Findings Of Fact For purposes of the Motion, the following allegations contained in the petitions are accepted as true: Albert Figueroa is an approved visitor for an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. Albert Figueroa regularly visits an inmate under the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. Jaylin Figueroa has a brother in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections. Jaylin Figueroa regularly visits with this brother. Martin Glick is on the Florida Department of Corrections approved visitor list for an inmate in its custody. Imposition of visitation restrictions upon an inmate, including indefinite suspension of these privileges, would affect the Petitioners’ visitation of that inmate.
The Issue An administrative complaint and first amended administrative complaint allege that Respondent violated Section 496.405, F.S. (1991) by soliciting contributions as a charitable organization on several occasions prior to approval of its registration statement by the Division of Consumer Services. The parties have stipulated that the violations occurred and further stipulated that the remaining issue for resolution is an appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, United Rainbow Foundation, Inc. (URF) is a Florida not- for-profit corporation with its principal office in Tarpon Springs, Pinellas County, Florida. The following facts, comprising the parties' stipulation filed on February 12, 1993, are adopted: Prior to being registered on July 17, 1992, under Chapter 496, Florida Statutes, United Rainbow solicited contributions in the State of Florida for a total of thirty-two (32) days; Solicitations for charitable contributions were made by United Rainbow in the calendar year 1992 on or about the following dates: April 10, 13 May 12, 13, 15, 22, 26, 28, 29 June 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29 July 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14 These solicitations were made in several locations in Florida as follows: Bradenton New Port Richey Orlando Gainesville Lecanto Venice As a result of the aforementioned activities, United Rainbow received charitable contributions between April 10, 1992 and July 14, 1992 totalling approximately $15,446.74; and United Rainbow incurred attorney's fees and costs totalling $12,876.87 (as of December 31, 1992) in connection with administrative proceedings in both this action and in a related action wherein United Rainbow successfully challenged the denial of its registration under Chapter 496 (DOAH Case No. 92-4817). However, the Department objects to the relevancy of attorney's fees incurred by United Rainbow and does not waive its objection by execution of this Stipulation. The findings of fact reflected in the recommended order dated August 17, 1992 in DOAH case #92-4817, as adopted in the agency's final order entered August 19, 1992 are adopted herein. The recommended and final orders are appended hereto.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its final order finding that the Respondent, United Rainbow Foundation, Inc. violated Section 496.405(1)(c), F.S. and assessing a penalty of $32,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings day of April, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: John P. Holsonback, Esquire Melendi, Gibbons & Holsonback, P.A. 408 East Madison Tampa, Florida 33602 Robert G. Worley, Esquire Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Mitchell is a highway construction contractor with its principal place of business located in Tallahassee, Florida. FDOT is the agency of the state of Florida which is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the roads designated as part of the State Highway System. On July 15, 1994, the parties entered into Contract No. 18,784 (contract) which required Mitchell to resurface the existing roadway, construct four (4) foot wide paved shoulders and perform other related work for $626,347.44 in State Project No. 59100-3512 (project) in Wakulla County, Florida. The contract incorporated by reference special provisions attached thereto and FDOT's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (1991) (Standard Specifications). The contract required Mitchell to complete the project within 84 calendar days. Construction began on August 31, 1994, which was contract day one (1). In order to construct and pave the shoulders, Mitchell had to remove the top soil and stabilize the subgrade. After removing the top soil, Mitchell hauled borrow material to the project site. Mitchell spread the borrow along the roadside and mixed it with the existing sub-soil. Mitchell then attempted to attain a certain required density by compacting the shoulders. Mitchell hauled borrow to the project site from October 5, 1994, through October 8, 1994, and on October 13, 1994. Mitchell rolled the surface of the shoulders on October 18, and 20-22, 1994. The contractor was unable compact the subgrade to the required density. On or about October 22, 1994, FDOT refused to pay Mitchell for additional material to reestablish grade on the shoulders. From approximately October 24, 1994, through November 11, 1994, Mitchell remixed and compressed the subgrade soil in an unsuccessful attempt to stabilize the shoulders. From October 25, 1994, through November 7, 1994, Mitchell wrote at least four (4) letters to FDOT discussing the problems at the project site in achieving required density and stabilization of the subgrade on the shoulders. These letters are not a part of the record in this case. However, the hearing transcript from February 15, 1995, clearly shows Mitchell's position: (1) Plastic materials beneath the subgrade (unexpected conditions not contemplated under the contract) were causing a delay on the project and preventing Mitchell from achieving the required density and stabilization of the subgrade; (2) Mitchell would have to excavate the plastic material and haul in additional borrow to reestablish the grade of the shoulders before stabilization could be obtained; (3) Mitchell needed an extension of time in which to complete the project; and (4) Mitchell wanted FDOT to pay for the expenses (not covered under the contract) that Mitchell would incur in curing the problem. On or about November 11, 1994, Mitchell informed FDOT in writing that Mitchell was suspending work on the project. Mitchell suspended work without obtaining FDOT's approval as required by the contract. By letter dated November 14, 1994, FDOT responded to Mitchell's four (4) letters. FDOT's letter did not specifically deny each of Mitchell's requests but made it clear that Mitchell's claims were unsubstantiated. FDOT took the position that Mitchell created the problems with compaction by failing to follow FDOT procedures: (1) Prior to hauling in stabilizing material, Mitchell did not submit a sample of the existing on-site material so that a lime rock bearing ratio (LBR) could be established to determine how much, if any, stabilizing material would be needed to obtain the required LBR; (2) Mitchell did not submit samples or get FDOT's approval of the material used for stabilization before spreading and mixing it on the project site; (3) Mitchell did not sufficiently mix the material used for stabilization so that density could be obtained; (4) Soil samples of the material beneath the area being stabilized, to a depth of approximately three and one half feet, indicated that it was suitable for compaction; (5) The sources of borrow material used in attempting to stabilize the subgrade were not approved as required by the contract; (6) Mitchell added unapproved material, in excess of what was required, to the borrow material hauled to the project site. FDOT wrote this November 14, 1994, letter after investigating the problem and performing certain field and laboratory soil tests. On December 12, 1994, Stephen Benak, District Construction Engineer for FDOT, made a visit to the project site to conduct further investigation. Later that day the parties had a meeting. Mitchell again explained to FDOT that unexpected conditions at the job site were causing problems and preventing the contractor from obtaining density requirements on the subgrade. FDOT again informed Mitchell: (1) The unapproved borrow material that Mitchell previously hauled to the project site was unsuitable and causing the problem; and (2) Mitchell's proposal to under-cut (excavate and haul more borrow material) was a drastic cure and not compensable under the contract. Mitchell did not immediately return to work on the project. With credit for twenty-four (24) rain days, the contract performance time increased to 108 calendar days. Taking the rain days and intervening holidays into consideration, FDOT determined that the contract term expired on December 20, 1994. Mitchell did not return to work at the project site until December 23, 1994. By letter dated December 29, 1994, FDOT gave Mitchell notice of the agency's intent to declare Mitchell delinquent on the project and to suspend its Certificate of Qualification and that of all its subsidiaries. This letter states that Mitchell was making unsatisfactory progress on the contract because the contract time had expired and the work was not complete. The letter refers to section 8-8.2 of FDOT's Standard Specifications and Rule 14- 23, Florida Administrative Code. On January 12, 1995, Mitchell filed a Request for Formal Hearing without making an additional request for extension of contract time. This petition states: Mitchell Brothers has filed timely requests for extension of contract time due to the delays resulting from the lack of constructability and differing site conditions of the project. Therefore, the Department's issuance of the notice of delinquency is invalid. After receiving Mitchell's request for hearing, FDOT designated Tom Kinsella, Esquire, as counsel for the agency. By letter dated January 23, 1995, Mr. Kinsella referred Mitchell's request for a hearing to DOAH. The Hearing Officer issued a Notice of Hearing on January 27, 1995, setting this matter for hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 on February 8, 1995. In order to allow the parties sufficient time for discovery, the Hearing Officer subsequently rescheduled the case for hearing on February 15 and 16, 1995. The parties took depositions every day from February 2, 1995, to February 13, 1995. Bill Carpenter, FDOT's Project Engineer on the project at issue here, was the first deponent. Prior to Mr. Carpenter's deposition, Mr. Kinsella inquired as to whether there were any outstanding time requests. Mr. Carpenter assured Mr. Kinsella that FDOT had addressed and denied all outstanding time requests in FDOT's letter dated November 14, 1995. At the formal hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 on February 15, 1995, Mr. Benak testified on FDOT's behalf. On direct examination, Mr. Benak testified that Mitchell made no "proper" requests for contract time extensions. During cross-examination, Mitchell questioned Mr. Benak concerning Mitchell's letters written between October 25, 1994, and November 7, 1994. Initially, Mr. Benak testified that Mitchell's letters were not "formal" requests for extension of contract time. The Hearing Officer ruled that two of these letters contained preliminary requests for extension of contract time. Mr. Benak subsequently questioned whether Mitchell's letters were timely pursuant to section 8-7.3.2, Standard Specifications. Without resolving the issue of timeliness, Mr. Benak conceded that the delay was on-going and that the agency had never written to Mitchell requesting more specific information about the delay, i.e. all documentation of the delay and a request for the exact number of days justified to be added to the contract time. Therefore Mitchell was never required to submit a more formal request for contract time extensions. However, Mr. Benak never conceded that Mitchell's preliminary requests were pending at the time the agency issued its notice of intent to declare Mitchell delinquent or that the agency failed to follow its own procedures before issuing that notice. Mr. Benak maintained that the contract did not provide for extensions of contract time for delays due to the fault or negligence of the contractor. He testified that FDOT's letter dated November 14, 1994, effectively denied Mitchell's pending preliminary requests for time extensions and informed Mitchell that the delay was due to the contractor's fault or negligence. Accordingly, FDOT was not required to solicit further information from Mitchell before issuing the December 29, 1994, delinquency letter. As the hearing on February 15, 1995, progressed, it became apparent that the parties disputed a variety issues involving mixed question of fact and law. In ruling on an objection which is not at issue here, the Hearing Officer stated: * * It seems to me the more pertinent, you know, a much more pertinent area -- and we haven't addressed this in terms of the Department's procedures, that would start a request for extension of time, and it appears that the Department has never acted on that. And you've raised a very interesting matter, and that is under the rules, apparently if that process has been initiated, you can't go to delinquency, which means that this activity, this that they've tried to initiate, lacks the appropriate legal predicate. That's a good point. After the hearing in DOAH Case No. 95-289 recessed on February 15, 1995, Mr. Kinsella advised Mitchell's counsel that FDOT would withdraw the delinquency. Mr. Kinsella wanted to alert Mitchell that it was unnecessary for witnesses to attend the hearing the next day. When the hearing resumed on February 16, 1995, FDOT filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Notice of Delinquency and Motion for Relinquishment and Remand of Jurisdiction. The motion states, "The Department is now withdrawing it (sic) notice of intent to declare delinquincy without prejudice, it appearing that all of Mitchell Brothers, Inc., requests for additional time may not have been addressed by the Department." However, competent persuasive record evidence indicates that FDOT made this determination based on the Hearing Officer's prior rulings and statements during the hearing on February 15, 1995. Mr. Kinsella stated on the record: * * After the conclusion of the hearing yesterday on the basis of the matters that came up in terms of whether the preliminary requests for time extensions have been properly met by the Department and evaluated and addressed in the correspondence as pointed out by the Court, we went back and evaluated, and determined that we don't believe those have been fairly met and addressed by the Department, and that this delinquency was premature for that reason. Counsel for Mitchell did not object to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction but requested an opportunity to submit a proposed order. The Hearing Officer stated that Mitchell could file a motion to submit a proposed order and that FDOT would have an opportunity to respond to that motion. The Hearing Officer did not set a date certain for the filing of the posthearing motion but Mitchell's counsel stated that the motion would be filed in a very brief time, within a day or two. February 16, 1995, was a Thursday. The following Monday, February 20, 1995, Mitchell filed a Motion to Permit Submittal of Proposed Findings and for Entry of a Recommended Order, a proposed recommended order for the Hearing Officer's signature, and a Motion for Attorney's Fees. DOAH's Clerk docketed Mitchell's motion to submit proposed findings and the proposed recommended order in DOAH Case No. 95-289. The Clerk docketed Mitchell's motion for attorney's fees under DOAH Case No. 95-1096F. That same day, the Hearing Officer entered an Order Closing File which did not retain jurisdiction over any issue in DOAH Case No. 95-289. Subsequent relevant pleadings and procedures arising in the instant case between February 20, 1995, and June 14, 1995, are set forth above in the Preliminary Statement and incorporated herein. The record indicates that the parties were at an impasse when Mitchell suspended work on the project on or about November 11, 1994. After FDOT's November 14, 1994, letter and the meeting on December 12, 1994, the parties certainly were aware of each other's positions, and were deadlocked as to the reason for the delay in stabilizing the subgrade. The dispute between them involved multiple questions of fact and law which are not at issue here. FDOT's December 29, 1994, delinquency letter gave Mitchell what it was entitled to, i.e., a point-of-entry to challenge, in an administrative proceeding, FDOT's position that Mitchell created the conditions causing the delay in stabilizing the subgrade. FDOT had a reasonably clear legal justification for issuing that letter based on sections 8-7.3.2 and 8-8.2 of FDOT's Standard Specifications and Rule 14-23, Florida Administrative Code. The delinquency letter was not issued and subsequently filed with DOAH for an improper or frivolous purpose. As of February 15, 1995, the 165th calendar day of the project, Mitchell continued to work on the project which was only 36 percent complete and which FDOT had not conditionally accepted. Mitchell has incurred $44,408.50 in attorney's fees and $18,071.13 in cost in litigating DOAH Case No. 95-289 and DOAH Case No. 95-1096F. Mitchell is also obligated to pay $1,045.00 to Carolyn Raepple, Esquire, who testified concerning the reasonableness of the fees and costs that Mitchell incurred in DOAH Case Nos. 95-289 and 95-1096F. FDOT has presented no evidence to rebut the reasonableness of these fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Harry M. Katz, M.D., is a medical doctor. His address is P.O. Box 192, Cedar Hill, Missouri 63016. He maintains an active family practice in the area of that location and is licensed by the agency charged with regulating and licensing medical doctors in the State of Missouri ("Missouri Board"). The Petitioner is seeking reinstatement of his medical doctor's license revoked by the Florida Board's Final Order of February 14, 1966. The Respondent is the Board of Medicine of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation located at 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. It has denied the Petitioner's reinstatement of his Florida medical doctor's license, which initial agency action resulted in this formal proceeding. The Petitioner falls within that class of physicians whose licenses were revoked prior to June 1994 and under the legal authority cited herein, are entitled to petition for reinstatement. In order to have his license reinstated, the Petitioner must demonstrate that he is capable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety, as required by Subsection 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1991). On February 14, 1966, the State Board of Medical Examiners revoked the Petitioner's medical license for aiding, assisting and promoting an unlicensed physician to practice medicine and surgery at his hospital and by apparently failing to correctly perform physical examinations upon pilots for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), although he certified them as physically fit. The Petitioner had employed a physician (surgeon) to practice at his hospital in Clearwater, Florida, including the performance of surgery. Sometime later, while that physician was in his employ, the Petitioner learned that his license had been either revoked or suspended. The Petitioner states that he promptly contacted the State Board of Medical Examiners to ascertain what his responsibility was in terms of employing such a physician, who was unlicensed, without the Petitioner's knowledge. The Petitioner states that he was informed by the Executive Director of the Medical Board that, in effect, he was not liable or subject to enforcement action by the Board for unknowingly allowing the unlicensed physician to practice under the circumstances described in the Petitioner's testimony in this case. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was ultimately prosecuted by the Medical Board for this activity, some of which occurred soon after he became aware of the doctor's license suspension, and also for allegedly certifying pilots as physically fit to the FAA when he had not actually done complete physical examinations. The Petitioner maintains that, indeed, he did do physical examinations on the four pilots, but testified that he did not do prostate examinations because it was not medically necessary, with pilots of such a young age to do such examinations. The Board found that he could not have done adequate physicals if the pilots were not required to disrobe. In any event, his medical license was revoked, which he freely admits. Sometime in 1972, the Petitioner was prosecuted on a federal indictment, concerning charges in the nature of "medicare fraud". In essence, the Petitioner was charged with billing the medicare system for doctor/patient visits, for patients in his hospital, for each day the patients resided in his hospital, which apparently did not conform to medicare regulations. The Petitioner maintains that, indeed, he made the visits he billed for and believed that he was billing correctly for them. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that he was convicted and sentenced to two years in the federal prison facility at Eglin Air Force Base for those charges. Shortly after his confinement, the sentence was reduced to one year. The Petitioner appealed both the state license revocation and the federal criminal conviction, but both were upheld on appeal. The Petitioner testified concerning circumstances surrounding his federal trial involving purported inappropriate, ineffective and possible failure by the prosecution to reveal potential exculpatory evidence representation by his counsel, the effect of which he was unable to overturn in the appellate process. Be that as it may, as the Petitioner concedes, he did have his medical doctor's license revoked in 1966 and suffered a federal conviction in 1972. The Petitioner's license to practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Kentucky was revoked based upon the Florida disciplinary action, and his Alabama license was voluntarily surrendered on the same basis. His application for licensure in South Dakota was denied based, in effect, upon the Florida disciplinary action, and his application for a State of Louisiana medical license was denied, as to full licensure, on the same basis. The State of Louisiana, however, did grant him a conditional license to practice medicine, which authorized him to practice as an employed physician at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. He served in that capacity and was promoted to medical director of the facility, providing medical care for some 4,000 inmates. Additionally, the Petitioner applied for licensure with the Kansas Board of Healing Arts, but elected not to pursue that licensure. The application was deemed withdrawn. The various state medical licensing boards revoked the Petitioner's pre-existing licensure or denied his applications for licensure based upon the Florida disciplinary action. Those other state boards took the position that he had to cure the licensure deficiency in Florida before he could be licensed in the other states. Those licensure actions were not based upon any independent disciplinary prosecutions in those states. The Petitioner practiced as a physician III and physician IV in the Louisiana Department of Corrections at the penitentiary at Angola from sometime in 1973 until 1981. He became medical director of that facility. He performed a competent and honorable medical practice at that facility, as shown by unrefuted testimony in this proceeding and by the testimonial letters stipulated into evidence. The Petitioner is currently licensed to practice medicine in the State of Missouri, where he has conducted a family practice since 1981. During his tenure in practice in Missouri, he had four malpractice suits filed against him. The first suit was settled for the sum of $1,200.00. The second and third suits were dismissed. The fourth suit resulted in a verdict in his favor. The verdict was later set aside, but the case was settled for the sum of $15,000.00. One of the malpractice suits resulted in the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts in Missouri inquiring into his practice in that instance. His licensure status was not disciplined, but the Missouri Board required him to take the SPEX examination administered by the Federation of State Medical Boards. He took that examination and passed it with a score of 81. The Petitioner is held in high esteem by his colleagues in the medical profession in Missouri, as shown by the testimonial letters in evidence and by a certificate of appreciation he was awarded by the St. Louis University Medical Center for his support and medical practice in conjunction with the St. Louis University Hospital's clinical services and teaching mission in conjunction with its operations as a teaching hospital. He has referred numerous patients to that facility and has received favorable comment on his evaluation, treatment of patients, and the good standards with which he has conducted his practice. The Petitioner is licensed to prescribe narcotics without restriction. He is current with all of the required continuing medical education requirements and exceeds those requirements. He held a certificate of membership in good standing with the American Medical Association at least through July 1, 1993. He is a participant in good standing in the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the State of Missouri. He holds a valid certificate from the United States Department of Health and Human Services for clinical laboratory services. He is a participating physician in good standing with the Medicare and Medicaid programs and with the Blue Cross/Blue Shield program and is approved by the United States Department of Transportation to perform its required physicals. During his tenure in Louisiana, he was a member in good standing in the Louisiana State Medical Society from approximately 1976 to 1980 and an officer of that association. He is a member in good standing of the American Medical Association as an AMA senior physician, the Southern Medical Association, since about 1982, and the American Correctional Association. Additionally, he has been board certified in the field of family practice by the American Board of Family Practice since 1976, in good standing. The Petitioner has labored with a commendable dedication to good medical practice in amassing the above-found credits to his medical practice since suffering the above-referenced blemishes on his professional record so long ago, culminating in his demonstration to the Missouri State Board of his ability to safely engage in the practice of medicine by passing the SPEX examination with a high score. He has demonstrated that he is capable of and has practiced medicine with reasonable skill and safety, as required by Subsection 458.331(4), Florida Statutes (1991). The testimony of Georgia Leigh Katz, the Petitioner's daughter, speaks eloquently to the high level of character demonstrated by the Petitioner's single-minded dedication to his medical practice, even under his diminished professional standing for over 20 years. That demonstration of the perseverance and character with which he has approached his practice of medicine, under professionally and legally straitened circumstances during that time, certainly militates in favor of finding him rehabilitated from his prior disciplinary blemishes. Ms. Katz' testimony was unrefuted and is adopted herein by reference as true. She thus established that, although not the fault of the medical board nor the federal court, the Petitioner's disciplinary action in Florida and the federal court conviction effectively destroyed his family. Shortly thereafter, he and his wife were divorced; and he, for much of the ensuing, approximate quarter century, has had to live apart from his children, in a distant state, while attempting, with his licensure impairment, to earn a relatively meager living and to support his family. He has made herculian efforts to support his family and himself with his medical practice, which could not reach its full potential because of the blemishes upon his professional record. Ms. Katz' testimony demonstrated, in a truly heart-rending way, the effect which this has had upon the Petitioner, his children and his former wife, their mother, in terms of the lack of financial security these circumstances imposed and, more importantly, the emotional hardship caused to the Petitioner and his family. The Petitioner's dedication to his profession under these debilitating circumstances for these long years certainly demonstrates a rehabilitation of character in the Petitioner. This rehabilitation, coupled with the showing that he is competent and capable of practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety, shows that his new licensure in Florida would pose no risk to its citizens but rather would be a benefit to them. Counsel for the Board apparently avers that the Petitioner unrealistically claims that the Florida Board of Medicine, and its counterparts in other states, are engaged in some covert conspiracy to continue to deny him licensure, to impair his professional standing and medical practice. Questions by counsel, however, as well as those by the Hearing Officer, reveal that, although it is granted that the Petitioner has a great deal of emotional investment and anguish resulting from his multiple bouts with his licensure restrictions, that he really intended to explain in his testimony, in an imperfect way, that his licensure problems in the other states are interrelated with the root disciplinary action in Florida and that the Florida disciplinary action and the federal conviction, has had a legally operative effect with the medical practice acts in the other named states which cannot be cured until his licensure status in Florida can be restored. The Hearing Officer does not find from the testimony and evidence that the Petitioner has an unrealistic thought process leading to a perception on his part that there is a real conspiracy between the medical boards of the various named states or any of their personnel. The Respondent also appears to take the position that the Petitioner cannot truly demonstrate rehabilitation unless he comes before the Board to express apology and contrition for his past conduct, and it decries his remonstrances concerning his disciplinary record. In fact, however, the Petitioner does not deny the past disciplinary actions, although he did seek to explain their circumstances in an exculpatory way. On one level, it might seem a valid criticism that the Petitioner expresses no contrition or apology for his past conduct. On the other hand, he appears to genuinely believe in his innocence or at least his lack of moral turpitude concerning his disciplinary circumstances. This genuine belief on his part has motivated him to resist expressions of apology to the Florida Board, while exercising every available remedy to overturn the disciplinary action. This fact supports an inference that he is a man who has adhered to genuinely- held convictions, even through years of professional and personal adversity such a stand may have imposed upon him; rather than to "kowtow" to expediency and, by humble contrition, surrender those convictions simply to facilitate his re-entry into a lucrative profession in Florida. Given the preponderant evidence adduced by the Petitioner in this proceeding, such a lack of expressed apology or contrition evinces more of strong character than a lack of rehabilitation. In any event, the Petitioner has certainly already suffered sufficiently for any such lack of contrition.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor, demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the license to practice medicine in the State of Florida of Harry Meyer Katz, M.D., be reinstated. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2797 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-25. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-14. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15. Rejected, in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as subordinate thereto. 16-18. Rejected, in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as subordinate thereto. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely consonant with the preponderance evidence of record and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not itself dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Michael A. Mone, Esquire Gregory A. Chaires, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esq. General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Dr. Hoover, seeks to recover his attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of an action brought against him by the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine. The issues for determination are whether Respondent, the state agency charged with regulation of the professional conduct of physicians in the State of Florida, was substantially justified with regard to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner, a licensed physician, in DOAH Case No. 92-2202, DPR Case No. 0104601, and whether, in the absence of such substantial justification, Petitioner is entitled to the award of the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought, or whether special circumstances exist which would make an award unjust.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, a state agency, initiated action against Dr. Hoover by filing an Administrative Complaint on May 16, 1991, in DPR Case No. 0104601 (Hoover I); Dr. Hoover by election of rights requested a formal hearing; the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and was assigned DOAH #91-4068. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Administrative Complaint, Election of Rights form) The case was set for final hearing on November 13-14, 1991. Dr. Hoover requested a continuance on October 16 because he would be unavailable to assist counsel prepare for hearing. Hearing Officer Robert Meale denied his request. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Request for Continuance, Order Denying Continuance) The Department moved for a continuance on October 29th because the primary expert witness had gone to Japan and could not return in time for the hearing or depositions by Dr. Hoover. The Hearing Officer also denied this motion. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Petitioner's Motion for Continuance, Order Denying Continuance) On November 5, 1991, the Department filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Without Prejudice. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Notice) The Hearing Officer closed the DOAH file on November 13, 1991. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Order) Dr. Hoover then filed a Petition for Fees and Costs on November 21, 1991, and the case was assigned DOAH Case No. 91-7526F. (DOAH Case No. 91- 7526F: Petition) After formal hearing the Petition was denied by the Hearing Officer, who on March 31, 1992, ruled that "the Department has met its burden of showing that the filing of the Administrative Complaint was substantially justified." (DOAH Case No. 91-7526: Final Order) Immediately, without returning the case to the Probable Cause Panel, the Department served the same Administrative Complaint in DPR Case #0104601 on Dr. Hoover (Hoover II). By election of right, he again requested a formal hearing. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On April 8, 1992 two cases against Dr. Hoover were referred to DOAH, DPR Case #0104601 and #110008. They were assigned DOAH Case #92-2202 and 92- 2201, respectively, and were assigned to Hearing Officer Mary Clark, who consolidated them without objection. (DOAH Case Nos. 92-2201, 92-2202) Dr. Hoover's counsel withdrew and Mr. Brooten became counsel of record on May 4, 1992. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On May 14, 1992, Dr. Hoover filed his Motion to Dismiss DOAH Case #92- 2202. After oral argument the motion was granted by the Hearing Officer on September 16, 1992. (Recommended Order of Dismissal, DOAH Case No. 92-2202) The Hearing Officer held in her Conclusions of Law that the Department of Professional Regulation had no jurisdiction to dismiss a complaint, hold it in abeyance, and refile at its convenience without a new probable cause determination. The Hearing Officer also noted that the passage of time might yield changed circumstances and a changed result. (Recommended Order of Dismissal, DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On October 12, 1992, Dr. Hoover filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs which was denied without prejudice by the Hearing Officer on October 21, 1992, on the grounds that, without a final order, he was not a prevailing small business party. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On October 4, 1992, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine again found probable cause in DPR Case #0104601. (Memorandum of Finding of Probable Cause, filed by DPR in DOAH Case No. 93-0168F) By Final Order filed on December 30, 1992, the Board of Medicine dismissed DPR Case #0104601 without prejudice. The Board of Medicine in its Conclusions of Law in the Final Order expounded and clarified the Board's intentions and interpretation of the governing statutes. The Board rejected the Hearing Officer's conclusions, but "in the interest of equity" determined that ". . . the disposition recommended by the Hearing Officer be ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED." (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On February 8, 1993, the Department served the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case #0104601 (Hoover III) on Dr. Hoover. (Motion to Abate, filed 3/8/93 in DOAH Case No. 92-2201). DPR Case #0104601 (Hoover III) is now pending in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Case #93-455, on a petition for writ of prohibition by Dr. Hoover. DOAH Case #92-2201 (DPR Case #0110008) is in abeyance, at the request of the parties, awaiting determination by the appellate court on the extraordinary writ. (Order of Abeyance dated 3/17/93 in DOAH Case No. 93-2201) It is uncontroverted that DOAH Case #92-2202 was initiated by a state agency, that Dr. Hoover prevailed when the case was dismissed, and that Dr. Hoover is a "small business party" as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), F.S. The reasonableness of the claimed fees and costs, $10,376.22, total, is likewise uncontroverted.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE is before me for issuance of a Final Order. In a letter dated May 14, 2010, Miami Behavioral Health Center, Inc. (Respondent) was informed that the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) was applying a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 for violation of 7(c) under Rule Section 59G-9.070, F.A.C. The letter contained full disclosure and notice regarding Respondent’s administrative hearing and due process rights. Respondent requested a formal administrative hearing to dispute the facts contained in the letter. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and was assigned case number 10-3225MPI. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration filed a Notice Rescinding Final Agency Action dated August 30, 2010, which is incorporated by reference. In the interim, the medical records at issue were provided. The Agency accepted the explanation: that there had been confusion in the original records response. The letter to Respondent that was 1 Filed December 13, 2010 4:01 PM Division of Administrative Hearings issued by the Agency on May 14, 2010, is hereby rescinded and no other action affecting the Respondent under the above-styled case number is pending. Based on the foregoing, the request for a hearing is dismissed and the file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on Detan. har [3 , 2010, in Tallahassee, Florida. oh ELIZABETH DUDEK, INTE: SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: L. William Porter II Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Laserfiche) Lester J. Perling, Esquire Broad and Cassel One Financial Plaza, Suite 2700 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394 (U.S. Mail) E. T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance & Accounting CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above-named addressees by U.S. Mail, Laserfiche or electronic mail on Lecco ber [3 _, 210. Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3642/FAX (850) 921-0158
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners as a medical doctor in the State of Florida. By Final Order rendered June 18, 1981 and filed June 24, 1981, the Board of Medical Examiners revoked Petitioner's license but stayed the revocation and suspended his license for three years; however, he was permitted to petition for reinstatement one year or more from the date of that order. On July 8, 1983, Petitioner petitioned the Board of Medical Examiners for reinstatement. By order dated September 1, 1983, the Board denied the petition. The instant hearing was then requested to allow Petitioner opportunity to present evidence showing his qualification for reinstatement and to rebut evidence to the contrary. The order of June 18, 1981, provided in part: In order to obtain reinstatement, (Petitioner) shall demonstrate that he can practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients, and present a favorable psychiatric evaluation from a Board appointed psychiatrist. Reinstatement shall be on a probationary basis for a period of five (5) years subject to the following terms and conditions: semiannual appearance before the board, obtain fifty (50) hours of AMA approval, category I, continuing Medical Education annually. Petition presented a favorable psychiatric evaluation from a Board appointed psychiatrist and evidence showing a completion of 62 hours of continuing medical evaluation in 1982 and 56 hours in 1983. Although Petitioner's license to practice medicine was suspended on June 18, 1981, he continued to practice until December 1, 1981, pending his appeal from the order of suspension. As a result of the publicity generated by the charges which resulted in the suspension of his license, Petitioner and his family have suffered considerable humiliation. Suspension of his license barred Petitioner from his well established practice of dermatology and resulted in financial hardship and a step down in life style. In short, Petitioner has been punished for his infractions of the Medical Practices Act. No issue was raised in the Administrative Complaint that led to the suspension of Petitioner's license, or since, that Petitioner is other than a technically capable dermatologist who is adequately trained and experienced to practice dermatology with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. The issue in the initial proceedings that led to the suspension of Petitioner's license was his prescribing of Quaaludes to one female for reasons not medically indicated or justified. Accordingly the determining factor in whether or not Petitioner's license should be reinstated is his potential for again prescribing controlled substances when not medically indicated. Petitioner has been licensed since 1950 and is now 57 years old. As a result of his peccadillos he has suffered humiliation and financial disaster Petitioner presented one expert witness who opined that Petitioner can practice medicine with reasonable skills and safety to his patients; and Petitioner testified that he would never again let himself become involved in a situation similar to that which led to the original charges, or again prescribe controlled substances when not medically justified. No evidence was submitted by Respondent to rebut this testimony.
