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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. CHERYLYN STOPPLER, DOROTHY DIANE OWENS, AND ESCAMBIA REALTY, INC., 86-003982 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003982 Latest Update: May 28, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs LYNTON OLIVER THOMAS AND L T EXPRESS REALTY CORPORATION, 97-002549 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 27, 1997 Number: 97-002549 Latest Update: Jan. 21, 1998

The Issue Whether the Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to regulate the practice of real estate, pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Lynton Oliver Thomas, was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0504596 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Thomas was as a broker-salesperson at Pagliari Realty, Inc., 323 Northeast 167 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, L T Express Realty Corp., was a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker, having been issued license number 0273473 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Thomas was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer of Respondent L T Express Realty Corp. The office for this corporate entity was located at 2124 Northeast 123 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. There was no evidence that Respondent Thomas operated his corporate entity from any other office. On May 7, 1995, Respondent Thomas, a licensed real estate broker, d/b/a L T Express Realty Corp., negotiated a contract for the sale of a house between Bruce and Ann McCormick (as sellers) and Marie S. Saintel and Carita Luc (as buyers). The buyers gave Respondent Thomas an earnest money deposit in the amount of $5,528.00. The transaction failed to close. The sellers, through their agent, attempted to make a demand upon Respondent Thomas for delivery of the earnest money deposit. The sellers' agent was unable to serve the demand on the Respondents because the Respondents had closed their offices and could not be located. Respondents had, or should have had, a good faith doubt as to the proper way to disburse the escrowed funds. Respondent Thomas, without authorization from the sellers, returned $3,000.00 of the original $5,528.00 deposit to the buyers. The balance of the earnest money deposit, in the amount of $2,528.00, has not been recovered from the Respondents. Rule 61J2-10.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides the procedure real estate brokers are required to follow when competing demands are made for funds that have been received in escrow or when a broker has a good faith doubt as to how escrowed funds should be disbursed. At no time did Respondents attempt to invoke those procedures. Kenneth G. Rehm, Petitioner's investigator, visited Respondent L T Express Realty Corp. and discovered that Respondent Thomas had abandoned his registered office. Respondent Thomas failed to notify Petitioner that he closed his real estate office at 2124 Northeast 123 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered that finds Respondents guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I-VIII of the Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for these violations, the Final Order should revoke all licenses issued by Petitioner to Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Mr. Lynton Oliver Thomas L T Express Realty Corp. 10810 Northeast Tenth Place Miami, Florida 33161 CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1997 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25 Florida Administrative Code (2) 61J2-10.02261J2-10.032
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs DOROTHEA L. PRISAMENT AND WARRICKS REAL ESTATE, INC., 89-006293 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 17, 1989 Number: 89-006293 Latest Update: Jul. 20, 1990

The Issue The issues in this case are whether the respondents, Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate , Inc., should be disciplined on charges filed in a six-count Administrative Complaint, three counts for each respondent, and alleging that the respondents: (1) were culpably negligent in allowing their escrow account to have a negative balance, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); (2) failed to maintain trust funds in a properly maintained escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) failed to maintain a proper office sign, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.024 and Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.22, Florida Statutes (1989).

Findings Of Fact Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate, Inc., are now, and were at all times material hereto, licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida. Dorothea L. Prisament was the active real estate broker for the corporate broker, Warricks Real Estate. On or about August 16, 1989, investigator Marjorie G. May conducted an office inspection and audit of the escrow accounts of the respondents. Ms. May also reviewed the outer office of the respondents. The entrance sign did not have the name of Dorothea L. Prisament on it; however, the sign did have Warricks Real Estate correctly identified and identified as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. May advised Ms. Prisament of the fact that Ms. Prisament's name needed to be on the sign and identified as a real estate broker. Ms. Prisament had a new sign made which fully complies with the statutes and rules. There was no evidence introduced at hearing to show that the escrow account of the respondents had a shortage in any amount; directly to the contrary, both the Department of Professional Regulation investigator and Ms. Prisament agreed that there was no shortage in the account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in light of the fact both that the respondents' violation was a very minor and technical one which was immediately corrected and that the respondents had to undergo the costs of defense of this case and suffer the mental duress of defending this case, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint and reprimanding the respondents for a minor and technical violation under Counts V and VI. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine A. Bamping, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729

Florida Laws (2) 475.22475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. NEVIN H. NORDAL, 88-003758 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003758 Latest Update: Apr. 04, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent is now and was at all times material to this action a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0064475. Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm under his license. The firm was located in Niceville, Florida. In addition to his real estate brokerage business Respondent maintained and managed his personal real estate investments. Several of these personal investments included rental property which Respondent would later sell. One such piece of property was located at 104 Perdido Circle, Niceville, Florida, and is the property involved in this action. Prior to July 6, 1985, the Respondent, as seller and not as a broker, advertised for sale the Perdido property. Sometime around July 6, 1985, Robert L. Mitchell and June F. Mitchell looked at the Perdido property. Frank Ray, a salesman for John Brooks Realty, an unrelated real estate firm showed the property to the Mitchells. They liked the property and wanted to buy it. Frank Ray made arrangements for himself and the Mitchells to meet with Respondent in order to discuss the terms of the potential purchase contract. They met on July 6, 1985. The meeting lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half. During the lengthy meeting Respondent went over the purchase terms contained in the contract of sale. The Mitchells main concern was to have immediate occupancy of the house. Special terms were developed for renting the property. At some point during the meeting the down payment came under discussion. Originally, the Mitchells had planned on a $1500 down payment which was acceptable to Respondent. However, as the meeting progressed the Mitchells decided they would like to reduce the amount of the down payment. Respondent informed the Mitchells that the only way he could decrease the $1500 down payment was to make the money a non-refundable option payment. Respondent then marked out the $1500 down payment figure contained in the purchase contract and inserted a $1200 figure. Respondent concurrently added the language "option payment" next to the $1200 figure. The remainder of the contract was discussed and the Mitchells signed the amended document. The Mitchells then wrote a check to Respondent, personally, in the amount of $1200. The note section of the check the Mitchells wrote contained the language "house down payment." The exact discussion on the down payment/option is not clear. What is clear from the evidence is that neither party had a meeting of the minds over what the $1200 check was. The Mitchells being very inexperienced in real estate thought it was a down payment. Although it is doubtful the Mitchells understood the legal meaning of the term "down payment." Respondent thought it was a non- refundable option payment. Absolutely no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Respondent was demonstrated. Likewise, there was no evidence that Respondent in any way used his knowledge or expertise in the real estate market improperly. The final result of the negotiations was that the Mitchells had entered into what on its face purports to be a rental contract with an option to buy. However, since there was no meeting of the minds over the option, the option was eventually unenforceable. Since there was no meeting of the minds regarding the $1200 the money was not properly escrowable property. In essence the $1200 was neither a down payment nor an option payment. This lack of escrowability is borne out by the sales contract which calls for another escrow agent. 1/ The Mitchells took possession of the property for approximately three months. The Mitchells failed to obtain financing. The contract was conditioned upon the Mitchells obtaining financing, and the transaction failed to close. A dispute arose between the parties concerning the down payment/option money. When the dispute could not be resolved by the parties, the Mitchells filed a lawsuit against Nevin H. Nordal demanding a refund of the $1200 "house down payment." As a result of the Mitchell's lawsuit the County Court, in Okaloosa County, Florida, Summary Claims Division, by Amended Final Judgment dated January 20, 1987, awarded the sum of $1,028,87. The judgment figure is the balance of the $1200 after deduction of a counterclaim of $171.13 for cleaning the house after the Mitchells evacuated the property. Additionally, the Respondent was required to pay costs in the sum of $57 for a total of $1,087.87 due the Mitchells. The judgment amount is bearing interest at a rate of 12 percent per annum. The County Court judgment contains no findings of fact as to the Judge's reasoning on the judgment award. The Mitchells have repeatedly demanded of the Respondent that he pay the judgment. He has repeatedly refused to pay the judgment. Respondent did account to the Mitchells for the money when he told them he had deposited the check and had spent the funds.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint failed against Respondent, Nevin H. Nordal, be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. DEAN O. VANDERWOUDE, 89-000138 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000138 Latest Update: Jun. 29, 1989

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Chapter 475, Florida Statute, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Dean O. Vanderwoude is now a real estate broker and was at all times material hereto a real estate salesman in Florida having been issued license number 0432878 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On August 15, 1988, Respondent passed an examination to be licensed as a broker and was licensed as a broker on September 1, 1988. At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed as a salesman and operated under the direction, control, or management of a licensed real estate broker, Anne M. Graffunder, and P.M.M. Properties under a 100 percent commission agreement whereby Respondent rented office space from his broker Graffunder. Respondent was affiliated with Graffunder and P.M.M. Capital, Inc., from approximately November 4, 1986, to October 16, 1987. When Respondent became affiliated with P.M.M., he had been licensed less than one year having first been affiliated with Security Realty Florida from December 20, 1985, to November 4, 1986. Under Graffunder's supervision, Respondent received little assistance in the form of guidance or instructions as to the methods and manner of presenting purchase contracts to sellers, little or no office support in the form of clerical assistance or technical training in the methods of handling escrow funds, no malpractice insurance coverage in the form of errors or omission's policy and no sales/training seminars. On approximately April 6, 1987, Respondent obtained a sales listing from Gary Alan Dahl (Dahl), a real estate investor, concerning real property, the record owner of which was Joe Belcik who had granted to Dahl equitable title to the property by Quit Claim Deed yet unrecorded. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). The real property located at 2785 Adrian Avenue, Largo, Florida, had been purchased by Belcik from Dahl who had previously purchased the property from the Veteran's Administration. Respondent was aware of the condition of the title to the property listed by him for sale as he reviewed an abstract of the property. On April 6, 1987, prospective purchasers David and Donna A. Kiser (herein purchasers) viewed the real property at 2785 Adrian Avenue, Largo, Florida, and contacted Respondent at a telephone number observed on a "for sale" sign posted on the property. On that date, the purchasers executed a written offer to purchase the property, which offer was prepared by Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). In conjunction with the offer to purchase, the purchasers tendered an earnest money deposit to Respondent, by cashier's check number 703917, dated April 10, 1987, in the amount of $100.00 made payable to P.M.M. Properties. The cashier's check was deposited into the escrow account of P.M.M. Capital, Inc., Sun Bank of Tampa Bay account number 265-014-3405 on April 15, 1987. The transaction closed on April 22, 1987. Following the closing, Graffunder issued a check number 140 written on the escrow account of P.M.M. Capital, Inc., Sun Bank/Southeast, account number 265-014-3405, dated April 22, 1987, made payable to Respondent in the amount of $100.00. The check was received by Respondent with Dahl's full permission and consent. Respondent represented to the purchasers that the seller, Dahl, had accepted their offer and desired to close the transaction immediately. Toward that end, Dahl came to Pinellas County from Sarasota County and executed all documentation necessary to effectuate the transfer on or before April 15, 1987. On April 15, 1987, Respondent met with the purchasers and had them sign all closing documents. This included execution of a closing statement and the Kisers requested an extension in order to obtain the $4,900.00 closing proceeds from Mrs. Kiser's father. On April 22, 1987, Mrs. Kiser presented the closing proceeds check and the transaction was finalized. That proceeds check and the $100.00 deposit check were both placed in Graffunder's operating account and pursuant to instructions from Dahl, Respondent received the closing proceeds as agent for Dahl. Dahl and the purchasers completed the closing by executing an Agreement for Deed on April 15, 1987. That agreement provides, in pertinent part, that the purchaser's would pay Dahl the total purchase price of $65,000.00 which included a down payment of $5,000.00 and monthly payments of $557.07 commencing May 1, 1987, and continuing for twenty-nine (29) months at which time the remaining principal balance of $60,073.18 would be payable in the form of a balloon payment. Dahl agreed to carry fire insurance for the full insurable value of the property and the purchasers were to have their names added to the policy as additional insureds. Additionally, both parties agreed that a Memorandum of Interest would be filed in the records of Pinellas County at the time of entering into the Agreement for Deed. Finally, the Agreement for Deed represented that there was a first mortgage in favor of Chrysler First and stated the condition that should the purchasers fail to make payments required of them within thirty (30) days after the same becomes due, the seller may, at his option, declare the contract null and void and all monies paid may be retained as full satisfaction and/or liquidated damages. Respondent did not provide the purchasers a warranty deed until approximately June 27, 1988, when he first became aware that Dahl had not given one to the Kisers. Respondent acknowledges that given the opportunity to reconstruct that transaction, he would have ensured that the seller provided a Warranty Deed to the purchasers as agreed in the Agreement for Deed. Respondent did not follow-up to ensure that a Memorandum of Interest was filed in the public records of Pinellas County as the parties agreed. Within months following the Riser's purchase of the subject property from Dahl, they became disenchanted with the property and ceased making payments under the agreement for Deed causing a large arrearage to accumulate and a subsequent mortgage foreclosure action was initiated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED: The Petitioner enter a final order finding that an administrative fine of $500.00 be imposed upon Respondent and his license number 0432878 be placed on probation for a period of sixty (60) days with the condition that the fine be payable to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of entry of the final order. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of June, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Brian E. Johnson, Esquire Brian E. Johnson, P.A. 7190 Seminole Boulevard Seminole, Florida 34642 Kenneth Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. PETER DAVID FRONTIERO, 84-002745 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002745 Latest Update: Oct. 11, 1985

The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed real estate salesman, is guilty, as charged, of fraud, misrepresentation, culpable negligence or breach of trust in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact I. At all times material to the charges, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., in Melbourne, Florida. He obtained his real estate salesman's license in 1982. On March 14, 1985, became a licensed real estate broker and now operates his own business under the name of Peter Frontiero Realty. His office is located in his residence at 3247 West New Haven Avenue, Melbourne, Florida. II. On or about April 7, 1983, while employed as a real estate salesman at Apollo Realty, Inc., Mary E. Sousa obtained a listing on a tract of land owned by John and Janet Biansco. In connection with the listing, an Exclusive Right of Sale Contract was executed. This contract contained the following legal description of the tract to be sold: Parcel of land lying in the County of Brevard in the southwest 1/4 of Sec 11, TW 28 South Range 36E more particularly described as follows: S 2/3 of the following tract: commence at SE corner of W 1/2 of Sec 11 TW 28 South Range 36E, thence along south line of said Sec 11, 589-54-14 West for 30 feet., thence north 1- 17-00E for [sic] 43 feet to the point of beginning thence south 89-54-14 west along the north R/W line Melbourne Tillman Drainage district canal #63 for 297.43 feet, thence north 1-15-49 east for 353 feet, thence north 89-54-14 east for 297.55 feet, to the west R/W line of Arizona Street; thence south 1 17-00 West along R/W line for 353.00 feet, to the point of beginning. (P-4, Admissions No. 5, 6) As so described, this tract of land measures 235.34' x 297.47' and contains approximately 1.61 acres. (Admission No. 7) Mary E. Sousa and her broker, Peter Sergis, however, incorrectly determined that the legal description described a tract of land measuring 297' x 353' feet, containing 2.4 acres. (They determined this by examining the legal description attached to the Listing Contract and relying on Mr. Biansco's representation that the tract contained 2.4 acres.) Mary E. Sousa then had the property listed in the Melbourne Multiple Listing Service (MLS) on or about April 26, 1983. The MLS listing reflected the incorrect measurements and size of the tract, as submitted by Ms. Sousa. (P-3, Admission No. 8) III. During May, 1983, Karen Dunn-Frehsee and Paul Winkler (her fiance), contacted Respondents, a real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., about purchasing a home. After Respondent showed them a house they were interested in, Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler decided that what they really wanted was to buy land on which they could build a residence. They told Respondent that they would need a minimum of two acres since they had two horses: local zoning requirements required at least one acre of land per horse. (Admission No. 10, Testimony of Dunn-Frehsee) Respondent checked MLS and found the listing (containing the incorrect measurements and size) of the Biansco property. He showed the land to Ms. Dunn- Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, who liked it and decided to make an offer. (At that time, Respondent was unaware that the MLS listing erroneously described the tract to be 297' x 353', containing 2.4 acres, when in fact it was 297.47' x 235.34', containing approximately 1.61 acres.) On or about May 5, 1983, Respondent prepared a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" containing the offer of Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. After she signed it, it was presented to the Bianscos, who subsequently accepted it. (Admission No. 12, P- 1) The Contract for Sale and Purchase contained, on the attached addendum--a correct legal description of the tracts as the description was taken from the listing agreement, not the erroneous MLS listing. Prior to closing, Respondent contacted Ms. Dunn-Frehsee several times to advise her regarding efforts being made by Lawyers Title Insurance Company to locate the prior owner of the property and secure a quitclaim deed covering a 30-foot strip of land bordering Arizona Street on the east side of the property. He was still unaware of the discrepancy between dimensions of the property contained on the MLS listing and the Contract of Sale. He did not tell Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had personally measured the property, or that he had confirmed the accuracy of the listing information. He was concerned only with the problem of obtaining access to the property through the 30-foot strip bordering Arizona Street. Although he told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he thought she was getting 2.7 or 3.0 acres by virtue of the additional strip of land which was to be quitclaimed to her at no additional cost, this belief was based on his reasonable assumption that the original tract contained 2.4 acres, as represented by the listing agents (Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty) and reflected in the Multiple Listing Book. Respondent also contacted Mr. Winkler, but similarly, did not represent to him that he (Respondent) had personally measured the property or confirmed the MLS information. (Testimony of Respondent) Prior to the closing, Respondent discussed with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee the need to order a survey of the property. She then ordered a survey, which was completed a week and a half before closing. After picking it up, Respondent telephoned Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. There is conflicting testimony about the conversation which ensued. Respondent testifies that he telephoned her and asked if she would like him to deliver the survey to her house or mail it to her, or if she would like to pick it up at his office. (TR-30) Ms. Dunn- Frehsee, on the other hand, testified that Respondent telephoned her stating that he had looked the survey over and there was no reason for her to drive out to his office to pick it up, that he would bring it to the closing. (TR-48) Neither version is more plausible or believable than the other. Both Respondent and Ms. Dunn-Frehsee have a discernible bias: Respondent faces charges which could result in the revocation of his professional license; Ms. Dunn-Frehsee has sued Respondent for damages resulting from her purchase of a tract of land which was smaller than what she was led to believe. Since the burden of proof lies with the Departments, the conflicting testimony is resolved in Respondent's favor as it has not been shown with any reliable degree of certainty that Respondent told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had looked the survey over and that there was no need for her to examine it before closing. Both witnesses agree, however, and it is affirmatively found that Ms. Dunn-Frehsee agreed that Respondent should bring the survey with him to the closing, which was imminent. The surveys prepared by Hugh Smith, a registered land surveyors correctly showed the property to be approximately 235.33' x 297.43', but did not indicate the size by acreage. (Admission No. 20, P-2) At closings on or about June 23, 1983, Respondent showed the survey to Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. Ms. Dunn- Frehsee questioned the measurements as not being the same as she recalled being on the MLS listing. Neither Ms. Sousa nor Respondent, both of whom were in attendance, had a copy of the MLS listing so that the measurements on the two documents were not compared. (Admission No. 22-23) Ms. Dunn-Frehsee chose to close the transaction anyway after her questions regarding the property were apparently resolved to her satisfaction by Kathleen Van Mier, the agent for Lawyers Title Insurance Company which was handling the closing. Ms. Dunn-Frehsee signed a contingency statement indicating that all contract contingencies had been satisfied and that she wished to proceed with the closing. (TR-4O-41; 77-78) Respondent was misinformed regarding the dimensions and size of the property by the listing agents, Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty, who had provided inaccurate information to the Multiple Listing Service. Respondent reasonably relied upon the listing information and the representations of the listing agents concerning the size of the property. In his discussions with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, he drew reasonable inferences from such (incorrect) representations. He did not intentionally mislead anyone. It has not been shown that, under the circumstances, he failed to exercise due care or that degree of care required of a licensed real estate salesman. Nor has it been shown that he violated any professional standard of care adhered to by real estate salesmen and established by qualified expert testimony at hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges against Respondent be DISMISSED for failure of proof. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs ARMANDO ADAMES RIVAS, 20-003889PL (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 28, 2020 Number: 20-003889PL Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.

Florida Laws (7) 120.574120.60120.6820.165455.225455.227475.25 Florida Administrative Code (4) 61J2-10.03261J2-14.01161J2-24.00161J2-5.016 DOAH Case (1) 20-3889PL
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. BENJAMIN C. FOSTER AND FREDERICK ANTHONY, III, 81-002408 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002408 Latest Update: May 13, 1982

The Issue Did Frederick Anthony III, Inc., employ persons who were not licensed? Did Benjamin Foster have knowledge that these individuals were employed? Was Benjamin Foster responsible for the employment of unlicensed individuals? Was Benjamin Foster liable for Anthony John Bascone's actions as a real estate salesman? Did Benjamin Foster violate Sections 475.42(1)(c) and 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact Notice of the formal hearing was given to all parties as required by the statutes and rules. Benjamin C. Foster is a real estate broker holding License No. 0151634 issued by the Board of Real Estate. Frederick Anthony III, Inc. (FA III), is a Florida corporate real estate broker holding License No. 0215470 issued by the Board. Foster was the active firm member of the corporation. Donald McDonald and Delores McDonald were employed by FA III. While so employed, both of these persons engaged in the sale of real estate. Neither Delores McDonald nor Donald McDonald were licensed at the times in question. Foster agreed to be the active firm member for FA III because Anthony John Bascone and Frederick Hall, a real estate salesman, wanted to start a brokerage firm. Bascone and Hall had business connections with whom Foster wanted to affiliate, and Foster concluded that his function as active firm member with FA III would lead to business opportunities for FA III and for Foster's other real estate business. Bascone and Hall were corporate officers of FA III and managed the day-to-day activities of the office. They hired Donald and Delores McDonald as salespersons. Foster never met Delores McDonald and did not employ her. Foster met with Donald McDonald, Delores McDonald's husband, who said he was selling real estate at that time. Foster sent Donald McDonald to Bascone and Hall to be interviewed. Under Foster's agreement with Bascone and Hall, they would make the initial hiring determinations for their sales personnel and Foster would process the personnel as salespersons affiliated with the company. According to Foster's agreement with Bascone, Bascone would not engage in real estate sales until after he was license. Bascone was seeking a brokerage license, and it was their intent that Bascone would become the active firm member. The allegations involving Bascone's acting as a real estate professional were based on a transaction which was undisclosed to Hall or Foster until after the fact. This transaction involved the payment of a commission directly to Bascone by the seller which was unreported to Foster or Hall. Foster did not exercise close supervision over the activities of FA III.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Benjamin C. Foster be suspended for three months, and that the license of Frederick Anthony III, Inc., be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire 2701 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 10 Post Office Box 729 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Mr. Benjamin C. Foster 5354 Emily Drive, Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Frederick Anthony III, Inc. 3920 Orange Grove Boulevard North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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