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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs JERRY GREEN, 96-005314 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 08, 1996 Number: 96-005314 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Jerry Green, acted as a yacht and ship broker as defined in Section 326.022(1), Florida Statutes, without being licensed by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, as alleged in a Notice to Show Cause entered September 3, 1996.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Division is charged with the responsibility for carrying out the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers’ Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Respondent is Jerry Green. Mr. Green is not licensed by the Division pursuant to the Act as a yacht and ship broker. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Green was employed at Rick’s on the River (hereinafter referred to as “Rick’s”), in Tampa, Florida. Mr. Green was compensated for his employment at Rick’s by being provided room and board. During 1996 the Division received an anonymous complaint including a copy of an advertisement from a October 13, 1995 edition of a publication known as the “West Florida Boat Trader”. The advertisement indicated it was from Rick’s and included several photographs of boats purportedly for sale at Rick’s. Among other boats listed on the advertisement was the following: 1975 42’POST Full Tuna Tower, Twin Turbo Charge Detroit 671 Out of Town Owner DESPARATE to Sell, $84,500 A similar advertisement was placed in the November 3, 1995 edition of the “West Florida Boat Trader”. Although Mr. Green denied at hearing that he had placed the advertisement, he admitted in his Response to Notice to Show Cause that “between October of 1995 and May of 1996 he advertised a 1975 42’ Post named the ‘Dunn Deal’ . . . .” He also admitted in the Response “that he advertised the 42’ Post at the request of the owner, Richard Dame, who is a personal friend, for the purpose of testing whether there was a market for such a boat and to determine the approximate value of the boat.” It is, therefore, concluded that Mr. Green was responsible for the advertisement. On May 31, 1996, James Courchaine, an investigator for the Division, went to Rick’s. After arriving at Rick’s, Mr. Courchaine met Mr. Green. Mr. Green identified himself as the “dockmaster”. Mr. Courchaine asked about the 42-foot Post and Mr. Green told him that he knew all about the Post and could talk to Mr. Courchaine about it. Mr. Green told Mr. Courchaine the Post belonged to a friend and that he, Mr. Green, could sell it. Mr. Green also indicated the Post was in Key West and that he wasn’t sure if the owner would be bringing it back. Mr. Green also told Mr. Courchaine that the owner was originally asking $84,500.00 for the Post but, that since it had been on the market so long without any interest, he might take between $79,000.00 and $81,000.00 for it. Mr. Courchaine asked Mr. Green whether the amount Mr. Green quoted included Mr. Green’s commission. Mr. Green told Mr. Courchaine that “he would be taken care of.” Mr. Green wasn’t employed as the dock master at Rick’s. Mr. Green lived on the premises and looked after the property, including boats located there. In return, he received room and meals. At the time of the formal hearing Mr. Green testified that he was not employed and that his only source of funds is Social Security. He also testified, however, that he still lives at Rick’s. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Green has any source of funds other than Social Security. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Green offered to sell any vessel regulated under the Act except as described in this Recommended Order.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ordering Jerry Green to cease and desists from acting as an unlicensed broker in violation of the Act and that he pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00 within thirty days of the date this matter becomes final.DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne V. Estrella Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Paul T. Marks, Esquire Post Office Box 4048 Tampa, Florida 33677 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business & Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Robert H. Elizey, Jr., Director Department of Business & Professional Regulation Florida Land Sales, Condominium & Mobil Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 326.002326.004326.006
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. RICHARD C. LIGHTNER, III, 87-003668 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003668 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard C. Lightner, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0408120. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker, with a home address of 1221 Duval Street, Key West, Florida 32040. Respondent, or a representative on his behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's Real Estate brokers license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Raymond O. Bodiford, Esquire 515 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE Petitioner vs. Case No. 0154510 DOAH No. 87-3668 RICHARD C. LIGHTNER III Respondent /

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. LINDA BURR, 85-001010 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001010 Latest Update: Dec. 05, 1986

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was secretary to Kingsland, Inc., Ferndale Estates, Inc., and Fairwood villas, Inc., all corporations controlled by C. Thomas Petersen. Kingsland, Inc., is engaged in land development. Ferndale Estates and Fairwood Villas are corporations holding title to real estate for investment purposes. Respondent was not a director in any of these corporations. By mortgage dated June 30, 1981 (Exhibit 1), Kingsland, Inc. mortgaged certain registered properties to secure a loan from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company without approval from Petitioner. Respondent's signature appears on that conveyance as corporate secretary attesting to the signature of Petersen as president of Kingsland, Inc. Similarly, Respondent attested to Petersen's signature on mortgage dated July 9, 1981 (Exhibit 2), on modification of mortgage dated February 8, 1982 (Exhibit 4), on mortgage dated May 12, 1982 (Exhibit 7), on mortgage dated May 20, 1982 (Exhibit 8), on deed to Winokur dated May 27, 1981 (Exhibit 9), and on deeds to nine separate third party purchases (Exhibit 10). On mortgage from Kingsland, Inc. to City National Bank of Miami (Exhibit 3), encumbering lots previously sold to third party purchasers and on mortgage dated March 5, 1982 (Exhibit 6), Respondent's signature does not appear. By mortgage dated March 9, 1982 (Exhibit 5), Respondent signed as a witness. All of those mortgages and deeds in Exhibits 1-10 involve the encumbering registered land without prior approval from Petitioner, or conveying to the mortgagee or buyer lands- previously sold to third party purchasers on contract for deed or unrecorded deed. Proceeds from those mortgages and sales went into bank accounts controlled by Petersen. At the time of these transactions, Respondent was handling the accounts of the so called Pan American Investors, a group of individuals who had purchased the land installment sales contracts from Kingsland, Inc., and was entitled to the monthly payments with interest being paid by the purchasers of lots in these subdivisions. During this period, Respondent exchanged letters with several of these investors and knew many of these lots were paid for or nearly so and that interim deeds were being issued to the original purchasers. No credible evidence was presented regarding who picked the lots to be included in those transactions involved in Exhibits 1-10, or that Respondent had any responsibility for or control in those selections. In 1977, when Suncoast Highlands Corporation owned by Petersen and Leonard Lenhardt acquired the stock of Kingsland, Inc. and Illinois Corporation from the Oehlerking family, Kingsland owned registered subdivisions in Marion County, Florida, known as Ocala Waterway Estates, Section 27 and 34, Kingsland Country Estates, Units 1 and 22, Kingsland Country Estates, Whispering Pines and Forest Glen. On the date of acquisition of Kingsland, Section 34 had 19 unsold lots, Section 27 had 51 unsold lots, and Unit 22 had 43 unsold lots. The most accurate office record of the transactions involving lands sold by Kingsland were the Alpha listings (Exhibits 11 and 12), a computer printout showing the names of purchasers alphabetically by subdivision. This listing contained numerous errors. No evidence was presented that Respondent was made aware, before attesting to Petersen's signature, that the mortgages and deeds in Exhibits 1 through 10 were being prepared or that she was given any opportunity to have input into the specific lots to be included in those instruments. She received no recognizable benefit from the proceeds received by Kingsland from those mortgages and deeds.

Florida Laws (1) 692.01
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MOTION COMPUTING vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 07-002667 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 14, 2007 Number: 07-002667 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2017

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business and domicile in Texas, has an obligation to collect and remit Florida sales taxes on sales it made to a Massachusetts-domiciled corporation, in view of the facts found below.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Delaware Corporation whose principal place of business is in Austin, Texas. The Petitioner designs, develops, and markets portable computer equipment, chiefly portable "tablet" personal computers with related "peripherals," which it sells and delivers in multiple states, including Florida. It sells these products to "re-sellers" and distributors, as well as to "end users." The Petitioner, by the Department's admission in Exhibit "A" (audit) does not maintain a physical presence in the State of Florida. It does employ one sales person for business in Florida, but maintains no warehouse or other facilities, vehicles nor other indicia of physical locations or operation in the state of Florida. The Petitioner is registered as a "dealer" with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue under the Florida Sales and Use Tax Law. The Petitioner does engage in some sales to Florida "end customers" or to re-sale purchasers in Florida. These transactions, however, are not at issue in this case. The dispute solely relates to transactions between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer System, Inc., of Marlboro, Massachusetts. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. The Respondent conducted an audit of the books and records of the Petitioner, resulting in this proceeding, for the audit period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2006. That audit was conducted by Xena Francis, and revealed, according to the Department's position, a purported sales tax payment deficiency on the part of the Petitioner in the above-referenced amounts. The Department, upon completion of the audit, issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, thus advising the Petitioner of the amount of the tax penalty and interest it was assessing as a result of the audit. The transactions which the Department maintained were questionable, in terms of taxes not being paid with regard thereto, were those where the Petitioner sold computer products to entities who did not produce to the Petitioner a certificate of exemption from collection of sales tax by Florida on that transaction, and where the product was shipped by the Petitioner into Florida by common carrier. The Department essentially takes the position that, since the Petitioner has a state sales and use tax "dealer certificate," that it is responsible to prove any transactions as being exempt from the relevant taxing provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the above rule chapter. The Department apparently presumes as a part of this position that the fact that the product in question was shipped to ultimate users in Florida by common carrier from the Petitioner's place of business outside the state that such were Florida sales tax transactions. It thus contends that the burden is on the Petitioner to prove that they are exempt from such tax and collection. After it was advised of the audit findings and the basis for the assessment, the Petitioner provided to the Department certain exemption certificates for a number of the entities and transactions for which shipment had not been made into Florida. The Department accepted these and the assessment was adjusted downward to reflect the exempt status of those transactions, pursuant to the further information provided the Department by the Petitioner. The other disputed transactions for which no exemption certificate was provided by the Petitioner, were deemed by the auditor to be taxable. In essence, the auditor took the position, as does the Department, that every person making sales into the State of Florida is subject to sales and use tax unless specifically exempt and that it is incumbent upon the selling dealer (which it maintains is the Petitioner) to establish the exempt status of the transaction, at the time of sale, with a supporting re-sale certificate or some documentation to support the transactions, exempt status.1/ The sales which are the subject of this dispute are exclusively those between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer Systems, Inc. Advantec is a Massachusetts Incorporated and domiciled corporation. It apparently does not possess a Florida "re-sale certificate" or "dealer certificate." The Petitioner sold various computers and related products, as shown by the invoices in evidence, to Advantec. The invoices and the testimony adduced by the Petitioner established that those sales were between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Massachusetts corporation. Advantec, in turn, sold the products or some of them to Florida customers. Those customers did not pay the Petitioner for the sales, but paid Advantec. Advantec directed that delivery from the Petitioner be made not to Advantec itself, but to its Florida-end customer via common carrier from the Petitioner's out-of-state location or from its overseas supplier. In any event, delivery was made from outside Florida to the Florida Advantec customers by common carrier. The Petitioner billed no Florida customer and had no relationship with any Florida customer of Advantec. Instead it invoiced and billed Advantec for the price of the products involved on a "net 30-day" basis. Advantec would then pay the Petitioner for the amount invoiced by the Petitioner to Advantec. As to the Advantec sales at issue, there was no nexus, substantial or otherwise, between the Petitioner and Advantec's customers in Florida, except that the product was "drop shipped" from the Petitioner's relevant location out of the State of Florida to the Florida customer by common carrier, not by any vehicle owned, leased, or operated by any person or entity affiliated with the Petitioner. In fact, the deliveries in question were made by Federal Express as a drop shipment. Advantec's principal business activity is the re-sale and distribution of computers and related products. It has no presence in Florida and is not a registered dealer in Florida. When the Petitioner made the sales to Advantec Computer Systems, as shown by the invoices and testimony in evidence, it billed Advantec for the sales and did not collect sales tax. While the Petitioner has in its possession Advantec's Massachusetts-issued tax-exempt certificate, the Petitioner does not have a Florida tax-exempt certificate on-file for Advantec, because Advantec is not registered in Florida, and the sale by the Petitioner to Advantec is a Massachusetts sale with no Florida nexus. The Petitioner offered three Technical Assistance Advisements (TAA) into evidence, which it obtained from the Department in support of the fact that the transactions in question are not taxable. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4 in evidence.) These exhibits were admitted on a limited basis over the Department's objection as being possibly material to a determination as to the weight and credibility of the Department's evidence in this case, but not as being legally binding or constituting legal precedent, which last quality is precluded by Section 213.22(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Additionally, the Petitioner offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which was an e-mail received from a representative of the Department, in response to an inquiry by the Petitioner. This was admitted over hearsay objection as a party statement offered by the opposing party.2/ In that exchange between the Petitioner and the Department, the Petitioner, as shown by testimony and the exhibit, related the facts involved in the sales to Advantec. The Department's response indicated that, if indeed, the buyer and seller were both located outside the State of Florida and the goods when purchased were outside the State of Florida, then the sale is not a Florida sale, between the out-of-state buyer and the out- of-state seller (the Petitioner). If the goods were then delivered by common carrier to the out-of-state buyer's ultimate customers in Florida, from the Petitioner's out-of-state location, then the transaction between the Petitioner and the out-of-state buyer is not subject to the Florida sales tax law and, in essence, is non-jurisdictional, not as a "Florida nexus sale." In summary, the Petitioner sold the goods in question to Advantec and invoiced Advantec at its Massachusetts domicile and address on "net 30-day" term. No Florida customer, person, or entity was billed for the sales in question, nor was any payment collected from any individual or business entity located in the State of Florida. Once the sale was consummated between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Petitioner merely "dropped shipped," by common carrier, the goods purchased by Advantec to Advantec's ultimate customer located in the State of Florida.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue, vacating and dismissing the assessment of the subject sales tax and interest to the Petitioner, Motion Computing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2007.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57212.02212.06212.18212.21213.22 Florida Administrative Code (2) 12A-1.03812A-1.060
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ALAN SHERMAN, 77-001798 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001798 Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1978

Findings Of Fact From January 23, 1976, to March 31, 1976, Sherman was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR, a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During that period of time, FAR was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters" or "qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners whose names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owner for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing fee. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. The listings here advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. There was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to the allegations of misrepresentations by Sherman. FREC introduced no evidence to show that Sherman represented that the property could be sold for several times the purchase price, that it would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase United States property listed with the company. There was no evidence introduced to show that Sherman either made the representations or knew them to be false. There was no evidence introduced to show that Sherman knew that no bona fide effort would be made to sell the property listed. There was no evidence of any nature introduced by FREC to show that Sherman was dishonest or untruthful. No evidence was introduced to establish the amended allegation that Sherman was guilty of a violation of a duty imposed by law.

Florida Laws (1) 501.204
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GOLD COAST RANCHES, INC. vs. FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 78-000125 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000125 Latest Update: May 08, 1978

The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption under Section 478.221(3), Florida Statutes, from the provisions of the Florida Uniform Land Sales Practices Law, Chapter 478, Florida Statutes. By stipulation dated February 14, 1978, the parties agreed that the Division of Administrative Hearings take jurisdiction in the matter under Section 120.57(1), in the absence of disputed issues of material fact. The parties also agreed to waive the notice requirements under Chapter 120. The parties stipulated to the facts of the case (Exhibit 4), and to the admission in evidence of Petitioner's application and supporting documents (Composite Exhibit 1), a letter of Respondent acknowledging receipt of the Claim of Exemption dated July 15, 1977, (Exhibit 2), and Respondent's notice to Petitioner, dated September 19, 1977, that the Claim of Exemption was rejected (Exhibit 3). Petitioner submitted an answer filed by the Respondent as Defendant in civil judicial proceedings based on its denial of the exemption claim in the Circuit Court of Leon County, Case No. 77-220, which was rejected by the Hearing Officer as irrelevant to the proceedings in view of the accepted Stipulation of Facts. (Appellate Exhibit 1)

Findings Of Fact The Stipulation of Facts is as follows: On July 14, 1977, Petitioner submitted to the Respondent and the Director thereto, a claim of exemption as required by Florida Statute 478.221(3); and claiming compliance with the provisions thereunder. Pursuant to the discretionary authority as provided for in Section 478.221(3), Florida Statutes, the Director of the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, by letter dated September 19, 1977, informed Petitioner that its claim for exemption was denied. Said letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as exhibit 1. The substance of said letter indicated that the Director, pursuant to his discretionary authority, provided for in Section 478.221(3), Florida Statutes, was not satisfied "that all necessary conditions of the exemption are present, i.e., in particular that the property is usable for the purpose for which it is offered." Said denial was based upon a letter received from the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Martin, State of Florida, dated August 8, 1977, and objecting to any exemption on the grounds that: "Gold Coast Ranches has not applied to Martin County for plat approval as required in our subdivision regulations," and; "Gold Coast Ranches, Inc., has not applied for road opening permits as required by Martin County ordinances." Said letter from the County of Martin, also indicated that since the parcels created by Gold Coast Ranches, Inc., were smaller than 20 acres, they were subject to the subdivision regulations of the County. A copy of said August 8, 1977, letter from the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, for the County of Martin, State of Florida, is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 2. The roads proposed by Gold Coast Ranches, Inc., are to be of a private nature. The subdivision in question is not to be platted, but lots are to be sold pursuant to a metes and bounds description in excess of 5 acres.

Recommendation That Respondent deny Petitioner's request for exemption pursuant to Section 478.221(3), Florida Statutes. Done and Entered this 16th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire 725 South Bronough 210 Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 L. M. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 14577 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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