02-002524 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2003

The Issue Does the Florida Commission on Human Relations have jurisdiction of this matter? Does the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction of this matter? Did Respondent discharge Petitioner for refusal to be tested for drugs or drug use?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for Respondent for about 60-days prior to May 4, 2001, as a tractor-trailer driver. Respondent is in the logging business. On May 2, 2001, Petitioner injured his back while on the job. He did not report this to his supervisor who was operating equipment deep in the woods. Petitioner told a co-worker, who was moving between the supervisor's location and Petitioner's location, to tell the supervisor he had hurt himself. On the evening of May 2, 2001, Petitioner was in severe pain. He called his employer the morning of May 3, 2001, and reported that he could not come to work. The company's business manager, Charlotte Lanier, advised him not to go to the hospital emergency room and made an appointment at 1:30 p.m. that afternoon for him to see a Chiropractor, Dr. Hutchens, who had treated other employees. Petitioner agreed to see Dr. Hutchens. Charlotte Lanier called the insurance company and found out that Petitioner had to be referred by a medical doctor to see Dr. Hutchens and had to have a drug test. Petitioner saw the Chiropractor, Dr. Hutchens, and was X-rayed, and given message therapy. He was in contact with Mr. Tuten's office. Ms. Lanier had been getting drug tests done by Dr. Hutchens; however, she called the doctor and found out that he was not testing. Ms. Lanier then had to make an appointment with another doctor for the test. She called Dr. Hidalgo and arranged for Petitioner to go there; but that doctor's office was getting ready to close early on Friday afternoon. Ms. Lanier then called Dr. Hutchens office again for Petitioner, but she did not connect with him. Petitioner finally got word from Ms. Lanier to go to Dr. Hildago's office for a drug test. However, when he got there, he was told he needed a referral from the office of the medical doctor, Dr. Mohammed. Petitioner went to Dr. Mohammed's office for the referral, but when he got there, Dr. Mohammed's office would not write a referral without an examination. By the time Petitioner had finished with Dr. Mohammed's examination, Dr. Hidalgo's office was closed. At this point, Petitioner went to his employer's office to pick up his pay check. What happened there is subject to controversy and conflicting testimony. Petitioner testified that when he got to the office of the employer company, Mr. Tuten and several of his friends were standing in the workshop/garage. Petitioner told Mr. Tuten that he was unable to see the last doctor because of Dr. Mohammed's insistence that he be examined prior to writing a referral. Mr. Tuten and others testified that Petitioner came in and was very agitated. Petitioner told Mr. Tuten that because of the pain he had had the previous night, he had taken drugs belonging to a friend and smoked a marijuana cigarette. Mr. Tuten fired Petitioner for violating the company's drug policy.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that if the Commission determines the Division does have jurisdiction, or that, for reasons of judicial economy it wishes to adopt the finding and conclusions herein as its own, the Commission enter its order denying relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. B. Tuten H. B. Tuten Logging, Inc. 3870 US Highway 90, South Perry, Florida 32348 Michael D. Metz 2946 Dorman Road Perry, Florida 32348 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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DAVE HARVEY vs MEAL ON WHEELS ETC., INC., 15-003941 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 15, 2015 Number: 15-003941 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc., on account of his race and disability, as a result of Respondent's maintenance of a hostile work environment, or as retaliation to his opposition to an unlawful employment practice, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact As its name implies, Respondent is a non-profit charitable organization engaged in the business of providing free meals, transportation services, and related assistance to senior citizens in the Sanford, Florida, area. Petitioner is a 64-year-old black male of Jamaican origin. He worked as a driver for Respondent from August 13, 2012, until October 23, 2014, when he was discharged for violating a company policy. As a condition of employment as a driver, Petitioner was required to submit a medical fitness form regarding his current medical condition. In the form filed on July 30, 2012, he denied having any medical issues except non-insulin dependent diabetes, which is controlled by diet. See Ex. 21. An updated form was submitted on August 25, 2014, reflecting no change in his medical condition. Id. No other medical records were submitted to substantiate any other medical condition. When he interviewed for the position, Petitioner did not tell Respondent that he needed an accommodation for his diabetes or that he had any work restrictions. As such, management never considered Petitioner to have a disability. Petitioner also provided a post-employment medical questionnaire on August 8, 2012, which stated that he had diabetes but that it was controlled by diet. Id. No other injuries, illnesses, or health abnormalities were reported. As a driver, Petitioner was expected to adhere to Respondent's safety rules. To ensure compliance with the rules, shortly after being hired, Petitioner was required to read, and then sign a statement acknowledging that he understood, the organization's General Policies. See Ex. 1, p. 4. He was also required to acknowledge receipt of its Employee Handbook containing the Safety Policies and Procedures. See Ex. 3. In addition, Respondent's Transportation Coordinator, Mark Taylor, conducted periodic refresher training sessions with all drivers, including Respondent. One of Respondent's most significant safety rules, if not the most significant, is a rule that requires drivers to provide door-to-door service. It provides in relevant part that "[u]pon arrival at a client's home, [a driver must] go to [the] door and knock. If the client needs help, you will be right there to assist." Ex. 1, p. 1, ¶ 6. This rule is intended to promote client safety and to ensure, to the extent possible, that Respondent will not face legal exposure because, for example, a client falls down while walking unassisted to or from the vehicle. To comply with the above rule, drivers are required to get out of the van, go to the front door, knock, and then assist the client walking to the van. This is because the clients are elderly, some use walkers, and they need assistance from the driver while getting to and from the van. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner signed another statement acknowledging that he understood the policy, he agreed to follow it at all times, and he understood that "[t]ermination will result in not following this important safety rule." Ex. 7. As a corollary to the above safety rule, drivers are instructed that they should never honk the vehicle's horn when they arrive at a client's home. Instead, they should get out of the vehicle and go to the front door of the residence. Petitioner was specifically told about the no-honking rule at two safety meetings. The incident underlying Petitioner's discharge occurred on the morning of October 23, 2014. Petitioner was told to pick up Angelo Rosario and transport him to an appointment. The client is in his 80s, suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and uses a walker. He resides in a mobile home-type community with his daughter; and the driveway in front of the mobile home is unpaved with exposed roots making it easy to trip or fall. Although Mr. Rosario was not one of his regular clients, Petitioner had picked him up at least 12 times in the previous 30 days and was familiar with his condition and the area in which he lived. The testimony describing the incident is conflicting. However, the accepted testimony shows that Petitioner arrived at the Rosario residence while Petitioner was on a personal cell phone call to his sister. When he finished the call, Petitioner blew the horn to alert the client that he was there. The honking was loud enough to annoy Rosario's neighbor who approached Petitioner's vehicle complaining about the noise. Suspecting that the neighbor's concern might cause a problem, Petitioner immediately telephoned Mr. Taylor and told him that he had blown the horn and anticipated that someone might be calling him with a complaint. Mr. Taylor told Petitioner that honking the horn was inappropriate, it violated an important safety rule, and he could not just sit in the van waiting for the client. Petitioner admits that during the telephone call, he shouted at Mr. Taylor and claimed he was unaware of the rule. After Mr. Taylor instructed Petitioner to go to the front door to pick up the client, Petitioner exited the vehicle and escorted the client to the van. After speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor immediately telephoned the client's daughter to get her version of events. Mr. Taylor learned that honking had recently occurred rather frequently at the client's home, and he believed that Petitioner was the responsible driver, as Petitioner had transported the client at least 12 times during the previous 30 days. Mr. Taylor immediately reported the incident to the Executive Director, Sherry Fincher, who evaluated the matter, and then decided to terminate Petitioner for violating the organization's most important safety rule. Notwithstanding Petitioner's claim to the contrary, it is the Executive Director alone, and not Mr. Taylor, who makes the decision to terminate an employee. A memorandum was prepared by Ms. Fincher that day indicating that Petitioner was being terminated "due to not following agency policies regarding door-to-door pick up of clients[,] . . . one of the most important policies to ensure the safety of all clients." Ex. 20. This was consistent with Respondent's policy, and one that Petitioner clearly understood. Petitioner's race and diabetic condition played no role in the decision. Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination was filed one month later. Prior to that time, there is no competent evidence that Petitioner had ever complained to Taylor or Fincher about any discriminatory practices by the organization. Since the inception of this case, Petitioner has contended that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. At hearing, however, he acknowledged that his diabetic condition does not affect any major life activity. To support his disability discrimination claim, he testified that on an undisclosed date in 2014, he asked Mr. Taylor if he could eat meals or snacks at designated times because of his diabetic condition but was told he could not. The accepted testimony shows, however, that Mr. Taylor advised him that he could eat whenever necessary, as lunch and break hours are not set in stone. To avoid a drop in his blood sugar, Petitioner was told that he was free to eat or drink something at any time, or even bring a bag lunch with him while driving his routes. Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner had a disability, which he does not, the contention that a disability formed the basis for an unlawful employment practice must fail. Petitioner also contended that Belinda Stum, a white female lead driver, was treated differently than he and was given more "leeway" when she violated a rule. However, the only evidence concerning a rule violation by Ms. Stum involved a different rule. After a client accidentally slipped while being assisted out of the van, Ms. Stum immediately reported the incident to Mr. Taylor and then filed a completed incident report. Other than Ms. Stum, Petitioner was unable to specifically identify any other similarly-situated employees outside his protected class (or even ones within his own class) who were allegedly treated differently than he. Although a client testified at hearing that on several occasions she had observed Ms. Stum sitting in her van when picking up clients, even if this is true, the client admitted that she never reported this to anyone at Respondent's organization so that the alleged violation could be investigated and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate. Petitioner also contends he was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his race and disability. He claimed that Mr. Taylor, a white male, called him "boy," required him to answer "yes sir," and would gesture a "cut throat" sign towards him, threatening him to keep his mouth shut. This assertion was not corroborated by any other evidence, and Mr. Taylor denied the charge. The testimony of Mr. Taylor is accepted as being more credible on this issue. Assuming arguendo that he had a disability, there is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner was subjected to a hostile working environment due to his diabetic condition. Finally, there is no evidence regarding the charge that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Indeed, Petitioner submitted no credible proof that he complained to management regarding any discriminatory practices that precipitated the alleged retaliation, other than "standing up for his rights" on the day he was terminated, and Taylor and Fincher credibly testified that they were unaware of any such complaints. Complaints made at hearing that he is still owed money and was never paid for training are not germane to this dispute. Petitioner is now working part-time as a driver for a retirement center in the Sanford area. He says he is also employed as a substitute teacher for the Seminole County School Board. Both jobs equate to full-time employment. According to evaluations and testimony at hearing, Petitioner was considered a "good worker," "likeable," and someone who "did a pretty good job." While his evaluations showed he met expectations, his last evaluation noted that he needed improvement in following orders. Except for being "written up" one time for being late to work, Petitioner had no other disciplinary action.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2015.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68760.10760.11
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