The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Jose Iglesias (Petitioner or Iglesias) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 2003, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. The Complaint alleged: Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly interfering with Police Department’s day-to- day operations, and spreading false rumors about Police Department personnel. (Document #1) Vice Mayor Iglesias is causing a hostile work environment with constant complaints about officers. Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly encouraging racism, pitting hispanics against white and black officers of the Department. Vice Mayor Iglesias filed false police reports (verbally) constantly for his own gain and benefits. Vice Mayor Iglesias’s 16-year-old son works part time in Town Hall. (Nepotism) Vice Mayor Iglesias improper use of his title by instructing the Town Manager to take actions on the police department, and even retaliation against the Police Chief and myself. Vice Mayor Iglesias ordered public records about himself not to be released, and then when they were released he insisted the secretary releasing the records be fired. (Document #1) Mr. Iglesias is falsely using the title of M.D. and in fact used this title to gain his seat on the council and then becoming Vice Mayor. When Mr. Iglesias has been questioned on this matter by residents in the past he has stated he was a brain surgeon, a foot doctor, and a chiropractor, and could not list a hospital where he did his residency to become M.D. (Document #2) At all times material to this case the Petitioner was Vice Mayor serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Respondent is a town employee and serves as a police sergeant within the police department. Mr. Nieman has been so employed for over 20 years. After an investigation of three of the allegations set forth in the Complaint (only three were deemed legally sufficient to warrant investigation) and consideration of the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission entered a Public Report on March 16, 2004. The Public Report dismissed the Complaint and closed the matter. On April 14, 2004, the Petitioner filed the instant Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Fee Petition alleged that the Complaint “is based on eight allegations, all of which are false and were known to be false by Complainant when he filed the Complaint.” Additionally, the Fee Petition stated the Complaint “was filed by the Complainant with the knowledge the Complaint contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard as to whether the Complaint contained false allegations. ” At hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence as to the three allegations of the Complaint that were investigated and deemed legally sufficient to require an ethics investigation. Those allegations were: whether the Petitioner had filed false police reports for his personal benefit; whether the Petitioner had attempted to prevent the release of a public record or insisted on the firing of the person who had released the record; and whether the Petitioner had caused his son to be employed by the Town. The false police reports allegation stemmed from the Petitioner’s use of public roads for rollerblading. The Petitioner is an avid rollerblader and likes to rollerblade for exercise. The Petitioner opined that rollerblading puts less stress on his back and has less impact than jogging. The Petitioner frequently rollerblades on the public road within the Town. Automobile traffic on the road must go around the Petitioner in order to pass. It is the Petitioner’s position that since there is no sidewalk or shoulder suitable to rollerblade, he is entitled to use the road surface just as a pedestrian might use the road surface. The Petitioner skates toward the middle of the lane and not on the edge of the road surface because the roadway is better there for the rollerblades. The record in this case does not clarify whether the Petitioner skates with or against the traffic. In connection with the rollerblading, the Respondent believes that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the road as he does and that if the Petitioner did not use his position as a councilman for influence, he would be cited for rollerblading down the road as he does. Further, the Respondent maintains that the Petitioner has made verbal complaints against motorists who passed too close to him. The Respondent maintains that the verbal complaints are false in that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the roadway as he does and therefore cannot complain against motorists as he does. The Petitioner does not deny the activity. The Respondent has observed the Petitioner rollerblading down the road. The Respondent has not issued a citation to the Petitioner because he is assigned an administrative position within the police department and he believes he is not allowed to issue such citations. The Respondent based the allegation regarding this claim upon statements he has heard from police officers within the Town’s police department. The Respondent did not subpoena the officers to the hearing because he did not want to involve other Town employees in the matter. The Respondent does not have any evidence to support the allegation other than what he believed he had been told in his experience as a police officer for the Town. The record does not demonstrate any written record of either the Petitioner being cited for improper rollerblading or making a report against a vehicle. As to the second allegation that was investigated, a memo purportedly from the chief of police was released to a member of the public by accident. It was included within a stack of documents that had been requested by a private citizen. The document stated in part: SUBJECT: Ethics violations and continual interference of day-to-day police operations by the Vice Mayor Iglesias This memorandum is to inform you [Mayor Michael Addicott] of constant harassment of police personnel and interference in daily operations by the new vice mayor. The Petitioner admitted that he was concerned that the document had been released in error and that the person who wrongly released a document should be disciplined. The Petitioner did not know about the document before it was released. He did not attempt to prevent the release of the document. Instead, the Petitioner sought to, after-the-fact find out why the document had been released, if the document was in fact a public record subject to release, and if the employee should be disciplined for the release. The document in question was a public record, was subject to public release, and the employee was not disciplined for its release. Nevertheless, the Petitioner did require a second (and arguably third opinion) regarding whether the document constituted a public record. In the meanwhile, the controversy within the Town over whether the document should have been released was widely discussed among Town employees. The Respondent filed his claim based upon several reports that the Petitioner wanted the secretary who released the report fired. One of the Respondent’s sources was the Chief of Police. The Respondent did not question the veracity of the police chief. At hearing, the Petitioner did not deny that discipline would have been appropriate if the release of the document were shown to be erroneous. The Petitioner acknowledged that the Town pursued a full review of the matter and that he was among those who called for the review. As to the third allegation (that the Petitioner caused his son to be hired by the Town), the Respondent believed that once the Petitioner was elected as a councilman that the son was not eligible to work for the Town. The Respondent thought that rules prohibiting nepotism applied to the Petitioner’s son and that as such the son could not continue to work for the Town. The Respondent based this interpretation on a general but un- researched idea about nepotism. He also discussed this matter with another Town employee who also thought the son was not eligible to work for the Town. In fact, the Petitioner’s son, Joseph, started working for the Town in a part-time position prior to the Petitioner being elected to office. After the Petitioner became Vice Mayor, the son continued with his duties but was moved from an independent contractor status to part-time employee status. The son then received a raise in his hourly rate of pay when the Town employees also received a raise. The Petitioner did not supervise the son’s employment and did not direct the son’s work. The record is unclear as to whether the Petitioner voted on the pay raise or not. At hearing the Respondent maintained that he had had numerous conversations with persons at the Ethics Commission who recommended that he add the information regarding the nepotism claim to his allegations. He admitted that he did not independently check any laws or rules that might pertain to nepotism before filing the claim. Much of the Respondent’s attitude and comments in connection with the Petitioner must be viewed in the context of the happenings within the Town. For unknown reasons, the Town, its employees, and the governing council were in a state of change and confrontation. The Respondent and the Petitioner apparently do not relate well to one another personally. The Respondent is suspicious of the Petitioner’s medical credentials and is uncertain as to why the Petitioner holds himself out as an “M.D.”, when he is not licensed nor is he eligible to be licensed as a medical doctor. The Petitioner believes the Respondent holds some animosity toward him for unknown reasons. Further, because the Respondent admitted he believes the Petitioner is arrogant, that belief somehow that demonstrates malice toward the Petitioner. The questions of whether the Petitioner is credentialed to be a medical doctor, whether the Petitioner attempted to interfere with the police department, or whether the Petitioner spread false rumors regarding the police department were not investigated and do not support, if true, an ethics violation. If attorney's fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney's fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense against the Respondent’s Complaint. The expert merely opined that the invoices he reviewed were reasonable. He maintained that the Petitioner should recover $27,455.53 in this matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026
The Issue Whether Petitioner (the School Board) has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment on the grounds alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges.
Findings Of Fact The School Board is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida. See Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 230.03, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the School Board employed Respondent as a classroom teacher pursuant to a professional service contract and assigned her to teach at Mae M. Walters Elementary School. Respondent began her employment with the School Board in 1993. While on traffic detail on August 10, 2000, Officer Calicchio stopped a car with an expired tag. At the time pertinent to this proceeding the car, a convertible, had its top down. The driver, a male, and Respondent, the front seat passenger, were the only occupants of the car. After the car pulled off the road, Officer Calicchio parked his patrol car behind the stopped vehicle, approached the vehicle, and asked the driver for his license and registration. The driver responded that he did not have his driver's license on his person and gave his name and date of birth to Officer Calicchio. Respondent informed Officer Calicchio that the vehicle belonged to her and gave him her license and the car's registration. Officer Calicchio returned to his patrol car to verify the information that had been given to him and to determine whether the driver had a valid license. While he was doing that, Officer Gomez appeared at the scene as backup for Officer Calicchio. Officer Gomez observed marijuana particles on the driver's shirt and in the car. After Officer Gomez related his observations to Officer Calicchio, the two officers took the driver into custody and placed him in the backseat of Officer Calicchio's patrol car. Officer Calicchio returned to the vehicle and observed marijuana particles in the vehicle. Officer Calicchio asked Respondent if he could search the vehicle. She consented and got out of the vehicle. After he completed his search, Officer Calicchio asked Respondent if he could search the large purse she was carrying. She consented and began pulling objects out of the purse and placing them on the hood of Officer Calicchio's patrol car. When Respondent slid her purse back up on her arm, Officer Calicchio asked if her purse was empty. Respondent answered in the affirmative. Officer Calicchio asked if he could look inside her purse. Respondent responded by leaning the purse towards him so he could look inside. Officer Calicchio observed two yellow envelopes in the bottom of the purse. Respondent consented to Officer Calicchio retrieving the two envelopes and opening them. The envelopes contained a green, leafy substance. When Officer Calicchio showed Respondent the contents of the envelope and asked what the substance was, Respondent fled on foot. Officer Calicchio, immediately followed by Officer Gomez, pursued Respondent. As she was fleeing, both officers observed Respondent reach into the front of her pants and pull out a plastic bag. As she was attempting to throw the bag into some bushes, Respondent slipped and fell to the ground. The plastic bag fell to the ground, landing next to the Respondent. The two officers recovered the bag and took Respondent into custody. The plastic bag contained a white-yellowish substance that Officer Calicchio field-tested using a Valtox field test. The substance tested positive for cocaine. Officer Calicchio also performed a field test on the green, leafy substance that was taken from the envelopes in Respondent's purse. The substance tested positive for cannabis. Subsequent tests by John Gall, a forensic chemist employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Officer, confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was cocaine. The cocaine taken from the plastic bag weighed 35.2 grams. Respondent's conduct was sufficiently notorious to bring both Respondent and the educational profession into public disgrace or disrespect. Respondent's misconduct impaired her service in the community. On December 13, 2000, the School Board voted to suspend Respondent's employment and begin proceedings to terminate her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order that upholds the suspension of Respondent's employment and terminates her professional service contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2001.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether A-1 Security and Detective Agency’s Class B security agency license, and Mr. Rozzi’s Class MB security agency manager license should be disciplined because of the matters set out in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, between May 5 and August 4, 1997, the Petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division) was the state agency responsible for the licensing of security agencies and security agency managers in Florida. Respondent, A-1 Security and Detective Agency, Incorporated (A-1) held a Class “B” security agency license number B89-0115; and Respondent, Stephen V. Rozzi, held a Class “MB” security agency manager’s license number MB89-00186. Respondent Rozzi was President and operating manager of A-1. At some point during the period in issue, Gary Q. Floyd, an investigator with the Division, received a call from the owner of another security agency who reported a potential problem. At the time, Mr. Floyd was nearby and responded immediately to the apartment complex which belonged to a client of the individual who had called in. His review of the security logs revealed abnormal entries. Returning to the Division office, Floyd checked on the license status of the guard in question who had made the questionable entries and found that this guard was not licensed. The guard, Carmen Santiago, had applied for a class “D” license as a security guard, but because of a prior disciplinary problem out-of-state, the Division had indicated its intent to deny the license. Santiago was employed by Respondent, A-1. Coincidentally, the following morning, Respondent Rozzi came to the Division office on another matter and Floyd showed him the questioned logs. Respondent agreed that the entry was unusual, but said he had terminated Santiago from employment with A-1 as a guard on July 30, 1997, before the date of the questioned entry. Floyd asked Rozzi which guard had worked on the site on Wednesday, July 30, 1997, and on Thursday, July 31, 1997, after Santiago had been terminated. Respondent indicated the replacement guard was a Mr. Michelin. The log entries in question, which got the interest of Floyd, indicated that Santiago, who was not properly licensed as a Class “D” security guard, had served as such at the Whisper Woods Apartments. By pre-hearing stipulation dated June 10, 1998, Rozzi agreed that he had employed Santiago at Whisper Woods Apartments during the period July 30 to July 31, 1997, and that Santiago did not have the proper license at the time. Rozzi indicated at hearing that he received notice from the Division to the effect that Santiago’s application for licensure as a security guard was being denied, but claims he did not receive the notice until he picked up his mail at about 9:00 p.m., on July 31, 1997. As soon as he got that word, Rozzi claims, he called Santiago at home but was unable to reach him. Nonetheless, he left word on Santiago’s answering machine for him not to report for work that evening. In his report to the Division made previously, he indicated he had fired Santiago on July 30, 1997. At hearing Rozzi claimed he back-dated the firing to the date he received the information on the denial, which would have been July 30, not July 31, 1997. However, Rozzi had already indicated he had notified Mr. Michelin, who was scheduled to work on July 30 and 31 at Fletcher Woods Apartments, to go instead to Whisper Wood Apartments to relieve Santiago. Mr. Carter, another employee, was to take Michelin’s place at Fletcher Wood Apartments. When asked to asked to explain the inconsistencies, he could not do so. Carter, when interviewed by Floyd on August 5, 1997, as a part of the investigation, stated he did not work at Fletcher Woods Apartments that night nor has he ever worked there. Carter also indicated that when he was contacted by Rozzi shortly before August 5, 1997, Rozzi told Carter, to say, if he were asked, that he had worked at Fletcher Woods on the night of July 31, 1997. When Floyd advised Rozzi of Carter’s story, Rozzi still declined to change his version. Santiago is disqualified from licensure as a security guard in Florida because of his conviction of a felony in another state. Nonetheless, he applied for a security guard license in Florida in April or May 1997. At the time he applied, he received a temporary Class “D” license which allowed him to work pending action on the permanent license application, and he started work at A-1 as a security guard at different locations wherever he was posted. From time to time, including on July 30 and 31, 1997, he worked at Whisper Woods Apartments. On July 30, 1997, Santiago went to work at 4:00 p.m., intending to stay until relieved at the end of his shift, at 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997. At the time he went to work, he did not know that his application for licensure had been denied, nor did he know of the denial when he went to work on July 31, 1997. He claims he did not go home after work on either July 31 or early on August 1, 1997. Santiago claims he first learned of the denial when he got home later in the day on Friday, August 1, 1997, to find Floyd at his door. During the conversation he had with Floyd which followed, Floyd advised him that his license had been denied. This was the first he had heard of the denial, he claims. Santiago indicates that as soon as Floyd told him that, he left Floyd in his apartment and immediately went to his mailbox where he found the denial letter from the Division. There is some evidence to indicate that Santiago told Floyd in another interview prior to the hearing, that he had received the letter informing him of the denial on either July 30 or July 31, 1997. At hearing he claims that he was referring to a letter from the Division soliciting more information. This contention is rejected, however, since it is considered unlikely the Division would seek additional information and reject the application almost concurrently with the request. After Floyd left Santiago on August 1, 1997, Santiago immediately called Rozzi to tell him he could no longer work. Santiago claims Rozzi was upset with him when he called, claiming that he, Rozzi had tried to call Santiago a few days earlier to tell him not to go to work, but Santiago had not received the message or called him back. However, Santiago was at work at Whisper Woods Apartments from 4:00 p.m., on July 30, 1997, until 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997, and again that evening, and no one came to the job site either evening to talk with him about his status. This was, he claims, even after he told Rozzi that he, Rozzi, was going to get a letter indicating Santiago’s license was denied. Santiago claims that at no time after that notice did Rozzi terminate him or advise him he would be terminated when the letter came in. Rozzi contended at hearing that the first time he heard anything about the problem with Santiago working was on August 1, 1997, when he was in the Division office on a probation matter. It was at that time that Floyd showed him the logs from Whisper Woods Apartments and asked him about what appeared to be differences in the handwriting on them. Floyd also asked him at that time if he knew Santiago’s license was going to be denied. Rozzi said then that he had first learned of the problem on July 31, 1997. That same day, Rozzi claims, he made arrangements for someone else to cover that post so that Santiago would not be on duty, and Rozzi insists he did not know that this had not happened until the next day. Analysis of and comparison of the varied stories told by Rozzi regarding when he found out that Santiago’s license was being denied results in the conclusion that Rozzi found out on July 30, 1997. Had he not known, he would have had no reason to contact Michelin and tell him to switch duty assignments or to call Santiago and leave the message not to go to work any more. However, Michelin did not testify at the hearing, and the evidence of what he told Floyd regarding this is hearsay evidence. Even if Rozzi received the notice on July 30, 1997, as it appears, by his own admission he did not receive it until mid- evening, at a time when Santiago would have already been at work on the 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. shift. There is no way he could have reached Santiago that evening. Knowing this, Rozzi still did not make any effort to contact Santiago by going to the work site and relieving him by taking a relief guard with him. Consequently, it is found that regardless of which day Rozzi found out about Santiago’s disqualification, he did nothing to ensure that Santiago did not serve as a security guard without a license. Merely calling Santiago and leaving a message on the answering machine is not enough. At the least, he should have gone to the site to insure Santiago was not on duty. At this initial interview, Floyd also showed Rozzi a copy of one of A-1’s invoice forms which reflected at the bottom that the firm was available to perform certain tasks which were limited to a licensed detective agency and not permitted to a security agency. Rozzi indicated that he had copied the information from an advertisement of another agency, but assured Floyd that A-1 was not doing the unauthorized work. No evidence was introduced to indicate it was, and it is so found. Rozzi agreed to remove the inappropriate language from any form or communication used by the firm immediately. He did so. On December 31, 1996, the Director of the Division of Licensing entered a Final Order in Case No. C96-00855 relating to the two Respondents herein, adopting and incorporating the terms of a Stipulation and Settlement entered into between the division and the Respondents in that case. None of the documentation submitted in connection with that case indicates what offenses were alleged to have been committed by either Respondent. The terms of the Stipulation and Settlement called for the Respondents’ licenses to be placed on probation for a period of two years, and for Respondents to pay an administrative fine of four thousand dollars.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of employing an unlicensed employee to perform services which require the possession of a license; of advertising the business of a private investigative agency without possessing the proper license; of failing to respond truthfully to questions asked by an authorized investigator during an official investigation; and of violating the terms of probation by committing violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondents’ class “B” and Class “ MB” licenses as a security agency and security agency manager respectively, be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Rayford H. Taylor, Esquire Stiles, Taylor, Grace & Smith, P.A. Post office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 14, 1983, and November 19, 1981, and was issued certificate numbers 02-33918 and 502-868. Respondent is currently certified as a law enforcement officer and as a correctional officer by the Commission. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a Deputy Sheriff by the Broward County Sheriff's Department. On May 3, 1986, Respondent, Deputy McDonald, and their immediate supervisor Sergeant James Walkup were working a directed patrol in the south portion of Broward County, Florida. Each was in his own patrol car, but they were working as a group with the express purpose of conducting a routine harassment of known or suspected drug dealers or users in the vicinity. They spotted a rental car occupied by two black males parked in an open field in a residential neighborhood. The occupant of the vehicle in the driver's seat was Jimmy Fox, a reputed drug dealer. All three patrol cars pulled into the field behind the rental vehicle. Respondent "radioed" in that he had made a traffic stop. Neither McDonald nor Walkup radioed that they were on the scene to serve as back-up units. Deputy George Gechoff was working off-duty at the Home Depot on 58th Avenue in the west Hollywood area when he heard Respondent radio that he had made a traffic stop. Since Gechoff did not hear anyone radio that they were serving as back-up to Respondent, Gechoff drove to the location of the traffic stop which was just a few blocks away. When Gechoff arrived at the scene Respondent had already searched the front seat area of the rental vehicle and had asked Fox's permission to search the trunk. Initially, Fox refused consent to the search of the trunk of the rental vehicle. Gechoff and Fox knew each other. After Respondent assured Fox that Fox would not be arrested since the search was illegal and after Gechoff urged Fox to be cooperative, Fox consented to the request. The trunk of the car was opened, and Respondent and Gechoff began searching it. The Respondent found a pistol in the trunk and went to his patrol car to "run a check" on the gun. While Respondent was in is patrol car, Deputy Gechoff, who assisted in the search of the trunk, found an aspirin or "pill- type" bottle containing approximately 50 small objects. Although Walkup testified that the objects were square cubes of yellowish material, Gechoff testified that the objects were white chips of different sizes. At the time, Walkup, Gechoff, and Respondent each believed that the objects were "crack" cocaine. If the objects were indeed crack cocaine, each object would be a single dose of the drug, and each object would have a sale price ranging from $10 to $20. In respondent to his radio inquiry, Respondent was advised that he had a "hit" on the gun, which meant it was wanted in connection with a crime or that it had been previously reported as stolen. When Respondent communicated that information to his immediate supervisor, Sergeant Walkup, Gechoff handed Respondent the aspirin bottle. Walkup instructed Respondent to take both the firearm and the suspected cocaine and write up a "found property report." Respondent was concerned about writing a report for found property, rather than seized property, and suggested to Walkup that they simply turn the matter over to the State Attorney's Office. Walkup took the position that the property was illegally seized since there was no probable cause for the search of the vehicle and the search had taken place simply as part of an harassment operation. He instructed Respondent to report the property as "found property" and left the scene. When Respondent left the scene, he had with him both the confiscated firearm and the aspirin bottle with its contents. He remained concerned about being ordered to write a found property report, but knew he had to do something since he had already radioed in that he had recovered a firearm wanted by the Broward County sheriff's Office. On the spur of the moment, as he was driving through a wooded area near a rock pit, Respondent took the top off the bottle and threw it out the window scattering the contents as he threw away the bottle. Later that day Respondent wrote and signed an Event Report at the Broward County Sheriff's Office reporting that he had found a .44 Magnum and suspected cocaine off the roadway while on routine patrol. The firearm was turned in at the same time, and a property receipt was issued. No property receipt was issued for the suspected cocaine. Several weeks later, Sergeant Walkup received a telephone call from Fox concerning the incident on May 3. In response to that telephone call, Walkup retrieved and reviewed Respondent's report of the May 3 incident with Fox. Upon reviewing the report, Walkup became concerned with the apparent conflicts between the report's contents and his recollection of the events. He so notified his supervisor. On July 1, 1986, Respondent provided a sworn statement to Lieutenant Roger Lekutis of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, Internal Affairs Unit. He admitted that after he drove away from the scene of the Fox "traffic stop" he threw the bottle which he believed contained cocaine "rocks" out the window of his patrol car. He told Lekutis that Walkup had instructed him to write a report of the incident as a "found property" report. He also admitted failing to turn over the suspected cocaine to an evidence custodian. No evidence was offered suggesting that Respondent disposed of the suspected cocaine in a manner different than throwing it out the window as he drove through the wooded area near the rock pit, and the Respondent's testimony in that regard is credited. Since this incident, Respondent has been reinstated by the Broward County Sheriff's Office but was not yet on the payroll by the time of the final hearing in this cause, since he was undergoing certain pre-employment certification and testing procedures.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April 1989. APPENDIX DOAH CASE NO. 88-4963 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 5, 6, 8-10, 13-17, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4, 7, 11, 12, and 18 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Johnny L. McCray, Jr., Esquire 400 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue An administrative complaint dated June 19, 1997, alleges that Respondent, Richard P. Bushey, committed aggravated assault and had adjudication withheld on a felony charge of carrying a concealed weapon, and therefore violated Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and was not qualified for licensure, pursuant to Sections 493.6106(1)(b), 493.6118(1)(f) and 493.6101(7), Florida Statutes. The issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether the allegations are true, and if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the matters at issue, Respondent, Richard Paul Bushey (Bushey), held a class "D" security license no. D94-16538. Sometime around 9:30 p.m. on July 19, 1996, in Winter Garden, Florida, Joseph Howers was in a convenience store standing in line with his purchases when an individual, later identified as Respondent Bushey, entered the store swearing, waving his arms, and complaining about how people drive. Mr. Howers, who had never met Respondent Bushey before, commented something like, "Life is rough all over. I guess he'll get over it." After paying for his purchases, Mr. Howers left the store and got into his truck which was parked near the door of the store. He leaned over to arrange his parcel on the floor of the passenger side of the vehicle, and as he sat back up, he heard mumbling and saw Respondent Bushey at the truck window on the driver's side. Respondent Bushey was swearing and inarticulate, and Mr. Howers thought there was something wrong with him. Mr. Howers said, "Listen, go away, leave me alone. I don't know what your problem is but it's not with me." Respondent Bushey stepped back, lifted his t-shirt, and put his hand on a gun that was under the shirt. Afraid, but still under control, Mr. Howers said, "You don't want to do this- -I'm going to start my truck." Respondent Bushey pulled the gun out and extended it 2-3 feet from Mr. Howers' head. Mr. Howers backed out slowly and Respondent Bushey walked along, following the truck. When he was close to the road, Mr. Howers leaned across the seat out of the range of his vehicle's windows and stepped on the gas pedal. Once out of sight of Respondent Bushey, Mr. Howers called 911 on his cellular phone and reached the Winter Garden police dispatcher. He reported the incident and the police were sent to the convenience store. Mr. Howers continued to the police station where he was told that the arrest had already been made. He then returned to the convenience store to identify the individual who pulled the gun on him. The individual was Respondent Bushey, who by this time was in custody in the back of the patrol car. It was apparent to Mr. Howers that Respondent Bushey, at the time of the incident, had the ability to pull the trigger and shoot him. Mr. Howers did not provoke or otherwise justify the attack and had a reasonable and well-founded fear for his safety. As admitted in his response to requests to admit, on or about January 13, 1997, Respondent Bushey had adjudication withheld, in Orange County, Florida, on a felony charge of carrying a concealed weapon.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Department of State enter its Final Order revoking the Class "D" security license of Respondent Paul Bushey. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 John M. Russi, Director Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Richard P. Bushey 1620 Cimarron Hills Drive Apopka, Florida 32703
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission as a correctional officer on March 21, 1985, and issued Certificate No. 04-85-599-01. At the time of the events which form the basis for the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at the Marion Correctional Institution, a correctional facility of the State Department of Corrections. Marion County Sheriff's Deputies, David F. Faircloth, Jr. and Art King, are veteran law enforcement officers who have received training in the detection and recognition of controlled substances, to include marijuana. Both officers have made numerous arrests for the possession of a controlled substance which they suspected was marijuana and which, upon being tested, proved to be marijuana On June 9, 1990, while on regular patrol in Marion County, Florida, Deputy David F. Faircloth, Jr. was directed to investigate an anonymous report of a male and female who had been observed fighting in a white Camaro automobile parked on U.S. Highway 27. While in that vicinity in response to that request, Officer Faircloth responded to a complaint of a disturbance at 1261 N.W. 56th Court, Ocala, Florida. When Deputy Faircloth arrived on the scene, he noticed a white, two-door Camaro. Deputy Faircloth determined upon investigation that the Respondent and Linda Altman, who lived at the address, had engaged in an altercation involving their respective vehicles which were both damaged and parked in the front yard. Both the Respondent and Ms. Altman had been drinking and both were upset. Deputy King was dispatched as a backup and arrived at the Altman residence. Upon his arrival, Deputy King was briefed by Deputy Faircloth, who advised him that both the Respondent and Ms. Altman had been drinking, both were angry with one another, both had engaged in some altercation involving their vehicles which had caused damage to both vehicles, and both were correctional officers. Pursuant to their standard operating procedure, the deputies separated and interviewed separately the Respondent and Ms. Altman. Deputy King talked to the Respondent and Deputy Faircloth talked to Ms. Altman. Deputies Faircloth and King determined that the white Camaro parked at the location belonged to the Respondent. Deputy King stated that he intended to permit the Respondent to leave the scene; however, he was concerned that the Respondent, being a corrections officer, might have a weapon in his vehicle and return to cause more trouble. This testimony is logically inconsistent because if the Respondent had a gun and was released, he could retrieve the gun and return. However, it was on this basis Deputy King asked the Respondent if he could search his vehicle. The Respondent consented to the search of his vehicle by Deputy King. Officer King began his search of the vehicle in the front driver's seat. As Deputy King was leaning into the vehicle, conducting his search, the Respondent leaned over his back into the rear of the automobile and removed a shaving kit from the back seat. The Respondent's unanticipated action startled deputy King, who turned and inquired of the Respondent what he was doing. The Respondent, through words and gestures, indicated to Deputy King that he did not want him to search the shaving kit. The Respondent told Deputy King that there were no guns in the kit; but when Deputy King persisted in being permitted to search the kit, the Respondent indicated that he would open the kit and show Deputy King its contents. When the Respondent unzipped and opened the kit, Deputy King observed at the top of the kit a plastic bag containing dried vegetable matter which Deputy King thought to be marijuana. Deputy King seized as contraband the contents of the plastic bag, and upon administration of a field test for controlled substances, he determined that the substance was marijuana. Deputy King arrested the Respondent, and conducted a search of the Respondent's vehicle where he found a portion of a partially-smoked marijuana cigarette and a device which appeared to be some type of smoking device. The bag of marijuana which Deputy King seized from the Respondent's shaving kit was sent to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement crime laboratory for analysis. The crime laboratory concluded that the plastic bag contained 4.7 grams of cannabis or marijuana. One cannot determine from the report whether the burnt cigarette was tested and determined to be marijuana. Although Deputy King filed charges against the Respondent, the charges were later dismissed by the prosecutor for reasons unknown to Deputies King and Faircloth.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, Respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, acting on a tip from local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Metro Dade Corrections), had in its employ a number of correctional officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the employment records of Metro Dade Corrections. As a result of this review, Respondent identified 363 individuals, including Petitioner, who were employed by Metro Dade Corrections as correctional officers but who had not been certified by Respondent. On August 10-11, 1988, personnel employed by Respondent visited the Metro Dade Corrections personnel office and audited the personnel file maintained by Metro Dade Corrections of each of the 363 individuals in question, including Petitioner's personnel file. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that Metro Dade Corrections had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. Over the course of their two-day visit, employees of Respondent worked with employees of Metro Dade Corrections to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, they prepared registration forms and affidavits of compliance and assembled other missing documentation, such as birth certificate and fingerprint cards. The 363 completed applications for certification were returned to Tallahassee by Respondent for processing. The vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, Respondent declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify Petitioner. The Pending Application Petitioner has been employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter called Metro Dade Corrections) as a correctional officer since June 9, 1987, without benefit of certification. As part of the preemployment process, Petitioner submitted to Metro Dade Corrections an affidavit dated June 9, 1987, which provides in pertinent part: I fully understand that, in order to qualify as a law enforcement or correctional officer, I must fully comply with the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, as follows: * * * Be of good moral character. I further understand that by executing this document I am attesting that I have met the qualifications as specified... Metro Dade Corrections, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, Metro Dade Corrections routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. At the time Petitioner began employment on June 9, 1987, Metro Dade Corrections had completed its investigation into Petitioner's background and had concluded that Petitioner possessed the good moral character required for certification. Fred Crawford, the Metro Dade Corrections director, executed an affidavit of compliance on June 9, 1987, that contained the following sworn statement: I hereby certify that I have collected, verified, and am maintaining on file evidence that the applicant has met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8) and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. There is no evidence that a complete application package for Petitioner's certification was prepared in 1985. Respondent did not receive a complete application for certification on Petitioner's behalf until August 11, 1988. On August 11, 1988, Metro Dade Corrections, as the employing agency, submitted to Respondent a complete application package for certification of Petitioner as a correctional officer. This was the first application for certification submitted on Petitioner's behalf. By letter dated November 1, 1988, Respondent notified Petitioner that his application for certification was denied because Petitioner did not possess the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer. Respondent gave the following as its reasons for concluding that Petitioner lacked good moral character: You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cocaine, cannabis and methaqualone. Petitioner used one-half of one Quaalude and three lines of cocaine when he was 16 or 17 years of age and still in high school. Petitioner used marijuana no more than 26 times, the last date of use being in July of 1983, at which time Petitioner was 20 years of age. Petitioner freely admitted this prior drug usage during his pre-employment processing and made no attempt to conceal the truth. Petitioner has used no controlled substance since July of 1983. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was 25 years of age and had worked as a Correctional Officer for 1 1/2 years. His job performance evaluations have been satisfactory and above. Petitioner's reputation is that he is a dependable, reliable, and trustworthy individual who possesses high moral character. Petitioner's superiors value him highly as an employee. Following the denial of his request for certification as a correctional officer on November 1, 1988, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing by the election of rights form he filed with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Criminal Justice standards and Training Issue a Final Order which approves Petitioner's application for certification. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner, individually, are addressed as follows: 1-2. Rejected as unnecessary to the result reached. 3-6. Addressed in paragraph 12. Rejected in part as being subordinate to the conclusion reached. 7. Addressed in paragraph 6. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusion reached. 10. Addressed in paragraph 10. 11-20. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusion reached. The proposed findings of fact submitted for petitioner on the generic record are addressed as follows: 1-14. Rejected as recitation of witness testimony, and not findings of fact. The matters have, however, been addressed in paragraph 7 so far as deemed necessary to the result reached. 15, 16, 1-20. Addressed in paragraphs 1-4. 17. Rejected as unnecessary to the result reached. 21. Addressed in paragraph 7, otherwise rejected as unnecessary to the result reached in a legal conclusion. 22-27. Rejected as subordinate to the conclusion reached. 28. Rejected as misleading and not supported by competent proof. 29-36. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusion reached or not supported by competent evidence. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: 1-2. Addressed in paragraphs 10-11. 3. Addressed in paragraph 10. 4-7. Rejected as unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 13. Rejected as unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 5. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald D. Slesnick, III, Esquire 10680 Northwest 25th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lee Kraftchick, Esquire Assistant County Attorney in and for Dade County Metro Dade Center 111 N.W. First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33123 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Thaw Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel Florida Department of law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the licensing of Class "D" Security Officers. On November 6, 1991, Respondent received Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. By letter dated March 3, 1992, Respondent advised Petitioner that it was denying his application for two reasons. The first reason alleged that Petitioner had made a fraudulent or wilful misrepresentation in applying for his license and that the denial was pursuant to the provisions of Section 493.6118(1)(a), Florida Statutes. 1/ The second reason alleged that Petitioner had been guilty of the commission of an assault or battery or the use of force except in the lawful protection of one's self or another from physical harm and that the denial was pursuant to the provisions of Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes. On August 15, 1992, Officer Phillip Frazin of the Metro Dade Police Department was dispatched to Petitioner's home in Dade County, Florida, on a priority call. When Officer Frazin arrived at Petitioner's home, he observed that Petitioner's wife appeared shaken and that she had sustained a lacerated and swollen lip. Officer Frazin also observed that Petitioner had been drinking alcohol and was verbally abusive to his wife and uncooperative. Petitioner's wife told Officer Frazin that she had been struck, pushed, kicked, slapped, and punched in the face by Petitioner. Petitioner's wife also testified that she was afraid that Petitioner would shoot her. Consequently, Officer Frazin took into custody a firearm that Petitioner kept in his house in a locked briefcase. 2/ Petitioner testified at the formal hearing that he had pushed his wife, but denied that she had sustained a lacerated and swollen lip. Petitioner also asserted that he does not drink alcohol. The conflict in the testimony of Officer Frazin and Petitioner is resolved by finding that Officer Frazin is the more credible witness. Consequently, it is concluded that Petitioner had been drinking on the night in question and that he had battered his wife and caused her to sustain a lacerated lip. On November 20, 1991, Petitioner was found guilty by Dade County Judge Cindy S. Ledderman of the charge of battery on his spouse following a bench trial. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was fined and placed on probation for a period of six months. Petitioner successfully completed his term of probation on May 11, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which denies Petitioner's application to be licensed as a Class "D" Security Officer. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1992.
The Issue The issues in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner has violated provisions of Florida Statutes relating to the certification of police officers as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed by the Commission.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is certified with the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement officer. He holds Certificate No. 02- 16422. From approximately March, 1976, until August, 1981, the Respondent was employed with the City of Orlando as a police officer. On or about August 11, 1981, the Respondent was on duty as a uniformed police officer during the midnight shift. He was riding in a patrol car with another officer. The two officers observed a pickup truck in a parking lot with a white male in the driver's seat and a black woman in the passenger's seat. The Respondent identified the woman as a "known prostitute." The officers drove into the parking lot to investigate. The woman jumped out of the truck. She had a gun in her possession. The two officers successfully apprehended her. In the meantime, the driver of the truck had wandered away. The other police officer left the area, looking for the man. It took the other officer approximately five minutes to apprehend the man, who was quite intoxicated. During this time, the Respondent was alone with the woman. She appeared intoxicated or drugged. She inferred that Respondent should release her, unzipped his pants, and grabbed his penis. Respondent wanted to make a case against her on this basis. He called out to his partner in an effort to get his attention to come witness the incident, but was unable to reach him. Respondent withdrew from the woman and came to the conclusion that he could not make a case against her for the incident because of the lack of an additional witness. Approximately a year before this incident, Respondent was working in uniform as an off-duty policeman at a lounge. He met the same woman involved in the later incident. After he finished his duties and changed clothes, he had a sexual encounter with her. The encounter was not an act of prostitution. On August 11, the Respondent arrested the woman for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The next morning, the woman complained that the Respondent had agreed to do something about the arrest if she performed oral sex on him. An investigator with the police department's Internal Affairs Division interviewed the woman. The investigator then interviewed the Respondent. At the initial interview, the Respondent denied ever having had a sexual liaison with the woman. Two days later, the Respondent contacted the investigator and said he remembered some additional facts. In a second interview, the Respondent admitted having had sex with the woman on the earlier occasion. He continued to deny having had sex with her on August 11, 1981. He conceded, however, that she may have touched him in the area of his genitals while pleading for him not to arrest her. Later on that same day, the Respondent again contacted the investigator and said that he had more to say. A third interview was conducted, and the Respondent admitted that the woman committed the act as set out in Paragraph 2 above. During this time, the Respondent was experiencing personal difficulties. His contradictory statements to the investigator were in part the result of anxieties about his job and his personal life. The State Attorney's Office in Orange County ultimately declined to prosecute the possession-of-a-firearm case against the woman on account of the potential embarrassment that the Respondent's testimony could have. The Respondent's employment with the police department of the City of Orlando was terminated in August, 1981. He has not been employed in the law enforcement field since that time.
