Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Katherine Tyson is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0312196 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a salesperson, with a mailing address of 1411 N.W. 40th Street, Miami, Florida 33142. During the period from approximately March 1992 through approximately March 1993, the Respondent and Denis Michel, acting in concert with one another in their own names and/or under the business name of Katherine Karrington & Associates, Inc., operated as, and represented themselves as, real estate brokers and/or mortgage brokers. Operating and representing themselves in this manner, the Respondent and Michel solicited persons to entrust them with funds to be used in connection with proposed real estate and/or mortgage loan transactions, as follows: Name of Person Amount of Funds Entrusted Raymonvil $ 1,828 Eline 3,550 Pierre-Louis 5,500 Roberts 2,600 Blot 2,750 Francois 2,546 $18,774 TOTAL Through and including the date of the filing of the Administrative Complaint, none of the proposed transactions for which the above funds were entrusted has been completed, and none of the funds have been returned despite numerous demands therefor. At all times material hereto, neither the Respondent, nor Denis Michel, nor Katherine Karrington & Associates, Inc. was licensed as a real estate broker or mortgage broker or lender pursuant to Chapters 475 or 494, Florida Statutes, except that the Respondent became licensed as a mortgage broker on or about February 10, 1993, approximately two months after the last of the aforementioned entrustments of funds had occurred. At various times material hereto, the Respondent was registered with the Petitioner as being the employee of licensed real estate brokers Atlas Realty & Investments, Inc., 11626 N.E. 2nd Avenue, Miami, Florida 33161-6104 (hereinafter, "Atlas") or Murray Realties of Hollywood, Inc., 2843 Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida 33020-4226 (hereinafter, "Murray"). However, in connection with the proposed transactions referred to hereinabove in paragraph 4, neither the Respondent nor Denis Michel: disclosed the existence of the transactions to Atlas or Murray; represented themselves as acting on behalf of Atlas or Murray; and delivered or paid over any of the entrusted funds to Atlas or Murray.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of violations of Subsections 475.25(1)(b),(d),and (e) and 475.42(1)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, imposing a $5,000 administrative fine, and revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3362 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1 - Adopted. Paragraph 2 - Adopted. Paragraph 3 - Adopted. Paragraph 4 - Adopted. Paragraph 5 - Adopted. Paragraph 6 - Adopted. Paragraph 7 - Adopted. Paragraph 8 - Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Katherine Tyson 6709 Ficus Drive Miramar, Florida 32023 Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue This case concerns action by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, through a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) to assess a civil penalty, suspend or revoke or deny the renewal of the beverage license of the Respondent, Keith Nothnagel. This action is promoted on the allegation that the Respondent was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan of the offense of conspiracy to possess marijuana in violation of the United States Code, Title 21, Section 846, on May 25, 1978, in that this conviction constituted a violation of Subsections 561.15(2) and 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and thereby subjects the Respondent to penalties found in Section 561.29, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Keith Nothnagel, holds license No. 62-1311, series 2- COP, issued by the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. This license allows the Respondent to sell beer and wine to be consumed on his premises located at 606-608 Court Street, Clearwater, Florida. The beverage license was issued on January 17, 1977, at a time subsequent to the commission of an offense for which the Respondent pled guilty to conspiracy to possess marijuana in violation of the United States Code, Title 21, Section 846, and this plea was made on March 15, 1978. On May 24, 1978, the Respondent was found guilty of the offense and convicted and sentenced to serve one (1) year. The Respondent did serve seven (7) months of that sentence. A copy of the Judgment and Commitment Order may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. It is on the strength of this plea and adjudication of guilty and sentence that the Petitioner has charged the Respondent with violations of Subsections 561.15(2)(a) and 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation It is recommended that the action through this Notice to Show Cause filed against the Respondent, Keith Nothnagel, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Waldense D. Malouf, Esquire 325 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, Petitioner, v. DOAH NO. 79-1287 DABT NO. 33234A THE INN BETWEEN/KEITH NOTHNAGEL, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether or not the, Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., may be issued Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2, for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner and Respondent stipulated and agreed to the underlying facts which they deemed to have necessary application in considering the question of the propriety of the Respondent issuing the Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 to the Petitioner for use at 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida. Notwithstanding the lack of dispute in facts surrounding this issue, the Respondent and Petitioner have requested the undersigned to examine those facts and to offer conclusions of law on the dispute. In the course of the presentation, it was agreed that Mr. Norman J. Smith, attorney for the Petitioner, would be allowed to set forth the factual stipulation for the record. Mr. Smith indicated that the official description of the license was, Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2. It was stated that the Petitioner is now a qualified motel and restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which describes those establishments which would qualify for a "special" beverage license. It was further indicated that when the license in question was issued originally it was not issued to such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant as set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20, which established the requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license, and that when the subject license was transferred to the present location, that the motel and restaurant, at the present location, was not such a qualified hotel, motel or restaurant in accordance with Florida Statute, 561.20, which established those requirements for issuance of a "special" beverage license. However, as of October 21, 1975, and as of the application date for license transfer, filed by the Petitioner, by improvements and physical changes to the edifice, (location where the license currently is housed), would meet the definitional requirements of Florida Statute, 561.20, which sets forth the qualifications for "special" beverage licenses to be issued to a hotel, motel or restaurant. This qualification referred to as of October 21, 1975, and as of the date of application, applies to the section on hotels/motels and restaurants. That is to say the establishment would qualify under the standards for a hotel/motel or under the standards for a restaurant. It was further established that the application which was filed by the Petitioner was duly filed with the Division of Beverage upon form, DBR-704L, which is the application for the transfer of an alcoholic beverage license in this type request. Mr. Smith stated that the Petitioner understood that the letter of August 21, 1975, from the Director of the Division of Beverage, addressed to the Petitioner, stated the only basis for denying the application which had been filed by the Petitioner, and Mr. Hatch, attorney for the Respondent, agreed that there were no other grounds for disapproving the license application other than the one established in the letter from Mr. C. A. Nuzum, Director of the Division of Beverage. It was more specifically developed that the language which was relied upon to deny the application was that language set forth in Florida Statute, 561.20(2)(a)(3), "... However, any license heretofore issued to any such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant or hereafter issued to any such hotel, motel, or motor court [including a condominium accommodation] under the general law shall not be moved to a new location, such license being valid only on the premises of such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant." Mr. Hatch, in behalf of the Respondent, agreed to the accuracy of the depiction of the stipulation as stated for the record by Mr. Smith. The parties through their respective attorneys then offered oral argument on the law as it relates to the Petitioner's request for issuance of a license at the aforementioned location. Additionally, Mr. Bishop, a licensing supervisor with the Division of Beverage, was called to testify concerning his interpretation of the operation of Florida Statute, 561 as it pertains to license applications, moves, and transfers. One further item was offered in the way of a stipulation, and that is an agreement on the part of Mr. Smith, for the Petitioner, to allow examination of two memoranda offered by the Respondent as part of its argument. Mr. Smith indicated that he had a copy of the memoranda and that he had no objection to the use of that memoranda in the way of argument in behalf of the Respondent. Upon that representation the undersigned was provided with a copy of the Respondent's memoranda and has considered the same in addressing the legal issue.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for transfer as filed by the Respondent, Buenaventura Lakes Country Club, Inc., to transfer Division of Beverage, license number 7-COP-59-2 from its present location to 301 Buenaventura Boulevard, Kissimmee, Florida, be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman J. Smith, Esquire Brinson and Smith, P. A. Post Office Drawer 1549 Kissimmee, Florida 32741 William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Ida Bartlett is the sole shareholder, officer and director of the Applicant corporation. She pursued the lottery drawing for Pasco County for a quota liquor license in order to embark on her own business venture involving the sale of alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption in a lounge-type situation, as well as possibly to sell alcoholic beverages in a package store for off-premises consumption. On September 18, 1984, the Division informed Ms. Bartlett by letter that she had been selected in the lottery drawing for an available quota liquor license in Pasco County. The letter advised her that she had 45 days from the date of the letter to file her application with the Tampa field office of the Division, which she did. In preparing her application, she sought the advice and counsel of her son, Charles Bartlett, an attorney who has extensive experience in commercial and real estate matters, including commercial litigation, contract litigation, landlord tenant litigation and zoning matters, as well as experience representing other quota liquor license applicants as clients. Mr. Bartlett was tendered and accepted without objection as an expert in these areas of law, and in the interpretation of contracts, leases and other documents related to these fields of law. In particular, Mr. Bartlett currently represents establishments holding liquor licenses, has recently been actively involved in leasing and licensing matters for them and was counsel for a 4-COP quota liquor license applicant in Sarasota County with regard to the same lottery drawing as the instant application. After she was advised of her successful lottery drawing and of the right to file her application within the 45 days, Mr. Bartlett and Ms. Bartlett began the preparation process for the application by attempting to locate suitable premises in Pasco County at which to locate the license and operate the related business. Mr. Bartlett contacted several real estate brokers in this connection and eventually met Mr. Harry Sasser, who had an existing lounge establishment in Hudson, Florida, Pasco County. Mr. Sasser's premises were then used for only on premises consumption of alcoholic beverages in a lounge-type situation. Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Sasser negotiated an agreement, reduced to writing and executed by the Applicant and Mr. Sasser, whereby his premises would be used for the liquor license sought by Ms. Bartlett. That agreement was entered into on November 1, 1984. It provided that upon the issuance of a license to Ms. Bartlett, Mr. Sasser would place his liquor license in escrow so that the only license applicable and used at the Sasser premises would be the license to be awarded Ms. Bartlett. Ms. Bartlett entered into this agreement in good faith and with the bona fide intent to be bound by it and to actually operate the premises under the license she sought (Applicant's Exhibit 2, in evidence). Mr. Bartlett drafted the agreement which required Mr. Sasser to lease the premises to the Applicant upon the occurrence of the condition precedent which is the granting of the liquor license. The agreement does not specify a rental amount, but rather provides that the rent shall be the prevailing market rate upon the execution of the related lease, which the parties agreed to enter into upon the granting of the license. The agreement does not specify a date certain for execution of the lease, but rather provides that the leasing of the subject premises will take effect upon the issuance of the liquor license. Mr. Bartlett established that this agreement is a legally binding document and affords the Applicant a legal right of occupancy to Mr. Sasser's premises upon the occurrence of that condition precedent. Such provisions for rental payment at market rates are common in lease agreements of that nature, and such a provision as to rental amount does not mitigate the binding effect and enforceability of such an agreement. Agreements contingent on the occurrence of a specific event which would trigger the execution of a lease to which the agreement refers, are common. Otherwise there would be no purpose to be served in leasing the premises for either party, until it is clear that the Applicant can use the premises for the purposes for which the agreement and contemplated lease are intended. Charles Bartlett and the Applicant prepared and completed the remainder of the license application and related documents to be filed with it. Mr. Sasser was actively involved in the completion and submission of the application, and indeed took it himself to the Pasco County zoning Authority to secure that body's approval of the purpose to which the premises involved would be devoted. The Pasco County Zoning Authority indicated no objection to issuance of the liquor license for the Sasser premises and it is noted in three letters, (in evidence) from the Pasco County Attorney regarding the zoning question, that the property was correctly zoned for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages, which is what the premises were currently used for and would be used for under the sought license, at least in part. The letters from the County Attorney regarding zoning do indicate that if off-premises package store sales were engaged in under the sought liquor license, that further certification from the zoning authority concerning the question of whether that would be a substantial departure from the existing use of the premises might be necessary and that rezoning to commercial zoning might be necessary before the premises could be used for package sales for off-premises consumption. Mr. Bartlett opined, based upon his experience in similar liquor license application matters that the premises were appropriately zoned for the issuance of the subject liquor license. Mr. Sasser took the application to the appropriate health department official and secured his approval as to the suitability of the Sasser premises for the use of the liquor license. The zoning authority approval and health department approval were asserted on the face of the application when filed. On about November 1, 1984, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Bartlett, and Ms. Bartlett met at the Tampa field office of the Respondent to assemble the liquor license application, submit it, and sign the agreement concerning the use of Sasser premises. The Division's filing clerk thereupon reviewed the materials submitted with the application and the application to make certain that all information had been provided in the spaces and blanks on the application, and that it was duly executed and signed. Those parties then met with Mr. Espinola who identified himself to them as the "licensing officer" to review the completeness of the application. Mr. Espinola met with the parties for about 15 minutes to review the application and the related agreement with Mr. Sasser. After reviewing the Sasser agreement, Mr. Espinola suggested that Sasser enter into an escrow agreement for his existing liquor license for those premises, so that the Applicant's license, if issued, could be located at the Sasser premises without occurrence of the situation of two licenses being issued for the same premises. Mr. Sasser agreed and entered into and signed an escrow agreement to that effect in the presence of Mr. Espinola, Charles Bartlett and Ms. Bartlett, the principal of the applicant corporation. Mr. Espinola, on behalf of the Division, accepted the application as complete upon submission. Mr. Bartlett was advised that the acceptance of the application as complete would stand so long as he submitted an affidavit from his father concerning the source of financing for the proposed business. Mr. Bartlett had the affidavit executed the same day and sent it by Federal Express the same day to Mr. Espinola. He then called Mr. Espinola the following day to verify the receipt of the financial affidavit by Federal Express, and Mr. Espinola indicated that all was in order. Thereafter the Applicant, being advised that the application was complete and in order, waited to hear from the Division as to its decision regarding the application. Neither the Applicant nor her attorney, Mr. Bartlett, was contacted further by the Division or by anyone from its headquarters in Tallahassee concerning any questions regarding the review of the application. In the meantime, Ms. Bartlett and her attorney, Mr. Bartlett, remained in contact with Mr. Sasser to make certain that everything was still in order regarding their arrangement. Mr. Sasser gave them no indication that anything was amiss or that he had changed his position regarding escrow of his license and the lease of his premises to the applicant corporation. Since a binding agreement between the Applicant and Mr. Sasser had been entered into, and since the execution of the contemplated lease only required occurrence of the condition precedent, that is the issuance of the license, there was no reason to enter into other agreements by the parties until the license was issued. Thus, the Applicant and Mr. Sasser awaited the Division's decision before taking any further action regarding the application or the inauguration of the new business. On March 6, 1985, by letter, the Applicant was advised that its application was denied by the Division. This was the first indication the Applicant had that the application was not in order and would not be routinely approved following Mr. Espinola's assurance that the application was complete and in order. The Division indicated in its letter of denial that the bases for denial were a lack of establishment of a right of occupancy of the subject premises, and lack of sufficient zoning for the subject premises. Upon learning of the Division's denial of the application, Mr. Bartlett contacted the Tampa and Tallahassee offices of the Division seeking further explanation for the denial. He offered to file an amendment to the application to cure the alleged defects, but was informed by a staff member of Mr. Schoenfeld, the Bureau Chief's office, that amendments would not be accepted. Thereupon, the Applicant instituted this-administrative challenge to the denial of the application. During the interim period of time prior to the subject hearing, the Applicant took further steps to secure approval of the application. Thus, at Mr. Bartlett's behest, the Chief Assistant County Attorney for Pasco County provided Attorney Sandra Stockwell of the Division a letter setting forth further and clarifying the zoning authority's position regarding the Sasser premises. This letter (in evidence) makes clear that the County has no objection to the issuance of a 4-COP liquor license for the Sasser premises, although it points out that should the holder of the license desire to expand the alcoholic beverage use to include the sale of liquor for on-premises consumption then a determination would have to be obtained from the zoning administrator of the County whether or not the expansion constituted a substantial expansion of use. If the administrator determined that the expansion of use was substantial in nature, then the Board of County Commissioners would have to approve the actual sale of liquor on the premises. Correspondingly, if the holder of the license were to seek to expand the alcoholic beverage use for the Sasser premises to include the sale of alcoholic beverages for off-premise consumption (package sales) the same action would be necessary prior to actual sale of the alcoholic beverages for off-premise consumption. Additionally, rezoning of property to the appropriate commercial district would be required prior to sale of alcohol for off-premise consumption. The Applicant also secured alternate premises to locate the applied-for liquor license in the event the Sasser arrangement fails to consummate or is otherwise deemed undesirable. The Applicant thus entered into a three-year lease agreement with two 5-year options for premises on U.S. 19 in the City of Port Richey. These premises had been recently used as a lounge establishment and are equipped with all required lounge and bar equipment and fixtures. The lease depicted in Applicant's Exhibit 8, in evidence, gives the Applicant a legal right to occupy the premises identified in that lease for the purposes of this license application. Those premises, additionally, are zoned for commercial use, which according to the City of Port Richey Zoning Code is appropriate for the on premises consumption of alcoholic beverages. In this connection, it was established by Mr. Bartlett, based on his personal experience in representing liquor license applicants, that the Division has approved the issuance of 4-COP liquor licenses to a number of applicants he has represented for premises zoned for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages only without them being zoned at the time of issuance for off-premises package sales. DIVISION POLICY Mr. Barry Sehoenfeld is the Bureau Chief of Licensing and Records for the Division. He has been delegated the authority to process and finalize all quota liquor license applications and is in charge of the state-wide system for the review and issuance of alcoholic beverage licenses. He is the final decision maker on quota liquor license applications. Quota liquor licenses authorize license holders to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premise consumption and/or package sales. A quota liquor license enables the holder to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premise consumption, to sell such beverages in a package store capacity or both, according to Mr. Schoenfeld. Quota liquor licenses are issued on a county basis. Only a certain number of such licenses are issued in a county, depending on the population of the county. When the Division determines that it is appropriate for additional quota liquor licenses to be issued for a county, the Division holds a drawing and all interested persons may apply to get in the pool for the lottery drawing. When such a person is drawn, that person can then file an application with the Division for issuance of a liquor license. A "4-COP quota liquor license" refers to a county which has more than 100,000 population. When a party is selected from the lottery drawing to file an application for a quota liquor license, that person has 45 days from notice of the drawing to do so. The application is filed in the local field office of the Division in which the applicant seeks a license. The field office involved in this proceeding is the Tampa office. The application and all related documents must be filed with the licensing clerk of that field office, who then determines whether all documents are in order and whether the application can be accepted by the field office for review. Another staff member in the field office then meets with the applicant to determine whether all necessary forms and documents are complete. In the instant situation, that person was Mr. Espinola. According to Division policy, the field office will not accept an application if not complete. According to policy the applicant does not receive a letter regarding completeness from the field office, but simply a verbal understanding from the personnel of the field office that the application is complete upon submission and acceptance by that office. Here the Applicant was so informed. Once an application is submitted and deemed complete, the field office may ask the applicant for additional information. Requesting additional information is common practice and is often done after the 45-day submission deadline. In fact, if an application is missing the field office will contact an applicant to request that he provide the missing documents. According to Division policy, as explicated by Mr. Schoenfeld, review of an application should be performed with the applicant present so that additional information or explanation required may be done at that time. The intent of this policy is to keep the applicant advised of Division requirements and to communicate freely with an applicant to ensure that all necessary data is gathered for review. Further investigation of an application will be pursued if the field office supervisor deems that necessary and it is within the discretion of that supervisor as to whether an investigation is necessary, and if so, the scope of that investigation. If an investigation is deemed necessary, the supervisor should provide specific instructions to an investigator as to the scope of his investigation. There is no set time during which an investigation should be completed, and the scope depends on the particular circumstances of the application. It is common for an investigation to require one to to three months. The purpose of the investigation is to discover as much information as necessary to fairly make a recommendation on the application. After review by the field office, and any investigation by that office if it is deemed necessary, the field office makes a recommendation to the Division headquarters and Mr. Schoenfeld in Tallahassee regarding disposition of the license application. It is at this point that Mr. Schoenfeld becomes involved with any license application. Thereafter Mr. Schoenfeld makes a final determination on the application and the applicant is sent either a liquor license or a letter of denial. The letter of denial sets forth all bases for the Division's denial of such an application. According to statute, the application process must be completed and the Division must make its decision within 180 days. This time frame can be waived by an applicant however, if it appears for any reason that the statutory time requirement cannot be met, as for instance in situations where the premises to be used are not yet constructed or other delays have been encountered by the applicant or the Division, when both are acting in good faith. In such situations, the Division's decision on the application is placed in abeyance for an indefinite period until the premises are constructed or the other basis for delay by either the Division or the applicant in the review process have been alleviated. Mr. Schoenfeld also explained Division policy to allow for a liquor license holder to move his license to another premises by submitting an application to the Division for a transfer. Additionally, Division policy allows an applicant to propose to locate his license in a premise already holding a liquor license, if the existing license holder places his license in escrow. It is a routine matter for such previous license holders to place their licenses in escrow under these circumstances. Pursuant to the below-cited statutory authority, an applicant must have "suitable premises" in which to house or locate the liquor license for which it has applied. The Division interprets this to mean that an applicant must demonstrate a legal right of occupancy for the premises identified in an application. Mr. Schoenfeld acknowledged that the phrase "legal right of occupancy" is not defined by statute or agency rule, but that the intent is to make certain that an applicant has a lawful right to occupy the identified premises. The Division determines on a case by case basis whether an applicant has secured a lawful right of occupancy. Typically, this determination process does not employ the use of Division attorneys to review and determine from a legal standpoint whether a right of occupancy has been demonstrated. There is no statutory provision or Division rule which requires that written documentation be submitted with an application in establishing a legal right of occupancy. The Division's policy and procedures manual does not specifically require a right of occupancy document to be filed with the application. The Division's application form furthermore, does not require written documentation by the applicant to prove its legal right of occupancy. Although Mr. Schoenfeld indicated that the Division requires written documentation of an applicant's lawful right of occupancy to the identified premises, no specific type of agreement is required. Rather, any document reflecting a binding, lawful right of occupancy is sufficient, nor is it necessary that the written document be a lease agreement. In the instant case, as Mr. Bartlett established, a binding, written contract calling for the occupancy of the Sasser premises was timely executed by the parties to the application and filed with the application, which binds the parties to enter into a written lease upon the occurrence of the condition precedent, that is the issuance of the liquor license. The Division requires an applicant to show sufficient, appropriate zoning for the premises identified to be used in an application. On the second page of the application there is a section requiring indication whether the appropriate zoning authority has determined whether the identified premises are in compliance with existing zoning regulations. Additional information in the form of letters from the appropriate governing authority is commonly submitted with an application to demonstrate that the premises have sufficient zoning. A 4-COP quota liquor license authorizes on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or package store sales. In some situations, existing zoning regulations permit only the on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and not package store sales for off-premise consumption. That is the case with the Sasser premises involved herein and as to the alternate premises, depicted in Applicant's Exhibit 8, in evidence, although that property is commercially zoned. Commercial zoning also encompasses on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages only. Division policy, however, provides that conditional zoning approvals are acceptable in the process of reviewing and granting liquor licenses. The Division has approved applications where the zoning only allowed on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and, as discussed above, in Mr. Bartlett's experience with his own clients such approval has been given where zoning only permitted on-premises consumption for quota liquor licenses on more than one occasion. In these situations, the Division's policy is that it is not responsible for enforcing the terms of the conditional zoning approval' that is a matter to be negotiated or enforced between the local zoning authority and the ultimate holder of the liquor license involved. Conditional zoning approval does not bar the issuance of a quota liquor license. Additionally, Mr. Schoenfeld corroborated Mr. Bartlett's testimony showing that it is often reasonable to waive the 180-day statutory time period to accommodate situations where an applicant must change the premises originally applied for in such instances where a landlord or owner of the premises originally identified in an application breaches the right of occupancy agreement after the application is submitted for review by the Division. In those instances, it has often been determined to be reasonable to allow an applicant to amend his application after the 45-day time period has elapsed to allow for such a change of premises. Licenses have indeed been issued frequently for alternate or changed premises from those originally identified in an application so long as an applicant has acted in good faith throughout the application process. Also, according to Division policy, if an applicant is making a good faith effort to arrange for a suitable, appropriately zoned premises from which to operate his license, the Division will permit the applicant to locate alternate premises in instances where zoning approval is denied subsequent to the 45-day period or has not yet been obtained at the end of the 45-day period. It should be noted that Mr. Bartlett described two instances where this policy was followed where the Division permitted a change of premises after submission of an application. In one case an application was submitted for premises in a shopping center not yet built. After it was filed and prior to issuance of the license, the applicant elected to change the location and to amend the application. The license was granted for the second location. In another situation an amendment to the application was effected after the 45-day period, proposing a change of premises. The amended application was approved by the Division and the zoning on the changed location allowed only on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages and not package store sales. Even so the Division approved issuance of that license. DIVISION REVIEW Mr. William Fisher is a law enforcement investigator for the Tampa field office of the Division. Mr. Fisher's immediate supervisor is Reuben Espinola. Mr. Fisher's duties involve investigation of liquor license applicants and related premises to ascertain whether the application should be recommended for approval or not. He does not investigate applications independently, but rather acts on Mr. Espinola's instructions. Mr. Espinola normally does not instruct him as to the scope of his investigation (contrary to policy as stated by their superior, Mr. Schoenfeld). In any event, Mr. Espinola ordered Mr. Fisher to investigate the Ida Know, Inc. application without giving him specific instructions. Mr. Fisher was not present at the meetings between the applicant and Mr. Espinola and other members of the staff in the Tampa field office when the application was first submitted and accepted as complete. Mr. Fisher traveled to Mr. Sasser's establishment to investigate the application, and conferred with Mr. Sasser for approximately 75 minutes on January 29, 1985, which meeting constituted the entirety of his investigation of this application, although he had acknowledged that such application investigations normally require one to three months so as to discover as many facts as possible to completely and fairly conduct the review. The next day, however, Mr. Fisher recommended to his superiors that the application be denied after his single conversation with Mr. Sasser. No further investigation by the Tampa field office was performed. Mr. Fisher never conversed with the applicant nor Mr. Bartlett during the investigation or at any other time, nor did he communicate in writing with them, although he acknowledged that conversing with applicants concerning matters involved in investigation of an application is common practice. Mr. Fisher had not read the Division's policy and procedures manual in its entirety. He exhibited some unfamiliarity with Division policy, as for example, his belief that Division policy does not allow issuance of a liquor license for premises where the zoning does not authorize both on-premises consumption and package store sales for off-premises consumption. Mr. Schoenfeld acknowledged that Mr. Fisher misunderstood the pertinent Division policies regarding this liquor license application and the review of it, and yet Mr. Schoenfeld's denial of the application was based entirely on the investigation performed by the Tampa field office and specifically Mr. Fisher. Mr. Schoenfeld did not conduct any independent investigation of his own and never conferred with either Mr. Sasser, the Applicant, Ms. Bartlett, or Mr. Bartlett. His conclusion, and Mr. Fisher's conclusion that no right of occupancy of the Sasser premises existed was evidently based on the Division's Exhibit No. 3, which was not admitted into evidence. In any event, if indeed Mr. Sasser was seeking to recant his agreements with the Applicant and that fact was within the knowledge of Mr. Fisher or someone else in the Tampa field office or the Tallahassee office of the Division, no Division staff member ever contacted the Applicant to advise them of that purported situation, nor to seek additional information from the Applicant concerning it. Even if Mr. Sasser could successfully repudiate his agreement to escrow his liquor license and his agreement to allow the Applicant to use his premises, the Applicant has successfully established its right of occupancy and use of the alternative premises depicted and described in Applicant's Exhibit 8, however, which is zoned commercially such that on-premises consumption of any alcoholic beverage is permitted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the application of Ida Know, Inc. d/b/a The Anchorage, be approved and that the subject 4-COP quota liquor license be issued to that applicant in a manner consistent with the conditions and alternatives posited in the paragraph last above. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1986.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to issuance of an occupational license, pursuant to section 550.105, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, John A. Short, is an applicant for a general individual occupational license, pursuant to section 550.105(2)(a), which would authorize him to work as a blacksmith and farrier at licensed pari-mutuel facilities in Florida.4/ Respondent is the state agency charged with issuing occupational licenses to employees of pari-mutuel wagering facilities in the state of Florida pursuant to chapter 550. Petitioner's Application for Occupational License and Waiver On December 11, 2017,5/ Petitioner filed with Respondent DBPR PMW-3120, Individual Occupational License Application, seeking to obtain a pari-mutuel wagering general individual occupational license. Also on December 11, 2017, Petitioner filed DBPR PMW-1380, Request for Waiver, seeking a waiver, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006, of disqualification from occupational licensure under section 550.105(5)(b) on the basis of a felony conviction. In his license application filed on December 11, 2017, Petitioner disclosed that he had a prior felony conviction that was adjudicated on September 22, 1998, in Jefferson County, Kentucky.6/ Subsequently, on March 5, 2018, Petitioner filed an amended application page on which he disclosed two other criminal offenses: receiving stolen property, and possession of marijuana. Both of these offenses, which were misdemeanors, were adjudicated on November 24, 1991, in Kentucky. On June 13, 2018, Petitioner participated in a waiver interview conducted by Respondent, as required under rule 61D-5.006. At the interview, Petitioner disclosed that he had several other criminal convictions, some of which had not been listed on his license application. In the Denial Letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that it was denying his application on the basis of his felony conviction for third degree assault on a police officer and his failure to disclose all of his convictions on his license application. Respondent also notified Petitioner that it was denying his request for a waiver. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing As noted above, Petitioner is a blacksmith and farrier, and he currently works in that trade in Florida, where he now resides full time. Specifically, Petitioner works with Marshall Hudson, also a blacksmith and farrier, who is a subcontractor to the Wellington Equestrian Federation at Equestrian Sport Productions in Wellington, Florida. Petitioner has worked with Hudson for four or five seasons, shoeing horses of many different breeds, including thoroughbreds, quarter horses, standardbreds, walking horses, saddlebreds, and carriage horses, at the barns, showgrounds, and other venues at which the horses are located. The competent, credible evidence establishes that Petitioner is, or has been, licensed by the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission as a blacksmith and farrier over a period of several years,7/ with the exception of a short period in 2016 during which his license had lapsed. Pursuant to his Kentucky occupational license, Petitioner is, or has been, authorized to conduct his trade at licensed racing facilities in Kentucky, including Churchill Downs and other tracks. Petitioner credibly testified——and no countervailing evidence was presented——that he has never been subject to licensure discipline during the entire time he has been licensed in Kentucky. Petitioner's Criminal Offenses At the final hearing, Petitioner was forthright regarding his criminal record. He testified that he had been convicted of third degree assault on a police officer, a felony, in Jefferson County, Kentucky in 1998,8/ and credibly explained the circumstances surrounding that conviction. His account of that incident provided at the final hearing is consistent with that provided in his June 13, 2018, waiver interview.9/ Petitioner also readily acknowledged that he had been convicted of numerous misdemeanor offenses, some of which have been expunged from his criminal record. These include theft by deception, receiving stolen property, shoplifting, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of marijuana, driving under the influence, and several traffic—related offenses. With the exception of the possession of marijuana and some traffic—related offenses, Petitioner's criminal offenses were committed during the 1990s. His most recent arrest was in 2011, for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, which was resolved by paying a $150.00 fine. Since then, Petitioner has not been convicted of any crimes.10/ There was no evidence presented showing that Petitioner has ever engaged in criminal activity regarding pari— mutuel wagering, gambling, bookmaking, cruelty to animals, or that is a capital offense.11/ Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Character Hudson testified regarding Petitioner's character. He attested that Petitioner is a good person who has a talent for working with horses. He has never known Petitioner to have a conflict with any owner, rider, or veterinarian in connection with any of the horses that Petitioner has worked with over the years. At the final hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that in 2016, he engaged in pari-mutuel work for a short period of time in Kentucky without being licensed. Petitioner's Kentucky Horse Racing Commission occupational license had lapsed while he was not working in—state. He renewed it later that year, but during the time his license had lapsed, he occasionally worked at Churchill Downs in order to make enough money to apply for a new occupational license. On those occasions, he rode into the facility in the truck of another racetrack employee who was licensed, and no one questioned his presence because they knew him from having previously worked there, while he was licensed. He acknowledged that he knew he was legally required to hold a license to gain access to the backside of pari-mutuel racetracks in Kentucky, but testified that it was commonplace for unlicensed persons to work in the backside at Churchill Downs, except on large racing event days. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has ever accessed the backside of, or engaged in activities requiring occupational licensure at, pari-mutuel facilities in Florida while not being licensed to do so.12/ Findings of Ultimate Fact Petitioner's Felony Conviction As discussed above, Petitioner readily acknowledged that he was convicted of third degree assault on a police officer, a felony, in Kentucky in 1998. Respondent is authorized, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(b), to deny Petitioner's application for an occupational license on the basis of his felony conviction. Waiver of Disqualification from Licensure Section 550.105(5)(c) authorizes Respondent to waive licensure disqualification under section 550.105(5)(b) if "the applicant establishes that she or he is of good moral character, that she or he has been rehabilitated, and that the crime she or he was convicted of is not related to pari—mutuel wagering and is not a capital offense." As discussed above, there is no evidence showing that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime involving pari—mutuel wagering or that is a capital offense. Therefore, the question becomes whether the preponderance of the evidence shows that Petitioner is rehabilitated and of good moral character such that, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006, he is entitled to a waiver from licensure disqualification. The question whether a person is rehabilitated from his or her criminal conviction primarily focuses on the person's behavior subsequent to committing the offense, rather than focusing solely——or even primarily——on whether the person committed the offenses.13/ As discussed above, Petitioner was forthright in acknowledging that he had committed numerous criminal offenses in the past——one of them a serious felony that, pursuant to statute, has effectively excluded him from obtaining an occupational license. This is his only felony offense, and was committed over 20 years ago. Although Petitioner committed several offenses subsequent to his 1998 felony conviction, they were misdemeanors, the majority of which were committed in the 1990s and many of which subsequently have been expunged from his record. His most recent offense, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, for which he paid a small fine to resolve, occurred in 2011, some eight years ago. There is no evidence that he has engaged in criminal behavior since then. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner is rehabilitated from his 1998 felony in Kentucky, which is the basis on which Respondent has proposed to deny his occupational license application. See J.D. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 114 So. 3d 1127, 1131 (whether an applicant is rehabilitated is an issue of ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of fact). Marshall Hudson, a colleague with whom Petitioner has worked for a few years now, vouched for Petitioner's character. Petitioner testified, credibly, that he has never had any "problems" associated with his work as a blacksmith and farrier. Respondent presented no evidence to the contrary. Petitioner admitted to working without a license in the backside of Churchill Downs in Kentucky for a short time, approximately three years ago. The evidence establishes that he did so because he needed the work in order to make enough money to apply for an occupational license, since his had lapsed while he had not been working in—state. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Petitioner would accept the opportunity to make money that would enable him apply for an occupational license that would allow him to legally practice his trade. Once Petitioner had earned enough money to obtain an occupational license, he did so. It is further noted that there was no evidence presented that Petitioner has since engaged in the unlicensed practice of his trade in Kentucky or in any other state. The evidence also does not show that Petitioner has ever engaged in the unlicensed practice of his trade at licensed pari—mutuel facilities in Florida. Importantly, too, no evidence was presented showing that Petitioner has ever engaged in conduct involving gambling, bookmaking, or cruelty to animals, and none of his criminal offenses involved pari—mutuel wagering——conduct that would rightfully raise significant concerns as to whether he should be licensed. Based on these considerations, the undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner is of good moral character for purposes of obtaining a waiver, pursuant to section 550.105(5)(c) and rule 61D—5.006. See Albert v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enf., 573 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(except where a specific provision of statute has categorically——i.e., absolutely and without qualification—— disqualified an applicant from consideration for licensure, the question of what constitutes "good moral character" is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact).14/ Failure to Disclose Criminal History Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's application on the basis that he did not disclose his entire criminal history, as required by the "Background Information" section of the occupational license application form. The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not disclose his entire criminal history on the application form filed on December 11, 2017, as supplemented on March 5, 2018. However, this is a de novo proceeding designed to formulate agency action, not review action taken earlier and preliminarily. As such, Petitioner was entitled to present, at the final hearing in this proceeding, information regarding his criminal history additional to that provided in his application. At the final hearing, in response to Respondent's questioning in its case in chief, Petitioner testified regarding each criminal offense he had committed. Petitioner's testimony regarding his complete criminal history at the de novo final hearing in this proceeding satisfies the requirement in the occupational license application Background Information section, that his complete criminal history be disclosed. Accordingly, failure to disclose his criminal history is not a basis for denying his application pursuant to section 559.791.
Conclusions For Petitioner: John A. Short, pro se 3701 Quantum Lakes Drive, Suite 109 West Palm Beach, Florida 33426 For Respondent: James A. Lewis, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399—2202
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2019.
The Issue Whether or not on or about December 8, 2000, Petitioner possessed the appropriate license to operate a body-piercing salon establishment in accordance with Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented, the testimony, and upon the personal inspection of the undersigned, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Respondent, Department of Health, Division of Environmental Health, is the state agency charged with implementation of Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code. At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Rita Moroz, operated a manicure-pedicure, nail-lengthening establishment, "A New Adventure of Tampa Bay," located at 11608 North Dale Mabry Highway, Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida 33618. Section 381.0075(2)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "BodyPiercing" as for commercial purposes the act of penetrating the skin to make, generally permanent in nature, a hole, mark, or scar. "Bodypiercing" does not include the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system that penetrates the outer perimeter of lobe of the ear or both. At all times material hereto, Petitioner admitted that she operated a body-piercing establishment salon and provided body-piercing services without first having obtained a body-piercing license as required by law. At all times pertinent hereto, Petitioner possessed a manicure-pedicure license issued by another country and her foreign license also authorized body-piercing services. Petitioner, upon receipt of the Certificate of Violation, discontinued performing body-piercing services. The representative for the Agency stated that the Department would accept, in consideration of Petitioner's admissions and prompt discontinuation of body-piercing services, a reduced fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 96-4984, whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Action dated March 13, 1996, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed. As to DOAH Case No. 97-0708, whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Action dated November 4, 1996, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On December 29, 1995, Respondent applied for a license authorizing the sale of beer and wine for consumption on the premises of her business known as Mrs. B's Restaurant and Lounge, which was located at 342 Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Stuart, Florida. Thereafter a temporary license, numbered 53-01741, series 2-COP, was issued to Respondent. The application executed by Respondent on December 29, 1995, contained a Personal Questionnaire that the applicant submitted under oath. The Personal Questionnaire required certain information about the individual applicant, including her criminal history. Respondent answered in the affirmative to the question whether she had ever been arrested, and in the negative to the question whether she had ever been convicted of a crime. As part of the application process, Respondent was fingerprinted so that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement could check her criminal record. Respondent was arrested on four separate occasions and was convicted of a crime on one occasion. On May 31, 1998, Respondent was arrested by the St. Lucie County Sheriff's office for failure to redeliver a hired vehicle. On September 16, 1988, Respondent was placed on probation for this offense, but adjudication of guilt was withheld. On January 29, 1989, Respondent was arrested by the Martin County Sheriff's Office for violation of probation. On January 4, 1992, Respondent was arrested by the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office on a charge of robbery, a felony. On November 10, 1992, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendre to a reduced charge of resisting a merchant, a first degree misdemeanor, and was subsequently sentenced. On March 20, 1992, Respondent was arrested by the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office on charges of robbery and battery. These charges were subsequently dismissed. Respondent's answers on her Personal Questionnaire failed to disclose the required particulars of her criminal history, including information as to the charges, the dates and places of the arrests, the arresting agencies, and the dispositions. Respondent failed to disclose that she had been convicted of a crime. The uncontroverted evidence was that a permanent license was never issued by Petitioner to Respondent and that, prior to the formal hearing, Respondent's temporary license was revoked by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that, pursuant to Section 559.791, Florida Statutes, denies Respondent's application for permanent licensure and sustains the revocation of her temporary license. It is further recommended that DOAH Case No. 96-4984 be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Mrs. Mary Ann Brinkley, pro se Mrs. B's Restaurant Post Office Box 765 Stuart, Florida 34995 Richard Boyd, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner’s request to renew a lien against alcoholic beverage license number 62- 08383 on or about July 8, 2011, should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at hearing, and upon the entire record of this proceeding, the following facts are found: Respondent is the state agency charged with the licensing, regulation, and enforcement of Florida’s alcoholic beverage laws pursuant to section 20.165(2)(b) and chapters 561- 568, Florida Statutes, including recordation of liens against alcoholic beverage licenses and provision of notice to lienholders pursuant to section 561.65. Petitioner is the holder of a recorded lien against alcoholic beverage license number 62-08383, a 4COP spirituous alcoholic beverage license, commonly referred to as a quota license, which was issued pursuant to sections 561.20(1) and 565.02(1)(a)-(f) for use in Pinellas County. Liens and Security Interests in Alcoholic Beverage Licenses Section 561.65 governs mortgages, liens, and security interests against spirituous alcoholic beverage licenses. DABT has a lien section within its Bureau of Licensing that is responsible for the oversight of lien recordings and lien searches. To perfect a lien or security interest in a spirituous alcoholic beverage license that may be enforceable against the license, the entity holding the security interest or lien must record it with DABT within 90 days of the date of creation of the lien or security interest, using forms authorized by DABT. The forms adopted by DABT require the names of the parties and the terms of the obligation being recorded. § 561.65(4), Fla. Stat. Form DBPR ABT-6022, Application for Mortgagee’s Interest in Spirituous Alcoholic Beverage License, is used to record a new lien, a lien assignment or assumption, or a lien renewal or extension. The form is adopted by rule. Fla. Admin. Code R. 61A-5.0012. Upon receipt of a request to record a lien or the renewal of an existing lien, DABT will review the provided documentation and, if the documentation is in order on approved forms and accompanied by the security agreement and statutorily- required payment, will record the lien or lien renewal. If there is a deficiency noted during review of the lien documentation submitted, DABT will issue a 14-day deficiency notice to the requesting entity to provide any missing information. If timely corrected, DABT will record the lien or lien renewal. Section 561.65(4) provides that any lien or security interest filed with DABT on or after July 1, 1995, expires five years after recordation by DABT unless renewed by the lienholder within six months prior to its expiration date. Statutory Notice Requirements to Lienholders Recording a lien not only makes it enforceable, but provides assurance to the lienholder that it will receive notice of pending actions by DABT against the license that may compromise the lien’s vitality. Section 561.65 also sets forth requirements for DABT to provide notice to lienholders of both pending actions against encumbered licenses and any suspension or revocation of a license subject to a lien. Specifically, section 561.65(3) provides that “such lienholder shall be notified in writing of the filing of an order to show cause as to why the license should not be suspended or revoked; and also the lienholder shall be furnished a copy of any order of suspension or revocation.” (Emphasis added). In other words, two separate notices are required: one when the agency institutes proceedings against the licensee and a second if the agency action against the licensee results in a suspension or revocation of the license. Respondent does not assert and no evidence was presented to demonstrate that Petitioner had knowledge of or participated in the cause for revocation of the license at issue in this proceeding, or that Petitioner would not otherwise be entitled to notice of the revocation proceeding. The holder of a recorded lien is entitled to notice because the lienholder has the right to enforce the lien against the licensee within 180 days after the entry of any order of revocation or suspension of the license. Section 561.65(3) specifies that “the 180 days within which to file for enforcement of the lien by the lienholder shall commence running from the date of the mailing of the copy of the order of revocation or suspension.” Thus, the 180-day period runs from when notice is sent to the lienholder, not from the entry of the final order of suspension or revocation. Once notice is provided to the lienholder, any enforcement of the lien is through foreclosure proceedings in circuit court. The process for foreclosure proceedings is outlined in section 561.65(5). Most importantly, both section 561.19(2) and section 561.65(1) provide that no revoked quota beverage license encumbered by a lien or security interest perfected in accordance with section 561.65 shall be issued until the 180-day period (from mailing of the suspension or revocation order) has elapsed or until such enforcement proceeding is final. Re-issuance Through Double Random Drawings Quota licenses may become available three ways: 1) when a dry county goes wet (i.e., a county that previously prohibited the sale of alcohol decides to allow it), three initial quota licenses are issued for the county; 2) when there are population increases in a county, an additional quota license is issued for every population increase of 7,500; and 3) when a quota license in a county has been revoked. When any of those instances occur, pursuant to the directive in section 561.19(2), quota licenses are issued through the use of a double random public drawing. While a revoked quota license may be reissued in a double random quota drawing, if a revoked quota license is encumbered by a perfected and recorded lien or security interest, as discussed previously, it may not be reissued until the 180-day period has elapsed or until enforcement/foreclosure proceedings are final. Damon Larry is currently the assistant bureau chief of licensing, and oversees the annual quota drawing. Each year, he runs a report of all revoked quota licenses and, if the revocation is final, determines whether the 180-day period has elapsed. Before a revoked quota license is placed in the double random drawing, there is communication between staff in different sections within the Department to determine if a license is eligible for inclusion in the quota drawing. The communications involve the quota drawing section, the licensing section, the administrative case unit, the Office of the General Counsel, and the lien section. During this process, DABT staff will determine whether there is a lien attached to the license and, if so, whether there was notice to the lienholder, and whether the 180 days has elapsed or foreclosure proceedings no longer remain pending. If all of these conditions have been met, the revoked license is placed in the quota drawing for reissuance under a new license number. The revoked license number is then deleted from the Department’s database. Petitioner’s Lien Against Alcoholic Beverage License No. 62-08383 Turning to the facts of this case, Daniel A. King, as debtor, executed and delivered a Demand Promissory Note in favor of Rebco on or about April 18, 1997, in the principal amount of $61,000, and simultaneously executed a security agreement in favor of Rebco, as the secured party, pledging license number 62-08383 (the License) as collateral for repayment of the sums due and owing under the Promissory Note. Rebco submitted the promissory note and security agreement to DABT for initial recordation as a lien against the License on or about May 1, 1997, within 90 days of the date of the creation of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien against the License effective May 8, 1997. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on May 8, 2002. Rebco submitted a request to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation on or about November 7, 2001, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The request for renewal was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement, and the forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien renewal against the License effective November 7, 2001. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on November 7, 2006. Rebco submitted a second request to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation on or about July 26, 2006, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division. The request for renewal was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement and the forms clearly identified the parties and the obligation. DABT recorded the lien renewal against the License effective August 1, 2006. If not timely renewed, the lien would expire on August 1, 2011. The License Revocation Proceedings On or about November 16, 2006, at a time when the lien was recorded in the records of DABT, DABT filed administrative charges against Daniel J. King, holder of the License, in Case number 2006-049240, alleging that the licensee failed to operate the License in accordance with section 561.29(1)(f). DABT was unable to achieve personal service on Mr. King, so it published notice of the administrative action in the St. Petersburg Times on May 2, 9, 16, and 23, 2007. The published notice did not identify Petitioner, and no evidence was presented to indicate that DABT sent a copy of the notice to Rebco. Rebco clearly had a recorded lien against the License when the disciplinary action was filed against the License. DABT did not notify Petitioner of the pending action. On or about June 22, 2007, after receiving no written defense in the disciplinary proceeding, DABT issued a Final Order revoking the License effective July 31, 2007. The Final Order of Revocation was not served on Rebco, the owner of the security interest in the License. Petitioner had a recorded lien against the License on file with DABT both when proceedings were instituted against the License and on the date of the entry of the Final Order of Revocation. Stephanie Coxwell works in the administrative case unit of DABT and has done so for at least the last 14 years. The administrative case unit is responsible for determining whether an alcoholic beverage license that is pending revocation or suspension is encumbered by a lien and for notifying any lienholder of the revocation or suspension of an encumbered license. DABT’s practice was to mail any lienholder notice of the license suspension or revocation, along with a copy of the final order, soon after entry of the final order. It is this mailing of the notice and final order that commences the 180 days referenced in section 561.65. For at least the last 14 years, DABT has used a form “notice to lienholder” to notify lienholders of the revocation or suspension of an alcoholic beverage license, accompanied by a copy of the final order revoking or suspending the license. The notification form is a public record maintained by DABT. It is this notification, and not the publication of the pending action, that provides notice to the lienholder. Internal correspondence from Ms. Coxwell within the licensure file for the License indicates that in December 2006, she requested a lien search with respect to the License. Ms. Coxwell was advised by return e-mail that Rebco had a recorded lien against the license. On or about March 21, 2007, Ms. Coxwell requested research for any bankruptcy proceedings affecting the License. She was again informed by intra-agency e-mail that Rebco had a recorded lien against the License. Ms. Coxwell replied by e-mail that she was aware that there was a lien, but that they would notify the lienholder of the administrative action “in the usual way.” However, Ms. Coxwell’s March 27 e-mail was sent three months before the final order revoking the license, not simultaneous to the Order. There is no record that notification was sent to Rebco, either at the time of the administrative action, or after issuance of the final order. Beverly Peebles works in Rebco’s corporate office located at 701 Tennessee River Drive, Muscle Shoals, Alabama 35661, and has done so since 1990. She is responsible for receiving, retaining, and disbursing any mail received by Rebco. Ms. Peebles testified regarding the process used to copy, scan into the company’s electronic database, and distribute any mail received by Rebco. Rebco did not receive any notice concerning the administrative action or the revocation of the License until Rebco received the letter denying the recordation of its lien renewal against the license in 2011. Rebco’s address was at all times on file with the DABT since the inception of the lien against the license in 1997. It is found that the DABT did not notify Rebco that there was an administrative action filed against the License, and did not notify Rebco of the Final Order of Revocation against the License. The licensure file contains all other expected documents from the first recordation of the lien in 1997 to the present. It does not include a copy of notice to Rebco of either the pending action or the Final Order of revocation. Moreover, both a letter dated August 19, 2011, to counsel for Rebco, as well as an e-mail dated March 21, 2007, from Ms. Coxwell, contain handwritten notes regarding the failure to send proper notification. The notes, which are clearly hearsay, are part of public records maintained in the normal course of business, and corroborate Ms. Peebles’ testimony that no notification was received. They also corroborate evidence of the absence of any record of notification to Rebco in DABT’s records of regularly-conducted activity. The August 19, 2011, letter contains a handwritten note at the top stating, “$61K lien no lien ltr sent,” and the e-mail dated March 21, 2007, referenced in paragraph 32, contains the following note: “are we the only group/people who check for current liens recorded before deleting the license? It was deleted on 5/4/2011. Lien was still recorded at that time.”2/ Respondent has presented no credible evidence to indicate that the notice was somehow sent despite the lack of any documentation to that effect contained in the DABT’s records. While the handwritten notes standing alone do not establish that no notice was sent, they do indicate that a question was raised internally regarding whether adequate notice was provided. Despite the failure to notify Rebco of the revocation of the License, the License was placed in the 2010 double random drawing held on March 10, 2011, at a time when a valid lien against the License was duly recorded. Only one license for Pinellas County was included in the drawing for that year, and no licenses for Pinellas County have been issued in a double random quota drawing since then. Shortly after the random drawing, the license number assigned to the License was removed from the Department’s system and a new number assigned to the license issued as a result of the drawing. While there is no direct testimony on the issue, it can be inferred that the purchaser of the new license received the license with no notice that there was any outstanding lien on the right to engage in the sale of alcoholic beverages in Pinellas County under the new license. While it is DABT’s practice to delete a revoked license number from its database, no evidence or statutory reference was presented to support the premise that there is a legal impediment to renewing an existing lien for a revoked license when no notice of the revocation was provided. Given the Department’s failure to notify Rebco of the revocation of the License, the 180-day period identified in section 560.65 never began to run. On or about July 6, 2011, Rebco timely submitted a third request to DABT to renew its existing lien against the License for recordation, within six months of expiration of the lien, on forms approved by the Division, which request was accompanied by the promissory note and security agreement. DABT notified Rebco by letter dated July 19, 2011, that it was unable to record the lien renewal because it was not submitted for recordation within 90 days of its creation. The July 19, 2011, notice of denial was issued based upon a review of the lien renewal request submitted to DABT, because the executed ABT6022 lien-recording form submitted with Rebco’s third renewal request mistakenly identified the effective date of the lien renewal as April 18, 1997, the date of the creation of the original lien. On or about July 25, 2011, Rebco submitted an amended form ABT6022 correcting the effective date for renewal of the lien as August 1, 2011. On August 3, 2011, DABT notified Rebco that it was unable to record the renewal of the lien against the License because “the alcoholic beverage license being pledged as collateral was revoked by the Division on July 31, 2007,” following service of a Notice of Action through publication in the St. Petersburg Times on May 2, 9, 16, and 23, 2007. No action taken by Rebco compromised the vitality of its recorded lien against the License. To the contrary, Rebco faithfully adhered to the recording requirements outlined by statute to record and renew its lien. DABT, however, failed to take the action required by section 561.65 to provide notice to Rebco of the pending action and subsequent revocation of the License. As a result, the 180- day period required by section 561.65 did not run before the License was placed in the quota drawing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order approving the renewal of Rebco’s lien in the License at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2015.
