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WINKO-MATIC SIGNAL COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-002250 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002250 Latest Update: Jan. 18, 1985

Findings Of Fact On March 1, 1984, Respondent gave notice to qualified contractors that it would receive sealed bids for State Project No. 72000-3541, referred to as Federal-Aid Project No. M 9041(10). This project involves the installation of a computerized traffic control system for the City of Jacksonville. In response to the opportunity to bid, the Department of Transportation received four bids. Petitioner, Winko-Matic Signal Company, was among the bidders. The other bidders were Georgia Electric Company, Traffic Control Devices, Inc., and Sperry Systems Management. The bids of Traffic Control Devices and Sperry Systems were rejected based upon an error in bid tabulations on the part of Traffic Control, a mistake on the quantities page, with the Sperry rejection being based upon a bid bond problem. Traffic Control had been the apparent low bidder with a bid of $1,964,115. Winko-Matic was the second apparent low bidder with a bid of $2,279,604.70. The Department of Transportation had estimated that the total cost of the Jacksonville project would be $ 2,024,680.61. Having discarded the bid of Traffic Control Devices, the Department of Transportation telegrammed Winko-Matic on April 4, 1984, advising Winko-Matic that it was the apparent low bidder for the Jacksonville project. Subsequently, the awards committee of the Department of Transportation met on April 18, 1984, and determined to reject all bids and re-advertise the job. In the course of this meeting the awards committee was told that there were erratic bids received on contract items, pointing to some perceived confusion among the contractors as to requirements of the contract. Discussion was also held on the possibility of establishing a pre-bid conference if the project was re advertised. The awards committee then voted to reject the bids on the basis that the apparent low bidder, Winko-Matic, had submitted a bid which-was 12.6 percent over the Department's estimate, instead of being within 7 percent of the Department of Transportation's pre-bid estimate, a point above which the Department of Transportation in its non-rule policy would call to question to the acceptability of the apparent low bid. In addition to deciding to reject all bids and re-advertise, it was determined that a pre-bid conference should be scheduled at least 30 days prior to the bid-letting date. Winko-Matic was advised that the Department of Transportation's decision to reject all bids by correspondence of May 4, 1984, in which it was indicated that all bids had been rejected based upon the fact that they were too high. In response to this notice of rejection, Winko-Matic, effective May 17, 1984, filed a written notice of protest. The case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 20, 1984, and a final hearing date was established by Notice of Hearing of July 5, 1984. The hearing date in this cause was September 12, 1984. The Jacksonville project in question requires the utilization of what has been referred to "UTCS Enhanced" software. This software package is unique and has only been used in a limited number of locations within the country. Those locations are Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Broward County, Florida; and Birmingham, Alabama. Another unique feature within the project design is the use of an associated coaxial computer sys gem. Given the unique nature of this project and the fact that the Department of Transportation had never advertised for bids related to UTCS software, Department of Transportation obtained assistance from a consulting firm, Harland, Bartholomew & Associates. In fulfilling its function Harland gave estimates to include an estimate related to the projected cost of the software, Item 681-102. The Harland estimate for the overall project was $2,143,130 including a $100,000 estimate for the software system. That estimate relating to the software was subsequently adjusted by the Department of Transportation to depict a cost of $13,780. The Department of Transportation estimate was based upon information within its computer related to a system unlike the enhanced software contemplated by the plans and specifications. In other words, the stored information in the Department of Transportation computer was not the same as contemplated by the plans and specifications in the Jacksonville project. Moreover, the initial estimate of Harland was based upon the idea of an extended software system, as opposed to an enhanced software system. Winko-Matic had bid $389,500 for the software in Item 681-102. That estimate was premised upon figures obtained from JHK and Associates, the group which Winko-Matic intended to use as its subcontractor for the enhanced software portion of the project. JHK developed the software and was responsible for systems integration of the Los Angeles, California, project, one of the locations in which UTCS enhanced software has been utilized. JHK premised its estimate for the software hare upon experience in Los Angeles and an evaluation of the tasks to be performed related to the enhanced software. This included general software development activities, hardware innovation, installation costs during the period of acceptance and testing, and the preparation of data base. The JHK bid price was $339,500. Another $50,000 was added to that price related to what the Petitioner describes as its management costs for that item. By June 20, 1984, when a further meeting was held by the awards committee on the subject of the Jacksonville project, it was concluded that the estimate made by the Department of Transportation of $13,780 was not correct, on the topic of the enhanced software. A more reasonable estimate, according to the information imparted in this session, would be $200,000 for enhanced software as called for in this project, with a $100,000 amount being a reasonable estimate had they chosen to use extended software. Adjusting the initial price related to the UTCS enhanced software to reflect a corrected estimate of the Department of Transportation in its original advertised bid, that estimate becomes $2,210,900.61 and its consultant Harland's estimate becomes $2,243,130. With this adjustment, the differential in the estimate made by the Department of Transportation and the Petitioner approaches 3 percent and not the 12.6 percent originally found. The 3 percent is below the threshold of 7 percent used as the policy for determining whether a bid might be rejected as being far beyond the acceptable limits set forth in the Department of Transportation's estimate. In the aforementioned June 20, 1984, awards committee meeting, the Department of Transportation continued to hold the opinion that all bids in the Jacksonville project should be rejected and the matter re-advertised. Although the problem pertaining to the estimate of the cost of the enhanced software package had been addressed, the committee continued to feel that the prices received in the bid letting were erratic Reference was also made to revisions or modifications to the project plan which would be offered if the matter were re- advertised. It was also pointed out that the Federal Highway Administration would concur in the Department's decision to reject all bids and would accept modifications. The awards committee again voted to reject the bids. The matter was again considered by the awards committee on August 31, 1984. On that occasion, it was pointed out that the revisions contemplated by the Department of Transportation, should the matter be re-advertised, would not affect in a substantial way the cost estimate for the project with the exception of Item 680-101, the system control equipment (CPU), which would promote a lower price for the project. The committee determined in the August, 1984, meeting to reject all bids and re-advertise. While the initial notice of rejection of May 4, 1984, had suggested the basis for rejection as being the fact that Petitioner's bid far exceeded the 7 percent allowance for price above the Department of Transportation's estimate of costs, the meetings of the awards committee and the suggestion of the Respondent in the course of the final hearing in this case indicated that there were other reasons for the decision to reject. Those Were: (a) an apparent lack of clarity among bidders regarding specifications for the Jacksonville job, (b) the desire of the Respondent to revise specifications on the Jacksonville project; and (c) a lack of sufficient competition in the bids. In connection with the first of the additional reasons Respondent suggests that variations within the bid responses related to particular line items within the specifications point out a lack of clarity in the project's specifications or confusion by bidders related to those specifications. Respondent did not bring forth any of the bidders who might speak to the matter of possible confusion or misunderstanding concerning some of the bid items. By contrast, the Petitioner's president; the president of JHK & Associates and James Robinson, Harland's project manager for the Jacksonville job, did not find the specifications in the original documents to be confusing. In addition, the testimony of those individuals established the fact that bid variations related to particular line items are not extraordinary and do not establish any apparent confusion by the bidders as to the requirements of those line items. In effect, what the differentials demonstrate are variations related to the manufacture or in-house capabilities of the bidders and an effort to allocate discretionary costs in various places as to line items. Moreover, they might indicate last- minute adjustments in the bid quote prior to the opening and a possible effort by a contractor to enter into a new job market. Finally, they demonstrate offsetting which is the allocation of item prices by a contractor to maximize profits. To do this, a contractor submits high bids on items representing quantities which the contractor feels will increase after the contract is awarded and submits low bids on items representing quantities which are not likely to change. In summary, while the Department of Transportation in its presentation expressed some concern about the variations in the pricing in the bid quotations offered by the respective bidders in this project, its suspicions on the question of the possible clarity of its specifications were not confirmed and are not convincing. On the topic of revisions which the Department of Transportation would offer if the matter were re-advertised, with one exception those matters appear to be items that could be attended through change orders or supplemental agreements. They are not matters which necessarily must be addressed through a rejection of all bids and a re-advertising of the project. The lone exception to this is the possibility that the Department of Transportation may not be able to protect its proprietary rights in the enhanced software which is being developed for the project, under the terms of the present bid documents. Given that uncertainty, the Respondent would wish to re-advertise the project and make certain that its proprietary interests are protected. Finally, Respondent has alluded to the fact that the Jacksonville project should be re-advertised in view of the lack of competition in the initial letting. Only four bidders expressed an interest in this project at the time of the first letting. Of those, two bidders were found to be responsive. While this is a low number of bidders, there does not appear to be any agency practice on the part of' the Department of Transportation to the effect that this number of bidders would not be accepted. Moreover, no indication has been given that should the matter be re-advertised a greater number of bidders would express an interest than was the case in the first letting. Consequently, this reason for bid rejection is not acceptable. If Respondent did not reject the bids and re-advertise the project, Winko-Matic would be the successful bidder in the Jacksonville project.

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57337.11
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R. A. M. PLANT GROWERS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 92-000169BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 13, 1992 Number: 92-000169BID Latest Update: Apr. 16, 1992

Findings Of Fact Nine bids were received for Contract E4571, Project/Job No. 99004-3516 ("E4571"). Petitioner's bid was timely received. Respondent opened bids on December 13, 1991. Respondent posted its intent to award E4571 to J & D Tropical Landscape Design on December 20, 1991. Section 1.2 of the Bid Specifications for E4571, as modified by the Special Provisions, states: A contractor's bid shall be in the form of a unit price for each unit expected to be accomplished. The Special Provisions to E4571 require each bidder to submit a single unit price for each pay item called for in the Bid Price Proposal. Item 4 in the Special "Provisions provides: It shall be the responsibility of the Contractor to submit to the Department A SINGLE unit price for each pay item called for in the Bid Price Proposal. The Contractor shall be responsible for his/her method of averaging. Failure to comply shall result in the Contractor's Bid Proposal being declared "Irregular" and such Bid Proposals will be rejected. (emphasis added) Petitioner's Bid Proposal was properly declared irregular and rejected by Respondent. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Item 4 in the Special Provisions by failing to submit a single unit price for each pay item, by failing to correctly average a unit price, and by failing to state the unit price in words. The Unit Price Sheet on page 23 of the Bid Proposals contains the following table listing item numbers A582- 2 through A584-4. Petitioner listed item number A583 as follows: ITEM PLAN ITEM DESCRIPTION AND UNIT PRICE $ AMOUNTS NUMBER QUANTITIES UNIT PRICE (IN FIGURES) (Exten- (IN WORDS) sion Price) 3/ A583 4 200.000 TREES (8' TO 20, 85 20400 PLANT ' HEIGHT OR CLEAR TRUNK) @ DOLLARS CENTS The actual extension price 4/ for 200 trees at $85 per unit is $17,000 rather than the $20,400 stated by Petitioner in the table on page 23. The "Contract Total" stated by Petitioner in the bottom right corner of the table is $37,013.20. The "Contract Total" that should have been stated if Petitioner intended the extension price of item number A583-4 to be $17,000 would have been $33,613. The "Contract Total" listed by a bidder on the Unit Price Sheet is the unverified contract price. The actual contract price is determined by Respondent pursuant to the formula given in Section 1.3 of the Bid Specifications. Section 1.3 of the Bid Specifications foil E4571 states: The contract price is defined as the sum of the unit bid price times the planned work for each item as shown on the Unit Price Sheet. Petitioner would have been the lowest successful bidder irrespective of whether Respondent had replaced the extension price for item number A583-4 and the "Contract Total" stated by Petitioner with the actual extension price for item number A583-4 and the actual "Contract Total" . However, Respondent is precluded from doing so by Section 3-1 of the Standard Specifications For Road ,and Bridge Construction ("Standard Specifications"), published by the Florida Department of Transportation (1991) and by the Special Provisions for E4571. Respondent follows "Section 3-1 of the Standard Specifications for the purpose of evaluating bid proposals. Section 3-1 is used, in part, to determine the extension price for item numbers listed on the Unit Price Sheet. Section 3- 1 provides in relevant part: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price of any item, the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, In which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. Petitioner did not show the unit price in words for any item number on the Unit Price Sheet, including item number A583-4. There is a discrepancy in the three entries for item number A583-4 on the Unit Price Sheet. Petitioner failed to show the unit price for item number A583-4 in words, and the unit price and extension price are not in agreement. Under such circumstances, Respondent interprets Section 3-1 of the Standard Specifications as requiring that Petitioner's bid be declared irregular and rejected. Respondent's interpretation of Section 3-1 of the Standard Specifications is reasonable and is consistent with the mandate in Item 4 of the Special Provisions for E4571. See Finding 4, supra. Furthermore, in practice, the correct unit price of a pay item is necessary to process payment under the contract and the contractor must submit invoices based upon the pay items and unit prices listed in its bid. The bid specifications for E4571 provide that a bidder is responsible for his or her own averaging of a stated unit price, and that if a bidder fails to provide a single unit price for each pay item on the Unit Price Sheet the bid shall be declared "Irregular" and will be rejected. The requirement to provide a single unit price for each pay item was emphasized by Respondent at the mandatory pre-bid meeting. Petitioner's representative attended the mandatory pre-bid meeting. No challenges were made to the bid specifications by any bidder.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the protest filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of February, 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (964) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1992.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57337.11
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SWEEPING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 91-008230BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Dec. 26, 1991 Number: 91-008230BID Latest Update: May 01, 1992

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On October 11, 1991, DOT's District Four office let out for bid district contracts E4551 and E4554. Contract E4551 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Broward County. Contract E4554 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors is a four page document which is specific to each contract. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district contracts. Both the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications to the bidders required bidders to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price. Bidders could satisfy this requirement by submitting a bid guarantee of 5% of the bid, submitting a notarized letter of intent from a bonding company or by providing a Certificate of Qualification issued by Respondent. The Notice to Contractors for both Contracts provided as follows: Failure to provide the following with each bid proposal will result in rejection of the contractor's bid.... District contracts of $150,000 or less require the following as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond: A notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: (1) a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or (2) a copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department. (No emphasis added) Similarly, the first Standard Specification provides: 1.1 Bidders (contractors) A contractor shall be eligible to bid on this contract if:... (2) Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the District Contract Administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project.... The requirement to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond has been imposed on the Districts by DOT Directive 375-00-001-a (hereinafter the "Directive".) This Directive was in place at all times material to this proceeding. Section 3.2.2 of the Directive provides: A contractor shall be eligible to bid if: ...Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the minicontract administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of the bid, should the firm be awarded the project. A bid guaranty as specified above may substitute as proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. This applies to bids amount over or under $150,000. A copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department may be substituted in lieu of a notarized letter for those contracts not requiring a bid bond. The bids for the Contracts were opened on October 11, 1991 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received from four bidders: CPM, SCA, Florida Sweeping, Inc. and P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. In its bid proposals, SCA included executed bid bonds in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of each bid proposal. Each bid bond cost $55.00. CPM did not submit executed bid bonds with its proposals. Instead, CPM submitted letters from Mark A. Latini dated September 25, 1991. Those letters were provided on the stationery of Bonina-McCutchen-Bradshaw, Insurance and indicate that Mr. Latini is the "bond manager." The letters provide as follows: Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above-referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should Certified Property Maintenance, Inc., be low and awarded the referenced contract. All bonds are subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request.... The letters submitted by CPM with its bid proposals were not notarized and were not binding obligations to issue bonds since they were conditioned upon meeting certain unspecified underwriting requirements at the time of the bond requests. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Four Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by CPM were the lowest for each contract. Its bid for Contract No. E4551 was $109,343.97. Its bid for Contract No. E4554 was $30,312.63. SCA's bids for the Contracts were $139,442.14 and $44,100.00, respectively. During the initial review of the bid proposals, the Contractual Services Office rejected CPM's bids for failure to have its bonding company "letters of intent" notarized. In addition, the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping, Inc. were rejected for failure to note a required addendum and the bids submitted by P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. were rejected because the "proposal bond was not of proper character". On October 18, 1991, DOT posted its Notice of Intent to Award the Contracts to SCA, the only bidder for the Contracts whose proposals had not been rejected. CPM timely filed protests of the proposed awards to SCA on October 22, 1991. The protests filed by CPM argued that its bids should not have been invalidated simply because the bonding company's letters did not include notary seals. At this point, the sole basis for the disqualification of CPM's bids was the failure to have the bonding company letters notarized. Respondent contends that, except for the absence of the notary seal, the letters submitted by CPM met the requirements of the Notice to Contractor and the Standard Specifications cited above. However, those letters are equivocal and do not evidence a binding commitment to issue a bond upon award of the contract. The DOT officials admit that they do not know what "normal underwriting requirements" would or could be required by CPM's bonding company. This conditional language makes it uncertain whether CPM could obtain the necessary bond. Therefore, it is concluded that those letters do not meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors, the Standard Specifications or the Directive. A hearing on CPM's protest was not held. CPM's president, Raymond Hanousek, who prepared CPM's bid and attended the pre-bid meeting, called DOT's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. Mr. Hanousek spoke with Joseph Yesbeck, the District's Director of Planning and Programs. After their conversation, Mr. Yesbeck reviewed the file and met with Teresa Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts, and other members of the contracting staff. Ms. Martin explained why CPM's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Yesbeck determined that the failure to submit notarized letters should be considered a non-material deviation and the bids submitted by CPM should be accepted and considered the low responsive bids. Mr. Yesbeck concluded that the absence of the notary seal did not give any competitive advantage to CPM and that defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. Therefore, he reversed the contract administrator's decision to disqualify CPM on both Contracts. The District secretary concurred in the decision reached by Mr. Yesbeck to repost the award of the Contracts. Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed CPM's disqualification and declared CPM to be the low bidder for both Contracts. At the time Mr. Yesbeck made his decision, he had not reviewed the Directive from the Assistant Secretary's office stating that there must be a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Mr. Yesbeck did not review the Directive until his deposition was taken one week prior to the hearing in this case. According to Ms. Martin, the option to provide a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the posting of a 5% bid guarantee or obtaining prequalification was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants. While DOT was apparently trying to make it easier and cheaper for companies to bid by not requiring a bond to be posted, the DOT Directive and the bid documents still clearly required unconditional proof that a bid bond would be issued if the contract was awarded to the bidder. CPM was not prequalified nor did it post a bond. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications, CPM's only option was to submit a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. DOT was never provided with any proof that CPM had been prequalified by the bonding company for a bond and/or that a bond would unconditionally be issued if CPM was awarded the Contracts. Because the letters stated they were "subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request", there was some possibility CPM would not be able to obtain a bond. Such a condition was not permissible under the bid doucments. The decision to accept CPM's bid was contrary to the DOT Directive, the Notice to Contractors and the bid specifications which require that a bidder demonstrate proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Consequently, it is concluded that DOT's decision to accept the conditional, unnotarized letters submitted by CPM was arbitrary and capricious. There is some indication that other DOT Districts have, on occasion, waived the notarization requirement for the bond letter. However, it is not clear whether the language in the bid documents was the same or similar in those cases and/or whether the bond letters were conditional. In the past, whenever District Four has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter, the bid was rejected. Apparently, there has never been a protest based on such a denial in District Four. Under Section 337.18, DOT does not need to require notarized, unconditional bond letters on contracts under $150,000. Indeed, there was a suggestion that some DOT Districts have dropped the requirement for certain contracts under $150,000. However, the bid documents in this case clearly required some proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the Contracts. It was incumbent for all bidders to meet this requirement. It was arbitrary to delete this requirement after the bids were submitted.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding the bids submitted by CPM to be non-responsive and rejecting those bids. Petitioner should enter into negotiations with SCA regarding the award of the contract. In the absence of a favorable negotiation, Petitioner should enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and opening the Contracts up for new bids. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1992.

Florida Laws (8) 120.53120.57120.68287.012287.057337.11337.18343.97
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NAPLES BUSINESS EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS, INC. vs. LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 88-000690BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000690BID Latest Update: Mar. 30, 1988

The Issue The first issue to be determined is whether the BOARD can reject all bids, with or without cause. The second issue is to determine if the BOARD is required to have cause, was there a sufficient basis for the rejection of all bids in Bid NO. 3996?

Findings Of Fact On December 14, 1987, the BOARD sent invitations to bid to a list of approved vendors in Bid NO. 3996. The purpose of the invitation was to obtain the lowest responsible bid on a purchase of one hundred and fifty typewriters. The bids were to be submitted prior to January 11, 1988 at 2:00 P.M.. They were opened by the BOARD on the same day. OFFICE did not receive an invitation to bid despite its request to be placed on the approved vendor's list in November of 1987. When OFFICE learned of the outstanding invitation to bid, its representative, Mr. Richard Foss, went to the BOARD's Purchasing Department and requested a bid package. The bid documents given to OFFICE mistakenly gave January 14, 1988 at 2:00 P.M. as the deadline for the bid submission. Because of the later date given by the BOARD to OFFICE, the company's bid was received after the opening of the bids. When the results of the bidding were made known at the public bid opening, NAPLES bid was the lowest received. On January 14, 1988, after 10:42 A.M., it was discovered by the BOARD that OFFICE's bid price was lower than the price submitted by NAPLES. At this time, NAPLES bid had not yet been accepted by the BOARD, and no formal announcement had been made awarding the contract to NAPLES. During the BOARD's Purchasing Department's bid analysis, a request was made to reject all bids in Bid NO. 3996. The reason given by Purchasing for the request for rejection was that the specifications were being revised. The bids were rejected on the same date. The written reason sent to the vendors on January 14, 1988 for the bid rejection was that one vendor had been given an incorrect opening date. Attached to the written notice to the vendors was a new bid invitation for Bid NO. 4013. The BOARD explained its mistake was unfair to the one vendor. A new bid opening date was given of February 1, 1988. On January 14, 1988, in addition to the required bid documents, OFFICE submitted a letter which listed additional offerings or incentives that OFFICE would give the BOARD if OFFICE was awarded the contract. These additional purchasing incentives were: wall charts and teacher/student manuals for each typing classroom in the county. OFFICE also informed the BOARD that one of the BOARD's own service personnel was already trained in the servicing of Swintec typewriters. The bid submitted by OFFICE did not meet either the weight or the print wheel specifications as set forth in Bid NO. 3996. The specifications as written in Bid NO. 3996 were not written to eliminate all other typewriters but the Brothers 511-11. Weight specifications required were below the Brother's minimum weight, and at least two other manufacturers provide protected drop-in cassette print wheels in electronic typewriters. The Invitation to Bid contained specific provisions which encouraged the bidding of typewriters other than the Brother 511-11, and set up procedures under which other typewriters, which substantially meet the specifications, could be reviewed on their merits. NAPLES was the lowest responsible bidder for the electronic typewriter contract in the prior school year. The BOARD had rejected all bids at that time because of the decision to consider a different brand of typewriter once bids were opened. A notice of protest was filed by NAPLES, and the BOARD agreed to honor NAPLES bid and award the company the contract. The BOARD revised its bid specifications from last year prior to its solicitations for bids in Bid NO. 3996. The protected drop-in cassette print wheel and the weight requirements were two new technical specifications. During the hearing, the BOARD was unable to determine whether the weight factor or the protected drop-in cassette print wheel requirement will continue to be included in future revisions of the specifications.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the BOARD reject the bid submitted by OFFICE as it was nonconforming and sought an advantage not enjoyed by the other bidders. Reinstate the bids which were rejected in Bid NO. 3996, consider the bids, and make an award of the contract to NAPLES. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA D. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen Emens, President Naples Business Equipment and Systems, Inc. 859 4th Avenue South Naples, Florida 33940 Harry A. Blair, Esquire 2138-40 Hoople Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Richard Foss, Typewriter Sales Manager 8A-Del Prado Boulevard Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Karl Engel, Superintendent Lee County Public Schools The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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RANGER CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 92-001538BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 05, 1992 Number: 92-001538BID Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter "Department") declaration that the bid of Ranger Construction, Inc. (hereinafter ("Ranger") was materially irregular and therefore unresponsive to an invitation to bid on contracts in highway construction projects 93110-3539, 3543, 3525, on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in West Palm Beach, Florida.

Findings Of Fact On December 4, 1991, both Petitioner, Ranger, and Intervenor, Community, submitted bids for job numbers 93110-3539, 93110-3542, and 93110-3525, for a construction project on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in Palm Beach County. Petitioner's bid was in the total amount of $2,554,390.37, and Intervenor's was in the total amount of $2,557,071.42. On the basis of those figures, Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. Bid specifications incorporated in all this agency's bids indicate that a bid may be rejected for irregularities. The term, "material" is not used in that specification. When bids are opened, agency procurement officials look at each bid to insure that any award is based on balanced bids containing all appropriate signatures and other requirements, and in the event of an irregularity, a decision is made on the question of whether any irregularity is material in that specific contract. This decision, made by the Awards Committee, is whether the irregularity is material enough to declare the questioned bid unresponsive and award the contract to the next lower bidder. When bids are first opened at the Department auditorium, they are checked to see if the bid bond or a cash or cash equivalent alternative is present. Then the figures are read off and recorded. The bids are then taken back to the contracts office and safeguarded until the minority business enterprise office looks at them. When this is done, the bids are then passed out to the checkers for examination. This more detailed review of the bids submitted revealed that Ranger's bid bond form, though attested to by the corporate secretary, and executed by George H. Friedlander, Agent for the bonding company, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, did not bear the signature of either Ranger's president or vice president. This is considered by Department representatives as being a requirement of a responsive bid. Community's bid bond was properly signed and attested to, and bore the signature of the agent for Reliant Insurance Company, the surety. Community failed to put the company name on the certificate of non- collusion, but in light of the fact that the certificate was signed by the president and was attached to other Community documents, it was identifiable as a part of that bid. In addition, further review of Ranger's bid revealed that on item 630-1- 12 of the computerized price breakdown, certain conduit was listed with a unit price of $621.00 per linear foot. The computer disc furnished to the bidders by the Department, which was used to compute the pricing breakout, reflected 38 linear feet of this conduit would be required. The price of $621.00 per foot on the bid form was in error, however. It should have been $6.21 per linear foot. The error occurred when Ranger's representative punched in the typographically incorrect figure, a clearly clerical error, at the time the bid forms were being completed. This was done, according to Mr. Slade, Ranger's vice president and the person responsible for the bid preparation, in the press of last minute preparation in a motel room in Tallahassee, under less than optimum circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that this was a clerical error which was not caught by any Ranger official on review of its bid prior to submittal, Department officials considered the use of that large figure made Ranger's bid "unbalanced." This defect, plus the failure of the bid bond to be signed by Ranger's president or vice-president, were both considered to be material deviations by the members of the Department's technical review committee which, based on those deviations, recommended to the Department's Contract Award Committee that Ranger's bid be declared unresponsive. This was notwithstanding the fact that even with the incorrect pricing for the amount of the conduit stated on the Department's discs, Ranger's bid was still low. It must be noted, however, that the 38 linear foot quantity of conduit listed in the Department's discs was an incorrect amount. The project plans, furnished to all bidders prior to the bid process, reflected, in the breakdown of specifications, that the correct amount was 97 linear feet of conduit required. When Ranger's incorrect price of $621.00 per foot was applied to the actual footage required, the result was a bid figure for Ranger which was substantially higher than that submitted by Community and, therefore, caused a reversal in the order of the bidders. The Department applies a deviation standard of 7% to flag bids for more careful scrutiny. Here, the $621.00 item price was clearly in excess of that standard. As will be seen below, Ranger was not the only party to make a mistake in this procurement. The Department's discs erroneously reflected the quantity of conduit required at 38 feet when the actual amount called for was 97 feet. There is a difference, however, between the Department changing its specifications, as would be the case here, and the bidder correcting a unit price after opening. The Department can but the bidder can't. The bid documents, furnished to each prospective bidder, reserve the Department's right to make changes. Though the evidence indicates that it was not unknown in the past for Department officials to call a bidder for clarification of an unclear point in its bid, prior to bid award in this case, even though the pricing of the conduit was, at a figure almost 100 times the average/estimate of $7.30 per foot, no call was made to Ranger by any Department official to insure that the stated figure was the intended figure for inclusion. Mr. Griner, upon inquiry by the Hearing Officer, indicated that though while not usual, such an intentional inflation was not unknown to happen in bidding on Department contracts. No specific cases were cited, however. The evidence also indicates that this particular item was not the only item the Department considered to be unbalanced. There were three others in Ranger's bid, but this one was the only one which was felt to be inappropriate. By the same token, Community's bid also contained several items considered to be unbalanced, but they were not considered to be in the disqualifying category that the conduit price in Ranger's bid was in. Unbalanced bids are considered bad by the Department because, if successful, they allow the contractor to recoup or receive a larger portion of the contract price at the beginning of the contract term thereby making it less disadvantageous for him to walk away from the contract and making agency control over the contractor more difficult. Here, Mr. Slade unequivocally denies it was Ranger's intention to unbalance its contract for any purpose and claims it was no more than a clerical error in inserting the decimal point in the unit price when entered into the computer which resulted in the error. He claims that if he had been contacted by the Department when the obvious error was discovered, as he asserts, has been done in the past, he would have corrected it. It is clear that while query calls may have been made by the Department to bidders in the past, they were of a nature which did not affect the price of the contract. Ranger never received any notice from the Department about any problem with its bid. The first information Mr. Slade had of any problem with Ranger's bid came when his estimator made a routine call to the Department and was told of the problem with the unbalance. Thereafter Mr. Slade spoke with Mr. Newell to determine what route the subsequent proceedings would take. The Department contends, through the testimony of Mr. Newell and Mr. Griner, that it is Department policy to consider the failure to have a required signature on a relevant document to be grounds for declaring a bid non- responsive. Their testimony further reflects, however, that while the recommendations of the Technical Review Committee, (TRC), and the Contract Award Committee, (CAC), are uniformly to that effect, the Department Secretary has, on occasion, rejected such a recommendation and awarded a contract to a bidder whose bid did not contain a "required" signature. Consequently, it cannot be said to be Department policy to reject all bids containing an unsigned document since the Secretary, who as the agency head, sets agency policy, has acted inconsistent with such a "policy." Further, Mr. Morefield indicated that the Awards Committee could waive a failure of signature if it felt to do so was appropriate. To the best of his knowledge, however, that has not been done on this type of contract documents.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Ranger Construction Industries, Inc., in regard to project Nos. 93110- 3539, 3543, and 3525 in West Palm Beach, Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 20th day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1538 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: I 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. II 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 31. Accepted. 32. - 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. - 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. 45. - 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. 49. & 50. Accepted. - 53. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. - 61. Accepted. & 63. Accepted. Accepted. & 66. Accepted. 67. & 68. Accepted. 69. Accepted to the extend that the correction is of mathematical calculations of the bid price - not corrections of pricing elements. 70. Accepted. 71. & 72. Accepted. 73. Accepted as a probability 74. Accepted. 75. & 76. Accepted. 77. Accepted. 78. Accepted. 79. Accepted and incorporated herein. 80. Accepted as to the Bond defect; rejected as to the pricing error. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted. 12. - 14. Accepted. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted. 23. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. - 30. Accepted. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. & 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a summary of testimony. & 38. Accepted. Irrelevant and not related to basis for denial. - 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and Second sentences accepted. Balance accepted and incorporated herein. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Douglas S. Roberts, Esquire 123 S. Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Mary M. Piccard, Esquire 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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DIVERSIFIED DESIGN ENTERPRISES vs SEMINOLE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 90-002357BID (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Apr. 20, 1990 Number: 90-002357BID Latest Update: May 22, 1990

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent properly rejected the bid of Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent issued on February 28, 1990, an invitation to bid concerning the installation of bleachers at a high school ("ITB"). The ITB was duly advertised. Among the bidders was Interkal, Inc., which is a manufacturer of bleachers. The Interkal bid, which was timely submitted, was executed by its president. The Interkal bid contained a bid bond naming Interkal as principal and a certification from the secretary of Interkal reflecting a corporate resolution authorizing the execution of all bid documents on behalf of Interkal by its corporate officers. The Interkal bid disclosed two subcontractors. The supplier was shown as Interkal, and the erector was shown as Petitioner. Petitioner is the authorized factory representative for Interkal in Florida. As such, Petitioner solicits business and installs and removes bleachers on behalf of Interkal. As compensation, Petitioner receives commissions for such work from Interkal. However, the shareholder and chief executive officer of Petitioner is not a shareholder or officer of Interkal. In addition, Petitioner is not authorized to execute bid documents on behalf of Interkal. Petitioner is no more than a Subcontrator of Interkal. The bidder in this case was Interkal, not Petitioner, even though Petitioner handled much of the paperwork or its manufacturer. When an unrelated bidder was awarded the contract, Petitioner filed a formal written protest in its name. Interkal has not participated as a party in the subject proceeding.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of Diversified Design Enterprises. ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Ned N. Julian Stenstrom, McIntosh, et al. P.O. Box 1330 Sanford, FL 32772-1330 William Merkel, President Diversified Design Enterprises 321 N.E. Second Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33444 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Seminole County School Board 1211 Mellonville Avenue Sanford, FL 32771

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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DUVAL FORD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 93-006790BID (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 23, 1993 Number: 93-006790BID Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1994

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 287.042(2), Florida Statutes, the Department of Management Services (DMS), lets various Invitations to Bid (ITB) for the benefit of state agencies, cities, counties and other local government agencies so that these entities may purchase a variety of goods and services. On August 24, 1993, DMS issued Invitation To Bid #28-070-700-P. The bid was one of 225 Invitations to Bid issued by DMS in 1993. The bid was for the purchase of medium and heavy trucks. The bid which is the subject of this case involves truck #150. The truck #150 bid has thirteen pages with forty- seven options plus base truck bid blanks. General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid requires that "all corrections made by bidder to his price must be initialed." Other documents provided by the Department to interested bidders as part of the bid package reiterate the requirement that all price changes must be initialed. These documents include the "Checklist," a document entitled "Common Problems That Result in Bid Being Rejected" and the document entitled "Medium and Heavy Trucks Index." The requirement in General Condition I of the Invitation to Bid, that all price changes must be initialed, contains no printed exceptions with respect to "nonpreselected" options. The purpose of the requirements of General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid is to protect both the State of Florida as well as competing vendors. The reason for the requirement that all price changes or alterations be initialed by the vendor is to protect both the State of Florida against a successful bidder later inserting higher option prices and charging the state agencies those prices, and the vendor against the State later inserting lower prices and attempting to hold the vendor to those prices. General Condition 13 of the bid document states: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: Applicable provisions of Federal, State and Local law and all ordinances, rules, and regulations shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of all bids received in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which may arise between persons(s) submitting a bid response hereto and the State of Florida, by and through its officers, employees and authorized representatives, or any other person, natural or otherwise; and lack of knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a cognizable defense against the legal effect thereof. . . (Emphasis added.) General Condition 13 incorporates Rule 60A-1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, which permits the State to waive minor irregularities in the conformance of a bid proposal to the formal bid requirements. The lowest bidder is determined by two factors. The first factor is the price for the base truck. The base truck is the minimum truck which can be ordered in this contract with no options. It is basically a chassis with an engine. The second factor involves additions to the truck called preselected options or predetermined options. All of the other options for the particular vehicle are deemed nonpreselected options. Preselected options are generally the most frequently ordered additions to the base truck along with some other less frequently ordered options. The preselected options can vary from bid to bid; however, DMS always determines the preselected options before opening the bids. The price of any option cannot exceed retail price. There is, therefore, a ceiling for the prices of preselected and nonpreselected options. The preselected options are not announced until after the bid is posted to prevent dishonestly low prices on preselected options and to promote competitive prices throughout the contract document. The bidders therefore do not know which options are preselected when they are composing their bids. There is nothing to be gained by a bidder loading a particular option with a high markup, because the bidder cannot guarantee that the option will not be preselected. The bid evaluation price is the base truck price plus the price of the combined chosen preselected options. DMS received numerous bids on the ITB, including a bid from Petitioner and Intervenor. Atlantic Ford bid a combined price of $38,737.00, and was the apparent low bidder; Duval Ford bid a combined price of $39,944.00 and was the apparent second low bidder. Upon receipt of the bids from the bidders, the bids were held in a locked room until the bid opening. After the bid opening, the purchasing specialist assigned to this bid reviewed each bid for conformity to the general non-technical specifications. Only the Bureau of Procurement is responsible for the nontechnical review although other Bureaus or Divisions may review and have input into the review process. However, these other Divisions' input is not binding. In the nontechnical review the purchasing specialist reviewed each bid's signatures, whether or not the bid was signed in ink, and numerous other requirements. The purchasing specialist also reviewed the bids to determine if all base bid blanks and price blanks for preselected options were filled in and that no corrections were made to those prices without a bidder's initials acknowledging the change. The bids which failed to meet the general conditions of the bid for base bid items and preselected options were rejected as nonresponsive bids. After the initial nontechnical review, the bids were sent to the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft for a technical evaluation. However, since each bid document contains bids for several trucks, there may be a mixture of responsive and nonresponsive bids for various trucks in the same document and the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft may receive responsive and nonresponsive bids for technical review. John Bevins of the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft reviewed the technical parts of the bid. This information included manufacturer's codes for options and base truck features as well as the manufacturer's retail price which no bidder can exceed. After John Bevins completed his review, he filled out a bid rejection recommendation form. John Bevins chose to include nontechnical items in his recommendation, although this was beyond the scope of his review. Mr. Bevins indicated on his bid evaluation form that Atlantic Ford failed to initial a typewritten correction on option 8206 of truck 150. Mr. Bevins returned the reviewed bids to the purchasing specialist along with his recommendation that Atlantic Ford's bid was not responsive since it failed to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206. The purchasing specialist discussed the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206 with H. P. Barker, Jr., the Bureau Chief of Procurement. H. P. Barker, Jr. has the final authority within the Bureau of Procurement to decide if a bid is responsive. He is the customary agency decision-maker on these matters. After careful consideration and discussion, H. P. Barker, Jr., determined that the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on a credit is a minor irregularity according to the Department's purchasing rules, since option 8206 was a nonpreselected option and did not effect the total bid price for determining the lowest bidder. Barker's decision was based on the State's interest in obtaining trucks at the lowest price, thereby obtaining the most goods per contracting dollar. Duval Ford conceded that the typewritten correction was faint and does not appear on photocopies of the bid. Barker testified that DMS accepts photocopies of bids. If Atlantic Ford had submitted a photocopy of its bid, as it could have legally done, then the typewritten correction would probably not have been noted by the Department or the other bidders. Barker also testified that bids are not rejected if nonpreselected option blanks are not filled in. Dealers can choose not to offer all nonpreselected options. Finally, in this case option 8206 was a credit. Even if a purchaser under the contract orders option 8206, it will pay six dollars ($6.00) less for the overall truck from Atlantic Ford than if the truck was ordered from Duval Ford. Duval Ford offered evidence from 1991, that DMS had rejected a bid of another dealer for failure to initial a price change on a nonpreselected option. However, Nelson Easom, Duval Ford's manager had not been able to discover any similar rejections in the subsequent two years. Barker testified that the policy regarding noninitialed nonpreselected options changed three years ago. DMS then decided to treat them as minor irregularities. The policy change was based on the public policy to award the lowest bid whenever possible and to prevent minor deviations in bids from causing the state to pay higher prices for goods and services. Moreover, the evidence did not show any abuse of the bid process which would occur should price changes not be initialed. The alleged "protection" afforded to bidders by requiring every change to be initialed is at best tenuous since any fraudulent price changes could easily be recognized by the party against whom the change was made. Given these facts, this case over initials appears to be much ado about nothing, and the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial its price change on a nonpreselected option is a minor irregularity and waiveable by DMS. DMS therefore did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by waiving the irregularity and awarding the bid to Atlantic Ford.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order in this case dismissing Petitioner's formal protest and awarding the contract for the Project to Atlantic Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6790BID The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. Paragraphs 15 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was legal argument. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 24 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. 9. The facts contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Cook Howell, III Howell, O'Neal & Johnson Suite 1100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cindy Horne Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kerri L. Barsh Attorney at Law Greenberg Traurig et al. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 312 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 William H. Lindner Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57287.042 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60A-1.001
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ANDERSON COLUMBIA COMPANY, INC., AND PANHANDLE LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 99-000740BID (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 17, 1999 Number: 99-000740BID Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Florida Department of Transportation's (FDOT's or Department's) proposed action to award a contract to Couch Construction, L.P., is contrary to the agency's governing statutes, the agency's rules or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (Department) issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for road resurfacing on State Road 10/US 90 in Columbia County, Florida; Financial Project No. 208406-1-52-01 (The Project). Four companies submitted responses to the ITB. Couch was low bidder at $2,271,354.81, and Petitioner was second low at $2,278,263.07. The ITB incorporated the plans and specifications for the proposed highway resurfacing. The price proposal specifications stated in pertinent part: Item Number 2102-10. . .Approximate Quantity. . . 4,320.00 hours Item Number 2102-74-1 . Approximate Quantity . . .75,780.00 each day Item Number 2102-99 . . Approximate Quantity . . . 720.00 each day None of the bidders filed a timely objection to the price proposal specifications. Article 2-6, of the Florida Department of Transportation Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction states: A proposal will be subject to being considered irregular and may be rejected if it shows omissions, alternations of form, additions not called for, conditional or unauthorized alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind; also if the unit prices are obviously unbalanced, either in excess of or below the reasonable cost analysis values. After the bids were opened, each bid was reviewed by the Department to determine whether the bid was mathematically and/or materially unbalanced. The Department's Preliminary Estimates Engineer conducts an unbalanced review of the bids to determine if the bids are mathematically unbalanced. A bid is considered to be mathematically unbalanced if the prices quoted are significantly different from the approximate cost of the item to the contractor. It is very common for bids on construction projects to contain some item prices that are mathematically unbalanced. Bid prices that are mathematically unbalanced are considered by the Department to be non-material irregularities if they do not affect the order of the bidders. In determining whether a mathematically unbalanced price is material, the Department follows a policy set out by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The Department has been following the same policy since at least 1992. The FHWA does not allow for materially unbalanced bids to be accepted by the Department on projects that are federally funded. A materially unbalanced bid is one in which there is a reasonable doubt as to whether award to the bidder submitting the mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the ultimately lowest cost to the Department. The Department has developed an Unbalanced Program Logic for its computer analysis of the bids. The program flags the items that are mathematically unbalanced. It flags the item with an "A" for those items that are above the tolerance window, "U" for under the tolerance window, and "F" as front-loaded items. The flagged items which are short-listed by the computer program are sent to the designer of record to verify the quantities and to verify whether the correct pay item was used. The designer of record verified that the quantities were correct for this Project. As part of the bid review, the Department does a statistical average or mean average for each of the bid items. A standard and a-half deviation either side of the mean is established. The bid items outside that standard and a-half deviation, positive or minus, are discarded. The remaining bid items are re-averaged and this second average is referred to as the "serious average." A front-end loaded item is an item for which work is performed early in the contract. Mobilization is considered a front-end loaded item. Couch's Mobilization item 2101-1B was flagged by the computer analysis. The Department did an analysis of the Mobilization item. The Department started with the difference between Couch's bid and the Petitioner's bid on this item, $18,0000.00. That amount was multiplied by the current interest rate, 10 per cent, and then multiplied by a factor of .5, which spread it over half the contract, times 180-day contract period divided by 365, one calendar year. The result was $434.84, which represents the potential advantage that could result from paying the $18,000.00 amount early in the contract. That amount, $434.84, did not materially unbalance Couch's bid. The three items identified by Petitioner as unbalanced (paragraph 3, above) were low and did not present any detriment to the Department. If those three items overran at the rate established, it would be an advantage to the Department. In evaluating unbalanced bids, the Department follows the guidance in a May 1988 memorandum from the FHWA, which addresses bid analysis and unbalanced bids. The memorandum provides that where unit prices for items bid are either unusually high or low in relation to the engineer's estimate of the price, the accuracy of the estimated quantities of the items are to be checked. If the quantities are reasonably accurate, the bid is to be further evaluated to determine whether the mathematical imbalance is materially unbalanced such that there is "reasonable doubt that award to the bidder submitting the mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the lowest ultimate cost to the Government." The analysis of a mathematically unbalanced bid to determine if it is materially unbalanced considers the effect of the unbalanced bid on the total contract amount; the increase, if any, in the contract cost when quantities are corrected; whether the low bidder will remain as the low bidder; and whether the unbalanced bid would have a potential detrimental effect upon the competitive process or cause contract administration problems later. In this case, the Department compared the unit prices (line item prices) by each bidder on the bid proposal sheet to the average unit price for that item. The average unit price is based upon an average of the bidders' unit prices bid for a given pay item and the Department's estimated unit price for that item. If an individual bidder's unit price is significantly greater or less than the average price, the Department's computer flags the item as mathematically unbalanced. Such a bid then receives further evaluation by the Department to ensure the accuracy of the original estimates of the quantities of those items for which an unbalanced unit price has been submitted. The Department also reviews the project plans for accuracy. The more in-depth review is performed to determine if there is a potential for a cost overrun or if there is an error in the Department's estimated quantities which would result in an increased cost to the Department for the project. In this case, Couch and Anderson submitted bid proposals for each of the individual line item prices contained on FDOT's form. Couch's unit price for the off-duty law enforcement item was $0.25/hour. The Department's average price for the off-duty law enforcement item was $25.22/hour. The Petitioner's quotation for off-duty law enforcement was $26.00/hour. The Department's computer analysis of Couch's bid flagged the off-duty law enforcement item as mathematically unbalanced. The quote by Petitioner for the off-duty law enforcement item was not unbalanced, and therefore was not flagged for further review by the Department. The same analysis was applied to the barricades and variable message sign items, with similar results. The Department also did an in-depth review of item 2101-B, Mobilization, for front-end loading. The result of that analysis was that, as a result of front-end loading, there was the probability of increased cost to the Department of $443.84. This small increase in the cost to the Department was not large enough to change the order of the bidders. Therefore, it was not a materially unbalanced item. The Department then made a more in-depth review of the three mathematically unbalanced items in Couch's bid and determined that none of those items were materially unbalanced, because none of them had the potential to increase the cost to the Department and none of them had the potential to change the order of the bids. In sum, the Couch bid was not materially unbalanced. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a basis for rejecting the Couch bid.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation issue a final order in this case dismissing the Petitioner's Formal Protest and Request for Hearing; denying all relief requested by the Petitioner; and awarding the subject contract to the Intervenor, Couch Construction, L.P. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1999.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57337.11
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CAPITAL ASPHALT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-003499 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003499 Latest Update: May 17, 1984

Findings Of Fact After its initial review of the bids, Respondent determined that Petitioner was the apparent low bidder, with a total bid of $344,971.53. Subsequently, however, it found an inconsistency in one of Petitioner's item prices and recomputed the subtotal which had the effect of increasing Petitioner's bid to $346,851.53. As a result of this recomputation, Intervenor became the apparent low bidder with its bid of $346,371.06. Respondent discovered that Intervenor had also made a similar error in one of its item prices which, had the subtotal been recalculated, would have increased Intervenor's bid by over $12,000. However, Respondent waived the error and allowed Intervenor's bid to stand. Respondent's bid forms specify various quantities of material required. Each quantity listed is followed by three columns which the bidder must complete. The first column is the unit bid in words (e.g. five dollars and no cents). The second column is the unit bid in numbers (e.g. $5.00). The final column, referred to as the "extension" is the total bid on the item in numbers (e.g. 30 units required times $5.00 per unit equals $150.00) Respondent's item number 10275 specified 1,890 construction signs. Petitioner entered one dollar and fifty cents in the unit bid (words) column, followed by $1.50 in the unit bid (numbers) column. Petitioner's extension column entry was $945.00. Respondent determined that 1,890 signs times one dollar and fifty cents each totalled $2,835.00, rather than $945.00, and raised Petitioner's bid accordingly. Respondent's item number 285710367 specified 7,070 square yards of material. Intervenor entered twelve dollars and no cents in the unit bid (words) column followed by $12.00 and $10.25 in the unit bid (numbers) column. A black line was drawn through the number $12.00, but was not initialed. Intervenor's extension column entry was $72,467.50. Here, Respondent determined that the $10.25 unit price should be permitted since 7,070 square yards times $10.25 did, if fact, equal the stated extension price. Using red ink, Respondent drew a second line through the number $12.00, and initialed this change. Respondent also drew lines through the words twelve (dollars) and no (cents), and wrote the words ten (dollars) and twenty-five (cents) and initialed this correction. Respondent's published policy on bid procedures is contained in its Standard Specifications Manual. Section 3-1 provides in part: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price for any item. the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, in which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to reject Petitioner's extension price on the signs since it did not agree with the unit price in figures or in words. Respondent applied the above procedure to accept Intervenor's extension price on the material since the $10.25 unit price in figures agreed with the extension. Acceptance of the $10.25 unit price figure (rather than the other entry of $12.00) was essential since no attempt had been made to change the twelve dollar unit price in words. Respondent's policy on bid procedures as set forth in its Standards Specification manual requires initialling of all changes made by the bidder. Section 2-5.1 provides in part: In case a change is made in a word or figure after it has been written in ink or typewritten, the bidder shall write his initials by the change. Intervenor failed to initial the change in its unit price figure. However, Respondent did not consider this to be a significant error and accepted the uninitialed change. Respondent's Standards Specifications Manual, Section 3-1, provides in part: Until the actual award of the contract, however, the right will be reserved to reject any or all proposals and to waive technical errors as may be deemed best for the interest of the State. This policy permits Respondent to reject either or both of these bids because of the errors discussed herein. Conversely, Respondent could consider either or both errors to be merely technical errors and waive them. Respondent's testimony and documentary evidence demonstrated that it does not enforce the policy requiring initialling of corrections. Additionally, Respondent's evidence established that it rigorously applies the procedure in Section 3-1 requiring the unit price in words to prevail where there are discrepancies except when the unit price in numbers and the extension agree. Respondent argues that the unit price figure is critical since the State may wish to order more of a given item and would not want to be bound by an erroneously high unit price. However, a stated unit price would not be binding where there is an error. Rather, the presumably correct extension price could be divided by the bid quantity to determine the correct unit price. The primary purpose of the policy which requires agreement of numbers and initialling of corrections is the prevention of conspiracy between bidders and State employees to alter bids. A further policy consideration, which is the stated basis for waiver of technical errors, is the furtherance of State interest. See Section 3-1, quoted above. In this regard, it should be noted that since Petitioner's original bid is the lowest, acceptance thereof would be in the interest of the State.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order rejecting existing bids and reissuing its bid proposal. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Pennington, Jr., Esquire 325 John Knox Road, Suite L-101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 West Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57337.11
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KELLOGG AND KIMSEY, INC. vs LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 91-007597BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Nov. 26, 1991 Number: 91-007597BID Latest Update: Mar. 02, 1992

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence addressed at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The request for sealed bids for the construction of the Project was advertised on October 9, 16 and 23, 1991. There were six addenda to the original bid documents which added, deleted or modified provisions of the original bidding requirements, contract requirements, administrative requirements and technical specifications. The original bid documents plus the six addenda will be referred to herein as the "bid documents". The bid documents required that all bids be in full accord with the contract documents. Sealed bids for the Project were opened on October 30, 1991. Wright submitted the lowest lump sum bid for the Project, with Sovran submitting the second lowest lump sum bid and Kellogg submitting the third lowest lump sum bid. At the time of the bid opening, the bid documents listed only four casework manufacturers that were approved to furnish casework for the Project. Empire Custom Cabinets, Inc. (Empire) was not listed as one of the four approved casework manufacturers in the bid documents. The bid documents did not require the bidder to list the casework manufacturer it intended to obtain the casework from, but only that the bidder name the casework subcontractor. The only work item in the bid documents which requires identifying the name of the manufacturer on the subcontractor's list is the metal roof system. Because Empire's bid on the casework was extremely low compared to other bids received by Wright on the casework, Wright called Empire prior to submitting its bid to confirm that Empire's bid was submitted per plans and specifications. Although Wright did not specifically inquire of Empire at this time as to which manufacturer Empire was obtaining the casework from for the Project, Empire did advise Wright that Empire's bid on the casework was according to plans and specifications. Additionally, Empire did not divulge or advise Wright at this time that the bid was based on Empire manufacturing the casework for the Project. Based on this representation from Empire, Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor, and calculated its lump sum bid for the Project using Empire's bid. Although Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor in its bid, this did not create an irregularity in Wright's bid since Wright's bid was per plans and specification without exception or exclusion. This would require Wright to furnish casework for the Project manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents regardless of which subcontractor Wright listed as the subcontractor for casework. By letter dated November 1, 1991, the Board's architect for the Project requested Wright to have Empire submit written certification by one of the four approved casework manufacturers that its casework was being furnished to Empire for the project. By letter dated November 4, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire's bid on the casework for the Project was based on casework to be manufactured by Empire. On the same day, Wright furnished the architect for the Project a copy of Empire's letter of November 4, 1991. In response to a request by the Board, Wright, by letter dated November 7, 1991, advised the Board that Wright would furnish casework manufactured by one of the four approved manufacturers listed in the bid documents for the Project. By letter dated December 3, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire would need to withdraw its bid if Empire was required to use casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents. On that same day, Wright furnished the Board a copy of Empire's letter and requested that the Board allow Wright to remove and replace Empire with Steven Ward and Associates, Inc. (Ward), as the casework subcontractor since Ward would be able to furnish and install casework manufactured by LSI Corporation of America, Inc., one of the four approved casework manufacturers. No Action has been taken on that request. The bid documents provide for a subcontractor to be removed and replaced from the list of subcontractors after the bid is opened if there is a showing of good cause and written approval by the Board and the Project architect is obtained. Although Empire's bid on the casework for the Project submitted to Wright was based on Empire manufacturing the casework, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that at the time Wright submitted its bid on the Project it had reasonable grounds to believe that Empire's bid on the casework was based on Empire furnishing and installing casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. After determining that Empire could not perform under its bid, Wright obtained a bid from Ward for furnishing and installing the casework for the Project which was less than Ward's original bid submitted to Wright before the bid opening. However, this bid was substantially more than Empire's bid, and if Wright is allowed to substitute Ward for Empire, Wright will have to absorb the additional costs since the bids were lump sum bids. Wright is neither attempting to furnish casework from a manufacturer that is not approved, nor is Wright requesting an increase in the lump sum bid price. The advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project required that all bidders be prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date. Sovran and one other bidder were not prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date in accordance with Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran received the bid documents for the Project approximately one month before the bid date but did not file a Notice of Protest of the prequalification requirement contained in the Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran holds a certificate as a general contractor licensed in the State of Florida in accordance with Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. As a certified general contractor Sovran, pursuant to Section 489.125, Florida Statutes, was authorized to bid on the Project notwithstanding the Board's prequalification requirement. This was explained by the Board's representative at the bid opening. The bid documents required that a subcontractor list be submitted by all bidders, and when submitted with the bid becomes an integral part of the bid. The purpose of the subcontractor list was to prevent bid shopping, and to allow the Board an opportunity to review the subcontractors to determine if any subcontractor on the list had performed unsatisfactorily on previous Board projects. Neither the statutes relating to competitive bidding nor the bid documents prohibit the listing of the general contractor together with a subcontractor on a subcontractor list. The subcontractor list submitted by Sovran indicated "Sovran Constr/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the masonry work and "Sovran/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the poured-in-place concrete work. "Naples" is Naples Concrete and Masonry Work, Inc. The bid received by Sovran from Naples was for both labor and materials for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran neither requested nor did Naples furnish Sovran a bid to provide labor only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. There was no agreement between Sovran and Naples whereby Sovran would supply the materials and Naples would furnish the labor for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran did request and receive bids from other companies for furnishing materials only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran listed itself, the general contractor, along with Naples on the subcontractor list for the purpose of supplying the materials for the poured-in- place concrete and masonry work. Sovran's main reason for supplying the materials was that Naples was not bondable. Without a payment bond from Naples, Sovran would be without protection and could be forced into paying double for the materials in the event Naples failed to pay the material suppliers. Although the Superintendent of the Lee County Schools has recommended to the Board that the Board accept Wright's bid for the Project, the Board has not voted on that recommendation. The fact that Wright used Empire's bid to calculate its lump sum bid in no way excuses Wright for the requirement set out in the bid documents that casework used for the Project (when the time comes) be manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. Wright gains no economic advantage in this regard since the lump sum bid price remains the same. The advertisement for Sealed Bids on the Project provides that the Board reserves the right to waive any and all irregularities of any bid received.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order dismissing the instant bid protest and awarding to Wright the contract for the construction of Elementary School "C", Job No. 91063. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 91-7597B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1 - 3(1,2 and 3 , respectively); 4 - 5(6); 6(4); 7 - 9(5); 12(10); 13(11); 15 - 16(12); 17(13); 18 - 19(16); 20(29); 21(18); 23(19); 24 - 25(20); 26(22); 27(23); 28(22); 29 - 30(29); 32 - 33(25); and 34(26). Proposed finding of fact 10 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record in that Wright's bid was as per plans and specifications without exceptions or exclusions which included the use of casework manufactured by one of the approved casework manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record in that the Board knew of Empire's bid being based on nonconforming materials prior to issuing its Notice of Intent. However, the only information the Board had in reference to Wright's bid before issuing its Notice of Intent was that Wright had bid as per plans and specifications and would be installing casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. The only question was whether Empire could furnish casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 14 is neither material nor relevant. How the Board's architect interpreted Wright's bid is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 22 is unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 31 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed findings of fact 35 and 36 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. The timeliness of Kellogg's protest is not an issue and therefore, a finding that it was timely is unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent While not specifically adopting proposed finding of fact 1, where material or relevant or necessary to this proceeding, and supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record the stipulated facts have been adopted. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2(4,5); 3(9); 4 - 5(7); 7 - 8(8); 10(16); 11(14); 12(31); 13(21); and 15(23). Proposed finding of fact 6 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed finding of fact 9 and 14 are neither material nor relevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor See ruling on Respondent's proposed finding of fact Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2 - 3(21); 4(24); 5 - 6(21); 13(23); 14(24,28); 15(22); 16 - 17(23,24); and 18(28). Proposed findings of fact 7 through 12 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Gurley, Esquire Norton, Gurley & Darnell, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 610 Sarasota, FL 34236 Marianne Kantor, Esquire The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, FL 33901 James M. Talley, Esquire Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. Post Office Box 712 Orlando, FL 32802 Karl Engel Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57489.125
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