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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs JOSEPH C. MILLER, 00-003543PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Aug. 30, 2000 Number: 00-003543PL Latest Update: Oct. 02, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs KATIE SCHONECK, 01-003820PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Sep. 28, 2001 Number: 01-003820PL Latest Update: Oct. 02, 2024
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs DELTA HEALTH GROUP, INC., D/B/A FOUNTAINHEAD CARE CENTER, 05-002789 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 02, 2005 Number: 05-002789 Latest Update: Apr. 05, 2006

The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of the isolated Class III deficiency alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed, skilled nursing home facility located in North Miami, Florida. Respondent was at all times pertinent hereto licensed by Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 400 Part II, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida with the responsibility to regulate skilled nursing homes in Florida. Petitioner surveys nursing home facilities to evaluate their compliance with applicable rules. Petitioner classifies any deficiency noted by a survey according to the nature and scope of the deficiency. The severity of the deficiency determines the amount of any administrative fine and whether the licensure status of the facility should be "standard" or "conditional." A licensee’s failure to comply with an applicable statute or rule is a deficiency. A survey results in a report that lists each deficiency that is found, identifies the applicable regulatory standard that the surveyor believes has been violated, provides a factual basis for the alleged violation, and indicates the scope and severity of the deficiency. A facility is given a deadline to correct each alleged deficiency found during the initial survey. Disciplinary action is typically initiated if a facility has not corrected a deficiency as determined by a follow-up survey. Petitioner conducted a survey of Respondent during the period February 28 - March 3, 2005 (the initial survey). Barbara Catinella, who is a registered nurse and an experienced surveyor, participated in the initial survey on behalf of Petitioner. On March 1, 2005, Ms. Catinella observed perineal care being administered to two female residents (identified as Resident 26 and Resident 27). Each resident was being attended to following an episode of urinary incontinence. The first observation began at approximately 2:00 p.m. and the second began approximately thirty minutes later. Two certified nurses assistants (CNAs) administered the perineal care to Resident 26 and two different CNAs administered the perineal care to Resident 27. In both instances, the CNAs failed to properly perform the perineal care. In each instant, the CNAs performing the perineal care failed to open and clean the labia. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had a policy as to perineal care for female residents that conformed to accepted perineal care standards. Paragraph 15 of the policy required Respondent's staff to do the following in sequence for a female resident who had suffered an episode of incontinence, whether the episode was of bowel, bladder, or both: For a female resident: Wet washcloth and apply soap or skin cleansing agent. Wash perineal area, wiping from front to back. Separate labia and was area downward from front to back. Continue to wash the perineum moving outward to and including thighs, alternating from side to side, and using downward strokes. Rinse perineum thoroughly in same direction, using fresh water and a washcloth. Gently dry perineum. Instruct the resident to turn on her side. Rinse wash cloth and apply soap or skin cleansing agent. Wash the rectal area thoroughly, wiping from the base of the labia and extending over the buttocks. Rinse. Dry area. 8. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had a policy as to perineal care for male residents that conformed to accepted perineal care standards. Paragraph 16 of the policy required Respondent's staff to do the following in sequence for a male resident who had suffered an episode of incontinence, whether the episode was of bowel, bladder, or both: For a male resident: Wet washcloth and apply soap or skin cleansing agent. Wash perineal area starting with the urethra and working outward. Retract foreskin of the uncircumcised male. Wash and rinse urethral area using a circular motion. Continue to was the perineal area, including the penis, scrotum and inner thighs. Thoroughly rinse perineal area in [the] same order using fresh water and clean washcloth. Gently dry perineum following [the] same sequence. Reposition foreskin of uncircumcised male. Instruct or assist the resident to turn on his side. Rinse washcloth and apply soap or cleansing agent. Wash and rinse the rectal area thoroughly, including the area under the scrotum, the anus, and the buttocks. i. Dry area. The perineal care policy was adopted ". . . to provide cleanliness and comfort to the resident, to prevent infections and skin irritation, and to observe the resident's skin condition." Respondent's staff is trained to adhere to the perineal care policy. The perineal care provided Resident 26 and Resident 27 as observed by Ms. Catinella failed to adhere to Respondent's policy and constituted a failure to provide care and services to prevent potential urinary tract infection as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent argued that the failure to adhere to its policy by failing to spread and cleanse the labia would not cause a urinary tract infection as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent correctly argues that urine, in the body, is sterile and would not by itself cause a urinary tract infection. Most, but not all, urinary tract infections are caused by the e-coli bacteria found in feces. Respondent established that incontinent residents typically receive perineal care from Respondent's staff 10 times during a 24-hour period. Respondent also established that the facility uses only anti-bacterial soap for perineal care. Based on those considerations, Respondent argued that the perineal care observed by the surveyors may have led to a skin irritation, but that it would not have resulted in a urinary tract infection as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The greater weight of the credible evidence established clearly and convincingly that the failure to spread and cleanse the labia has the potential for various adverse consequences for the resident, including urinary tract infection.3 If staff does not spread and cleanse the labia, the fact that anti-bacterial soap is being used is irrelevant. If the soap does not reach the labia, that area will not be cleansed, regardless of the number of times perineal care is administered during a typical day. Petitioner established the Class III violations pertaining to perineal care as to the initial survey by the requisite evidentiary standard. Petitioner also established that the violations should be considered "isolated" since there were some 55 incontinent residents in Respondent's facility at the time of the initial survey and only two episodes of improper perineal care were observed. Respondent was provided with a correction date thirty days from the conclusion of the initial survey to correct the noted deficiencies by coming into substantial compliance with accepted perineal care standards. The first follow-up survey occurred April 19-20, 2005. Eleanor Kennedy participated in that follow-up survey and testified, in her deposition, as to three incidents of perineal care that she observed. During the course of the follow-up survey, Ms. Kennedy observed two CNAs administering inappropriate perineal care to a female resident referred to as Resident 15. Ms. Kennedy observed that this resident had suffered an episode of incontinence involving both bowel and bladder. In the course of administering the perineal care, the CNAs failed to open and clean the labia. In addition to observing perineal care to Resident 15, Ms. Kennedy observed perineal care administered to a female resident referred to as Resident 16 and a male resident referred to as Resident and to a male resident referred to as Resident The perineal care administered to Resident 16 and to Resident 17 were inconsistent with Respondent's perineal care policy. The CNAs performing the perineal care for Resident 16 did not follow the proper sequence for cleaning. They first washed the resident's abdominal folds and thigh creases and then opened and washed the labia with the same disposable cloth. Ms. Kennedy testified that the sequence of the cleaning is significant because it risked the transfer of bacteria from the areas first washed to an area that could result in a urinary tract infection. The CNAs who performed the perineal care for Resident 17 first washed the resident's face, underarms, and back. Then, without changing water, the CNAs took a clean cloth and washed the resident's groin area, his retracted foreskin area, and the urinary urethral meatus. The CNAs then dried the resident, but failed to follow the required sequence. As with Resident 16, Ms. Kennedy testified that the incorrect sequence followed by the CNAs risked the transfer of bacteria to an area that could result in a urinary tract infection. Although this sequence clearly violated Respondent's perineal care policy, Respondent established that the potential for urinary tract infection as a result of the sequence was reduced because anti-bacterial soap was used. Ms. Kennedy was uncertain as to whether the use of anti-bacterial soap would alleviate the concerns she had as to the care given these two residents. Because of that uncertainty, it is found that Petitioner did not prove that the perineal care provided Resident 16 and Resident 17 constituted a failure to provide care and services to prevent potential urinary tract infection as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The perineal care provided Resident 15 as observed by Ms. Kennedy failed to adhere to Respondent's policy and constituted a failure to provide care and services to prevent potential urinary tract infection as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. On May 26, 2005, Petitioner conducted a second follow- up survey and determined that Respondent was in substantial compliance with applicable regulations.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth herein. It is recommended that Count I of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner find Respondent guilty of an isolated, Class III deficiency based on Count II of the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner assess an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00 for the Class III deficiency found in Count II of the Administrative Complaint and that Petitioner's records reflect that Respondent's licensure was classified "conditional" for the period April 20 - May 19, 2005, and that Respondent's licensure was classified as "standard" before and after those dates. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2006.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57400.23
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs RONALD LORIN SHAW, M.D., 14-004478PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 23, 2014 Number: 14-004478PL Latest Update: Oct. 02, 2024
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. R. TIMOTHY CARTER, 88-002032 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002032 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 1989

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent is, and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed optometrist in the state of Florida, having been issued license number OP 000773. Respondent has been a practicing optometrist in the state of Florida for 24 years having graduated from the Southern College of Optometry in Memphis, Tennessee in 1964. Respondent has maintained his practice in Orange Park, Florida since 1964. Respondent has been treating patients with orthokeratology for approximately 20 years. Count I: Treatment of Keith Roberson with Orthokeratology and Follow-Up Care Therefor. On or about October 23, 1979, Alan Keith Roberson and his mother visited Respondent for the first time concerning a program of orthokeratology. During that visit, Respondent gave Roberson literature regarding orthokeratology. Roberson expressed a strong desire to obtain a driver's license. Roberson was 21 years of age at the time. Respondent told Roberson that orthokeratology would possibly enhance his vision and possibly enable him to achieve those things that he desired, more specifically, a driver's license. Orthokeratology has been defined as the programmed application of contact lenses to reduce or eliminate refractive anomalies and to sphericalize the cornea in order to reduce myopia, contain myopia, and to bring back a more functional vision. Orthokeratology has also been used for the reduction of astigmatism. The American Academy of Optometry does not recognize diplomacy for orthokeratology. Neither the American Optometric Association nor the Florida Optometric Association recognizes orthokeratology as a separate section. No special license or certification is required to practice orthokeratology in Florida. The initial refraction of Roberson by Respondent showed that the patient's eyes were a minus 21 diopter. Roberson was extremely myopic, which means he was extremely nearsighted. Roberson also had a high degree of nystagmus (constant movement of the eyes from side to side) and very large eyes. Respondent treated Roberson with a modified orthokeratology program in an attempt to improve Roberson's vision so that Roberson could obtain a driver's license. Through this modified orthokeratology program, Respondent hoped to reduce and contain Roberson's myopia, to reduce Roberson's nystagmus, and to improve Roberson's vision. Roberson's aided vision improved from the initial visit of 20/200 in each eye to that of 20/70 in the right eye and 20/100 in the left eye. Although Petitioner contends that Roberson's improved vision was not attributable to the orthokeratology treatment, there is insufficient evidence to show otherwise. From 1979 through September 1982, Roberson's vision did not slip and his myopia did not get any worse, and indeed, his vision had improved. During that period, Roberson was seen approximately eight times by Respondent, of which six visits were for orthokeratology and contact lens treatment. On March 17, 1981, Roberson was issued an operator's license with corrective lens restrictions by the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Prior to the issuance of this driver's license, Roberson had obtained a form entitled "Report of Eye Examination with a Certification of Eye Specialist" which was completed and apparently used to obtain Roberson's driver's license. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent completed and signed that portion of the form entitled "Certification of Eye Specialist". Although Roberson testified that his driver's license was issued the day after this form was dated on October 4, 1980, it is clear from the record that Roberson's driver's license was not issued until March 17, 1981. Respondent did not make any promises to Roberson that treatment with modified orthokeratology would improve his vision, unaided by glasses or contact lenses, so that Roberson could pass the vision requirement of the Florida Driver's Test unaided by glasses or contact lens, notwithstanding that the ultimate goal of orthokeratology may be to allow the patient to go for periods of time without refractive devices and function normally. Although Roberson's condition at the time of his first visit may have contraindicated a "strict" orthokeratology treatment, there were indications that the "modified" orthokeratology treatment suggested and used by the Respondent, after full explanation to Roberson, would produce the results that Roberson was seeking. In fact, it did improve Roberson's vision aided by refractive device sufficiently to allow Roberson to obtain a driver's license. Respondent did not promise Roberson that the "modified" orthokeratology treatment would enhance his vision, unaided by refractive devices, to the point of allowing Roberson to pass the driver's license test or that Roberson would be able to function normally for any period of time without refractive devices to aid his vision. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent could have obtained the same results using a less expensive treatment such as gas permeable contact lens. There was insufficient evidence that Respondent's follow-up care of Roberson was inadequate, particularly considering the use of "modified" orthokeratology treatment. There was insufficient evidence to show that Respondent's treatment of Roberson with "modified" orthokeratology fell below the standard of care in the community or that such treatment was inappropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case. Count II: Whether Respondent charged Patient Roberson an Excessive Fee for Orthokeratology. Because Roberson was the highest myopic (-21 diopter) patient ever seen by Respondent and initially unsure whether orthokeratology would work on this patient, Respondent quoted a fee of $1,000.00 with the understanding that if treatment was not successful then the fee would only be $500.00. The parties stipulated that Respondent ultimately received $1,000.00 in payment from Roberson for orthokeratology. Dr. Carter's normal fee in 1979 for orthokeratology was $2,000.00. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent prescribed orthokeratology treatment for Roberson to facilitate charging him a higher fee. Count III: Whether Respondent Failed to Properly Treat Patient Roberson and Follow Patient Roberson's Condition. At approximately 7:30 p.m., on September 7, 1982, Roberson visited Respondent's office after accidentally being "poked" in the left eye four days earlier causing a bright blue flash of light resulting in a curtain over Roberson's eye and poor sight vision in the nasal field. Roberson complained about fluctuating vision, seeing light flashes, a veil-like curtain coming over his left eye, watering of the left eye and slipping of contact lens. Respondent spent approximately 20-25 minutes examining Roberson. After examining Roberson's visual acuities, Respondent examined Roberson with a slitlamp or biomicroscope and attempted an optomoscopy in an attempt to view Roberson's retina. Because of Roberson's high degree of myopia and nystagmus and because Respondent did not dilate eyes during this time period, Respondent was unable to determine for certain that Roberson had a detached retina. However, Respondent was aware of the high possibility that Roberson had a detached retina. Although Respondent may have advised Roberson to visit his previous ophthalmologist the next day, Respondent did not call an ophthalmologist on the evening of September 7, 1982 to facilitate referral, nor did Respondent follow- up by calling a ophthalmologist at any other time. After Roberson left Respondent's office he went home. The next day Roberson went to work and while at work he continued to experience the veil like curtain over his eye and a dark spot. Roberson then went home and played drums for about 3 1/2 to 4 hours. When he finished playing the drums he took a shower. While shaking his hair dry he lost the vision in his left eye. Roberson, on the advice of his mother, then went to the University Hospital where he was immobilized and diagnosed as having a probable retinal detachment, and thereafter transported to Shands Hospital, where he was diagnosed as having a giant retinal tear. While at Shands Hospital, Roberson underwent three major operations on his eye and 45 minutes of laser surgery. He was informed that he would probably always be blind in his left eye. Because of Roberson's high degree of myopia, statistically he was at a very high risk of experiencing a detached retina with or without injury. Respondent was aware that patient's eyes were sensitive to a retinal detachment as early as 1979. In 1979, Respondent went to great lengths to inform Respondent that if he ever had the symptoms of a detached retina he should go directly to an ophthalmologist. The classic symptoms of a detached retina are flashes of light with what appears to be a veil or curtain floating over the eye. Roberson experienced the classic symptoms of a retinal detachment and communicated them to Respondent on the evening of September 7, 1982. A detached retina usually occurs secondarily to a retinal tear. A detached retina becomes an ocular emergency once detected or when it should have been detected. The circumstances presented in this case, inter alia, the history of the patient's eyes; a high degree of myopia; difficulty Respondent had with viewing patient's eyes and the symptoms complained of made the situation an ocular emergency. It was of paramount importance to get the patient to an ophthalmic specialist. The failure to promptly refer a patient who has a possible detached retina to the appropriate specialist is a grave departure from the prevailing standard of care for reasonable and prudent optometrists in Respondent's community under similar circumstances. The longer the blood supply is cut off from the retina the less chance there is that the retina will continue to function. The fact that 4 days had elapsed between the time Roberson had been struck in the eye on September 3, 1982, and the time he visited Respondent on September 7, 1982, makes referral that much more important. Merely telling Roberson to see an ophthalmologist the next day is not enough. Respondent should have called the retinal specialist and made the referral. The appropriate referral protocol and standard of care under the circumstances presented in this case would have been for Respondent to call the ophthalmologist himself that evening and, if the ophthalmologist was not in the office, it would have been appropriate to leave a message with the doctor's service explaining the emergency nature of the circumstances. Count IV: Whether Patient Roberson's Records were Altered or Made After the Fact by Respondent. When Roberson first visited Respondent's office in 1979, Respondent recorded Roberson's case history on a 5 x 8 card which was kept with Roberson's patient jacket. The results of Respondent's examination and testing of patients were records on a letter size document. In 1984, after receiving and responding to numerous inquiries regarding Roberson, Respondent transferred information from the 5 x 8 card onto the larger patient record so that all of the information would be contained on one form. The 5 x 8 card was then returned to the patient jacket. Respondent no longer has the patient jacket as all of his original records were subpoenaed from him during the civil litigation. While Dr. Carter candidly admits to transferring part of the patient record from one document onto another document, there was no testimony or evidence presented that Dr. Carter altered or changed any of the patient records or added any information thereto. Count V: Whether Respondent has Engaged in Gross or Repeated Malpractice in the Practice of Optometry Regarding his Treatment and Examination of Keith Roberson. The Respondent was disciplined by the Board of Optometry in its Final Order dated July 17, 1981 in Department of Professional Regulation v. R.T. Carter, O.D., Case No. 81-403, wherein Respondent was assessed an administrative fine of $5,000.00, ordered to make restitution in the total amount of $1,471.00, placed on probation for 18 months and had restrictions placed on his advertising. In General Although the record reveals that Petitioner has not always timely complied with time limits set out in Section 455.225(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, there has been no showing by the Respondent that he was prejudiced by the delays.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Count III and Count V, in regard to Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and suspending his license to practice optometry in the state of Florida for a period of one year followed by one (1) year of supervised probation with conditions the Board may consider appropriate, and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that Count I, Count II, Count IV and Count V as it relates to Counts I, II and IV be dismissed. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-2032 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings in Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, except date which was October 23, 1979. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance' in Finding of Fact 5, except last sentence which is rejected as not being supported by the substantial competent evidence in the record. 5.-6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7, respectively. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. The first sentence adopted in Findings of Fact 10. The balance of this findings of rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 9.-12. Subordinate to facts actually found in the Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 15.-22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 23,24,25,27,28,29,30 and 31, respectively. The first sentence is only a restatement of Respondent's testimony rather than a finding of fact. The balance of this finding is subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Adopted in Findings of Fact 26 and 35. 25.-28. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 33, 34 and 40. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1.-13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 7, 3, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16, respectively. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. -20. Are not findings of fact, but statements as to the weight given certain evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. Covered in Background. 23.-26. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 19, 20 and 21, respectively. 27.-28. Not a finding of fact, but rather a restatement of testimony. 29.-35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 23, 23, 24, 25, 25, 25 and 25, respectively. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26, but modified. The first sentence is subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. The balance is adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 39.-41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Is a restatement of testimony rather than a finding of fact but, if stated as a finding of fact would reject as subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Rejected as being argument rather than a finding of fact. Covered in Background. Rejected as not being material or relevant. 48.-51. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36, 37, 38 and 39. Rejected as argument not a finding of fact. The first, third and fifth sentences are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. The balance of this finding is subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 54.-67. Rejected as not being material or relevant since Respondent produced insufficient evidence to show that he was prejudiced by these acts. 68. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 69.-70. Rejected as not being material or relevant. 71. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Gary J. Anton, Esquire Stowell, Anton & Kraemer Post Office Box 11059 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mildred Gardner, Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lawrence A. Gonzalez, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68455.225463.016
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. MARK N. DOBIN, 86-004484 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-004484 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Mark N. Dobin (Dobin), was at all times material hereto licensed to practice optometry in the State of Florida, and held license number OP 0001202. Inadequate Eye Examinations On November 5, 1985, Alison Lichtenstein, an investigator employed by the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), entered Dobin's offices in Margate, Florida. Using the assumed name of Alison Smith, Ms. Lichtenstein, who was wearing glasses at the time, requested that Dobin perform a routine eye examination, with the exception of tonometry. Dobin undertook the requested examination, and was paid his fee of $25.00. The visual analysis performed by Dobin on Ms. Lichtenstein failed to include the following minimum proceduresrequired by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code: (a) an adequate patient history, since he failed to inquire whether Lichtenstein was taking any medication; (b) an external examination; (c) a pupillary examination; (d) visual field testing; and (e) a biomicroscopy. On November 5, 1985, Mary Pfab, a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida, entered Dobin's offices in Margate, Florida. Using the assumed name of Mary Parker, Ms. Pfab, who was wearing contact lenses, requested that Dobin perform a routine eye examination, with the exception of tonometry. Dobin undertook the requested examination, and was paid his fee of $25.00. The visual analysis performed by Dobin on Ms. Pfab failed to include the following minimum procedures required by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code: (a) an adequate patient history, since he failed to inquire of Pfab's personal medical history, her medications, her family medical history, or her family ocular history; (b) a pupillary examination; and (c) visual field testing. An optometrist's failure to perform the minimum procedures required by Rule 21Q-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, can have a profound impact on the results of his examination. Pertinent to this case, the procedures omitted by Dobin were of import because: Many medications mask the symptoms of a number of eye diseases. A failure to ascertain what medications a patient is taking could, therefore, result in the optometrist missing or not checking for certain diseases. A personal medical history is likewise important to an informed examination. Pre-existing injuries and diseases can have a profound impact on an optometrist's findings, and the cause of that finding is important too the ultimate diagnosis and treatment of the patient. The patient's family medical and ocular history is also important to an informed examination. For example, a person with a family history of diabetes, cataracts or glaucoma is more likely to have such disease than one without such family history. Consequently, if alerted by such information, the optometrist could diagnose the presence of such disease and prescribe treatment at a much earlier stage of its development than might ordinarily be the case. A pupillary examination evaluates the nervous system which connects the eye and retina to the brain. A failure to perform such examination could cause the optometrist to overlook the existence of a brain tumor or other forms of nerve damage. Visual field testing is a diagnostic tool used to detect the presence of gross nerve damage, traumatic cataracts, glaucoma, diabetes, and certain peripheral retinal diseases. Absent such test, these diseases might not be detected. In this case, the import of Dobin's failure to perform a visual field test was heightened. Visual field testing and tonometry are two of the three diagnostic procedures utilized to detect glaucoma. Where, as here, tonometry was not performed, the importance of visual field testing is more significant to the early detection of that disease. Biomicroscopy is a diagnostic tool used to detect the presence of bacterial conjunctivitis, corneal ulcers, corneal scars, blepharitis, and some lid injuries. Absent stich test, these diseases or injuries might not be detected. An external examination is important to the detection of skin cancer, skin lesions, blepharitis, and bacterial or allergic conjunctivitis. Absent such examination, these ocular problems might be overlooked. Inadequate Patient Records Contrary to the requirement of Rule 2IQ-3.007, Florida Administrative Code, the patient case record for Ms. Lichtenstein and Ms. Pfab did not reflect whether the following tests were performed or if performed the results: (a) a complete patient history, (b) an external examination, (c) a pupillary examination, (d) a visual field test, (e) an internal examina- tion, (f) a biomicroscopy, and (g) diagnosis and treatment. The inadequacy of Dobin's patient records would adversely affect his ability, and that of a subsequent treating optometrist, in treating these patients. Absent a medical history and the results of the tests performed, an optometrist is severely hampered in his ability to track the progress of diseases, or to detect their onset. Exercising Influence For Financial Gain Petitioner asserts that Dobin, by accepting a fee for a vision analysis that did not comply with the minimum requirements of Rule 2IQ-3.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, violated Section 463.0l6(1)(m), Florida Statutes. That section prohibits: Exercising influence on the patient in such a manner as to exploit the patient for financial gain of the licensee or of a third party. Petitioner's proof was not persuasive. While the patients in this case may not have received the minimum examination mandated by law, I am not persuaded that such failure constituted the exercise of influence to exploit a patient contemplated by Section 463.016(1)(m). There was no showing that Dobin recommended unnecessary tests or unnecessary products, or that he otherwise sought to influence their choice of procedures or materials for financial gain. Such being the proof, the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation of Section 463.016(1)(m) Unlicensed Practice Of Optometry Petitioner further asserts that Dobin's "association" with Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., his landlord, violated the provisions of Section 463.0l4(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 2IQ-3.008, Florida Administrative Code. Section 463.014(1) provides: (c) No optometrist shall engage in the practice of optometry with any organization, corporation, group, or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit optometrists from employing, or from forming partnerships or professional associations with, optometrists licensed in this state. And, pertinent to this case, Rule 2IQ-3.008 provides: No licensed practitioner shall enter into any agreement which adversely affects the licensed practitioner's exercise of free, independent and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility, or which permits any unlicensed person or entity to practice optometry through the licensed practitioner by controlling and/or offering `optometric services to the public. The professional judgment of a licensed practitioner should be exercised solely for the benefit of his patients and free from any compromising influences and loyalties. The Board will consider the circumstances of the practice including but not limited to, the following factors in determining whether a violation of Section 463.014, F.S., has occurred: Whether the licensed practitioner holds himself out to the public as available to render professional services in any manner which implies that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with or employed by an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. For purposes of this rule "entity" shall refer to any corporation, lay body, organization, individual or commercial or mercantile establishment which is not a licensed practitioner. The term "commercial or mercantile establishment" shall include, but not be limited to, an establishment in which the practice of opticianry is conducted pursuant to Chapter 484. Whether the professional office space occupied by the licensed practitioner is such that it does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his practice of optometry is independent of, and not associated with the entity. Whether the licensed practitiQner has a telephone listing and number that is separate and distinct from that of the entity or whether the phone is answered in a manner that does not identify his optometric practice or whether the telephone is answered in a way that indicates that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with or employed by the entity. Whether the entrance to the building or commercial or mercantile area in which the licensed practitioner's practice is located sufficiently identifies that the licensed practitioner is practicing his profession independent of, and not associated with the entity. Whether advertisements, including those placed in a newspaper and/or telephone directory, imply that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated with, or employed by an entity. Whether the licensed practitioner maintains full and total responsibility and control of all files and records relating to patients and the optometric practice, in accordance with Rule 2IQ-3.003. Whether the licensed practitioner has full and complete control and discretion over fees charged to patients for his services and billing methods. Whether the provisions of a lease or space agreement between the licensed practitioner and the entity operate so as to impair the licensed practitioner's free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. Whether the arrangements for the furnishing of equipment or supplies to the licensed practitioner operate so as to impair the licensed practitioner's free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., is owned and operated by two licensed opticians. By a "rental agreement" dated October 12, 1983, Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc., and Dobin entered into an agreement whereby Dobin was sublet space within Eye-Wear Glasses' premises. That "rental agreement" provided: RENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN EYEWEAR GLASSES INC. AND DR. MARK N. DOBIN Rent shall be $1.00 per month, and shall continue for a 2 year period with continuing 2 year options. This lease will go into affect on October 17th 1983. The rent of $1.00 per month shall include water, electricity, and air conditioning. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will be responsible to supply all equipment, stationary, and supplies needed to run an Optometric Office. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will have a phone installed at his own expense and his monthly bill along with Yellow Pages advertising c shall be paid by him. Dr. Mark N. Dobin will be allowed to advertise independent of Eyewear Glasses Inc. at his own expense. A key allowing access to the premises shall be given to Dr. Mark N. Dobin. Fees for Services performed by Dr. Mark N. Dobin, will be determined by Dr. Mark N. Dobin and shall be collected independent of those fees from Eyewear Glasses. Being a private entity, Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall have the right to determine his own office hours, days worked and vacation time, but he shall try to coordinate these days with those of Eyewear Glasses Inc. if this is possible. Renter, Dr. Mark N. Dobin, has the option of selling his practice and its contents to another Eye Doctor. This sale may include all records and files of patients belonging to Dr. Mark N. Dobin. At the time of sale, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the right to renegotiate the lease, but not to alter it in such a way as to make the sale of the practice uninviting. Before the sale is finalized a 3 month trial period may be requested by either party. If Dr. Mark N. Dobin is unable to sell his practice, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the right of first refusal to purchase his practice or his equipment. If the office is unoccupied for a period of 30 days, Eyewear Glasses Inc. has the option of subleasing the practice to another Eye Doctor, until which time the practice is sold or Dr. Mark N. Dobin returns. Dr. Mark N. Dobin has the right to hire another Eye Doctor to work his office during vacation time, or other times when he is not available. If Eyewear Glasses Inc. is not happy with the performance of said Eye Doctor. it may request that another Doctor be hired by Dr. Mark N. Dobin, but the final decision shall be his. Dr. Mark N. Dobin has the right to hire c an employee at his own expense, to assist in his office. A key to the premises may be given to said employee, but permission must first be granted by Eyewear Glasses inc. If either partner of Eyewear Glasses Inc. decides to sell his share of the corporation to the other, all points of this lease agreement shall remain in affect. If both owners agree to sell their share of the corporation, Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall have the right of first refusal to purchase Eyewear Glasses Inc. and its contents. Eyewear Glasses Inc. agrees to build a partition at its own expense in order to meet Florida State Optometric Board requirements. A Covenant of Restriction with a radius of 5 miles shall go into affect 2 years from the beginning of this lease, and shall last for a period of 3 years from the termination of this lease. Dr. Mark N. Dobin shall not sell eyeglasses or other optical excessories, excluding all items pertaining to the sale and dispensing of contact lenses. The space occupied by Dobin, which consisted of approximately 248 square feet, was located at the rear of the optician's store, and accessible by way of a sliding glass door from the store or through a back glass door from the shopping mall area. Consequently, customers of either business had an unrestricted view and access to the business of either profession. Considering the physical layout of the premises, as well as the view of the premises afforded by Petitioner's exhibit 5, the proof established that Dobin held himself out to the public in a manner that implied he was professionally associated with or employed by Eye-Wear Glasses, Inc. Indeed, the "rental agreement" itself depicts a business association more far reaching than that of landlord and tenant, and served to impair Dobin's exercise of free, independent, and unlimited professional judgment and responsibility. 1/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOM)MENDED that Respondent, Mark N. Dobin, be placed on probation for twelve (12) months, and that an administrative fine of $3,000 be imposed upon him. DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4484 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2-3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5-6. Addressed in paragraph 2. 7-9. Addressed in paragraph 4. 10. Addressed in paragraph 5. 11-12. Addressed in paragraph 4. 13-22. Addressed in paragraph 6(a) -(g). 23-24. Addressed in paragraph 7. 25. Addressed in paragraph 8. 26. Addressed in paragraphs 9-10. 27-31. Addressed in paragraphs 11-13. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip B. Miller, Esquire c Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire 102 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark N. Dobin 7384 West Atlantic Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063 Mildred Gardner, Executive Director Board of Optometry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Honorable Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 463.014463.016
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KAREN JACKSON vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, 99-005245 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 13, 1999 Number: 99-005245 Latest Update: Nov. 14, 2000

The Issue Whether Petitioner should be given a passing grade for the pharmacology portion of the Optometry Licensure Examination given on August 1999.

Findings Of Fact Jackson took the optometry licensure examination given on August 5-8, 1999. The examination consisted of three parts: clinical, laws and rules, and pharmacology. Jackson failed the pharmacology portion of the examination with a score of 65.70. The minimum passing score for the pharmacology portion is 70. The pharmacology portion is a practical examination that tests the candidate's competency in diagnosing and treating ocular diseases. The pharmacology examination consists of a series of case studies followed by questions of varying point values. Each case study is worth seven points. The questions for each case study require the candidate to correctly identify a differential diagnosis, a second differential diagnosis, and a final diagnosis and to answer two follow-up questions, giving the best answer. Jackson challenged the scores that she received for the answers to questions 86, 31, 33, 85, 7, 9, 80, 111, 113, 66, and 69. Question 86 dealt with a differential diagnosis for a patient who was complaining of tenderness in one eye. An initial scraping and cytology showed some organisms but no hyphae or gram negative cocci. Jackson listed a homograft rejection as the first differential diagnosis. Her answer was incorrect because the case study did not present the characteristics of a homograft rejection and did give indicators of a bacterial infection. The correct answer was "F," and Jackson gave "C" as the answer. Questions 31 and 33 dealt with a case study of a patient who was complaining of some tearing, feeling like something was in her eye when nothing was there, light sensitivity, and redness in her right eye. For question 31, Jackson answered that a differential diagnosis was gonococcal conjunctivitis, which is incorrect because the patient did not have a severe purulent discharge, which is characteristic of gonococcal conjunctivitis. The correct answer for question 31 was "G," and Jackson gave "L" as the answer. Question 33 was for the final diagnosis, and Jackson again answered gonococcal conjunctivitis. The answer was incorrect because of the absence of a severe purulent discharge. The correct answer to question 33 was "A," and Jackson answered "L." Question 85 dealt with a patient who was complaining of decreased vision in one eye. The applicant was asked to pick the next step in the management of care to be taken if the appropriate medical care had been unsuccessful. Jackson incorrectly indicated that the answer was retinal focal laser therapy. Such treatment would be appropriate for a patient who had diabetic macular edema but not for the diagnosis of the patient in question. The correct answer to question 85 was "A," and Jackson answered "H." Questions 7 and 9 dealt with a patient complaining of floaters and decreased vision. Question 7 called for a second differential diagnosis. Jackson answered rheumatoid arthritis, which is incorrect because the patient was experiencing chronic granulomatous uveitis. The correct answer to question 7 is "I," and Jackson answered "E." Question 9 asked the candidate to identify the testing which would be appropriate for the correct final diagnosis. Jackson correctly identified the final diagnosis, but did not correctly identify the appropriate treatment. Jackson's answer gave the appropriate test for rheumatoid arthritis, which was not the final diagnosis. The correct answer was "B," and Jackson answered "G." For question 80, Jackson stated that she bubbled in the wrong answer. She bubbled in "F," and the correct answer was "E." The responsibility for bubbling in the correct answer rests with the candidate; thus, "F" is considered an incorrect answer even if it was bubbled in by mistake. Questions 111 and 113 dealt with a patient complaining of intermittent haloes and blurred vision. Question 111 asked for a differential diagnosis. Jackson answered acute angle closure glaucoma, which is incorrect because the patient did not present the characteristics of acute angle disclosure glaucoma, particularly with an intraocular pressure of 27. The correct answer was "C," and Jackson answered "A." Question 113 asked for the final diagnosis. Again Jackson answered acute angle closure glaucoma, which is incorrect. Questions 66 and 69 dealt with a patient who had a dark shadow which obscured the vision in his right eye six hours before his visit to the doctor. Question 66 asked for a differential diagnosis. Jackson answered traumatic vitreous hemorrhage, which is incorrect because there was no evidence of trauma given in the case study. The correct answer was "F," and Jackson answered "K." Question 69 asked for the immediate treatment or management which would be indicated for the right eye. Jackson answered vitrectomy, which is incorrect because a vitrectomy would not be performed on a hemorrhage which had been present for only six hours. The correct answer is "D," and Jackson answered "F."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Karen Jackson failed to earn a passing score of 70 on the pharmacology portion of the optometrist licensure examination given in August 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Jackson Post Office Box 7157 West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 Cherry A. Shaw, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C07 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703

Florida Laws (2) 120.57463.006
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