Findings Of Fact In mid-1983 National had a properly permitted outdoor advertising structure bearing tag numbers AD-016-10 (south-facing sign) and AD-018-10 (north-facing sign) on the east side of U.S. 27 on leased property in Highlands County. In the latter part of 1983 this property was purchased by Young. On September 15, 1983, Young notified National that he was the owner of the property on which this sign was located and requested National to remove the sign. On September 16, 1983, Young applied for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign at this location. Young's application was disapproved by DOT on November 7, 1983, because DOT's records showed this to be a site occupied by a permitted sign (Exhibit 3). On or about October 26, 1983, after having received no response from National to his request for National to remove the sign, Young cut down the sign by sawing its supporting posts. On November 28, 1983, Young requested a hearing on the denial by DOT of his application for a permit for a sign at this site. On November 3, 1983, National obtained a lease (Exhibit 2) on property abutting Young's property and, on or about November 4, 1983, erected a sign on this property using the same faces from the fallen sign and attached the tags issued for its original sign. National's original lease dated 10/13/80 (Exhibit 1) with John Larino provided that either party could terminate the agreement on thirty days' notice. When Young purchased the property from Larino, he complied with the lease provisions regarding termination of the lease, including rebating the rent for the unused portion of the lease. Young erected a sign on this property on November 6, 1983, before his application had been denied and two days after National had re-erected its sign. Young obtained a county building permit on September 16, 1983, for the sign he subsequently erected. National has not applied for permit for the structure erected on the land leased from Boyd but attached permit tags AD-016-10 and AD-018-10 to the sign. The juxtaposition of the signs is as follows: proceeding north on U.S. 27, the first sign is owned by Young, next is the site of the former National sign, and then National's new sign. All of these locations are on the east side of U.S. 27, are less than 1,000 feet from a permitted sign to the south, are more than 500 feet from the sign, and all are within 180 feet of each other. When an applicant applies for a permit for a new sign, the site is inspected by a member of the Outdoor Advertising staff in the DOT district where the sign is to be located in company with the application, or the site is staked out by the applicant and viewed by a staff member. This inspection is to ascertain that the proposed sign will be located the required minimum distance from an existing sign and the proper distance from the roadway from which the sign will primarily be observed. DOT'S policy is that any relocation of the sign from the authorized location constitutes a new sign and requires the submission of a new application and approval therefor. The approved application for National's original sign was on U.S. 27 2.9 miles north of "Junction 17-Sebring." This location is on the property now owned by Young.
Findings Of Fact In May of 1980, the Petitioner, Peterson Outdoor Advertising purchased a sign from Lamar Advertising Company. This sign is located on the east side of State Road 434, approximately 350 feet north of State Road 50 in Orange County, Florida. This sign is a stacked, back to back structure, having two faces which face north and south. The face which is the subject of this proceeding is the south face which faces northbound traffic on State Road 434. This face is visible to traffic on the main-traveled way of State Road 50. When the Petitioner purchased the subject sign from Lamar, it checked the records of Lamar, and the records of the Department of Transportation and the orange County Building and Zoning Department, to ascertain that the sign had all required building permits, electrical permits, county permits and state permits, and that the sign site was a legal location. The sign had all the permits that were required. The relevant document from the Department of Transportation pertaining to the subject sign was a letter dated March 13, 1978, from the Department's district office to Lamar. This letter returned the permit applications that had been submitted by Lamar in February of 1978 seeking permits for the subject sign, for the reason that "your applications do not require a state permit". The parties stipulated that, prior to May of 1984, the personnel of the Department's Fifth District gave advice that signs along non-controlled roads within 660 feet of a federal-aid primary highway did not need a state sign permit. The Petitioner relied on the determination of the Department that the subject sign site did not require a state permit, and purchased the sign from Lamar. In May of 1984 the Fifth District personnel of the Department corrected their erroneous prior interpretation of the statutes and rules they administer, and permits were thereafter required for all signs within 660 feet of a federal-aid primary highway if they were visible from the main-traveled way of the controlled road. On July 1, 1985, the Department's outdoor advertising inspector advised the Petitioner that the south faces of the subject sign required a state permit. These are the faces in question in this proceeding. In compliance with this advice from the Department, the Petitioner filed permit applications for both the north faces and the south faces of the subject sign. The Department returned the applications for the north faces for the reason that a permit was not required. The north faces are not involved in this proceeding. The Department denied the Petitioner's applications for the south faces by memorandum dated October 8, 1985, for the reason that these faces conflicted with permits held by Maxmedia, Inc., in that they were not located more than 1,000 feet from the Maxmedia sign. The Maxmedia permits authorized a sign which was erected at a point 740 feet from the subject sign of the Respondent. The permits held by Maxmedia were issued by the Department on May 8, 1984. Prior to July 1, 1984, the spacing rule for signs on a federal-aid primary highway required 500 feet between signs. On July 1, 1984, this spacing requirement was increased to require 1,000 feet on a federal-aid primary highway. State Road 50 is a federal-aid primary highway, and the area within 660 feet from State Road 50 is a controlled area. The Petitioner's sign 350 feet north of State Road 50 was more than 500 feet from any other structure prior to July 1, 1984. It is not more than 1,000 feet from the Maxmedia signs now, however.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Peterson Outdoor Advertising for a permit on the east side of State Road 434, approximately 350 feet north of State Road 50, facing south, in Orange County, Florida, be GRANTED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 29th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Thomas Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of this proceeding is situated 30-35 feet from the pavement on the northbound side of U.S. 1, approximately 170 feet north of 69th Street in the City of Marathon, Florida. The sign is visible to traffic on U.S. 1. U.S. 1 is a federal-aid primary highway, and it has been such since the subject sign was erected. This outdoor advertising sign is owned by the Respondent, T. L. Carpenter, who is also the owner of the property upon which the sign sits. The subject sign has not been issued an outdoor advertising sign permit by the Department, nor has any application for a permit been filed with the Department. This sign is less than 1,000 feet from an outdoor advertising sign which was erected on the same side of U.S. 1 by Jerry's Outdoor Advertising in 1983 or 1984. Permits numbered AK711-10 and AK710-10 have been issued by the Department to Jerry's Outdoor Advertising for its sign. The Respondent purchased the property where the subject sign stands in 1977. The sign had been erected by the prior owner, and the Respondent received the subject sign when he took title to the property. Nevertheless, the Respondent has never applied for an outdoor advertising permit for this sign. For some period of time after the Respondent bought this property and the subject sign, the Respondent advertised a health food store by copy on the sign. Presently, this sign advertises a restaurant. The copy, however, does not advertise an on-premise business. Due to the proximity of the permitted sign of Jerry's Outdoor Advertising, the Respondent may not now receive a permit for his sign at its present location.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the sign owned by the Respondent on the northbound side of U.S. 1, approximately 170 feet north of 69th Street in Marathon, Florida, be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. J. L. Carpenter P. O. Box 2641 Marathon Shores, Florida 33052 Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the sign of Respondent violates Section 479.07 and Section 479.02, Florida Statutes by violation of the permit and spacing requirements of the Outdoor Advertising Act.
Findings Of Fact An application was made for a permit for the subject sign and the application was denied on the basis that the sign was within the 500 foot spacing requirement, the sign being erected approximately in the middle of the distance between two outdoor advertising sign which are approximately 500 feet apart. The sign advertises Oaks Trading Post. The sign has been erected for many years and has carried messages such as "Elect Askew for Governor" and "Vote Democratic" or other political advertisements. The sign now advertises a commercial establishment and has since, at least, December of 1976. This sign does not bear a permit although the Respondent admitted that it is a commercial sign. 3.. The Respondent has paid the required license fees for the subject sign for more than the last 20 years to the City of Rockledge, Florida.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Anthony Ninos 112 Riverside Drive Cocoa, Florida 32922
Findings Of Fact This proceeding was initiated when the Department notified the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, that its permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 were being revoked because the Respondent no longer had permission of the property owner to maintain a sign there, as required by Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes. Permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 authorized an outdoor advertising sign on U.S. 98, 100 feet west of Hickory Avenue in Bay county, Florida. The record owner of the property where the above permits authorized the Respondent to locate a sign is E. Clay Lewis III, Trustee, who took title by deed in 1977. By letter dated August 9, 1985, the property owner notified the Respondent that the subject property was being sold, and that the Respondent had 30 days to remove the sign from the property and cancel the outdoor advertising permits for this sign. By letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised the Department that the Respondent no longer had a valid lease for the site where the subject permits authorized a sign, and that the signs had been removed. Documents marked Exhibits 1-3 reflect the foregoing, as does the testimony of the Department's outdoor advertising inspector. This evidence was received without objection from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AD089-10 and Ad090-10 held by the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of July, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 William G. Warner, Esquire P. O. Box 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Bobbie Palmer, Esquire P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. 8palla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, San Ann Food Stores, is the owner of an outdoor advertising sign located 5.89 miles east of the Hillsborough County Line, on the east side of Interstate 4 in Polk County. More specifically, the sign is east of the U.S. 98 and I-4 intersection which lies just north of the City of Lakeland. The sign is two-sided, with one side facing eastward, and the other facing westward. It sits on top of two poles which are approximately sixty feet high. The parties have stipulated that the sign is visible from I-4, although just barely, and lies within five hundred feet of that highway. They have also stipulated that no permit has ever been issued by petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), authorizing its use. The sign does not lie within the corporate limits of a city; however, this is immaterial to the resolution of these cases. On an undisclosed date, a DOT inspector observed the sign while conducting an inspection of another sign and found no display of a current valid permit tag. After checking his records, he found that no permit had ever been issued authorizing its erection and use. It was also determined, without contradiction, that the sign is within five hundred feet of the interchange of I-4 and U.S. 98. Such an intersection is classified as a restricted interchange. According to Rule 14 10.06(2)(b)2. and state law, no signs are permitted within five hundred feet of such an interchange. The sign in question was erected by Sun Oil Company around 1967 or 1968 when no permit was required. Respondent purchased the property on which the sign is located in April, 1978. It assumed that Sun Oil had obtained all necessary permits from the state to maintain and use the sign. It did not learn that Sun had failed to obtain a sign permit until the Notice of Violation was issued by DOT in February, 1985. It is willing to repay all fees owed during prior years if DOT will allow the sign to remain.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's sign (facing east and west) be found in violation of the statutes and rules cited in the conclusion of law portion of this order, and that it be removed. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 7th day of August, 1985.
The Issue Whether the structure described in the Department of Transportation's Notice of Violation No. 10B DB 2000 007 (Notice) is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and therefore subject to removal pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an outdoor advertising company that was formerly known as AK Media. On December 10, 1998, Petitioner (while still known as AK Media) entered into an agreement with NWT Partners, Ltd., the owner of the New World Tower (Building), a "thirty story four (4) sided building" located at 100 North Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, to lease certain portions of the Building. The lease agreement contained the following provisions, among others: Effective Date. This Lease shall become effective on the later of (x) the date that Tenant provides written notice to Landlord that Tenant has obtained all permits, license and governmental approvals necessary or required to enable Tenant to construct, maintain and operate the Wall Faces and Wall Structures, as hereinafter defined or (y) January 1, 1999 (the "Effective Date"). Tenant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Lease to obtain all such permits, licenses and approvals or the Landlord may cancel this Lease. Purpose. The purpose of this lease is for Tenant to construct, maintain and operate painted, printed, illuminated and/or electrical signs on the north and south wall faces of the Building (the "Wall Faces"), and all other uses not inconsistent therewith, including all necessary supporting structures, devices, illumination facilities and connections, service ladders and equipment, and other appurtenances (the "Wall Fixtures"). All construction to the Building, and advertising thereon, including construction drawing and artwork to be furnished by the Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's written approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant's Right to Enter and Use. For the duration of this Lease, Tenant shall have the non-exclusive right to enter onto the Property and into the Building and use the Wall Faces for the purposes described in this Lease and any other purposes allowed or required by this Lease and Tenant has the exclusive right to use the Wall Faces Property for advertising. In exercising Tenant's rights hereunder, Tenant may hang or attach the Wall Fixtures to the roof and exterior structure of the Building. Tenant shall maintain the Wall Fixtures at Tenant's cost and expense. Tenant shall pay all utility charges in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Wall Fixtures. Tenant shall be responsible for damage to the Building which is caused by Tenant's operation and maintenance and removal of the Wall Fixtures and shall repair any such damage and restore the Building to the condition it was in immediately prior to such damages at the expiration or termination of this Lease. Term. The term of this Lease is for five (5) years from the "Rent Commencement Date," as hereinafter defined, to the last day of the month during which the fifth anniversary of the Rent Commencement Date occurs (the "Term"). Rent. Tenant shall pay Landlord rent annually, in accordance with the schedule (the "Rent Schedule") set forth on Exhibit "B" hereto, inclusive of all taxes . . . . Contracts. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, Tenant will use its best efforts to obtain contracts (the "Contracts") for advertising on the Building which exceed the amount of the Guaranteed Rent, as set forth on the Rent Schedule. . . . 9. Ownership/Removal. At all times, Tenant is and shall remain the owner of the Wall Fixtures and all signs and permits of any kind in relation thereto, and has the right to remove the Wall Fixtures at any time. . . . Exhibit "B" Rent Schedule Tenant shall pay annual rent to Landlord in an amount equal to the greater of (x) Fifty-five percent (55%) of the gross revenues attributable to advertisements displayed on the North Wall and the South Wall of the Building less any agency fee or commissions not greater than 16 2/3% to bona fide third parties (the "Net Revenues") associated with such advertisements (the "Percentage Rent") or (y) the minimum guaranteed annual rent (the "Guaranteed Rent") hereinafter set forth as follows: . . . The Landlord may terminate the Lease Agreement upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to Tenant if either Wall is vacant for more than one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days during the Term of the Lease and the Tenant has failed to obtain a contract, before the expiration of such notice period, for advertising on the North Wall or South Wall, as the case may be, pursuant to which the projected Percentage Rent under such contract would exceed the Guaranteed Rent. . . . Subsequently, Petitioner (while still operating under the name AK Media) entered into a "bulletin contract" with New York Outdoor, an advertising agency acting on behalf of Supreme International, in which Petitioner agreed, for a fee, to produce and maintain an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. Supreme International sells "Perry Ellis" and "Perry Ellis for Men" brand fashion apparel. In accordance with the "bulletin contract," Petitioner produced an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. The "outdoor advertising display" that Petitioner produced was a large mural more than 100 feet high and more than 60 feet wide. Such a product is referred to in the outdoor advertising industry as a "wallscape." The "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International consisted of artwork (a picture of a young woman) and print (the words "Perry Ellis for Men") on a "canvass-type" material that was mounted on a "picture frame" support structure attached to the north wall of the Building. It was located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a roadway, US Highway 1 (also known, in that location, as North Biscayne Boulevard), which is a part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The artwork and print could be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity travelling on US Highway 1 in the vicinity of the Building. At no time has Petitioner applied for, or obtained, a permit from the Department authorizing it to erect and maintain a "sign," as that term is used in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, on the north wall of the Building. Petitioner, however, did seek and obtain a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami. The permit was granted by the Miami City Commission, through the passage of Miami City Commission Resolution 99- 828, at its October 26, 1999, meeting. The printed agenda distributed in advance of the meeting stated the following concerning the permit for which Petitioner had applied: Consideration of approving Class II Special Permit No. 99-0142 for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard for a sign of a graphic or artistic value. This will allow a mural containing a commercial message. The resolution passed by the Miami City Commission at the meeting read as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION APPROVING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF CLASS II SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. 99-0142, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO WRITING PERMITTED WITH THE MURAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100 NORTH BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO SECTION 401 OF ORDINANCE NO. 11000, AS AMENDED, THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, AS AMENDED. WHEREAS, the Director for the Department of Planning is recommending approval of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and WHEREAS, Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami, Florida, requires City Commission approval of the Class II Special Permit as hereinafter set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful consideration of this matter, finds the application for a Class II Special Permit does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to approve the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to uphold the issuance of the Class II Special Permit, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this section. Section 2. The recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to issue Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, is hereby approved, and the City Commission finds that the issuance of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended. Section 3. The Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Inasmuch as the words "Perry Ellis for Men" were on the "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International, this "wallscape" was not in compliance with the condition imposed by the Miami City Commission, in issuing the Class II Special Permit to Petitioner, that there "be no writing permitted with the mural." On February 22, 2000, Bernard Davis, who, at the time, was the Department's District 6 Roadside Outdoor Advertising Administrator, issued a Notice of Violation (Notice No. 10B DB 2000 007) alleging that the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building (described above) was "in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, which requires a permit for all outdoor advertising signs not exempted by Section 479.16, Florida Statutes" and directing that the sign be removed within 30 days. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, the artwork and print on the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building were changed. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building contained a picture of a man and part of a woman and the words "Perry Ellis," underneath which was written "www.perryellis.com," Supreme International's website address. The Monday and Tuesday before the final hearing (February 5 and 6, 2001), Mr. Davis' successor, C. Jean Cann, went inside the Building to determine whether Supreme International had an "on-premises presence." On Monday, February 5, 2001, Ms. Cann entered the Building at approximately 1:15 p.m. After obtaining information from the Building's Electronic Directory that "Perry Ellis" occupied room 2128, she took the elevator to the 21st floor. After getting off the elevator, she walked down a hallway, where she saw a paper sign on a door which read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128." When she knocked on the door, no one answered. She waited 10 to 15 seconds and then knocked again, with the same result. She then, unsuccessfully, attempted to open the door. At around 1:45 p.m., she left the Building. Ms. Cann returned to the Building the following day at approximately 11:40 a.m., at which time she spoke to a security guard, who informed her that "Perry Ellis" "was in 2126." She then again went up to the 21st floor, and, on the same door that she had seen the "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128" sign the day before, she saw a paper sign that read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2126." Her knocks on the door, like those of the previous day, went unanswered, and she was again unable to open the door. At around 12:00 noon, she exited the Building. At no time during either of her two visits was Ms. Cann able to ascertain what, if any, business activity Supreme International was engaging in inside the Building.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the "wallscape" on the north side of the Building is a "sign" that was erected and is being maintained without the Department-issued permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and that it therefore is a public and private nuisance that must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Marilyn Bethel owns Tract B of Unit 3 in Indian River Estates in St. Lucie County, Florida [hereinafter referred to as the Property]. On or about May 14, 1988, Bethel entered into a lease agreement with Respondent. The agreement, which was signed by Bethel and Respondent's Secretary Treasurer, Richard Pozniak, provided as follows: The undersigned lessor, his [sic] heirs or assigns, in consideration of the annual sum of TWELVE HUNDRED (1,200) Dollars paid by AD-CON OUTDOOR ADV., INC., its heirs or assigns, hereafter known as Lessee, hereby grants to it or assigns the exclusive right to use and occupy the premises known as, [the Property] space for a south facing sign[,] for the purpose of constructing and maintaining advertising displays and devices, including necessary equipment for a period of Year to Year years from 6/1/88 19 . First option to lease both North and South facing locations will be granted to the Lessee by the Lessor for the above mentioned location at the termination date of the Lease drawn between the Lessor and National Outdoor Adv due to expire in [sic] April 1, 1989, for an additional 1,200. Total due will be $2,400. It is further agreed: In the event said property is to be improved by the erection of a permanent building, the agreement may be cancelled by giving sixty (60) days written notice to the Lessee prior to the commencement of construction. If the title passes from the present owner, this agreement may be cancelled by giving sixty (60) days written notice to the Lessee. In either case, the Lessee shall be refunded all unearned prepaid rental. The right is given to the Lessee to cancel this agreement by giving sixty (60) days written notice if the advertising value of the premises is diminished by any law or regulation, obstruction of view, or change of traffic. The Lessor agrees not to obstruct, nor to permit any other person to obstruct, the view of the advertising displays or devices constructed on said premises in any manner whatsoever. In the event this agreement is terminated before the end of its term (or the renewal thereof) the Lessor agrees to refund to the Lessee all unearned prepaid rental. It is understood that all display or necessary equipment placed on above property by Lessee is at all times its property and subject to its removal at any time. After the term (or renewal thereof) of this agreement, it will continue in force from year to year unless terminated by either Lessee or Lessor or[sic] written notice to the other, served not less than sixty (60) days before the beginning of such additional year. Lessor grants to lessee, or agents, the right to ingress or egress during the term of this contract to maintain sign structure(s). This agreement is subject to Lessee securing a building permit for said display. Payment is to be made upon securing building permit. The foregoing agreement was drafted by Respondent. Respondent prepared the agreement by adding the underscored language to a printed, form "Outdoor Advertising Structures and Display Lease" that it routinely utilizes in such transactions. On or about June 20, 1988, Respondent submitted an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the south facing sign referenced in the above-described lease agreement. Permit AY 242-35 was subsequently granted to Respondent by Petitioner. By letter dated January 9, 1989, from Respondent's attorney, Respondent informed Bethel that it sought to exercise its option "to lease both North and South facing locations," as provided in their agreement. By letter dated January 24, 1989, Bethel, through her attorney, gave "notification to [Respondent] pursuant to the Lease that it will be terminated on May 31, 1989." The letter was received by Respondent on January 25, 1989. On or about May 1, 1989, Bethel sent Petitioner a letter advising that Respondent would "not have a lease for the billboard [which is the subject of permit AY 242-35] after May 31, 1989." Based on the information provided by Bethel, Petitioner initiated action to revoke permit AY 242-35 on the ground that Respondent no longer had "the property owner's permission to maintain signs at the subject location."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, its hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's permit AY 242-35. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of November, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3807T The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioner: Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected. The Hearing Officer is of the view that the agreement is not vague and ambiguous regarding Bethel's right to terminate her agreement with Respondent in the manner prescribed by the agreement's termination clause. In any event, to the extent that there may an ambiguity in the agreement concerning this matter, any such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of Bethel's right to terminate the agreement inasmuch as the agreement was drafted by Respondent. See Finlayson v. Broward County, 471 So.2d 67, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). COPIES FURNISHED: Rivers H. Buford, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Garrison M. Dundas, Esquire Swann and Haddock, P.A. Southeast Bank Building 300 South Sixth Street Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Richard J. Pozniak Ad-Con Advertising Company Post Office Box 541 Fort Pierce, Florida 34954
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
The Issue Whether respondent's initial proposal to deny petitioner's application for a permit to construct an outdoor advertising sign had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it occurred or was otherwise substantially justified; or, if not, whether special circumstances would make an award of costs and fees unjust?
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1988, petitioner proposed to erect a sign facing east, within 15 feet of an existing outdoor advertising sign, on the north side of State Road 200, approximately .6 miles west of the intersection of State Road 200 and I-75. He planned to place a single face at such an angle to the existing, single-faced sign that a V configuration would result. Another outdoor advertising company held a permit for the existing sign, which faced west. It stood on property belonging to a land owner who did not own the property to the east on which Ray proposed to raise its sign. On November 10, 1988, the Department of Transportation issued a notice of intent to deny petitioner's application for a permit to construct the outdoor advertising sign. Petitioner reasonably incurred attorneys' fees of $787.50 and costs of $28.00 before Department of Transportation decided, well after the evidentiary hearing held April 5, 1989, to issue the permit, after all. As far as the record reveals, the Department has faced only one other situation in which an applicant for a permit to construct a sign, within 15 feet of an existing sign, proposed to build on property not owned by the land owner who had leased to the company which had built the existing sign, viz., Ad-Con Outdoor Advertising v. Department of Transportation, No. 89- 0087T. In that case, too, the Department issued a permit for the second sign. In an internal memorandum dated February 17, 1989, respondent's Rivers Buford wrote Dallas Gray, while the Ad-Con application was pending, the following: Inasmuch as the proposed sign would be within fifteen feet of another sign it would, by virtue of the provisions of Rule Chapter 14-10.1006(1)(b)3, be considered a part of a V-type sign and thus its two faces would be exempt from the minimum spacing requirements of Section 479.07, F.S. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. The memorandum antedated the final hearing in Case No. 88-6107 by more than six weeks. Presumably, the intended rule reference was to Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)3., Florida Administrative Code. At the hearing in the present case, the Department of Transportation produced two witnesses to explain why the Department initially turned down petitioner's application. In their view, the Department of Transportation should never have granted petitioner's application, in order to protect rights vested in the other company, particularly a purported, preemptive right the other company had, by virtue of the location of its existing sign, to build another sign where Ray proposed to build, even though the other company did not own and had not leased the site Ray applied to build on. They asserted not only that the Department was substantially justified in turning down petitioner's application when it was originally considered, but also that any other similar application should be turned down. In their opinion, the Department erred in issuing permits in both cases in which the question has arisen. They attributed the eventual issuance of permits to petitioner and in the Ad-Con case to misinformed and misguided departmental employees. As authority for this view, Mr. Kissinger, respondent's Motorist Information Services Coordinator, cited Sections 479.07(9)(a) and 479.01(14), Florida Statutes (1989) and Rule 14-10.006(b)(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code.
