The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In his original petition the Petitioner sought to challenge several rules of the Department, as well as certain Department policy and procedure directives and internal operating procedures of Florida State Prison. At the hearing the scope of the issues was narrowed by agreement of the Petitioner to challenges to the following: Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code; Department of Corrections Policy and Procedure Directives 4.07.06 and 4.10.51; and Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony at the final hearing and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Ervin J. Horton, is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is presently confined at Florida State Prison. At the time of the hearing in this case, the Petitioner was on confinement status and he has been on confinement status in the past. Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, has been adopted by the Department of Corrections. The title of the rule is "Legal Documents and Legal and Privileged Mail." The general subject matter of the rule concerns the preparation, mailing, and receipt of legal documents and legal mail by inmates. The rule is applicable to the Petitioner. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06, which is titled "Preparation And Processing Of Legal Documents And Legal Mail." This directive is for the most part a restatement of many of the provisions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. The directive also includes a provision requiring each prison Superintendent to issue an institutional policy memorandum to effectuate the provisions of the directive. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.10.51, which is titled "Law Libraries." The directive is in part a restatement of portions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. However, for the most part it sets forth the Department's policies regarding the establishment, operation, and maintenance of prison law libraries. Portions of the directive contain limitations on the time, place, and manner in which inmates may use the law libraries. The Superintendent of Florida State Prison has adopted Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04, which is titled "Preparation Of Legal Documents By Inmates." This is an institutional policy memorandum required by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. IOP No. 4-86.04 addresses the same general subject matter as is addressed by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. The IOP includes additional specific details for implementation of Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06 and Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, at the Florida State Prison facility. As a result of his status as an inmate at Florida State Prison, the Rule, the Policy And Procedure Directives, and the Institutional Operating Procedure described above are applicable to the Petitioner to the extent they regulate his activities within the scope of those documents. The documents described above in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these findings of fact are the only documents to which this rule challenge proceeding is addressed. The testimony at the hearing consisted largely of anecdotal testimony regarding a long series of Petitioner's alleged individual problems within the State correctional system. Some of his problems have been real; others appear to probably have been imaginary. All of the problems described by Petitioner were largely irrelevant to the issues raised in the petition. And to the extent portions of Petitioner's testimony were relevant to the general subject matter at hand, the testimony did not tend to demonstrate that the challenged documents were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The exhibits offered by Petitioner were of the same general tenor as his testimony.
The Issue Whether Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact A. Standing. The Petitioner, Peter B. Dolinger, is not incarcerated by the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is, therefore, not subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is an independent paralegal who owns and operates a sole proprietorship specializing in prisoner related issues. The intended scope of the Petitioner's business is to include research and pleading preparation for licensed members of the Florida Bar; agency representation before state agencies, in a qualified non-attorney representative status. The Petitioner, while representing an inmate in an unrelated administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Archie White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92-2392RXP, sought the release of the inmate's records from the Respondent. The request was denied by the Respondent pursuant to Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Archie D. White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92- 2392RXP, is no longer pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Final Order was entered in that case in June, 1992. The Respondent. The Respondent is the state agency required to adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (9) When it is reasonably believed that a party may divulge information contained in the files of the department to an offender, the department shall restrict release of any information to that party. The Petitioner has alleged that Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, "facially fails to establish an adeqaute [sic] standard for agency decisions. In other words, a person of common intelligence may imply the utilization of a 'reasonable' etst [sic] or standard thstb [sic] differs in totality from thst [sic] of another, most notably in the absence of definition, guidelines or policy on the standard to be applied."
The Issue Whether Proposed Rule 33.9007(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Steven Rivera, Petitioner, is currently serving a prison sentence at Walton Correctional Institution at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. He is on his fifth commitment to prison. Respondent supervises the operation of correctional institutions in Florida and promulgates rules governing the operation of the prisons and various subjects relating to inmates of these prisons. The proposed rule here under challenge provides: Any inmate who is serving his fourth commitment to prison or higher shall be excluded from work release if the inmate has previously been given the opportunity to participate in work release, except that an inmate may be given consideration if the inmate has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist. Petitioner has been admitted to the work release program in a prior commitment and, with more than four prison commitments is in the class of prisoner covered by this rule. Accordingly, he has standing to challenge the rule. The work release program is intended to motivate the individual offender toward self improvement, to ease the transition from prison into the community, place the inmate in employment to which he or she may return after release from the institution, permit the offender to contribute towards his own support and the support of his or her family, help determine the prisoner's readiness for parole, preserve family and community ties, and permit the offender to develop or maintain occupational skills. (Exhibit 6) The Florida work release program has been in effect for many years allowing Department of Corrections officers the opportunity to gain experience in the effectiveness and efficacy of the program. First commitment offenders are more likely to benefit from work release than are those who have three or more prior commitments. Inmates who have been given one chance in the work release program and are subsequently recommitted to the prison institution have thereby demonstrated that they did not obtain the anticipated benefit of remaining crime free subsequent to being admitted to the work release program. Following a murder committed by a prisoner who escaped from the work release program at another institution, a Task Force was set up to study the work release program and prepare recommendations affecting this program. As a result of this Task Force's recommendations, wide ranging changes to the rules affecting the work release program were promulgated of which the rule here challenged is only one small subsection. Furthermore, prior to the commission of the crime referred to above, there were approximately 4000 prisoners admitted to the work release program. Legislative changes since that time have limited the maximum number of prisoners admitted to the work release program to 2100. Although Petitioner contends that there is no rule definition of commitment, this is a word that is well recognized in the prison community. As defined by one of Respondent's witnesses in these proceedings, each time a prisoner is committed following a release from a prior commitment whether in Florida or in another jurisdiction, this counts as an additional commitment. If the inmate commits an offense while in confinement, is taken to court and receives an additional sentence, this is not counted as an additional commitment. This method of counting commitments inures to the benefit of the prison inmates. Petitioner also contends that the phrase "has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist" is arbitrary and vests unbridled discretion in the prison officials. However, admission to the work release program is a privilege which all prisoners admitted to such program must earn. They earn this privilege by adhering to the code of conduct established for prisoners, by participating in education, drug and alcohol abuse programs, and by other acts contributing to earning gain time. Certain classes of prisoners, e.g. those who have committed serious crimes, sex crimes, and crimes evincing a violent disposition must demonstrate more clearly than does the less violent criminal that he is eligible for work release. No one act can show that one prisoner is better deserving for the limited number that can be admitted to the work release program than is another prisoner. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider innumerable factors to determine which are the prisoners most likely to benefit from work release based upon their history and their current conduct in the prison system. A finite list of factors to be considered in determining those most eligible for work release is impracticable because the list would be too numerous and could still omit factors deserving consideration. The proposed rules, including the rule in issue here, provide that certain prisoners are not eligible for work release; but the rule provides two exceptions to this general disqualification, to wit: those who "demonstrate outstanding institutional adjustment and extenuating circumstances." By providing these exceptions, the rule removes the arbitrary exclusion of certain prisoners from work release regardless of their good conduct in prison and demonstration that they have totally reformed and are most unlikely ever to again commit a crime.
Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jean Colden (Colder), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), as an Accountant II at Broward Correctional Institution. The evidence establishes that Colden was absent without authorized leave on three consecutive workdays, to wit: October 1-3, 1985. At no time did Colden notify the Department of her intention not to appear for work on those dates, and at hearing she offered no explanation for her absences. By certified letter dated October 4, 1985, return receipt requested, Colden was advised that her absence from work since October 1, 1985, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), F.A.C., she was deemed to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Colden of her right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. Colden timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review On November 5, 1985, he Department of Administration accepted Colden's petition and requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Gary M. Piccirillo ("Piccirillo"), Douglas L. Adams ("Adams"), and George Crain ("Crain") each are inmates who are presently incarcerated and within the custody of Respondent, Department of Corrections. At the time of final hearing in this cause, each of the Petitioners was incarcerated in Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. At the time of final hearing in this cause, both Petitioner Adams and Petitioner Crain had been classified as "close custody" in accordance with the provisions of Rule 33-6.09(4), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner Piccirillo had been classified as "medium custody" in accordance with that same rule. The custody status of each of these inmates had been reviewed and established within the last six months prior to final hearing. In addition to challenging the validity of Rule 33-9.07(4), Florida Administrative Code, Petitioners also challenge the validity of Department of Corrections' Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40 issued April 27, 1977, and revised March 10, 1982, as an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioners contend that Section IXB conflicts with certain provisions of Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and is, therefore, invalid. Specifically the Policy and Procedure Directive in the above referenced section provides that: The department will permit considera- tion for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or [sic]. . . .
Findings Of Fact 1/ The parties to this proeeeding have stipulated that Petitioner has standing as an inmate at Union Correctional Institution to challenge the provisions of Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedures No. 82-69. The parties have further stipulated that all of the provisions contained in the aforementioned operating procedure which are not self-limiting are intended to be either System or institutionwide in their impact. As mentioned above, Respondent and Petitioner have stipulated into evidence the challenged operating procedures and any relevant rules contained in Chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. 2/ On or about December 15, 1976, Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedures No. 82-69 was initially issued. These procedures were revised on September 13, 1982, and were reviewed and continued in an operational status on May 23, 1983. The challenged operating procedures were issued ". . . to establish criteria for the placement of inmates in an Administrative Confinement status and to establish institutional policy and procedures applicable to such confinement." The operating procedures purport to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Sections 944.28 and 945.21, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-3, Florida Administrative Code. In the briefing process of this proceeding Respondent has conceded that the following portions of the challenged operating procedure constitute unpromulgated rules: That portion of 82-69.7A on pages 4 and 5 dealing with personal property which an inmate will be permitted to retain in his possession while in administrative confinement; 82-69.7B concerning inmate bank withdrawals; 82-69.7C dealing with canteen privileges; 82-69.7D dealing with library privileges; 82-69.7F concerning clothing for inmates in administrative confinement; 82-69.7K concerning religious material available to administrative confinement inmates; 82-69.7M concereing visiting privileges; 82-69.7U governing notarizing of legal papers and materials; and 82-69.8 governing restrictions to be imposed on privileges granted to inmates by virtue of the operating procedure. Further, Petitioner challenges in his memorandum Sections 82-69.4, entitled Criteria for Administrative Confinement, 82-69.70, entitled Medical Procedures, and 82-69.7Q, entitled Inmate Count procedures. Any sections of the operating procedures not argued by Petitioner in his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have been considered abandoned. Section 82-69.4 of the operating procedures, entitled Criteria for Administrative Confinement, provides as follows: Inmates may be placed in Administrative Confinement who pose an immediate threat of violence or disruption to themselves, other inmates, Department employees, or the institution generally, or as a result of threats of physical harm from other inmates, or other good reasons. Reasons for placing inmates in Administrative Confinement are further defined as follows: Awaiting Disciplinary Action: When the evidence clearly suggests that to allow the inmate to remain in open population would present a clear danger to other inmates or to the security of the institution. Placing inmates in Administrative Confinement to await a disciplinary hearing is permitted only when there is a danger to the welfare of the inmate or other inmates in the population, or when the security and good order of the institution is in jeopardy. Pending Trial: For a crime committed in the Department when the facts clearly suggest that to allow the inmate to remain in open population would present a clear danger to the inmate, other inmates, or to the security of the institution. Custody Risk: Cases when the facts clearly indicate the inmate cannot be housed in the general inmate population. Inmates who, after removal from disciplinary confinement, clearly appear to the Classification Team to be a potential assaultive or disruptive factor if placed in the inmate population and who, therefore, cannot reasonably and safely be returned to the inmate population. For protection of the inmate or other inmates. The aforecited provisions of Section 82-69.4 of the operating procedures are a virtual recapitulation of the requirements currently contained in Rule 33-3.081(1) and (4) Florida Administrative Code. The requirements of the challenged operating procedures neither create, add to, nor detract from the rights of inmates at Union Correctional Institution. Section 82-69.7 0.1. of the operating procedures provide as follows: 1. Health Appraisal Prior to placement in confinement the inmate shall be escorted to the outpatient clinic for health appraisal. (In cases of combative or assaultive behavior, the appraisal shall be done as soon as possible after being confined.) Inmates who are acutely ill or whose mental condition or behavior shows sudden, rapid change (which may be due to the ingention[sic] of stimulants, drugs, alcohol, medications, or other toxic sub- stances, whether taken legally or illegally) who exhibit acute personality changes or other markedly bizarre behavior, or who have exhibi- ted a recent, serious intent to harm themselves, shall not be confined until the inmate's health status has been evaluated by the medical professional or paraprofessional on duty. If it is feasible to initially confine such persons in the clinic for observation, the medical staff member on duty will monitor the health status of the inmate in confinement at least every two hours, and more often as indicated in individual cases. The health appraisal must include as a minimum, the following: A brief review of health record Determine any medication the inmate is currently on that mustbe continued while in con finement, and essential scheduled health appointments for call-out. Vital signs, including temperature, blood pressure, pulse and respiration Determine any health complaints Perform physical examination as necessary based especially on any noted complaints For inmates in Medical Grades III or IV, determine any necessary continuity of care while in confinement An overall statement as to the fitness of the inmates' confinement will be based on the findings above No such specific procedure dealing with health appraisal was contained in either Chapters 944 or 945, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. These procedures are mandatory, and must be completed before an inmate may be placed in administrative confinement. The remaining provisions of Section 82-69.7 0 relate to Respondent's internal management of routine sick call, emergency medical procedures, medication, and inmate visits by the institution medical director. These sections do not purport to create or otherwise affect any individual inmate right. Section 82-69.7Q, entitled Inmate Count Procedures, provides, in part, that: The special nature of inmates confined on Administrative Confinement require maximum supervision and control. Consequently, there will be a total of six counts con- ducted throughout the day . . . . This section of the operating procedures goes on to establish the times and procedures for conducting the six inmate counts: an 8 a.m. response count; 12 noon response count; a 4:30 p.m. response count; a 9 p.m. master count; a 12 midnight body count; and a 4 a.m. body count. The only act required of inmates in this section is that they present themselves at their cell door and respond with their inmate number when their name is called at the 8 a.m., 12 noon, and 4:30 p.m. response counts.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Christopher Knowles, was employed at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, during the period of time prior to July 19, 1981, up until February 4, 1983. On July 19, 1981, the Respondent was injured during the course of his employment when he tripped over one of the center's detainees while on the athletic field attempting to break up a fight between detainees. The Respondent received medical treatment and was placed on disability leave until August 10, 1981, when he returned to work and was given a light-duty assignment. On August 17, 1981, the Respondent was returned to a full-duty status, but he was still being treated by a physician, and until November 22, 1982, he worked irregularly and took sick leave when not working. On November 22, 1982, the Respondent told his supervisor that he had been released by his doctor to return to work, but that he did not feel that he was yet able to return to work. The Respondent at this time was required to obtain a physician's authorization for continued sick leave, or else return to work. When the Respondent did not return to work, he was advised on December 3, 1982, that he must contact his supervisor by December 10 or report to work by this date, or a recommendation would be made for termination of his employment. When the Respondent did not respond, he was sent a letter on December 21, 1982, directed to the address which had been furnished by the Respondent to the personnel office, repeating the requirement that he contact his supervisor or report to work. As a result of this letter, the Respondent went to the detention center on December 30, 1982, and repeated his contention that he was not yet able to return to work. In January of 1983 the personnel office of the detention center secured a statement dated January 17, 1983, from the Respondent's physician advising that the Respondent was able to return to work on November 22, 1982. On January 18, 1983, the Respondent was again told by letter sent certified mail, return receipt requested, that he must return to work, and he was given until January 24, 1983, to do so or, he was informed, that he would be terminated. This letter also advised the Respondent that his physician's statement had been secured stating that he had been fit for duty since November 22, 1982. The Respondent did not respond to this letter. On February 2, 1983, the Respondent was advised by letter that his employment was terminated as of February 4, 1983, due to abandonment by the Respondent. On February 4, 1983, the Respondent went to the office of his supervisor at the detention center, complaining that he did not abandon his job, and asking that his termination be reversed. This request was declined. The detention center needed an employee in the Respondent's position and could not hire someone as long as the Respondent was employed in this position. The Respondent contends that he fears that he might become reinjured if he should return to work, although he admits that his physician released him from further treatment and advised him to return to work on November 22, 1982. The Respondent also admits that he is not now under the care of a physician, and has not been examined by a doctor since November of 1982.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter an Order finding that the Respondent, Christopher Knowles abandoned his position of employment at the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center, and that he be discharged effective February 4, 1983. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14 day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Braynon, Esquire 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mr. Christopher Knowles 3530 North West 18th Place Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Douglas Lavern Adams, Edwin Paul, Stanley Blanding, Carl B. Cribbs, Efron Yero, and James M. Cook are all incarcerated in the State of Florida at Respondent's facility, the Union Correctional Institution located at Raiford, Florida. On November 15, 1984, the Department of Corrections forwarded to the Bureau of the Administrative Code for publishing in the next available issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly, its proposed Rule 33-5. The proposed rule in question was published in Volume 10, No. 46 on November 21, 1984. The stated purpose and effect of the proposed rule was to clarify and revise policies and procedures relating to visitation with inmates. The proposed rule purported to make certain changes to pre-existing Rule 33-5 as outlined in the proposal which, among other things, allowed superintendents to make exceptions to any provision of this rule on an individual case by case basis, based on the best interests of the inmate, the security and welfare of the department, or both with the qualification that the exception could not be more restrictive than the provisions of the rules and with the further requirement that all visiting policies promulgated by the superintendent shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of the department. Petitioners contend that the proposed changes severely limit their prior existing visiting rights. Specifically, Petitioners' contentions include: Rule 33-5.01 is without legislative authority in that the Secretary has no authority from the legislature to delegate policy making authority to superintendents; Rule 33-5.04 is an invalid rule for the same reason and because it deprives hospital inmates of family visits in an arbitrary and capricious manner, without a valid penological objective, and in violation of both equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions and is fatally vague and invalid in that by stating, "any other special status" it fails to specify what status prisoners will be prohibited from visitation; Rule 33-5.07(5) constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority to an employee; Rule 33-5.08(2) is arbitrary, capricious, and without any known penological objective, constitutes an abuse of discretion, and is unreasonable in that it is without a rational basis for the potential reduction of visiting days; Rule 33-5.08(3) is discriminatory on its face, is fatally vague, and insufficient in specificity to inform Petitioners what circumstances will be considered; Rule 33-5.08(4) is without a rational basis in fact and is fatally vague; Rule 33-5.10(c) is an unconstitutional rule in that by authorizing unwarranted searches and invasions of privacy of visitors, this would discourage visitation and thereby deprive Petitioners of visits; Rule 33-5.08(12)(c) is fatally vague and overbroad and discriminates against female visitors in an arbitrary and capricious manner by permitting their exclusion if they are "not appropriately clothed or are dressed in revealing attire . . . and other like attire"; Rule 33-5.08(14) and (15) constitute an abuse of discretion and are discriminatory in an arbitrary and capricious manner in that they refer without defining or explaining "security" reasons for allowing non-contact visits; (j) Rule 33-5.04 and 33-5.08(2) render the proposed rule ambiguous and vague because prisoners will not be able to ascertain if they are entitled to visits and the rules cannot be uniformly applied on a just and rational basis; (k) that Respondent has failed to provide adequate notice of the proposed rule to those inmates in administrative, disciplinary, and close management status. The proposed changes to the rules came about after Respondent conducted a survey of the existing visitation policies of all institutions within its system. This review indicated a need for a statewide set of standards for visitations while at the same time allowing the superintendents of the various institutions the flexibility to tailor standards at the individual institutions to local needs and the special needs of the inmates. The survey showed a need for some flexibility within the rules to accommodate the uniqueness of the individual facilities and the special needs inherent therein while at the same time addressing the overall needs constant throughout the system such as security, inmate health and welfare, and safety of both staff and inmate population. Primary among the concerns considered by the Department was the security aspect. The need to control contraband and to maintain order and discipline within the confines of any given facility is obvious. Without question a valid concern of the staff is the ability to control who and what goes into the facility. The superintendent has the inherent power to interdict the introduction of drugs, alcohol, weapons and similar contraband into a facility. He or she also has the responsibility to insure against the potential for disturbance caused by obviously inappropriate clothing worn by staff visitors to a sexually segregated institution. James M. Cook is an inmate at the Union Correctional Institution who has received special visits of the type to be governed under proposed Rule 33- 5.04 in the past. On those occasions he had to establish for his proposed visitor the classification the visitor would fall under, such as distance from the facility travel led or other criteria. In his opinion the proposed rule is somewhat vague. He contends it does not give specifics as to mileage, clothing to be worn, etc., in detail adequate for the proposed visitor to know what is required. He understands from a conversation with his classification officer that the distance requirement to be applied under the new rule is 400 miles but this criteria is not specifically stated in the proposed rule nor can it be determined from reading the rule. As to female visitors, he contends that that portion of the proposed rule which provides for appropriate clothing is insufficient in detail to insure the visitors will be properly dressed for the visit. It has been his experience in the past that if a female visitor is improperly dressed, as determined by the institution's personnel, the guards require her to wear a shapeless smock. Under the terms of the new rule, Cook said, he is required to inform his visitor what can and cannot be worn, but because the rule is devoid of detail, it is difficult for him to do this. Proposed Rule 33-5.06(3) does not, as Cook asserts, require the inmate to inform the visitor in detail of the particulars of the visiting program only the basics, such as hours, days, and, to be sure, the need for non-provocative apparel. The question on the distance requirements for special visits is also of concern to inmate Cribbs whose mother lives in Tampa, a 350 mile round trip from this facility. Cribbs contends the proposed-rule has no specifics in it as to mileage for special visitors. In the past, his mother, coming from Tampa, has been able to visit on both Saturday and Sunday and because of the distance, has made a two day visit out of the trip. The new rule, according to Cribbs, leaves everything up to the superintendent regarding visiting privileges and depending upon the determination of that officer, his mother may be forced to come this long distance to see him only on one day of the weekend. Under the current policy, inmates are allowed visitors on both Saturday and Sunday and the new rule, he feels, will change this benefit to allow visits normally only once per weekend. Cribbs is also concerned about the dress requirements of the new rule. He is concerned with the term "like attire" which he feels makes it difficult for him to tell his female visitors what to wear. Petitioner, Stanley Blending, has also had visitors on both days of the weekend in the past. He had a need for this benefit because his grandmother came from Canada for a visit once a year and, in addition, his son comes up to visit from time to time and the two day visit is required for him to talk with the young man regarding family problems. At UCI he currently gets two days of visits and, in his opinion, these two day visits have had a beneficial, rehabilitative effect. As in the case of Cribbs, Blanding's family comes from Tampa and that distance makes it necessary for them to have a two day visit. He is concerned and believes that the proposed rule will limit visits to one day per weekend which, in his opinion, would severely limit the amount of visitation he would receive. He is also concerned, about the proposed rule regarding appropriate dress for female visitors. The proposed rule says nothing about the institution providing a smock for inappropriately dressed females as has been done in the past. Combining the two changes, if his visits were reduced to one day or his female visitors were barred because of "improper" clothing, either situation would have an adverse effect on him. The current rule does not provide what is appropriate clothing and under the terms of the new rule, he would have a difficult time explaining to his female visitors what "appropriate" clothing is. Inmate Yero was in disciplinary confinement in December, 1984 and then placed under investigation. While he was in that status from October 26, 1984 through early January, 1985, he did not get to see nor did he ever receive notice of the proposed rule. Prior to October, 1984, he was allowed visitors from one to two hours. This was the rule for prisoner in disciplinary confinement. The new rule would allow the superintendent to restrict visitors to prisoners in Yero's status. The new rule adds the word "infirmaries" to the list of special status inmates. He signed the Petition herein with only limited knowledge of its contents. Inmate Paul is presently a hospital inmate and has been intermittently since 1982. He is housed in the hospital because of a disability which confines him to a wheel chair not because of any contagious or infectious disease. He understands the new rule to state that since he is in the hospital, he could be denied visitors even though he is not a patient but a special housing prisoner who is considered to be a regular inmate. He was advised that when his sister from New York called to arrange a visit with him, she was told that because he was in the hospital, he could have only a one hour visit with her. The new rule could prohibit him from having visitors at all, he says, and leaves too much discretion with the superintendent. The one hour rule which applies to inmates in the hospital has had an adverse effect on him since he has been deprived of visits from his sister. He and his sister are orphans, he says, who have just been recently reunited after a long separation. He contends that the new rule puts too much control in the hands of the superintendent. It is too vague and gives the superintendent authorization to make decisions which he should not have. The propriety of placing control, the right to make decisions, and discretion in the hands of the superintendent is clear. Without question, the superintendent is the individual most qualified to make those decisions and to exercise those functions. Adams' mother is old. Because of this and because she cannot walk far, the past changes in parking and entry procedures have cut down on her visits to him. Because of this, he is not likely to be affected by the potential for a change to one day visits. However, as to the dress rule, he would have difficulty in telling his family what they could or could not wear based on the descriptions or lack thereof in the proposed rule. During the four years he has been in confinement, he has found it difficult to know or determine who is going to do what at any given time. His mother has told him that she would like to visit him but doesn't want to go through all the difficulties she has to encounter when she does visit. She states to him that the metal in her bra sets off the metal detector utilized to screen visitors and as a result, she wears a tank top on her visits which would be prohibited by the new rules. He considers this to be deleterious to him and his welfare and he contends that the new rule will destroy any uniformity among the 79 or so different facilities within the DOC. There is no evidence that the sole alternative to a metal braced bra is a tank top. Numerous other modes of dress are available to women of all ages, sizes, and shapes. According to Harry Singletary, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the Department is presently reviewing all rules and policy and procedure directives in an effort to do away with the latter and make all controlling directives for the Department in the form of Rules. The intent is to promulgate standards for statewide application to meet the needs of the families of the inmates, the inmates, and the institutions. Mr. Singletary contends that the majority of changes set out in the proposed rules make them more liberal for the inmate or increase security for the institution. Both of these goals are worthy and supportable. It was the intent of the drafters of the rule to standardize procedures so that visitation would be made easier and safer and to increase uniformity among the institutions so that prisoners moving from one institution to another could know what to expect. It is the Department's position that a rule should not create surprises for the inmates and should liberalize and simplify procedures for them as much as possible. As to proposed Rule 33-5.01, the reason for the new language was to give the Superintendent the discretion to provide more visitation for the inmates and their families and to deal with special needs of the inmates or the institution. The change here is to liberalize - not penalize. The terms of the proposed rule provide that Superintendents' interpretations cannot be more strict than the terms of the rule and it in essence legitimizes superintendents being more liberal than the rule calls for. Based on the population and size of the UCI visitor park, notwithstanding the concerns of Mr. Adams that the Legislature and recent court decisions will have the effect of significantly reducing the population at UCI, there should he no change in visitor policy as it exists now at this institution. As a matter of fact, if the population decreases, there would be less pressure or reason to reduce the visit days for each inmate to make more time available for others. The fact that some language is less than specific (i.e., 6 hours instead of 9 am to 3 pm) reflects an intention on the part of the drafters to give the superintendent latitude to tailor local policy to the needs of the inmates and his institution. It is recognized that there may be some abuses by superintendents, but if this should occur, it would be the exception rather than the rule and there are adequate remedies existing in the DOC rules through grievance procedures to rectify any such abuse. With regard to proposed Rule 33-5.04, dealing with special status inmates, the change here proposed adds only the word "infirmaries." The existing rule was changed only to describe all types of facilities. The rule originally was designed to prevent the spread of disease incident to the closeness of prison populations. However, it is Mr. Singletary's confirmed opinion that ambulatory or non-infectious patient- inmates, such as Mr. Paul, one of the Petitioners here, would be allowed visitors in the visitor park the same as any other inmate, on regular hours. Proposed Rule 33-5.07(5) is a new offering which gives the Superintendent authority to act to promote discipline but provides adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. Proposed Rule 33- 5.08(3) is also new and it gives the inmates the opportunity to tell the superintendent what they need and provides for extra visiting time when justified. It also gives specific factors that inmates are to use to justify extra visiting time. It was intended to promote uniformity. Proposed Rule 33-5.08(10) dealing with searches, is designed to provide for a method to prevent the introduction of contraband into the institution. It is for the security of the institution and if reasonable, should provide no problems. There are presently no dress codes applicable to visitors coming into UCI or any other institution. Proposed Rule 33- 5.08(1)(c) applies to both men and women and is based on the need for security in the institution. The intent of the agency was to limit the opportunity for rude, suggestive, or untoward comments by inmates which could give offense to the resident inmate relative of the visitor to whom the comments are directed and which could incite fights or other violence. Proposed Rules 33-5.08(14) and (15) both exist in the present rule. Subparagraph 14 deals with people in protective custody and death row inmates as well as violent inmates. Subparagraph 15 deals with those instances where contact visits might jeopardize security. Those inmates in normal status would not be separated. The rules are based on the need to maintain security and prevent the passing of weapons, the spread of disease, or inappropriate conduct as is periodically demonstrated by inmates and visitors. The machinery designed by the agency to deal with those instances envisioned by the rule where a Superintendent of a particular institution might want to impose a standard stricter than that encompassed in the rule, requires that superintendent to submit his proposal to the Secretary of DOC along with justification and documentation indicating a need for a stricter standard. It is also envisioned that prisoners requesting a transfer from one institution to another write in advance to the new institution to get the local policy regarding a particular area or, wait to be briefed as to local policy during the incoming orientation on arrival. Just as the institutional superintendent must justify imposing a stricter standard than called for in the rule, it is, as well, the responsibility of the inmate who request extra visiting time, to present factors justifying the extension, the grant or denial of which is within the prerogative of the superintendent. Admittedly, while the rule does not define specific criteria for the superintendent to use in making his decision, it will be based on the reasonableness of the request and the sufficiency of the reasons submitted by the inmate. In short, the inmate must make his case and is not limited as to the factors he may use to show the need for extra time or for the change in location. The decision is within the discretion of the superintendent and is similar to other areas such as release, privileges, and the like in which the superintendent has been held capable of legitimately utilizing his discretion.
