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FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 92-001009RP (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 29, 1992 Number: 92-001009RP Latest Update: Sep. 15, 1994

The Issue As presented in the petition to determine the invalidity of a proposed rule filed on February 14, 1992, and as refined in the parties' joint stipulation filed at hearing on September 14, 1992, the issue presented for disposition is the validity of proposed amendments to rules 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C.

Findings Of Fact The following facts are based in their entirety on the parties' joint stipulation presented at hearing on September 14, 1992: This is a Section 120.54(4), F.S., rule challenge proceeding initiated by the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., Petitioner, to challenge the validity of proposed amendments to Rules 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C., as proposed by the State of Florida Department of Revenue, Respondent. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action. The Petitioner is the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., "FMHA". The FMHA is a not-for-profit corporation organized to do business in the State of Florida. The FMHA is located at 115 North Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The agency affected by this proceeding is the Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue, whose address is Post Office Box 3000, Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3000. The proposed rules at issue in this proceeding are proposed Rule 12D- 6.001(3) and proposed rule 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C., as published in Volume 18, Number 4 of the Florida Administrative Weekly, January 24, 1992. The challenged provisions of these rules provide as follows: 12D-6.001(3) - "Permanently affixed." A mobile home shall be considered "permanently affixed" if it is tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities, and if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land to which it is affixed. 12D-6.002(1) This rule subsection shall apply if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on which the mobile home is permanently affixed and the mobile home has a current sticker affixed, regardless of the series. (d) This rule subsection shall apply to mobile home parks operating a sales office in which a mobile home is being offered for sale where the dealer/developer/owner owns the mobile home and the land to which it is permanently affixed as follows: The dealer/developer/owner must pay real property taxes even if the mobile home has been issued a dealer license plate. A mobile home discussed in this subsection shall not be considered tangible personal property or mobile home inventory. The proposed rules were promulgated by the Department of Revenue to give effect to the statutory change to Section 193.075, F.S., as set forth in Committee Substitute to Senate Bill 1578 which provides as follows: 193.075 Mobile Homes -- A mobile home shall be taxed as real property if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on which the mobile home is permanently affixed. A mobile home shall be considered permanently affixed if it is tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities. A mobile home that is taxed as real property shall be issued an "RP" series sticker as provided in Section 320.0815. A mobile home that is not taxed as real property shall have a current license plate properly affixed as provided in Section 320.08(11). Any such mobile home without a current license plate properly affixed shall be presumed to be tangible personal property. The Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., is a trade association representing the interests of approximately 1300 mobile home parks, dealerships, manufacturers and related mobile home service firms who conduct business in the State of Florida. One of the primary purposes of the FMHA is to act on behalf of its members before the various governmental entities of the state, including the Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue. The subject matter of the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding is within the general scope of interest and activity of the FMHA. The relief requested in this action is of the type appropriate for FMHA to obtain on behalf of its members. The proposed rules and economic impact statement were promulgated by the Department of Revenue in accordance with the requirements of Section 120.54, F.S. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners who are substantially affected by the proposed rules at issue herein are engaged in the business of selling mobile homes and offer mobile homes for sale to the public. A number of these homes are tied down in accordance with all applicable local, state and federal requirements and connected to the normal and usual utilities so that they can be displayed as fully functioning "model" homes prior to the time they are sold. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners who display fully functional mobile homes for sale to the public maintain they have no intention of permanently affixing the homes to their real property. The homes are maintained in this manner for the purposes of safety and display only, with the full intention that they be removed from the realty subsequent to the sale. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA will be substantially affected by the proposed rules, because their business activities are subject to the rule provisions challenged herein and because it is FMHA's position that the proposed rules will directly impact the continued ability of FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners to display fully functioning model homes held for sale to the public on their real property without being subject to ad valorem tax liability. FMHA members who own and operate mobile home parks, mobile home dealerships and mobile home manufacturing enterprises are subject to the rulemaking authority of the Respondent, Department of Revenue. A substantial number of FMHA members are engaged in the process of manufacturing mobile homes. Mobile home manufacturers commonly display one or more completed mobile home units which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities at model home centers located on their manufacturing premises. The homes are held for sale to mobile home dealers or to the general public. The homes are tied down and connected to utilities for purposes of safety and display. The attachment of the homes to the property is not intended by the manufacturer to be permanent. When the homes are sold, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported off the manufacturer's property. The removal process does not cause damage to the home or the real property. A substantial number of FMHA members operate retail sales lots, where new and used mobile homes are held for sale and displayed for sale to the public. These homes are owned by the retail dealers. Mobile home dealers typically display one or more mobile homes which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities located on the dealer's sales lots. The homes are held for sale to mobile home park owners or the general public. The homes are tied down and connected to utilities for purposes of safety and display. The attachment of the homes to the property is not intended by the dealer to be permanent. When the homes are sold, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported off the dealer's property. The removal process does not cause damage to the home or the real property. A substantial number of FMHA members own and operate rental mobile home parks. In rental mobile home parks, a tenant places his own mobile home upon land owned by the park owner commonly referred to as a park "developer", and leases the land. A substantial number of FMHA members who own mobile home parks also hold dealer licenses, and operate a mobile home sales business within the park. Mobile home park owners or developers typically display one or more model homes which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities. The homes are held for sale to the public. When the units are sold to a purchaser, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported from the model home area to a designated lot within the mobile home park. This process does not result in damage to the mobile home or the real property. At the time of sale, the purchaser of the mobile home enters into a land lease with the mobile home park owner. At his option, the purchaser may choose to terminate the lease and remove the mobile home from the mobile home park. In some instances, FMHA members, who own mobile home parks and operate a sales business within the park, lease both land and mobile homes to tenants as part of a lease option agreement, where the park owner retains ownership of the home and land until the home purchase option is exercised. If the tenant fails to exercise the option or defaults under the agreement, the park owner may sell the home to another purchaser. That purchaser may either remove the mobile home from the lot, or enter into a new land lease with the park owner. Under proposed Rules 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., mobile homes owned by FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners determined to be permanently affixed to real property, as defined by Section 193.075, F.S., and owned by the manufacturers, dealers and park owners will be declared real property, and taxed accordingly. Under the proposed rules the assessment date is January 1 of any given year, and a mobile home permanently affixed to real property owned by FMHA member manufacturers, dealers, or mobile home park owners on January 1 will be taxed as real property. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners determined to own mobile homes permanently affixed to their realty will have their real property tax increased by the assessed valuation of the mobile homes, without regard to their intended use or disposition of the homes.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.54120.57120.68193.075213.06320.08320.0815 Florida Administrative Code (3) 12D-6.00112D-6.00212D-6.003
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs PARK BRITTLE AND PHYLLIS BRITTLE, T/A BRIARWOOD PROPERTIES, 92-002961 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 14, 1992 Number: 92-002961 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 1992

The Issue This case concerns a Notice to Show Cause served by Petitioner on Respondents, by which Petitioner orders Respondents to cease and desist their activities, to pay statutory fees, and to be assessed penalties. The activities in question are associated with the alleged need for Respondents to pay annual fees for mobile home lots rented within an alleged mobile home park operated by Respondents from the years 1984 through 1991. See, Section 723.007, Florida Statutes. Based upon the alleged nonpayment of the annual fees, Petitioner seeks to impose a civil penalty in accordance with Section 723.006(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact In 1978, Park T. Brittle purchased property in Leon County, Florida, which had been foreclosed on by Barnett Bank. This property had been originally developed by Miles Salgret. Prior to the purchase by Park T. Brittle, some lots had been sold by Mr. Salgret, approximately four in number. The property in question is known as Briarwood Estates. The Briarwood Estates is for use by mobile home owners who either own or rent lots on this property. Subsequent to his purchase, Park T. Brittle had the property surveyed by Tom Howard, a surveyor. Through this survey, a plat was prepared. The plat was submitted to the Leon County Property Appraiser. Subsequent to that time, beginning in 1980, the lots within Briarwood Estates have been individually assessed by the Property Appraiser for tax purposes. That is to say that the tax assessment is made on the individual lot owners. Park T. Brittle has sold 29 or 30 lots during his ownership. The property that is described in the plat is property in which the individual lot owners own to the center line of the roads which adjoin the lots. Respondents provide water and street lights as amenities within Briarwood Estates. Respondents are billed for these utilities and, in turn, charge individual lot owners for the amenities. In addition to the mobile home lots which have been sold, beginning with 1984 when the Florida Mobile Home Act was passed, the relevant time frame in this inquiry, Respondents have rented 10 or more mobile home lots on the property known as Briarwood Estates. These lots were rented to residential mobile home owners. More specifically, Respondents have continually collected monthly rents for mobile home lots on the property from 16 residential mobile home owners. All 16 of these mobile homes, during the period of 1984 through 1991, were mobile homes which were at least 8 feet by 35 feet in dimension. None of these 16 mobile homes are owned by Respondents. The 16 lots are not for purposes of rental spaces for RVs. In view of an attempt to institute a rental increase for the mobile home lots which Respondents rented at Briarwood Estates, a complaint was made to Petitioner concerning Respondents' intention to increase the rental fees. Respondents deferred to the requirements set forth by Petitioner concerning rent increases for those lots rented to the residential mobile home owners. Respondents complied notwithstanding Respondents' claimed uncertainty concerning the necessity to follow the guidelines and requirements established by Petitioner for adopting rent increases for lots rented to residential mobile home owners at Briarwood Estates. The uncertainty asserted by Respondents concerned the question of whether the 16 lots for which Respondents receive rents are part of a mobile home park, as defined in Section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. Respondent, Park T. Brittle, testified at page 17 in the hearing transcript: "I attempted to follow those guidelines, not because I felt obligated, but if indeed later on it was determined that I was operating a mobile home park, I wanted to be sure that I was clear on that part of it." This refers to the increases in lot rental fees. Respondents do not concede that they are operating a mobile home park as it pertains to the payment of annual fees for each of the 16 lots in the amount of $1.00 in 1984 and $3.00 from 1985 through 1991, together with a 10% late fee charge for each year and each lot if the fees were not paid prior to December 31st of the year in question. Consequently, the fees for the 16 lots in the years 1984 through 1991 have not been paid. The amount due for the annual lot fees and penalties is $387.20. In addition to the amount assessed for annual fees for the lots and penalties for late payment, historically, Petitioner has assessed a $500.00 fine per year for noncompliance with the requirement to pay annual lot fees. Respondents do not believe that they are operating a mobile home park, rather it is their assertion that they are operating a mobile home subdivision. Respondents have cooperated with the Petitioner in the investigation concerning the payment of annual fees for lot rentals which was occasioned by inquiries by Park Brittle as well as a complaint by a tenant in one of the sixteen lots in question over increases in the monthly mobile home lot rental fees.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that final order be entered which requires Respondents to pay $387.20 in annual fees and penalties for the period 1984-1991, and assesses a civil penalty in the amount of $500. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2961 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to facts found. Respondents' Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 7 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Harper Field, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 George Carswell, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Monticello, Florida 32344 Henry M. Solares, Director Department of Business Regulation, Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007

Florida Laws (9) 120.57120.68723.002723.003723.007723.035723.038723.055723.058
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs WILDER CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, T/A PLEASANT LIVING MOBILE HOME PARK, 90-005933 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 20, 1990 Number: 90-005933 Latest Update: Mar. 20, 1991

Findings Of Fact Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park (Pleasant Living) is an established park with 245 lots in Riverview, Florida. It has been in existence for a number of years, and has had at least three different owners, according to the records and testimony presented at hearing. One witness who testified at hearing recalls moving into the park between 1974 and 1975. Since at least 1981, Pleasant Living has had written leases with each of its tenants. For purposes of this proceeding there are two different paragraphs in the lease that are important: (1) Paragraph 5 which limits annual rent adjustments to fifteen percent of the existing rental amount. (2) Paragraph 6 which requires the tenant to pay as additional rent its proportionate share of any increases in real estate taxes, utility assessments, or any other governmental costs or taxes if such taxes or costs increase during the term of this lease. In 1981, published park rules and regulations made it clear to park residents that lot rent includes water, sewer and trash collections. On June 4, 1984, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, which is also known as "The Florida Mobile Home Act", was enacted. The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility to enforce the statutes involving landlord/tenant relationships in mobile home parks in which homes are owned by the tenants and are affixed to lots owned by the landlord. Pleasant Living is a park which falls in the category of parks regulated by these statutes. Once Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, became law, park owners were required to file a prospectus or offering circular with the Division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement with tenants. The Division was to review the prospectus and decide if it meets the requirements of the act. If the prospectus did not meet the requirements, the park owner was to be notified of the deficiencies. Prospectus number 2900243P was prepared by the owner of Pleasant Living in order to comply with the act. It was filed with the Division in November 1984. As part of the prospectus review process, the park owner was required to complete a Park Owner Filing Statement. The owner notified the Division that two hundred and twenty-two mobile home lots would receive the prospectus being filed. The lot designations and the names of the two hundred and twenty-two tenants in the park on December 18, 1984, were given to the Division. In a separate listing, the names and lot designations of the two hundred and eight tenants residing in the park on June 4, 1984, were also provided. Copies of the two different rental agreements to be offered with the prospectus were also filed. One was going to be used for resales, the other would be used for new sales. The lease that applies to resales is the same lease used since 1981. The lease that applies to new sales contains the same wording as the other lease concerning the payment of additional rent for proportionate shares of any increases in real estate taxes, utility assessments, or any other governmental costs or taxes during the term of this lease. Again, this tenant obligation was found in paragraph 6 of the new agreement. Paragraph 5 provided that rent increases would not exceed an average of ten percent annually. The prospectus filed by Pleasant Living went through the review process within the Division, and after some revision, it was determined that the document met the requirements of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The prospectus was officially approved on April 26, 1986. The approved prospectus advised tenants that they would receive at least ninety days notice in advance of an increase in rent. Only the new rental agreement originally designated as the one that applies to new sales was referenced in the prospectus. It was emphasized that all lots are governed by this rental agreement, which provides for rental increases not to exceed an average of ten percent annually. The payment of pass through charges by the tenant was also mentioned in the approved prospectus. Tenants were referred to the rental agreement, and were informed that the tenant will be responsible for payment of all costs charged to the park owner as a result of any action by state and local government, or public/private utilities. Tenants were further advised, as follows: The charges may be assessed more often than annually. The costs charged to the Park Owner will be assessed to the tenant on a pro rata basis. Any such increases shall be shared equally by the tenants of all leased lots in the mobile home park. The amount of an increase in pass-through charges shall be limited to the increased costs charged to the Park Owner and maintenance and administrative costs as permitted by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. As to pass-through charges, the Park Owner cannot with any degree of accuracy disclose the potential financial obligation which the tenant will be responsible for paying. The rent may only be increased as is stated in the above Rental Agreement. The only other increased (sic) to rent will be per the increases that result from pass-through charges created by any governmental (sic) or utility as explained above. Tenancies under the 1981 lease form were still in effect, and the tenants could rely on the representations set forth in them. However, the landlord voluntarily waived his right to any maximum average annual rent increase that exceeded ten percent annually. Pursuant to these leases, which were obligations of contract that could not be impaired by the new laws, these leases were automatically renewed annually. Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the landlord informed all tenants that they would receive ninety days notice before any increases in rent occurred, as opposed to the thirty days set forth in the leases. This was a procedural change in the notice requirements that was governed by the new Florida Mobile Home Act. During the 1986 legislative session, amendments were made to the portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, that set forth the information a prospectus or offering circular is required to contain. More stringent disclosure regarding services, user fees, and lot rental amounts charged by the park owner were required. To reconcile these changes with existing laws, the Legislature allowed previously approved prospectuses delivered to tenants on or before July 1, 1986, to remain valid if the park owner complied with all of the conditions set forth in the newly amended Section 723.011, Florida Statutes [1986 Supp.]. In order to comply with the new disclosure requirements in the laws relating to prospectuses for mobile home parks, the 1986 Pleasant Living park owner filed amendments to the original prospectus with the Division in August of 1986. The amended prospectus was given identification number 2900243P86, and was deemed adequate to meet the 1986 amendments to the statutes on September 26, 1986. When the proposed amendments to the prospectus were examined by the Division on August 28, 1986, the park manager was advised in writing that pursuant to Rule 7D-30.04, Florida Administrative Code, the approved amendments must be delivered to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements. The two rental agreements used by the park remained the same after the amended prospectus became the park's disclosure document for tenants who came to the park on or after July 2, 1986. Respondent Wilder purchased Pleasant Living on June 11, 1987. Prior to the purchase, Respondent's predecessor in interest increased the rent to be paid in the 1987 rental year beginning August 1, 1987 by $7.00 per month for the upcoming one year term. Notice was given of the increase on April 24, 1987, to each affected mobile home owner. Notice was also given to the board of directors of the homeowner's association on April 29, 1987. These notices of rental increase complied with all of the procedural and time requirements imposed on the owner by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The notices specifically informed the recipients that Hillsborough County increased the ad valorem taxes for the park in the 1986 tax year, during the current term of each lease. The increase per unit was $76.22. Under the annual leases, the increase was payable at $6.35 per month for twelve months, effective August 1, 1987. The pass-through of the increased ad valorem taxes to tenants is authorized by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and was disclosed prior to occupancy to tenants who came to the park when the 1981 lease, the 1986 prospectus number 2900243P and the 1986 amended prospectus under number 2900243P86 were in effect. As all tenants who lived in the park prior to 1981 had the same written lease as the 1981 lease, according to the Park Owner Filing Statement completed in December 1984, the landlord had the right to charge additional rent based upon the tax increase. All leases specifically mention the ad valorem taxes, increases in governmental costs, as well as the three utilities: water, sewer and garbage. The notices sent in April 1987 by Respondent Wilder's predecessor in interest, also informed the recipients of the increases in the costs of the following utilities: rubbish pick-up, water charges, and sewer charges. The increase of the cost of rubbish pick-up during 1986 by $20.76 per unit charged by East Bay Sanitation was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of each lease. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $.94 per month, effective August 1, 1987. The increase in the cost for water during 1986 by $18.36 per unit charged by Hillsborough County was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of the annual lease. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $1.53 per month. The increase in the cost of sewer charges during 1986 by $9.48 per unit charged by Wilder corporation was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of the annual leases. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $.79 per month. At the time of the purchase of the park, Respondent Wilder was aware that tenants had been given notice of the additional rent or pass-through charges which increased the payments to the park owner for the use of the lots during the 1987 rental year. The additional rent or pass-through charges were collected by Wilder for the one-year period, as stated in the notices. All of the above listed facts were contained in the agency's files prior to the issuance of the Notice to Show Cause.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended the Division enter a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the alleged violations of Section 723.031(6), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated July 16, 1990. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER,CASE NO. 90-5933 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted for purposes of this proceeding. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. 6. Accepted. See HO #17, #18, #20 - #23. Accepted. Accepted. 9.-21. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #24. Accepted. See HO #25. Rejected. Contrary to fact. The charges related only to increases in charges. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9 and HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2 and HO #12. Accepted. See HO #11 - #12. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David S. Bernstein, Esquire Robbins, Gaynor & Bronstein, P.A. Post Office Box 14034 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (4) 120.57723.006723.011723.031
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ST. WILLIAM LAND COMPANY, INC. vs CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 94-003343VR (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Jun. 15, 1994 Number: 94-003343VR Latest Update: Sep. 09, 1994

Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.

Florida Laws (5) 120.65163.3167163.3215515.37582.31
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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. T. CAYTON ENTERPRISES, INC., 88-001372 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001372 Latest Update: Sep. 13, 1988

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the violations as alleged and, if so, what civil penalty is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. is the owner and operator of Four Oaks Mobile Home Village, a mobile home park located in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida. On or around June 27, 1986, Thomas Cayton, as President of T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. filed a prospectus for the park with Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. The filing statement provided that 49 lots would be offered for rent, and that none of the lots were occupied. The $10.00 per lot filing fee ($490.00) was paid. The filing was rejected as the form was deficient. Between the end of June 1986, and August 26, 1987, the date of the approval letter, eight versions of the prospectus were filed by the park owner and were reviewed by staff of the division. After each review, the owner was sent a letter outlining the deficiencies. At one point, sometime around June 1987, Mr. and Mrs. Cayton travelled to Tallahassee to meet with Selena Einwechter, the Supervisor of the Examination Section in the agency's Bureau of Mobile Homes. The prospectus submittals and correspondence to and from the Bureau comprise 425 pages. Between the filing of the first version of the prospectus and the final approval, approximately 14 months later, twelve lots were rented at Four Oaks Mobile Home Village. The lot numbers and dates of the rentals are: Lot #3 August 1, 1986 Lot #2 August 2, 1986 Lot #44 August 15, 1986 Lot #46 August 30, 1986 Lot #12 November 1, 1986 Lot #4 November 30, 1986 Lot #19 January 15, 1987 Lot #7 March 9, 1987 Lot #6 June 1, 1987 Lot #15 June 1, 1987 Lot #5 June 6, 1987 Lot #9 June 30, 1987 Six of the recitals are evidenced by written leases; the remainder were oral agreements, reflected in the office records of the park. All of the tenants commenced paying rent upon occupancy of the lot and no one was told that the leases were unenforceable. At the beginning of the process, on July 29, 1986, Thomas Cayton was sent a letter from the Bureau of Mobile Homes confirming that his prospectus filing had been received and was being examined. The bottom of the letter includes this statement, clearly displayed: NOTE: Section 723.011, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-31.01, Florida Administrative Code, requires the delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate by the Division prior to entering into enforceable rental agreements or renewal of existing rental agreements. Renewals of existing rental agreements or entering into new rental agreements without delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate will constitute a violation of the Florida Mobile Home Act. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, composite) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Subsection 723.005(d)1., F.S. authorizes the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes to impose a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against a mobile home park owner for each separate violation of Chapter 723, F.S. or regulation promulgated pursuant thereto. The statute and rule allegedly violated by Respondent provides as follows: 723.011 Disclosure prior to rental of a mobile home lot; prospectus, filing, approval.-- (1)(a) In a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots, the park owner shall file a prospectus with the diversion. Prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for a mobile home lot, the park owner shall deliver to the home owner a prospectus approved by the division. This subsection shall not be construed to invalidate those lot rental agreements for which an approved prospectus was required to be delivered and which was delivered on or before July 1, 1986, if the mobile home park owner had: Filed a prospectus with the division prior to entering into the lot rental agreement; Made a good faith effort to correct deficiencies cited by the division by responding within the time limit set by the division, if one was set; and Delivered the approved prospectus to the mobile home owner within 45 days of approval by the division. This paragraph shall not preclude the finding that a lot rental agreement is invalid on other grounds and shall not be construed to limit any rights of a mobile home-owner from seeking any remedies allowed by this chapter, including a determination that the lot rental agreement or any part thereof is unreasonable or unconscionable. (emphasis added) * * * 7D-31.001 Prospectus and Rental Agreement. * * * (13) The park owner shall deliver the prospectus to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements or prior to entering into a new rental agreement. Once a tenant has been given a prospectus, the park owner shall not be required to provide another prospectus but shall provide amendments, as described in Rule 7D-30.004 and this rule. Because Four Oaks' prospectus was not approved until the end of August 1987, the 12 rental agreements entered between August 1, 1986 and June 30, 1987, violated the above provisions. Respondent claims that he thought that as long as the prospectus had been filed, he could enter into rental agreements. This would have been true under the original version of the Florida Mobile Home Act, passed by the Legislature in 1984. The relevant provision of that act is found in Section 720.302(1), F.S. (1984) as follows: Every mobile home park owner of a park which contains 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus or offering circular with the division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida, Part III) This section took effect on January 1, 1985, for parks with more than 100 lots, and on July 1, 1985 for parks with less than 100 lots. (Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida) The current version, reflected in Section 723.011, F.S., cited above, took effect on July 1, 1986. (Chapter 86-162, Laws of Florida) Respondent cannot avail himself of the "grand-father" provision of Section 723.011, since his rental agreements and prospectus approval occurred after July 1st. Further, the explicit language of the note on the July 29, 1986, letter should have put him on notice of the new requirements of the law. There are no guidelines for the imposition of a penalty, other than the $5,000.00 maximum per violation found in Section 723.006(5)(d)1. F.S. No evidence was presented as to prior violations by this Respondent. The extensive file evidences a good faith attempt to comply with a law that was still relatively new.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violation of Section 723.011(1)(a), F.S. (1986), as charged, and that a civil penalty of $100.00 per violation be imposed, for a total of $1,200.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coates, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas Cayton, Registered Agent 2475 Cheney Highway Titusville, Florida 3270 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (3) 120.57720.302723.011
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs SUN COAST INTERNATIONAL, INC., 89-005132 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Flagler Beach, Florida Sep. 19, 1989 Number: 89-005132 Latest Update: Jul. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Michael Weiss is part owner of Suncoast International, Inc. and general manager of the corporation's only business, a trailer park in Flagler County known as Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park. At all pertinent times, the park has leased or offered for lease a total of 44 mobile home lots. In mid-1985, Mr. Weiss received a letter from petitioner Department of Business Regulation (DBR) informing him that park owners were required by law to prepare and distribute prospectuses to mobile home tenants. Efforts to draft a prospectus meeting petitioner's approval began in August of 1985. After several revisions, the petitioner approved a prospectus on June 13, 1986, No. 1802171P, for all lots. Mr. Weiss received written notice of approval, together with a copy of the prospectus to which it pertained, with attachments, on June 26, 1986; and promptly arranged for a copier to produce 50 uncollated copies of everything received from the petitioner, see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, including the cover letter. With the assistance of Mr. and Mrs. Whaley, who worked for the company at the park, he tried to assemble at least 44 complete sets of these materials. In late May of 1986, Mr. Weiss had given all tenants notice by registered mail of his intention to raise rents, effective September 1, 1986. Realizing he needed to distribute prospectuses before any rent increase, he had simultaneously informed tenants that a then current (but unapproved) version of the prospectus was available for inspection. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Hand Delivery As instructed, Ms. Whaley encouraged tenants to pick copies of the prospectus up when they paid their rent. She kept a list of persons to whom she distributed copies of the prospectus. Part of the list survived and has been received in evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One tenant, Mary Oetken, received a copy of the approved prospectus on July 29, 1986. But the prospectus given to Ms. Oetken did not contain rules and regulations, a copy of the lot rental agreement, a lot layout plan, or the number of her lot. Ms. Oetken already had a copy of her lot rental agreement, and park personnel customarily distributed copies of rules and regulations to each tenant, before tenancies began. On August 29, 1986, another tenant, Betty Marinoff, wife of Peter, received a copy of an approved prospectus. Before September 1, 1986, Ms. Whaley hailed Mr. Philip H. Bird, and handed him a copy. Whether these copies of the approved pro-spectus included all attachments the evidence did not disclose. Robert Onusko, who has leased a lot in Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park continuously since August of 1981, has had a copy of the park's rules and regulations since he moved in. As did all other tenants, he paid increased rent beginning September 1, 1986. Although Mr. Onusko himself received no copy of an approved prospectus until January of 1989, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, Angela Whaley gave his daughter Marilyn a copy of the prospectus when Marilyn paid rent in July or August. Taped to Doors Not all tenants were then in residence at the park. About half lived there full time. (T.127) With respect to lots whose lessees were away, Mr. Weiss directed Mr. and Mrs. Whaley to tape copies of the prospectus on trailer doors. "That was common procedure with late payments or whatever . . . " T.112. In mid-August of 1986, Ms. Whaley told him that prospectuses had been distributed for each lot, either by delivery to a tenant or by posting. Clarence Rainey leased a lot from 1977 to 1989 at Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park, where he lived part of the year, returning to Illinois in the summer. Told by a neighbor that they were available, he asked for and received a prospectus in November of 1986. He had not received one earlier. With her husband Roger, Madeline DuJardin resided at Flagler by the Sea from February of 1979 until February of 1988. She did not get a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased on September 1, 1986, from $125.00 to $150.00 per month. Neither Mr. and Mrs. Rainey nor Mr. and Mrs. DuJardin received copies when they were originally distributed. Their trailers were among those to which copies were taped, weeks or months before their return in cooler weather. Charles A. Bond, who shared a trailer with a half-brother, resided at Flagler by the Sea from November 21, 1985, until December 31, 1988. While he lived at the park he never received a prospectus. Brothers surnamed Karcher each leased lots from respondent. Ms. Whaley gave one Mr. Karcher a copy of the approved prospectus, before September 1, 1986. But Richard Karcher, who in those days only spent a week at a time in the park, at intervals of several months, did not receive a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased. Richard Karcher had obtained a preliminary draft of the prospectus, but it differed in important respects from the draft which was eventually approved. In June of 1988, he obtained another copy of the prospectus, the copy, he testified, which he gave DBR's investigator, which also differs in important respects from the approved version. Attached to the copy Mr. Karcher gave DBR's investigator was a set of the park rules and regulations. It is not clear whether Ms. Whaley told Mr. Weiss that she had taped an approved copy to Mr. Richard Karcher's door. (T. 126, 128) Change of Law Effective July 1, 1986, statutory changes altered prospectus requirements. Petitioner mailed advice concerning the new requirements when it sent out annual fee statements to mobile park owners. Mr. Weiss did not personally receive this advice nor any written notice of the nine workshops petitioner conducted in August of 1986 to acquaint park owners with the statutory changes. Although approved a few days earlier, respondent's prospectus did not conform to all the new requirements. In early 1988, Mr. Weiss heard from Gloria Thompson, a DBR employee in its Tampa office, in connection with a complaint filed by Charles Jagde, the same person whose complaint led to the investigation that gave rise to the present proceedings. Ms. Thompson found no violation on the original complaint. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Eventually Mr. Weiss learned that revisions to prospectus No. 1802171 were necessary. On November 18, 1988, he filed another proposed prospectus with petitioner. After its approval on January 30, 1989, park personnel distributed the revised, approved prospectus, No. 1802171P86, to the tenants.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DBR enter an order requiring respondent to send complete copies of currently approved prospectuses by registered mail to all tenants who have not received such copies personally and signed receipts so stating. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 9, 11 through 14 and 16 through 19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the evidence did not establish the contents of the copy of the prospectus the Miranoffs received. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Onusko's adult daughter Marilyn received a copy of the prospectus before the rent increased. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10 pertains to subordinate matters only. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, Mr. Karcher so testified, without contradiction. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 5, 7 through 10, 12 through 19, 21, 22, 24, and 27 through 30 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the prospectus had not been approved at that time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11, she did not personally deliver prospectuses to all tenants. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, the differences were material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23, 25 and 26 are immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Fitzgerald & Sheehan, P.A. The Perkins House, Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Paul Martz, Esquire Martz & Zimmerman 3 Palm Row St. Augustine, FL 32084 Stephen R. MacNamara Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 =================================================================

Florida Laws (10) 120.54120.68723.002723.005723.006723.011723.012723.031723.05983.56
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WESTSIDE RIDGE ADULT MOBILE HOME COMMUNITY vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 96-000273 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Jan. 10, 1996 Number: 96-000273 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 1996

The Issue Did Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community (Westside) violate Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, by having standing water in its mobile home park for more than 48 hours? If so, is this sufficient basis for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) to deny Westside's application for renewal of its mobile home park operating permit?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the deposition testimony and documentary evidence presented by the parties in this case, the following findings of fact are made: Westside Ridge, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, is the owner of Westside Ridge Adult Mobile Home Community. Under Chapter 513, Florida Statutes, the Department, in conjunction with the representative county public health units, such as the Polk County Public Health Unit, is the agency charged with the responsibility of inspecting mobile home parks such as Westside to assure their compliance with public health laws and rules. On August 14, 1995, the Department inspected Westside and found water underneath some of the mobile homes in the park; water covering some of lots in the park; and water ponding in some of the streets in the park. This water had been standing for more than 48 hours. The Department's inspector issued an Inspection Report dated August 14, 1995. This report indicated that the unsatisfactory condition found at the mobile home park was the park drainage. The report stated that all violations of standing water must be corrected within 14 days. Westside received a copy of the Inspection Report from the August 14, 1995, inspection in a timely manner. Sometime around September 10, 1995, Westside retained the services of J. D. Smith Exterminators, Inc. (Smith), a professional pest control service, to treat any standing water in Westside's mobile home park. Westside has not corrected the conditions which affected the drainage in the mobile home park and resulted in the water standing in the park for over 48 hours. The Department contends that the rule requires Westside correct the conditions - either fill in the depressions in the soil or provide proper drainage of the water - which affect the drainage and results in water standing over 48 hours in the mobile home park. Westside contends that the rule does not prohibit water standing over 48 hours where the water is treated and does not contribute to mosquito or fly breeding. By letter dated September 15, 1995, Westside advised the Department that Westside would retain a professional pest control service to prevent any standing water from contributing to mosquito or fly breeding. Westside also requested that the Department advise it if the Department intended to seek enforcement pursuant to the Department's interpretation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Apparently, the request concerning enforcement was made as a result of a telephone conversation between one of the Department's representatives and Westside's counsel on Thursday, September 14, 1995, concerning the Department's interpretation of the rule and what the Department intended to require Westside to correct the alleged violation of the rule. The Department did not advise Westside or its counsel of its intent to pursue enforcement. On or about September 10, 1995, Smith visited Westside mobile home park and found water standing as reported on the August Inspection Report but did not treat the water because Smith did not have the necessary chemical on hand. On or about September 13, 1995, Smith returned to Westside's mobile home park to treat the standing water but, upon arrival, Smith did not find any standing water at the mobile home park that required treatment. Before Westside's current annual mobile home park operating permit expired, Westside timely filed its application with the Department for the renewal of its mobile home park operating permit. The Department issued a Denial Of Application For Mobile Home Park/Recreational Vehicle Park Operating Permit dated November 26, 1995, denying Westside's application for its annual mobile home park operating permit. The basis of the Department's denial was that Westside mobile home park had violated Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code, in that the mobile home park had been found to have standing water in the park in excess of the 48 hour period allowed by the rule. The denial also warned Westside that unless it had requested a hearing, or ceased operating the park, or remit a plan of action to remove all standing water and measures to prevent reoccurrence of the violation that Westside would be cited for operating without a valid permit within 30 days. During the summer of 1995, there was an above-average rainfall in Polk County, Florida which resulted in flooding problems in mobile home parks located throughout Polk County, Florida, including Westside's mobile home park. Based on the testimony of the Department's employees involved with the inspection of mobile home parks, the flooding conditions were the worst seen in Polk County, Florida in 25 years. The is no evidence of how long water had been standing in Westside's mobile home park before the Department's inspection on August 14, 1995, other than it had been standing over 48 hours. There is no evidence of Westside being cited for having water standing in its park for over 48 hours at any time previous to the August 14, 1995, inspection. There is no evidence of any water standing, for any length of time, in Westside's mobile home park, after September 14, 1995. Although the inspection report for January 10, 1996, indicates water standing in drainage ditches along the sides of Westside mobile home park, there is no evidence that these drainage ditches are in fact within the park boundary. The Department did not inspect Westside mobile home park again until January 10, 1996, which was after the issuance of the denial of the permit on November 26, 1995. There were no violations or unsatisfactory conditions, such as drainage, indicated on the Department's January 10, 1996, Inspection Report, notwithstanding that the Department's position is that since Westside has failed to correct the drainage problem which resulted in the standing water it continues to be in violation of Rule 10D-26.085, Florida Administrative Code. Treating standing water with chemicals to prevent mosquito and fly breeding does not solve all of the public health problems that may be associated with water that has been standing for long periods of time. It is the Department's position that water standing in the park for more than 48 hours is a violation of Rule 10D-085, Florida Administrative Code, and, without any other violation, is sufficient to deny the application for the operating permit. Other than the violation for having standing water in the park for over 48 hours and the failure to correct the conditions which resulted in the standing water, the Department concedes that Westside meets all other criteria for granting the application for a mobile home park operating permit.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a mobile home operating permit. However, it is further recommended that the Department monitor the Westside mobile home park so as to determine if conditions presently existing at the park result in water standing in the park in excess of 48 hours under normal rainfall. If water found is to be standing in the park in excess of 48 under normal rainfall, the Department should then move to require Westside to correct the condition. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0273 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 11, 13, 16, 17, 19 through 25, 29, 30, 31 and 33 through 36 are adopted in substance as modified in the Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 12 and 26 through 28 are neither material nor relevant. Proposed findings of fact 14, 15 and 37 through 41 are argument rather than findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact 18 and 32 are not supported by evidence in the record. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 22 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 23 and 24 are argument rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Timothy F. Campbell, Esquire Clark, Comparetto & Campbell, P.A. 4740 Cleveland Heights Boulevard Post Office Box 6559 Lakeland, Florida 33807 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 14 270 Bartow Municipal Airport Bartow, Florida 33830

Florida Laws (4) 120.57513.01513.02513.05
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AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES vs TIMBERGREEN GROUP HOME, HELP IS ON THE WAY, INC., 11-002455 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida May 16, 2011 Number: 11-002455 Latest Update: Apr. 16, 2012

The Issue Whether Respondent's licenses to operate two group homes should be renewed, or whether renewal should be denied for the reasons charged in the administrative complaints issued by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact APD is the state agency charged with licensing and regulating group home facilities. The statewide headquarters, or "central office," is in Tallahassee. Regional offices carry out the licensing and regulatory functions within their designated regions, or "areas," in coordination with the central office. APD Area 14 covers Polk, Hardee, and Highlands Counties. Beginning in 2007 and at all times material to this proceeding, HIOTW has been a provider of various residential and non-residential services to developmentally disabled persons in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida, within APD Area 14. In 2007, HIOTW was licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to provide non-residential homemaker and companion care services. In November 2008, HIOTW became licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate Paces Trail Group Home to provide residential habilitation services to developmentally disabled adults. Shortly thereafter, HIOTW was licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate its second group home, Hampton Group Home. HIOTW was licensed by the APD Area 14 office to operate Timbergreen in May 2009. In February 2010, the APD Area 14 office issued a license to HIOTW to operate its fourth group home in Lakeland--Lake Miriam. The group home license renewal of these two group homes, each with a capacity to serve six adult male residents with developmental disabilities, is at issue in this proceeding. After initial licensure of a group home, the license must be renewed annually. All of HIOTW's group homes successfully have gone through the license renewal process one or more times, except for Lake Miriam, which is seeking its first license renewal. On November 12, 2010, HIOTW submitted an application to the APD Area 14 office to renew its license to operate Lake Miriam. On March 3, 2011, HIOTW submitted an application to renew its license to operate Timbergreen. By letter dated March 25, 2011, Petitioner denied the Lake Miriam license renewal application (March 25 Denial Letter). Petitioner relies on the following charges alleged in the March 25 Denial Letter as the basis for Petitioner's decision: On or about April 14, 2010, an employee of the applicant left two vulnerable adult group home residents alone in a car for at least ten minutes while that employee conducted business inside a bank. One of the adult residents who was left unsupervised in the car had a history of sexually molesting children and other vulnerable adults. The other resident who was left unsupervised in the car was non-verbal. This instance threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents in violation of page A-8 of the Developmental Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook and Rule 65G-2.012(15)(b), F.A.C. On or about September 29, 2010, an employee of the applicant was transporting group home residents when one of the residents left the vehicle without the driver's knowledge. The vulnerable adult resident was later located at a neighborhood store. This instance threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents in violation of page A-8 of the Developmental Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook and Rule 65G- 2.012(15)(b), F.A.C. The March 25 Denial Letter also alleged that HIOTW failed to submit a current approved emergency management plan as a third reason to deny the license renewal application. However, Petitioner abandoned the third charge at the outset of the final hearing. Petitioner sought to support its proposed denial of the Lake Miriam license renewal application solely as a penal measure based on the two alleged incidents quoted above. As such, but for these two alleged incidents, Petitioner acknowledges that Lake Miriam's license renewal application is otherwise entitled to approval. By letter dated April 29, 2011, Petitioner denied the Timbergreen license renewal application (April 29 Denial Letter). The April 29 Denial Letter set forth the same two charges that were alleged in the March 25 Denial Letter as the basis for Petitioner's decision. In other words, the same two incidents were asserted as grounds for denying both the Lake Miriam license renewal application and the Timbergreen license renewal application. But for these two incidents, Timbergreen's license renewal application, like Lake Miriam's application, is otherwise entitled to approval. First Alleged Incident (on or about April 14, 2010) The credible evidence established the following facts relevant to the first charged incident. In early April 2010, an employee of HIOTW's licensed companion care service, Frank Davis, was providing companion care to R.O., a developmentally disabled adult. R.O. was not a resident of any HIOTW group home. Instead, R.O. received only non-residential companion services through HIOTW from its employee Frank Davis. As previously noted, companion care services are licensed and regulated by a different agency, AHCA. R.O. was classified as developmentally disabled due to mild mental retardation and behavioral problems. R.O. had a history of sexually abusing children and vulnerable adults. R.O. also had a known tendency of "telling big whoppers," i.e., he was known to be a habitual liar. R.O. apparently told someone two stories of alleged incidents involving his companion, HIOTW employee Frank Davis. On April 14, 2010, the person to whom R.O. told the stories reported the two alleged incidents to the hotline operated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF), which fields reports of possible abuse or neglect.2/ One story told by R.O., as reported to DCF, was that Mr. Davis had left R.O. alone with Mr. Davis's three-year-old daughter. The other story told by R.O., as reported to DCF, was that Mr. Davis had left R.O. alone in a car with a non-verbal vulnerable adult for a period of time while Mr. Davis went into a bank to conduct some business. If true, these allegations of R.O. allegedly being left alone with a child in one instance and with a non-verbal vulnerable adult in the other instance would be of great concern. Both the child and the non-verbal vulnerable adult with whom R.O. was allegedly left alone would have to be considered at great risk of abuse by R.O., given R.O.'s known history of sexually abusing both children and vulnerable adults. With regard to R.O.'s first story, involving Mr. Davis's three-year-old daughter, a DCF adult protective investigator (API) was able to quickly determine that the allegation was completely baseless. In screening this allegation to determine if a formal investigation was warranted, the API spoke with R.O. and then with Samuel Cooper, one of the owners of HIOTW, on April 15, 2010, the day after the hotline call. Mr. Cooper provided a detailed description of the physical appearance of Frank Davis's daughter. When Mr. Cooper's description of Mr. Davis's daughter was compared to R.O.'s description of the girl with whom he was supposedly left alone, the two descriptions were so vastly different that the API was able to, and did, immediately determine that R.O. had fabricated the story, and the matter was closed without a formal investigation. The same API conducted an investigation of R.O.'s second story that he was left in Mr. Davis's car with a non-verbal vulnerable adult while Mr. Davis went into a bank. However, the API did not mention this story when he spoke with Mr. Cooper, nor did the API inform anyone from HIOTW that he was conducting a formal investigation. In conducting his investigation, the API spoke with R.O., twice with Mr. Davis, and with O.J. Bennett, another owner of HIOTW. HIOTW initially learned of R.O.'s story about the bank trip by a phone call from R.O.'s waiver support coordinator. Mr. Bennett immediately investigated the matter, speaking with Mr. Davis and also with the bank manager who was present and had personally observed the events that day. Mr. Bennett's report from his investigation was that when Mr. Davis drove up to the bank with R.O., he left R.O. in the car only to walk about nine feet from the car to the bank's glass entrance area. Mr. Davis signaled to a bank employee who came to the door. Mr. Davis told the employee he wanted to set up an account to make direct deposits of his paycheck. When Mr. Davis was told he would have to come into the bank and it would take a few minutes, Mr. Davis went back to the car for R.O. and brought him into the bank to wait while Mr. Davis set up the account. R.O. remained in Mr. Davis's sight at all times. Based on Mr. Bennett's report, which he reviewed with Mr. Cooper, HIOTW determined an unusual incident report (UIR) was not required, because there was no reason to suspect neglect of R.O. Several weeks later, when HIOTW learned from an APD employee that DCF was conducting a formal investigation, HIOTW submitted a UIR that set forth the details of Mr. Bennett's investigation and concluded that R.O. had been in Mr. Davis's sight and adequately supervised at all times. The APD Area 14 administrator confirmed in her testimony that if the facts were as Mr. Bennett found them to be in his investigation, there would not have been inadequate supervision, and there would have been no reason to submit a UIR. Of greatest significance with regard to R.O.'s story about the bank incident, the API determined that R.O. had lied about being left with a non-verbal vulnerable adult. Instead, the API found that Mr. Davis drove to a bank with R.O., and no one else, in the car. The DCF investigator's report summarized the differing versions of events told to him by R.O. and by Mr. Davis. R.O.'s version was that Mr. Davis left him in the car for the whole time that he went into the bank. Of course, R.O. also said that he was left with another adult, and that was not true. Therefore, R.O.'s statement to the DCF investigator could not be considered credible or reliable. According to the DCF investigator, Mr. Davis told him that he left R.O. alone in the car to go into the bank, but came back out of the bank to get R.O., who he then brought into the bank to wait while he conducted his business. However, Mr. Davis testified that he only told the DCF investigator that he walked up to the bank while R.O. was in the car. Mr. Davis's version of what happened and what he told the DCF investigator is more credible than the DCF investigator's report of what Mr. Davis told him. Mr. Davis's version was corroborated by the hearsay account of the bank manager, who told Mr. Bennett that Mr. Davis brought R.O. in the bank with him, only having left R.O. alone to walk up to the bank entrance. The bank manager confirmed Mr. Davis's testimony that R.O. was in Mr. Davis's sight at all times. In crediting Mr. Davis's version of events, corroborated by the bank manager, the undersigned finds it significant that Mr. Bennett told the DCF investigator about the bank manager eyewitness, and Mr. Bennett was under the impression that the DCF investigator would follow up by calling the bank manager. But the DCF investigator did not attempt to interview anyone at the bank, despite the fact that persons at the bank would have been the only other eyewitnesses besides Mr. Davis, who had a self-interest in the incident, and R.O., the habitual liar whose other story about Mr. Davis had been proven false. Petitioner did not undertake its own investigation of the facts, either at the time of the incident or at the time it was considering whether to rely on the incident as grounds to, in effect, revoke two of HIOTW's group home licenses. Instead, according to the area administrator for APD Area 14, Petitioner simply relied on the DCF investigation report. Indeed, the area administrator did not even seem to understand the DCF report, because at the hearing, she was adamant in her belief that DCF confirmed the allegation that Mr. Davis left R.O. in a car with a vulnerable non-verbal adult group home resident. The area administrator conveyed her misimpression to the central office in discussions to consider whether to non-renew two HIOTW group home licenses based on this incident. Ultimately at hearing, the area administrator conceded that she was improperly interpreting the DCF report, thinking that the allegation portion of the report contained the actual DCF findings. Even so, she steadfastly (and erroneously) asserted that she did not give any false information to the central office regarding HIOTW.3/ In addition to the misimpression conveyed about the R.O. incident, the area administrator testified that she had an employee convey numerous reports of allegations or suspicions of HIOTW improprieties to the central office in a single packet for the purpose of a decision on whether to renew the two HIOTW group home licenses. The area administrator explained other information about allegations and suspicions were sent in the same package so that the central office could also consider whether to terminate HIOTW's Medicaid waiver provider agreement at the same time. However, she admitted that the whole packet of material was sent for the purpose of review and a decision on whether to non-renew HIOTW's two group home licenses. As such, it would be difficult to ignore the extraneous allegations when making decisions regarding the license renewal applications, "[o]f course, you have all of that in your mind[.]" The actual transmittal package to the central office was not produced, apparently because it was sent by electronic mail, and there were some APD email system problems that got in the way of producing the email transmittal package. Nonetheless, the area administrator's description of what she believes was sent in a single package to the central office was sufficient to paint the picture of a litany of negative missives regarding HIOTW, intended, in part, to support the area administrator's recommendation to deny license renewal.4/ Petitioner did not allege in the administrative complaints and did not prove at the hearing that HIOTW itself was blameworthy for the R.O. incident. The APD Area 14 administrator testified that in recommending non-renewal of the two HIOTW group home licenses, a significant factor that she took into account was that HIOTW failed to promptly submit a UIR to report the R.O. incident. The facts found with respect to the R.O. incident do not demonstrate that a UIR was required. Moreover, HIOTW was not charged, in either administrative complaint, with a violation of its UIR reporting obligations. The DCF incident report concluded with a verified finding of inadequate supervision. The DCF investigator testified that it was his finding that "[p]rimarily, Mr. Davis was responsible for the inadequate supervision" of R.O. When asked whether HIOTW was also responsible as Mr. Davis's employer, the investigator said, "being his employer, and trainer, yes." However, neither the DCF investigator, nor Petitioner, presented any evidence to suggest that HIOTW was negligent in its hiring, training, or supervision of its companion care employees, generally, or Mr. Davis, in particular. Nor was there any evidence that HIOTW failed to appropriately respond to the R.O. incident once it was made aware of the incident. The DCF incident report found that Mr. Davis was an appropriately screened employee with no adverse history. Petitioner presented no evidence to the contrary. Both the DCF investigator and the area administrator for APD Area 14 concluded that HIOTW took appropriate action regarding the R.O. incident, by removing Mr. Davis from serving as R.O.'s companion and by putting Mr. Davis through additional "zero-tolerance" training. Mr. Davis's employment was terminated shortly thereafter for reasons unrelated to the R.O. incident. Although the DCF incident report verified a finding of inadequate supervision, the report concluded that the overall risk associated with the finding was low because of appropriate corrective action taken by HIOTW.5/ The area administrator for APD Area 14 candidly admitted at the final hearing that HIOTW handled the R.O. incident appropriately and took corrective action that was deemed sufficient by APD and alleviated any health and safety concerns. Inexplicably, she continued to support the charges in the two denial letters, which alleged that the R.O. incident "threatened the health, safety, and well being of the applicant's residents," because R.O., with his history of being sexually abusive, had allegedly been left alone with a vulnerable, non-verbal adult group home resident. Since the R.O. incident did not involve any HIOTW group home residents, but rather, involved non-residential services provided under HIOTW's companion care license, one would expect that if licensure disciplinary action was warranted against HIOTW at all for this incident, it would have been initiated by AHCA as the licensing agency for companion care services. No evidence was presented that AHCA took any disciplinary action against HIOTW's companion care license. Instead, the evidence established that HIOTW's companion care license remained in good standing as of the final hearing, more than one and one-half years after the R.O. incident. Notwithstanding APD's knowledge in June 2010 of the DCF report and findings regarding the R.O. incident, APD proceeded to renew annual licenses for the period of October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011, for two other HIOTW group homes--Pace's Trail Group Home and Hampton Group Home. The license certificates state that the facilities comply with the licensure rules of APD. No evidence was presented that APD issued administrative complaints seeking to revoke these group homes' licenses; however, the area administrator made clear that she did not intend to renew any licenses for any HIOTW group homes in the future. Second Alleged Incident (on or about September 29, 2010) The facts regarding the second alleged incident involving HIOTW employee Donyell Goodman, were not disputed. At the time of the incident, Ms. Goodman had been employed by HIOTW for three years, with a very good, unblemished employee record. On the day in question, she was serving as a van driver to transport several HIOTW companion care clients to various sites within the local community. E.K. was one of those clients receiving companion care services that day; E.K. also was a resident of HIOTW's Lake Miriam Group Home. E.K. is developmentally disabled due to his diagnosis of mental retardation. Ms. Goodman stopped to let off one client, and she watched the client walk to the appropriate destination and go inside. She then resumed driving. When she had driven for about five minutes, she glanced in her rear view mirror and realized that E.K. was not there. Ms. Goodman immediately called LaDonna Bennett, the third owner of HIOTW, to report that E.K. must have snuck out of the van at her last stop, and she was going back to find him. Ms. Bennett also headed over to where Ms. Goodman said she had stopped, to assist. When Ms. Goodman returned to the site of her last stop, she found E.K. there, inside the corner store. E.K. was fine and returned to the van without incident. E.K. apparently admitted to sneaking out of the van, saying he just wanted some fresh air. The entire incident spanned about ten minutes. Ms. Bennett and Ms. Goodman both immediately prepared and submitted UIRs to report the incident. Ms. Goodman received a written reprimand in her HIOTW personnel file and was suspended for several days. When she resumed work, she underwent additional training, was removed from the van driver position, and reassigned to the "third shift" with no direct interaction with residents. The UIR reports triggered a DCF investigation. The AIP who conducted the investigation confirmed the facts that were set forth in the two UIRs. The AIP's investigation included an assessment of E.K. at the Lake Miriam Group Home where E.K. was a resident. The DCF incident report concluded as follows: Victim Safety Factors Implications: No implications for the [victim's] safety. [Perpetrator] Factors Implications: Based on the informaiton [sic] rec'd, API has determined the [adult perpetrator] to pose no threat to the [victim]. No implication [sic] for the [victim's] safety. Facility Factors Implications: Based on the [victim] to the grouphome [sic], API has determined the [victim] to not be at any risk. The API found that the overall safety assessment was low; however, based on the UIRs and interviews with Ms. Goodman and Ms. Bennett, the incident report concluded with a verified finding of inadequate supervision. The API who conducted the investigation testified at hearing and confirmed that the inadequate supervision finding was directed to Ms. Goodman. When asked if HIOTW was also responsible because it was Ms. Goodman's employer, the API said he did not know and could not answer that question. Petitioner did not allege in the administrative complaints, and did not prove at the hearing, that HIOTW itself was blameworthy for the E.K. incident. Neither the DCF investigator, nor Petitioner, offered any evidence that HIOTW had negligently hired, trained, or supervised its employees, including Ms. Goodman in particular. Both the DCF investigator and the APD Area 14 area administrator agreed that HIOTW acted appropriately in response to the E.K. incident to alleviate any concerns about health and safety, by imposing appropriate discipline against Ms. Goodman for her lapse that caused the incident, and by taking steps to ensure no reoccurrence of the incident. In 2011, well after APD had knowledge of the DCF reports and findings on both the R.O. and E.K. incidents, APD issued a series of temporary or conditional licenses to both Lake Miriam and Timbergreen during the license renewal process to give HIOTW time to respond to certain identified omissions in the renewal applications, such as dental records, fire inspection reports, and the like. The temporary and conditional license certificates issued in February and March 2011 state on their face that the facilities comply with the licensure rules of APD. According to the APD Area 14 administrator, each of the DCF reports on the R.O. and E.K. incidents resulted in "a verified abuse finding." The area administrator testified that any DCF report resulting in a verified abuse finding is classified as a Class I offense, which is the most serious class of offenses and is sufficient, without more, to give APD legal authority to deny licensure or renewal of a license to a licensed applicant named in the report. Yet, despite the verified finding regarding the R.O. incident, Petitioner did not deny license renewal applications for other HIOTW group homes. Despite the verified findings in both the R.O. and E.K. incidents, Petitioner issued temporary and conditional licenses to Timbergreen and Lake Miriam during the license renewal process. Thus, Petitioner has not exercised its discretion consistently in dealing with HIOTW. Petitioner has not exercised its discretion consistently in contexts far more egregious than the two incidents charged here. For example, Petitioner acknowledged that a recent incident of abuse and neglect, resulting in the death of a group home resident, did not trigger action by Petitioner to take away all of the group home licenses held by the licensee. Instead, Petitioner only acted to suspend the license of the specific group home where the deceased resident had resided. Petitioner did not attribute this very serious incident to all facilities licensed by the same entity. It would be unreasonable for APD to automatically, without discretion, equate all verified findings--whether of abuse or neglect, whether deemed low risk or high risk, whether risk of death or imminent bodily injury was found or not found. A protracted period of abuse or neglect that actually causes death of a group home resident is on a different plane, in terms of seriousness, from a brief employee lapse in which an individual is not caught when he sneaks away, but is recovered without harm or incident ten minutes later. No explanation was offered by Petitioner as to why, in the more serious situation where a verified incident resulted in death, action was not taken to revoke all group home licenses held by the licensee, whereas here, two incidents verified as low risk situations by DCF (one of which was not proven at the hearing), would cause Petitioner to act more harshly.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, approving Respondent's applications to renew its annual licenses to operate Lake Miriam Group Home and Timbergreen Group Home and issuing standard licenses for one-year terms to those facilities. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2012.

Florida Laws (7) 120.56939.201393.0673393.13415.103415.1034415.104
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