The Issue The only issue remaining in this case is the extent to which the Petitioner, the Department of Transportation (DOT), should penalize the Respondent, Keystone Excavators, Inc. (Keystone), for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an expired vehicle registration and for exceeding the maximum legal weight of 35,000 pounds allowed under Section 316.545, Fla. Stat. (1987).
Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1987, one of Keystone's commercial motor vehicles was operating on Interstate I-4 near Plant City, Hillsborough County, Florida, with a registration that expired on May 31, 1987. According to the DOT scales, the weight of the vehicle, loaded, was 82,520 pounds. The DOT's Form 509-13, Revised 1/86, titled the "Load Report and Field Receipt," specifies that, in subtracting the legal weight from the the scaled weight to determine the amount of overweight, a ten percent tolerance should be added to the legal weight. This is how the DOT interprets and applies the requirement of Section 316.545(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987), that for enforcement purposes, all scaled weights of the gross or axle weight of vehicles and combinations of vehicles shall be deemed to be not closer than 10 percent to the true gross weight. When Keystone last registered the vehicle in question, it obtained a six-month registration instead of an annual registration. As a result, the registration expired May 31, 1987. For some reason, the sticker stating the month of expiration of the registration was not put on the vehicle's registration tag. Through inadvertent oversight, Keystone failed to renew the registration on the vehicle. When the DOT discovered the violation, it fined Keystone $2,376, calculated as 5 cents for each pound the vehicle weighed over 35,000 pounds. Keystone paid the fine under protest, taking the position that the fine was excessive under the circumstances. On the same day, after the DOT citation, Keystone paid a late fee and renewed the vehicle's registration for the period from May 31, 1987, forward. Keystone's evidence proved that Keystone did not intentionally violate the vehicle registration laws in this instance. Keystone does not intentionally violate the applicable laws and attempt to avoid or escape detection of violations. Nor does Keystone conduct business in a reckless or careless manner with respect to compliance with the applicable laws and treat penalties for detected violations as a cost of doing business. Notswithstanding this violation, Keystone generally has a good record for operating safe and properly licensed and permitted vehicles. The violation in this case resulted from an isolated case of inadvertent oversight. Keystone requested that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board (the Review Board) drop or reduce the fine. The Review Board considered Keystone's request on August 13, 1987, and denied it by letter dated August 18, 1987. Keystone then requested a rehearing. The Review Board met on December 8, 1987, and denied rehearing by letter dated December 14, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order reducing the fine against Keystone to $750. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1991.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a partial refund pursuant to Subsection 212.08(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), for sales tax paid on vehicles and parts thereof during the period March 20, 2004, through August 20, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for administration of the Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Sections 20.21 and 213.05, Florida Statutes (2008).2 Saddle Creek is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 3010 Saddle Creek Road, Lakeland, Florida. Saddle Creek is a motor carrier within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. Section 13102(14). Pursuant to that provision, the term "motor carrier" means "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." Effective November 21, 2003, Saddle Creek obtained its Contract Carrier Permit from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA"). The Contract Carrier Permit authorized Saddle Creek to engage in transportation as a "contract carrier" of property (except household goods) by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce. Since November 21, 2003, Saddle Creek has engaged in interstate commerce and has held itself out to the general public as offering transportation and warehousing services for a fee. The fact that a company holds itself out to the general public by offering transportation services for a fee does not mean that it operates as a common carrier. Since November 21, 2003, Saddle Creek has possessed cargo liability insurance and has made said insurance available to all of its shippers. As a contract carrier, the fee, terms, conditions of carriage, and the scope of liability can be specifically defined, limited, and restricted by the contract between the shipper and carrier. See 49 U.S.C. § 14101 (b). Between December 1, 2003, and October 31, 2006, Saddle Creek purchased trucks, trailers and parts for use on said vehicles in Florida and paid sales tax on all purchases. However, the parties stipulated that the time period at issue is March 20, 2004, through August 20, 2006. Effective March 9, 2007, Saddle Creek obtained its Common Carrier Certificate from the FMCSA. The Common Carrier Certificate authorized Saddle Creek to engage in transportation as a "common carrier" of property (except household goods) by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce. On March 12, 2007, Saddle Creek applied to the Department for a refund of $175,023.99 for sales tax paid on trucks, trailers and parts thereof, during the period of March 20, 2004, through August 20, 2006. Saddle Creek claimed a refund based on the partial exemption from sales tax provided to interstate carriers in Subsection 212.08(9), Florida Statutes (2005). The Department denied Saddle Creek's Application for Refund, because Saddle Creek was not licensed/registered or classified by FMCSA as a common carrier during the time period for which it was requesting a refund. In reaching this decision, the Department relied on Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.064,3 which implements and interprets Subsection 212.08(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). The Department's interpretation of the above- referenced rule is that entitlement to the partial exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), requires that the motor carrier engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier be licensed as a common carrier by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Revenue, enter a final order upholding it denial of Petitioner, Saddle Creek Transportation, Inc.'s, application for a partial refund of sales taxes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency which has the authority to enforce the statutory weight limit restrictions for vehicles traveling on the highways in the state and to impose penalties for violations of the restrictions. Sections 316.640, .535, and .545, Florida Statutes. On January 30, 1996, Officer Daniel Starling of the Department's Motor Carrier Compliance office, observed Reinaldo Gutierrez operating a commercial motor vehicle on State Road 80 in Palm Beach County, Florida. The vehicle appeared to Officer Starling to be overweight, and he stopped the vehicle and weighed it on the portable scales issued to him by the Department. These scales are inspected and certified as accurate twice a year by the Florida Department of Agriculture. Officer Starling weighed the vehicle in accordance with the training he had received from the Department. He determined that the vehicle's total weight was 81,500 pounds. Mr. Gutierrez's vehicle was a tractor/trailer combination carrying a load of sand; its length was 40 feet between its first and last axles. The maximum weight allowable by statute for this vehicle is 73,271 pounds. Officer Starling calculated that Mr. Gutierrez's vehicle weighed 8,226 pounds more than the 73,271-pound statutory limit, and he issued Load Report Citation number 119441L, assessing a penalty of $.05 cents per pound of excess weight. The resulting penalty, as calculated by Officer Starling, was $411.45, and Mr. Gutierrez paid this penalty in cash on January 30, 1996. Mr. Gutierrez does not dispute that his vehicle was overweight on January 30, 1996, but he contends that his vehicle was only 3,009 pounds overweight. He bases this contention on the load ticket he received on January 30, 1996, when he left the premises of GKK Corporation, the company for which he was hauling on that day. Although this load ticket showed a total weight of 76,280 pounds, Mr. Gutierrez did not produce evidence that the weight stated on the ticket was reliable. Furthermore, Mr. Gutierrez did not produce evidence that the scales used by Officer Starling were inaccurate or that the procedures he used in weighing the vehicle were improper. The evidence is clear and convincing that, on January 30, 1996, Mr. Gutierrez was operating a commercial vehicle on Florida's public highways whose weight exceeded the statutory weight limit of 73,271 pounds by 8,226 pounds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that Reinaldo Gutierrez violated section 316.545(3), Florida Statutes, in the amount of 8,229 pounds and that Reinaldo Gutierrez is not entitled to a refund of the $411.45 penalty assessed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Murray M. Wadsworth, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Reinaldo Gutierrez 1360 South Main Street Belle Glade, Florida 33430 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Sanwa Growers, Inc., owns and operates over the highways of the state of Florida a commercial vehicle identified as a 1987 Ford truck, VIN 9BFPH70P3HDM03333, Florida license number H1056W (vehicle). On November 13, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle while traveling on highway I-4 in Hillsborough County, Florida was stopped and weighed by the Department. The total weight of the vehicle was 24,100 pounds consisting of 10,540 pounds on the steering axle and 13,560 pounds on the rear axle. A Load Report and Field Receipt was completed which indicated the legal weight (declared gross vehicle weight) of the vehicle to be 19,999 with a tax class weight (gross vehicle weight) of 24,100 pounds which resulted in the vehicle being 4,101 pounds overweight. The Respondent was assessed a penalty of $0.05 per pound for each pound the truck was overweight which resulted in a total penalty assessed the Respondent of $205.05. The Respondent paid the penalty as assessed and was issued a Field Receipt. The gross vehicle weight (GVW) of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent in accordance with Section 320.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, on vehicle's registration certificate issued on September 19, 1990 was 19,999 pounds which was the legal weight indicated on the Load Report issued on November 13, 1991. On November 13, 1990 the GVW (legal weight) of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent was 19,999 pounds. The GVW of the vehicle as declared by the Respondent on the initial registration dated May 11, 1988 was 29,500 pounds. However, on the subsequent registration of the vehicle dated January 4, 1989, the declared GVW by the Respondent was 16,090 pounds which was the same as the net weight of the vehicle shown on the registration. Although the registration issued on January 4, 1989 expired on December 31, 1989, there was no evidence of a registration being issued upon expiration. The next registration that was issued subsequent to January 4, 1989 that is in evidence was issued on September 19, 1990 apparently for the purpose of increasing the GVW from 16,090 pounds to 19,994 pounds. This was the registration in effect at the time the vehicle was weighed on November 13, 1990. On November 15, 1990, two days after the weighing, the registration was corrected by increasing the GVW from 19,999 pounds to 29,500 pounds. There was insufficient evidence to show that the GVW set out in each of the registrations in evidence was not the GVW as declared by the Respondent at the time of issuing the registration or that the issuing agency incorrectly listed the GVW as declared by the Respondent on any of the registrations in evidence. On November 13, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle was 4,101 pounds overweight when stopped and weighed in Hillsborough County, Florida on I-4 and the calculation of the penalty ($0.05 x 4,101 pounds - $205.05) is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order finding the Respondent subject to the penalty as assessed and denying its request for refund of the penalty. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3727 The following contributes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Covered in the Preliminary Statement but adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 3. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 2 and 4. - 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent did not submit or file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Wendy Wheelock Qualified Representative Sanwa Growers, Inc. 5107 State Road 674 East Wimauma, FL 33570 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, was responsible for the licensing and regulation of the operation of commercial motor vehicles on all streets and roads in this state. The Respondent, Florida Mining & Materials operates and, at the time of the alleged violation, operated commercial vehicles over the roads of this state. By letter dated June 11, 1990, George L. Crawford, P.E., Acting Director of Lee County's Department of Transportation and Engineering, notified the Petitioner's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance that it appeared trucks were exceeding the posted weight limits of the Ortiz Road Culvert, located 0.3 miles south of SR - 80 in Lee County. As a result of this letter, the Department began to monitor the cited culvert and on July 19, 1990, Officer Ellis K. Burroughs observed Respondent's cement dump truck cross the culvert in front of and to the side of which, in plain view, was a sign indicating that trucks weighing over 5,000 pounds should detour and go down Luckett Road without crossing the culvert. According to Mr. Burroughs, Respondent's vehicle did not detour as directed and went north on Ortiz Avenue, over the culvert. Mr. Burroughs gave chase and finally stopped the driver of Respondent's truck some 6 or 7 blocks north of the culvert. When asked why he had failed to use the detour and had crossed the culvert, the driver of the truck said his office had told him to do so and he had done so before. This comment is introduced not to show aggravation but to dispel any inference of lack of knowledge of the limitation. The sign in question had been erected on December 4, 1980. Some months after this incident, the sign was changed and the current permissible weight is 20 tons. No reason was given for the change nor was any information presented as to whether any modifications were done to the culvert before or since the change. The culvert in issue was described as of light construction - a culvert pass-through underneath the roadway. Mr. Burroughs weighed the offending truck at the scene and determined it had a gross weight of 45,700 pounds. The legal weight on that bridge at the time was only 5,000 pounds and, therefore, the Respondent's truck was overweight by 40,700 pounds. At a penalty of 5 cents per pound of violation, the penalty was assessed at $2,035.00 which was paid by the Respondent on August 3, 1990. Respondent's representative, Mr. Watson, was not present at the time and had no personal knowledge of the incident. He claims, however, that his company was operating under the impression that even at the time, the weight limit over that culvert was 20 tons. He does not concede that at the time of the incident the load limit was only 5,000 pounds. The weight of the evidence, however, is that it was. He claims this road is the only way they have of getting to certain jobs and if cut off from crossing, they are cut off from their business. Mr. Watson admittedly is not familiar with the area and overlooks the fact that there are alternative routes to the other side of that culvert, albeit somewhat longer. He discounts the somewhat longer, (2 1/2 miles additional), route claiming, "That's a lot of milage when what you're hauling is redi-mix concrete." Mr. Watson introduced several pictures of other large trucks going over that same culvert in an effort to show that other vehicles may also have been in violation. Some of those pictures were taken subsequent to the limit change and reflect that the limit is 20 tons. Further, Mr. Burroughs and Mr. Thompson indicate that subsequent to the letter from the County requesting increased surveillance, at least 45 to 50 citations were issued at that culvert. Some carriers were cited several times. Respondent was cited only once. After paying the penalty assessed, Respondent appealed it to the Department's Commercial Vehicle Review Board which reviewed it at its November 8, 1990 meeting and determined that a refund was not appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's request for a refund of the $2,035.00 fine paid for the violation of the weight limits on the culvert in question here be denied. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Robert Bishop, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 695 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ray Watson Operations Manager Florida Mining & Materials Post Office Box 2367 Tallahassee, Florida 33902 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
