The Issue Whether Respondent, Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent or Condominium Association), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes,1/ by engaging in discriminatory housing practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, James Henkel (Petitioner), is a full-time resident of unit 609 within Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium. Petitioner is wheel-chair bound. He is physically disabled and protected for the purposes of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. Respondent is a condominium association charged with operation of the Harbour Pointe of Perdido Key Condominium (Condominium). The Condominium was developed by Harbour Pointe Land and Finance, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability company. Respondent is the successor in interest to the developer. Respondent now manages and maintains the Condominium common areas through its board of directors. Although Respondent has made subsequent changes with regard to security gates for the pool and dock, Respondent had no role in the design or development of the Condominium. The subject entrance and exit doors have opening pressures that vary, but are usually out of compliance with applicable Florida and Federal standards for handicap access. However, despite Petitioner’s allegations, the evidence does not support a finding that any of the door closers that are out of compliance have been altered since ownership of the Condominium was transferred and Respondent became responsible for management and operation of the Condominium. At one point in time, Respondent altered the pool gate in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Design Manual. Respondent, however, has since made alterations to the pool gate to make it compliant and has a pending work order for additional changes, at Respondent’s expense, designed to make the pool gate’s key pad even more accessible to Petitioner. Access to the boat slip portions of the Condominium dock is a “Limited Common Element” that has always been limited to Condominium unit owners with assigned rights to one or more dock slips. See sections 3.20, 4.1, and 8.1B of the Condominium’s Declaration of Condominium. Petitioner’s unit does not have an assigned dock slip. Petitioner, however, along with other residents without boat slips have historically had access to the dock through a gate and key pad, the combination of which was provided to all unit owners. Initially, access to the dock for Petitioner and other residents who did not own boat slips was not a problem because there was only one gate to the dock and, once through the gate, Petitioner and other residents could proceed to the end of the dock where there was ample room to turn around a wheelchair. Although not officially designated as a common area, in essence, all residents, including Petitioner, with permission of the boat owners, enjoyed access to the dock, except for the boat slip areas. Later, however, security issues arose regarding the dock. Non-residents were going around the single security gate to get on the dock. With the goal of increasing security, Respondent installed a second gate further down on the narrow walkway portion of the dock before the end. Even after that, non-residents were accessing the dock by breaking the lock on the second gate or climbing around and jumping up on the other side of the pier. Respondent repaired the gate locks on more than one occasion, and has since made additional changes to the second gate to make it more difficult to get through or around. Petitioner agrees that dock security was a problem that needed to be addressed. The problem is that Petitioner cannot get through the second gate and the width of the dock between the gates is inadequate for Petitioner to turn around his wheelchair. If the area between the gates was common area, it would not meet the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) Design Manual standards. At the time of hearing, however, the dock area between the gates was not common area, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the dock was ever common area. Specifically, after assessing the issues and receiving two legal opinions that the entire dock was a “Limited Common Element” with access limited to condominium unit owners with assigned boat slips, Respondent’s board voted to change the condominium document with an amendment for improvements that would allow access for residents without boat slips, including access that would meet the needs for wheelchair access. That amendment, however, made it clear that, until the improvements were completed, access between the first and second gates is a Limited Common Element restricted to boat slip owners. In other words, the evidence failed to show that Petitioner or any other non-boat slip owners are entitled to access to the dock during the dock improvement design and construction. While Petitioner may have a claim if the ultimate improvements do not comply with applicable FHA standards, that claim is not ripe for consideration. In sum, Petitioner failed to show that Respondent discriminated against him because of his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2015.
The Issue This issue in this case is whether the private Respondents are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Because the undersigned is not required or authorized to recommend a disposition on the merits of Singer’s Petition, the fact-findings that follow are limited to those necessary to determine the narrow issue whether an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is proper under Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, as written, the findings below assume the reader’s familiarity with the preceding Preliminary Statement. On July 22, 1999, the Owners submitted an application to the Department seeking approval to build a dock. In a letter dated January 21, 2000, which is included in File 2, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the proposed dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This January 21, 2000, letter constituted the first agency action (“First Action” or “FA”) concerning the Owners’ dock. The First Action comprised three distinct determinations (for short, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3”), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: FA-D1: The dock is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”). FA-D2: The dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. FA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the dock is deemed consistent with the State Programmatic General Permit (“SPGP”) program. As originally designed, and as approved by the Department on January 21, 2000, the Owners’ dock will be referred to herein as the “Approved Dock.” After receiving notice of the First Action, the Owners caused a “Notice of Determination of Exemption” to be published in the February 1, 2000, issue of the Palm Beach Daily Business Review. In pertinent part, this public notice stated: The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the [Owners’] project to construct a 125-foot by 4-foot access dock and a 40-foot by 8-foot terminal platform has been determined to be exempt from the requirements to obtain an environmental resource permit. . . . . A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department’s action may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . * * * Complete copies of all documents relating to this determination of exemption are available for public inspection during normal business hours . . . at the [Department’s regional office]. (Owners’ Exhibit No. 4). Following the publication of this notice, an individual named Karrie Webb timely filed a petition with the agency challenging the Department’s approval of the Approved Dock. Her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing was filed with DOAH on February 17, 2000, initiating Webb. v. Timothy and Hope Delong and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 00-0761 (the “Webb case”). The Webb case proceeded through final hearing, but before a Recommended Order was issued, the petitioner, on January 9, 2001, filed a Stipulation for Dismissal. Consequently, on January 12, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order closing the file.1 Not long after the conclusion of the Webb case, the Owners submitted a second application to the Department for authorization to build a dock. As described in this second application (which gave rise to File 3), the newly proposed dock (hereafter, the “Redesigned Dock”) differed somewhat from the Approved Dock. Most noticeably, the terminal platform of the Redesigned Dock faced north, towards Singer’s property, whereas the terminal platform of the Approved Dock had faced south. Singer and the Owners disagreed sharply as to whether the differences between the Approved Dock and the Redesigned Dock should be considered “substantial” (as Singer claims) or merely “minor” (as the Owners claim). For present purposes, however, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, to resolve that particular dispute. What is significant and should be emphasized, however, is that whether or not the Redesigned Dock differed substantially from the Approved Dock, the Owners submitted a new application respecting the Redesigned Dock as if it were a new project, and the Department acted upon the Owners’ second application as if the first one had neither been made nor approved. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 2001, which is included in File 3, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the Redesigned Dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This February 28, 2001, letter constituted the second agency action (“Second Action” or “SA”) concerning the Owners’ dock (though it was, of course, the first agency action on the Redesigned Dock). Like the First Action of the previous year, the Second Action was composed of three distinct determinations (again, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3” for short), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: SA-D1: The re-designed dock is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. SA-D2: The re-designed dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. SA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the re-designed dock is deemed not consistent with the SPGP program.2 The Owners did not cause notice of the Department’s Second Action to be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Armed with the Second Action, the Owners proceeded to have the Redesigned Dock constructed, and it now exists in fact. The existing structure will be referred to herein as the “As- Built Dock,” which, to be clear, was constructed according to the blueprint of the Redesigned Dock. After the construction began, Singer initiated this administrative litigation, the procedural history of which is summarized in the Preliminary Statement. In the course of the litigation, on May 17, 2002, the Department filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction. As the basis for its request that the undersigned relinquish jurisdiction over File 3——that is, the Department’s file supporting the Second Action, which had approved the Redesigned Dock——the Department relied upon a letter dated May 16, 2002, from the Owners’ counsel to the Department’s counsel, which contained the following pertinent text: Please accept this notice as the withdrawal of the application filed by Timothy and Hope Delong in the above matter [namely, File 3]. The Department (with the Owners’ concurrence) contended that because the Owners had voluntarily withdrawn their application, the agency had lost jurisdiction to enter a final order implementing, modifying, or rescinding the Second Action, which had preliminarily approved that application. See, e.g., City of North Port, Florida v. Consolidated Minerals, Inc., 645 So. 2d 485, 486-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The undersigned agreed that, by withdrawing their application for approval of the Redesigned Dock, the Owners had divested the Department of jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, the undersigned relinquished jurisdiction over File 3. In withdrawing their second application, the Owners materially changed their position and substantially modified the outcome of the most relevant preliminary agency action at issue, namely, the Second Action approving the Redesigned Dock. Indeed, by nullifying the Second Action, the Owners forfeited the only express authorization, albeit a preliminary one, that they had ever obtained from the Department for the Redesigned Dock. Thus, in other words, rather than defend the Department’s preliminary approval of the Redesigned Dock in this proceeding, the Owners elected to rely upon the First Action as a defense against any future claim that the As-Built Dock is an illegal, unpermitted project.3 The Owners’ withdrawal of their second application was intended to resolve, and in fact did resolve, matters raised in Singer’s Petition. The undersigned specifically finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Owners’ change of position was substantial for purposes of Section 120.595(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 13, 1984, Dax and Trin filed an application with DER, pursuant to Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, for a permit and water quality certification to construct a 28-slip docking facility in Canal No. 8 in Mashes Sands, Panacea Shores, Wakulla County, Florida. Dax and Trin's application was complete on September 19, 1984. On December 14, 1984, DER issued its letter of intent to issue the requested permits for a "20-slip docking facility," and requested that Dax and Trin publish notice of the proposed agency action as required by Section 403.815, Florida Statutes. Notice was published December 24, 1984. The notice advised the public of DER's intent to issue the requested permits to "construct a 20-slip dockage facility," and advised substantially affected persons of their right to a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing on DER's proposed agency action. Petitioner, Jean McMillan, timely filed a petition for formal administrative proceedings. Petitioner is a resident of Wakulla County, Florida, and is the record owner of real property adjacent to that of Dax and Trin and claims a right of access to Canal No. 8. Petitioner has used, and continues to use, the waters of Canal No. 8 and of Ochlockonee Bay for boating, fishing and recreation. The Marina The permit sought by Dax and Trin would allow it to construct a 28-slip docking facility consisting of a 357 foot long by 2 foot wide floating pier parallel to an existing concrete bulkhead on the west side of Canal No. 8, up to fourteen 12 foot by 2 foot wide floating finger piers extending 60 degrees from perpendicular into the canal, and 14 mooring pilings centered between the outer limits of the finger piers. The floating pier and finger piers would be constructed of pressure treated wood resting on styrofoam, and would be secured to pressure treated pilings. No fueling, electrical or water hookups, or other service-type amenities are proposed for this facility. The boats to be docked at the facility would be less than 30 feet in length. The 28 slips proposed by Dax and Trin in this proceeding are part of a larger marina development of at least 48 slips, which Dax and Trin proposes to develop in the canal adjoining a 27-unit condominium development it is presently constructing. Dax and Trin proposes to construct the additional 20 slips, with the same means of construction, immediately adjacent to the proposed 28 slips and parallel to the existing bulkhead, under a claimed exemption for reconstruction and restoration. Additional slips, beyond the first 48, are contemplated by Dax and Trin's development plans. In connection with the 20-slip facility Dax and Trin proposes to provide the following services and amenities: bait and tackle shop, upland fish cleaning stations, public boat fueling facilities, sewage pump-out station, picnic tables, gazebo, snack bar, and restrooms. All services and amenities will be available to the public, including the users of the adjacent 28 slips which are the subject matter of these proceedings. DER's December 14, 1984, Letter of Intent proposed to issue the permit subject to the following conditions: A dockmaster shall: supervise dockage and vessel operations; ensure that all dockage users are familiar with dockage rules, especially those pertaining to vessel discharges; and, be responsible for the clean-up correction of all unauthorized discharges; There shall be no discharges into the canal or bay waters of fish carcasses, food wastes, litter, sewage, fuel, oil, grease, paint or thinner, varnish or other materials other than clean water; Waste containers shall be located along the dockage and emptied regularly to prevent their spill-over; Any fish cleaning stations shall be located on the uplands and all fish carcasses shall be placed in upland containers, and shall not be disposed of in the canal or bay; The dockage user agreement shall contain and stipulate the operational controls. Dax and Trin has agreed to comply with all conditions established by the DER Letter of Intent and at final hearing, agreed to comply with the following additional conditions: OPERATIONAL CONTROLS. The following operations controls shall be implemented immediately after construction of the dockage and shall be applicable to the 28 slip docking facility which is the subject of this permit and the adjoining 20 slip docking facility. Dockmaster. There will be a responsible dockmaster on duty at all reasonable hours who will supervise dockage and vessel operations, ensure that all dock users are familiar with dockage rules and be responsible for proper operation. Fuel Storage and Equipment. The fuel storage area shall be located on the upland site. The fuel tanks shall be provided with automatic cut off valves and each dispenser will be equipped with an automatic knock off valve. In the event a dispenser is knocked off the dock or the fuel line ruptured, the automatic valves will minimize fuel spill. Any time the docks are not attended, the fuel lines will be shut off at the tanks. Fuel Spill. Any time fueling opera- tions are under way they will be continuously attended by docking personnel. This will not be a self-service fueling operation. Fueling procedures include the following: The quantity of fuel desired or required to fill each vessel will be determined prior to fueling. Extreme caution will take place as tanks approach full to prevent overfilling. A nozzle soak up ring will be used with this operation. Any over-fill or slop-out will be wiped up, not washed off. The spill containment and clean-up plan shall be posted at the fuel and supply shed. All fuel spill equipment and material will be located on the dock facilities in the fuel and supply shed for ready access and quick deployment. The spill equipment will include absorbent material that responds to fuel products. All staff shall be trained in the use of the equipment, and shall be instructed to notify any affected agencies (Department of Natural Resources, Marine Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Environmental Regulation). Trash Disposal and Removal. Overboard discarding of trash in the dock or canal area shall be prohibited. Trash receptacles will be placed throughout the docking facility and maintained in a clean and sanitary condition. These receptacles will be secured so as to prevent accidental dumping or tipping during inclement weather. Dock personnel will monitor these receptacles so that they do not have the opportunity to become over full. The full or partially full containers will be removed from the docking facility area. This trash will be taken upland and disposed of in an approved manner. Any trash noted on docks will be removed at once. Discharge of Bilge Water. Discharge of bilge water into the dock or canal area shall be prohibited. Waste Holding Tank Storage and Pump Out Procedures. Overboard pumping or dis- charge of waste into the docking or canal area shall be prohibited. A portable sewage pumpout will be installed and utilized. The expense of this service will be covered by regular assessments. The portable sewage pumpout will be made available to the general public. The service will be provided as follows: User will notify dock personnel that pumpout is desired. When dock personnel advise they are ready, the vessel will be moved to the designated area in the service area. The vessel will be adequately secured to the dock in the service area before pumpout will be hooked up. The sealed pumpout equipment will be properly hooked up to the vessel prior to turning on the equipment. This system will empty directly into lift station then to sewer system. This equipment will be attended to at all times to ensure proper operation during pumpout. Once equipment has been removed from the vessel, the vessel will be allowed to continue on. Fish Cleaning. Fish cleaning in the docking area shall be prohibited, and the placement or construction of fish cleaning facilities on the docks shall be prohibited. A designated cleaning area shall be provided upland. This area will provide rinse water that goes directly to the sewer system of the adjoining condominium. A macerator will grind up fish parts so that the system will not be clogged. Larger fish remains will be packaged for removal by sanitation personnel as part of normal trash removal services in connection with the condominium operation upland. Boat Cleaning. Detergent cleaning of boats in the dock or canal area shall be prohibited. Discharges. Discharges of fish carcasses, food wastes, litter, sewage, fuel, oil, grease, paint, thinner, varnish or other materials into the canal or the docking area shall be prohibited. Restroom Facilities. Restroom facilities shall be located upland in an area convenient to the docking facilities. Operation of Boats. Operating boats in a careless, reckless or negligent fashion shall be prohibited. Maintenance and Repair. There will be a requirement that all boats and equipment be kept and maintained in good order. The painting, repair or maintenance of any vessel hull or engine within the docking or canal area shall be prohibited. Boat Size. The restrictions will provide that no slip will be used to store a vessel that, because of its size, would extend or encroach over a storage or stern line established to provide a 27 foot traffic lane that is consistent with the property rights of third parties having an interest in the canal. Liveaboard Vessels. The use of vessels for living quarters, temporarily or otherwise, shall be prohibited. ENFORCEMENT. Restrictions. All boat slips will be subjected to covenants, conditions and restrictions that will be binding upon and run with the property. The restrictions will incorporate all prohibitions and controls set forth in Section I above. Association. The restrictions will require all boat owners to be members of an Association that will be primarily responsible for enforcement of all restrictions. Addi- tionally, any individual owner will have the right to individually enforce restrictions. Fines and Penalties. The restrictions will establish a system of fines and penalties for any violations. Penalties will include the suspension of rights to use the facilities. Assessments. The restrictions will provide for monthly and special assessments against all boat slip owners in order to pay the expenses incurred in connection with the operational controls and provide funding for deferred maintenance, the replacement of equipment used in the operational controls, the repair and maintenance of such controls and dock personnel wages and salaries. Liens. The restrictions will provide for lien rights of the Association to enforce assessments and penalties. Injunctive Relief. The restrictions will provide for the right to seek and obtain injunctive relief to prevent continuing or repeated violations or the failure to abide by penalties imposed, e.g., suspension of rights to use facilities. Responsible Party. The restrictions will provide that the boat slip owner will be responsible, and be subject to fines, penalties and assessments, for the acts of the owner's lessees, guests or invitees who may use the boat slip. Notice. Each purchaser of a boat slip will be provided a copy of the restrictions at or prior to the closing of the sale. Leases. Any lease of a boat slip which is not sold to a condominium owner shall incorporate the restrictions and provide that any violation of any restriction shall constitute a default under the lease by the lessee. Right of First Refusal. The restrictions shall provide that the Applicant, the Association and the remaining boat slip owners will have the right of first refusal in the event an owner of a boat slip desires to sell the boat slip to someone other than the Applicant or another condominium owner. Dax and Trin's plans for the marina complex were still at an evolutionary stage at final hearing. Dax and Trin's owner, Clay Harris, contemplates owning and operating the bait and tackle shop, snack bar and public fueling facilities. He, and Dax and Trin, contemplate selling 47 slips to condominium owners. The remaining slip will be used in conjunction with the fueling operations. If the slips are not sold, they will be leased to the general public. If sold, there are no restrictions on subleasing. The developer reserves the right of first refusal on slips offered for resale, and the right to lease those slips. The marina complex, apart from a desire to sell slips to condominium owners, has none of the characteristics of a private docking facility for residential owners. Instead, it has all the indicia of a public marina, with the attendant traffic such a facility would produce. The Marina Site Canal No. 8 of Panacea Shores (canal) is a man made navigable water body which opens into Ochlockonee Bay, a Class II water body, at a point where shellfish harvesting is prohibited. The canal is a Class III water body. The canal is one of a series of similar residential canals in the area. The east side of the canal is totally developed with single family residences. Dax and Trin and Petitioner plan to develop the west side of the canal. The canal is a dead-end canal. It is approximately 52 feet wide where it opens into Ochlockonee Bay. From the mouth of the canal, it runs in a northerly direction for approximately 240 feet, with widths varying from 65 feet to 80 feet, then north-northeast for approximately 270 feet, with a width of approximately 90 feet, and then an additional 420 feet to the canal's terminus, with widths of 66 feet to 77 feet. The depths of the canal are irregular; a result of imprecise dredging. A substantial portion of the canal bottom has been dredged below -5 feet mean low water, with the deepest portions lying towards the terminus of the canal; the site of the proposed 28 slips. Canal depths vary from areas exposed at mean low water (-0.5 feet NGVD) to depths of -8.1 feet mean low water (-8.6 feet NGVD). The lack of continuity in the canal bottom, especially in light of the fact that depths at the mouth of the canal are less than those at its terminus, combined with the poor flushing rate exhibited by the canal, raise serious questions regarding the propriety of the site for a marina. The hydrographics of the canal, under its present physical configuration, establish the existence of quiescent areas where materials suspended in the water column could settle out and cause or contribute to water quality degradation in the canal. The flushing rate of the canal is poor. The evidence establishes that the rate at which the canal flushes would range from one to two days at its mouth, and up to 30 days at its terminus. Such a slow flushing rate would aggravate the problem of suspended particles settling out onto the canal bottom, and could contribute to a deterioration of dissolved oxygen in the water column. The biological community in the canal is in good health, in a stable equilibrium, and similar to that in the adjacent waters of Ochlockonee Bay. Shrimp, barnacles, and several types of encrusting, filtering organisms as well as sheepshead, killfish, Fundulus, mullet and redfish are found in the canal. In addition, juvenile crustaceans including blue crab are present. Given the hydrographics of the canal, the issue presented is whether reasonable assurances have been given that the short and long term effects of the proposed facility will not impact adversely on water quality or marine resources. Areas of Concern The major areas of concern raised by Petitioner regarding the proposed facility and its operation are dissolved oxygen (DO), bacteriological quality, oils and greases, and heavy metals associated with copper leaching from antifouling paints. Petitioner voices concern with bacteriological quality predicated on evidence that if one boat were to flush its toilet in the facility, a violation of fecal coliform and total coliform standards would result. Petitioner's concern is legally unpersuasive. It is unlawful to discharge wastes into the waters of the state. It is presumed that people will observe and abide by the law. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Mack, 57 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1952). Further, Dax and Trin has agreed that overboard pumping or discharge of waters or bilge waters into the dock or canal area be prohibited. Oils and greases, and heavy metals, in light of the hydrographics of this canal, raise a serious question. The best maintained boats will seep small amounts of oils and greases into the waters. Copper bottom paints, used by virtually all boat owners who permanently moor their boats as opposed to trailering them, will leach minute quantities of copper into the waters over the course of the paint's life expectancy. Twenty-eight boats moored in the canal, much less 48, even assuming their regular usage outside the canal, may be reasonably expected to inject oils and greases, and copper, into the canal's waters which, because of its hydrographics, will not be dissipated. Because of the canal's quiescent nature, operation of the proposed facility will violate state water quality standards for copper. Dissolved oxygen (DO) degradation is an additional concern. Because of the lineal area of the canal occupied by the proposed facility, and because of oils and greases which could be expected to eventually mix with the bottom sediments and scavenge oxygen from the water column, violations of the DO standard can be reasonably expected. DO in the water column of a water body such as the canal comes principally from the atmosphere. Reaeration occurs at the surface of the waters, and is intensified as the air circulates over the waters causing turbulence. The proposed 28-slip facility would preempt about 10 percent of the surface area of the canal. The additional 20 slips proposed would, if all 48 slips were occupied, preempt 30 percent of the canal's surface area. Because the boats and docks will screen off the winds from the surface of the canal, air circulation near the surface will be reduced and reaeration impeded to such an extent that degradation of DO may be reasonably expected. Dax and Trin has failed to affirmatively provide reasonable assurances that the construction and operation of the proposed facility will not violate state water quality standards for DO and copper. Dax and Trin's reasonable assurances assumed a uniform canal depth of -5 feet MLW, which would assure a good flushing rate for the canal. The evidence clearly establishes that a substantial portion of the canal has been dredged well below -5 feet MLW, and that the flushing characteristics of the canal are poor. Dax and Trin's reasonable assurances further relied on two water quality samples which are totally unreliable. The first water quality sample, taken November 1983, lacks reliability since the equipment was not shown to have been calibrated, and temperature and salinity measurements were not reported to correspond to DO readings. The second sample, taken April 12, 1985, lacks reliability because the DO levels reflected are 17 percent higher than the thermodynamic equilibrium value that could be obtained at the reported temperature and salinity levels if there were no BOD in the water. In fact, the same sample reflects a BOD level in the range of violations of DER Class III standards. Petitioner presented competent evidence that, based on the hydrographics of the canal, frequent violations of the state's DO standards could be reasonably expected during the months of May through October. The construction and operation of the proposed facility would contribute to and exacerbate the DO violations. Dax and Trin has presented no evidence with regard to anticipated public benefits of the proposed facility that might tend to offset the expected adverse impacts of the project. The additional areas of concern raised by Petitioner; erosion of the opposite bank of the canal and resultant resuspension of particulate caused by boat operation, navigational problems, and reliability of Dax and Trin to carry out its management plan, are without merit.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material hereto, Respondent was a certified pool contractor, holding license no. CP-C033753, issued by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board. At all times material hereto, Respondent's certified pool contractor's license qualified Artistic Pools and Spas, Inc. with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or about May 19, 1986, Respondent, d/b/a Artistic Pools and Spas, Inc. entered into a contract with Joseph and Joyce Malinoski for the construction of a swimming pool at 31 Sea Harbour Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida for a contract price of $9,737.75. The contract required a down payment of ten per cent (10 percent) of the contract amount ($973.78) which was paid by the Malinoskis on May 19, 1986. The Malinoskis resided in Massachusetts at the time they contracted for the swimming pool with Respondent and had contracted for the construction of a home in Ormond Beach, Florida to begin upon the pool shell being in place. The Malinsokis returned to Massachusetts upon execution of the contract expecting Respondent to commence work on the pool two weeks after he was notified by the builder that the survey was completed and the benchmark in place. On or before June 18, 1986, Respondent contacted the Malinoskis by phone to advise them that the pool was under construction, that Respondent was ready to start pouring concrete, and that he needed the next two (2) installments (20 percent due on day of excavation and 35 percent due on day of concrete shell installation) in the amount of $5,355.76. On or about June 18, 1986, the Malinoskis forwarded a cashier's check in the amount of $5,355.76 made payable to Respondent with the understanding from Respondent that the pool was under construction. On or about June 25, 1986, the Malinoskis were advised by their building contractor that the pool was not under construction. On or about July 5, 1986, the Malinoskis returned to Ormond Beach and found that the pool was not under construction. Although the business phone at Artistic Pools and Spas, Inc. had been disconnected, the Malinoskis ultimately located the Respondent but were unable to resolve the problem until after a complaint had been filed. In early August, 1986, an agreement was reached with the Malinoskis, Respondent and David Larsen whereby Respondent would furnish the labor to build the pool, Larsen would pay the bills and the Malinoskis would pay the balance owed on the contract to Larsen and at end of construction Larsen would give the Malinoskis release of liens. The pool was constructed without the Malinoskis having to pay any additional money on the contract. The money used by Larsen to purchase materials above the amount paid to Larsen by the Malinoskis was repaid to Larsen by Respondent. Respondent supplied all the labor to construct the pool. The testimony of Respondent, which I find credible, was that the funds received by Respondent were frozen due to an Internal Revenue Service levy on the Respondent's business account which resulted in the IRS taking all the funds in the bank account, including the money from the Malinoskis. There was insufficient evidence to show that Respondent diverted the Malinoskis' funds or that the Respondent was unable to fulfill the terms of the contract. On or about November 15, 1985 Respondent, d/b/a Artistic Pools and Spas, Inc. contracted with John and Louise McGowan for the construction of a swimming pool and spa at 1266 Robbin Drive, Port Orange, Florida for an original contract price of $11,500. These were 2 addendums to the original contract bringing the total contract price to $13,005.75. The contract provided for the spa to be 7 feet long by 5 feet wide with a depth ranging from 18 inches to 36 inches. As constructed, the spa was 5 feet long by 5 feet wide with a depth of 44 inches. The spa was also unlevel resulting in water spilling on to the deck rather than into the spillway to the pool. The therapy jets were located too deep in the spa to allow them to function properly. The spa has never been operational. Respondent was aware of the deficiencies in the construction of the spa but failed to correct them. The deck around the pool was not properly finished in that it is uneven and rough in several locations and is pitched toward the pool rather than away from the pool. The deck also has several facial cracks (not structural) which indicate a nonuniform thickness. As contracted, the pool was to have 3 return fittings of which only 2 were installed. The contract called for the installation of a heater by the Respondent. Although the heater was installed, it was improperly placed resulting in the inspector putting a "red tag" on the heater and having the gas company disconnect it. The McGowans have paid all but $575 of the contract price but refuse to pay the balance until corrections are completed. Respondent was aware of the deficiencies in the construction of the pool but failed to correct them. The evidence is clear that Respondent failed to properly supervise the construction of the McGowans' pool and spa, thereby resulting in poor workmanship in the construction of the pool and spa.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (Board) enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(j) and (m), Florida Statutes and for such violation it is Recommended that the Board assess the respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00 and suspend the Respondent's pool contracting license for a period of two (2) years, stay the suspension, and place Respondent on probation for a period of two (2) years, provided the Respondent pays the administrative fine of $500.00 within sixty days of the date of the Final Order. It is further Recommended that the charges of violating Section 489.129(1)(h) and (k), Florida Statutes be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1987.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(1)(o), and 489.1425, Florida Statutes (2007 & 2009),1/ and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CGC 1512005. At all times material to the administrative complaints, Mr. Organo was the primary qualifying agent for Bennett Marine Contracting and Construction, Inc. (Bennett Marine). On or about September 29, 2007, Jean Walker (Ms. Walker) entered into a contract with Bennett Marine to construct a dock and a tiki hut at 12305 Boat Shell Drive. The contract (the Walker contract) provided that the contractor would make application for a permit from Lee County, Florida. Mr. Organo signed the Walker contract for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Walker contract did not include a written statement explaining Ms. Walker's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On October 24, 2007, Bennett Marine applied for a permit to construct the dock. The application was denied October 29, 2007, because the site plan contained the tiki hut. When the tiki hut was removed from the application, the dock permit was approved. Ms. Walker paid Bennett Marine draws on the construction project. The payments were given to Mr. Organo. The payments totaled $9,200. By February 2008, a tiki hut had been constructed on Ms. Walker's property without a permit. Because the tiki hut was built without a permit, and it was in an illegal location, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. By April 2008, the tiki hut had been removed, and another tiki hut had been built in its place. Again, no permit was pulled for the tiki hut, and it was placed in an illegal location. Again, Lee County required that the tiki hut be removed. Mr. Organo subcontracted the construction of the tiki hut to Rick Fewell Chickees. Mr. Fewell of Rick Fewell Chickees, a Seminole Indian,2/ applied for a permit to build a tiki hut, but the application was rejected because the plot plan was not to scale, and the tiki hut did not meet the setback requirements from the water. Another tiki hut was built, and, in March 2009, Lee County again cited Ms. Walker for not having a permit for the tiki hut and for not meeting the setback requirements. In 2010, a permit was finally issued for the construction of a tiki hut on Ms. Walker's property. The permit was issued to Ms. Walker. Bennett Marine commenced work on the tiki hut without obtaining a building permit. On January 5, 2010, Bennett Marine entered into a contract with Chris Bevan (Mr. Bevan) to remove an existing dock, uninstall an existing boatlift, construct a dock, construct a tiki hut, and to reinstall the boatlift. The contract (the Bevan contract) required that the contractor obtain a City of Cape Coral building permit. The Bevan contract was signed by Mr. Organo for Bennett Marine. It is undisputed that the Bevan contract did not contain a written statement explaining Mr. Bevan's rights under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund. On March 17, 2010, Bennett Marine showed up on Mr. Bevan's property and commenced work, by knocking down a cantilever dock that was hanging over a seawall, removing old decking from the boatlift, and rough-framing part of the new dock. Bennett Marine worked until approximately March 25, 2010. That was the last that Mr. Bevan heard from Mr. Organo or Bennett Marine. Mr. Organo applied for a building permit for the Bevan contract on April 1, 2010. The permit was approved on April 13, 2010, but it was not issued. On May 14, 2010, the City of Cape Coral placed a stop-work order on the Bevan project. Mr. Bevan applied for an owner-builder permit for the dock construction, and the permit was issued on June 9, 2010. Mr. Bevan completed the dock construction at additional expense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Organo violated sections 489.129(1)(i), 489.129(o), and 489.1425; imposing a fine of $250 each for the Walker contract and the Bevan contract for a total of $500, for failure to advise the owners of the recovery fund; imposing a fine of $3,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for two years for beginning work without a permit for the Walker contract; and imposing a fine of $1,000 and placing Mr. Organo on probation for one year for beginning work on the Bevan contract without a permit with the one-year probation to run concurrently with the probation imposed for the Walker contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding and should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact At no time material to the allegations was Respondent licensed or certified as a contractor of any type by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or about June 2000, Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement with Harold Knowles to construct a swimming pool at Mr. Knowles' residence located at 235 North Rosehill Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. The contract price for the swimming pool was $18,650.00. Mr. Knowles paid directly to Respondent $9,400.00. Respondent performed some work on the pool project and then stopped work on the project. Respondent failed to return to Mr. Knowles any monies received for the project. The homeowner was forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses to have a second, licensed pool contractor finish the pool that Respondent left unfinished. These expenses total in excess of $24,000.00. Respondent acknowledges that he had no license. Respondent testified at hearing along with his wife. It was clear that Respondent was sorry for his actions. He was unaware of the gravity of his acts. He does not have any financial resources, and a significant fine will not benefit Mr. Knowles. A substantial fine adversely impact Respondent's family more than Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be fined $500.00, together with the investigation and prosecution costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Robert Footman 2702 Lake Mary Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Gail Scott-Hill, Esquire Lead Professions Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0771 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact The upland property abutting the proposed marina is zoned CTF-28, which provides for the complete range of motel-hotel developments. Type A Marina facilities are permitted as a special exception in a CTF-28 district. The property owned by Petitioners is presently occupied by a 16-room motel with 15 designated parking spaces and fronts on the water. Riprap extends approximately six feet from the seawall and Petitioners propose to install a dock nine feet wide covering this riprap and extending some 83 feet, with six finger piers extending seaward from the seawall to provide the 12 boat slips for which this special exception pertains. Petitioners intend to convert the existing motel from single ownership to a condominium and sell the motel rooms as units to separate owners but continue to operate the facility as a motel. (Art. 12.1, Exhibit 2.) The Declaration of Condominium (Exhibit 2) which was received as a late-filed exhibit, is incomplete in that Exhibits A, B, C and D, which the Declaration states are made a part of the Declaration, were not attached to the copy of Exhibit 2 which was received. The proposed boat slips or dock is designated in the Declaration as Limited Common Elements. Art. 2.12 of Exhibit 2 provides that: Limited Common Elements, if any, are those portions of the Common Elements which are reserved for or attributable to the exclusive use of a certain Unit Owner whether such use is assigned as an appurtenance to a Unit or separate thereto including, but not limited to, boat docks assigned as appurtenances to specific individual units. The boat slips presumably are assigned to specific motel units as appurtenances thereto. (Art. 6.1, Exhibit 2.) Article 12.2 provides no unit owner or lessee of a unit owner may lease or sublease any Limited Common Element including, but not limited to, any boat dock assigned as an appurtenance to a specific unit. Similar provisions are made for the existing automobile parking spaces which are also designated Limited Common Elements and appurtenant to a specific unit (Art. 6.2, Exhibit 2). Respondent's primary concern, and the reason this application was denied by the Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning is the effect the proposed marina will have on parking on Clearwater Beach. Vehicular parking is a serious problem confronting Clearwater Beach at this time. Further aggravation of this problem will adversely affect the public interest. A special exception for a seven-slip Class A marina was granted to the Sea Gull Motel, located in the same general area, less than one year ago. The Sea Gull converted to cooperative ownership instead of into a condominium as Petitioners here propose. The Sea Gull continues to operate as a motel, with multiple ownership of the units, just as Petitioners propose. Absent Exhibits A, B, C and D to Exhibit 2, it is not possible to tell which boat slip is appurtenant to which motel unit or that one slip may not be appurtenant to more than one motel unit. Since multiple ownership of a single unit is contemplated by the developer (Art. 13.2.3, Exhibit 2) the possibility exists that one of the joint owners could occupy the motel unit while another occupied the boat slip appurtenant to the unit. The proposed slips propose no/hazard to navigation or interfere with the enjoyment of the waters adjacent thereto by the general public.
Findings Of Fact On February 9, 1984, Respondent Fernandina Marine Terminals, Inc., by its agent Harbor Engineering Company, filed a joint application with the Department of the Army/Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for the rehabilitation of its existing marine facility located on the Amelia River at Fernandina Beach, Florida. The application was subsequently amended several times and eventually included the construction of a 1,000 foot dock to be constructed on the applicant's property parallel to the shoreline. (Testimony of Ray, FMT Exhibits 1-3, DER Exhibit 2) An environmental supervisor of the Department of Environmental Regulation inspected the site on March 17 and April 17, 1984, and prepared a permit application appraisal on May 21, 1984, in which he determined that the Department had permitting jurisdiction under Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, due to the fact that the Amelia River constitutes navigable waters of the state. He found that the proposed dock would extend some 42 feet farther into the river than a previously existing dock which presently consists mostly of old pilings. He further determined that from a navigational standpoint, the proposed dock should present no problem. This view was concurred in by his supervisor Dr. Marvin Collins, III, who recommended issuance of the permit. On September 6, 1984, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to issue the requested permit. Thereafter, by letter of September 14, 1984, Petitioners requested a hearing to contest the issuance of the permit. On July 9, 1984, the Department of the Army/Corps of Engineers had issued a permit to the applicant to perform the requested work. (Testimony of Deuerling, Collins, DER Exhibits 1, 3, FMT Exhibit 4) Petitioner A. B. Cook, Jr., Seafood Company is located immediately to the south of the proposed site. Shrimp boats unload at the north end of Petitioner's dock. The boats average from 60 to 70 feet in length. Petitioner is concerned that the cement pilings of the applicant's proposed pier will interfere with and prohibit the dockage of the shrimp boat due to the fact that a strong current is generated at the site where the Bells River joins the Amelia River. Petitioner therefore believes that the proposed placement of the applicant's dock would constitute a navigational hazard and that therefore it should be constructed further to the north or closer to the shoreline. (Testimony of Mrs. Cook, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Applicant's design engineer took cognizance of the need for shrimp boats to unload at the Cook dock. At the time the project was designed he conducted surveys of the uplands to ensure that adequate land was available for the proposed facility. In his expert engineering opinion, which is accepted, the proposed site is ideal for a marine terminal since no maintenance dredging will be required and because the river curves at the site, thus making it the widest place of the river in the vicinity. The planned length of the dock is sufficient to enable the docking of two vessels at the same time. If the proposed dock were to be placed further north, it would he unable to berth two vessels. If it were placed closer to shore, it would be necessary to utilize the adjoining marsh area and-would require constant dredging. Although the dock will extend some 42 feet into the Amelia River on the southwest end, it is almost in line with the applicant's property because of the bend in the river. The dock will be located approximately 115 feet from the Cook dock. The existing dilapidated dock is only approximately 50 feet from the Cook dock, although it is more in line or more parallel to the Cook dock. (Testimony of Ray, Cavanaugh, E. Cook, DER Exhibits 1 (photos), 2, FMT Exhibits 1-3) Expert testimony from riverboat captains presented by both the applicants and petitioners is in conflict as to the extent of difficulty that will be encountered in docking shrimp boats at the Cook pier after the applicant's dock is built, and as to whether it will constitute a navigational hazard. The proposed dock will be put on pilings to avoid eddies which would be caused by a bulkhead, and will prevent change in existing currents. It is acknowledged even by the applicant's experts that a problem would exist with a falling tide and a west wind, and also in conditions of fog. However, the president of Johnson Petroleum Company which operates what is known as the "Gulf" dock located 100 feet south of the Cook dock, is familiar with the tide in the area and testified that the tide is used to spring vessels in and out of the docking area. In light of all the evidence presented, it is found that although the alignment of applicant's proposed pier will to some degree make it more difficult for boats to dock at the Cook pier, it nevertheless constitutes an appropriate use of the applicant's property and sufficient evidence has been presented to show that it will not constitute a navigational hazard or a serious impediment to navigation. (Testimony of Ray, Thompson, Ferguson, Mrs. Cook, E. Cook, Little, Johnson, Cavanaugh)
The Issue Whether the equipment purchase and lease agreement to which Paul Richards and Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., became parties is an "investment contract" and so a security, within the meaning of Section 517.021, Florida Statutes (1985)? If so, whether it was exempt from registration requirements under Section 517.061(11)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)? If not, whether respondent Ogle solicited an offer, or offered or attempted to dispose of any interest in the agreement for value?
Findings Of Fact William Carl Webster had an idea, but no money. In fact, the business he and his wife owned, Cap'n Carl's Seafood Company, was in bankruptcy. No stranger to the seafood business, wholesale or retail, he had been involved for some twelve years. He came to believe he could profit by adopting a technique he noticed purveyors of pizza and milk used: the "impulse freezer," a topless display freezer rolled into the middle of a grocery store aisle to attract customers' attention. The "concept" was to sell frozen seafood wholesale to licensed food retailers. Webster believed it would be a simple matter of establishing the accounts, installing the freezers, and arranging with a reputable Tampa Bay fish house to deliver "custom packed" seafood. Overhead would be minimal, or so Mr. Webster told Barry Louis Harris, with whom he had played baseball in high school, and from whom he borrowed three thousand dollars for the new venture. None of this money was left by the time Mr. Webster dropped in on Jerry Russell Ogle, an account executive in the Fort Walton Beach office of A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., to discuss the ins and outs of going public, in late April of 1984. Mr. Ogle recommended against going public but expressed a willingness to help for a fee. Both Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., and Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc., came into existence on April 24, 1984. Articles of incorporation drawn by Messrs Webster and Harris, with the help of a kit, were filed that day. Jerry Ogle is registered with petitioner as a securities dealer. One of Mr. Ogle's customers, Paul Richards, had been a builder and developer before he moved to Florida from Ohio. As he sold properties in Ohio, he deposited the proceeds in his account at the Fort Walton Beach office of A. G. Edwards & Son. Since Mr. Richards had expressed an interest in investing in a small business, Mr. Ogle thought some of this money might be available for the enterprise on which Messrs Webster and Harris had embarked. Before taking Mr. Richards to lunch at the Harborlight, Mr. Ogle sought and obtained the oral approval of the A. G. Edwards' branch manager to work as a "marketing consultant" for Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. At lunch, he mentioned Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., and gave a "capsule form" account of the business to Mr. Richards. Mr. Richards expressed interest, and Mr. Ogle arranged a second luncheon meeting a week or two later. Messrs Richards, Webster, Harris and Ogle gathered in Mr. Ogle's office, before setting out for lunch at the High Tide. Mr. Ogle told Mr. Richards he thought that Mr. Webster's idea was a good one, but it was Mr. Webster who presented the idea in detail. Although remarking that he might be "digging a hole and throwing money into it," Mr. Richards decided to purchase 25 freezers from Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. On May 23, 1984, he signed an equipment purchase and lease agreement, but negotiations continued and the final agreement was executed on May 24, 1984, in Mr. Ogle's office. At this meeting, Mr. Richards drew a check for $10,000.00 on his A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Total Assets Account, Mr. Ogle witnessed the equipment lease agreement Messrs Richards and Webster signed, and Mr. Ogle wrote, at the bottom of the agreement, "Rec'd $10,000 5-24-84 JRO." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 Under the equipment purchase and lease agreement, Mr. Richards purchased freezers to lease to Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. In exchange, he was to receive "one half of the net profit of [each] freezer . . . not [to] exceed $800.00 per month for each freezer." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. As per Ogle's suggestion, he was also to get "1 percent of gross sales revenue of Florida Seafood Centers," Id., all payments to begin after a 180-day "grace period." Mr. Richards' only obligation under the parties' agreement was to pay $1,500.00 for each freezer, or $37,500.00 in all. He had the option to choose among available locations, but had no responsibilities for installation or operation of the freezers or for the sale of seafood. His role was that of a passive investor. Mr. Richards was the only person in Florida who invested in this way, although two of the Alabamians who invested also had houses in Florida. Mr. Richards understood he was the initial investor, but knew others would be approached. The equipment purchase and lease agreement was never registered as a security. Mr. Harris took Mr. Richards' $10,000.00 check to a Barnett Bank branch and opened a bank account for Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., by depositing the check less $2,000.00 cash the bank disbursed and Mr. Webster took to cover expenses already incurred. The first check drawn on Florida Seafood Centers, Inc.'s first bank account was for $500.00 in favor of Mr. Ogle, dated May 28, 1984. Mr. Ogle had told Mr. Webster he expected to be paid for his time and Mr. Webster had agreed, before Mr. Richards signed the equipment lease agreement, to pay Mr. Ogle something if he was ever in a position to do so. At the hearing, they testified the payments to Mr. Ogle - $2,000 in cash from the proceeds of Mr. Richards' second and final check to Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc., dated June 4, 1984, in addition to the $500 check - were for his services as a "marketing consultant." Mr. Ogle never told Mr. Richards he had any sort of agreement with Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc. or Mr. Webster, and Mr. Richards was aware of none before investing in the enterprise. Mr. Ogle did know that bankruptcy had befallen Cap'n Carl's Seafood Company. Mr. Richards never received any payments or sales reports. Some freezers were placed in Piggly Wiggly stores in Birmingham, among other places, without, however, Mr. Richards' advice or assistance, as far as the record shows. Such sales of fish as Messrs Webster and Harris made were in amounts too small to make deliveries of custom-packed seafood economic, so they were obliged to repack the seafood themselves, which entailed renting space and bringing it up to health department standards, all at considerable, unanticipated expense. Eventually the business failed.
The Issue Whether Wayne Zimmet's proposed single-family boat dock and lift project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(c).1
Findings Of Fact Both Wayne Zimmet and Scott Rosenblum own property in Tequesta, Florida, in a community known as North Passage, which has a man-made navigation and drainage easement canal that terminates at its eastern end at Mr. Rosenblum's property, which is Lot 74, at 8738 Riverfront Terrace. Mr. Zimmet's property, which is Lot 75, at 8750 Riverfront Terrace, is south of the eastern terminus of the canal. The Rosenblum and Zimmet properties are adjacent and share a common boundary. There is an existing dock extending from Mr. Rosenblum's property into the canal. The existing dock is perpendicular to, and extends west from the middle of, the shore of the eastern terminus of the canal. There is a wooden walkway leading from the residence on Mr. Rosenblum's property to the existing dock. However, there also has been a wooden walkway leading from Mr. Zimmet's property to the existing dock. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, there is a dispute between Mr. Zimmet and Mr. Rosenblum as to who is entitled to access and use the existing dock--and in particular the south side of the existing dock. That dispute will be resolved in state circuit court.2 For purposes of this proceeding, it will be assumed that Mr. Rosenblum has the right to use the existing dock. On or about May 25, 2006, Mr. Zimmet filed an application requesting an ERP exemption to install an eight-foot by twenty-foot (160-square feet) marginal dock with a two-pile elevator lift to designed to accommodate his boat, which is approximately 24.5 feet long (22 feet at the waterline) and eight feet wide. According to documentation submitted with the application, the proposed dock would be centered along the waterfront of his property and extend approximately four feet into the canal. The proposed boat lift would be skewed toward the western end of the proposed marginal dock with the intent being to dock his boat with the bow facing the west so that proposed dock could be used to enter and load the boat from the stern. This positioning of the proposed lift and boat at the proposed dock would skew a boat on the lift at the proposed dock about three feet to the west, away from the existing dock. Based on the evidence, it is found that Mr. Zimmet did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his proposed boat dock and lift, even if skewed to the west as indicated in the application drawings, would not "impede navigation" to and from the south side of the existing dock. (Otherwise, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift would not "impede navigation" in the canal.) This impediment to navigation to and from the south side of the existing dock is not a mere inconvenience. Although Mr. Rosenblum now only owns and uses a raft at the existing dock, he testified that he plans on purchasing and using a boat. Boats in the range of approximately 24.5 feet in length with a beam of 8 to 8.5 feet are common in the North Passage canal. A boat of that size docked at the south side of the existing dock would barely fit alongside Mr. Zimmet's boat, whether docked or on the lift, and there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for navigating a boat of that size commonly to or from the south side of the existing dock if Mr. Zimmet's boat were docked at the proposed dock or on the proposed lift. (Likewise, if a boat of that size were docked on the south side of the existing dock, there would not be a reasonable amount of clearance for Mr. Zimmet to use his proposed dock and lift.) There was no evidence of any impediment to navigation to and from the north side of the existing dock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that, absent a circuit court determination that Mr. Rosenblum does not have the right to access and use the south side of the existing dock, Mr. Zimmet's proposed dock and lift project is not exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2007.
