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L. J. CRAWFORD, D/B/A CRAWFORD MELON SALES vs. DANNY LEWIS YOUNG, D/B/A HUGH YOUNG PRODUCE, 83-000748 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000748 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 1983

The Issue The issues presented in this case concern claims made by the Petitioner related to the delivery of agricultural products, namely watermelons, to the Respondent, Young, which petitioner claims have not been paid for. The claim has been advanced pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. The disputed amount is $9,226.30. FINDINGS OF FACT 1/ Petitioner, who does business as Crawford Melon Sales, made an oral agreement with Respondent, Danny Lewis Young, who trades as Hugh Young Produce, to sell U.S. No. 1 watermelons for the price of .03 cents or .025 cents f.o.b. The total charge for the watermelons delivered and associated costs was $23,559.20, of which $14,332.90 has been paid, leaving a balance of $9,226.30. The watermelons were delivered in Florida to drivers who signed invoices of receipt at the time of shipment. The drivers were individuals dispatched by the Respondent Young or employed by the Petitioner. The exact dates of delivery are set forth in the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1. All shipments were sent to Tennessee. The trucks were very tightly packed at the request of Respondent Young. Time in transport varied depending on whether the drivers were union affiliated. The union drivers would not drive for the same length of time before stopping, as contrasted with the non-union drivers. Jessie Johnson, who was a driver in the delivery of two of the loads, found 75 to 100 bad melons in his initial load delivered to Nashville, Tennessee. In the second load, Johnson observed 65 to 70 melons that were damaged to include some broken melons. Some of that group of 65 to 70 melons had been damaged at a time when they were unloaded in Clarksville, Tennessee. The 65 to 70 damaged melons which Johnson testified about in the second load were returned to Nashville, Tennessee to be Inspected. Each of the loads which were transported by Jessie Johnson and his brother Leroy Johnson contained 1,500 to 1,800 melons in the truck bed. Randall Harper, who had been employed by the Respondent Young, established that in those loads of 50,000 to 60,000 pounds, which are in dispute, there would he a certain amount of watermelons that were bruised because of their placement on the bottom of the stack in the truck bed. The Johnson brothers and Harper were not present at times when the federal agricultural inspector in Nashville, Tennessee, examined the subject loads of watermelons. Michael W. Golightly, an employee with the United States Department of Agriculture, was the individual who inspected some watermelons at issue. He had considerable experience in inspecting watermelons prior to his examination of the loads delivered pursuant to the oral agreement between Petitioner and Respondent Young. In addition to work experience, Golightly had attended schools designed to promote his expertise in the examination of commodities, such as watermelons, to determine their marketability. Through his experience and training, Golightly is an expert in identifying the grade quality of watermelons and any associated problem reducing the quality of the commodity, watermelons. His background and training is identified in his deposition which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 and admitted into evidence. The grading of watermelons is pursuant to standards developed by the United States Department of Agriculture and is found in Exhibit 2 to the deposition. In inspecting a load of watermelons, a representative sample is examined of approximately 100 watermelons, going from the top of the load to the bottom. The Petitioner's watermelons, which were inspected by Golightly, were all inspected in Tennessee, as contrasted with the point of origin in Florida. As a consequence, the standards to be applied in that inspection were not as rigid. The loads in question were examined by Golightly after a request had been made by Young to conduct the inspection. That request was made at the time of receipt of the watermelons and any delay in inspection was occasioned by other duties to be fulfilled by Golightly or the fact of an intervening weekend between the time of receipt and the time of inspection. In view of these delays, as much as two to five days would pass between the time that the watermelons were loaded and the inspection was made. The results of the inspections may be found as part of the Respondents' Exhibit No. 1 as exhibits to the deposition and as part of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1. In examining the watermelons, anthracnose, anthracnose rot, stem end rot, sunburn, immature picks and bruising were found. With the exception of the 45,280 pound load of July 2, 1982, and the 76,060 pound load of July 11, 1982, by the deposition and attachments, which are Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, and the Respondents' Exhibit No. 1, which contains copies of inspections made by Golightly, it has been shown that the watermelons in dispute were subject to a rejection as U.S. No. 1 watermelons. The basis of the rejection pertains to the observation made by the inspector in which he found those categories of deficiencies related in this paragraph. Those deficiencies are completely described in the deposition and in the inspection reports. Pursuant to custom or practice in the watermelon business, Respondent Young was entitled to sell the substandard watermelons, found by the federal inspector, at the best price possible and to pay the Petitioner a reduced amount for the product. In fact, Respondent Young mitigated the circumstances by selling those questioned watermelons that could be sold and has paid the Petitioner money realized from those sales. In addition, he has paid the Petitioner the full amount on the 45,250 pounds of watermelons of July 2, 1982. He has only paid the Respondent .015 cents f.o.b. on the 76,060 pounds of watermelons of July 11, 1982. The agreed upon price was .03 cents f.o.b. for those watermelons of July 11, 1982, and there was no proof in the course of the hearing to the effect that those watermelons were substandard. Based upon the facts as presented, Respondent still owes the Petitioner an additional $1,140.90 for the 76,060 pounds of watermelons which were delivered on July 11, 1982. The petitioner also claims $350 as a payment advanced to a driver involved with the July 3, 1982, load of 51,270 pounds. Petitioner claims Young is responsible for the reimbursement of the $350 which Petitioner advanced to this driver. The document within Respondents' Composite Exhibit No. 1, which is a copy of the invoice or statement for the load shows the payment of that advance. None of the Respondents' proof by testimony or documentation indicates any reimbursement of the $350 and the $350 claim is found to be established. Another related claim pertains to the July 13, 1982, load of 46,440 pounds in which the allegation is made by the Petitioner that $428.80 in freight costs are due from the Respondent Young. This is a balance remaining from the $928.80 freight reflected in the invoice or statement of account of July 13, 1982, which is found in Composite Exhibit No. 1 by the Petitioner. The complaint allegation shows that $500 of the total $928.80 has been paid leaving the subject $428.80 at issue. The Petitioner has successfully established entitlement to $428.80 related to freight on that load and this proof has been unrefuted by the Respondent. Finally, Petitioner claims an additional sum of $859.20 for freight on the July 18, 1983, 42,960 pound load. The statement of account or invoice, which is part of Composite Exhibit No. 1 by the Petitioner, shows a freight claim in that amount, and is sufficient proof to demonstrate entitlement to that amount. The proof offered by the Respondent Young fails to refute this claim. When added to remaining money owed for watermelon sales per se, Respondent owes the Petitioner a total amount of $2,778.90 for watermelons and related cost of freight and incidentals. American Insurance Company is surety on a $20,000.00 bond for the benefit of the Respondent Danny Lewis Young d/b/a Hugh Young Produce. This arrangement represents the available funds to pay Petitioner's claims.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57559.20604.21
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F. D. (SONNY) CHESNUT vs JIM RASH, INC., AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, 92-006075 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake Wales, Florida Oct. 08, 1992 Number: 92-006075 Latest Update: May 07, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to payment in connection with the sale of watermelons in June, 1992.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner grows watermelons. He has only done business with Respondent Jim Rash, Inc. (Respondent) in 1991 and 1992. In both of those years, Petitioner was responsible for the hiring of the crews to pick the melons and load the trailers. Respondent obtained receivers who supplied the trailers and then drove them to the markets, which are typically up north. In 1991, Respondent paid for two of the seven loads at the weighing scales and the remainder a few days later. It is unclear whether the latter payment was made before the shipments were received by the wholesalers and retailers from the shippers or receivers. In 1991, as in 1992, the parties maintained no documentation indicating when Respondent became liable for payment to Petitioner. The parties agree that the subject sale was not a sale on consignment. The price of the watermelons was fixed. Petitioner testified that the sale was to Respondent and complete once the weighing was completed and the final price could be calculated. Petitioner might allow a few days to pass before payment, but this, according to Petitioner, was only a convenience to Respondent. Respondent's representative testified that the role of Respondent was to find receivers who shipped the melons to wholesale or retail markets. If the melons were rejected there, then Petitioner was not due payment for the rejected melons. Perhaps the major problem for the parties is that 1992, unlike 1991, was a poor year for watermelon sellers. Unfortunately, the parties did not document which of them was to bear the risk of loss due to poor market conditions, or even due to substandard watermelons in terms of size or quality. Although the loading was performed by persons hired by Petitioner, Jim Rash, who died in December, 1992, supervised the loading of the melons at Petitioner's farm. He could note size discrepancies relatively easily. Although Respondent's representative testified that his late brother accepted the melons under protest, this testimony is not credited. Without Petitioner's consent, Mr. Rash evidently decided to market the melons as a premium, relatively small variety known as Sangrias, which they are not. However, Petitioner admitted that he should not be paid for watermelons that are of substandard quality. He did so when he admitted that Respondent's claim on spoiled or overripe watermelons would be a different matter if he had had a USDA inspector certify that the melons were bad. Although Mr. Rash took some field samples, he could not have as readily determined the condition of the watermelons as he could have determined their size. Petitioner has proved that Respondent was liable for payment of all melons loaded on the trailers except for those that were of deficient quality. In this case, between June 22 and 28, 1992, Petitioner sold nine loads to Respondent under the above-described terms. The total due Petitioner was $18,802.20, of which Respondent paid all but $5175.80. The only load that was rejected due to the watermelons' condition, rather than size, was the one in which Petitioner was underpaid by $2240.80. The purchaser in Chicago rejected these watermelons on June 26, 1992--two days after Petitioner sold them--because they were overripe and bruised.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent owes Petitioner the sum of $2935. ENTERED on March 30, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Sonny Chesnut, pro se Route 1, Box 658 Bonifay, FL 32421 Earl M. Rash Post Office Box 1180 Dundee, FL 33838 Legal Department Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, MD 21203

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21604.34
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JOE TOWNSEND vs. GREAT LAKES PRODUCE OF FLORIDA, INC., 77-001827 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001827 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1978

The Issue The dispute here involves the alleged non-payment for watermelons that the Petitioner claims to have sold to the Respondent.

Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Joe Townsend, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that one load of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, was sold directly to Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. as set forth below: July 9, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,430 lbs. at .02, totaling $948.60 An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The Respondent has not paid the $948.60 which it greed to pay to the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner.

Recommendation It is Recommended that the Respondent be required to pay, the Petitioner 4 for the watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Townsend Post Office Box 1505 Live Oak, Florida Roger Serzen c/o Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 11931 Tampa, Florida 33680 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

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PAULINE ALLEN vs SUNSHINE FRUIT COMPANY, INC., AND MERITOR SAVINGS, F.A., 93-006173 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Oct. 26, 1993 Number: 93-006173 Latest Update: May 17, 1994

The Issue The issues presented here concern the attempt by Petitioner to recover $2,367.30 as payment for watermelons sold to Sunshine Fruit Company, Inc. See Sections 604.15 - 604.30, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact In July, 1993, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in Florida. That product was watermelons. At that time Sunshine Fruit Company was a dealer in agricultural products grown in Florida. Bill Hamilton also produced watermelons in Florida in July, 1993. His field had a common boundary with Petitioner's field. The watermelons taken from Petitioner's field in July, 1993 adjacent to the Hamilton field are at issue here. Bill Hamilton had done business with Sunshine Fruit Company in 1993 but was unable to meet the July demand which Sunshine Fruit Company had for watermelons. Hamilton had conducted his business with Allen Reiter as representative for Sunshine Fruit Company. To assist Reiter in obtaining additional watermelons in July that Hamilton could not supply, Hamilton referred Reiter to the Petitioner. An agreement was made to sell Petitioner's watermelons. The agreement was one in which Phillip Allen, Petitioner's son, served as her representative in the negotiations. In this arrangement the son was entitled to fifty percent of any profits and Petitioner the remaining 50 percent. The deal Petitioner made was to provide one load of medium melons and one load of large melons to Sunshine Fruit Company. Allen Reiter sent trucks to pick up the melons from Petitioner's field. After referring the Petitioner's business to Sunshine Fruit Company, Bill Hamilton observed Allen Reiter cut watermelons that were being delivered to Sunshine Fruit Company to examine the condition of the watermelons. Those watermelons that were being examined were located on a field truck. The field truck was a truck different from the truck that was to be used in transporting the watermelons to market. Hamilton also observed Reiter examining watermelons that were being loaded onto the transport truck. Hamilton had not experienced significant problems with hollow heart or bruising in the watermelons that he had harvested in the field adjacent to that belonging to the Petitioner in the year 1993. An approach which Hamilton and Petitioner had employed to avoid crop damage to the watermelons was to avoid loading watermelons that had become wet when it rained. Both producers, that is to say Hamilton and the Petitioner, had experienced an occasional slow down in harvesting in July, 1993, because of rain. Rain delayed the harvesting and loading of the Petitioner's watermelons provided to Sunshine Fruit Company. When the rain shut down the harvesting operation, some of the watermelons had already been picked. Harvested watermelons were put on the field truck before the rain commenced and were covered up with plastic to keep the rain from damaging the watermelons. The watermelons that had been picked that morning and placed on the field truck were left on the field truck while it rained hard that afternoon. The load that is being described was finished with watermelons picked the following day. Charles Gardner who worked for Petitioner in the harvesting operation also saw Allen Reiter cut watermelons that were on the field truck on the first day, the day it rained in the afternoon. Gardner also saw Reiter examine melons on the field truck on the second day. Phillip Allen and others loaded the two trucks provided by Sunshine Fruit Company and he supervised that operation. The second load of watermelons was placed on a truck that Phillip Allen and Charles Gardner understood to be Allen Reiter's "personal truck." An individual whose name was not identified at the hearing, whom Gardner and Phillip Allen understood to be "Reiter's personal driver", based upon an introduction made by Allen Reiter, interfered with the attempts by Phillip Allen to discard watermelons of questionable quality that were being loaded onto the transport truck. Phillip Allen told the driver that the questionable watermelons were bad, and the driver said "they are all right". When Phillip Allen would attempt to discard watermelons, this unidentified individual would return the questionable watermelons into the group of watermelons being transported, accompanied by a remark to the effect, "don't worry about it." This arrangement was contrary to the more typical arrangement in which the producer would discard what it referred to as the "culls." This caused a considerable number of watermelons to be kept for transport that should have been discarded. In the past the "culls" had been broken in the field or sold as pig feed. Phillip Allen tried to contact Allen Reiter by telephone after experiencing problems in which the driver insisted that substandard watermelons be packed. Phillip Allen was unable to reach Allen Reiter. Being unsuccessful in this attempt at contact, Phillip Allen deferred to the driver's choice to leave bad watermelons in the load for transport to market. However, Phillip Allen, not the driver, was in charge of the loading of the truck upon which substandard watermelons were being placed. Therefore, to the extent that the substandard watermelons diminished the value of the load, Petitioner must suffer the consequences. Nothing in the record leads to the conclusion that the driver had the authority to act as agent for Sunshine Fruit Company in determining what watermelons were of sufficient quality to be shipped. The driver mentioned in the previous paragraph stated in the presence of Charles Gardner that he was going home for the weekend and would deliver the watermelons on Monday. This comment was made on the prior Friday. The driver stated in the presence of Phillip Allen that he was going home because of brake problems and was going to wait to deliver the melons until Monday. Larry Thompson was the buyer and field supervisor for Sunshine Fruit Company in the transaction with Petitioner. Because it had been raining for several days, the decision to purchase the watermelons was through an arrangement in which the price would be determined at the time of receipt at the ultimate destination for the produce. There was no written agreement between the parties. Larry Thompson went to the field on the day after it had rained. While at the field on the second day Thompson observed the load of large watermelons. Charles Gardner told Larry Thompson that the large watermelons were popping. Larry Thompson told Allen Reiter that Reiter needed to check the large watermelons. Larry Thompson observed watermelons that were split. The watermelons were further observed by cutting the melons to examine them. During these events Thompson told Reiter that Thompson was glad that Sunshine Fruit Company was "riding" the watermelons, meaning waiting to determine the price until delivery at the ultimate destination. Otherwise Sunshine Fruit Company would not have bought the watermelons that were in the questionable condition as Thompson observed them on the second day. Some of these substandard watermelons were observed by Phillip Allen when loading the trailer and in conversation with the unnamed driver. As expected, this load of watermelons was in poor condition at the place and time that it was delivered. This was confirmed by an inspection that was performed at the place of ultimate delivery. Phillip Allen was made aware of the problem with that load. Phillip Allen told Larry Thompson that he, Phillip Allen, was going to have to contact the Inspector and asked that Thompson provide Allen with a copy of the inspection report. Thompson mailed Allen a copy of the inspection report. Thompson told Allen that some arrangement would have to be made to gain the best financial outcome with the questionable load of watermelons that could be achieved or that the watermelons would have to be dumped. It was resolved between Thompson and Allen that an individual in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, would be responsible for making some disposition with the questionable load of watermelons and this was accomplished by that individual in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It is unclear who would pay for freight. Concerning the freight costs, Petitioner made no claim at hearing that the freight costs should be borne by Sunshine Fruit Company, and Petitioner and Sunshine Fruit Company failed to prove the amount of freight costs that had been incurred. However, based upon testimony by Dale Swain, a dealer in agricultural products in the region, it is inferred that the custom and practice employed in selling watermelons in 1993, to include watermelons sold by Petitioner to Sunshine Fruit Company, called for the deduction of freight expenses from the price paid for the watermelons. Watermelons Swain purchased from Petitioner in July 1993 were of acceptable quality. It was established that the cost of harvesting the subject watermelons would be borne by the producer, Pauline Allen. Phillip Allen established that the price per pound for both medium and large watermelons was 3.5 . It is undisputed that the load amounting to 41,180 pounds at 3.5 per pound was worth $1,441.30. Nor is there any contention concerning the fact that Sunshine Fruit Company has paid $740 to the Petitioner for the watermelons in question. At hearing, Petitioner asserted that the second load, the load with problems, weighed at the scales in Florida before the transport in the amount 47,600 pounds. At 3.5 per pound the claimed value was $1,666.00. The at-scale value was not the agreed upon arrangement. The actual amount which was paid for the problem second load as delivered was not established at the hearing, but it can be inferred that the amount is less than $1,666.00 based upon facts that were presented at hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Final Order be entered which dismisses the complaint calling for the payment of additional monies in the amount of $2,367.30. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-6173A The following discussion is given concerning the Respondent Sunshine Fruit Company's findings of fact: Unnumbered Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that it is not clear in the record whether both loads are to be paid for within two weeks of passing inspection. Unnumbered Paragraphs 2 and 3 are not supported by the record. Unnumbered Paragraph 4 constitutes legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Allen 695 North Maylen Lacanto, FL 34461 Allen Reiter 3535 Recker Highway Winter Haven, FL 33880 Richard E. Straughn, Esquire Post Office Box 2295 Winter Haven, FL 33883-2295 Meritor Savings, F.A. Post Office Box 193 Winter Haven, FL 33882 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Bureau of Licensure and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (4) 120.57604.15604.21604.30
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CURTIS SANDERS vs. GREAT LAKES PRODUCE OF FLORIDA, INC., 77-001825 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001825 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1978

The Issue The dispute here involves the alleged non-payment for watermelons that the Petitioner claims to have sold to the Respondent.

Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, with establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Curtis Sanders, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that two loads of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, were sold directly to Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. as set forth below: July 6, 1977, Jubilee Watermelons, 27,440 lbs., at .02 totaling $548.80 July 6, 1977, Jubilee Watermelons, 50,980 lbs., at .02 totaling $1,019.80 Total for all loads $1,568.40 An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The Respondent has paid $1,176.30, leaving a balance of $392.10. The Respondent has not paid the $392.10 which it agreed to pay to' the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioner $392.10 for the watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis Sanders 630 Colonial Street Live Oak, Florida Roger Serzen c/o Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 11931 Tampa, Florida 33680

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ALPHONSO HUNT vs DENNIS THARP, D/B/A SWEET AND FANCY MELONS, AND AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 96-004279 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Sep. 09, 1996 Number: 96-004279 Latest Update: May 19, 1997

The Issue Whether the Respondent owes the Petitioner money for watermelons allegedly purchased from Petitioner. The factual and legal issue is whether Respondent purchased the melons or acted as a broker/agent for Petitioner and attempted to sell the melons for Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact During the 1996 season, the Petitioner, who is a labor contractor and farmer, grew watermelons. The Respondent, who is a building contractor and watermelon broker, was “handling” watermelons in the area around Archer, Florida. The Respondent was represented by Tony Tharp, brother of the Respondent, who spoke with the Petitioner. As a result of an oral agreement reached between Tony Tharp and Petitioner, the watermelons which Petitioner had grown were picked by persons working for Tharp on June 20, 21, and 23, 1996. There was no written contract or memorandum regarding the agreement of the parties. Petitioner stated that he wanted to get his melons picked, but that he was busy with his crew and could not pick them, and the melons needed to be picked because they were past their prime. Tony Tharp agreed to “move them” for Petitioner. One truck load was picked and loaded on June 20; three truck loads were picked and loaded on June 21, and two truck loads were picked and loaded on June 23. Tharp paid Petitioner $700 which was termed an “advance” by Respondent, and considered a “down payment” by Petitioner, who understood he would receive the remainder of the money due him in approximately seven days. The trucking was arranged for by Tharp, and the Respondent bore the cost of picking and freight initially, and the merchants who received the melons paid the shipping for the melons they accepted. The melons were shipped to markets in several states. The first load was refused by the intended recipient, and after several attempts to dispose of the melons, they were sold at salvage for $180. The second load was also refused, and could not be salvaged. Pictures of this load were introduced where it was unloaded in Marianna, Florida. The remaining loads of watermelons were accepted, and $4,876.43 received for them. The costs of loading the two loads which were refused was $1,149.75. The freight costs on these two loads was $3,901.83. The Petitioner testified that the Tharp agreed to purchase the melons in the field, and, therefore, he is entitled to the purchase price for the melons. Dennis Tharp stated he was a broker, and that the Petitioner assumed the risk if the melons could not be sold. Dennis Tharp stated that he had lost the costs of picking, $1,149.75, and transporting, $3,901.83, the two loads of melons offset by the salvage value of $180.00, resulted in a total loss of $4,871.58. When the costs of picking the last four loads, $1,591.20, and the $700.00 advance on the sale is deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the last four loads, $4,876.43, the net profit on the last four loads is $2,585.23. When the profits from the sale of the last four loads is deducted from the loses on the first two loads, there is a net loss of $2,286.35. This net loss was absorbed by the Respondent. Several of the people who were in the field testified regarding the state of the melons being picked. The melons were past their prime for picking. On the last load, the pickers refused to pick any more melons without additional compensation because so many melons were being rejected at the truck. Petitioner, who was present, concurred in this extraordinary expense. Generally, melons are not sold because the market drops and the merchants refuse melons being shipped to them. In this case, the first melons were rejected, and the last loads were accepted. The quality of a watermelon cannot be determined without cutting it open which destroys its merchantability. Watermelon graders attempt to judge the quality of melons from the external characteristics; however, purchasers cut open samples upon receipt to judge their quality. The Respondent notified the Petitioner by letter dated July 11, 1996 that the first two loads had been rejected; that he had salvaged those he could; and that the costs related to these two loads exceeded the profits due Petitioner on the last four loads.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order finding that the Respondent owes no further money to the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Alphonso Hunt 226 Fawn Drive Archer, Florida 32618 Dennis Tharp 4516 Decatur Street Marianna, Florida 32446 Auto Owners Insurance Company Legal Department Post Office Box 30660 Lansing, MI 48909-8160 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (9) 120.57585.23591.20672.201672.314672.316672.602672.717876.43
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DEWEY BREWTON, JR., AND DEWEY BREWTON, III vs JAMES R. SMITH AND D. RANDALL SMITH, D/B/A MIDWEST MARKETING COMPANY AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-005682 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Sep. 18, 1992 Number: 92-005682 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1993

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondents Smith are broker-shippers of watermelons and qualify as "dealers" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company is surety for Respondents Smith. Petitioners Brewton and Respondents Smith have had a good business relationship overall, including the 1992 growing season during which several loads of high quality watermelons were sold by the Brewtons through the Smiths. Of the several loads of melons sold, only one load, the one invoiced on June 18, 1992, is at issue. Regardless of oral agreements with varying conditions for other loads, the parties agreed as of June 18, 1992 that the load of June 18, 1992, invoice 2088, (R-5), would be paid for by Respondents Smith advancing harvest costs and agreeing to pay Petitioners for the load, minus the costs of harvesting, after Respondents had received payment from the recipient. At the time of loading, everyone concerned felt the June 18, 1992 load might have some problems with it, but every attempt was made to load only quality product. Petitioners and Respondents each had input on which specific melons were loaded. At that time, Mr. Rick Smith o/b/o Respondents Smith advised Mr. Dewey Brewton, III that because the quality of the load was borderline and as a result of its borderline condition the whole load could be rejected at its ultimate destination, Respondents Smith wanted Petitioners Brewton to protect the Respondents Smith on the quality of the melons. He also specifically advised Dewey Brewton, III that the whole load could be rejected. The parties then entered into an agreement, partly oral and partly written. Rick Smith and Dewey Brewton, III understood their agreement to mean that Petitioners would absorb any loss as a result of the quality of the watermelons from that point forward, but that Respondents would not come back against Petitioners for the costs Respondents had advanced on Petitioners' behalf or for the cost of the freight. To signify this, the words "grower protects shipper on quality" was written on the invoice. On or about June 22, 1992, Rick Smith informed Dewey Brewton, III that the entire June 18, 1992 load had been rejected by the first receiver. At that time, Dewey Brewton, III accepted Rick Smith's representation and did not require further proof of rejection at the first point of delivery or request an independent inspection at the first point of delivery. He also acquiesced in Respondents shopping around for a second buyer who might take all or some of the load originally sent out on June 18, 1992, and did not request the return of Petitioners' watermelons. At that time, Rick Smith also told Dewey Brewton, III that the load might have to be held on the truck a day or two to ripen some of the watermelons for a second point of delivery. He again indicated that the whole load could be rejected again when the load was sent on to a second receiver. Dewey Brewton, III specifically agreed to let the melons ripen "a day or so," and did not request any change in the grower protection plan initially agreed to between the parties. Respondents Smith were eventually able to market the melons to a second delivery point (consignee) in Michigan. That receiver complained that the melons started breaking down and he had to dump 735 melons. Pursuant to standard custom of the trade, Respondents accepted payment of $1,944.00 for the melons, subtracted $1,831.98 they had laid out in freight costs and also subtracted the $675.18 they had advanced on behalf of Petitioners to the harvester. Thus, Respondents sustained a net loss of $563.16. Respondents absorbed the $563.16 loss and did not require any repayment of harvesting costs advanced or any freight charges from Petitioners. Dewey Brewton, III testified that he originally understood that "grower protection" meant that Petitioners "would stand behind their quality product until the ultimate point," but that he had interpreted a comment by Mr. Rick Smith on June 22, 1992 to the effect that "the grower (Petitioners) agreed to 'ride' the watermelons and the shipper (Respondent) agreed to 'ride' the freight" to mean that the growers (Petitioners) no longer had any duty to cover their own losses on the June 18, 1992 load of watermelons after the first rejection and up to final sale to the second buyer. In light of Mr. Brewton's failure to change the written language concerning protection on the invoice, his knowledge from the day of initial shipment that the June 18, 1992 load was of dubious quality, his acceptance that the first recipient had rejected the load, and his agreement that Respondents could have a further waiting/ripening/shopping around period before ultimate sale, coupled with his knowledge from the very beginning that the June 18, 1992 load could be utterly rejected at any point so as to render the endeavor a complete loss to the Petitioners, Mr. Brewton's assumption that on June 22, 1992, Respondents Smith were voluntarily waiving their written agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not reasonable. On June 22, 1992, the load had already been rejected once. At that stage, the outcome of the proposed sale was considerably more precarious than when the crop was loaded on June 18, 1992. It is also found Mr. Brewton's assumption that the agreement had been modified was not knowingly or intentionally induced by the Respondents and that the assumption was not contemporaneously conveyed to Respondents Smith so that they could disabuse Mr. Brewton of his error. Upon the foregoing, it is further found that the written initial agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not altered on June 22, 1992 but continued in force.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Jacquelyn J. Brewton 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Dewey Brewton III 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Richard L. Smith Midwest Marketing Company P. O. Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lade Street Columbia, SC 29201-0000

Florida Laws (2) 120.57604.15
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JAMES M. O`DELL, JR., AND RONALD LEWIS vs. RONALD JUSTICE, 77-001874 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001874 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1978

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Ronald Justice, is indebted to the complainants, James M. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis, d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms.

Findings Of Fact This cause is being considered pursuant to Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes procedure for settlement of controversies between Florida produce farmers and dealers involved with farmers' products. James M. O'Dell, Jr. and Ronald Lewis filed a complaint against Ronald Justice contending that the Respondent had not paid for two loads of watermelons as follows: May 27, 1977, invoice number 387664, 46,640 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,865.60 May 29, 1977, invoice number 387670, 43,910 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,756.40 The Petitioners contend, "Mr. Justice placed this order over the telephone, at which time the price had been agreed upon. He sent his own truck and his own driver to pick up these watermelons. The trucks were loaded according to his instructions while his own drivers were present and observed the loading. We had sold watermelons from this same field prior to these and the same day as well as after these dates and there had been no problem with quality. These watermelons were produced here by us at Oxford, Florida. We had expected payment within a few days after arrival, when he was expected to wire money to our bank. Thus far he has not sent this money which is for the above load while previous loads have been paid for." Respondent contends "As the Respondent in this case I wish to state again that I cannot ignore the first load of melons involved, (which I readily paid for sight unseen) as settled even though O'Dell and Lewis wish to ignore it as they had no grievance in the first load transaction. As my own personal affidavit states and as the affidavit of the driver John Braziel, supports; the first load was the greenest of the three loads which it naturally would be as it was clipped from the vine before the next two loads, also it was the inspection of the first load and the second load that made me feel justified that I had paid O'Dell and Lewis an appropriate sum of money until I was more certain how I could come out financially in the freight, sorting and handling of their melons, also please bear in mind that I suffered a business reputation damage that I am now willing to forego in an effort to settle this matter." The Petitioners sold the Respondent three loads of watermelons. Respondent's drivers loaded the watermelons on or near the farm of Petitioners. The first load was paid for and is not a part of the complaint of the Petitioners. The second and third loads ordered by the Respondent and filled by the Petitioners are the points of controversy. The watermelons were delivered to the Respondent in Mississippi where he had sold them to various stores. He stated that of the first load which he bought from the Petitioners that he could use but 50 percent inasmuch as the watermelons were unripe. He states that of the second load 30 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used and that of the third load 25 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used. He states that he was compelled to dump the part of the watermelons that could not be used and so dumped them. He contends that his loss on the first load was $1,640.34; that his loss on the second load was $356.80; and that his loss on the third load was $298.58 for a total loss on the three loads from the Petitioners of $2,295.72 actual money out of pocket. Mr. Justice states that he intended to cancel the third load inasmuch as a large percentage of the first two loads were unripe, but that it was his understanding by a telephone call to the Petitioner Ronald Lewis that Lewis had the intention of standing behind his loss and that therefore he did not cancel the order for the third load. The Petitioners claim that the watermelons were loaded into trucks sent there by the Respondent with his drivers, each of whom inspected the watermelons at the time of loading. They contend that no more than 1 percent of the watermelons loaded were unripe. They also contend that had the Respondent employed a certified inspector to inspect the watermelons at the point of delivery and the inspector had stated that the watermelons were unripe that they would have accepted the inspector's report, but that no inspection was made. Affidavits from the truck drivers who were not growers or inspectors were submitted. Each stated that a large percentage of the watermelons were not ripe.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioners $3,622.00 for the watermelons purchased from the Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ronald Justice 500 South Main Street Dermott, Arkansas 71638 James A. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms Post Office Box 268 Oxford, Florida

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TERRY MCCULLY vs GROWERS MARKETING SERVICES, INC., AND PREFERRED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 99-004162 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jasper, Florida Oct. 04, 1999 Number: 99-004162 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 2000

The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to $7,433.00, or any part thereof, from Respondent on the basis of a brokered sale of watermelons?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner Terry McCully was a first-year independent grower of Sangria watermelons in Jasper, Florida. Respondent is a professional broker of produce. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Nolan Mancil, known to Petitioner as a watermelon buyer from Georgia representing Respondent, "walked" Petitioner's sole field. On June 13, 1999, Petitioner and Mr. Mancil agreed that Respondent would pay 10¢ per pound for watermelons from Petitioner's sole field of watermelons. However, Petitioner also understood that ultimately, his payment would be based on whatever the "market price" was, per load. Petitioner had no prior experience with how "market price" is defined or determined. At all times material, Nolan Mancil was acting as an agent of Respondent, and regardless of the extent of the authority actually authorized by Respondent, Mr. Mancil had, with Respondent's concurrence, apparent authority for all agreements reached with Petitioner. According to Respondent's President, Mr. Ward, the standard in the industry is that no value is placed on an agricultural commodity until a final price is determined with the ultimate consumer/retailer. Respondent produced business records tracking each of the six loads harvested from Petitioner's field (including the four loads in dispute) and showing the accepted weights for each load. According to Mr. Mancil, "market price" is "zero," unless some amount is paid by the retailer to the broker on delivery and the amount paid on delivery constitutes "the market price." He denied ever telling Petitioner that their oral contract would use the United States Department of Agriculture National Watermelon Report (USDA Report) to specifically set a daily market price, although he admitted that at a later point in time, under changed conditions (see Finding of Fact No. 19) he had told Petitioner that the USDA Daily Report could be the maximum price. Petitioner conceded that he received the USDA Report from the Department of Agriculture Extension Agent only after a dispute arose and Petitioner had begun to prepare his claim. The undersigned infers therefrom that Petitioner was only aware of this methodology of setting a market price "after the fact." On Monday, June 14, 1999, Nolan Mancil's harvesters and graders entered Petitioner's field. Petitioner agreed to pay for the harvesting by Respondent's deduction of harvesting costs from each load after sale to the ultimate buyer, but at this point Petitioner also expected Respondent to pay him by the load, each load, immediately after sale at the ultimate point of sale (FOB). On Tuesday, June 15, 1999, trucks hired by Mr. Mancil and/or Respondent began removing watermelons from Petitioner's field. On that day, Mr. Mancil indicated that the watermelons being loaded were worth only 8-1/2¢ per pound. Petitioner agreed to the change in the amount to be paid. At some point, Petitioner accommodated Mr. Mancil by getting a truck, driver, and loaders, and by feeding Mr. Mancil's crew members. Petitioner seeks no reimbursement for these accommodations. Respondent took two truckloads away on June 15, 1999. Load #3664 of 46,340 pounds "shipped weight" and 45,830 pounds "accepted weight" were brokered by Respondent to a retailer at 8¢ per pound. Load #3692 of 48,060 shipped weight and 43,392 pounds accepted weight were brokered to a retailer at 9¢ per pound. Respondent's business records show that on the first (undisputed) load, the sale to a retailer was contracted by Respondent at 8¢ per pound, but when the time came to settle- up, the payment was made by Respondent's retail customer at the small melon size (13-plus pounds), not at the medium or large melon size. Respondent's business records further show that the second (undisputed) load was contracted at 9¢ per pound but was ultimately paid-out at the average weight per melon of 15.4 pounds instead of at 19.2 pounds per melon, after an initial rejection by the first buyer. No brokerage fee was imposed by Respondent on either of these undisputed loads, and on each of these loads, Respondent suffered a substantial loss. These losses were not passed on to Petitioner due to their "immediate cash payment" arrangement. Respondent immediately paid Petitioner for both loads at the agreed rate of 8-1/2¢ per pound, less harvesting costs and mandatory government fee. Petitioner does not dispute deduction of the government fee from the first two loads. Indeed, Petitioner's claim does not address the amount, method, or appropriateness of Respondent's payment to Petitioner for these first two loads. Petitioner's claim only addresses the last four loads harvested after June 15, 1999. After the first two loads, Mr. Mancil informed Petitioner that Respondent could no longer pay Petitioner in cash immediately after each load, but would henceforth pay Petitioner within 30 days. There is no dispute that Petitioner reluctantly agreed to this change in the timing of payment. Mr. Mancil claimed that he told Petitioner, either beginning with the third load or sometime between the third and fourth loads, that the USDA Report's daily price would be the highest price Petitioner could be paid by Respondent. According to Mr. Ward, over the four loads in dispute, the price received by Respondent from retailers was 7¢ per pound adjusted downward due to market conditions such as watermelon size being less than expected, smaller watermelons being in less demand, and the watermelons being in poor condition when accepted by the retailer(s). According to Mr. Ward, the net weight of a load is determined by deducting the truck's empty weight from the loaded weight of the truck; then the melons in the truck are counted, and that count is divided into the net weight, to get the average weight per melon. Petitioner maintained that he was never advised by Mr. Ward or Mr. Mancil that the watermelons in the last four loads were the wrong size or that many melons were not good. Mr. Mancil stated that he believed he had indicated to Petitioner that the watermelons in the last four truckloads were actually smaller than the size anticipated when the deal was struck on June 13, 1999, and that the watermelons were of poorer quality. He conceded that he was not sure Petitioner had understood him. There is no dispute that Petitioner's field was rather overgrown or that watermelons could be harvested despite this overgrowth. The overgrowth could have obscured the size and condition of the watermelons until after harvest. After the sixth load, neither Respondent nor Mr. Mancil sent any more trucks. There was never an agreement that Respondent would buy all the watermelons in Petitioner's field. Petitioner found it necessary to obtain trucks himself to haul away and dump the remaining watermelons which were rotting in his field. He seeks no reimbursement for this expense. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I also find that the watermelons in the last four loads were smaller and inferior in quality to what had been expected. On June 16, 1999, 42,140 pounds shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3691. Petitioner is claiming 7¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report on every pound for $2,879.00, less harvesting costs of $781.00 for $2,098.00. On June 17, 1999, 43,500 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3685. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,610.00, less harvesting costs of $826.00 for $1,784.00. The same day, 43,620 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3694. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound for $2,617.20, less harvesting costs of $830.00 for $1,787.20. Either on June 20, 21, or 22, 1999 (the dates on exhibits conflict), 43,000 shipped weight of watermelons were loaded by Respondent from Petitioner's field in Load #3702. Petitioner is claiming 6¢ per pound on the basis of a USDA Report for every pound less harvesting costs of $817.00 for $1,763.00. Petitioner bases the price per pound that he is claiming on his Exhibit P-6, the USDA Reports for June 17-18, and 21, 1999. He did not select from those reports the price per largest average weight of Sangria watermelon, but selected the middle or lowest average weight of "other red meat varieties." Except for June 21, 1999, this calculation gives Respondent the benefit of the doubt as to cents per pound for average market price on the respective USDA Reports, but in light of all the other evidence it is not an accurate method of calculating the true market price for the four disputed loads. Although Petitioner considers payment on the first two (undisputed) loads based on accepted weight to be within the parties' agreement and correct, he has not made his calculations of claim on the accepted weight of any of the last four (disputed) loads. Petitioner's calculations of claim also have not addressed the mandatory government fee for any of the last four (disputed) loads, although he considers payment on the first two, (undisputed) loads, for which Respondent deducted the mandatory fee, to be within the parties' agreement and correct. According to Respondent's business records for the four loads shipped after the Mancil-Petitioner re-negotiations of price per pound and discussion on maximum market pricing, these disputed loads were sold to retailers as follows: On June 16, 1999, Load #3691 had a shipped weight of 41,140 pounds and accepted weight of 39,940 pounds. The sale price was $0.055 per pound. The sale amount was $2,196.70. The government fee was $7.99. The harvesting cost was $781.00. A brokerage fee of $399.40 was subtracted, and Respondent's debt to Petitioner was calculated as $1,008.31. On June 17, 1999, Load #3685 had a shipped weight of 43,500 pounds and an accepted weight of 43,280 pounds. The watermelons were originally contracted for retail sale at $.0635 per pound but were refused by the first retailer as undersized. The second, alternative retailer bought these watermelons at a smaller-size market price for melons averaging 18 pounds, instead of 19.5- pound melons, and also made some returns of bad watermelons, so that the sale amount ended-up as $973.80, less a $8.66 government fee, less $826.00 for harvesting, less $216.40 brokerage fee, so that even Petitioner lost $77.26 on the deal. Also on June 17, 1999, Load #3694 had a shipped weight of 43,620 pounds and an accepted weight of 42,848 pounds. The contract sale had been for watermelons averaging 19.3 pounds, and the average size turned to out to be 16.7 pounds, and some of these melons were returned. The ultimate sale amount was $1,692.50, less a government fee of $8.72, less harvesting costs of $830.00, less brokerage fee of $321.36, with Respondent owing Petitioner $532.42. Finally, on or about June 22, 1999, the final load, #3702, had a shipped weight of 43,000 pounds, and accepted weight of 41,157 pounds, for a sale amount of $832.00; a government fee of $8.60; harvesting costs of $817.00; brokerage fee of $200.00; and amount due to Petitioner of $193.60. Again, the contract price of 6¢ from the retailer had been negotiated on melons in good condition of an average weight of 19.6 pounds, and the watermelons actually delivered by Respondent from Petitioner's field averaged 16.8 pounds, and many melons were returned to Respondent based on lack of quality. On the foregoing calculations, Respondent admits to owing Petitioner $1,269.87, rather than the $7,433.00 claimed by Petitioner's calculations. Neither party presented any evidence of an agreement to deduct a brokerage fee or how a brokerage fee was to be calculated. No brokerage fee was deducted by Respondent for the first two loads which are not in dispute, but Respondent actually suffered a loss on those loads which was not passed on to Petitioner (See Finding of Fact No. 14). For the last four loads, the only loads in dispute and the only loads for which a brokerage fee was deducted, the brokerage fee constitutes the only profit made by Respondent on the entire six-load transaction.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order requiring Respondent Growers Marketing Service, Inc. to pay Petitioner $1,269.87, plus interest, if any, to be calculated by the Department, and requiring that if Growers Marketing Service, Inc., does not pay the amount specified within 30 days of the final order that its surety, Preferred National Insurance Company, shall be liable to Petitioner for the full amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McCully 3245 Northwest 30th Lane Jennings, Florida 33806 William R. Ward, Jr., President Growers Marketing Service, Inc. Post Office Box 2595 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Preferred National Insurance Company Post Office Box 407003 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21
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BIGHAM HIDE COMPANY, INC. vs L. A. WOOTEN COMPANY, INC., AND THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-006193 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Coleman, Florida Oct. 14, 1992 Number: 92-006193 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1993

The Issue Whether Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products (watermelons) purchased by Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times relevant, Respondent had a bond posted through Cincinnati Insurance Company as surety. During times material, Respondent employed Grady Smith as a field representative. As such, Smith had authority to, and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on behalf of Respondent. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been growing melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Smith for the duration of his production of agricultural products and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on numerous occasions during the past two years. During May and June of 1992, Petitioner sold 21 loads of melons to Respondent Wroten. Four of those loads are at issue in this case. (The remaining 17 loads Smith purchased from Petitioner as representative of Respondent, are not at issue herein.) On June 11 and 12, 1992, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to buy the loads of melons in controversy here. Smith purchased Sangria watermelons at four and one-half cents per pound. When the loads were loaded, graded and weighed, Smith was on hand and the totals were as follows: Load #6149 44,460 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,000.70 Load #6351 43,870 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,974.15 Load #5898 49,140 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,211.30 Load #5900 43,660 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,964.70 The total agreed price for the melons at issue was $8,150.85. Respondent Wroten has previously paid Petitioner $4,456.13 of the amount due which, when deducted from the amount claimed together with $45.71 in melon promotion fees, leaves a balance claimed by Petitioner in the amount of $3,649.01. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the transaction was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. This agreement included an understanding that Respondent would provide a trailer to haul the melons and would pay all transportation charges. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scales", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or on the following day. Finally, the understanding and agreement between the parties was that the title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten on the day of shipment. The growers receipt submitted in evidence clearly showed the essential terms of the agreement and contained no language which would indicate that the sale was conditioned in any manner respecting Respondent Wroten's claim that Petitioner agreed to "ride the load". The admitted growers receipts and other testimony supports Petitioner's claim that Respondent's representative Smith offered the same terms to other producers and growers in the area. The referenced understanding/agreement was the focal point of the terms under which Petitioner conducted business with representative Smith. Although the growers receipt did not contain a price for the melons, Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham, credibly testified that the agreed price between Bigham and Smith was 4 1/2 cents per pound. Further, Respondent offered no testimony and presented no documentary evidence establishing that the price was other than as stated by Bigham. Respondent Wroten contests that it owes the sum claimed by Petitioner based on a phone conversation allegedly had between Lee Wroten and Greg Bigham in which it is contended that Bigham agreed to bear the risk of loss of the melons to their ultimate destination. This method of sale in the industry is known as offering "protection" or "riding-the-load". Bigham acknowledged a phone conversation respecting loads of royal sweet melons which had been previously rejected by Respondent Wroten, however he did not agree to offer "protection" or otherwise "ride-the-load" as to the Sangria melons questioned here. Likewise, Smith could not remember telling Bigham that the terms of sale had changed nor did he attempt to confirm that Petitioner was required to assume the risk of loss for the Sangria melons. Likewise, the growers receipts issued thereafter to Petitioner contained no changed conditions or restrictions respecting the terms of sale. Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner offered protection or otherwise agreed to "ride the load", Respondent offered no credible evidence to establish that the melons were either defective or that there was any other fault with the melons when shipped or upon arrival at destination which would somehow require that a set off be issued to Respondent. As stated, Smith was present on June 11 and 12, 1992 and witnessed the loading and graded the melons as they were being placed on the trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Smith, while inspecting and grading the melons, eliminated those melons which were not acceptable to him. After the melons were loaded, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent, accepted the load and observed the weighing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order requiring that: Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,649.01. In the event that Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner the sum of $3649.01 as ordered, that the Respondent Cincinnati Insurance, as surety, be ordered to pay the Department a like sum as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department timely reimburse Petitioner in accordance with that subsection. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 6, adopted in part, Paragraph 9, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Marchbanks, Esquire MARCHBANKS DAIELLO & LEIDER 4800 North Federal Highway #101-E Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Don Davis L.A. Wroten Company, Inc. Post Office Box 2437 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68211.30604.15604.17604.20604.21604.34
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