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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. DAVIE DES ROCHER SAND CORPORATION, 79-002264 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002264 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1980

Findings Of Fact The facts reveal that Jose Gonzalez, a driver for the Respondent, operating one of Respondent's tractor/trailer pieces of Respondent, went to a rock company located in Hollywood, Florida, on February 13, 1978, for the purpose of picking up a load of "P" rock. This rock was purchased from Miramar Lakes, d/b/a Miramar Rock on that date and the driver, Gonzalez, was given a weight ticket. The weight ticket from Miramar Rock reflected a gross weight of 72,360 pounds, which is the total of the equipment and load. (The scales at Miramar peck used to weigh the Respondent's equipment and load had been certified by the Petitioner to be accurate on June 7, 1977, and again on April 11, 1978.) The weather on February 13, 1978, was clear and the purchase, loading and weighing done on the subject equipment was without incident, until the driver attempted to pull away from the weight scales. At that moment the universal joint and yoke snapped and this caused the vehicle to be inoperable. Gonzalez left the truck at the Miramar Rock Company. At that point, the load was covered by a canvas and the trailer was not seeping or leaking water from the rock aggregate. Later, on February 13, 1978, a mechanic employed by the Respondent came to effect repairs to the vehicle, but due to the unavailability of certain parts necessary to complete the repairs, did not finish the work until February 14, 1978. When the repairs had been completed on that date, the driver, Gonzalez, removed the truck from the Miramar Rock compound and entered the roads of Broward County, Florida. At around 9:15 a.m. on February 14, 1978, Gonzalez arrived at the intersection of Hollywood Boulevard and Flamingo Road in Broward County, Florida, eastbound on Hollywood Boulevard. At that intersection, officers employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, Weights Division, intercepted the Des Rocher truck and caused the vehicle to stop. After the stop the equipment being operated at that time was established to be a vehicle measuring between 37 feet to 38 feet from the front axle to the rear axle, and the peak of the rock load was located in the center rear portion of the trailer. Officer Wilkerson of the Florida Highway Patrol observed water dripping out of the rear tailgate after making the stop. Gonzalez was asked to produce a weight ticket and in response to this request produced the weight ticket given him by Miramar Rock on February 13, 1978. Officer Wilkerson commented that this ticket was from the day before and that a ticket bearing the current date was required. Gonzalez was then told that the truck would be weighed with the method for weighing the truck being by two portable scales. Officer Wilkerson weighed one side of the truck and Officer Herron went to the other side of the truck. Wilkerson weighed the steering axle on his side of the truck; the drive axle on his side of the truck, and two tires on the rear tandem axles on his side of the truck. It is not known what Officer Herron did, if anything, in effecting the purposes of this inspection and weigh-in, because Officer Herron did not appear at the hearing in this cause and was not seen by Officer Wilkerson in conducting his inspection activities, if any. Therefore, the total weight of the truck as ascertained from the inspection ostensibly conducted by these officers was not shown by competent evidence. However, it was demonstrated through the testimony in this hearing that the plan which the officers had for making the roadside inspections was one which called for basically stopping all trucks of the category of aggregate haulers that were eastbound through the intersection on Hollywood Boulevard, to the exclusion of pickup trucks and moving vans. After stopping the former category of trucks, some were weighed and others were not. As a result of the stop, Gonzalez was ticketed for a weight violation and that ticket was in the amount of $136.45 as an assessed penalty. Gonzalez then took the truck back to the Des Rocher installation which contained a set of scales and between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. the truck was weighed and shown to be 35.64 tons, or 71,280 pounds as the gross weight including the equipment and load. (The scales that were utilized had been certified by the Petitioner on June 7, 1977, and again on May 8, 1978.)

Florida Laws (2) 316.535316.545
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HEALTH CARE CENTER OF NAPLES, D/B/A THE ARISTOCRAT vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-001446F (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Apr. 21, 2003 Number: 03-001446F Latest Update: Oct. 31, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made. The Agency is authorized to license nursing home facilities in the State of Florida and, pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, to evaluate nursing facilities and assign ratings. The Agency conducted a survey of Petitioner's facility from October 8 through 10, 2001. As a result of the survey, the Agency cited Petitioner for "fail[ing] to adequately assess and develop a plan of care to maintain acceptable parameters for a resident resulting in significant weight loss," and issued a Notice of Intent to change its licensure status to conditional. Petitioner timely challenged the conditional rating and filed a Petition for Formal Hearing. Pursuant thereto, a formal hearing was held on March 28 and 29, 2002. The Recommended Order, which was issued on August 14, 2002, recommended that the Agency enter a final order issuing a standard licensure rating to Petitioner and rescinding the conditional licensure rating. On February 18, 2003, AHCA issued a Final Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order, ordering that a standard licensure rating be issued to replace the previously-issued conditional licensure rating, and rescinding the conditional licensure rating. As such, Petitioner was the prevailing party in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 02-0049, AHCA 2001-071241. No appeal of the Final Order in the underlying proceeding was filed. On April 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs (Petition) with supporting affidavits. In the Petition, Petitioner sought relief under both the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, as well as pursuant to Subsection 120.569(2)(e). The Agency opposed the Petition. Although Petitioner requested an award of attorney fees under Subsection 120.569(2)(e), it presented no evidence that the Agency had filed any pleadings, motions, or other papers not properly signed or that any were interposed for any improper purpose. Accordingly, the undersigned will not consider an award of attorney fee's under Subsection 120.569(2)(e), and the focus of the evidence presented will be as to Section 57.111. The parties stipulated as to the reasonableness and amounts of the attorneys fees and costs. Reasonable attorney's fees are $21,547.50. The reasonable amount of costs is $4,183.82. The amount of attorney's fees and costs that may be awarded is limited to $15,000.00, based upon Subsection 57.111(3)(d)(2), which the parties agree is applicable to this proceeding. The Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., is a corporation with its principal office in Florida. At the time the underlying action was initiated by the Agency in October 2001, the Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., had a net worth of not more than $2 million. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., on October 31, 2001, was $158,048.65. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., for September 2001 was $190,829.22. The net worth of Health Care Center of Naples, Inc., for November 2001 was $171,726.44. The Administrative Complaint in the underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 02-0049, alleged that Petitioner failed to ensure that a resident maintained acceptable parameters of nutritional status. The basis of this allegation was the result of a survey which found that a resident had a significant weight loss from the period between July 30, 2001, to August 11, 2001. The Agency's Final Order, adopting the Recommended Order in Case No. 02-0049, found that the patient's weight loss was expected due to edema or third space fluid, resulting from the patient's being over-dehydrated before her recent surgery. Moreover, in the underlying proceeding, it was found that in determining that the resident had a significant weight loss, "the Agency surveyors based their calculations on an inaccurate usual body weight for the resident." As a result of these and other findings, the Agency's decision to change the status of Petitioner's licensure rating to conditional was rescinded. Although the Agency did not prevail in the underlying proceeding, the surveyors were substantially justified in citing Petitioner for the alleged deficiency, and the Agency was substantially justified in initiating the action. The Final Order found that the usual body weight relied upon by the surveyors in determining that the resident had a significant weight loss was obtained from the records of Petitioner. Also, the record in the underlying proceeding found that many of Petitioner's staff members were concerned about the resident's weight loss and did not consider that the weight loss was caused by edema. Finally, there is no indication in the record that at the time of the survey, Petitioner's staff gave the Agency surveyors any reasonable explanation for the resident's alleged significant weight loss. The evidence, which was the basis of the findings in the Final Order in the underlying proceeding, while available at the time of the survey, was not discovered or known to the surveyors and, to some extent, to Petitioner's staff.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.6857.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs DELTA BUILDING SUPPLIES, 92-001870 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 25, 1992 Number: 92-001870 Latest Update: Aug. 28, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether the Respondent violated the weight limitations for truck traffic over a low limit bridge on SR 850 in Palm Beach County, Florida on November 12, 1991, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, was the state agency responsible for enforcing the state statutes involving commercial carrier weight compliance in this state which it does through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to cite drivers and owners of commercial vehicles which violate the load limits on the streets and highways of this state. On November 12, 1991, at approximately 2:30 PM, Officer Roy Neff stopped the Respondent's open board truck for crossing the low limit bridge located on State Road 850 in North Palm Beach, Florida, while apparently overloaded. The truck was carrying a load of drywall sheets and stucco. Officer Neff weighed the vehicle with the Department's portable scales he carried with him. These scales are calibrated for accuracy every 6 months. He utilized the standard Department weighing procedure which calls for a weight under each axle combined to give a total vehicle weight. This vehicle weighed 68,000 pounds loaded, according to this procedure used. Because this particular bridge was allowed no more than 26 tons, (52,000 pounds), of weight for a vehicle in this category, (non-trailer with 2 axles), Officer Neff cited the Respondent's driver for an overweight of 16,000 pounds. Since overweight is penalized at 5 per pound, the penalty assessed was $800.00. The approach to this bridge was clearly marked at several locations with signs indicating the maximum weight permitted for this bridge was 26 tons. These signs were located at sites which were far enough away from the bridge (1 mile and 1/2 mile) to give a driver ample opportunity to turn around or to take an alternate route to his destination on roads situated between the signs and the bridge. When the citation was issued here, the driver posted an acceptable bond and the vehicle was released. Respondent does not deny its vehicle as loaded exceeded the state's weight limitations for this bridge. However, it contends that the amount of overweight was less than that determined by officer Ness and it therefore overpaid the penalty by $252.30. Respondent bases this calculation on what it claims was the load on the truck at the time, multiplied by the weight per piece as provided by the manufacture of the product. In support of its claim, Respondent offered a handwritten, self-made list of weights purportedly taken from manufacturer furnished documents. These weights are then utilized in a computation of total load weight based on another handwritten list of materials, reportedly on the truck at the time, which was reconstructed from the delivery ticket for that trip approximately one week or so after the citation was issued. The weakness of this evidence is compounded by the fact that there is no weight in the "manufacturer's" list for the 30 sheets of 14 foot long drywall which Respondent claims weigh a total of 4,284 pounds. There is also no source for the 6,000 pounds of stucco. Presumably, the "75 stucco" relates to 75 bags at 80 pounds per bag. No doubt Respondent's protestations of overpayment are honestly made and made with good intentions. However, its evidence in support of its claim does not outweigh the evidence that the Department scales used to conduct the inspection here were calibrated for accuracy every 6 months. There is no evidence to indicate either that they were not accurate when used or that the weighing procedures followed were improper.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a civil fine in the amount of $800.00 against the Respondent, Delta Building Supplies. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS - 58 ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1992. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Tim Czencz Delta Building Supplies 12951 SW 124th Street Miami, Florida 33186 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (3) 120.57316.545316.555
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs BOARDWALK FRIES, 10-000450 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 29, 2010 Number: 10-000450 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2010

Conclusions The Director, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (the Division), after consideration of the complete record of this case on file with the Division, enters this Final Order. 1. On November 10, 2009, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint attached hereto as exhibit "A." 2. On April 27, 2010, a hearing in this cause was held before the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings. 3. On July 14, 2010, the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson issued a Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B." The Statement of the Issues, Preliminary Statement, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation contained in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted in toto and incorporated herein by reference. Based upon the foregoing, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises it is, hereby ORDERED that: for Respondent's violations of Section 509, Florida Statutes, and/or the rules promulgated thereto the following penalty is imposed: 1. Respondent shall pay a fine in the amount of $500.00, due and payable to the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1011, within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this Order is filed with the agency clerk. 2. This Final Order shall become effective on the date of filing with the Agency Clerk DONE AND ORDERED this 2O day of Angus ,2010. L. Veach, Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Hotels and Restaurants 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1015

Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party substantially affected by this final order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days rendition of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P., and Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Boardwalk Fries, c/o Halim Hanna, 848 Eagle View Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32311; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monrog .@breet, Tallahassee, Floxida 3¥399-2202, this day of ~ , 2010. - ° For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants

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CHARLES FENESY vs. GTE DATA SERVICES, INC., 80-000473 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000473 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1981

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at final hearing, the following facts are determined: Nature of Complainant's Handicap At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Charles Fenesy ("COMPLAINANT"), suffered from severe coronary heart disease (arteriosclerosis), diabetes, and excess weight. The arteriosclerosis consists of lipid deposits which obstruct and interfere with the flow of blood in all three major arteries to his heart; the diffuseness of the deposits make bypass surgery inadvisable. As a result of this disease, the COMPLAINANT began, in 1972, to experience occasional angina pectoris, which is sharp chest pain associated with activity. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton; P.E. 11.) The angina pectoris, however, occurred only when he was engaging in tasks involving physical activity and exertion, such as working in the yard, mowing the lawn, pulling weeds, and walking too fast; he has never experienced angina pectoris because of mental or emotional stress. During his 17 years as a computer analyst and programmer, he never experienced angina attacks in connection with his work environment; neither did his angina attacks ever interfere with his job attendance or performance or require that his work schedule be altered. Because of his heart disease, COMPLAINANT is unable to perform normal physical activity and exertion; his working activities are limited to those found in the office environment. The ability of a person inflicted with severe heart disease to capably function in a working environment is related to his temperament. The COMPLAINANT is a well-controlled, even- tempered person who has demonstrated ability to capably perform computer analyst and programmer duties and effectively cope with the stresses of an office environment. He has never experienced a heart attack. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 11.) In order to control and treat his heart disease (which is incurable, without surgical bypass), and relieve angina pectoris symptoms, COMPLAINANT takes various vasodilators, including nitroglycerin and inderal; he is on a diet and takes diabinese to control his diabetes. If he suffers angina pectoris when mowing the lawn, he quickly takes the prescribed medication, the pain subsides, and he continues mowing. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 11) Complainant's Application for Employment as a Program-Analyst On September 18, 1978, COMPLAINANT filed an application for employment as a program-analyst with the Respondent, GTE Data Services, Inc. ("COMPANY"). Betty Graef, Supervision of the COMPANY's CRB Source Group, had an available program-analyst position in the Customer Master File Unit; after review the COMPLAINANT's application, she concluded that he appeared to be qualified for the position and asked Nancy Fitzpatrick, the COMPANY's Personnel Representative, to arrange an employment interview. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef, Fitzpatrick; R.E. 4.) Qualifications and Duties of the Available Program-Analyst Position. The program-analyst position which Ms. Graef had available entailed coding computer programs based on specifications prepared by a senior analyst. These programs maintained billing and address information on telephone company customers. There were approximately 22 other program-analysts in that department. The work required knowledge of assembly, also known as BAL or computer language, and typically required meeting deadlines and coping with emergency demands. Occasionally analysts were required to work long and irregular hours, due to emergencies, or in order to correct errors. The frequency of such a requirement would vary: employees who were capable and careful in their work were less likely to experience such demands. Substantial overtime work was not ordinarily required. (Testimony of Fenesy, Gradef.) During the subsequent employment interview conducted by Ms. Graef, COMPLAINANT specifically asked if the position required overtime work: she answered that, except under exceptional conditions, there would be no overtime required unless he fell behind in his work. To the extent Ms. Graef's testimony at hearing tended to describe the position as on regularly requiring excessive or extraordinary hours, it is rejected as at variance with her prior description of the position during the employment interview with COMPLAINANT, and is considered unpersuasive. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef.) Qualification of Complainant At the time of his application, COMPLAINANT was employed by Pinellas County as an automatic mapping supervisor, at $12,000 per annum. He supervised 23 employees, and was responsible for their hiring, performance, and firing. Generally, he worked a 40-hour work week, although he occasionally worked irregular or overtime hours. During the summer of 1977, he worked 50 hours a week. (Testimony of Fenesy.) COMPLAINANT was knowledgeable and had extensive experience in the area of data processing. He had worked in that field for 17 years, and attended various technical training seminars; moreover, he had previous programming experience using BAL, the particular computer language required for the position. He also held a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration. By virtue of his technical knowledge and experience, COMPLAINANT was qualified to carry out the duties of the available program-analyst position in Ms. Graef's department. The only objection raised to his employment was based on his physical condition. (Testimony of Fenesy; R.E. 4.) The Company's Conditional Offers of Employment and Rejection of Complainant. On September 21, 1978, after the COMPLAINANT's employment interview with Ms. Graef and Ms. Fitzpatrick, the COMPANY offered to employ him as a program-analyst, at $16,000 per annum, conditioned upon his passing the standard pre-employment physical. After his rejection of the offer, the COMPANY made a second offer on October 6, 1978, with a salary of $18,000 per annum; this offer was also condition upon passage of the pre-employment physical. COMPLAINANT accepted this offer, and promptly gave notice to his present employer, Pinellas County, effective October 13, 1978. He was scheduled to begin work with the COMPANY on October 16, 1978. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef, Fitzpatrick; P.E. 1,2,3) On October 10, 1978, the medical doctor ordinarily used by the COMPANY for this purpose, Edward F. Carter, M.D., gave the COMPLAINANT the standard pre- employment physical examination. On the medical questionnaire form, COMPLAINANT disclosed that he had angina pectoris, and was taking inderal for its control; and he also explained the "over exertion may cause angina pain" (R.E. 4), and gave the name of his cardiologist, John Dormois, M.D. Despite this disclosure, no diagnostic tests were administered by Dr. Carter to determine the severity of his heart disease, or the extent to which it might interfere with his performance as a program-analyst. The stated purpose of the examination, as indicated on the COMPANY form is "to determine if . . .[the applicant] meet(s) the physical standards of the position for which . . .[he is] applying." (R.E. 4.) Several days later, COMPLAINANT was notified by Ms. Fitzpatrick that he had "flunked" the physical. Dr. Carter's brief written "Physician's Report" indicated the COMPLAINANT had "angina, on medication", and "diabetes regulated and diet"; the box labeled "unemployable at this time", was checked. (Testimony of Fenesy; R.E. 4.) COMPLAINANT protested to Ms. Fitzpatrick and tried to contact the COMPANY's affirmative action officer. He also asked Dr. Dormois (his cardiologist who was familiar with the nature of his heart disease) to call Dr. Carter to discuss his condition. On October 16, 1978, Ms. Fitzpatrick told him they would try to arrange a second physical with another doctor. Due to his resignation (extended one week), the COMPLAINANT faced unemployment as of October 20, 1978, and was anxious to quickly resolve the matter. A second physical examination was thereafter scheduled for October 20, 1978, with Phillip Hampton, M.D., a practitioner of internal medicine with specialties in both diabetes and cardiology. The COMPANY's representative involved had, at that time, resolved to go along with whatever decision was made by Dr. Hampton. (Testimony of Fenesy, Fitzpatrick, Hampton). On October 20, 1978, Dr. Hampton took the COMPLAINANT's medical history, and conducted a 15-minute physical consisting of x-rays, an electrocardiogram, blood, and urine tests. COMPLAINANT explained that he had experienced angina pectoris for approximately three years, in situations of physical exertion and stress.3 Dr. Hampton was aware that COMPLAINANT was taking vasodilatory medication to alleviate angina pain, as well as diabinese to control his diabetes. The medically recognized diagnostic test to coronary diabetes. The medically recognized diagnostic test for coronary heart disease is a coronary arteriography; however, Dr. Hampton did not administer this test to COMPLAINANT. There is one objective diagnostic test to determine whether an individual suffers from angina pectoris--the stress test. It consists of placing the patient on a treadmill requiring physical exertion; the effects of exertion on blood pressure and production of pain (angina pectoris) are detected, as are changes in the patient's electrocardiogram. However, Dr. Hampton did not perform a stress test upon COMPLAINANT. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton.) On October 27, 1978, Dr. Hampton notified the COMPANY of the results of his examination of COMPLAINANT: "Dear Mrs. Fitzpatrick: As a result of my examination of Mr. Charles A. Fenesy on Oct. 1978, I find that he has obesity, diabetes and angina pectoris. He would be largely relieved of diabetes and angina if he would reduce his weight to under 200 lbs. which means a loss of about 70 lbs. If he does not he is not a good risk physically and in danger of a myocardial infarction." (R.E. 3.) Based on Dr. Hampton's letter, Ms. Fitzpatrick notified COMPLAINANT on October 30, 1978, that Dr. Hampton had concurred with Dr. Carter, and that he would not be hired. COMPLAINANT asked for a letter to that effect which the COMPANY never furnished. (Testimony of Fitzpatrick, Fenesy; R.E. 3.) Neither Dr. Carter nor Dr. Hampton recommended to the COMPANY that COMPLAINANT was "employable" if he took medication to control his condition. They both were aware that he was already taking such medication. (Testimony of Hampton, Fenesy; R.E. 4.) However, after COMPLAINANT warned that he would file a grievance because of his rejection, Tannia Yarborough, the COMPANY's Equal Employment Opportunity Administrator, told him that he would be considered for employment if he submitted a letter from his doctor stating that his medical problems were under control and if he would participate in a COMPANY weight reduction program; the weight reduction program requisite was later withdrawn. [The COMPANY did not have a policy to monitor the weight of its employees.] Ms. Yarborough, who was involved in the COMPANY's decisions concerning COMPLAINANT, thought angina pectoris was a cardiac disease, and not a symptom of the disease. (Tr. 213.) She also was not aware at the time of hearing that COMPLAINANT's cardiac disease was progressive--that is could be controlled but not cured. In response to Ms. Yarborough's suggestion, COMPLAINANT's cardiologist, Dr. Dormois, wrote a letter on January 18, 1979, stating that COMPLAINANT's symptoms (angina pectoris) were under control by medication, that COMPLAINANT had shown "absolutely no tendency over the last several years to have any difficulty performing his usual assigned task," and that he had "no reason to think that in the foreseeable future that this will be greatly altered." (P.E. 4.) (Testimony of Fenesy, Yarborough; P.E. 4.) Effect of Complainant's Coronary Heart Disease on His Performance as a Program-Analyst There is insufficient evidence to establish that COMPLAINANT's coronary heart disease would adversely impact or interfere with his performance as a program-analyst with the COMPANY. The two COMPANY doctors who examined him had no awareness of the particular demands of the position for which he applied; they did not even discuss with him his extensive experience in the data processing field (18 years), and whether his disease had interfered with his work in an office environment. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton.) The actions of the two doctors supports an inference that the COMPANY had not enunciated, in advance, the purpose of pre-employment physicals, and the standards which apply to determining the medical "employability" of a job applicant. The COMPANY accepted the simple checking of an "unemployable" box on a form by Dr. Carter, and Dr. Hampton's reinforcing conclusion that COMPLAINANT "is not a good risk physically" (R.E.3) if he does not reduce his weight; these documents form the basis of the COMPANY's rejection. Dr. Hampton's conclusions concerning COMPLAINANT's disease were admittedly based on statistical probability, not on an individual assessment of COMPLAINANT's temperament, his defense mechanisms, and his ability to perform data processing work in an office environment. In essence, they concluded that COMPLAINANT's longevity or life expectancy is not good because of the progressive nature of his disease. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton; P.E. 11, R.E. 3,4.) Complainant's Lost Wages and Attorney's Fees COMPLAINANT made reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain employment after his rejection by the COMPANY. For 19 weeks he was unemployed; if the COMPANY had fulfilled its offer to employ him on October 39, 1978, he would have earned $6,576.93 during that period. He eventually secured various employment positions in the data processing field, and now works again for Pinellas County. As of the date of hearing, the difference between what he earned in those positions and what he would have earned with the COMPANY (had he been hired at $18,000 per annum) is $3,379.88. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6.) COMPLAINANT claims lost of fringe benefits which he would have received if he had remained in his job with Pinellas County in 1978; alternatively, he claims loss of fringe benefits which he would have received from the COMPANY if he had been employed since October, 1978. However, the benefits accorded by the two employers, including pensions, vacation, sick leave, and insurance coverage, are markedly dissimilar. Based on the quality of the evidence submitted on this question, any conclusion concerning COMPLAINANT's actual monetary loss in fringe benefits due to the COMPANY's action would be conjecture and unreliable. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6,9.) Because of the COMPANY's rejection of his employment application, COMPLAINANT applied for and received Social Security Disability Payments from October, 1978 through March, 1979. However, since he subsequently found gainful employment in March, 1979, (i.e., he did not remain disabled for the requisite period) the Social Security Administration retroactively denied his eligibility. He may now be required to reimburse the government for the disability payment which he received. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 5.) The COMPLAINANT testified that he is obligated to pay attorney's fees of $600 in connection with this proceeding. In the absence of the COMPANY contesting this amount, it is concluded that such attorney's fees are reasonable. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6.)

Conclusions Conclusions: That Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by failing or refusing to hire Petitioner because of his handicap. The Respondent failed to substantiate its asserted defense--that the absence of Petitioner's particular handicap was a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the position for which he applied. Recommendation: That the Commission prohibit the Respondent from engaging in such practice in the future, require it to pay Petitioner lost wages and attorney's fees, and offer him employment in the next available program-analyst position. Background On November 21, 1978, Petitioner, Charles Fenesy ("COMPLAINANT"), filed a complaint of discrimination with the Intervenor, Florida Commission on Human Relations ("COMMISSION"), alleging Respondent, GTE Data Services Inc. ("COMPANY"), denied him employment because of his physical handicap--heart disease. After investigation, the COMMISSION's Executive Director issued a "Determination: Cause" on October 22, 1979, concluding that there was reasonable cause to believe that the COMPANY had committed an unlawful employment practice prohibited by Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1979) [formerly Section 13.261(1), Florida Statutes (1977)]. After the parties failed to conciliate, or informally resolve the dispute, COMPLAINANT filed his Petition for Relief with the COMMISSION on February 29, 1980. Thereafter, the Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer to conduct a Section 120.57 hearing. Final hearing was then set for May 20, 1980. Subsequently, upon the COMPANY's motion, and without objection, hearing was continued and reset for July 9, 1980. Thereafter, upon COMPLAINANT's motion, and without objection, the hearing was again continued and reset for September 10, 1980. Several pleadings were filed and disposed of prior to final hearing. On April 29, 1980, the COMMISSION's Executive Director moved to intervene as a party in this proceeding, which motion was granted. By way of affirmative defense to COMPLAINANT's Petition for Relief, the COMPANY asserted, among other things, that the Petition was untimely in that the COMMISSION had failed to comply with its own rules, Section 9D-9.05(3), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the COMPANY asserted that the above rule requires the service of a "Notice of Failure of Conciliation" 30 days after service of the "Determination: Cause". Records show that the COMMISSION denied the COMPANY's petition for reconsideration of the "Determination: Cause" on December 5, 1979; but the Notice of Failure of Conciliation was not issued until February 21, 180. On May 12, 1980, the COMMISSION moved to dismiss the COMPANY's affirmative defense. The COMPANY responded to the COMMISSION's motions, and moved for summary judgment. By order dated June 30, 1980, the COMMISSION's motion to dismiss the COMPANY's affirmative defense was granted on the grounds that (1) Rule 9D-9.05 does not specify the time period which a Notice of Failure of Conciliation must be issued, (2) COMPLAINANT's Petition for Relief was filed within the requisite time period from the issuance of the Notice, and (3) the COMPANY's actions contributed to the delay in issuance of the Notice. Also, the COMPANY's motion for summary judgment was denied on the ground that the conduct of the parties during settlement negotiations was not germane to the issues to be decided at final hearing. On June 18, 1980, the COMPANY moved to compel COMPLAINANT to answer interrogatories, which motion was granted on July 1, 1980. At final hearing, COMPLAINANT testified in his own behalf and offered Petitioner's Exhibit1 Nos. 3 through 7, each of which was received.2 The COMMISSION presented no witnesses or documentary evidence. At the close of hearing, the parties requested and were granted the opportunity to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by October 21, 1980. Proposed findings were subsequently filed; those filed by the COMMISSION and COMPLAINANT are the subject of a pending motion to strike filed by the COMPANY.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding the COMPANY engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1979), and prohibiting such practice in the future; and Providing COMPLAINANT affirmative relief from the unlawful practice by requiring the COMPANY to (a) pay him lost wages in the amount of $9, 956.81; (b) offer him the next available program-analyst position at a salary and under conditions similar to that which he would have received in October, 1978, but for the COMPANY's unlawful practice; and (c) pay him $600 for attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1980.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JOSEPH SCOTT SHEPHERD vs. REDMAN HOMES, 87-003407 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003407 Latest Update: Nov. 23, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 26, 1986 to November 6, 1986 as a millworker cutting wood for floor joists used in the manufacture of mobile homes. His employment was terminated by Respondent on November 6, 1986 due to his inability to keep up with production. Petitioner timely filed his request for hearing with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Respondent is an employer within the terms of the Human Rights Act of 1977, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and manufactures mobile homes. Petitioner is handicapped by virtue of the amputation of his left arm above the elbow due to a motorcycle accident in 1977. During the approximately two and one-half month period that Petitioner was employed by Respondent, four mobile homes per day were being produced. However, Respondent determined in late October, 1986 to increase production to five mobile homes per day and implemented this increased level of production in November, after Petitioner was terminated. All employees are evaluated within thirty days of their employment by Respondent. Petitioner's thirty day evaluation was conducted on September 23, 1986. On a five point scale, with one being excellent and five being poor, Petitioner received a rating of four in productivity. This is a low average rating. Comments by his group leader on the evaluation form state that Petitioner "needs to get a system down in order to increase productivity." Petitioner was counsel led about the need to increase his productivity at the time of this evaluation. From September 23 to October 24, 1986 Petitioner's productivity did not improve. His group leader at the time he was terminated, Frederick W. Moulder, testified that it took Petitioner 3 1/2 hours to do a job which it took Moulder 1 1/2 to 3 hours to do. Moulder also helped Petitioner finish his work since Moulder regularly finished early and Petitioner never completed his work early, even though production at the time was four homes per day and had not yet been increased to five. On October 24, 1986 Petitioner's supervisor, Tim Powers, prepared a written warning notice which stated that Petitioner "needs to improve his speed to enable him to keep up with his production . . . ." Petitioner refused to sign this warning notice to acknowledge receipt, and instead stated to Powers that his production was fast enough. Petitioner was assigned to work with Charles Rogers on the last day of his employment to show Rogers how the machines he worked with operated. Rogers replaced Petitioner after his termination. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever asked for a reassignment due to production demands of his millworker position. To the contrary, Petitioner continues to feel that he was working fast enough and was meeting production that he felt was sufficient. In any event, there is no evidence that alternative positions were available. During October and November, 1986 Respondent terminated eleven employees for slow or insufficient production, in addition to Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd Day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1987. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-3407 Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-3 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8-9 Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 10-11 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 12 Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 13-16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Scott Shepherd 108 Flores Way Auburndale, Florida 33823 Jeffrey W. Bell, Esquire 600 Peachtree At The Circle Building 1275 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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HEALTHPARK CARE CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 02-000033 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jan. 02, 2002 Number: 02-000033 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2003

The Issue DOAH Case No. 02-0033: Whether Respondent's licensure status should be reduced from standard to conditional. DOAH Case No. 02-1788: Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated March 13, 2002, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: AHCA is the state Agency responsible for licensure and regulation of nursing homes operating in the State of Florida. Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes. Healthpark operates a licensed nursing home at 16131 Roserush Court, Fort Myers, Florida. The standard form used by AHCA to document survey findings, titled "Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction," is commonly referred to as a "2567" form. The individual deficiencies are noted on the form by way of identifying numbers commonly called "Tags." A Tag identifies the applicable regulatory standard that the surveyors believe has been violated and provides a summary of the violation, specific factual allegations that the surveyors believe support the violation, and two ratings which indicate the severity of the deficiency. One of the ratings identified in a Tag is a "scope and severity" rating, which is a letter rating from A to L with A representing the least severe deficiency and L representing the most severe. The second rating is a "class" rating, which is a numerical rating of I, II, or III, with I representing the most severe deficiency and III representing the least severe deficiency. On October 15 through 18, 2001, AHCA conducted an annual licensure and certification survey of Healthpark, to evaluate the facility's compliance with state and federal regulations governing the operation of nursing homes. The survey team alleged three deficiencies during the survey, two of which are at issue in these proceedings. At issue are deficiencies identified as Tag F224 (violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(c)(1)(i), relating to neglect of residents) and Tag F325 (violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.25(i)(l), relating to maintenance of acceptable parameters of nutritional status). Both of the deficiencies alleged in the survey were classified as Class II under the Florida classification system for nursing homes. A class II deficiency is "a deficiency that the agency determines has compromised the resident's ability to maintain or reach his or her highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being, as defined by an accurate and comprehensive resident assessment, plan of care, and provision of services." Section 400.23(8)(b), Florida Statutes. Both of the deficiencies alleged in the survey were cited at a federal scope and severity rating of G, meaning that each deficiency was isolated, caused actual harm that is not immediate jeopardy, and did not involve substandard quality of care. Based on the alleged Class II deficiencies in Tags F224 and F325, AHCA imposed a conditional license on Healthpark, effective October 18, 2001. The license expiration date was September 30, 2002. Tag F224 The survey allegedly found violations of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.13(c)(1)(i), which states: Staff treatment of residents. The facility must develop and implement written policies and procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect, and abuse of residents and misappropriation of resident property. The facility must-- (i) Not use verbal, mental, sexual, or physical abuse, corporal punishment, or involuntary seclusion.... In the parlance of the federal Health Care Financing Administration Form 2567 employed by AHCA to report its findings, this requirement is referenced as "Tag F224." The Agency's allegations in this case involved neglect of a resident rather than any form of abusive treatment. The Form 2567 listed two incidents under Tag F224, both involving Resident 10, or "R-10." The surveyor observations read as follows: Based on observations, record review and interviews with a resident and a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA), the facility failed to provide toileting needs as care planned for 1 (Resident #10) of 8 sampled residents reviewed for incontinence and toileting programs. The resident was not toileted for more than 5 hours causing multiple creased areas and redness to her left groin, perineum and buttocks. The findings include: On 10/15/2001, Resident #10 was in her room, #141, in bed A at 2:20 P.M. Resident stated she was wet. The call bell cord was clipped to the sheet, but the bell mechanism was off the side of the bed, out of the resident's reach. Surveyor walked to the North nurse's station and continued to observe the resident's room entrance. Record review revealed Resident #10's most recent quarterly Minimum Data Set (MDS) completed 8/27/2001, assessed her with bladder incontinence at 3 (frequently incontinent), bowel incontinence at 1 (less than once weekly), activity is assessed as bed mobility 3/3 (needs extensive assistance to move in bed), and toilet use at 3/2 (needs extensive assistance). At 4:15 P.M., the resident requested the surveyor to get someone to change her as no one had come in and the call bell was still out of her reach. The resident's request was given to the nurse at 4:20 P.M. On 10/16/01, Resident #10 was observed in her wheelchair in the hall outside her room from 8:55 A.M. until 12:05 P.M., when she was escorted to the main dining room. At 2:20 P.M., resident was still sitting in her wheelchair. After surveyor intervention, the CNA put the resident to bed at 2:30 P.M. When the adult diaper was removed, it revealed the resident to be incontinent of feces and urine. The odor of urine was very strong in the room. The resident's perineum and buttocks were red and moist, with multiple creased areas. The left groin was especially red. During an interview with the CNA, she stated the resident was last toileted before lunch at approximately 11:00 A.M. This was during the time of direct observation by the surveyor of the resident in the hall outside her room. Review of the resident's Care Plan revealed that she was to have the call bell in place at all times and scheduled toileting. Diane Ashworth was the survey team member who recorded the observation of R-10. Ms. Ashworth was assigned the task of observing R-10, and based her findings on a review of the resident's medical records, observations and interviews. R-10 was a 96-year-old diabetic female who had been admitted to Healthpark on March 28, 2000. R-10's most recent Minimum Data Set ("MDS"), completed on August 27, 2001, indicated that R-10 had short and long-term memory difficulties and moderately impaired decision making as to tasks of daily life. R-10 was generally confused as to place and time. She could make herself understood, and had no difficulty understanding what was said to her. She was easily angered and could be physically abusive to staff. R-10 required extensive assistance to move, dress, toilet, and maintain general hygiene. She was confined to her bed or to a wheelchair, and required assistance to move the wheelchair. R-10's MDS indicated a loss of voluntary movement in her hands, including her wrists and fingers. The MDS indicated that R-10 experienced daily incontinence of the bladder, and bowel incontinence once a week on average. The nurse's notes for R-10 indicated that she was able to make her needs known and that she was encouraged by staff to call for assistance as needed. The care plan for R-10 stated that she should have "scheduled toileting," but set forth no firm schedule. Ms. Ashworth testified that she would have expected R-10 to be toileted before meals, before bed, and upon rising, at a minimum. Mona Joseph was the CNA who attended R-10 on a daily basis. Ms. Joseph testified that R-10, like all residents who wore adult diapers, was scheduled for toileting every two hours and whenever necessary. In practice this meant that Ms. Joseph would inquire as to R-10's need for toileting every two hours. Ms. Joseph testified that R-10 would ask her for toileting at least twice a day, and that she never refused the request. She always toileted R-10 before lunch, and testified that on October 16 she toileted R-10 at about 11 a.m. before taking her to lunch. Toileting R-10 required the use of a Hoyer lift to move the resident from her wheelchair to the bed. Ms. Joseph estimated that the entire process of toileting R-10 took seven to eight minutes. Caroline Nicotra, the supervisor of the long-term care unit in which R-10 resided and Ms. Joseph's supervisor, confirmed that Healthpark's CNAs were trained to make rounds every two hours and ask those residents requiring assistance if they needed to be toileted. R-10 was capable of making that decision, and her wishes regarding her need for toileting would be respected by the CNA. Ms. Ashworth's testimony was generally consistent with her written findings. She met R-10 on the afternoon of October 15. R-10 was lying in bed, and told Ms. Ashworth that she was wet. Ms. Ashworth noted that the call bell cord was clipped to R-10's bed, but that the bell mechanism itself was not within R-10's reach. Ms. Ashworth left the room and took a position at the nurses' station, from which she could see the door to R-10's room. She watched to see if any staff person from Healthpark went into R-10's room. She saw no one enter the room between 2:20 p.m. and 4:15 p.m., at which time she asked a CNA to toilet R-10. Ms. Ashworth returned at 8:55 a.m. on October 16, and observed R-10 sitting in her wheelchair in the hallway outside her room. Ms. Ashworth took up her post at the nurses' station and watched R-10 until 12:05 p.m. At no time in the morning did Ms. Ashworth see R-10 being moved or taken for toileting, though Ms. Joseph testified that she toileted R-10 at about 11 a.m. The evidence established that R-10's room was at the opposite end of a corridor from the nurses' station. The corridor was approximately 200 feet long from the nurses' station to R-10's room. The corridor was busy. Medications were passed at 9:00 a.m., meaning that medication carts went up and down the corridor. Staff carried breakfast trays in and out of rooms. Housekeeping and treatment carts were in the hallway. Given the distance of the nurses' station from R-10's room and the constant activity in the corridor, it is unlikely that Ms. Ashworth's view of R-10 was unobstructed at all times. Moreover, the nurses' station itself was a hub of activity. At the end of the nurses' station where Ms. Ashworth stood was the fax machine. The fax machine was kept constantly busy sending physicians' orders to the pharmacy. The unit secretary was stationed in this location. Nurses passed through this area to retrieve forms from the filing cabinets or to go to the medication room. The likelihood that Ms. Ashworth was unable from her vantage point to view R-10 at all times makes credible Ms. Joseph's testimony that she regularly checked with R-10 to ask whether she required toileting. However, it is unlikely that R-10 was ever out of Ms. Ashworth's sight for the period of seven to eight minutes necessary to actually toilet the resident. Ms. Ashworth's testimony that R-10 was not toileted at 11 a.m. on October 16 is therefore credited. At 12:05 p.m., R-10 was taken to the dining room for lunch. Ms. Ashworth followed and observed R-10 in the dining room. After lunch, R-10 was wheeled back to the outside of her room. Ms. Ashworth observed her from the nurses' station until 2:20 p.m. Ms. Ashworth did not see R-10 being taken for toileting between 12:05 and 2:20 p.m. At 2:30 p.m. on October 16, Ms. Ashworth approached Mona Joseph, the CNA responsible for R-10, and asked her to put R-10 to bed so that Ms. Ashworth could examine her buttocks. Ms. Ashworth asked another AHCA surveyor, Maria Donohue, to accompany her to confirm her observations. There was some delay while Ms. Joseph finished a task for another resident, but eventually Ms. Joseph wheeled R-10 into the room and placed her into bed. Ms. Joseph changed R-10's adult brief in the presence of Ms. Ashworth and Ms. Donohue. Ms. Ashworth testified that there was a strong smell of urine in the room, even before the brief was removed, though she noticed no smell of urine about R- 10 prior to entering the room. When Ms. Joseph removed the adult brief, Ms. Ashworth noted that it was wet and that there was a large amount of feces in the brief and on R-10's buttocks. Ms. Ashworth noted that the skin on R-10's perineum and buttocks was creased and red. The area of R-10's left groin was so red that Ms. Ashworth at first thought there was no skin. Ms. Ashworth stated that this kind of redness is associated with not being toileted as scheduled, though she conceded that such redness can also result from pressure. Ms. Ashworth also conceded that this was her first observation of R-10's buttocks, and thus that she had no baseline to judge how abnormal the redness was at the time Ms. Joseph changed the adult brief. Ms. Donohue also recalled a strong urine smell as soon as they entered the room. She agreed that R-10's buttocks were red in some areas, but recalled no further details. She could not recall if there was feces in the adult brief, but did recall that it was saturated with urine. Mona Joseph, the CNA who changed R-10's adult brief, believed that the urine smell in the room came from the next bed, because she had just changed the adult brief of the person in that bed. Ms. Joseph smelled no odor of urine or feces about R-10. Ms. Joseph testified that R-10's brief was dry, and that she began having a bowel movement while being changed. She noted no redness on R-10's buttocks. Caroline Nicotra was the supervisor of the long-term care unit in which R-10 resided. She knew R-10, and stated that R-10 regularly used her call bell, and would call out for help if she could not reach the call button clipped to her bed. She noted that all of the rooms to which Ms. Joseph was assigned were in the same area of the corridor, so that Ms. Joseph would always be able to hear R-10 call out. There would also be nurses in the area who could hear R-10. Ms. Nicotra knew the surveyors had gone into R-10's room with Ms. Joseph, and she went into the room moments after the surveyors left the room to ascertain whether anything had occurred that she needed to address. Ms. Joseph told Ms. Nicotra what had happened. Ms. Nicotra asked R-10 for permission to examine her body and R-10 assented. Ms. Nicotra removed R-10's adult brief and inspected R-10's buttocks. She observed no creasing or redness of the perineum or the buttocks. R-10's skin was intact and no different than Ms. Nicotra had seen it on other occasions. R-10 told Ms. Nicotra that she was not experiencing pain or discomfort in her buttocks area. Ms. Nicotra stated that R-10 weighed about 180 pounds, and that the creasing and redness observed by the surveyors could have been caused by the pressure of sitting in her wheelchair for a long time. Ms. Nicotra examined the adult brief that had been removed from R-10. She observed that it was slightly damp, which she attributed to sweat, and that it contained a smear of bowel movement. It did not smell strongly of urine. Viewing the evidence in its entirety, and crediting the honesty of the testimony of each witness, it is found that AHCA failed to prove the elements of Tag F224 by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. Ashworth did not observe R-10 being toileted. However, Ms. Ashworth's observation does not establish that R-10 required toileting or that the facility was negligent in not toileting the resident. After the first meeting on October 15, Ms. Ashworth did not ask R-10 whether she needed to be toileted. Ms. Joseph inquired as to R-10's toileting needs every two hours. R-10 was able to make her needs known to facility staff, and she did so on a daily basis. If her call bell was out of reach, she would call out to staff. Ms. Joseph's testimony that the adult brief was dry of urine and contained only a slight amount of fecal material is supported by that of Ms. Nicotra, the only other witness who actually handled the adult brief, and is therefore credited. The only harm alleged by AHCA was the irritation to R- 10's bottom, claimed to be the result of R-10's sitting in a soiled adult brief for an extended period of time. The surveyors' testimony that R-10's perineum, buttocks, and left groin were creased and red at the time of changing is credited. Also credited, however, is Ms. Nicotra's testimony that R-10's perineum, buttocks and left groin were no longer creased or red a few minutes after the changing. Ms. Nicotra's testimony indicates that the creasing and redness were caused, not by irritation from urine and/or feces in the adult brief, but by an extended period of sitting in her wheelchair. The evidence indicates no neglect of R-10, and that R-10 suffered no harm during the sequence of events described in the Form 2567. II. Tag F325 The survey allegedly found a violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.25(i)(1), which states: Nutrition. Based on a resident's comprehensive assessment, the facility must ensure that a resident-- Maintains acceptable parameters of nutritional status, such as body weight and protein levels, unless the resident's clinical condition demonstrates that this is not possible.... This requirement is referenced on Form 2567 as "Tag F325." The survey found one instance in which Healthpark allegedly failed to ensure that a resident maintained acceptable parameters of nutritional status. The surveyor's observation on Form 2567 concerned Resident 17, or "R-17": Based on record review and staff (Unit Manager and Registered Dietician) interviews, the facility failed to adequately assess and revise the care plan to address the significant weight loss of 1 (Resident #17) of 15 from a sample of 21 residents reviewed for nutritional concerns. This is evidenced by: 1) After Resident #17 had a significant weight loss of 6.8% in 4 weeks, the facility did not have an adequate nutritional assessment and did not revise the care plan to prevent the resident from further weight loss. The findings include: 1. Resident #17 was admitted to the facility on 9/6/01 with diagnoses that include Sepsis, S/P Incision and Drainage (I&D) of the Right Knee and GI Bleed. The resident has a history of Coronary Artery Disease (CAD). During the clinical record review, it revealed [sic] that the resident's physician ordered Ancef (antibiotic) 2 grams every 8 hours on 9/6/01, to be given for 25 days. During the review of the resident's initial MDS (Minimum Data Set) completed on 9/19/01, it revealed [sic] he weighed 185 lbs (pounds) and is 72 inches tall. Review of the MDS also revealed the resident is independent with his cognitive skills for daily decision making. Further review of the MDS also revealed he requires set up and supervision during meals. He requires extensive assistance with dressing, bathing, and ambulation. Review of the nutritional assessment revealed the RD assessed the resident on 9/10/01. The assessment stated, "Resident has decreased appetite which may be R/T (related to) current meds (medications); Resident's wife feels he has lost wt (weight) but wt is increased due to edema in feet. Resident's current diet meets assessed needs. Will include food preferences to increase intake." Under "Ethnic/Religious Food Preferences" it stated, "No cultural preferences stated." The nutritional assessment completed by the RD on 9/10/01, stated that the resident weighs 185 lbs. His UBW (usual body weight) is 182 lbs. During an interview with the Unit Manager and Registered Dietician (RD) on 10/18/01 at approximately 11:00 AM, they stated that the resident's weight of 185 lbs., which is documented in the initial MDS, was inaccurate. The resident's accurate weight on admission was 175 lbs. During the review of the weight record, it revealed [sic] the resident remained 175 lbs. on 9/11/01. On 9/18/01, the resident weighed 168 lbs., indicating a weight loss of 7 lbs. in 7 days. During the review of the Resident Assessment Protocol (RAP) completed on 9/19/01, it revealed [sic] she [sic] triggered for "Nutritional Status." The care plan developed on 9/19/01 stated, "Res. (resident) leaves 25% or more of food uneaten at most meals. Weight: 168 lbs; UBW (usual body weight) 182 lbs." The goal stated, "Res will maintain weight up or down within 1-2 lbs. through next quarter: 10/17/01." The following approaches are listed: "Diet as ordered." "Encourage fluids." "Monitor weights." "Food preferences and substitute for uneaten foods." "Assist with tray set-ups, open all packages." Review of the physician's order dated 9/18/01 revealed the resident was started on TwoCal HN (supplements) 60cc's four times a day, ice cream everyday [sic] at 8:00 P.M., fruit everyday [sic] at 10:00 A.M. and peanut butter, cracker, and juice everyday [sic] at 2:00 P.M. During the review of the Medication Administration Record (MAR) for the months of 9/01 and 10/01, it confirmed [sic] that this additional supplements were given to the resident, however there is no documentation to indicate the resident's consumption of each supplement. Interview with the Unit Manager on 10/18/01 at approximately 11:15 A.M. also confirmed there is no documentation in the clinical record to indicate the resident's consumption of each snack. Review of the CNA (Certified Nursing Assistant) Care Plan for the month of 9/01 revealed no documentation being offered at bedtime and no documentation for the month of 10/01 that the resident received bedtime snacks. Further review of the resident's weight record revealed the resident weighed 163 lbs on 10/2/01. This indicates a significant weight loss of 12 lbs or 6.8 percent of his total body weight in 4 weeks. Review of the nurses' notes revealed that this significant weight loss had been identified on 9/26/01, 20 days after the resident's admission to the facility. The nurse's notes dated 9/26/01 stated that the care plan to address the risk for weight loss was reviewed. Review of the care plan confirmed it was reviewed on 9/26/01 and 10/6/01. The goal stated, "Will lose no more weight, 11/6/01." Added to approaches stated, "Nutritional supplements as ordered." However, further review of the clinical record and the care plan revealed no documentation to indicate that a comprehensive nutritional assessment was done. There is no documentation in the resident's clinical record to indicate that the care plan was revised. During an interview with the Unit Manager on 10/18/01 at approximately 2:15 P.M., she confirmed that after the resident's admission to the facility on 9/6/01, the resident was refusing to eat, but his appetite improved in the beginning of 10/01. He was consuming 75 percent-100 percent of his meals. She also stated that the resident had "pedal (foot and ankle) edema" on admission to the facility. There is no documentation in the resident's clinical record to indicate that this edema was monitored. There is no documentation in the clinical record that the resident was on a diuretic. She further stated that the final report on the blood culture done on the resident, dated 10/1/01, was positive for Candida sp (yeast infection). During the review of the clinical record, it did not have [sic] documentation to indicate that an assessment of the resident's protein intake was assessed at this time. There is no documentation in the resident's clinical record to indicate that the resident's albumin and protein levels were assessed. During an interview with the Unit Manager on 10/18/01, at approximately 2:15 P.M., she stated that the resident's family members were encouraged to visit more often and encourage to bring foods that he likes. She stated that the resident liked Italian food. This is in contrary to [sic] the RD's nutritional assessment completed on 9/10/01. She also stated that the facility staff continued to honor resident's food preferences and provided alternatives. There is no documentation in the resident's clinical record to indicate that an assessment of the resident's nutritional status, based on his current weight of 163 lbs. and current food intake was done. Further review of the resident's weight record revealed he weighed 158 lbs. on 10/9/01. This reveals a weight loss of 5 more lbs. in 12 days. During the interview on 10/18/01 at approximately 2:15 P.M., she did not have an explanation why the resident continued to lose weight despite an improvement in his appetite. Maria Donohue was the survey team member who recorded the observation of R-17. This resident was initially assigned to Ms. Ashworth, who briefly assessed R-17 in his room and commenced a review of his medical records. Ms. Ashworth noted R-17's weight loss and that his situation required further investigation. Because Ms. Ashworth was busy with her observations of R-10, the survey team shifted responsibility for R-17 to Ms. Donohue. Ms. Donohue based her findings on a review of the resident's medical records and interviews with Healthpark staff. She did not speak to or observe R-17. She did not interview R-17's physician, and could not recall speaking to R- 17's family. R-17 was an 84-year-old male with a history of coronary artery disease who was admitted to Healthpark from a hospital. About a year and a half before his admission to Healthpark, R-17 had a total knee replacement. He was admitted to the hospital because of a fever. A medical work-up revealed that he was septic, with infection throughout his body. The infection stemmed from his knee, and an incision and drainage was performed. The infection was severe, requiring the parenteral administration of the cephalosporin Ancef for a period of 25 days, beginning September 6, 2001. Anorexia is a known adverse reaction to Ancef. Upon admission to Healthpark, R-17 was experiencing pain that was controlled by Percocet, an analgesic with the potential to affect appetite. R-17 was prescribed Zanaflex, a muscle relaxant that can affect appetite. R-17 was also diagnosed as prone to constipation and took laxatives. R-17 also had swelling in his feet and ankles that caused discomfort when he walked. On September 9, an attending nurse documented edema from his ankles to his feet. On September 10, R-17's physician prescribed T.E.D. hose (compressive stockings) for the edema. R-17 refused to wear them. On the same date, R-17's pain increased and his physician ordered a low-dosage Duragesic patch in addition to his other medications. The dosage was increased on September 12, when his pain became so severe that he was screaming out and having spasms. By September 13, R-17's spasms were abating. On September 14, the pain had lessened and he was able to move about, though he continued to voice complaints about the pain. On September 18, R-17 was weighed and it was noted that he had lost seven pounds in the week since his admission. This weight loss was attributed to his pain and the combination of drugs R- 17 was taking, as well as some subsidence of the edema. Healthpark's nursing staff reported the weight loss to R-17's physician, who ordered the snacks and the TwoCal protein drinks described in Ms. Donohoe's observation. The physician visited on September 24 because R-17's pain level had increased and he was again experiencing constipation. The physician ordered blood cultures and Methotrexate for his pain. The physician was making continued efforts to determine the cause of R-17's pain. After the blood cultures were performed, R-17 was referred to a rheumotologist. The blood cultures revealed the presence of another organism in R-17's system besides that being treated with Ancef. On October 2, R-17 was also seen by an infectious disease specialist. R-17's condition improved for about a week. By October 10, the physician was preparing to order his discharge from Healthpark. However, in the early morning hours of October 11, R-17 became confused, incontinent, and had greatly increased pain. His physician ordered new lab work, including a total protein array and electrolyte tests. The record shows that on October 12, R-17 was screaming out in pain and his appetite, which had shown some improvement in early October, was very poor. Though R-17's condition and appetite showed some improvement over the next few days, on October 16 his physician decided to admit him to a hospital to determine the cause of R-17's weight loss and why his pain could not be controlled. Ms. Donohue explained the protocol followed by AHCA surveyors assessing a resident's nutritional status. First, the surveyor determines whether the resident has been assessed comprehensively, adequately, and accurately. If the assessment found that the resident was at risk for nutritional problems, then the facility must determine the interventions necessary to prevent the problems. The surveyor next assesses how the facility implemented the interventions. If the interventions do not work, the facility must show that it has re-evaluated the interventions and reassessed the resident to determine why the interventions failed. The facility must demonstrate that it has looked at all relevant factors, including intake of food and supplements and the resident's underlying medical condition. This re-evaluation and reassessment should lead to revisions in the interventions. The essential allegation under Tag F325 was that Healthpark failed to make a nutritional reassessment after finding that R-17 experienced a significant weight loss over a period of four weeks. Ms. Donohue's testimony at the hearing essentially confirmed her observation on the Form 2567, quoted above. R-17 was weighed weekly, and his weight record confirmed that between September 11, 2001 and October 9, 2001, R-17's weight dropped from 175 to 158 pounds. Lori Riddle, AHCA's expert in dietetics and nutrition, was also involved in the decision to cite R-17's treatment as a deficiency. Her review of the records led her to conclude that Healthpark was aware of R-17's weight loss and put in place approaches to counter that weight loss, but that these approaches were not well planned. Healthpark did not adequately monitor R-17's nutritional intake, such that the record indicated amount of food that was offered but not how much R-17 actually consumed. Ms. Riddle found that Healthpark's approaches were "fairly generic." Healthpark added snacks and nutritional supplements to R-17's diet, but did not indicate in its written care plan whether or how these would meet R-17's nutritional needs. After the initial nutritional assessment on September 10, Healthpark did not formally reassess R-17's caloric needs, even after he began losing weight. Ms. Riddle saw indications in the record that Healthpark recognized the weight loss and stated a goal of maintaining R-17's weight, but saw no recalculation of how many calories would be needed to maintain his weight. Alexandria Antoni was the registered dietician at Healthpark and an expert in the field of nutrition. Ms. Antoni performed the initial nutritional assessment of R-17 and monitored his status throughout the relevant period. She testified as to her relationship with R-17 and her efforts to maintain his food intake. R-17 was very alert and oriented, but had adjustment problems because he had always been an independent, relatively healthy person and had never been in a facility like Healthpark. As a result, R-17 was not receptive to staff's offering food. He did not want to be in the facility at all and resented being bothered by staff. Ms. Antoni noted that R-17 was in much pain and had a hard time dealing with it. The pain affected his ability to sit up or be mobile, and he was on many medications for his pain and infection, any or all of which could have affected his appetite. On her initial visit, Ms. Antoni brought R-17 a copy of the Healthpark menu and reviewed it with him and his family. Ms. Antoni credibly testified that R-17 stated no ethnic food preferences at this initial meeting, though he did tell her that he liked soup at lunch, prune juice in the morning, and a banana on his breakfast tray. Ms. Antoni's initial strategy was to increase R-17's intake by offering foods he liked to eat. His family was there with him every day, and she encouraged them to bring in foods that R-17 liked. Ms. Antoni saw R-17 daily. He would wait for her in the hallway and ask her to come in and tell him what was on the menu. R-17 would often directly phone the kitchen staff to discuss his meal preferences. Ms. Antoni disagreed that R-17's caloric needs were not properly documented. In her initial nutritional assessment, she calculated his caloric needs, based on his height, weight and medical condition, at 1,900 to 2,300 calories per day. She relied on the nursing admission assessment, which listed R-17's weight at 185 pounds, rather than his accurate weight of 175 pounds. Thus, Ms. Antoni's calculation resulted in R-17's getting more calories than his actual weight would have indicated. In her later approaches to R-17's situation, Ms. Antoni kept in mind that R-17 was already being offered more calories than his weight required. She opined that if R-17 had consumed what she calculated, his nutritional needs would have been met and he should not have lost weight. Ms. Antoni could not say why R-17 was losing weight. For the most part, he was eating 75 percent of his meals, which provided between 1,800 and 2,000 calories per day. The TwoCal supplement and the snacks ordered by the physician provided an additional 1,000 calories per day, providing a total well in excess of the 1,900 to 2,300 calorie range calculated by Ms. Antoni. Healthpark staff, including Ms. Antoni and R-17's physician, held meetings every week to discuss the residents' weight status. At each of these weight meetings, Ms. Antoni brought up the subject of R-17's weight loss with his doctor. Ms. Antoni disagreed with AHCA's conclusion that no reassessment was performed. She contended that reassessment occurred at the weekly weight meetings. She followed R-17's caloric intake daily. She could think of nothing else she could have done to increase R-17's weight. Any further action, such as ordering further laboratory tests or a feeding tube, would have required a physician's order. Carol Morris, an RN, was Medicare clinical coordinator at Healthpark and an expert in geriatric nursing. She concurred that the diet ordered for R-17 was adequate to meet his needs. He was cognitively aware, responsive, and could not be forced to eat. Ms. Morris confirmed that Healthpark staff tried to encourage R-17 to eat. The staff gave nutritional advice to R-17's family members so that they could assist in offering him foods that might help his appetite. Ms. Morris noted that pain can be a factor in weight loss. She also observed that the edema would have added to his weight on admission, and its resolution would naturally cause some weight loss. Resolution of his constipation also could have affected his weight. Healthpark staff considered all these factors in care planning to deal with R-17's weight loss. Staff communicated with R-17's physician and with his family on a daily basis. The nursing staff was following doctor's orders, and expected to see R-17's weight stabilize at some point. Ms. Morris testified that Healthpark's assessment of R-17's weight loss took into account his edema, constipation, adjustment to the facility, disease process, and the amount he was eating. She did not think there was anything else Healthpark could have done, given that R-17's physician was also perplexed as to why he was losing weight. Ms. Morris attributed the AHCA citation for failure to document R-17's caloric intake to a simple failure to understand Healthpark's method of charting. The nurses did not explicitly note the amount eaten by R-17 at every meal or snack. The nurse's initials indicated that R-17 ate 100 percent of the meal or snack. An amount was noted only when R-17 ate less than 100 percent of the food offered. If R-17 declined a meal or snack, it was noted and his physician was informed. Ms. Morris testified that R-17's preference for Italian food came up in a conversation with his family, after the nutritional assessment was done. When Healthpark staff saw that R-17 was losing weight, they to the family about what he might like to eat. Viewing the evidence in its entirety, it is found that AHCA failed to prove the elements of Tag F325 by a preponderance of the evidence. It is unquestioned that R-17 lost a significant amount of weight during the four weeks from September 11, 2001, to October 9, 2001. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that R-17's weight loss was caused by Healthpark's failure to provide adequate nutrition. To the contrary, the record indicates that R-17 was provided more than enough calories through meals to maintain his weight, and that supplements were ordered by his physician when he began to lose weight. While R-17's appetite was diminished, he continued to consume 75 percent of his meals on average and to take the snacks and TwoCal supplement. Healthpark's staff and R-17's physician were perplexed as to the reasons for his weight loss, with the physician ultimately ordering R-17 admitted to a hospital for further testing as to both his persistent pain and his weight loss. AHCA correctly noted that Healthpark failed to perform a nutritional reassessment of R-17, but the evidence indicates that such a reassessment would merely have constituted a written rendition of the actions the facility was taking. Healthpark was fully aware of R-17's weight loss and reacted in a reasonable manner. Staff encouraged R-17 to eat by offering him dietary options and enlisting the aid of his family. AHCA criticized Healthpark for failure to perform follow-up laboratory tests or to consider a feeding tube for R-17. However, only R-17's physician could have ordered laboratory tests or a feeding tube. The record makes it apparent the physician was concerned with the weight loss, but that his primary concern was R-17's multiple infections and his unexplained and intractable pain. R-17's edema subsided during his stay at Healthpark, which could account for some weight loss. His constipation was resolved to some extent, which could also have had some effect on his weight. R-17 was taking multiple medications, including powerful antibiotics and analgesics, that could affect his appetite. R-17 was having emotional difficulty adjusting to the facility and to his physical condition. Finally, R-17 was cognitively alert and within his rights simply to refuse to eat. Aside from the weight loss itself, R-17 showed no indications of a lack of proper nutrition. Healthpark took all these factors into account in its treatment of R-17. A formal nutritional reassessment would have had no substantive effect on R-17's treatment. At most, Healthpark failed adequately to document the steps it took in caring for R-17 and addressing his weight loss.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 02-1788, and rescinding the notice of intent to assign conditional licensure status to Healthpark Care Center in Doah Case No. 02-0033 and reinstating the facility's standard licensure status. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Karen L. Goldsmith, Esquire Goldsmith, Grout & Lewis, P.A. 2180 North Park Avenue, Suite 100 Post Office Box 2011 Winter Park, Florida 32790-2011 Jodie C. Page, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

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CALDER RACE COURSE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 04-003026RP (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 26, 2004 Number: 04-003026RP Latest Update: Oct. 28, 2005

The Issue Whether proposed rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g) are invalid exercises of legislative delegated authority pursuant to Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004),2 and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Calder is a Florida corporation and a pari-mutuel permitholder permitted and licensed by the Department pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. Calder seeks to challenge proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.021. Specifically, Calder challenges Subsection (5)(f), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 32, August 6, 2004, and Subsection (5)(g), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 21, May 21, 2004.3 The challenged amendments shall be referred to as the "Proposed Rules." The Proposed Rules provide: For tickets cashed more than 30 days after the purchase of the ticket, the ticket may not be cashed at any type of patron- operated machine or terminal. The totalisator system must be configured to instruct patrons on how to cash the ticket. The totalisator system must have the ability to identify such tickets and indicate to a teller that the ticket falls within this category. Calder is a licensed and permitted pari-mutuel facility which sells tickets and uses totalisator machines, and the Proposed Rules would govern the operation of such facility. The Proposed Rules have the effect of directly regulating the operation of Calder's pari-mutuel facility, and, as such, Calder is substantially affected by the Proposed Rules. The parties have stipulated that Calder "may properly challenge both Proposed Rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g)." A pari-mutuel ticket evidences participation in a pari-mutuel pool. A winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket belongs to the purchaser and may be claimed by the purchaser for a period of one year after the date the pari-mutuel ticket was issued. An "outs" or "outs ticket" is a winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket which is not redeemed. If a ticket remains unclaimed, uncashed, or abandoned after one year from the date of issuance, such uncashed ticket escheats to the state unless the ticket was for a live race held by a thoroughbred permitholder such as Calder, in which case the funds are retained by the permitholder conducting the race. A totalisator machine is "the computer system used to accumulate wagers, record sales, calculate payoffs, and display wagering data on a display device that is located at a pari- mutuel facility." § 550.002(36), Fla. Stat. The Department was prompted to begin the rulemaking process for the Proposed Rules by two major cases involving fraud, one Florida case and one national case. The Florida case involved two totalisator employees named Dubinsky and Thompson, who allegedly accessed outs ticket information in the totalisator's central computer system, counterfeited outs tickets based on the information, and cashed the tickets at self-service machines at two pari-mutuel wagering facilities. The fraudulent conduct involved approximately $13,000. In the Florida case the fraudulent tickets were cashed several months after the tickets were said to have been issued. The fraud came to light when the ticketholder who held the true ticket attempted to cash the ticket, but could not because the fraudulent ticket had been cashed. The national case also involved a totalisator employee who cashed fraudulent outs tickets. In the national case, the fraudulent tickets were cashed less than 30 days after the date the tickets were purportedly issued. The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to deter the cashing of fraudulent tickets. The Department received comments from AmTote International, a totalisator company, at the rule workshop held during the rulemaking process and received written comments submitted by AmTote International after the workshop, indicating that the majority of tickets are cashed within six to nine days after the date of issuance. The older a ticket gets the less likely it becomes that the ticket will be cashed, and the less likely that it becomes that the cashing of a fraudulent ticket would be revealed by the true owner attempting to cash the ticket. Staff of the Department felt that by requiring that outs tickets older than 30 days be cashed by a live person, a thief would be deterred because he would be dealing with a person rather than a machine. The only thing that the self- service machine requires to redeem a ticket is a bar code, so it would be possible to submit a ticket containing nothing but the bar code and receive a voucher which could be submitted to a teller for money.4 If the fraudulent ticket looks different in anyway from a valid ticket, a teller may be able to spot the difference and question the transaction. Calder argues that the way to deter the fraud which has occurred is to stop totalisator employees from being able to print fraudulent tickets. However, the Department is also concerned about computer hackers potentially getting into the computer system which contains the outs tickets numbers and copying the bar code which could be submitted to a self-service machine. By regulating the method of cashing outs tickets, the Department is attempting to deter fraud by totalisator employees and others who may be able to access outs tickets information which could be used in producing counterfeit tickets. During the rule making process, the Department held a workshop, received written comments from the public, and held a hearing to receive comments from the public after the Proposed Rules were first noticed. The Department considered the comments it received and modified the Proposed Rules as noticed in the Notice of Change published on August 6, 2004, to accommodate some of the comments. Calder did not submit a good faith, written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative within 21 days after the notice of the Proposed Rules was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on May 21, 2004, or after the Notice of Change was published.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.56120.595120.68550.002550.155550.1645550.2633550.495
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TODD RAVEN vs MANTEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 10-000550FC (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Feb. 08, 2010 Number: 10-000550FC Latest Update: Apr. 05, 2011

The Issue The amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to Petitioner, pursuant to the order on remand from the Second District Court of Appeal, in Raven v. Manatee County School Board, 32 So. 3d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (2009).1

Findings Of Fact Petitioner retained the law offices of Kelly & McKee, P.A., to represent him in connection with his dispute over Respondent seeking to terminate his employment. Petitioner was successful in reinstating Petitioner to his position; however, the Administrative Law Judge was without authority to order the School Board to extend his contract beyond the May 25, 2007, expiration date. Petitioner seeks attorney's fees for the underlying proceeding and the appellate proceeding in the amount of $66,881.25, representing the total number of hours billed to Petitioner. Petitioner is also seeking $5,074.98 in costs. Melissa Mihok, Esquire, billed 286.75 hours at $225.00 per hour for legal services performed. The two principals of the firm, Mark Kelly, Esquire, and Robert F. McKee, Esquire, billed 1.75 hours and 5.0 hours, respectively, of legal services, for which they billed at $350.00 per hour. Petitioner's expert witness, Mark Herdman, Esquire, who has intensive experience in this area, testified that the hourly rate for employment of attorneys in the Tampa Bay Area ranged from $200.00 to $350.00 per hour and that the amount of time expended on this case was reasonable. Respondent's expert witness, Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire, testified that the amount of time spent and the fees claimed were not reasonable; that the fee usually charged for an attorney with five years' experience, representing a School Board employee, was between $150.00 to $200.00 per hour; that 19 hours of preparation time for an administrative hearing that took three hours was excessive; and, further, that 102 hours to prepare essentially the same brief three times in the form of a proposed order, a one-page exception, a response to Respondent's exception, and the appellate brief was not reasonable. Based on all the evidence, including the billing statement; the fact that Ms. Mihok testified that her regular hourly rate in representing teachers in administrative hearings was $100.00 per hour; and the credible and persuasive testimony of Respondent's expert, an hourly rate of $150.00 is reasonable. The amount of time expended on this matter was excessive and should be reduced by 50 hours, plus a reduction of 35 hours from the time spent on seeking and collecting attorney's fees. The reasonable amount of time spent on this matter is 201.75 hours. Therefore, the reasonable amount of attorney's fees for Ms. Mihok in this matter is $30,262.50, which is 201.75 hours at an hourly rate of $150.00. The fee for Mr. Kelly and Mr. McKee should be reduced by 1.5 hours at $350.00 per hour for the time spent on research for collecting attorney's fees. The total due for their legal services is 5.25 hours at $350.00 for a total amount of $1,837.50. Therefore, the lodestar amount for attorney's fees for the firm is $32,100.00, plus an enhancement of $5,000.00 for the establishment of new law. As for costs, the expert witness fee for attorney's fees is not recoverable. The amount of costs sought is reduced by $1,800.00, and $1,194.70 is awarded for court reporter fees. Therefore, the total recoverable costs are $4,469.68.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.595120.62120.68627.428
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