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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs POORNAWATIE TIWARTI, 91-008255 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 20, 1991 Number: 91-008255 Latest Update: Sep. 18, 1992

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of operating as a broker or salesperson without holding a valid and current license as a broker or salesperson, in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent was licensed as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida and held license number 0443677. She placed her license with Active One Realty, Inc. in 1990 for two months in the spring and, after a brief interval during which her license was not with Active One, one month in the early summer. Each time, Respondent terminated her license with Active One. On September 4, 1990, Respondent again placed her license with Active One. Respondent worked as a 100% commission agent. She retained 100% of the commission earned by her broker on sales or purchases on which she participated. In return, Respondent paid Active One $150 monthly and $100 per closed transaction. In late October, 1990, Respondent informed her broker that she had purchased a daycare center, which was taking a lot of her time. Accordingly, Respondent wanted again to terminate her license with Active One. The broker and Respondent agreed that her last day of work would be November 5, 1990. The broker offered to return a $450 deposit to Respondent, but she asked that the broker retain it until she returned to Active One, as she intended to do. Respondent terminated her license with Active One effective November 6, 1990. Since that date, Respondent's license has continuously been on current inactive status, meaning that she may not engage in real estate activities for which a license is required. By letter to Respondent dated November 8, 1990, Active One confirmed the effective date of the termination. The letter contains a copy of a completed form informing Petitioner of the termination of the license. On November 26, 1990, Respondent prepared a standard contract for sale and purchase in connection with a proposed purchase of real property by her husband. Respondent completed the portions of the contract showing the buyer's name, purchase price, and mortgage information. Respondent delivered the contract, together with a business card showing Respondent as a salesperson with Active One, to another salesperson who was employed by the broker representing the sellers. Respondent also signed the contract as a cooperating broker on behalf of Active One. Prior to the sellers' execution of the contract, which had already been signed by Respondent's husband, Respondent informed the sellers' agent that certain provisions of the contract needed to be changed. The sellers' salesperson prepared another contract, which Respondent's husband signed December 2, 1990. Over Respondent's objection, the sellers' salesperson insisted that the contract contain an addendum stating that Respondent would be participating in the commission and her spouse was the buyer. Respondent's husband, as buyer, also signed the addendum on December 2. Respondent failed to inform Active One of the contract, which the sellers signed on December 8, 1990. The closing was set for no later than January 30, 1991. Active One learned of the contract by chance. An employee of the title company writing the title insurance noticed the name of Active One on the contract. He mentioned the fact to his wife, who is a broker with Active One. When the broker called Respondent and asked her why she was writing a contract when she was no longer licensed, Respondent said only that she had not realized that she was not licensed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order determining that Respondent violated Sections 475.42(1)(a) and, thus, 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, issuing a reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine of $1000. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Jack McCray, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Poornawatie Tiwari 9916 N.W. 9th Ct. Plantation, FL 33322

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.25475.42
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RITA MOROZ, D/B/A A NEW ADVENTURE OF TAMPA BAY vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 01-000373 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 26, 2001 Number: 01-000373 Latest Update: May 14, 2001

The Issue Whether or not on or about December 8, 2000, Petitioner possessed the appropriate license to operate a body-piercing salon establishment in accordance with Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented, the testimony, and upon the personal inspection of the undersigned, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Respondent, Department of Health, Division of Environmental Health, is the state agency charged with implementation of Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code. At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Rita Moroz, operated a manicure-pedicure, nail-lengthening establishment, "A New Adventure of Tampa Bay," located at 11608 North Dale Mabry Highway, Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida 33618. Section 381.0075(2)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "BodyPiercing" as for commercial purposes the act of penetrating the skin to make, generally permanent in nature, a hole, mark, or scar. "Bodypiercing" does not include the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system that penetrates the outer perimeter of lobe of the ear or both. At all times material hereto, Petitioner admitted that she operated a body-piercing establishment salon and provided body-piercing services without first having obtained a body-piercing license as required by law. At all times pertinent hereto, Petitioner possessed a manicure-pedicure license issued by another country and her foreign license also authorized body-piercing services. Petitioner, upon receipt of the Certificate of Violation, discontinued performing body-piercing services. The representative for the Agency stated that the Department would accept, in consideration of Petitioner's admissions and prompt discontinuation of body-piercing services, a reduced fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57381.0075
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs DONALD L. BRADY, 99-000958 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 26, 1999 Number: 99-000958 Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2000

The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated January 26, 1999, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against persons holding licenses as real estate brokers and salespersons. Section 455.225, Florida Statutes. The Florida Real Estate Commission operates within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation and is the entity responsible for imposing discipline on those holding real estate broker or salesperson licenses. Sections 475.02 and 475.25, Florida Statutes. On or about July 11, 1996, John and Darleen Bothe, as buyers, and John Zucarelli, as seller, entered into a contract to purchase and sell real property located in Rolling Hills, Florida. Donald L. Brady was the real estate salesperson who represented Mr. and Mrs. Bothe in the transaction, and David Taylor represented Mr. Zucarelli. Mr. Brady represented in the Contract for Sale and Purchase executed July 11, 1996, and in addenda thereto, that, for purposes of the transaction, he was the real estate licensee and Westar International was the brokerage firm with which he was associated. Although the real estate transaction closed, neither Westar International nor Mr. Brady received any commission on the transaction. The commission that was to have been paid to Westar International was placed into an escrow account by the closing agent when Mr. Brady was unable to present the license of his supervising broker at the closing. At the time of the transaction, Mr. Brady's supervising broker, David A. Brady, was not licensed as a real estate broker because he had failed to renew his license. Mr. Brady was not aware at the time that his broker was not licensed. At the time of the transaction, Donald L. Brady had a valid and current license as a real estate salesperson, license number 0537988, which was effective from April 1, 1995, through March 31, 1997. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding that Donald L. Brady did not violate Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1999.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57455.225455.227475.02475.25475.4290.80390.902
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JOHNNIE LEE SIMMONS, D/B/A 101 CLUB vs. DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 88-006465 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006465 Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1989

The Issue Whether or not Petitioner may be issued a 2-COP License to operate a business to be known as the 101 Club located at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Florida.

Findings Of Fact On September 21, 1987, Petitioner, Johnnie Lee Simmons, submitted a completed application for a new permanent and temporary 2-COP (beer and wine) alcoholic beverage license(s) to the Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (DABT) at DABT's Gainesville, Florida District Office. The application involved the proposed "101 Club, located at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Putnam County, Florida." At the time Petitioner submitted the application(s) he was issued a temporary ninety-day license, numbered 64-00378. By the terms on the face of this first or initial temporary license, it expired on December 19, 1987. This first or initial temporary license likewise indicated on its face that it would expire upon disapproval of the pending permanent license application. The application listed Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., the Petitioner's father, as having a direct interest in the "101 Club" through a personal loan of $1,000.00 by which Petitioner would finance the "101 Club". Also in the Personal Questionnaire portion of the application, Petitioner admitted that he and his father had once held beverage license number 64-00029 for the "Palatka Blue Diamond", a bar previously located at the same address and location as the proposed "101 Club", and further admitted that the prior license had been revoked. Other "Personal Questionnaires" were also submitted simultaneously with, and as part of, the initial application. These had been completed by Petitioner's wife; the father, Willie Lee Simmons, Sr.; and Willie Lee Simmons, Sr.`s wife because the property at 424 North 11th Street, Palatka, Florida is owned together by these four family members. Petitioner and his father, Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., were formerly co- license holders for the "Palatka Blue Diamond". The revocation of that prior license was based upon Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Willie Lee and G. L. Simmons d/b/a Palatka Blue Diamond, DOAH Case No. 83-3023, resulting in a July 12, 1984 Final Order, which was upheld on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal in Simmons v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 465 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The First District Court of Appeal found, "[T]here was competent substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's findings that the underlying violations had occurred. We also conclude there was sufficient evidence of flagrant, persistent and recurring violations from which the hearing officer could infer that the licensees failed to supervise the premises in a reasonably diligent manner and thus, were culpable." Significant and material undisturbed findings of fact contained in the underlying Recommended Order of that case were that "Respondents did keep a public nuisance on the licensed premises by maintaining it as a place visited by persons for the unlawful use or sale of a controlled substance [marijuana], in violation of Section 823.10, F.S." The hearing officer specifically found that although Petitioner might not have been on the premises of the "Palatka Blue Diamond" when drug sales and gambling were going on, he surely knew about these activities from conversations with his wife who tended bar there. When Petitioner submitted the initial license application for the "101 Club" on September 21, 1987, Sgt. Homer Scroggin, DABT Supervisor of the Gainesville Sub-District, already knew the Petitioner and had knowledge about the revocation proceedings against Petitioner's prior license for the "Palatka Blue Diamond". He led Petitioner to believe that the prior revocation would not impede the new license application for the "101 Club", but he made no specific promise or guarantee of licensure. On December 1, 1987, seventy-one days after receiving Petitioner's application, DABT issued a written request to Petitioner for information concerning an alleged arrest in North Carolina. Subsequently, on December 16, 1987, DABT issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Disapprove his application for permanent licensure for failure to furnish information on the alleged North Carolina arrest. On December 23, 1987, ninety-three days after the license application and four days after the first temporary license had expired, but prior to the agency's completing its background checks, DABT's Gainesville office issued Petitioner the second of five temporary licenses. Also on that day, Petitioner signed a waiver, reading: I, Johnnie Lee Simmons, do hereby wave [sic) the 90 day period for my beverage license Sgt. Scroggin testified that if the Petitioner had not signed the foregoing waiver, he, Sgt. Scroggin, would have denied the Petitioner's application for a permanent 2-COP license at that point in time, December 23, 1987, because DABT cannot grant a license without receiving information concerning fingerprints and that information had not arrived. While it is clear that Sgt. Scroggin, told this to Petitioner, thereby inducing him to sign the waiver, the statement itself is erroneous and not credible because the thrust of the entire remainder of Sgt. Scroggin's testimony, the greater weight of the documentary evidence, and much of the testimony of DABT Licensing Bureau Chief, Barry Schoenfeld, is that Sgt. Scroggin's recommendations from the District are not binding on the Bureau of Licensing, located in Tallahassee, that the ultimate decision to grant or deny an application is made by Schoenfeld unless a prior revocation is involved, and that in unusual circumstances, such as appearance of a prior revocation history, an entire committee review procedure, culminating in the signature of the Director of DABT, Leonard Ivey's signature, was in place, and that in each alternative situation, Sgt. Scroggin was only the first recommender.1/ Moreover, the specific terms of the December 16, 1987 Notice of Intent to Disapprove is contrary to Sgt. Scroggin's December 23, 1987 statement to the Petitioner/applicant. That document provided, in pertinent part: The purpose of this letter is to notify you of our intention to recommend disapproval of your application for a license as referenced above. We are giving you ten (10) days in which to correct the deficiencies or supply additional documentation to correct the reason(s) for the recommended disapproval as indicated on the reverse of this letter. The response must be received or postmarked no later than ten (10) days from the date of this letter. If you have not complied within this time period the application will be sent to the Bureau of Licensing and Records in Tallahassee to be disapproved. No amendments or supplements will be accepted after this ten (10) day period unless specifically requested by the Division. Any documentation submitted after this period will be returned. XXX The application is deficient as indicated: 14 day letter was sent to applicant requesting disposition on case #FL0540000 Offense #4999, to date we have not heard from applicant as to his ability to clear up this matter. 14 day letter was dated on December 1, 1987. Despite the agency's characterization of this December 16, 1987 document (R-4, page 2), as an "intent to disapprove/deny," it is clearly nothing more than a repeated untimely agency request for the same information already untimely requested on December 1 (R- 4, page 1; see Finding of Fact No. 6, supra.) It is an untimely request for information, and not a denial of the permanent application. It also is clearly misleading to the applicant concerning his rights with regard to time limits which had become effective by operation of law. It specifically represents that Petitioner had until December 25 to prevent denial of his application, when in fact, the 90-day statutory period starting with the initial application date would lapse on December 20. It is also noted that Schoenfeld and Scroggin agreed, with regard to a subsequent Notice of Intent to Disapprove, that such a notice does not constitute final agency action; therefore, it is clear that both these notices in December, 1987 could not be "final" either. For these reasons and for the reasons set forth in the following Conclusions of Law, Sgt. Scroggin's statement was an erroneous legal conclusion, which either by error or design misled the Petitioner. Sgt. Scroggin also led Petitioner to believe that a backlog in license processing was the reason he needed the waiver signed. Petitioner was subsequently issued three more temporary licenses on March 31, 1988, June 30, 1988, and September 27, 1988. All five temporary licenses clearly notified Petitioner that they expired 90 days from issuance and would expire if the permanent license application were disapproved. The December 23 license lapsed March 22, nine days before the issuance of the March 31 license. The March 31 license lapsed June 28, two days before the June 30 license was issued. All the temporary licenses were issued without fee and permitted Petitioner to continue to operate his bar/nightclub, the "101 Club", pending further license processing which included out of state arrest inquiries, FBI fingerprint processing, and further background checks. Approximately January 22, 1988, the criminal background checks on all four members of Petitioner's family were completed and determined to be no impediment to licensure. On February 4, 1988, Sgt. Scroggin recommended that Tallahassee DABT approve the Petitioner's application and that it issue the requested permanent license. On or about May 18, 1988, Sgt. Scroggin received a memorandum from Mr. Schoenfeld questioning Sgt. Scroggin's February 4 favorable recommendation. Sgt. Scroggin then reconsidered and recommended that Petitioner's application should be disapproved for several reasons. At formal hearing, however, Sgt. Scroggin was unable to provide any evidence supportive of the allegations/reasons contained in this disapproval recommendation. Rather, and contrariwise to those allegations, Sgt. Scroggin admitted that his Gainesville office had received no complaints of any kind relating to the "101 Club" during the 15 months it had operated on its five temporary licenses; that he had, subsequent to his disapproval recommendation, determined that only one police incident report involving the "101 Club" had ever been made; and that that single report had been made by a customer whose boyfriend had slapped her. The DABT witnesses concede that this incident report does not reflect badly in any way on any "101 Club" principal and would not preclude issuing the license. On August 4, 1988, DABT sent Petitioner its "Amended Notice of Intent to Disapprove," naming Petitioner's prior "Palatka Blue Diamond" license revocation as the reason for disapproval. By the terms of that Amended Notice, and in response to it, Petitioner's attorney timely submitted further information, and Sgt. Scroggin, untimely, but by August 19, 1988, advised Tallahassee DABT in favor of licensure approval due to the results of his check of local police incident reports. On September 27, 1988, the fifth temporary license was issued to Petitioner with the approval of Tallahassee DABT. On December 1, 1988, Tallahassee DABT issued its final "Notice of Disapproval," citing the prior license revocation and Petitioner's and his father's lack of good moral character as the only reasons for the license denial. The record as a whole clearly shows that the only unfavorable evidence of moral character that DABT had before it with regard to this license application arose out of the prior license revocation 4-5 years before. Petitioner/applicant, Johnnie Lee Simmons, is 40 years old. He has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of any offense against the beverage laws of Florida, the United States, or any other state; has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, or illegally dealing in narcotics; and has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of a felony in this state, or the United States. Willie Lee Simmons, Sr., Petitioner/applicant's 58 year old father and an interested party, also has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of any offense against the beverage laws of Florida, the United States, or any other state; has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, or illegally dealing in narcotics; and has never been convicted (or otherwise pled guilty or nolo contendere or suffered a bond forfeiture) of a felony in this state, or the United States. Upon the testimony of Dorothy Carter, accountant- bookkeeper for, and long-time friend of, all the Simmons family members, the testimony of Sgt. Scroggin, and admissible hearsay statements of Palatka Chief of Police Hill and Assistant Chief of Police Rowe (P-12), it is found that as of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner and his father respectively have good reputations for honesty, fair dealing, and personal character in the Palatka, Putnam County community. Both men are reputable and responsible business persons, each employing between 25 and 40 migrant laborers. They pay their taxes. They have established credit. Further, upon the record as a whole, it is found that the Simmons father and son, between them, support three Palatka city-league baseball teams and are also engaged in other activities which benefit the community with an emphasis on youth. Also, Johnnie Lee Simmons, the applicant/Petitioner, has long been active in the local chapter of the NAACP and served two years as its President. In so finding, the undersigned has assessed Mrs. Carter's credibility in several respects. First, it is recognized that as a social friend and business associate of all the Simmons family members, her view of them is favorably weighted by that association. Second, her view of the prior license revocation is also affected in their favor by their business and social association. Mrs. Carter has, in her own mind at least, minimized the importance of the prior license revocation by her belief that all wrongdoing in the "Palatka Blue Diamond" occurred while the Simmons men were out-of-town, for the purpose of transporting laborers to northern farms and while they were not physically within the licensed premises providing active management. This belief of Mrs. Carter is directly contrary to the responsibilities imposed by statute, rule, and case law upon beverage licensees who are required to know and to monitor affairs on their premises, but it is accurate in terms of the factual absence of applicant/Petitioner's absence from the "Palatka Blue Diamond" at times crucial to the prior revocation. However, third, and most importantly, it is found that Mrs. Carter was testifying concerning the status of the Simmons mens' affairs, conduct, and character in 1989, 6-7 years after the prior revocation events, 4-5 years after actual revocation, and at a time when other evidence confirms that Petitioner and his father have centralized all their business and community activities within the Palatka community. The moral character of the principals approximately 5 years after the prior revocation, at the time of the new application and the de novo formal hearing, is material and persuasive. Mrs. Carter, as a long-time local resident, has had opportunity and reason to know the current situation, and her testimony that the Simmons father's and son's character (based on her own experience and opinion) is now "good" is credible and unrefuted. Moreover, her conclusion with regard to their good character and reputation (arising from word of mouth in the community) is reinforced by Sgt. Scroggin's investigation and ultimate favorable recommendation, which in turn was based on the customary predicate for "reputation in the community". Mrs. Carter's evidence of current good character is direct and unrefuted. Sgt. Scroggins' testimony is in the nature of reputation testimony but is bolstered by his personal examination of the police incident reports and corroborates the statements/opinions of Palatka's Chief and Assistant Chief of Police, which, though hearsay, are admissible pursuant to Section 120.58 F.S. Sgt. Scroggins' and the officers' opinions are consistent as to reputation with Mrs. Carter's unrefuted opinion as to character.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages, issue a Final Order confirming that the permanent 2 COP beverage license was issued to Petitioner pursuant to operation of law on December 20, 1987. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of September 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1989.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.60561.15561.181823.10
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JOSEPH L. NACCA vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 05-003208 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 02, 2005 Number: 05-003208 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2006

The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of his felony conviction in accordance with Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2006).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a racehorse owner on or about March 30, 2005. On his application, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted on one count of Conspiracy to Transport Stolen Property and Evade Taxes, a felony. Due to Petitioner’s felony conviction, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver failed to include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he is of good moral character. In the regular course of the Division's review of Petitioner's application and request for waiver, on or about April 11, 2005, Petitioner was interviewed by Dennis Badillo, an investigator for the Division. During the interview, Mr. Badillo completed a waiver interview form based upon the answers provided by Petitioner. Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present information to establish his rehabilitation and to demonstrate his present good moral character, but Petitioner did not provide such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner’s felony conviction, which is undisputed and admitted by Petitioner on his application form and at the final hearing, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license he seeks. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to minimize his role in the crime of which he was convicted, and expressed the view that he "doesn't have much time" to fulfill his desire to "participate in the racing industry" in Florida, inasmuch as he has passed his 70th birthday. Petitioner failed to present any testimony from friends, relatives, associates, employers, probation officers, or other individuals to establish good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his felony conviction. Absent such evidence, the Division has no basis upon which to conclude that Petitioner is rehabilitated or that Petitioner is of present good moral character.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Thomas Peavey Hoffer Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Joseph L. Nacca 268 West Walk West Haven, Connecticut 06516 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (3) 10.001550.0251550.105
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RODNEY WILLIAMS vs CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 06-004396 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 07, 2006 Number: 06-004396 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2019

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to have his general contractor’s license re-instated.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner received a license as a general contractor in 1984. At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was required to renew his license every two years. For the Petitioner, the renewal was due on or before August 31 of even numbered years. For example, the Petitioner’s license due for renewal in 2000 was due August 31, 2000. There are two types of licenses pertinent to this case: active and inactive. The renewal fees associated with these licenses are different. An inactive licensee pays a smaller renewal fee. The Respondent is responsible for maintaining records, collecting the appropriate fees, and processing license renewals for licensees. If a contractor fails to pay the requisite renewal fees when they are due the license automatically goes into a “delinquent status.” This status continues until the licensee makes good on the past due renewal fees and submits a complete renewal application. If the licensee does not remit the appropriate fees and completed application before the next licensing renewal period expires (the next two year cycle), the license becomes “null.” In this case, the Petitioner held an inactive license during the 1998-2000 two year-period. On or before August 31, 2000, the Petitioner should have submitted a complete application and paid the renewal fees to keep his license in good status. The Petitioner did not submit a complete application and did not remit the appropriate fees for renewal on or before August 31, 2000. Consequently, on September 1, 2000, the Petitioner’s license went into the delinquent status noted above. To clear this status the Petitioner was required to renew his license by submitting a complete renewal application with the appropriate fees on or before August 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not do so. Therefore, on September 1, 2002, the Petitioner’s license became “null” as a matter of law. The “null” status cannot be changed by paying unpaid fees. Instead, a licensee may either apply for and seek a new license or seek to re-instate the license. To that end, the Petitioner filed a request for reinstatement on or about June 9, 2006. When the Respondent denied the Petitioner’s request for reinstatement, the instant case ensued. Prior to August 31, 2002, the Petitioner did not contact the Respondent to relate personal tragedies, did not cure the delinquent renewal status, and did not pay the fees necessary to renew his inactive license. The Petitioner’s request for a refund (dated May 18, 2005) of the untimely fees paid in September 2002 was not approved. The Respondent provided no explanation for why the untimely fees were not refunded to the Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for reinstatement of his license. The Respondent should, however, refund the Petitioner’s untimely paid fees. S DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney Williams 513 Northwest 22nd Avenue Apartment 4 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311-7773 Deborah Bartholow Loucks, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michael Martinez, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57455.271
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EXECUTIVE I AND II, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 92-003891 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jun. 25, 1992 Number: 92-003891 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1992

Findings Of Fact Some time before May 15, 1992, the Petitioner, Executive I & II, Inc., applied for licensure to operate as an adult congregate living facility (ACLF). (It had been, and is still, operating as a licensed boarding home.) The exact date of the application, or how long before May 15, 1992, the application was made, is not clear from the evidence. The facility operated by the Petitioner is the same facility that was the subject of Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case Nos. 90-3356 and 90-3791. Before and during the pendency of those proceedings, the facility was owned and operated by Kriscour, Inc., d/b/a Executive I & II. Kriscour, Inc., is a separate legal entity from the Petitioner. The sole owner and operator of the Petitioner was the sole owner and operator of Kriscour, Inc., until October 10, 1989, when he became a 49% owner of Kriscour and ceased all involvement in the operation of the facility. Throughout, however, he owned the real property operated by Kriscour and by the Petitioner. In DOAH Case No. 90-3356, HRS sought to revoke Kriscour's conditional ACLF license. While it was pending, Kriscour applied for renewal of the license, and HRS denied renewal. Kriscour initiated formal administrative proceedings, which became DOAH Case No. 90-3791. The two cases were consolidated at DOAH. Ultimately, they resulted in an HRS Final Order denying the renewal application and "cancelling" the conditional license. Kriscour appealed the Final Order to the District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida, where it was given Case No. 91-00751. Kriscour obtained a stay of the Final Order and continued to operate the facility as an ACLF during the appellate proceedings. Meanwhile, on or about November 26, 1991, the Petitioner, Executive I & II, Inc., was formed and became licensed to operate the facility as a boarding home. The Petitioner made extensive renovations and improvements to the physical plant. At the same time, Kriscour continued to operate the facility as an ACLF. Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the Final Order. The court's Mandate, which operated to dissolve the stay, was entered on January 2, 1992. On or about that date, Kriscour ceased to operate the facility as an ACLF and began operating the facility as a boarding home. To date, the Petitioner has operated the facility exclusively as a boarding home.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the application of the Petitioner, Executive I & II, Inc., for licensure to operate as an ACLF. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1992.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PATRICIA KATZ vs CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS, 98-002938 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 06, 1998 Number: 98-002938 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner's license to practice clinical social work was lawfully annulled.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia Katz, was licensed as a clinical social worker in Florida, license number SW 0002228, on March 31, 1989. Thereafter, Petitioner intended to remain fully licensed. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and licensing clinical social workers within the State of Florida. Based upon the testimony of Petitioner and documentary evidence received in this cause, it is undisputed that Petitioner remained actively licensed until January 31, 1995. Prior to the expiration of her license in January 1995, the Respondent was required to send Petitioner a license renewal notice. Renewal notices are typically computer generated and the Respondent does not maintain copies of the notices to verify that they are sent to, or received by, its licensees. In this case, there is no direct evidence to establish Petitioner received the renewal notice; however, the computer records maintained by the Respondent reflect that the renewal notice was sent to Petitioner's Miami address on or about September 20, 1994. The address the Respondent maintained for Petitioner for the 1995 renewal time frame was accurate: 9720 Southwest 159th Street, Miami, Florida. In June 1995, Petitioner acquired a new residence in Broward County, Florida. She has remained at the Broward residence, 762 Heritage Drive, Weston, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, continuously since that time. In August 1995, Petitioner sold her old residence in Miami. Between this sale and the acquisition of the Broward residence, Petitioner maintains she notified the Respondent, in writing, of the address change. For some unexplained reason, the Respondent did not change its records regarding Petitioner's address. It continued to carry Petitioner's address as the Miami residence. For some unexplained reason, Petitioner did not contact the Respondent, in writing, to question why she did not receive a renewal notice for the 1995-97 period. Petitioner knew or should have known that her license renewals were due every two years. In addition to renewal forms, license fees are due and payable to the Respondent at renewal time. Had Petitioner renewed her license for the 1995-97 period, it would have expired at the end of January 1997. In October 1996, Respondent, again by way of the computer-generated form, sent Petitioner a notice of license nullification. According to the computer records, this notice was also sent to the Petitioner's old Miami address. Respondent does not have a copy of the notice or verification that Petitioner received it. In February 1997, the Respondent declared Petitioner's license null and void. Petitioner chose not to renew her license in January 1995, but believed it had automatically gone into an "inactive" status which would continue indefinitely. During this time Petitioner encountered several personal challenges which rightfully preempted her interest in her license status. Among these crises were two close relatives with cancer who required her assistance. Nevertheless, because she desired to maintain her license for the 1995-1997 time frame, Petitioner took the required continuing education courses. Such course work, completed during calendar year 1996, is fully documented in Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Petitioner did not pay any fees associated with her license status for the period 1995-1997. Sometime in 1997, Petitioner became concerned regarding her license status and contacted the Respondent by telephone. She spoke with Lucy Gee, the former executive director for Respondent, and sought clarification as to her license. When Ms. Gee advised Petitioner that her license had been annulled as a matter of law, Petitioner immediately sought to challenge such decision. In August 1997, the Respondent advised Petitioner that she would have to re-apply for licensure as a new licensee. Other options were not suggested. Petitioner did not receive notice that her license would be annulled prior to the agency action in February 1997. Petitioner was not afforded a point of entry to challenge the agency decision until March 1998. Thereafter, the Petitioner's challenge was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's request for reinstatement to an inactive license status with leave to reactivate her license upon the payment of fees and demonstrated compliance with continuing education be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Foster, Executive Director Department of Health Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health BIN A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health BIN A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 E. Renee Alsobrook, Esquire Alsobrook & Dove, P.A. Post Office Box 10426 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2426 Edward Tellechea, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Attorney General's Office The Capitol, Plaza 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.60455.225455.271455.275
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ORLANDO GRANDAL vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL SURVEYORS AND MAPPERS, 00-004178 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 09, 2000 Number: 00-004178 Latest Update: Nov. 19, 2001

The Issue Whether Petitioner's license as a Professional Surveyor and Mapper became void on March 1, 1997, by operation of Section 455.271, Florida Statutes. If so, whether the Board of Surveyors and Mappers (Board) has the authority to reinstate Petitioner's license in any manner other than that set forth in Section 455.271(6), Florida Statutes. Whether the Board is estopped from asserting that Petitioner's license should not be reinstated. Whether Petitioner is entitled to have his license reinstated by operation of Section 472.041, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was initially licensed as a Professional Surveyor and Mapper on July 11, 1986, and issued license number 0004297. Such licenses must be renewed every two years pursuant to Section 472.017, Florida Statutes. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida with the duty to regulate those licensed as Professional Surveyors and Mappers. Pursuant to Section 472.015, Florida Statutes, DBPR is the agency of the State of Florida that actually issues such licenses. It is undisputed that Petitioner renewed and maintained an active license through the 1993/1994 biennium, which ended February 28, 1995. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Petitioner renewed his license after the 1993/1994 biennium. Petitioner testified that he mailed to DBPR by regular mail a form renewing his license for the 1995/1996 biennium, enclosed a check in the appropriate amount with the renewal form, and requested in writing on the back of the renewal form that the status of his license be changed from active to inactive because he could not at that time meet continuing education requirements. Petitioner produced a copy of the renewal form and a copy of the check, dated February 10, 1995, he said he mailed to DBPR. Petitioner did not know whether his check had been cashed, and he did not receive anything from DBPR reflecting that his license had been renewed and placed in an inactive status. Whenever any licensee renews a professional license, DBPR issues and mails a two-part license containing a wallet portion and a display portion that verifies the renewal. 3/ Petitioner made no effort to determine why his check had not been cashed or why he had not received his renewed license. Petitioner's failure to follow-up on his renewal request can be explained, in part, by the fact that his life was in disarray, both from a personal and a professional perspective. During this period in 1995, Petitioner had closed his surveying business and was working in an unrelated business, he was living in the marital residence on an intermittent basis, and he was depending on his estranged spouse and his children to deliver his mail to him. Respondent's records do not reflect that Petitioner took any action after the 1993/94 biennium to renew or inactivate his license. Had Petitioner taken such action, Respondent's records would have contained a renewal request form, the request to inactivate the license, and documentation that a renewed license had been forwarded to Petitioner. Had DBPR received a renewal check from Petitioner, its records would reflect that the check had been received and negotiated. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to renew his license after the 1993/1994 biennium. On March 1, 1995, Petitioner's license became delinquent pursuant to Section 455.271(5), Florida Statutes. On March 9, 1995, DBPR changed its computer records to reflect that Petitioner's license status had been changed to delinquent. In November 1996, Petitioner's address of record with DBPR was his marital residence, 1620 Southwest 99 Court, Miami, Florida. Petitioner continued to use the marital residence as his address of record with the Board and DBPR until November 1999. There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether DBPR and the Board had Petitioner's correct address of record. Petitioner introduced a roster of individuals and firms holding active Professional Surveyors and Mappers licenses that was prepared from the Board's data base as of October 1994. This roster contained an incorrect address for Petitioner. Respondent established that this roster was not used by either the DBPR or the Board to mail any of the forms or notices at issue in this proceeding. Respondent also established that both DBPR and the Board had Petitioner's correct address of record at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The conflicting evidence is resolved by rejecting Petitioner's contention that the pending cancellation notice was not mailed to his address of record in November 1996. Petitioner testified that he never received any notice that his license was about to be cancelled. The records of DBPR established that a Notice of Pending Cancellation of License was processed by DBPR on November 18, 1996, and mailed to Petitioner at his address of record on November 22, 1996. The notice advised that Petitioner's license would become null and void on March 1, 1997, if the license was not placed on an active or inactive status by that date. The notice also advised that it was the only notice Petitioner would receive before his license became null. Petitioner initiated no communication with either DBPR or the Board in 1996, 1997, or 1998. On March 1, 1997, Petitioner's license became null by operation of Section 455.271(6), Florida Statutes. DBPR entered in its computer system on March 9, 1997, that the status of Petitioner's license had been changed from the classification of "delinquent" to the classification of "null and void." In 1999, Petitioner decided to return to activities requiring licensure as a Professional Surveyor and Mapper. When he applied for a job with a surveying company in the fall of 1999, he learned that his license was classified null and void. Petitioner, through attorney T. S. Madson, II, moved the Board to reinstate his license and requested the opportunity to present argument in support of his motion at the Board meeting scheduled for January 12-14, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Madson and Petitioner appeared before the Board on January 13, 2000. Upon hearing Petitioner's claim that he had not received the pending cancellation notice in November 1996, the Board voted to reinstate his license. 1/ The Board did not enter a written order memorializing that vote. On March 6, 2000, counsel for DBPR filed a formal motion that the Board reconsider its vote to reinstate Petitioner's license, arguing that the Board lacked the legal authority to reinstate a license that had become null and void. Subsequent to the Board's vote on January 13, 2000, Petitioner engaged in activities that require licensure as a Professional Surveyor and Mapper. Until May 2000, Petitioner sealed surveys using license number 0004297. On May 18, 2000, at a duly noticed meeting in Key West, Florida, with Petitioner and Mr. Madson in attendance, the Board addressed DBPR's motion to reconsider. After debate, the Board voted to grant the motion to reconsider and thereafter voted to rescind its previous order reinstating Petitioner's license. A written Order Rescinding Reinstatement of License was formally entered on May 31, 2000. The basis for the vote was the Board's determination that it lacked the legal authority to reinstate Petitioner's license.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application that his license be reinstated. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 2001.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57455.227455.271455.273472.015472.017
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FRAMAY, INC., T/A THIRSTY PARROT vs DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 94-006914 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 09, 1994 Number: 94-006914 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1995

The Issue Whether Respondent is entitled to a refund of license fees and late penalties.

Findings Of Fact On September 6, 1988, a lien on License No. 68-01319, Series 4-COP, was recorded with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Respondent). The named lienholder was Francis D. Sawyer (Petitioner). Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot was the holder of License No. 68-01319. On May 21, 1990, an administrative action was filed by the Respondent against Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot. The administrative action, alleged that Framay failed to maintain the license in an active status. Framay never requested a hearing and a Final Order was entered on September 25, 1990, revoking License No. 68-01319. On November 8, 1990, the Respondent filed a Notice to Show Cause alleging failure to comply with the terms of the September 25, 1990 Final Order. On May 6, 1991, a second Final Order was entered revoking License No. 68-01319. In February 1992, the Respondent was contacted by attorney Stanley Chapman as counsel to Petitioner, Sawyer. Petitioner claimed that the Respondent had failed to provide him a point of entry as lienholder to foreclose his lien, and sought to have the license "reinstated in escrow" in order to allow him to proceed in foreclosure. After some discussion, the Respondent agreed to cooperate with Petitioner's efforts to foreclose by not opposing a summary judgement motion filed by Petitioner. Normally, foreclosure of a lien on a revoked license is permitted only when the lienholder brings an action within 12 days of an order or revocation. Even though the time had expired, the Division nonetheless permitted Sawyer to foreclose on the license because Sawyer had a legitimate claim and the Division's interests would not be adversely affected by ignoring the 12 day time frame. In August 1992, Petitioner, through his attorney Stanley Chapman, filed a complaint to foreclose his lienholder's interest in the license. Framay, Inc., d/b/a Thirsty Parrot, Wayne F. Sawyer and the Division were named as defendants. The Petitioner foreclosed on License No. 68-01319 and a Final Judgment of Foreclosure and Transfer of Beverage License was entered on January 27, 1993. Upon the entry of foreclosure, Petitioner, as required by the Respondent, filed an application for the delinquent renewal of License No. 68- 01319. The delinquent renewal of the license required that past due license fees totalling $5,512.50 for the years 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993 be paid to activate the license. Petitioner requested that the Respondent waive the payment of delinquent annual license fees and penalties which the Respondent was seeking prior to issuing the license to any transferee. The Respondent denied the request to waive applicable fees and required payment of delinquent renewal fees in the amount of $5,512.50. Petitioner paid the fee under protest, claiming that the fee was not applicable to this transaction.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly,

Florida Laws (4) 120.57561.26561.27562.01
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