The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's (DOT) intended decision to award contract T2442 for the Intelligent Transportation System improvements (Project) and other incidental construction on State Road 9A, in Duval County, to American Lighting & Signalization, Inc. (ALS), is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, the agency's rules or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made:1/ The contract being protested is T2442 for the Intelligent Transportation System improvements and other incidental construction for State Road 9A, in Duval County. The Department advertised the bid solicitation notice for the Project on July 27, 2012. The bid solicitation notice included a list of all of the pay items and estimated quantities for the project. DOT also posted all of the pay items online in two formats. One format was a downloadable file that could be used in software, and the other was similar to an Excel spreadsheet file. These formats could be used to formulate a bid. Changes to pay items are issued in an Addendum, and while two addendums were issued for this project, neither affected the pay items for the project. For several years, DOT has mandated that prospective bidders use an automated, online bidding process, by which prospective bidders request bid documents and submit their bids using the DOT's website. The letting date established as the deadline for submission of bids via electronic submission was September 26, 2012, and was set forth in the bid solicitation notice. In order to be considered, all bids were due by 10:30 a.m. on that day. Letting is the term used to indicate the date that the bids are due. The bid solicitation notice included a requirement that bidders for the Project attend a mandatory pre-bid meeting to be held on August 20, 2012. Hinson Electrical is a licensed electrical contracting company based in Jacksonville, Florida. The company has completed "hundreds" of projects for the State of Florida, including DOT, and is pre-qualified to bid on jobs with DOT. The mandatory pre-bid meeting was held on August 20, 2012, as scheduled. G. Christopher Ginn, Project Manager for Hinson Electrical, attended the pre-bid meeting, signed his name, and identified the company he represented (Hinson Electrical) on the sign-in sheet. Section 337.168(2), Florida Statutes, provides: (2) A document revealing the identity of persons who have requested or obtained bid packages, plans, or specifications pertaining to any project to be let by the department is confidential and exempt from the provisions of section 119.07(1) for the period which begins two working days prior to the deadline for obtaining bid packages, plans, or specifications and ends with the letting of the bid. As a business strategy, Hinson Electrical routinely orders bid documents within the two-day blackout period mandated by section 337.168(2), during which time DOT is required to take down its list of contractors who have requested bid documents concerning a particular project. Ordering bid documents within the blackout period prevents competitors from discovering whether Hinson Electrical is bidding for a particular project. The blackout period for the Project began at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, September 21, 2012. The deadline to order the bid documents for the Project was 10:30 a.m. on September 25, 2012. There is no requirement that contractors request bid documents prior to the pre-bid meeting (if one is required for a particular project), or at any time prior to the order deadline, which is 24 hours before the bid deadline. DOT acknowledged at hearing that it is Hinson Electrical's prerogative to order the bid documents within the blackout period during which the identities of bidders are kept confidential. Hinson Electrical ordered the bid documents for the Project at approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 24, 2012. The computerized system immediately provided access for Hinson Electrical to download the plans and specifications for the project at issue. However, four minutes later, at approximately 1:04 p.m., Hinson Electrical simultaneously received an email with a "Prequalification Failure Notice," and a second email stating that the bid document request for the Project was "pending." The Prequalification Failure Notice indicated that the bid document was not provided because Hinson Electrical had not attended the required pre-bid meeting for the Project.2/ Failure to attend the pre-bid meeting was the only basis stated in the Prequalification Failure Notice for DOT refusing to provide the bid document. As noted, Hinson Electrical's representative did in fact attend the pre-bid meeting for the Project, and he signed the sign-in sheet, attesting to his presence at the meeting. The sign-in sheet had been transmitted to DOT on August 21, 2012, the day after the pre-bid meeting was held. Thus, DOT's basis for sending Hinson Electrical a Prequalification Failure Notice was in error. The Prequalification Failure Notice also stated, "[Y]ou will be contacted by email or phone as soon as possible during business hours regarding requirements for obtaining the bid documents." However, DOT did not send an email or call Hinson Electrical after 1:04 p.m. on September 24, 2012, or at any time on September 25, 2012. Phillip Davis, a DOT employee in the Contracts Administration Office, was "blind copied" on the Hinson Electrical Prequalification Failure Notice email, with a "high importance" tag. Mr. Davis' job responsibilities include following up on these types of notices, though he is not supervised to ensure this occurs. Mr. Davis' responsibilities also include checking sign-in sheets from pre-bid meetings to authorize release of bid documents to contractors. DOT admits that Mr. Davis did not read the Hinson Electrical Prequalification Failure Notice; did not check the sign-in sheet from the pre-bid meeting; and made no attempt to contact Hinson Electrical, as promised in the notice. From September 20 through 25, 2012, Daniel Hinson and Chris Ginn obtained quotes from suppliers and subcontractors to prepare a bid for the Project. Hinson Electrical also secured a bid bond for the Project, and had everything necessary to submit a bid, except for the actual bid document. In the afternoon or early evening of September 25, 2012, Daniel Hinson sat down at his computer with the price lists and quotes he had obtained to prepare a bid for the Project. It was then that Mr. Hinson discovered DOT had not granted him access to the bid document for this Project, and that the failure notice he had received pertained to this Project, and was in error. Hinson Electrical was bidding on a total of eight contracts at that time, some of which did not have a mandatory pre-bid meeting. As of the close of business on September 25, 2012, DOT had still not made any effort to contact Hinson Electrical, as promised in the failure notice. At 7:55 p.m. on September 25, 2012, Hinson Electrical sent an email to the Contracts Administration general email address, stating that Hinson Electrical's representative had attended the pre-bid meeting and asking why Hinson Electrical was being excluded from the bidding. Shortly after 7:00 a.m. the following morning (September 26, 2012, the bid deadline), Chris Ginn called the project inspector, Thomas Woods of HNTB Corporation, on Hinson Electrical's behalf, and requested that HNTB confirm that Hinson Electrical's representative had attended the pre-bid meeting. At 7:32 a.m. that same morning, Mr. Woods sent an email to Juanita Moore notifying her of the error and confirming that Hinson Electrical's representative had indeed attended the pre-bid meeting. The Contracts Administration Office opened at 8:00 a.m. on the day of the bidding deadline. Within 36 minutes (by 8:36 a.m.), Ms. Moore reviewed Mr. Woods' email; checked the sign-in sheet; and instructed a subordinate, Colette Jackson, to send the bid document to Hinson Electrical. Ms. Jackson immediately sent the bid document to Hinson Electrical under a cover email. Ms. Moore testified that Phillip Davis could have easily gone through these same steps on September 24, 2012 (two days before the bid deadline), and timely transmitted the bid document to Hinson Electrical, if he had only read the Prequalification Failure Notice on which he was copied. Ms. Moore agreed that 24 hours would have been sufficient time for Mr. Davis to check the sign-in sheet and release the bid document. When DOT finally provided the bid document to Hinson Electrical, it was 1 hour, 54 minutes before the bid submission deadline. At 8:40 a.m. on September 26, 2012, (four minutes after receiving the bid document) Daniel Hinson spoke by telephone with Colette Jackson about needing additional time to complete Hinson Electrical's electronic bid submission. Colette Jackson testified that one of her responsibilities at DOT is to move bid deadlines, and that she can do so quickly upon receiving instructions from Ms. Moore to do so. However, Ms. Jackson did not have authority to provide the requested relief, so she transferred the call to Ms. Moore. Upon being transferred to Ms. Moore, Mr. Hinson asked for additional time to complete the Hinson Electrical bid for the Project. That request was refused by Ms. Moore. In her view, the fact that the pay items and estimated quantities for the project had previously been provided should have enabled Hinson Electrical to submit a bid within the two hours remaining prior to the deadline. In addition, Ms. Moore felt Hinson Electrical should have taken it upon itself to contact DOT immediately upon receiving the disqualification notification if it believed it had complied with all prerequisites. Contrary to Ms. Moore's opinion, Mr. Hinson testified that it would have taken him about four hours to go through the various steps to submit Hinson Electrical's online bid for the Project. DOT's position that Hinson Electrical could have completed and submitted its bid with less than two hours remaining is rejected as not credible. However, even if that were possible, it would have put Hinson Electrical at a disadvantage because every other bidder was able to download the bid document immediately upon request after the pre-bid meeting. Daniel Hinson has submitted bids for hundreds of DOT projects (including "dozens" using the current online system) and he reasonably believed there was insufficient time remaining before the deadline to prepare a competent bid and ensure its accuracy. Mr. Hinson's testimony regarding the amount of time necessary to prepare a complete and competent bid for the Project is more credible than the testimony of Ms. Moore. Considering the potential cost to Hinson Electrical of a mistake made in haste, it was entirely reasonable for Hinson Electrical to decline to submit a bid, and instead request a bid extension. Likewise, it was unreasonable for DOT to decline the extension request, given that it was DOT's mistake that necessitated the extension. DOT extends bid deadlines dozens of times each year, for various reasons, including computer issues, mistakes in the bid documents, or bad weather. Ms. Moore testified about bid deadlines that had been moved, three or four times in some cases, for reasons including computer glitches, website issues, and "technical problems." In one such instance, contractors could not obtain their bid documents on the Monday before a Wednesday letting (which is what happened to Hinson Electrical in this case), and DOT postponed the bid deadline. In another instance, a bid deadline was postponed for a third time "because the vendors couldn't download what they needed to bid." And in another example, the bid deadline was postponed with notice provided just 92 minutes before the deadline due to "server issues at the Department." In this final example, once the malfunction was identified, DOT promptly sent the notice of postponement to the bidders and later completed the other necessary steps to move the bid deadline. A postponement notice can be sent to bidders in less than ten minutes after the decision to postpone a bid is made. All other steps required to move a bid deadline are typically accomplished by DOT personnel in about an hour. DOT knows of no harm that would have come to the other bidders had DOT agreed to move the bid deadline to allow Hinson sufficient time to submit its online bid. At 9:22 a.m. on September 26, 2012, Daniel Hinson sent an email to Colette Jackson in response to her email, stating there was insufficient time for Hinson Electrical to prepare its bid for the Project and that a protest would be filed if DOT posted its intent to award the contract to one of the other bidders. The letting of the project occurred as scheduled at 10:30 a.m. on September 26, 2012. At approximately 4:00 p.m. on October 24, 2012, DOT posted notice of its intent to award the contract to ALS. This was the second posting date for the September 26, 2012 letting date. Thereafter, Hinson Electrical timely served its notice of protest, formal protest pleading, and the required bond. The advertisement for the Project reads, in part, "Bidders are hereby notified that all bids on any of the following projects are likely to be rejected if the lowest responsive bid received exceeds the engineer's estimate by more than ten percent (10%)." DOT does reject all bids for being too high in some cases. The bid submitted by ALS for the Project exceeded the proposal budget estimate of $4,183,958 by 19.9 percent (ALS' winning bid was $5,016,501.73). The Contract Award Committee (Committee) is the DOT body with discretion to reject all bids for a project. However, Ms. Moore never informed the Committee of Hinson Electrical's situation so that it could determine whether the Project should be rebid. Even after posting notice of intent to award the Project to ALS, DOT retained discretion to reject all bids, but Ms. Moore was unaware of that discretion and never discussed the matter with the Committee. Hinson Electrical credibly established that it would have submitted a bid of $4,973,361.99 for the Project had DOT provided the online bid document when Hinson Electrical first requested it. Thus, Hinson Electrical would have been the low bidder, and presumably awarded the contract. DOT had at least three opportunities to correct its mistake and allow Hinson Electrical an opportunity to bid. DOT could have (l) extended the bid deadline, as it has in many other cases; (2) rejected all bids and rebid the Project, before posting notice of intent to award the contract; or (3) rejected all bids even after posting notice of intent. In their Prehearing Stipulation, the parties stipulated to the following: DOT has no policy statements, handbook provisions, internal memoranda, guidelines, or other documents regarding the following subjects: How a failure to timely transmit bid documents in response to a prospective bidder's request, whether due to a transmission error or otherwise, should be handled or what relief may be provided to the bidder; Acceptable grounds for extending a bid submission deadline; How an erroneous determination that a prospective bidder for a project was not qualified to bid should be handled, either before or after the bid deadline has expired; Relief that can or should be provided to a prospective bidder who was denied the opportunity to bid for a project due, at least in part, to some irregularity in the bidding process; Relief that can or should be provided to a prospective bidder who was denied the opportunity to bid for a project due, at least in part, to some error made by FDOT (including its computer system); and How to handle a situation in which all received bids exceed the budget for the project by more than 10%. (Prehearing Stipulation, pgs. 11-12)
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation that rescinds the Notice of Intent to award Contract T2442 to American Lighting & Signalization, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, St. Johns Water Management District, is a special taxing district authorized by law to perform various water resource duties and is empowered to hire and terminate employees. As an employer, the District has developed an employment policy which states in pertinent part: VII. ACTS OF MISCONDUCT AND WORK STANDARDS VIOLATIONS FOR DISTRICT EMPLOYEES The following acts of misconduct and violation of work standards will subject an employee of the District to disciplinary action: 15. Insubordination - An employee may not willfully or deliberately refuse to comply with a direct order or any established work assignment of an immediate supervisor or higher level supervisor unless such order or assignment would result in an immediate danger to the health and safety of the employee or others. STANDARDS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION The following standards are established to insure the District is consistent in taking disciplinary actions against employees involved in similar situations. The recommended disciplinary action is normally the penalty which should be imposed. However, circumstances may make a greater or lesser action more appropriate than the one suggested. Realizing that some of the offenses and deficiencies listed will be more serious and more frequent in certain cases, the District shall utilize good judgement in light of all available facts in each case. Secondary and subsequent offenses have a cumulative effect and justify greater penalties. An offense need not be similar in nature to an earlier offense in order to have such cumulative effect. The disciplinary action should be based on an overall evaluation of conditions and severity of the violations. The standard of discipline for the first occasion of insubordination is a written reprimand, suspension up to three days or dismissal. The standard for the second event of insubordination is dismissal. Teresa Brun was employed by the District from July of 1988 to February 25, 1992. From April 1989 to February 25, 1992, Ms. Brun held the position of contract administrator in the water resources section of the District. As a contract administrator, she, along with four other contract administrators, oversaw various purchasing contracts for the District which the District was in the process of letting out for bid. Ms. Brun had also been assigned to work on drafting a new contracts policy manual and drafting standard forms for the new manual. Performance of clerical duties associated with the various purchasing contracts assigned her were not part of Petitioners established work assignment. Ms. Brun's supervisor was Mr. Jadwin, the contract supervisor. The water resources contract section had a secretary who, during the time period relevant to this proceeding, was Betty Anderson. Ms. Anderson had limited experience in the water resources section since she had been employed in the section since October or November 1990. Ms. Anderson's function was to perform clerical duties for the section's supervisor and contract administrators, including Ms. Brun. In essence, Ms. Anderson was supposed to work with the contracts administrators and perform the secretarial functions of the office as instructed by the contracts administrators. Her duties included, among other things, working with the bid files, maintaining a list of bidder's addresses (bidders' list), and typing and preparing bid tabulation sheets. Ms. Brun as well as other contract administrators did take materials to Ms. Anderson and instruct her how to prepare various materials and bid documents required by the contracts office. Ms. Anderson was a slow learner and was difficult to get along with. However, Ms. Brun felt that since Ms. Anderson had been employed for approximately three months, it was time for Ms. Anderson to learn to utilize the bid files and computer files containing bidder's addresses in order to gather the information she needed to prepare bid documents and materials without being spoon fed the information. In short, Ms. Brun legitimately expected Ms. Anderson to perform as past section secretaries had performed. On Friday, January 25, 1991, Ms. Anderson received a note from Ms. Brun asking Ms. Anderson to prepare a standard "Notice of Intent" to issue a contract on a particular bid which was to go before the Board for adoption. A "Notice of Intent" includes a cover letter, bid tabulation sheet and a Notice of Rights. The complete package is then mailed to the bidders who expressed an interest in the bid. Ms. Brun prepared the cover letter and standard Notice of Rights and requested Ms. Anderson to mail the Notice of Intent to all the bidders. Ms. Brun informed Ms. Anderson that the bid tabulation sheet was in the bid file. Ms. Anderson wrote a note back to Ms. Brun requesting that she furnish the "pertinent information" needed to complete the assignment. Ms. Anderson's request for information appears to refer to the bid tabulation sheet and the addresses of interested bidders to whom the Notice of Intent should be sent. 1/ The note from Ms. Anderson was deposited in Ms. Brun's in-basket. On Monday, January 28, Ms. Brun saw Ms. Anderson's note and responded with a note telling Ms. Anderson that the information she sought was in the bid file and she should get it herself. Following the note exchange, Ms. Brun and Ms. Anderson talked over the problem of preparing the Notice of Intent and bid addresses in a meeting initiated by Ms. Anderson about problems with the addresses for this bid. Ms. Brun told Ms. Anderson to go into her contract files and secure the information. Ms. Anderson refused to go into the bid files to find the bid tabulation sheet and refused to print out an address list from her computer file. Ms. Anderson's reply was that if she had to get the information, it would not get done and that she would wait and talk to Mr. Jadwin. Ms. Anderson left the file on Ms. Brun's desk and would not, as instructed by Ms. Brun, take it with her. Ms. Anderson made her refusal in front of another contracts manager, Cindy Gilmore. Ms. Anderson's refusal to comply with the requests of Ms. Brun were only explained as "territorial concerns." However, Ms. Anderson did eventually learn that part of her job was to get information out of the bid files and to utilize the address information she maintained in her directory. Following this impasse, Ms. Anderson went to Mr. Jadwin, who was the mutual supervisor of both Ms. Brun and Ms. Anderson. Mr. Jadwin agreed with Ms. Anderson's position and, told Ms. Anderson that he would talk to Ms. Brun. However, Ms. Anderson asked if she could work it out herself because she wished to develop effective working relationships with the contract administrators. Mr. Jadwin agreed and Ms. Anderson returned to Ms. Brun and asked to speak about the needed materials. Ms. Anderson informed Ms. Brun that Mr. Jadwin thought it was fair that Ms. Brun get the bid tabulation sheet out of the file and give it to Ms. Anderson. Ms. Brun still angry over Ms. Anderson's refusal to perform her secretarial duties refused to discuss the matter further and told Ms. Anderson to "just write in a memo what you will do and what you will not do." Mr. Jadwin later asked Ms. Anderson how her meeting with Ms. Brun had gone. She replied things had not gone well and she was writing the memo requested by Ms. Brun. Mr. Jadwin told her not to write the memo and that he would "take care of it." Ms. Anderson then got the bid file for the first time, went through it, and could not find the bid tabulation sheet. The yellow cards with the bidder's addresses as well as green cards from bidders who had submitted bids were in the file. Ms. Anderson then took the file to Mr. Jadwin and he searched for the bid tabulation sheet and could not find it. The bid tabulation sheet had been removed from the bid file and had been placed in a standard information-packet to the Board. This packet was known as Board back-up. Ms. Brun was unaware that the bid tabulation sheet had been removed from the bid file. On the other hand, the information to recreate the bid tabulation sheet was in the file. Additionally, the bid tabulation sheet was readily findable by any thinking secretary or individual who had become familiar with office procedures. On January 31, 1991, Mr. Jadwin approached Ms. Brun. 2/ This was the first time in these events that an immediate supervisor had addressed Ms. Brun on the bid tabulation sheet and address list. The meeting took place in Ms. Brun's office which was next to Ms. Anderson's desk. Ms. Anderson was seated at her desk and could hear the conversation. All the witnesses agree that Mr. Jadwin asked Ms. Brun if Ms. Anderson had typed a certain bid tabulation sheet. Ms. Brun replied affirmatively. Mr. Jadwin then informed Ms. Brun for the first time that neither he or Ms. Anderson could locate the bid tabulation sheet in the file. Mr. Jadwin asked Ms. Brun to help Ms. Anderson out and give Ms. Anderson the information to type another bid sheet. Ms. Brun said she would. Mr. Jadwin then began to broach the subject of the addresses. He said, 'About the address,' "We've had some problems with the address on that." Ms. Brun replied that she was "not the only person who makes problems with the bids." Mr. Jadwin started to say something else and Ms. Brun cut him short and said, "Why don't you just address everything that you need to me in a memo." Mr. Jadwin again began to say something else but Ms. Brun stated "Bob, I'm not going to argue with you," got up, put the bid file in the file cabinet and walked out of her office. Clearly, Ms. Brun terminated Mr. Jadwin''s conversation with her. Whether the termination was abrupt and cut short what Mr. Jadwin wanted to say, depends on the particular witnesses point of view. However, Mr. Jadwin did not object to the conversation's termination and did not ask or order Ms. Brun to stay. No instructions were given to Ms. Brun in regards to the addresses because she exited her office. However, Ms. Brun's behavior while rude and perhaps contemptuous toward Mr. Jadwin was not insubordinate conduct on her part. That afternoon Ms. Brun learned for the first time that some bid packages had been returned because the party to whom they had been addressed was not located at the address to which the packages had been mailed. Ms. Brun took the returned packages to Mr. Jadwin. Later that same afternoon, Ms. Brun furnished the bid tabulation sheet to Ms. Anderson. Ms. Anderson retyped the bid tabulation sheet which had caused so much trouble. After typing the bid tabulation sheet, Ms. Anderson came into Ms. Brun's office and asked where the bidder's list was. Ms. Brun told Ms. Anderson the list was in the file. Ms. Anderson replied that the list "just won't get done," and threw the bid file on Ms. Bruns desk. Ms. Brun put the file back in Ms. Anderson's work tray. Ms. Anderson said the file would "just stay there." The following day, Ms. Brun sent out a partial Notice of Intent. On Friday, February 1, approximately 2 days after Mr. Jadwin's conversation with Ms. Brun, Mr. Jadwin wrote Ms. Brun a note. The note states: To: Teresa From: Bob Subject: Notice of intended award Walkways - Clay Island Date: 2-91 I have asked you to supply Betty with the list of addresses to which to send the above Notice. Betty has had to re-type the Bid summary sheet that was lost from your file. 3/ If you choose to continue to refuse this request please explain your reasons immediately to Mr. Payton. As of Monday, 2/4/91, your refusal has held this 'Notice' up for one week. Please do not delay in getting this done. Bob The note was placed in Ms. Brun's in-basket on February 1. However, she did not receive Mr. Jadwin's note until Monday morning, February 4. Ms. Brun stated she did not give Ms. Anderson the list of addresses upon receiving the note because the note was in error about being instructed to furnish the addresses to Ms. Anderson and because her interpretation of the note was not as a directive to produce the addresses but as an option of going to Mr. Payton because she would in essence be doing Ms. Anderson's job for her. Ms. Brun decided to go to Mr. Payton. Given the inaccuracies in the note and its tenor, Ms. Brun's interpretation was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Ms. Brun printed out a copy of Ms. Anderson's directory which included the file for the bidder's list and immediately went to Mr. Payton. There is conflict in the testimony over what occurred at this meeting. Ms. Brun's version is that Mr. Payton sided with her and told her to go back to Ms. Anderson and tell her that the file was in the computer and explain the file to her. Mr. Payton denies this version, saying that he had discussed the matter during the previous week with Mr. Jadwin after the walkout and that he (Mr. Payton) then told Ms. Brun to provide the address list to her supervisor without getting upset and to go and ask Ms. Anderson what information she needed and provide that information. Except as set forth Ms. Brun's hearing testimony that Mr. Payton sided with her against her immediate supervisor is deemed not credible. Ms. Brun returned from Mr. Payton's office and told Ms. Anderson that Mr. Payton had directed her (Ms. Brun) to tell Ms. Anderson what she was to do with the file for the addresses and that the address file was in the computer. Mr. Jadwin overheard the conversation with Ms. Anderson and intervened because it was not consistent with what had been previously told to him by Mr. Payton. Mr. Jadwin then directed Ms. Anderson to complete the matter as best she could and have Ms. Brun verify the addresses. The address list was finally produced and Ms. Brun did satisfactorily verify the addresses. During the time Ms. Brun worked for the District, she was evaluated on an annual basis and never received any evaluation below the "above satisfactory" category. Her only prior disciplinary history was a reprimand for insubordination which she received in December, 1990. A reprimand is the least severe form of discipline at St. Johns River Water Management District.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Governing Board reinstating the Petitioner's employment with the District. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 1992. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2 day of September, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Respondent solicited contractors to replace a chiller in Building #45 at its Sunland facility located in Marianna, Florida. The project number for the replacement was HRS-95203000. The vendors were allowed until 10:00 a.m., Central Daylight Time, August 24, 1995, to submit responses to the request for bids. On August 24, 1995, Respondent received four responses. The responses were from Petitioner, Neel, JLS International and Smiths, Inc. On August 24, 1995, when the bids were opened JLS International and Smiths, Inc. were disqualified as nonresponsive bidders. On August 24, 1995, Respondent determined that Petitioner had submitted a base bid in the amount of $141,185.00 and as described on the tabulation form, an alternate bid in the amount of $14,750.00 for confined space compliance. The Neel bid as reflected on the tabulation was a base bid for $142,000.00. The forms upon which Petitioner and Neel had submitted their bid prices were forms identical in their format. The format was required by the Respondent. The Petitioner's bid stated: Base Bid: $141,185.00 With foregoing as a Base Bid the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifi- cations. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ N/A Alternate No. 2 Add of Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ If more or less work is required than that qualified by the specifications and drawings the following unit prices shall be applicable. *If Required (not included in base bid) ITEM UNIT PRICE Compliance for confined space for refrigerants & equipment *Note: Base bid price is compiled costs for construction duration & equipment delivery of 18 weeks. When Petitioner submitted its response to the request for bids, it offered no further explanation concerning the $14,750.00 price for "compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment" than has already been described. The Neel bid stated: Base Bid: $142,000.00 With foregoing as a Base Bid the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 2 Add of Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ If more or less work is required than that qualified by the specifications and drawings the following unit prices shall be applicable. ITEM UNIT PRICE Respondent had provided written instructions to the bidders concerning execution of the bid proposal form to the effect: Omit mention of alternates entirely, if there are none. Unit prices are to be used only if unit prices are applicable and approved by the Project Director. This project did not call for alternate bids or unit prices. The request for bids did not contemplate a quotation other than the base bid for all items, to include any costs associated with implementation of a design that complies with all applicable codes associated with the installation and with any laws pertaining to refrigerant handling. Posting of the bid evaluation/tabulation and notice of contract award recommendation was given on September 8, 1995, indicating Respondent's intent to award to Petitioner in the amount of $141,185.00 as the base bid for the project. Prior to the posting of the bids on September 8, 1995, as was customary, Thomas McAuley, an account representative for Petitioner, who had submitted Petitioner's bid response had met with Respondent's project manager Glen Jenkins, a Professional Engineer III. The meeting was held to discuss Petitioner's bid response as the apparent responsive lowest and best bidder. In the conversation held between Messrs. McAuley and Jenkins, they did not discuss the $14,750.00 separate price quotation in the Petitioner's bid. They did discuss compliance with the codes that were going to be applicable to the project and whether the base price quotation took into account the code requirements. McAuley indicated his opinion that the base price quotation did account for compliance with code requirements contemplated by the terms in the request for bids. McAuley was specifically asked whether Petitioner was complete and thorough in its compliance with the bid specifications and in its prices, inclusive of all the items that were going to be mandated by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services. McAuley answered that question in the affirmative. In the specifications, under Article 7, Miscellaneous Provisions, within the request for bids is set forth Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 related to permit and code compliance issues, which state as follows: State Building Permit. Current DMS requirements for state building permit applications and for permit inspections are attached. It shall be the Contractor's responsibility to apply for and pay all costs associated with the state building permit (including the cost of preparing any permit documents on which the state building official may require the seal of a registered engineer). It shall further be the Contractor's responsi- bility to comply fully with all permit inspection requirements. Code Compliance. It is the Contractor's responsibility to implement a design complying with all codes applicable to this installation, and with all laws pertaining to refrigerant handling. Neither the Owner nor the Project Manager shall be held responsible for stating or setting forth (in this or any other document, or verbally) any code requirement which may be applicable to this project. By disseminating this "Statement of Work Scope and Contractual Conditions", the Owner merely sets forth minimum acceptance criteria for materials and workmanship, and neither the Owner nor the Project Manager shall thereby be held liable, in full or in part, for the Contractor's adherence or non-adherence to any governing code and/or legal requirement. Special Terms and Conditions for Cont- racts Under the National Energy Conservation Policy Act. Due to partial project funding under a federal NECPA grant, Contractor compliance with federal laws and regulations are a special requirement of this project. Special terms and conditions pertaining to wages and payrolls, records retention and access, apprenticeship and training, equal opportunity access, are set forth in the attached "Special Terms and Conditions for Contracts Under the National Energy Conserva- tion Policy Act". The contractor shall responsible for full compliance with the attached special terms and conditions. In the meeting between McAuley and Jenkins discussion was made concerning compliance with pertinent electrical codes. One question was asked about pipes in the system being installed in a manner to allow variable speed drives to be placed above the pipes. Jenkins considered that speed drive placement underneath the pipes would be contrary to code requirements. Related to the mechanical features in the project there was discussion about the provision of refrigerants in compliance with the mechanical code that pertained. In the meeting there was little discussion about code compliance within confined spaces, because the two individuals did not perceive that there would likely be a code requirement concerning confined spaces. Mention was made that some code inspector or code official who came to the job site might require attention to the confined spaces, even though that requirement was not found in the code. According to Jenkins, in his recount of the meeting with McAuley, if a code official required compliance for an item in the confined spaces that was not set forth in the code, that would constitute an item about which the Respondent had not requested information to be included in the base price quotation offered by the Petitioner. Further, Jenkins stated there would not be a problem for failing to offer a quotation for the features required by the inspector, because it was not sought by the Respondent in designing the bid requirements. As Jenkins describes, Petitioner's unit price for that work had been made known. This is taken to refer to the $14,750.00 quote for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment. In that circumstance, Mr. Jenkins told Mr. McAuley that if a code official required something that was not contemplated by the code and the Respondent did not consider it worth fighting over, then Respondent would have to process a change order to install that equipment. This is taken to mean that Petitioner would be paid additional money under a change order for installing the equipment in the event that the Respondent did not choose to contest the decision of the code official. At the time that McAuley and Jenkins had the meeting, counsel for Neel had contacted Jenkins about protesting the decision to award the contract to Petitioner. That individual had stated the opinion to Respondent that Petitioner's discussion of confined space for refrigerants and the equipment at the additional cost of $14,750.00 might be perceived as potentially a code exclusion in violation of the requirements of Section 7.3 to the request for bids. Neel's counsel stated his belief that the vendors were expected to be in compliance with all codes and laws, even if it was not known to be a code requirement at the time the bid was submitted. He was concerned that someone might try and make it a requirement in the future. The Neel attorney explained that the reference to compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment set forth in Petitioner's bid response might be construed as a comment on code requirements through the contingency of someone's interpretation of the code. He believed that the responses to the request for bids needed to address that contingency as part of the basic quotation, not as a separate quotation. At the time McAuley and Jenkins had their meeting, Jenkins did not know of any requirement for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment based upon his experience, but he had not researched the issue. Through information which Neel imparted to Mr. Jenkins before the meeting was held between Jenkins and McAuley, the Neel attorney expressed the opinion that there was not a present code requirement for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment, a view held by McAuley and Jenkins. At the time the meeting was held between McAuley and Jenkins, Jenkins was of the opinion that the requirement for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment was not foreseen to be a likely code requirement. As contrasted with Neel's view, as explained to Jenkins, that its base bid was intended to cover the eventuality that there might become a requirement for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment, Neel's representative stated that Petitioner's bid had segregated that contingency for consideration by quoting the price of $14,750.00 separately. Neel did not appear at the hearing and there was no direct proof that the $142,000.00 base bid by Neel addressed the contingency that a future requirement might be imposed for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment. However, it may properly be assumed the Neel bid met the requirement for a base bid quotation to cover all costs to Respondent absent proof to the contrary. Later, when Respondent decided to award the contract to Neel, Respondent implied that the $142,000.00 base bid would meet code requirements contemplated by Section 7.3. Concerning the responsibility to determine which code requirements pertained and when, Respondent expected the vendors to derive that answer. This case was unlike most projects by the Respondent in which design professionals, engineers or architects create design documents that are completed in view of code requirements and the vendors assume that the bid documents prepared would be in conformance with code requirements. At hearing Mr. Jenkins, as project manager, opined that Section 7.3 obligated the contractor to meet existing requirements of the permitting authorities, and if during the pendency of the contract there was some change to the codes or code requirements set forth by code inspectors, then the contractor must assume the risk. Moreover, when the bids were opened and tabulated initially and the preliminary decision was made to award the contract to Petitioner, Mr. Jenkins perceived the quotation of $14,750.00 set forth in the Petitioner's bid to be a unit price for a scope of work that was not expected to be required at any point and was not been asked for by Respondent. Jenkins considered this quote as an alternate that was being proffered, something that Respondent might opt for in the future. Although not set forth in exact terms, Mr. Jenkins perceived this information in the Petitioner's bid response to be related to an alarm system and breathing apparatuses. He held this belief based upon his experience in association with compliance for confined spaces. Mr. Jenkins surmised that what was being described by the Petitioner was the type of installation that you would put into a closed mechanical room where a refrigeration machine was located that contained toxic refrigerant, which if released might kill a serviceman. In that connection when discussing refrigerant compliance with Mr. McAuley in their meeting, Mr. Jenkins indicated that the discussion had been limited because the type of machine proposed by the Petitioner was a 134A machine which is "ozone friendly" and not restricted by clean air amendment regulations. Following the posting on September 8, 1995, which recommended that the contract be awarded to Petitioner, Neel had 72 hours to file a protest. That protest was filed. Having considered the remarks by Neel's attorney in support of that protest, Mr. Jenkins became persuaded that Petitioner might not have intended to describe an alternate (unsolicited) purchase when discussing the compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment for a price of $14,750.00; instead, Petitioner may have been describing how to comply with future code requirements. Consequently, Mr. Jenkins attempted to settle the issue by presenting the opportunity for the Petitioner to obtain a letter from the Department of Management Services permitting office establishing that the equipment described in the bid by Petitioner for compliance for confined space refrigerants and equipment was not then a code requirement. Mr. Jenkins wanted that information to be in writing. This opportunity to submit information was imparted to Stuart Zaritsky, Branch Manager for Petitioner in its Tallahassee office. Petitioner did not take the opportunity to send written information concerning the compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment as not being required by applicable codes. Instead, Mr. Zaritsky called Mr. Jenkins and told him that Petitioner had placed calls to the Department of Management Services permitting office and was unable to get a definitive response at that time. On September 26, 1995, Mr. Zaritsky wrote to Mr. Jenkins and stated: The confined space for refrigerants and equipment compliance is based on ASHRAE recommendations only. If any of these items are required by code, then we will install it at no cost. Our base bid of $141,185 is based on the specifications, including paragraph 7.3 on page 13 and all other portions of the contract documents without any qualifications. If it is determined by the owner, that they wish to upgrade the machine room to ASHRAE 15 standards, and it is not required by code, the $14,750 would be the price to add refrigerant monitors, refrigerant purge fans and self-contained breathing apparatus. Should the jurisdictional authority of code compliance determine that these items are required by code, they will be installed as part of our base bid of $141,185. On September 29, 1995, Respondent gave notice of an amended bid tabulation finding Neel to be the responsive lowest and best bidder for the project in its quotation of $142,000.00. The September 29, 1995 correspondence notified the Petitioner that: After further review of issues raised by responsive bidders on the above project, the Department has determined that the bid sub- mitted by Natkin Service Co. on the above referenced project either: is nonresponsive, because the bid was not in compliance with Section 7.3 of the Statement of Work Scope and Contractual Conditions, since it exempted its bid from certain refrigerant handling requirements; or if responsive, is in the amount of $155,935.00. In either case, the bid submitted by Neel Mechanical Contractors, Inc. in the amount of $142,000.00 is the lowest responsive bid. The September 29, 1995 determination that Petitioner was not responsive led to Petitioner's present protest. Sometime shortly before the amended posting of the bid tabulation on September 29, 1995, Mr. Jenkins spoke to Mr. McAuley concerning the opportunity to present information to address the question concerning whether compliance for confined spaces for refrigerants and equipment was a code requirement. To assist the Petitioner Mr. Jenkins provided information which had been received from the Department of Community Affairs related to code provisions under enforcement by the Department of Management Services. This information was not provided by Mr. Jenkins as a determination of code requirements; it was provided to inform Petitioner concerning what Mr. Jenkins understood to be the latest code requirements. The expectation was still held that Petitioner would submit separate information from the Department of Management Services that would settle the issue concerning the possible need to comply with code requirements for confined spaces for refrigerants and equipment. As Mr. Jenkins described at hearing, the basis for finding the Petitioner's bid unresponsive was alternatively stated. First, the Respondent believes that Petitioner tried to avoid the responsibility for complying with code requirements, whatever they may be during the contract pendency; or second, Petitioner split its bid into two parts. One in the amount of $141,185.00 for matters unrelated to code compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment and the second in an amount of $14,750.00 for such compliance. If the former view is taken, Petitioner's bid is unresponsive. If the latter view is taken Petitioner's bid is responsive but exceeds the quotation by the responsive bidder Neel. At hearing it was not proven by competent evidence whether there was any necessity to meet code requirements for compliance for confined space for refrigerants and equipment as described in Petitioner's bid response at any point in time. Other provisions within the request for bids that pertain to the manner in which the vender would address its price quotation are as follows: 1.5 The Contract Sum shall initially be that lump-sum amount which the Contractor shall have enclosed in his sealed bid proposal. Subject to additions and deduc- tions by Change Order, the Contract Sum shall be the amount which the Owner shall pay the Contractor for the performance of the work, subject to the terms and conditions as provided in the Contract Documents. 2.6 The Contractor shall apply for, and pay all costs associated with, any permit which may be required by the Department of Management Services. Such permitting costs for which the Contractor shall be responsible shall include the preparation of any permit documents on which the building official may require the seal of a registered engineer. B-9 Instruction for bidders; They (the bidders) are also required to examine carefully any drawings, specifications and other bidding documents to inform themselves thoroughly regarding any and all conditions and requirements that may in any manner effect the work.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the final order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's protest based upon the unresponsive of its bid and awards the contract for Project No. HRS- 95203000 to Neel. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact finding by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraph B1 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph B2 is rejected in the suggestion that Respondent should be bound by resort to extrinsic evidence to determine Petitioner responsive to the bid invitation. Paragraph B3 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph B4 is rejected in the suggestion that it was inappropriate to defer to the Neel protest as a means for Respondent to reconsider its position. Paragraph B5 is rejected in the suggestion that Neel has controlled the outcome in this case. Paragraph B6 is rejected in the suggestion that Petitioner has complied with the bid invitation requirements. Paragraph B7 is rejected in the suggestion that the contrary position stated by the Respondent in the informal review wherein Petitioner had been preliminarily determined to be the responsive bidder and the point of view at hearing would preclude a decision favoring the Respondent. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Tommy McAuley, Account Manager Natkin Service Company 3428 A. Garber Drive Tallahassee, FL 32303 Sam Chavers, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Informational Copies: JLS International, Inc. P. O. Box 490 Foley, AL 36536 Neel Mechanical Contractors, Inc. P. O. Box 1916 Thomasville, GA 31799 Smith's, Inc. of Dothan P. O. Box 1207 Dothan, AL 36302
Findings Of Fact Prior to June, 1988, HRS determined that it needed 32,000 square feet of office space to house some of its indigent social services for southern Escambia County. Since the desired office space is greater than 2,000 square feet HRS was required to competitively bid lease number 590:1984. Towards that end, Respondent prepared an Invitation to Bid and a bid submittal package. The package contained various bid specifications, bid evaluation criteria and the numerical weight assigned to each of those criteria. Specific areas of importance to Respondent in the selection of its office space were: client safety one building to house all its units employee morale moving costs traffic flow within the building public access Many of the above areas were important to HRS since the agency would render indigent services to approximately 17,000 people a month, many of whom are handicapped or lack good mobility due to age or infirmity. Employee morale was important because of high employee burn out due to rendering aid to so many people who have so little and supplying a pleasant environment conducive to the work of the employees. Moving costs were important should HRS be required to find other space to operate in while necessary remodeling took place in the selected building, or be required to incur the expense of moving to a new building. 1/ All of the above areas were covered by one of Respondent's weighted bid evaluation criteria. The District Administrator of HRS, Chelene Schembera, is ultimately responsible for bidding, selection and leasing of all HRS facilities within District I, including Escambia County, Florida. In order to accomplish this task, Ms. Schembera appointed a bid evaluation committee to review and grade the responsive bids under the criteria established in the bid package, and to recommend to her the committee's choice of the lowest and best bid. Ms. Schembera's purpose in establishing the bid evaluation committee was to secure a cross section of input from people who had a variety of backgrounds and knowledge that would be material in evaluating the office space under the uses for which it was intended and the relative public worth of the work space. Ms. Schembera appointed individual who were familiar with the type of work to be done in the proposed space, as well as a persons familiar with the bid process. Ms. Schembera assigned to serve on the committee Charles Bates, Deputy District Administrator; Jim Peters, to provide a fiscal and overall administrative perspective as well as bid expertise; two citizens from the District Advisory Council to assure objectivity and to look at the properties from the perspective of a private citizen; Mamun Rashied, a program manager; Darlene McFarland, a program manager; Cherie Neal, a unit supervisor and program worker; and Stacey Cassidy, a clerical employee. Ms. Schembera did not personally know Cherie Neal or Stacey Cassidy. These staff members were designated by the supervisors upon Ms. Schembera's direction that she wanted persons who were both intelligent and respected by their peers. One private citizen member of the committee did not participate. The committee as constituted showed a great deal of thought on Ms. Schembera's part to ensure the objectivity of the bid process she was engaging in and to ensure the maximum amount of input from persons who had experience relevant to the overall review of the proposed real estate and to the decision they were being asked to make. The selection of the bid evaluation committee members was neither an arbitrary nor capricious act on Ms. Schembera's part. In fact, the evidence demonstrated the merit in constituting the committee as she did for the input she sought. The bid evaluation committee members, minus Mr. Bates, were briefed on their duties by Joe Pastucha, Facilities Services Manager. Mr. Pastucha is part of the staff responsible for the bid process at HRS. He provided these committee members with the weighted bid evaluation criteria found at page 15 in the bid package. He also gave the committee members a copy of Chapter 5 of the HRS manual containing guidelines for the bid process. His verbal instructions on specific procedures to follow in the evaluation process were limited since he did not wish to improperly influence the committee members. On July 20, 1988, HRS received three bids responding to its invitation to bid on Lease Number 590:1984. Bid A was submitted by Phillips and Company, the apparent second lowest bidder and Intervenor in this case. Its property consisted of one multi-story building located at 1740 North Palafox Street, Pensacola, Florida. Bid B was not responsive and therefore was not considered by HRS and is not a part of this litigation. Bid C was submitted by Petitioner Carmon S. Boone, and was the apparent low bid. Mr. Boone's property consisted of two buildings located at 401 and 411 North Baylen Street, Pensacola, Florida. The Boone property is the present location of Respondent's offices. Both Bid A and Bid C were within the mandatory geographical area designated in the bid package. Once the bids were received the bid evaluation committee began its work. The committee members, minus Mr. Bates, visited the Phillips property. However, the members did not visit the Boone property. There was no need. Four of the members currently worked at the Boone property and the other members had previously visited the Boone property on various other occasions. Mr. Bates was likewise already familiar with both properties. All members were sufficiently familiar with the cogent aspects of each property to allow them to make a rational decision. The bid evaluation committee, minus Mr. Bates, met as a group to evaluate each property in accordance with the weighted bid evaluation criteria. Each individual scored their sheets separately and the general consensus was supportive of recommending the Phillips property. Five committee members scored Mr. Phillips' property higher than the Boone property. The one exception was Mr. Peters who felt that HRS could not support a bid awarded for other than monetary reasons, i.e., he felt the lowest bid had to be accepted. Mr. Bates later reviewed all the bid synopsis sheets of the committee members and discussed the bid award with Mr. Peters and Mr. Pastucha. Mr. Bates felt that the Phillips property was the lowest and best bid. At about the same time, the staff responsible for providing technical assistance to the committee and the District Administrator were made aware that the general consensus of the committee was leaning towards the second lowest bidder, Phillips and Company, as the lowest and best bid. The staff members, one of whom was a bid committee member, disagreed with the award of the bid to Phillips and Company because the Boone property was the lower bid. The staff members sought to head off the committee's intended recommendation. The staff personnel held a meeting with some of the committee members in order to get them to join in a recommendation to Ms. Schembera of the Boone property. Mr. Boone was invited and attended the meeting. He was allowed to improperly bolster his bid by agreeing to convert the two buildings to one and other lesser additions. /2 The potential decision was discussed, but no committee member changed his or her mind. However, through a total lack of communication, a run away staff somehow rationalized themselves into a position of being authorized to submit a letter for Ms. Schembera's signature which awarded the Boone property the lease. Ms. Schembera became aware of her staff's attempt to subvert the bid process she had established. She refused to sign the letter submitted by the staff. She removed the staff member of the committee as a voting member. The staff member had supported the Boone property. She also removed a committee member who supported the Phillips property as a voting member. Ms. Schembera feared that her staff had improperly influenced this member to such an extent that his objectivity had been affected. Both members could still participate in committee discussions. Ms. Schembera thereby reasonably ensured the ongoing objectivity of the bid evaluation committee. The committee was reconvened, minus one member. It recommended the Phillips and Company property. Every reason given by the individual committee members for distinguishing and preferring one bid over another were rational and reasonable considerations and were covered by the bid evaluation criteria. Each individual member gave a rational and reasonable basis for the scoring he or she used on the bid synopsis score sheets. The scoring was done by each member after discussion of the two buildings and without influence from the other committee members. In essence, the committee felt that the Phillips property was the better property for the money. The Phillips property allowed working units to be located in one area with each such unit having its own access. It provided flat safe parking areas and sidewalks, bigger and more elevators, wide halls and windows which presented a bright, happy and pleasant working environment. The Boone property was in two buildings which could not accommodate co-located working units with their own access no matter how much remodeling took place. Parking and sidewalks are on a hill which is slippery when wet. It had one small elevator and narrow halls which did not adequately accommodate more than one wheel chair, and one ground floor where no windows could ever be remodeled into the building leaving a dark, dingy and unpleasant environment. Importantly, every committee member except for the staff member came to the conclusion that the Phillips and Company property was the lowest and best bid. There is no statutory or rule requirement that one scoring method be preferred over another. The only requirement is that the method be rational and reasonable especially where highly subjective, but legitimate criteria are involved in the selection of a particular piece of property. On these facts, the individual scoring methods used by the individual committee members were not arbitrary and capricious, but were very rational and reasonably related to the relative importance the committee members gave the above factors. After reviewing and considering information from the bid evaluation committee, the information on the bid synopsis sheet, and the oral recommendations of Mr. Bates, Mr. Peters and Mr. Pastucha, Ms. Schembera concluded that the Phillips property was vastly better, even considering costs. She found it to be materially superior in terms of construction, organization, client accessibility, handicap accessibility, repairability (in terms of walls), and maneuverability for clients and staff. She felt the Phillips' building's qualities would offer more "humanity" to the process of serving the Department's clients. Additional facts she considered when making her decision included the morale of the staff and their productivity; the ability of staff and clients to conduct their business in a reasonably pleasant, comfortable, safe, and easy to understand and comprehend environment; and the desire to provide a minimally adequate work space. In addition to other monetary costs, she considered energy costs and life cycle costs as reflected on the bid synopsis sheet. The bid synopsis sheet defined minimal energy and life cycle costs to be anything less than 55 BTU's per square feet per year. In this case, the Boone property reflected 39.5 BTU's per square feet and the Phillips property reflected 53.5 BTU's per square feet. Both properties were under the 55 BTU cutoff established by HRS. Translated into monetary figures (life cycle costs) the Boone property reflected a cost of $26,735.00 and the Phillips property reflected a cost of $41,160.00. It was the difference between the energy figures which caught Ms. Schembera's eye. In her layman's opinion, it was incomprehensible that the two buildings would have such a wide divergence of energy costs. /3 She learned from her staff that the information used to compute these costs was supplied by the bidders who had vested interests in the outcome. Ms. Schembera concluded the cost difference was minimal and not of overriding concern in relation to the physical characteristics of the two buildings and how they compared to each other. She quite correctly felt the two buildings were not comparable. In essence, the two buildings' differences in design location and construction rendered neither building comparable to the other building as a like facility under Section 255.254, Florida Statutes. 4/ Based on that information she gave the energy figures relatively little weight. More importantly, however, before the final bid award was made by HRS, the Division of General Services within HRS in its failsafe role in reviewing bids considered the life cycle cost figures of the two bids. The minimal language of Section 255.254, Florida Statutes, has been interpreted by HRS to mean that anything under 55 BTU's is minimal and except in one instance not applicable here, numerical differences under 55 BTU's are immaterial. The Division, without getting into the issue of the likeness of the facilities, concluded that both bids met the Department's interpretation of the "minimal" language of Section 255.254, Florida Statutes, and the relative numerical difference in the energy costs was immaterial. Ms. Schembera is entitled to rely on other more expert HRS Division staff to ensure a proper analysis of highly technical bid specifications such as the energy cost analysis required under Section 255.254, Florida Statutes. It does not matter that the review took place after Ms. Schembera had made her preliminary decision. What is important is that the review be made either personal or vicariously through staff before the final award is made. A proper review of energy costs was, therefore, made by Respondent before the final award was made. Likewise, Ms. Schembera's ultimate decision that the buildings were not comparable like facilities was a proper review of energy costs even though that conclusion was arrived at through a layman's unsophisticated, but more accurate intuition and common sense. To that extent, the energy cost data had no impact on the ultimate choice made by the District Administrator and were properly considered by the District Administrator. 5/ A letter for Ms. Schembera's signature adopting the committee's recommendation was drafted by Mr. Pastucha. The letter was signed and sent to the Department's Division of General Services for review. The District was requested to provide additional justification for its choice by the Department's Division of General Services. Mr. Rashied was directed to draft the response. He simply reorganized the original memorandum into a format more compatible with the Division's direction, clarified a few points and without significantly changing the content, submitted the response as directed. The Division acquiesced in Ms. Schembera's decision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing Case NO. 88-4900BID, and awarding lease number 590:1984 to Phillips and Company as the lowest and best bidder. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1988.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1994, the Respondent received and opened bids for its Project No. HSMV 92044000, Repairs, Art Sutton Drivers' License Office, Miami, Florida (the Project). The bid specification documents (the Specifications) for the Project included requirements for a Base Bid and for specific alternate proposals with respect to three defined items of alternate work. Section 01100 of the Specifications stated that "[a]ll Alternates described in this Section are required to be reflected on the Bid Form as submitted by the bidder." Part 2 of that section provided: ALTERNATE NO. 1 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the removal of existing window units and the installation of new units as indicated in plans and specification Section 08520. ALTERNATE NO. 2 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the provision of communications conductors see specification Section 16400. ALTERNATE No. 3 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the installation of all landscape materials as indicated on plans and as per specification Section 02960. Also included in the Specifications as Exhibit 4 was a Proposal Form. The Specifications required each bidder to submit this form in triplicate on the bidder's letterhead. With respect to alternates, the Proposal Form required: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ The Respondent's architect received four bids on August 31, 1994. As recorded on the Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation, three bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates, as well as a Base Bid. The Bid Tabulation shows that two bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates and included the alternate prices in their Base Bids. The Petitioner provided specific prices for the three alternates, but excluded the alternate prices from its Base Bid. The fourth bidder provided a specific price for only one alternate and excluded that alternate price from its Base Bid. (The fourth bidder was disqualified as non-responsive for failing to submit prices on all three alternates.) In pertinent part, the Petitioner's proposal read: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications: Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct . . . $4,400.00 Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct . . . $1,158.00 Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct . . . $2,084.00 These Alternates were in addition to the Petitioner's Base bid of $204,322.00. The proposal form submitted by the Petitioner comports with Exhibit 4 to the Specifications, which was the mandatory Proposal Form. On August 31, 1994, William Phillip Austin, Peitioner's President, wrote the architect: Per our telephone conversation this date regard- ing the confusion relating to the Add/Deduct for Alternates 1, 2 and 3 for the above project, please be advised that our base bid did not include the work described in the Alternates. As stated if you want work described in Alternates 1, 2 and 3, you must add the cost to our base bid. The base bid including Alternates 1, 2 and 3 would, therefore, be $211,964.00. If we can provide additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. The Respondent's architect completed and submitted the bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation to the Respondent in early September. The document clearly discloses the amounts of each bidder's Base Bid and Alternate proposals. Using plus (+) and minus (-) signs, the Bid Tabulation further shows each bidder's method of calculation. The record is devoid of evidence that the Respondent had any problem in evaluating the bids and identifying the lowest bidder. The Petitioner was the lowest bidder on any combination of base bid plus or minus any or all alternates. Subsequently the Petitioner received a NOTICE OF AWARD RECOMMENDATION dated October 4, 1994. The Notice informed the Petitioner that the Respondent "has recommended that the contract be awarded to your firm in the total amount of $211,964.00, accepting the Base Bid and Alternates #1, #2 & #3. The Administrator of Contracts Design and Permitting, Division of Building Construction, Department of Management Services, State of Florida will consider this recommendation." Larry R. Coleman, Construction Projects Administrator, signed the letter. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt. A representative of the second lowest bidder, Kalex Construction, then contacted the Respondent, complaining of the Award Recommendation. The grounds for the Kalex complaint are not in the record. However, on October 14, 1994, H. R. Hough, the Respondent's Contracts Administrator, sent the Petitioner a letter "to notify you of the State's decision to reject all bids on the above referenced project due to ambiguities in the specifications." Mr. Hough's reasons for the rejection are "other than those stated by the protestor," Kalex. The Respondent's Rule 60D-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, states: Determination of Successful Bidder. All projects except where competitive bidding is waived under the provisions of Rule 60D-5.008 will be publicly bid in accordance with the provisions in the project specifications bidding documents. Award of contract will be made to the responsive bidder, determined to be qualified in accordance with the provisions herein and meeting the requirements of the bidding documents, that submits the lowest valid bid for the work. The lowest bid will be determined as follows: The lowest bid will be the bid from the responsive bidder that has submitted the lowest price for the base bid or the base bid plus the additive alternates or less the deductive alternates chosen by the Agency to be included in or excluded from the proposed contract, taken in numerical order listed in the bid documents. The order of the alternates may be selected by the Agency in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. Under the above-quoted rule, the Respondent compares bids beginning with the lowest "base bid." The Respondent is of the view that for this comparison to be fair and equal, all bidders must include the same scope of work in the "base bid." The Respondent does not interpret the above-quoted rule to allow deductive alternates from some bidders and additive alternates from others. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, the Respondent's interpretation and application of the above-quoted rule is erroneous.) The Specifications contain some ambiguous and inconsistent language regarding whether alternates should be treated as additive or deductive. The ambiguous and inconsistent language did not provide any bidder with an advantage or a disadvantage, nor did it otherwise affect the fairness of the bidding process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a Final Order in this case awarding a contract for the subject project to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of December 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: This is primarily a statement of position and is addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 2 through 10: Accepted in substance with a few unnecessary details omitted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. Third sentence is accepted as an accurate statement of how Respondent has been interpreting the subject rule, but is not accepted as constituting a correct interpretation of the rule. Paragraph 8: Rejected as misleading and confusing because the "scope of work" to be performed under the contract can only be determined after the Respondent decides which alternates to include and which to exclude. Paragraph 9: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy J. Armstrong, Esquire Armstrong & Mejer Suite 1111 Douglas Centre 2600 Douglas Road Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an invitation to bid on March 13, 1992. Bid number SB 92-244I involved the disassembly and removal of an existing walk-in freezer and the furnishing and installation of a new walk-in freezer at Coral Sunset Elementary School. The invitations to bid provided in paragraph Y of the Special Conditions: Failure to file a specification protest within the time prescribed in Florida Statutes 120.53 3.(b) shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (sic) Bid specifications were included in the invitations to bid issued on March 13, 1992. Twenty-three bids were solicited. There were five responses. One of the responses was submitted by Choice Restaurant Equipment, Inc. ("Choice"). Choice is a vendor for equipment manufactured by Petitioner, Nor-Lake, Inc. ("Nor-Lake"). Nor-Lake is an out-of-state corporation with manufacturer's representatives in numerous states including Florida. 4, Petitioner, CHD Marketing Group ("CHD"), is the manufacturer's representative for Nor-Lake in Florida. CHD represents no other manufacturer of the product included in the bid response. Choice is a sales agent for CHD and other manufacturer's representatives in Florida. Choice sells the products of a variety of manufacturers but is the exclusive sales agent for CHD pursuant to a verbal agency agreement. Choice timely submitted a bid for bid number SB 92-244I on April 8, 1992, prior to the bid deadline of 2:00 p.m. on the same day. The successful bidder submitted its bid by Federal Express at 4:51 p.m on April 8, 1992. Respondent's Department of Purchasing and Stores (the "Department") had stated on March 13, 1992, when the invitations to bid were issued, that bid responses must be received by the Department no later than 2:00 p.m. on April 8, 1992, at the Department's address at 3980 RCA Boulevard/Suite 8044, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, 33410-4276. Prior to April 8, 1992, the Department relocated to a new facility at 3326 Forest Hill Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. The new address was posted at the old location and Department representatives were present at the old address to accept walk-in bids. Federal Express first attempted to deliver the successful bid at the Department's old address at 10:30 a.m. on April 8, 1992. Federal Express delivered the successful bid to the Department's new address at 4:51 p.m. At 2:00 p.m. on the same day, The Department announced that all bids were in and opened the bids that had been delivered. The successful bid and one other bid were delivered on April 8, 1992, after the public opening conducted at 2:00 p.m. on the same day. Bids were tabulated on April 9, 1992. Bid tabulations were posted on April 13, 1992, and the successful bid was announced. The successful bid was for $8,174.00. Three bids were lower than the successful bid. Choice's bid was for $7,742.56. The other two lower bids were for $8,020.00 and $6,620.00. All three lower bids were rejected as non- responsive. Choice's bid was rejected because it did not meet bid specifications for 22 gauge steel, thermostatically controlled door heaters, and reinforced steel door panels. CHD filed a Notice of Protest on April 14, 1992, and a Formal Written Protest on April 24, 1992. CHD's protest alleges that: Choice's bid was lower than that of the successful bidder; the successful bid was not timely made; the bids were not opened publicly in violation of bidding procedure requirements; and the bid specifications were arbitrary and capricious, favored one bidder, and that Choice's bid was responsive. Neither a notice of protest nor a formal written protest was submitted by Choice or Nor-Lake. Neither Choice nor Nor-Lake attended the informal protest conference conducted on April 30, 1992. On May 7, 1992, Respondent's Office of General Counsel issued its written notice of proposed agency action. The written notice recommended that the bid be awarded to the successful bidder and that CHD's protest be dismissed for lack of standing. CHD requested a formal hearing on May 14, 1992, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer on May 15, 1992. The bid submitted by Choice was prepared by CHD but signed by the president of Choice. Neither Nor-Lake nor CHD signed a bid or were otherwise bidders of record for bid number SB 92-244I. Neither Choice, CHD, nor Nor-Lake, filed a notice of protest concerning the bid specifications within 72 hours after Choice received the notice of the project plans and specifications on March 13, 1992. The sole basis upon which CHD claims it is substantially affected is the adverse economic impact caused to it by the proposed agency action. The proposed agency action will result in lost sales from this and future transactions. CHD will lose commissions from this and future transactions. The dealer relationship between CHD and Choice will be damaged because Choice will not want to sell a freezer that is not acceptable to Respondent. The marketing strategy developed between CHD and Nor-Lake will be damaged because it is conditioned upon the award of public contracts.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby note the following findings of fact: Notice and Invitation to Bid on State Project Number 72001-3448 (the project) was extended to various contractors by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, on August 1, 1985. Sealed bids on the project were opened August 28, 1985. The scope of the project involved cleaning and painting the structural steel of the Buckman Bridge over the St. Johns River in Jacksonville, Florida. (State Bridge Numbers 720249 and 720343). The bids were opened and Petitioner was the apparent low bidder on the project with a bid amount of $193,000. The Department of Transportation, on October 2, 1985, rejected all bids "due to error in quantities in plans." According to the contract plans and specifications utilized by the Department of Transportation for the project, the beams, girders, bracing and trusses were composed of 2,540 tons of structural steel. The plans were in error and the tonnage of structural steel was less than 2,540 tons. Petitioner, upon visiting the job site as required, immediately recognized that there was less steel in the bridge than shown in the plans. In submitting and formulating his bid, the Petitioner considered the amount of work and materials which would actually be required to complete the project. 6 Prior to the bids being posted on the project, the Department of Transportation discovered that the amount of structural steel noted in the plans was grossly overestimated. On October 2, 1985, the Department of Transportation notified bidders in writing that all bids submitted on the project were rejected and that the plans would be revised and the project relet.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the petition of Industrial Enterprise Sandblast and Painting, Inc., protesting the rejection of all bids on State Project No. 72001- 3448, be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of December 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December 1985. APPENDIX Respondent's Findings of Fact FINDING RULING Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraph 1. Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraph 2. Accepted, but not included because subordinate. Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraph 4. Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraphs 3 and 6. Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraphs 3 and 6. Accepted; see Recommended Order paragraph 6. COPIES FURNISHED: HONORABLE THOMAS E. DRAWDY, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 A. J. SPALLA, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 562 HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 LARRY D. SCOTT, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING, M.S. 58 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301-8064 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE SANDBLAST & PAINTING, INC. P. O. BOX 1547 1502 FOX RUN DRIVE TARPON SPRINGS, FLORIDA 32486-1547
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Corrections, by advertisement in a Jackson County, Florida newspaper on March 27, March 30 and April 6, 1988, sought bids for the provision of office space for the Department's offices in Marianna. The bid specifications, including, as pertinent hereto; minimum square footage, a requirement that Energy Performance Index calculations and certification thereof by an architect or engineer be shown, and the requirement that all parking spaces be on site, was made available to potential bidders on March 28. A pre-proposal conference of potential bidders was held on March 31 to explain and clarify the specifications. Bids were submitted by the two Petitioners, and the bids were opened on April 14, 1988. On or about April 19 or 20, Wendell Beall and Robert Sandall evaluated the bid proposals and made a preliminary determination that the Rainbow bid was non-responsive in three areas. It was determined that the required square footage depicted on the Rainbow bid was inadequate; the parking provision was inadequate in that not enough "on-site" spaces were shown on the bid; and the Energy Performance Index calculations and certification by an architect or engineer was not supplied. On April 21, 1988, the lease committee, chaired by Thomas Young, met and reviewed both bid packages submitted by the Petitioners and affirmed Mr. Beall and Mr. Sandall's findings, with the result that the agency decided to award the contract to Brooks. The bid specifications required a minimum of 12,756 net square feet of rentable office space. Only 11,862 square feet could be identified as net rentable square footage on the Rainbow bid's floor plan, as calculated in compliance with the "standard method of space measurement." This square footage calculation was consistent with the actual measurements of the building made by Mr. Beall himself. The Brooks' bid depicted an adequate amount of square footage in compliance with the specifications. Mr. Beall calculated the net rentable interior square footage by utilizing the standard method of space measurement provided for in the rules of the Department of General Services and, after deducting nonusable, nonrentable space under that standard, rule mandated method, he arrived at the net rentable office space figure of 11,862 square feet. Rainbow at no time has presented any conflicting measurement or alleged any specific errors in Mr. Beall's calculations. Item A-10 of the bid specifications requires a floor plan to be submitted showing the present configurations of the building, with measurements that equate to the required net rentable square footage. This means that the minimum square footage must be shown in the floor plan attached and submitted with the bid specifications, even if the building may contain more square footage. The Department supplied a specific number of offices of various sizes and a required configuration no floor plan in order to depict work units that should be constructed and/or arranged together, as part of the specifications in the Invitation to Bid documents. The purpose of this agency floor plan was to give potential bidders a guide to calculate the cost of remodeling existing space to meet the agency's needs so that those potential bidders could amortize that cost as part of the rental amount involved. Therefore, the proposed floor plan included in a bidder's package should not vary substantially from the final plan used to actually remodel the leased space in accordance with the agency's requirements. Accordingly, the only submittal of plans which is permissible subsequent to the bid opening, as contemplated by the bid specifications, are the final plans developed by a successful bidder in consultation with the agency after the bid award. No floor plan may be unilaterally submitted by a bidder after the bid opening since that would constitute an illegal amendment of the bid. Only a floor plan done in consultation with the agency in order to make final adjustments so that all office space and other related space will comply with the agency's precise requirements may be done after the bid is actually awarded, and this must be based upon the floor plan originally submitted in the bid itself in conformance with the bid specifications regarding office layout, square footage and the like. The Rainbow bid simply contained an inadequate amount of square footage necessary to be a responsive bid in this regard. An additional bid specification at issue concerns the requirement of 77 exclusive use, on-site parking spaces. The Rainbow bid only made provision for 27 on-site exclusive parking spaces, with the remaining 50 spaces of the required 77 being off the proposed building site, approximately 155 feet away, without sidewalk access to the proposed office building. The Brooks' bid incorporated all required parking spaces on the site, as required by the specifications. The Rainbow bid was non-responsive concerning the parking space specification as well. Mr. Beall prepared the bidding documents as Budget Manager for the Department of Corrections' Region I. He was the person designated in the bidding documents to answer any questions requiring clarification by prospective bidders before bids were prepared and submitted. Mr. Beall established that the intent of the agency with regard to this parking space requirement was to require all 77 parking spaces to be on-site. No bidder or prospective bidder asked any questions of Mr. Beall concerning this specification prior to the submittal of any of the bids. Mr. Brooks, however, did consult with Mr. Beall on the question of the Energy Performance Index specification item before he submitted his bid. Mr. Brooks is a former physics and advanced mathematics teacher with some 20 years experience in construction. He has been a licensed general contractor and master builder for residential, commercial and industrial types of construction for 11 years. He typically designs and draws his own plans, including those submitted with the bid at issue. He spent approximately 100 hours of his time on preparation of this bid. Mr. Brooks had previously been awarded a rid by the Department of Corrections on which he simply invalid the item concerning the Energy Performance Index (EPI) specification. That item was found to be responsive by the Department, and the bid was awarded to Mr. Brooks. On a subsequent bid on a different job, Mr. Brooks again merely initialed the EPI specification, which he intended to mean that he would perform the job at issue such that the EPI requirements would be met. He was not awarded the bid on that particular job, but upon his informally notifying the Department of Corrections that he might protest the decision to award the bid to a different bidder, the Department personnel advised him that they might choose to raise the issue of his responsiveness to the EPI specification in that situation. With this history in mind, Mr. Brooks, before submitting his bid, contacted Mr. Beall to inquire as to what would be considered an appropriate response to the EPI specification on the bidding documents. The EPI has been calculated by Mr. Brooks on numerous projects in the past, and he is capable of calculating it as to this project. He found, however, that it would be impossible to calculate a precise and accurate EPI specification response, because he would not have the final floor plan from which to calculate it, with all the information that would give him concerning room configurations, size, location and size of windows, size and type of heating and air-conditioning equipment and many other factors. Mr. Brooks could, however, give his certification that the energy performance requirement would be met, once the final plans were completed in conjunction with discussion with the agency after award of the bid, which comports with standard agency policy and practice. Because he was concerned that any energy performance calculations he might supply would not necessarily be accurate in the final analysis, in relation to the final "to be constructed" plans, Mr. Brooks contacted Mr. Beall to obtain his guidance about what would be considered a proper response to this specification item. Mr. Beall advised him that a letter certifying that he would comply with the specification as to this issue would be an appropriate alternative to simply initialing the specification. The same opinion was also voiced at the lease committee meeting. Mr. Beall's advice to Mr. Brooks in this regard was based upon advice given him by Mr. Edwin Johnson of the Department of General Services and was based upon past agency policy concerning treatment of this issue on previous bids considered by the lease committee. Previous bids had indeed been accepted in the form submitted by Mr. Brooks and had not been found to be nonresponsive as to the EPI issue. Thus, Mr. Brooks, in addition to initialing the specification concerning the EPI, also supplied the referenced letter certifying that he would comply with that specification and agency requirement. Rainbow, on the other hand, merely initialed that item in the specification and bidding document. Thus, the Brooks' bid is the more responsive on the issue of the EPI than the Rainbow bid. The bid award to Brooks was posted on May 2, and on May 4, Rainbow filed a Notice of Protest of she award which was received by the Department, timely on May 5. Shortly after that date, counsel for Rainbow requested that the Department's representatives and counsel meet with him and Mr. Jett, his client, of Rainbow Properties, to discuss the agency's award to Brooks and rejection of Rainbow's bid. On May 10, 1988, the Department's regional representatives and its counsel met with Mr. Jett of Rainbow Properties and his attorney, Mr. Barley. Mr. Jett used this opportunity to explain how he felt that the Rainbow bid had complied with the bid specifications in the three specific areas discussed above. The Department's counsel explained on that occasion that the bid could not be amended after opening and posting of the bids. Mr. Jett's bid had only shown 11,862 square feet identifiable as rentable space in the floor plan submitted with the bid, although 12,756 square feet were required by the bid specifications. Additionally, as discussed above, of the 77 required on-site parking spaces, only 27 were provided on site with 50 of them being off site, with Rainbow not establishing that it had ownership or right of control to the off site spaces. Additionally, as discussed above, there was the problem of no calculations or assurances being provided regarding the EPI specification, it merely having been initialed in Rainbow's bid submittal. At the May 10 meeting, Mr. Jett was given the opportunity to explain how his bid complied with the specifications at issue and to discuss how he felt the Department had misinterpreted his response or made an error in measuring or calculating the square footage available in his building. He provided no alternative calculations or measurements of the building, however, which would depict more than the 11,862 square feet measured by the Department's staff or which would show that measurement was incorrect. He was reminded that the only possible information he could legally provide the agency after the opening of bids was in the nature of minor clarification concerning how he had calculated the square footage. He was instructed that he could not revise his plans in order to establish that more square footage was available because that would be an illegal amendment of his bid after the bids were open and posted. At the May 10 meeting Mr. Jett also maintained that the Department had allowed for other than on site parking; however, but the bidding document or Invitation to Bid only contained one blank, and only one subsection on the bidding form, for the bidders to indicate 77 spaces designated as on site spaces. Mr. Jett maintained that since the Department had provided option "(A)" under this on-site parking specification item, that he was therefore free to add other options. Using that logic, however, it would also appear that he could have submitted a bid depicting spaces literally on the other side of town and still had a responsive bid. That clearly is not the correct interpretation of that specification. He also maintained that the EPI was impossible to calculate at the time of bidding, in view of the fact that final plans were not available to support the ultimate calculation. In any event, at the conclusion of this meeting, Department personnel informed Mr. Jett and his counsel that would inform him of its decision within a few days. The Department did not inform Mr. Jett that he would be permitted to amend his bid after obtaining professional help and redrawing his blueprint in an effort to show that the minimum square footage was available. Indeed, Rainbow and Mr. Jett did obtain the services of an architect and drew a new floor plan which it offered as PR-1 at the hearing. If the floor plan originally attached to Rainbow's bid, consisting of Exhibit PR-2 in evidence, is compared with the blueprint submitted by the architect after the meeting with the Department representatives on May 10, it can be discerned that the blueprint is not a mere refinement or clarification of the initial floor plan, but rather that major modifications have been made to the initial floor plan submitted with the bid. These consist of walls which have been moved, small rooms in some areas which have been eliminated, restrooms which have been deleted and an existing spiral staircase area which was eliminated, and a hallway enclosed, in order to add additional rentable square footage where new offices could be added. Thus, this blueprint offered at hearing was not a mere refinement or clarification of the original floor plan submitted with the Rainbow bid, but rather sufficiently different from original floor plan as to constitute a material amendment or modification to the bid. It therefore cannot be considered. The floor plan submitted with the bid was nonconforming to the bid specifications as to the square footage item and Rainbow cannot be permitted to rectify and correct that with the architect's new blueprint and floor plan offered at the time of the hearing. 1/ In short, insufficient square footage was depicted and that is not a minor waivable irregularity. Soon after this May 10 meeting, the Department changed its position, decided that both bids were not responsive and rejected them. Its alleged basis for doing so was that the Brooks bid was nonresponsive as to the energy performance index criteria and that the Rainbow bid was nonresponsive as to that criteria, as well as to those concerning minimum square footage and on-site parking availability; the same as the original grounds for rejecting Rainbow's bid. Timely formal protests of that second agency action were filed by both Brooks and Rainbow. In that connection, Rainbow's formal written protest of the original award to Brooks, which was announced and noticed on May 2, 1988, was untimely. The formal written protest must be filed within ten days of the notice of protest. Rainbow's original notice of protest was filed with the agency on May 5 and the formal written protest was not filed until May 17. Rainbow, in conjunction with its filing, filed a motion for leave to late-file the formal protest with the agency on the basis that it had mistakenly filed the formal protest with the Division of Administrative Hearings. That petition was filed with the Division on May 16th. The deadline for filing the formal protest was May 15th. Petitioner Rainbow, however, did not learn of the second intended agency action until May 16th, however, and may have been somewhat misled about the necessity of filing its formal protest by May 15th because of the informal discussion of May 10th. It is also true, however, that the informal meeting was improper, as discussed herein and was called at the behest of Rainbow without assurance that the filing time was tolled.
Recommendation In consideration of the above findings of fact and evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefor RECOMMENDED that the petition of Rainbow Properties, a Florida general partnership, should be denied and dismissed for the reasons found and concluded above, and that the petition of C. Leon Brooks be GRANTED and that the subject bid be awarded to C. Leon Brooks. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1988.
The Issue The issue is whether Kelly Services is the lowest responsive bidder on Bid No. 89-23 and should be awarded the bid.
Findings Of Fact On June 2, 1988, the School Board of Bay County issued Bid Request No. 89-23 for garbage collection services at thirteen locations. A quotation sheet was included in the bid package. The quotation sheet indicated the thirteen locations with a blank next to each location and a dollar sign in front of each blank where each bidder was to indicate its average monthly total charge for each location. There was also a quotation schedule where the bidder was to indicate the calculations which went into the total bid for each location. The bid request provided: The Board reserves the right to waive formalities and to reject any and all bids or to accept any bid or combination of bids deemed in the Board's best interest and the decision of the Board will be final. Bidders desiring that their bid be considered on an all-or-none basis, either in whole or part, shall so indicate. It is the intent of this bid request to secure prices and establish contracts for garbage collection services for the twelve schools specified herein and the District Maintenance Department. Awards will be made by location and will be based on an average monthly total charge as calculated on the quotation sheet. The bids were opened at 10:00 am., June 13, 1988, at the offices of the Bay County School Board. Three completed bid packages were submitted. Kelly Services, Argus and M&O each submitted a completed bid quotation sheet containing the bid for each location. M&O also submitted a letter which stated: We would like to submit this bid on an all- or-nothing basis as specified in paragraph four of the cover letter to the bid. For an estimated cost of $3,391.84. The quotation sheet and quotation schedule submitted by M&O did not reflect the all-or-nothing bid amount. Instead, the quotation sheet and quotation schedule showed a total bid of $3,738.24 when calculated by location. Based on the bids submitted by each bidder as shown on the quotation sheet add quotation schedules, Kelly Services was low bidder on five locations (Callaway, Tyndall, Waller, Southport, and Cedar Grove) ; Argus was low bidder on six locations (Parker, Hiland, Haney, Mosley, Beach and Merritt Brown); and M&O was low bidder on two locations (West Bay and the District Maintenance Department). Prior to the deadline for submitting bids, John Harrison, Purchasing Agent for the Board, responded to an inquiry from M&O by advising M&O that it could submit two bids, one as specified in the Bid Request by location and one as an all-or- nothing bid. No other bidders were advised that they could submit two bids. At the bid opening, M&O did not submit a quotation sheet or schedule for its all-or-nothing bid. A bid which did not have a breakdown per dump per container per facility would not be acceptable to the Board and does not meet the specifications in the Bid Request. The breakdown per dump per container per location is necessary to verify proper invoicing for specific locations on months when there is a change in the number of dumps or containers at that location. After opening the bids, the Board compiled the low bid for each location and then totaled that list. That total of $3,606.09 was greater than the all-or-nothing bid by M&O. Because M&O's all-or-nothing bid failed to meet the specifications by not having a location breakdown the Board contacted M&O to determine if its "estimated" bid was firm and to request a breakdown on the quotation schedule form for the all- or-nothing bid. On June 15, 1988, two days after the bid opening, M&O submitted a letter to the Board clarifying that its all-or- nothing bid was a firm bid for each location and M&O submitted a quotation schedule for each location per dump per container (see page 7 of Joint Exhibit 1 and the last page of Joint Exhibit 2). The charge for each location in this quotation schedule is different than the quotation schedule submitted by M&O at the bid opening and is for the most part lower per location than either M&O's first quotation schedule or the low bids taken from the quotation schedules submitted at the bid opening. Based on the letter and all-or-nothing quotation schedule filed by M&O on June 15, 1988, the Board determined to award the bid for garbage collection services to M&O for the all- or-nothing bid of $3,391.84.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that The School Board of Bay County enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and readvertising the bid request for garbage collection services as specified in Bid Request No. 89-23. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-3768BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Kelly Services: 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 4-6(3); 7-11(7-11); and 12 (9) Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, School Board of Bay County: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 3(10&11); and 5(8). Proposed findings of fact 6, 7, and 9 are irrelevant. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 2 is unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The remainder of proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 3. Proposed finding of fact 4 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 5 is rejected as being argumentative, conclusory and unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed finding of fact 8 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Argus Services, Inc.: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1-3); 6-8(5); 9 & 10(6) 11(3); and 12(11). Proposed findings of fact 1 and 5 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 13-17 are rejected as constituting argument and not findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey P. Whitton Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1956 Panama City, Florida 32402 Franklin R. Harrison Attorney at Law 304 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott W. Clemons Attorney at Law Post Office Box 860 Panama City, Florida 32402 School Board of Bay County Post Office Drawer 820 Panama City, Florida 32402-0820 M&O Sanitation, Inc. 266 N. Star Avenue Panama City, Florida 32404
Findings Of Fact Respondent HRS published ITB 590:2306 for existing rental space in the central area of Brooksville, Florida. The bid solicitation specified a bid opening time and date of 2:00 p.m. July 17, 1991. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted sealed bids. They were the only two bidders. Neither they nor anyone else timely filed any protest of the bid specifications, and therefore the specifications are not subject to attack in this proceeding. Petitioner received a notice of intent to award the bid for lease 590:2306 to Intervenor by letter from Respondent dated August 27, 1991 and timely filed its notice of intent to protest and formal bid protest. Petitioner accordingly has standing to bring this proceeding. Intervenor is the intended awardee and as such has standing to intervene. Petitioner submitted the property located at 7348 Broad Street, Brooksville, Florida, and showed in his bid submittal form that his proposed property contained 22,500 net square feet, with future expansion of 2,100 square feet available. When Petitioner submitted his bid, it included a floor plan, site plan, and a PUR 7068 form. A PUR 7068 form is a "Public Entity Crime Certification Statement," a sworn statement under Section 287.133(a) F.S. The ITB included two separate requirements for bidders to establish that they have control over the property that they submit to HRS. HRS' purposes in requiring bidders to demonstrate control are to prevent bids based on total speculation, to establish a reasonable expectation that the bidder can meet his obligations if awarded the bid, and to establish a reasonable expectation that the property can be occupied on time. Item 1 on page 3 provides as follows: Control of property - This pertains to both the structure(s) and proposed parking areas. To submit a responsive bid, a prospective lessor must meet one of the following qualifications: a.) Be the owner of record of the facility and parking areas (submit copy of deed). b.) Be the lessee of space being proposed and present with bid, a copy of lease with documen- tation of authorization to sublease the facility and parking areas through the base lease term and all renewal option periods. c.) Submit documentation of an option to purchase the facility and/or parking areas. d.) Submit documentation of an option to lease the facility with authorization to in turn, sublease. Any lease must encompass the entire time period of the basic lease and any renewal option periods as required the state. e.) Submit form PUR. 7068 Sworn Statement of Public Entity Crimes (Attachment H). Page 12 provides, in part, as follows: In order for a bid proposal to be accepted the items 1 through 6 must be included in the bid proposal. Items 7 through 11 must be included, if applicable. [Items 11 and 13 state:] 11. Documentation showing bidder as controller of property. 13. Public Enemy [sic] Crime Certification Statement A pre-bid conference attended by Petitioner made clear that evidence of control and the PUR 7068 form were two different items. Petitioner testified that he attached the PUR 7068 form as his sole basis for evidencing control of the building and parking spaces he submitted for lease, and acknowledged that, in fact, the form did not provide any information with regard to his control of the buildings or parking spaces offered for lease. Petitioner's assertion that his name on some of his site plans, etc. constitutes evidence of control is not persuasive. Such assertion is not in line with the ITB requirements or even common sense. Petitioner Proctor owned the buildings he offered HRS in his bid submittal. Petitioner offered multiple buildings separated by parking areas and driveways. The property offered by Petitioner was to have built an awning- covered walkway between buildings but the walkway would have to be placed through the driveway area of the property. The expansion area for Petitioner's property designated in its bid submittal was composed of approximately 10 gated warehouse units which would be converted to office space. Petitioner had leased a portion of the same premises to HRS for 15 years, and HRS was still leasing that portion at the time of the bid opening. At the time of the bid opening, another portion of the property Petitioner proposed to be leased to HRS was also already rented to other tenants, including a lease to the Florida Department of Labor which was not scheduled to expire until December 31, 1991, one day prior to HRS' proposed first day of occupancy under the ITB. The space leased to the Department of Labor would require some renovation for HRS' use, at least to connect it on the interior with the rest of the building. The remainder of the second, adjacent, building to be rented under Petitioner's bid would require more extensive renovation to create office spaces to meet HRS' needs. In addition to the Department of Labor, Petitioner was also renting space in the second building to a beauty salon, a book store, an office supply store, a clothing store, and a barber at the time of bid submittal and opening and at the time of the formal hearing. These latter tenants were on month-to-month leases. In order to ensure that there would be time for necessary renovations before January 1, 1992 and further to ensure that the property would be available for occupancy on January 1, 1992, the ITB required in the following unequivocal language that all bidders file tenant acknowledgments of the bid/proposed lease with their bid submittal: Existing Tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date must be included with the bid submittal. [Emphasis added] Petitioner submitted no tenant acknowledgments from any of his tenants with his bid to HRS. Even though Petitioner failed to submit evidence of control in the form of a deed and further failed to submit the required acknowledgments from tenants occupying the premises on the bid date, HRS did not immediately disqualify Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive. Instead, HRS evaluated Petitioner's bid simultaneously with Intervenor TCC's bid. HRS relied on old leases in its files and actual knowledge that monthly rent was paid to Petitioner for its own currently leased space, and HRS ignored the absence of tenant acknowledgments with Petitioner's bid. HRS followed this course of action despite the requirement of the ITB on page 7, item 1 under EVALUATION OF BIDS which unequivocally provides: Bids received are first evaluated to determine technical responsiveness. This includes submittal on bid submittal forms, inclusion of required information, data, attachments, signatures and notarization, etc. Non responsive [sic] bids will be withdrawn from further consideration. The portion of the ITB designated, Documents Required To Be Submitted With Bid Submittal For Existing Buildings on page 12, item 4. required bidders to submit "Scale Floor Plans showing present configurations with dimensions." Page 3 of 22, Item 9.(b) further required that, as a part of the bid submittal, bidders were to provide "A scaled (1/16" or 1/8" or 1/4" = 1'0") floor plan showing present configuration with measurements." Contrary to the ITB requirement, Petitioner submitted a floor plan scaled at 1/20" = 1', which also failed to reflect the present configurations with all measurements. Petitioner's scaled floor plan submitted with his bid was prepared prior to the present addition to one building and contained a hand- drawn configuration without accurate measurements for the northwest corner of one building. The term of the lease as shown on the ITB and Bid Submittal Form was 9 and one-half years with an option to renew for 2-5 year renewal periods. At the time of the bid opening on July 17, 1991, the bid submitted by Petitioner failed to have any proposed rental rates shown for "Renewal Options: Option II years 1 through 5." HRS permitted Petitioner to correct or supplement its bid after the bid opening (same date and place) to cover this material omission. Page 6, item 4 of the ITB provided for the property owner or other bidding entity to sign the bid submission. The pertinent part states: 4. Each bid submitted shall be signed by the owner(s) corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. ALL BID SUBMITTAL SIGNATURES MUST BE WITNESSED BY TWO PERSONS. [Emphasis appears in ITB] Petitioner Proctor signed his bid submittal in proper person. TCC's bid submittal was signed by Sharon K. Lane, "Executive Director," of TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc., Intervenor herein. At all times material, TCC Number 3 Ltd. Inc. has been a Florida corporation. At the time of the bid opening, Ms. Lane was TCC's sole shareholder and "all officers." At the time of formal hearing, Ms. Lane remained the sole shareholder, but others had assumed some of the corporate offices. Her status at the time of the bid submittal was sufficient for her to bid on behalf of the TCC corporation and to execute the PUR 7068 form on that corporation's behalf. Intervenor TCC submitted the required PUR 7068 form, but TCC submitted as sole evidence of control an undated, unrecorded "Contract for Sale and Purchase" by and between Hernando Plaza Ltd. as Seller and Intervenor TCC as Buyer, for the property which Intervenor was offering for lease to HRS. The best date assignable to this document is April 29, 1991. It was executed on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves as general partners of the limited partnership. TCC's obligation to proceed to closing under the foregoing contract was contingent upon TCC's securing an anchor tenant. However, the contract requires TCC to take steps to secure an anchor tenant. By its terms, TCC may purchase the property with or without an anchor tenant, but the contract requires TCC, in seeking an anchor tenant, to set time limits for the lease arrangement with the proposed anchor tenant which do not necessarily accord with the timing of HRS' bid process. HRS accepted TCC's contract to purchase from Hernando Plaza Ltd., as evidence of TCC's control of the premises offered by TCC for lease, believing it to constitute an option to purchase and the necessary evidence of control as required by the ITB. (See, Finding of Fact 6, supra.) At the time of the bid opening, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with a legal entity other than the record title owner of the property, which record title owner was and is the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation (Brown Foundation). See, infra. Up to that date, at least, Hernando Plaza Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as the owner of the property. The ITB did not require that an abstract of title be submitted with the bid, and HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contains provisions for future disclosure from successful bidders. (See, ITB item 5 under Requirements for Bidders to Submit Bids.) Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS attempts to protect itself by requiring successful bidders to put up an irrevocable letter of credit for one-half of one percent of the proposed lease rental obligation over the basic lease term as a penalty in the event a successful bidder cannot perform. (See, ITB page 4, item 10.) Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s certificate from the Florida Secretary of State expired December 31, 1981. That fact was advertised and the certificate cancelled July 16, 1982. At that time, Edward M. Strawgate was listed as a general partner and Harold Brown was listed as a limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd. Hernando Plaza Ltd. had been administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. Subsequent to the time that Intervenor submitted its bid proposal, but prior to formal hearing, Hernando Plaza Ltd. was reinstated by the Florida Secretary of State. Once reinstated, the limited partnership's ability to act related back and validated its prior actions. At all times material, the record title of the property offered by Intervenor TCC for lease to HRS was owned by "Harold Brown, Lillian Brown and Muriel Kahr as Trustees of the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation." This title is derived from a recorded June 30, 1967 warranty deed from Hernando Plaza Ltd., which deed was admitted in evidence at formal hearing. The warranty deed was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. Neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid to HRS on behalf of the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. There is also in evidence a recorded December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease between the Brown Foundation and City National Bank. That Amendment to Lease also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal to evidence control of the premises TCC was offering to lease to HRS. That Amendment to Lease also recites that Hernando Plaza Ltd. leased back the subject property from the Brown Foundation by a lease dated June 30, 1967. The June 30, 1967 lease was not recorded, was not part of TCC's bid submittal, and is not in evidence. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to recite that Hernando Plaza Ltd. has assigned its lessee interest under the June 30, 1967 lease to City National Bank by a March 14, 1978 assignment. There is also in evidence a recorded March 14, 1978 "Assignment of Lessee's Interest in Lease from Hernando Plaza Ltd. to City National Bank." This assignment was not part of TCC's bid submittal. The December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease goes on to further recite that the Brown Foundation has "agreed to give and grant to [Hernando Plaza Ltd.] an option to purchase the property." The remainder of the December 18, 1985 Amendment to Lease details the terms or conditions of the option to purchase granted by the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza. For instance, in order to exercise that option to purchase the subject property from the Brown Foundation, Hernando Plaza Ltd., among other requirements, would have to demonstrate that all the terms of the unrecorded June 30, 1967 lease are "in good standing." One may reasonably infer that "in good standing" would at a bare minimum mean that the rents under the lease are paid current at the time the option is exercised, but what the other terms of the lease might be are subject to pure conjecture. TCC's bid submittal did not include documentation that the June 30, 1967 lease was "in good standing." There is also in evidence a recorded June 7, 1989 Trustee's Deed (quitclaim deed of the trustee's interest) from City National Bank's successor bank/trustee to Hernando Plaza Ltd. The Trustee's Deed also was not attached to TCC's bid submittal. On the date of bid submittal/opening neither TCC, the corporation, nor Sharon K. Lane, individually, held any authority as agent to submit a bid on behalf of Hernando Plaza Ltd. or City National Bank's successor. At formal hearing, TCC submitted an October 24, 1991 written hearsay statement by Harold Brown as Trustee of the Brown Foundation to the effect that Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s December 18, 1985 option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation was "in full force and effect" and that the June 30, 1967 lease back from the Brown Foundation to Hernando Plaza Ltd. was "in full force and effect and that the lessee is in good standing thereunder." Assuming these items may be considered in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.58 (1) F.S. as supplementing or explaining direct evidence, they still do not clarify in any way what all the terms of the unrecorded 1967 lease are or that those terms will remain in good standing on the date in the future that Hernando Plaza Ltd. elects to exercise its option, if it elects to exercise its option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation so that Hernando Plaza Ltd. may, in turn, convey the property to TCC, pursuant to Hernando Plaza Ltd. and TCC's April 29, 1991 contract for sale and purchase. Oddly enough, there is further explanatory hearsay that on October 24, 1991, Harold Brown was a trustee of the Brown Foundation and that he also was the sole limited partner of Hernando Plaza Ltd., although TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza for sale and purchase previously indicated Harold Brown was one of two general partners. Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s option to purchase the property from the Brown Foundation must be exercised by Hernando Plaza Ltd. before Hernando Plaza Ltd. can honor its contract to purchase/sell to TCC. Since there is no record evidence that the June 30, 1967 lease from the Brown Foundation as lessor to Hernando Plaza Ltd. as lessee will be in good standing on whatever future date Hernando Plaza Ltd. attempts to exercise its option with the Brown Foundation, one may only speculate both as to when and if TCC will be able to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza Ltd. TCC has only an option to become owner of the subject property at some unspecified date conditioned upon Hernando Plaza Ltd.'s first successfully exercising its option from the Brown Foundation and further conditioned upon all the terms of TCC's contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. Apparently, TCC's only recourse to enforce its contract with Hernando Plaza Ltd. is a Circuit Court action for specific performance. TCC also submitted a site plan and floor plan with its bid submittal. The ITB required that offices on outside walls must provide windows. TCC's plans did not reflect windows in two sides of the building, but given HRS' retaining the right to partially design and locate its own halls and offices during the building's renovation, TCC's failure to show windows in the two outside walls is not, in and of itself, a material, disqualifying deviation from the ITB so as to unilaterally render TCC's bid nonresponsive. HRS staff member Donald J. Cerlanek prepared a bid synopsis of each bid. This involved completing a form from the HRS leasing manual which illustrates the characteristics of each of the bids. The bid requirements included evaluation criteria and a maximum amount of points which could be awarded for each criteria item. Five HRS bid evaluation committee members executed no conflict of interest forms. These were: Thomas C. Little Jr., David Thomley, Sylvia Smoot, Harvey Whitesides, and Mary Hawks. All committee members were given copies of the bid synopsis form to use in evaluating the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Some of the committee members did not obtain or review the actual bid submissions of each of the bidders, but all of them had access to the bid submissions and read the bid synopsis forms for both Petitioner's and Intervenor's bid submittals. The bid evaluation committee members, except for Mary Hawks, made site visits to the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Ms. Hawks essentially acted only as a facilitator or conduit for the evaluations of the other four evaluators as set out infra. The four site evaluators took notes regarding each location. The four site evaluators each assigned numerical weights to each item of evaluation criteria except for the rent and renewal rent portions of the evaluation criteria. Although on their site visits some committee members visiting TCC's site may have seen a color version of an artist's rendering of what TCC's project could look like after renovation was complete, a black and white version of the same artist's rendering was attached to TCC's bid submittal to which all committee members had access, and it is found that this situation in and of itself presented no false or misleading information nor constituted any prejudice to a fair bid process/evaluation. Likewise, although some evaluators discussed expansion prospects with TCC's and/or Proctor's on-site representatives, the evidence is credible and persuasive that each evaluator who visited the sites assessed the projects' respective expansion prospects substantially upon what they saw on each site and had experienced in Proctor's existing facility. The points awarded and reasons for the recommendations of each evaluator who visited the sites were reasonably based on specific needs of HRS. These specific needs of HRS were reasonably articulated by the two evaluators who made on-site inspections and who also testified at formal hearing and were reasonably set out in writing in the written notes of the two other evaluators who did not testify. Thomas C. Little, Jr., testified that he found the Intervenor's property superior as a result of the security problems at Petitioner's locations, the closer proximity of the courthouse, hospital, and health department to Intervenor's property and the superiority of a single building offered by Intervenor versus multiple buildings offered by Petitioner. Additionally, he found the esthetics of Petitioner's buildings lacking and expansion offered by Petitioner limited and was concerned that HRS would outgrow the space due to the fact that their service area is one of the most rapidly growing in Florida. His contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Sylvia Smoot, also a member of the evaluation committee, testified that she found Intervenor's facility superior based on its proximity to the courthouse, hospitals, and other key locations, and its flexibility of design and concentration of space in one building. She further found Petitioner's location lacking as a result of the three separate buildings, its limited expansion room, and the necessity for redirecting clients between buildings, and the difficulty for elderly and handicapped clients accessing Petitioner's building. Her contemporaneous notes were to the same effect. Evaluators Whitesides and Thomley made substantially similar contemporaneous notes justifying their scoring of the two bidders. Three of the four site evaluators met as a group following the site visits and discussed the properties submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. All four of the site evaluators made recommendations to accept the property for lease proposed by Intervenor, but they did not all confer and jointly develop a single recommendation to the facilities manager. The points assigned by each of the four site evaluators for the properties proposed by Petitioner and Intervenor were as follows: Evaluation Committee TCC Number Member's Names Proctor's Points 3's Points Thomley 75 98 Little 78 93 Whitesides 74 95 Smoot 80 91 307 377 The rent portion of the evaluation criteria was ascertained by applying present value methodology as set forth in the HRS leasing manual to the annual rents offered by the bidders. The discount factor was 8.32 percent. The present value of Proctor's bid was $1,934,038 and the present value of TCC's bid was $2,028,316. The leasing manual is considered advisory only. It advises present values be made, a determination of the difference in amounts be calculated and a comparison of the difference be made to determine a percentage. Thereafter, the percentage is applied to the maximum amount of points allocated for rent in the evaluation criteria. The lowest present value receives the maximum number of points allocated, and, thus, Proctor was awarded 35 points. TCC received 33 points, based upon the fact that its present value of rent was close to the present value submitted by Proctor. No penalty is imposed to a bidder whose rental amounts is higher than the lowest bidder. No benefit is conferred upon the lowest cost bidder over the next lowest bidder. Mary Hawks, Manager for Administrative Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, received each of the individual evaluation recommendations from Thomley, Little, Whitesides and Smoot. As a result of travel restrictions placed on the HRS, the four site evaluators and Ms. Hawks, who was also a fifth committee member, did not meet as a group following the site visits although three of the four site evaluators did meet collectively following the site visits. (See Finding of Fact 43-44, supra.) The committee members could have met by telephone conference call but Mary Hawks found it unnecessary to do so because there was such a clear evaluation in favor of Intervenor based on the total composite evaluation scores of 377 for Intervenor and only 307 for Petitioner, out of a total of 400 points. She assigned no points herself but approved their recommendations and forwarded a single recommendation in favor of TCC for ultimate approval by HRS management. Mary Hawks had spoken to the evaluation committee members subsequent to the evaluation and no member had expressed any reservation regarding his/her evaluation or a need to meet to discuss anything additional regarding the bid evaluation. The HRS Intent to Award to TCC subsequently issued. The evaluation process and formula for rent evaluation are not among the more commonly used methods but were reasonable and rational and fairly applied to the bids in this case. No conflict of interest in the evaluation committee members was demonstrated by Petitioner in these proceedings.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that: The bid of TCC Number 3 Ltd. is nonresponsive; The bid of Derick Proctor is nonresponsive; Declining to award the bid for Lease No. 590:2306 to either bidder. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5963BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Proctor's 74 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted, except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the recommended order (RO). Unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material has not been utilized: 1-3, sentence 1 of PFOF 4, 5-6, 9, 11-12, sentence 1 of PFOF 13, sentence 1 of PFOF 16, 17-26, sentence 1 of PFOF 29, 30-33, 35-36, sentences 1 and 4 of PFOF 38, 39-41, 44-54, 56-57, 60-61, 63. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute a proposed conclusion of law (PCOL) or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 4, sentence 2 of PFOF 16, 34, 43. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 10, sentence 2 of PFOF 13, 14- 15, sentence 2 of PFOF 29, sentences 2 and 3 of PFOF 38, 55, 58. PFOF 7-8 are accepted as modified because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found and other parts are mere recitations of unreconciled portions of the record and legal argument. The following PFOF are accepted in part but not utilized because parts are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, and other parts are rejected as immaterial to the dispositive issues herein, although correctly quoted from the record: 68-73. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or not dispositive: 27-28, 37, 42, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74. The following PFOF are covered in preliminary material: 64, 66. HRS 21 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-4, 6-8, 11-12, 16-19. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 5, 9-10, 14-15, 21. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 20. PFOF 13 is accepted as modified to correctly reflect the credible record evidence as a whole. TCC Number 3 75 PFOF: The following PFOF are accepted except to the extent they are unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the RO. Material unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative has not been utilized: 1-31, 34-38, 42- 45, 47-48, 56, 58-60, 64-69, 71-75. The following PFOF are rejected because they are not FOF as framed but constitute PCOL or are rejected because they constitute mere legal argument: 32. The following PFOF are rejected because, as framed, they constitute mere recitation of isolated, unreconciled testimony or other record evidence or are not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. However, the subject matter is covered in the RO as proven and supported by the competent, substantial evidence in the record: 33, 40-41, 53-55, 57, 61-63, 70. The following PFOF are rejected as immaterial or as not dispositive: 39, 46, 49, 51-52. PFOF 50 is not a sentence, but the subject matter is covered in the RO as understood. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas V. Infantino, Esquire Infantino & Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 3 Legal Office 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 B. Gray Gibbs, Esquire Sam Power, Clerk Bette B. Lehmberg, Esquire Department of Health and Suite 800 Rehabilitative Services One 4th Street North 1323 Winewood Boulevard St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
