Findings Of Fact On or about September 20, 1977, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of failing ". . . to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over. . ." withheld taxes to the United States, in violation of Title 26, U.S.C., Section 7215. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and placed on probation for a period of one year, during which time he was to make restitution. Petitioner did in fact make restitution after his probation was extended. Petitioner was discharged from probation in the above case on or about February 27, 1979. Section 7512 of the Internal Revenue Code, under which Respondent was convicted, requires the collection of Federal Withholding Taxes from the wages of employees and the deposit of same into a separate bank account in trust for the United States. Violation of Section 7512 constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioner owned and operated Wolfie's Restaurant in North Miami Beach for approximately 17 years. His testimony established that the business became indebted and he subsequently intentionally failed to pay some $46,000 in FICA and withholding taxes resulting in the above conviction. It should be noted that Petitioner filed the appropriate returns with the Internal Revenue Service and freely admitted his liability for taxes due and owing. The charges filed against him related only to his failure to pay said taxes and did not allege any attempt to conceal his liability. Petitioner was also charged with destruction of personal property in 1978, a misdemeanor. Petitioner pled guilty, adjudication was withheld, and he was required to pay costs of the action. This charge was not disclosed on Petitioner's application. Petitioner did not, however, intentionally withhold this information, but understood the application to require such information only where he had been formally arrested. Petitioner is currently employed at the Tiffany Hotel in Miami Beach. Prior to that, he operated the Lovin Oven Bakery in Miami. Petitioner presented two character witnesses who testified as to their personal business dealings with the Petitioner as well as Petitioner's general reputation in the business community. Their testimony established that Petitioner is regarded as honest and truthful.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
The Issue Whether Margaret Ann Reese is guilty of, and should be disciplined for committing, fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, or breach of trust in a business transaction?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Margaret Ann Reese was licensed by the State of Florida pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. She holds license number 0454079. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Reese was licensed as a real estate salesman, c/o Ellison Realty, Inc., 2226 E. Silver Springs Boulevard, Ocala, Florida 32671. During 1986, Ms. Reese showed certain real property and a mobile home (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), which was owned by Frederick W. and Mary Holm to Mary Kennedy and John J. Korsun, Sr., her father. The Property is located in Oxford, Sumter County, Florida. The Property was listed by Nehimiah Clark David, another real estate salesman with Ellison Realty, Inc. Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun inspected the Property several times. Water damage to the ceilings of the mobile home was noticed during the inspections. Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun expressed concern about the condition of the roof of the mobile home. The roof was, therefore, repaired by the owners. On November 5, 1986, Ms. Reese obtained a Contract of Sale, wherein Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun offered to purchase the Property. Because of their concern about the condition of the roof, Ms. Reese added the following under paragraph X, "Special Clauses," in the Contract of Sale: "Seller warrants roof for 1 year." The Contract of Sale was mailed to Mr. and Mrs. Holm in Punta Gorda, Charlotte County, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Holm struck the language included by Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun in the Contract of Sale concerning the one year warranty of the roof and added "sold as is" in paragraph X, "Special Clauses." Mr. and Mrs. Holm then executed the Contract of Sale, as modified, and mailed it to Ellison Realty, Inc. Ms. Reese, after receiving the Contract of Sale from Mr. and Mrs. Holm, informed Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun that their offer had been accepted. Ms. Reese did not inform Ms. Kennedy or Mr. Korsun that the sellers had modified the Contract of Sale by deleting the one year warranty of the roof and adding the language that the sale was "as is." Ms. Reese failed to provide a copy of the Contract of Sale signed by the Holms or have Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun initial the modifications made by the Holms. A copy of the Contract of Sale, as modified by the Holms, was not provided to Ms. Kennedy until February or March, 1987. The sale of the Property was closed on December 5, 1986. Closing took place at the offices of Advanced Title Searching, Inc., and was conducted by the President of Advanced Title, Robert M. Connell. At the closing Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Korsun decided that the Property would be sold only to Ms. Kennedy. Ms. Kennedy was not specifically informed during the closing that the language concerning the one year warranty of the roof had be stricken and that the language "sold as is" had been added. She was told, however, that the Property was being sold "as is" by Mr. Connell. Mr. Connell also followed his routine of reviewing paragraph X of the Contract of Sale with Ms. Kennedy and having her initial and sign a Buyers Affidavit. Among other things, Ms. Kennedy acknowledged by signing the Buyers Affidavit that she had reviewed paragraph X of the Contract of Sale. The Buyers Affidavit also refers to the only special clauses in paragraph X of the Contract of Sale as executed by Mr. and Mrs. Holm Although the terms of the sale were generally described by Mr. Connell and Ms. Kennedy signed the Buyers Affidavit, Ms. Kennedy was not shown the Contract of Sale as executed by Mr. and Mrs. Holm, she was not specifically told about the removal of the special clause concerning the one year warranty on the roof or that the roof was "as is," and she did not understand what she was signing. In approximately February, 1987, following Ms. Kennedy's purchase of the Property, the roof of the mobile home began leaking water during a rain storm. Ms. Kennedy called Ms. Reese to report the damage. Ms. Reese then informed Ms. Kennedy for the first time that the language concerning the one year warranty of the roof had been stricken and that the language "sold as is" had been added to the Contract of Sale. Ms. Reese offered to pay the cost of repairing the roof. Ms. Kennedy declined this offer because she wanted the roof replaced.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Margaret Ann Reese by found guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that Ms. Reese be reprimanded and required to pay a fine of $500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1294 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 3-6. 4 7. 5 8. A copy of the contract was provided in 1987, not 1988. 6 9-10. 7 See 10-11. 8 10. The last two lines of this proposed finding of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 9 12. 10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 13. 12-13 Hereby accepted. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 3-6. 4 7. 5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. David's testimony was contradicted by Ms. Reese's admissions to the Petitioner's investigator. 6 8. 7 10. See 11. 8 See 10-11. 9 12. 10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 13. 12-13 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 3280 Steven W. Johnson Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick D. Landt, III, Esquire Post Office Box 2045 Ocala, Florida 32678 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Respondent, Eugene Coney, is a licensee, and that he received due notice of said hearing. It was also stipulated that Robert Coney conducted 90 percent of the business activities of the business, writing checks, paying bills, and similar functions. Exhibits 1-6 were identified by James A. Harris, Jr., custodian of the Miami District Office Records, and were received into evidence. Beverage Agent James R. Bates testified that on May 8, 1974, he inspected the premises at 9:30 p.m. Robert Coney was present on the premises. Then asked to produce the beverage license, Robert Coney searched under the counter and produced the license. When asked to produce invoices for the sale of wine and malt beverages, Robert Coney produced those for that day but could not produce such invoices for the past six (6) months or for the past three (3) years. Bates did discover an old eviction notice and various other bills. In response to Bates' questions Robert Coney stated that he handled most of the business. Bates testified, and it was confirmed by the Coneys, that permission to keep invoices of wine and malt beverage sales off of the premises had not been requested. A copy of an eviction notice from the Court files was received as Exhibit 7. Beverage Agent Edward Pfitzenmaier inspected the licensed premises on April 9, 1975 and found the premises in the charge of Geneva Bell. Pfitzenmaier asked to see the beverage license and again it was found under the counter of the grocery. Robert Coney stated be was the brother of Eugene Coney, the licensee, and was employed at his brother's licensed premises as the manager. His duties included paying bills, clerking, protecting the business property, receiving beverages, selling beverages, and accounting for the business receipts. He had no written contract with his brother but it was their oral agreement that he could take food from the store's stocks and that the profits would split evenly between them. In addition, according to Eugene Coney, if Robert Coney required more than 50 percent of the profits to support his needs he was authorized to take so much of the profits as he required to support his basic needs. Robert and Eugene Coney both stated that Eugene had opened the business, had executed the lease with the landlord, and was in the premises at least every 7-8 days. Eugene Coney did relieve his brother when he was sick or as necessary, however, Eugene Coney had a full time job as a truck driver which required him to be out of town for several days at the time. Eugene testified that he had opened the business to provide his brother with employment because of Robert's heart condition, but that he (Eugene) was the owner, had absolutely final say in the conduct of the business, and could discharge Robert at any time. Eugene stated, however, that Robert was manager and could run the business as he wanted to run it. Both brothers testified that the store had been burglarized and vandalized on many occasions and that this had resulted in the destruction of many business records to include wine and malt beverage invoices. Similarly, their beverage license had been destroyed or disfigured during these burglaries which is why it was not displayed. Robert testified that after the inspection by Bates, he had found a box of business records which he had forgotten about which included some of the invoices in question. The Hearing Officer requested that the Petitioner's agents inspect these records and advise the Hearing Officer of the results of their inspection by affidavit which would be received as a late filed exhibit. Said affidavit is made a part of the record.
Recommendation Having found that the charges of falsifying the lease affidavit, the failure to keep records of sales of wine and malt beverages for a period of three (3) years, the failure of the applicant to show the alleged business interest of Robert Coney in his application were not proven, the Hearing Officer recommends these charges be dropped. Having found that the licensee failed to conspicuously display the beverage license, but having found some mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer recommends a minimal penalty of one week suspension or a civil penalty of $50. Having found the licensee in violation of Rule 7A-3.17, F.A.C., the Hearing Officer recommends that the licensee receive a light penalty of two weeks suspension or a civil penalty of $400. The suspensions are recommended to run consecutively. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida Barnett Pletz, Esquire 335 N. W. 54th Street Miami, Florida 33127 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF BEVERAGE DIVISION OF BEVERAGE, Petitioner, CASE NO. 75-1627 LICENSE NO. 23-951 EUGENE CONEY d/b/a 62nd STREET GROCERY, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Finding no record that Taxpayer had filed or paid intangible taxes for the years 1979 and 1980, on June 17, 1982, DOR notified Taxpayer they were reviewing Taxpayer's intangible personal property tax account for the years 1979 through 1982 (Exhibit 16). During the audit which followed Taxpayer presented copies of the 1981 and 1982 tax returns and cancelled checks evidencing payment. The audit disclosed small discrepancies in these returns and those discrepancies were satisfied by the Taxpayer and are not an issue in these proceedings. On December 15, 1982, Gateway Hospital sold its assets to Humana Corporation and in December 1983 the corporation was dissolved and a liquidating trust was established to settle accounts and distribute proceeds to the stockholders. After this date none of Taxpayer's employees were located at the Gateway Hospital address, 5115 - 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. One of Taxpayer's contentions on the timeliness issue is that all notices from DOR were sent to the 58th Street address and were either not received or not timely received by Taxpayer. No special notification to DOR of a change of address was submitted by Taxpayer. The 1983 intangible tax return showed Taxpayer's address as 5800 49th Street, Suite 201, St. Petersburg, Florida. However, in the petition for hearing dated March 21, 1985, Petitioner's address is shown as 5115 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida 33709. On April 2, 1984, DOR sent Taxpayer Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 6) for tax years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 in the amount of $19,786.36 with interest through February 23, 1984. This notice advised Taxpayer that this was final agency action and of its right to petition for an administrative hearing within 60 days or file an action in circuit court within 60 days, and that failure to so petition or file would render the proposed assessment final and no action could thereafter be brought to contest the assessment. This notice was sent certified mail and receipted for at the 58th Avenue North address. Alan Steinbach, the chief operating officer of the liquidating trust, testified he never received Exhibit 6. Subsequent to June 19, 1984, DOR sent Notice of Demand for Payment (Exhibit 7) to Taxpayer to the 58th Avenue North address. This document, the top part of which is identical to Exhibit 6 except interest has been computed to 6/19/84, was received by Steinbach. Steinbach contacted DOR and told Randy Miller, Executive Director, that this was the first notice of a delinquency he had received from DOR and needed additional time to show the taxes had been paid. Miller agreed to allow Taxpayer more time and communicated this to Steven J. Barger, Jr., Chief, Bureau of Audit Selection. By letter dated August 13, 1984 (Exhibit 8), Barger advised Steinbach that the collection procedure would be delayed 30 days to permit Taxpayer time to submit the information necessary to set aside the assessment. By letters dated September 11, 1984 (Exhibit 9) and October 17, 1984 (Exhibit 12), the collection procedures were further stayed until December 12, 1984. During this period Taxpayer presented evidence that the 1982 and 1983 intangible personal property taxes had been paid and all errors in those returns were corrected and the correct taxes paid. By Notice of Proposed Assessment dated 1/9/85 (Exhibit 14) an audit assessment for the tax years 1979-1983 was forwarded to Taxpayer showing the tax, penalties and interest for the tax years 1979 and 1980 through 1/3/85 in the amount of $12,296.30 were due and no taxes were due for the other years. The explanation of appeal rights attached to this audit assessment advised the Taxpayer had 60 days from the date of assessment to contest the assessment in an administrative proceeding or a judicial proceeding. On March 21, 1985, the instant petition was filed. During the period prior to January 9, 1985, Petitioner was unable to locate tax returns or cancelled checks showing payment for 1979 and 1980 although Taxpayer produced returns and cancelled checks for all of the other years from 1977 through 1983. DOR also located evidence showing intangible personal property taxes paid by Taxpayer before and after 1979 and 1980, but could find no record of returns being filed or taxes paid for the years 1979 and 1980. Upon receipt of a tax return and payment DOR photographs the return and payment check on microfilm, enters the data from the return in the computer, and forwards the tax return to the archives in the Department of State. An index for a tax year is compiled after the close of that tax year. Until this index is prepared, DOR cannot readily locate any tax return. As a result, whether or not a tax return was filed by a particular taxpayer cannot be ascertained by DOR until six to nine months after the close of the tax year. At the time Exhibit 7 was forwarded to Taxpayer, DOR could not have located the Taxpayer's 1983 return which, in fact, had been filed, as had the 1981 and 1982 returns. Taxpayer could not locate the returns or cancelled checks representing payment for the years 1979 and 1980. When asked why Taxpayer did not obtain bank records to establish payment, Steinbach responded that the corporation wrote 1000- 1500 checks per month and too many check would have to be screened. Since all payments by Taxpayer for the five years for which returns were produced were made in June, except for one year, 1983, which was paid in July, that does not appear to be an onerous task to avoid a tax liability of more than $12,000.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate broker's license on the grounds that the applicant pled nolo contendere to a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), was adjudicated guilty of the crime, and has not been rehabilitated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate brokers and sales persons in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent has licensed Petitioner as a real estate sales person since July 1, 1996. Petitioner has also been licensed in the state as a mortgage broker since September 1, 1993. On June 25, 2004, Petitioner applied for a license as a real estate broker. On December 1, 2004, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial. The Notice of Denial proposes to deny the license application on specific grounds. The Notice limits the grounds for denial to those included in the following statement: The Florida Real Estate Commission has determined that the Applicant has been adjudicated guilty of crimes relating to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate, and crimes of moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Specifically it has found that the applicant . . . has been convicted of or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere to: Contributing To The Delinquency of A Minor, 2001 During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that it does not seek denial of the application on the grounds that the alleged crimes relate to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or to fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Respondent relies solely on allegations that Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that the crime involved moral turpitude; and that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and has not been rehabilitated.1 It is undisputed that Petitioner pled nolo contendere in 2001 to a first-degree misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Florida, for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The factual allegations in the criminal proceeding were that Petitioner solicited a 13-year-old female (minor female) to pose topless or nude on August 2, 2001, when Petitioner was approximately 38 years old. It is undisputed that the minor female did not pose for Petitioner. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and withheld sentencing. Petitioner paid $353 in costs, served 75 hours of community service, and successfully completed probation of 12 months. The Notice of Denial does not allege that Petitioner actually committed the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Nor does the applicable statute require proof that Petitioner committed the acts alleged in the criminal proceeding as a prerequisite for denial in this proceeding.2 It is legally unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is guilty of the crime to which he pled nolo contendere. The entry of the plea, by itself, is a sufficient statutory ground for the proposed denial. The plea does not operate statutorily as conclusive evidence that Petitioner committed the crime to which he pled nolo contendere.3 No finding is made in this proceeding that Petitioner either did or did not solicit the minor female. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, and this Recommended Order refers to the solicitation as the adjudicated solicitation. The threshold factual issue in this proceeding is whether the adjudicated solicitation involved moral turpitude. If so, it must be determined whether there is a rational connection between the moral turpitude and Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. If the requisite connection exists, it must be determined whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated and is not a "danger to the public." The adjudicated solicitation involved an act of moral turpitude. Solicitation of a 13-year-old female to pose topless or nude was a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct acceptable in the community, violated the duties owed to society, and was an inherently base or depraved act.4 The base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation did not arise from a desire for monetary gain, as the motive typically is in other crimes, such as grand theft or the intent to sell controlled substances, that have been held to involve moral turpitude.5 Rather, the base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation arose from an attempt to coerce the involuntary compliance of a minor female by exploiting her vulnerability; exploiting a financial relationship over which Petitioner enjoyed financial control; and exploiting a quasi- familial relationship in which Petitioner was imbued with the advantage of an authority figure.6 A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would encourage delinquency and that disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from an appropriate standard of conduct. At age 13, the minor female was nowhere near the 18 years of age required for legal majority. That vulnerability was accentuated during the adjudicated solicitation by Petitioner's age of 38. The minor female was also financially dependent on Petitioner for income as the family babysitter. Petitioner enjoyed the advantage of financial control of that relationship and possessed the power to terminate the relationship. Petitioner also enjoyed the benefit of an authority figure in a quasi-familial relationship. The minor female is the daughter of the brother of Petitioner's wife. The minor female is not legally the niece of Petitioner because the brother never married the mother of the minor female. The minor female is also a long-time friend of Petitioner's daughter. There is no direct evidence of actual intent to exploit the vulnerability of the minor female and any existing relationship. However, Petitioner should have known that the minor female was in a position of vulnerability and that the adjudicated solicitation necessarily exploited her vulnerability and the advantages he enjoyed in their relationship. A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the solicitation would tend to cause or encourage delinquency. The risk was of such a nature and degree that Petitioner's adjudicated disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the appropriate standard of conduct.7 The moral turpitude evidenced by the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 is not rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to engage in the real estate business. Respondent admits that the adjudicated solicitation is not related to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate and does not involve fraudulent or dishonest dealing. It is undisputed that the adjudicated solicitation did not impugn Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. From July 1, 1996, through the date of hearing, Petitioner has functioned as a licensed real estate sales person with no harm to the public before or after the adjudicated solicitation. Petitioner disclosed the adjudicated solicitation to Respondent sometime after June 25, 2004. Respondent did not prevent Petitioner from engaging in the real estate business as a sales person. Respondent cited no evidence or authority to support a finding or conclusion that the misdemeanor disqualifies Petitioner from performing the functions of a real estate broker, but does not disqualify Petitioner from performing the duties and responsibilities of a real estate sales person. As a mortgage broker, Petitioner maintains trust accounts and transfers client deposits to third parties, including surveyors and credit reporting agencies. The absence of a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice real estate imbues the allegation of moral turpitude with the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the license application.8 The potential for selective enforcement should be avoided. The issue of whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated is moot in the absence of a rational connection between an act of moral turpitude and the fitness to engage in the real estate business. If it were determined that a rational connection existed between the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 and the fitness of Petitioner to engage in the real estate business, Petitioner has been rehabilitated.9 Petitioner paid the required court costs, served the community service, and completed his probation. Petitioner is a father of three children, has been married for more than 16 years, is a licensed real estate sales person, a licensed mortgage broker, and has not exhibited a pattern or practice of violations before or after the incident on August 2, 2001. Rather, the incident in 2001 stands alone as the only blemish on an otherwise flawless professional record as a real estate agent and a mortgage broker. The issuance of a broker's license to Petitioner does not frustrate legislative intent. The issuance of a license does not expose the public to a dishonest real estate broker that engages in fraudulent practices. The crime for which Petitioner was adjudicated guilty does not impugn the honesty of Petitioner or his ability to deal fairly with the public in the real estate business.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2005. 1/ Transcript at pages 44-45. 2/ The last sentence in Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), states that the court record of conviction is prima facie evidence of guilt. However, the statutory language preceding the last sentence does not expressly require proof of guilt as a prerequisite for denial. The last sentence appears to be a vestige from former statutory language that required a plea of nolo contendere to be treated as a conviction. The legislature deleted the former statutory language from the current statute, but, so far, has not deleted the remaining vestige of the former statute. The issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. If proof of guilt were a statutory prerequisite for denial, evidence Petitioner submitted to overcome the prima facie showing of guilt or to mitigate the prima facie showing of guilt is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The relevant evidence consists of Petitioner's own testimony and hearsay statements that the testimony attributes to the minor female, members of her family, and others. The hearsay did not supplement or explain competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). 3/ Cf. McNair v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(plea is not statutorily evaluated as conclusive evidence of the commission of wrongdoing but is, by itself, statutorily sufficient for disciplinary action). This issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 4/ Neither party cited an applicable statute or rule that defines moral turpitude. Judicial decisions generally hold that moral turpitude involves: . . . the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. (citations omitted) It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. . . . State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth et al., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 611 (Fla. 1933). 5/ Judicial decisions finding moral turpitude in the exploitation of others for monetary gain are discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 6/ Judicial decisions discussing exploitation of vulnerable persons in professional relationships are discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 7/ Culpable knowledge is an element in the judicial definition of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Shamrani, 370 So. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (Fla. 1979); Kito v. State, 888 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 8/ By analogy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a rational connection to an applicant's fitness to practice law must be applied to the requirement for good moral character or the requirement could become "a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-459 (Fla. 1978). 9/ Counsel for Respondent questioned Petitioner in an unsuccessful attempt to show that Petitioner currently lacks veracity and is therefore dishonest. Counsel stipulated that the grounds for denial do not include dishonesty or fraudulent practices. The attempt to show current dishonesty is relevant only to the issue of rehabilitation. See Transcript at pages 36-51. 10/ The agency action in McNair was mandatory but is discretionary in this proceeding. The substantially affected party in McNair pled nolo contendere to a felony while Petitioner entered a similar plea to a misdemeanor. However, those factual distinctions are not material to the absence in the applicable statute of the former statutory infirmity that spawned the requirement of proof of guilt in Ayala and Son. 11/ Unlike the facts in the instant case, the holding in some of the cited cases are arguably ambiguous in that the allegations recite all of the grounds in the applicable statute, and it is not clear in every case whether the decision is restricted to allegations of moral turpitude. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Guy Sanchez, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is entitled to documentary stamp tax in accordance with Section 201.02, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $326.10 and penalty in the like amount of $326.10 in accordance with Section 201.17, Florida Statutes, for a transaction between Petitioners in an assignment of interest of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., to the Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners were the stockholders of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. Among the assets of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., were the rights under a sublease undertaken between B.G.L. Corporation and Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. dated September 25, 1976 and recorded in Official Record Book 5663, at page 261 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. This sublease was an amendment to a sublease which was dated June 1, 1976, recorded in Official Record Book 4768, Page 176 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, between B.G.L. Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessor, and KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessee. One of the conditions of Gallagher's lease obligation was responsibility for the payment of a mortgage dated May 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 4592, at Page 161, of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, from KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation to Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky, as amended by agreement dated August 30, 1965 between KSJ Corporation and Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky. Pursuant to a plan of liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. that corporation executed and delivered to Petitioners an assignment of the lessee's interest in the aforementioned lease to which Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. was a party. The assignment of lease can be found as Exhibit A to the Petition filed by the Petitioners. The contents of such assignment are found to be fact. By letters of July 30, 1975 and March 10, 1975, the Respondent indicated its intention to assess tax in the amount of $326.10 upon the document representing the assignment between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners. The amount of documentary stamp tax was premised on the aforementioned mortgage which at the time of the proposed assessment was valued at $108,750. In addition the Respondent indicated its intention to impose a penalty in a like amount of $326.10. The assignment was in fact executed, pursuant to a plan of liquidation, which plan is shown as Petitioners' Exhibit C attached to the petition. The Petitioners' Exhibit C is established as fact. Petitioners in receiving the assignment in liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. received such assignment in proportion to their stock holdings in that corporation. The assessments of $326.10 for documentary stamp tax and $326.10 in penalty on such assessment, and the challenge to the assessments are the subject matter in this cause. Subsequent to the assignment of leases and agreement between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners a further assignment was made between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. of the same property which took place on December 16, 1974.
Recommendation It is recommended that the assessment of documentary stamp tax under 201.02 F.S. in the amount of $326.10 and the penalty in the amount of $326.10, as a penalty pursuant to 201.17 F.S. be set aside. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire Williams, Salomon, Kanner & Damian 1003 DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Caroline C. Mueller, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioners are responsible for the payment of tax, penalty and interest under the terms of the Respondent's Notice of Proposed Assessment of February 9, 1978, as revised June 12, 1978, which assessment was made pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Petition for Administrative Hearing filed in behalf of the Petitioners, Housing by Vogue, Inc., and Mobile Home Industries, Inc., against the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, as Respondent. The case was subsequently referred to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, for formal hearing in accordance with the terms of Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Mobile Home Industries, Inc., is a Florida corporation and Housing by Vogue, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former-named corporation. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is an agency of the State which has as its responsibility the investigation and enforcement of the tax laws of the State of Florida, to include Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The facts reveal that on October 2, 1974, the Petitioners submitted a bid to the State of Florida, State Board of Education, for the purpose of contracting to execute and complete construction of the project identified as, "Relocatable InstructIonal Space for the Department of Education, Tallahassee, Florida." A copy of that bid proposal is found as Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The specifications and drawings of that project may be found as Petitioners' Exhibit Number 1 admitted into evidence. In accordance with the instructions of the owner, the bid proposal stated a lump-sum bid price in the amount of $119,250.00 and, in addition, contained certain itemized costs. The Petitioners' bid was accepted and a contract was entered into between the Petitioners and the State of Florida, State Board of Education. A copy of that contract and other contract items may be found as the Petitioners' Composite Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The contract was modified by proposal of the project engineer, upon suggestion of the contractor. A copy of this statement of suggested changes may be found in the Petitioners' Exhibit Number 4 admitted into evidence. The suggested changes were allowed and certain change orders were entered as shown through the Petitioners Exhibit Number 5 admitted into evidence. The project went forward as contemplated and under the terms and conditions of the contract, modules were fabricated by the Petitioners in their plant at Lake City, Florida. These modules were subsequently transported from the plant at Lake City to a location at Woodville, Florida, which is located in Leon County, Florida. The method of transportation was by the process of towing, with the modules being moved on the highway by virtue of a series of wheels and axles attached to the module proper. Once the modules were placed in the location in Woodville, Florida, the wheels and axles were removed and the modules were "set up," utilizing two methods to accomplish this task. Some of the modules were put on traditional footings and foundations similar to those involved in the "set up" of mobile homes, in the sense that footings were prepared and the modules were placed on concrete blocks and tie-down straps were attached to the bottom cross beams and secured by hellical anchors. The second method for placing the modules was to utilize a large hellical anchor device in lieu of the concrete blocks and tie downs. The modules themselves had fixed floors with interchangeable wall panels to allow assembly and re-assembly in various configurations for the purpose of instructional classroom space. After the modules had been arranged in an initial configuration, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract the modules were disassembled and placed in a different configuration at the site location in Woodville, Florida. The realty upon which these modules were located was a school ground and plant owned by the Leon County School Board, Leon County, Florida. The ownership of the modules was in the State of Florida, State Board of Education. The testimony in the course of the hearing did not indicate in any way that the Leon County School Board either was a party to the contract between the Petitioners and the State of Florida, State Board of Education, nor in any sense was granted ownership of the subject modules. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, provides for the imposition of a four percent (4 percent) sales tax on the sale of articles of tangible personal property at retail within the State of Florida. The sale of the modules under the terms and conditions of the contract constituted a sale of tangible personal property by the Petitioners to the State of Florida, State Board of Education. Therefore, absent some specific exemption to the contrary, a sales tax was due. There does exist in law a partial exemption. This conclusion is reached after examination of the language of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, which states: "212.08 Sales, rental, storage, use tax; specified exemptions.--The sale at retail, the rental, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state of the following tangible personal property are hereby specifically exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter. (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, COMMUNICATIONS.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, the state, or any county, municipality or political sub- division of this state; provided this exemption shall not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959; . . ." Under the language of the introductory portion of Section 212.08, Florida Statutes, and the specific provisions of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, the sale which has been made to the State of Florida is exempt from tax implications, with the exception that the materials and supplies necessary for the fabrication of the modules, transportation of those modules and installation of the modules were tangible personal property which went into public works owned by the State of Florida, and as such were not exempt from taxation. (A public works is defined as "such works as are by statute authorized to be constructed for public purposes by the State or its agencies are generally regarded as public works." 26 Fla.Jur.section 2, citing to 43 Am. Jur., Public Works and Contracts section 2 as annotated at 92 ALR 835. From this definition, the modules which are used as instructional classroom space are considered to be public works within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes.) It is unclear what the specific costs were on the question of the increments of expense for materials and supplies incurred by the Petitioners in carrying out their contract; however, it would be necessary for the Respondent to impose a tax together with a penalty and interest premised upon calculations made after determining Petitioners' cost items. This opinion is held notwithstanding the stipulation on the part of the parties (at the beginning of the hearing) to the effect that $4,048.57 in tax was in dispute, together with interest of $794.32 effective June 12, 1978, and additional interest at 47 cents per day from June 13, 1978, plus a penalty. In summary, there would be due tax, a penalty of 25 percent (such penalty being subject to further reduction) and interest on the amount which is the aggregate of the cost of materials and supplies used in the fabrication, transportation and installation of the subject modules. See Subsections 212.12(2) and (3), Florida Statutes. One final item should be considered. The parties in the course of their presentation and argument relied on various interpretations to be given Rule l2A-1.5l Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for their contention of tax liability or no liability. That provision would not have application to the facts sub judice, because the rule only applies to "sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property". The installation of these modules which are the property of the State of Florida, State Board of Education, on realty which is owned by the Leon County School Board, of Leon County, Florida, does not constitute an action in which sales are made to or by contractors involved in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. While the modules as installed do constitute public works, they do not constitute repair, alteration, improvement or construction to real property. To consider this project to be one governed by Rule12A-1.5l, Florida Administrative Code, it would be necessary for the modules to be owned by the same entity which owns the property on which they are installed, as opposed to the facts in this case whereby ownership of the modules and real property are held by separate entities. In their present status, the modules are merely items of tangible personal property owned by the State of Florida, State Board of Education, which may be utilized at any location in accordance with the terms of their ownership.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioners, Housing by Vogue, Inc., and Mobile Home Industries, Inc., be required to pay tax, a penalty of 25 percent and interest for those items of materials and supplies incidental to the fabrication, transportation and installation of the modules which are the subject matter of the contract in this dispute. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Cooper, Esquire Douglass, Powell & Davey Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA HOUSING BY VOGUE, INC., and MOBILE HOME INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1637 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction contrary to Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Whether the Respondent is guilty of failure to account or deliver real estate brokerage books and records and other personal property in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a state agency charged by statute with the regulation of real estate salespersons and brokers. The Respondent, Robert Joseph Gumbrewicz, at all times relevant to this complaint, held real estate salesperson license number 0576053. On or about March 31, 1992, the Respondent bought Buy Owner Realty of Jacksonville, Inc. (Buy Owner) from James Weiss, a licensed real estate broker. Phyllis Sellers was employed by Respondent as the corporation's broker of record. Phyllis Sellers notified U.S. Title that she had become broker of record for Buy Owner. Buy Owner had incurred debts while owned by Weiss. A debt owed by Buy Owner to a copier company was not paid, and the company obtained a judgment against Buy Owner. The company then executed on its judgment and froze, on April 28, 1993, the operating account of Buy Owner, Account Number 5084900-134, at First Bank of Jacksonville. On April 27, 1993, the Respondent issued a check in the amount of $350 on Buy Owner's Account Number 5084900-134 at First Bank of Jacksonville to Phyllis Sellers as partial payment of a commission which she had already earned. Buy Owner had already earned its commission in this transaction and had already transferred its money from its trust account to its operating account. On April 27, 1993, Phyllis Sellers deposited the check from Respondent on Buy Owner's Account 5084900-134 into her bank account. On April 29, 1993, the check was presented to First Bank of Jacksonville for payment. This check was not paid because the account had been frozen pursuant to court order. There was no evidence presented that the Respondent knew, at the time he issued the check, that the account was going to be frozen. There were funds sufficient to pay the check in the account when it was issued. Immediately following receipt of the check, Sellers went on vacation. Upon her return, she found that the office of Buy Owner had been closed, and the records of the business were not present on the former business premises. Sellers attempted to contact the Respondent, but he would not return her calls. Hearsay evidence was received that the Respondent had removed the records of the office and was maintaining them in his garage at his home; however, there was no direct evidence of what happened to the records. The Respondent, in a response to admissions filed by Petitioner, denied taking the records.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order which dismisses the Administrative Comoplaint against the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801 Robert J. Gumbrewicz, Esquire 808 Elmwood Street Orange Park, FL 32073 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
