Findings Of Fact 14. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on September 29, 2004, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on October 14, 2004, the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on January 20, 2005, and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 25, 2010, attached as “Exhibit A”, “Exhibit B”, “Exhibit C“, and “Exhibit F”, respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On September 29, 2004, the Department of Financial Services, Division of _ Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”), issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 04-590-D1 to Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On September 29, 2004, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On October 14, 2004, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $30,844.10 against Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting was. advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On May 27, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On January 20, 2005, the Department issued a second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. The second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $104,044.10 against Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. The second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28- 106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 6. On May 27, 2010, the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. A copy of the second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. On June 8, 2010, Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting filed a petition for administrative review (“Petition”) with the Department. Pursuant to Sections 120.54(5)(b) and 120.569(2), Florida Statutes, the Department carefully reviewed the Petition to determine if it was in substantial compliance with Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit D”. 8. After reviewing the Petition, the Department determined that the Petition was not in substantial compliance with the requirements of 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code, in that the Petition did not contain a statement identifying the material facts in dispute, or a statement indicating that there were no material facts in dispute. Accordingly, on June 24, 2010, the Department issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Proceeding Without Prejudice. In the Order Dismissing Petition for Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Proceeding Without Prejudice, Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting was given an opportunity to file, within 21 days, an amended petition curing the defects in the original Petition. 9. On August 9, 2010, Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting filed an amended petition for administrative review (“Amended Petition”) with the Department, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 10-7312. A copy of the Amended Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit E”. 10. On August 25, 2010, the Department filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings a Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment with an attached 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $103,958.56 against Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting. A copy of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. On August 25, 2010, Administrative Law Judge W. D. Watkins entered an Order Granting Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment. 12. On October 12, 2010, Bill Veczko informed the Department that Bill Veczko, d/b/a Bill’s Painting did not wish to proceed to an administrative hearing in DOAH Case No. 10- 7312. 13. On October 12, 2010, the Department filed a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction with the Division of Administrative Hearings. As a result, Administrative Law Judge W. D. Watkins entered an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit G”.
The Issue The issues are 1) whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, 2) whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is seeking employment with The Arc of Alachua County, a service provider regulated by APD. Petitioner’s desired employment is to work as a direct service provider, which requires compliance with background screening requirements. The results of Petitioner’s background screening identified a history of criminal offenses. Petitioner received notification via letter dated April 4, 2016, from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to a criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was Larceny (a violation of section 810.014, Florida Statutes (2016)1/). Florida’s Legislature has designated certain criminal offenses as disqualifying offenses, which would prevent an individual from working as a direct service provider. However, an individual may seek an exemption from the employment disqualification. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow for Petitioner’s employment as a direct service provider to APD clients. APD’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of those individuals whose developmental disabilities are statutorily defined as: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. See § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without APD’s services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. APD’s clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve; consequently, employment as a direct service provider to APD clients is regarded as a position of special trust. APD is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks direct service providers perform for, and/or assist individuals with disabilities with, include those of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. APD relies on DCF to initially receive exemption from employment disqualification requests and compile documents received related to such requests. On or around May 10, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, a copy of her criminal record, character references, and other various documents (the Exemption Packet) to DCF in order to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to APD for review. In beginning its exemption review, APD considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. Specifically, in December 1982, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of Larceny/Grand Theft (a violation of section 810.014). The court’s final disposition of the case included the withholding of adjudication of guilt, two years’ probation, and payment of costs. In its continued exemption review pursuant to section 435.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, APD considered the following non- disqualifying offenses which Petitioner committed subsequent to her December 1982 disqualifying offense: an arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05, Florida Statutes); a second arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); a conviction for Worthless Check on December 24, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); an arrest for Driving While License Suspended/Revoked in June 1996 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for Worthless Check in January 2007 (a violation of section 832.05(4)(a)); and an arrest for Violation of Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court in August 2012 (a violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes). The Disqualifying Offense Petitioner provided an account of her disqualifying offense, Larcency/Grand Theft, in an addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire, dated August 3, 2015. Petitioner indicated in her account that she relocated to Tampa from Gainesville. She was 22 years old, single, and employed with the State of Florida. She became roommates with another female who was attending college at the University of South Florida. Petitioner stated “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner further explained that she received a two- year term of probation and completed all her court-ordered sanctions within a year. Petitioner also noted that “[s]ince that time, I have not committed any further crimes.” Petitioner provided the following record concerning her disqualifying offense: state attorney court record (13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, State Attorney). The Non-Disqualifying Offenses Court records received in evidence indicate a total of six non-disqualifying offenses as previously mentioned. Petitioner did not disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, nor did she provide accounts for such on the Exemption Questionnaire, despite the directions specifically requiring an applicant to do so. Petitioner did not provide records of her non- disqualifying offenses. Records of those offenses were obtained by APD as part of its detailed review process. Records of the non-disqualifying offenses obtained included: worthless check affidavit, witness form, copies of check, and no information filed court filing (Sears 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, and copy of check (Pic’n Save 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, and court judgment (Pic’n Save 12/24/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, copy of court diversion judgment and supporting documentation, and copy of dismissal of charge (Publix 1/30/2007); and warrant affidavit for arrest (Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, August 2012). Petitioner indicated that she has no current involvement with any court system; specifically, she stated “I have not experienced any criminal charges since my last event in 1982.” Regarding whether there was any degree of harm to any victim or property, including damage or injuries, Petitioner stated “I have not experienced any harm or damage to anyone or any property since my last event in 1982.” In answering the question about stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident, Petitioner indicated that there were none, other than being on probation. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner stated “I have no current stressors with the law.” Petitioner indicated that her current support system and living arrangements include being married and having one daughter and numerous grandchildren. Petitioner also explained that her community activities/volunteer efforts include volunteering with the school system (field trips/activities) and attending church and performing functions for the church’s treasury department. Regarding educational and training achievements, Petitioner stated that she graduated from high school, started a career with the State of Florida, and attended a word processing/information course where she received the Most Outstanding Student Award. The Exemption Questionnaire asks whether an applicant has ever received counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated that she has not received counseling for any reason; if she felt stress, she would call the Employee Assistance Program. Petitioner noted she has not experienced any “major post- traumatic [stress].” As to whether she has used and/or abused drugs or alcohol, Petitioner replied that she has “not abused any type of drugs or alcohol in [her] life.” Petitioner indicated the following regarding feeling remorse/accepting responsibility for her actions: “I am the type of person to feel remorse towards everything and every person that I have contact with. I always take full responsibility for any action(s) that I encounter when I am in the wrong.” The Exemption Questionnaire asks for an applicant’s prior three years’ work history. Petitioner provided the following information: 4/2016 to 5/2016--The Arc of Alachua County (support tech/direct care); 11/2007 to 7/2014--DCF--North Florida Evaluation & Treatment Center (Human Services Worker III); 3/2004 to 7/2007—DCF--State of Florida Foster Care (word processor/data management specialist); 4/1998 to 9/2003-- American Psychiatric Association (membership coordinator/secretary). In addition to the criminal record submitted, Petitioner also provided the following additional documents that were included in her Exemption Packet: local law background checks, a volunteer award (Head Start), three letters of reference attesting to Petitioner’s character, and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The letters were written by persons who have known Petitioner for several years; they described Petitioner as devoted, loyal, honest, kind, and trustworthy. Finally, Petitioner submitted a copy of an exemption letter she received from DCF, dated February 12, 2016. Leslie Richards, regional operations manager for APD’s Northeast Region, advised that APD reviewed all documentation provided by Petitioner in her Request for Exemption, the information indicated in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her volunteer award, character letters, and exemption from DCF. Following a review of Petitioner’s Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer, advised Petitioner by a letter dated September 26, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Petitioner sent APD a request for hearing on or around October 11, 2016. APD received this request timely and subsequently forwarded this appeal to DOAH. Along with her request for hearing, Petitioner submitted a personal statement explaining her reasons for disputing the denial and requesting the hearing, a copy of the denial letter, and a copy of a training certificate summary for APD-approved courses through her former employer, the Arc of Alachua County. At hearing, Ms. Richards explained APD’s process of reviewing exemption requests and the consideration of Petitioner’s application for such. Per Ms. Richards, APD considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger if employment is allowed. Additionally, Ms. Richards testified that APD looks for consistency in the applicant’s account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether the applicant accepts responsibility for his/her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Because an applicant will be occupying a position of special trust if granted an exemption, APD weighs all of these factors in its determination. Ms. Richards testified that all of Petitioner’s submissions were reviewed and taken into consideration; she noted that the starting point of APD’s review began with the date of the disqualifying offense and any criminal conduct occurring thereafter. Ms. Richards emphasized that in APD’s review, it was noted that Petitioner failed to disclose sufficient details of the account of her disqualifying offense. Specifically, Petitioner provided what appeared to be background information about the time frame surrounding the offense and the person whom she committed the offense with, but indicated in her statement “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner provided other details about this time in her life, but nothing specific about the crime itself. Ms. Richards stated that it left APD with a concern that Petitioner was not forthright with disclosure of the circumstances involving the crime. Ms. Richards also explained that APD took note that Petitioner failed to disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, and that this fact was also of concern. APD obtained records of the non-disqualifying offenses and considered them in its review. Ms. Richards noted that the nature of the offenses, particularly the Worthless Checks and the Violation of the Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court, were troubling because those offenses involved monetary transactions and interpersonal relations. Ms. Richards observed that the individuals APD serves are highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and a person who is in a role as a direct service provider would be assisting those individuals in a social and financial capacity. APD reviewed Petitioner’s involvement with three DCF investigations involving allegations of abuse toward a vulnerable adult, Petitioner’s spouse. Although there were no findings against Petitioner in these cases, based on the issues presented, DCF did make the recommendation for Petitioner to pursue family counseling. Ms. Richards noted that there is no evidence that Petitioner followed through with DCF’s recommendation, and by Petitioner’s own admission on the Exemption Questionnaire, has “not received counseling for any reason.” In addition to both the criminal offense and DCF- related information, APD noted Petitioner’s less than stellar driving record. Ms. Richards advised that a direct service provider will often be in a position to transport clients, and Petitioner’s driving record reflects a series of both moving and non-moving violations, which pose a concern. The record reflects a total of five driving-related violations: driving while license suspended/revoked (previously mentioned); tag not assigned (criminal traffic); red light camera citation; unlawful speeding; and a second red light camera citation. Ms. Richards testified regarding APD’s consideration of Petitioner’s prior employment history with DCF, and the subsequent exemption for employment granted to Petitioner by DCF. At hearing, APD presented employment evaluations and records of written disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by DCF while in its employ. Ms. Richards specifically noted that some of the disciplinary issues for which Petitioner was cited included: sleeping on the job while employed at a forensic facility; not securing the front door of a building at a forensic facility; tardiness; inappropriately streaming media on a state-owned computer; insubordination (refusal to work a shift); failure to report to work; and poor performance/negligence (failure to answer phones/answer front door of facility). Petitioner ultimately was dismissed from DCF due to her inability to perform her job functions because of an injury. Ms. Richards explained that these disciplinary issues gave APD great pause in considering granting Petitioner an exemption, as they were indicators for potential behaviors that could pose a great risk to individuals served by APD, many of whom are unable to communicate their wants and needs. The setting in which Petitioner committed these workplace violations mirrors those in which clients of APD are served. Ms. Richards did state that APD considered the exemption granted by DCF to Petitioner, however, the weight of the prior disciplinary issues outweighed that decision when compared to the possible jeopardy in which APD clients could be placed. Should Petitioner obtain future successful employment with DCF, APD would consider that in a subsequent exemption application review. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She spoke about the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense, reiterating her statement from the addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire. She provided no new information or surrounding details about the crime. Again, she stated that she has not had any legal issues since 1982. Regarding her non- disqualifying offenses, Petitioner remarked that she “didn’t consider those bad checks as crimes,” and though she denied being convicted of such, she admitted having overdrafted checks. Petitioner also stated that regarding the DCF investigations and the Injunction Violation/Contempt of Court charge, “that’s not why we are here today, so I am not going to talk about that.” Petitioner did admit to the driving infractions on her record, but stated that two of them, running red lights, were due to the fault of her daughter, as she was the driver at the time, rather than Petitioner. Petitioner stated that she is older and wiser and has changed. She enjoyed working at the adult day care program with the Arc of Alachua County. She indicated that any bad checks she has written, she “took care of.” Petitioner offered explanations for the disciplinary situations involving her prior employment with DCF, attempting to minimize her role. She explained that she and her husband, who Petitioner described as a vulnerable, disabled adult, no longer have domestic issues; however, they are currently homeless. Petitioner stated that APD’s denial is keeping her in an adverse financial situation, stating “I cannot find a job right now because of this denial.” When cross- examined by counsel regarding her ability to obtain gainful employment with DCF and its covered providers, Petitioner admitted that she can seek a job under DCF’s purview. Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses. Her sister, Sherry McCrae, a retired police officer, stated that she lived with her sister the entire time she was in college; Petitioner provided a source of support to her during this period. Ms. McCrae stated that her sister has been working all the years since the disqualifying incident. She affirmed that their maiden name is Williams, Petitioner’s last name at the time of the disqualifying incident. Petitioner’s second witness, Faye Williams, testified that after Petitioner’s disqualifying incident, she got a job and was active in the community. Petitioner has a desire “to be a part of something.” She loves people, especially children. Petitioner asserted that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities; at her last place of employment, she believed she found her “purpose and mission.” She loves helping people. She admits she made some mistakes, but that was long ago. Petitioner argued that she “really only committed one crime”; she has rehabilitated herself and that should be enough for APD. She believes APD abused its discretion in denying her request for exemption. The individuals APD serves are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, due to their developmental disabilities. APD’s representative observed that APD’s clients must be assigned to direct care providers without fear of their endangerment. This necessarily requires reliance on a caregiver’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals who provide direct care are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Ms. Richards cautioned that Petitioner’s criminal history reflects a pattern of poor judgment. Petitioner’s failure to disclose certain details in her account regarding her disqualifying offense calls into question her trustworthiness. Additionally, failure to disclose her non-disqualifying offenses, along with a failure to recognize that those offenses are truly crimes, is not only troubling, but calls into question Petitioner’s trustworthiness. It also demonstrates a complete lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions. Petitioner did not admit to any of the harm she caused to her victims. Petitioner’s minimization of the discipline she received while employed by DCF also gives great pause, as the individuals she was charged with caring for were clients in a forensic setting, a clear parallel to the clients she would serve should an exemption be granted by APD. Petitioner’s multiple driving citations are concerning as well, and demonstrate a pattern of questionable decision- making, especially when considering her for a position where she could potentially transport clients. All of the aforementioned factors, along with proximity in time of her application to her last arrest (2012), caused APD to question Petitioner’s fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible, the most vulnerable population in the state. Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, and therefore, the denial of the exemption was proper.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities issue a final order upholding the denial of Petitioner’s exemption request. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2017.
Findings Of Fact 12. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on June 11, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 3, 2010, the 2™4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on November 9, 2010, and the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on December 15, 2010, and attached as “Exhibit A” “Exhibit B” “Exhibit D” and “Exhibit F” respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Petition from DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC., the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On June 11, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-317-D3 to DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On June 11, 2010, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. A copy of the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On August 3, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $16,241.92 against DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28- 106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On August 31, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by process server on DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On August 31, 2010, DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. timely filed a request for administrative hearing (hereinafter “Petition”) with the Department. The Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 29, 2010, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 10-9374. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On November 9, 2010, the Department issued a 2" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $12,793.30 against DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. 7. On November 15, 2010, upon motion by the Department, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order accepting the 2’ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and allowing it to supersede any previously entered Order of Penalty Assessment. A copy of the 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On December 15, 2010, the Department issued a 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The 3! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $2,268.83 against DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. The 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28- 106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 9. On January 18, 2011, upon motion of the parties, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 10. On September 10, 2011, the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. A copy of the 314 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. DIAGONAL TILE AND MARBLE, INC. failed to answer the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment or request a proceeding in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Benny R. Hardy, is a licensed law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, holding License No. GF-7656. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the licensing of and the regulation and enforcing of licensure, practice and conduct standards for law enforcement officers. The Respondent was hired on the police force of the City of Umatilla, Florida, on September 16, 1975, rising to the position of Chief of Police. He served in that capacity until his termination of employment by his resignation on March 23, 1983. The Respondent resigned from his employment due to his having been charged with a felony, involving obtaining drugs with a forged prescription. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge and an order was entered on March 25, 1983, placing the Respondent on probation for three years and withholding adjudication of guilt, it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that the Respondent was "not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct . . . ." Certain conditions were imposed upon Respondent's probationary status and the court reserved jurisdiction to adjudge the Respondent guilty and impose any legally appropriate sentence if the conditions of that probation are violated. There is no evidence that Respondent has ever been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding such as this in the past. His licensure status is presently "inactive." The Respondent, however, after due and proper notice of hearing, failed to appear at the hearing at the appointed date and time and had still not appeared at 10:40 a.m., when the hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the evidence and testimony of record, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission revoking Law Enforcement Certificate No. GF-7656 presently held by Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Benny R. Hardy Post Office Box 1014 Umatilla, Florida 32784 James W. York, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact 6. The factual allegations in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On October 8, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A to CHARLES M. EIDENS, JAMES A. HABAN , RITA ZARNIK, AND RICHARD E. EIDENS, d/b/a PAINT BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND PAIN T BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC. (“PAINTBUSTERS”). The Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached as “Exhibit 1” and fully incorporated by reference. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on October 8, 2009, on PAINTBUSTERS. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On November 13, 2009, the Department served by certified mail an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on PAINTBUSTERS. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 2” and fully incorporated herein by reference. The penalty assessed on PAINTBUSTERS was $98,242.15. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a i Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 3. On November 24, 2009, PAINTBUSTERS submitted a Request for F ormal Hearing (“Petition”). The Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) and assigned DOAH case number 09-6634. 4. On January 8, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge granted the Department’s Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment. The 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment superseded the original Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and increased the penalty to $98,336.87. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 3” and fully incorporated by reference. 5. On March 25, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in Case No. 09-6634 as a result of PAINTBUSTERS failing to comply with DOAH’s request for a Status Report. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit 4” and fully incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
The Issue Whether Keith Jackson, Ph.D. (‘Petitioner’) should be required to pay FAMU’s claimed overpayment of salary as calculated in the amount of $29,141.57, for the pay periods between July 11, 2008 and December 12, 2008.
Findings Of Fact 1, On or about July 1, 2005, Petitioner executed an employment contract with FAMU to serve as Vice President for Research. The contract executed by Petitioner provides that Petitioner “is subject to the Constitution and Laws of the State of Florida and the United States and the rules, policies, guidelines and procedures of the Board of Governors and the University as now existing or hereafter promulgated.” 2. On July 11, 2008, Petitioner submitted to the University a letter advising that he was resigning from his administrative position with the University as the Vice President for Research. 3. Petitioner's letter of resignation was accepted by the University effective July 11, 2008. 4. Tenure as a faculty member was granted to Petitioner by the University on May 25, 2007. 12
Conclusions This matter is now before Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Board of Trustees (“FAMU,” “Respondent,” or the “University”) for final agency action.
