The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, A-1 Block Corp., discriminated against Petitioner, Harold E. Ford, Jr., on the basis of his race and/or color and in retaliation, and, if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business that manufactures concrete products, ready-mix concrete, concrete block, and precast concrete. Mr. Freeman has been the president of Respondent for approximately 10 years. Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent at two different times. Petitioner was hired to work in several different capacities which included: ready-mix driver; block driver; dump truck driver; and/or loader operator. Mr. Caviglia serves Respondent in a supervisory position, and Mr. Caviglia made the decision to hire Petitioner as a truck driver in December 2009 (first employment). Respondent hired Petitioner at $12.00 an hour. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment in July 2011 (first employment termination). Mr. Freeman described the circumstances under which Petitioner was terminated as: Petitioner failed to unhook some type of ladder or other apparatus at a self-loading dock, and drove off causing approximately $4,000 to $5,000 of damage to Respondent’s truck and/or the dock. Respondent was responsible for making the repairs. At the time of his first employment termination, Petitioner was making $13.00 an hour. Approximately five months later, in December 2011, Mr. Caviglia re-hired Petitioner to be a truck driver for Respondent. The other drivers employed by Respondent wanted Petitioner to return. Petitioner was hired at $13.00 an hour (second employment). At various times during Petitioner’s employment with Respondent, Petitioner inquired about becoming a “dispatcher” for Respondent. Mr. Freeman indicated to Petitioner that he (Mr. Freeman) would think about Petitioner’s dispatcher request. However, one of the requirements for Respondent’s dispatcher position was the availability to work on Saturdays. Mr. Freeman knew that Petitioner had a second job which required Petitioner to work on Saturdays. Since 2004, Petitioner worked part-time as an attendant at a local funeral home, which required Petitioner to work some Saturdays. Petitioner was paid $75 per funeral; however, he did not know how much he had been paid since his second employment termination. Petitioner did not have any pay-stubs to reflect how much he had been paid by the funeral home. Petitioner continues to work for the funeral home. In October 2013, Petitioner caused damage to tires on a truck belonging to Respondent. Respondent incurred a financial loss as a result of the damaged tires. Petitioner was terminated from his second employment with Respondent on November 20, 2013. Petitioner alleged and testified that Mr. Caviglia threatened Petitioner at various times during Respondent’s operational meetings.3/ Two other witnesses, Mr. Timmons and Mr. Sandy, testified that they did not observe Petitioner being threatened at these meetings. Petitioner alleged that he was retaliated against based on his race. Petitioner claimed that he was directed to wash a white man’s truck. Petitioner refused to wash the truck. Respondent requires its drivers to wash the trucks that they drive each day. However, there was no evidence of any retaliation against Petitioner when he did not wash the other man’s truck. Petitioner alleged he asked for raises when he thought it appropriate, and was refused. Mr. Freeman paid his employees the going rate, and it was established that Petitioner was being paid $14 an hour when he was terminated. Mr. Timmons, a former employee of Respondent, received the same rate of pay for working as a driver or as a dispatcher for Respondent. Petitioner’s resumé was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C. Petitioner created this resumé in 2011, and revised it one time to assist in the preparation for the hearing. The resumé does not accurately reflect Petitioner’s separate employment periods at Respondent, nor does it contain a two-week period of employment at another construction company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations DISMISSING the Petition for Relief filed by Mr. Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2014.
The Issue Whether or not no or about March 7, 1976, the Respondent, Mally Ray Ramer, a licensed vendor and/or his agent, servant or employee did sell, give serve or permit to be served, alcoholic beverages to wit: one six-pack of Busch Bavarian beer to a person, Jerry Lynn Scott and John Otey Hutchinson, under the age of 18, contrary to Section 562.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mally Ray Ramer, as shown by Petitioner's Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence, is licensed by the State of Florida, Division of Beverage under license no. 13-295, series 2-APS for the period October 1, 1976 through September 30, 1977. These premises are located at 16610 West Highway 98, Panama City Beach, Florida. On arch 7, 1976, Jerry Lynn Scott and John Otey Hutchinson entered the premises of 16610 West Highway 98, Panama City Beach, Florida and purchased a six-pack of Busch Bavarian beer, an alcoholic beverage, from the Respondent, Mally Ray Ramer. Both Scott and Hutchinson were under the age of 18 at the time of purchase and were in fact 16 years old. They did not produce any identification and were not required to produce any identification prior to the purchase. The identification which Scott had, showed him to be 16 years of age. The Respondent claimed that these individuals had been on his premises before and had shown some identification.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Mally Ray Ramer, have his beverage license suspended for a period of 30 days, for the violation as established in the administrative complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence Winson, Esquire Division of Beverage The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mally Ray Ramer 1543 Mulberry Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401
The Issue Whether Respondent, The Meltdown on 30A (“The Meltdown”), discriminated against Petitioners, D’Shante L. LeBeaux, Erin M. Scott, and Latanya M. Scott (collectively, the “Petitioners”), in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Meltdown is a restaurant operated out of a 23-foot- long Airstream trailer. It does not have tables and chairs for customers to consume their meals; it is a “to go” establishment. The trailer can comfortably hold about five people when it is in operation. The Meltdown operates on Highway 30A (hence its name) and is generally parked near the beach in Seaside, a tourist area. The Meltdown serves between 500 and 700 sandwiches per day. The restaurant is one of five owned by Mr. Shirley and managed by Mr. Haile. In February 2016, The Meltdown switched its payroll functions from Oasis to ECB. The change resulted also in a new method of signing in, on-line, by which employees were able to be paid. D’Shante L. LeBeaux is an African-American woman. At final hearing, she claimed to have a disability, but did not raise that as a basis for the discrimination claim against The Meltdown. She began working for The Meltdown in June 2016. She voluntarily left her employment when her means of transportation, Latanya Scott, resigned around August 19, 2016. While working for The Meltdown, Ms. LeBeaux was never written up or disciplined for missing work or performing poorly. Ms. LeBeaux did not cite any instance of discriminatory actions or words by her employer. She claimed that the manner in which her schedule was handled, i.e., that she did not always work the same hours as Latanya Scott, constituted discrimination. The testimony was not persuasive. Latanya Scott is an African-American woman. She is married to Erin Scott, an African-American woman. Latanya Scott was hired on June 24, 2016. On August 10, 2016, she provided a letter to The Meltdown which stated her intent to resign as of August 19, 2016. As of that date, she voluntarily ceased working for The Meltdown. Her reason for resigning was, primarily, that Mr. Haile had not shown any compassion when Latanya Scott’s grandmother got sick (and ultimately passed away). While working at The Meltdown, Latanya Scott was written up for being belligerent to other employees. She was passed over when a manager, Carolyn Bramlett, left her position and a new manager was needed. No one was hired, however, to replace Ms. Bramlett; Mr. Haile simply took over the responsibilities himself. Erin Scott is an African-American woman and is the wife of Latanya Scott. She was hired at The Meltdown on May 29, 2016, and continues to work there. She cited to no discriminatory actions by The Meltdown, but suggested that other related couples may have been treated somewhat differently than were she and her wife. Her complaints were neither confirmed nor deemed discriminatory. Erin Scott continues to work in a supervisory capacity for The Meltdown and is considered a good employee. Each of the Petitioners stated that they never received an employee handbook until recently, i.e., during the pendency of this administrative hearing. They never saw, therefore, the nepotism policy set forth in the handbook. The owner and manager maintain that all employees are given the handbook when they “signed in” as an employee the first time. Based upon the facts of this case, whether or not the Petitioners were provided an employee handbook or knew about the nepotism policy is essentially irrelevant to their claims of discrimination. There were a number of family members working at The Meltdown when Mr. Haile first began managing. When ECB came in, a nepotism policy was enacted that prevented any further employment of family members. The family members who were already there were grandfathered in, i.e., they were not asked to resign. Mr. Haile does not remember Ms. LeBeaux raising the issue of a disability at the time of her hiring. She did begin asking for fewer hours, no more than 25 per week, at some point and Mr. Haile tried to accommodate her. He learned that she and Latanya Scott were riding together, which created a small problem, but he attempted to work around that issue as well. Mr. Shirley operates all of his restaurants without tolerating discrimination or harassment. His credible testimony was that the Petitioners seem to have a problem with how the restaurant was managed rather than having a complaint about discrimination. He genuinely appears to care about his employees and to wish to do the right thing vis-à-vis his employees. In short, there was no credible or persuasive evidence of discrimination against Petitioners by The Meltdown.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent, The Meltdown on 30A, did not discriminate against Petitioners, D’Shante L. LeBeaux, Erin M. Scott, and Latanya M. Scott, and their Petitions for Relief should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) D'Shante LaCheryl LeBeaux Apartment B 190 Patrick Drive Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433 (eServed) Timothy Tack, Esquire Miller Tack & Madson Suite 135 3550 Buschwood Park Drive Tampa, Florida 33618 (eServed) Erin M. Scott Post Office Box 962 Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Latanya M. Scott Post Office Box 962 Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Notice of Hearing in these consolidated cases was issued on November 17, 2010, setting the hearing for January 24 and 25, 2011, in Tallahassee, Florida. The hearing was scheduled to commence at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011. Also on November 17, 2010, an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered. Neither the Notice of Hearing nor the Order of Pre- hearing Instructions was returned as undeliverable to Petitioner. On January 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a letter at the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that the hearing be delayed until after February 18, 2011, due to various appointments she had made that conflicted with the hearing dates. This letter indicated that Petitioner was aware of the scheduled hearing dates. By order dated January 20, 2011, the undersigned declined Petitioner's request for failure to state grounds sufficient to warrant a continuance over the objection of Respondent. Several attempts to reach Petitioner by telephone were unavailing. At 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 2011, counsel and witnesses for Respondent were present and prepared to go forward with the hearing. Petitioner was not present. The undersigned delayed the commencement of the hearing by fifteen minutes, but Petitioner still did not appear. The hearing was called to order at 9:45 a.m. Counsel for Respondent entered her appearance and requested the entry of a recommended order of dismissal. The hearing was then adjourned. As of the date of this recommended order, Petitioner has not contacted the Division of Administrative Hearings, in writing or by telephone, to explain her failure to appear at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Relief in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly D. Dotson 825 Briandav Street Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Kim M. Fluharty-Denson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Kowalski Department of Financial Services Human Resource 200 East Gaines Street, Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding, under the relevant provisions of Chapter 760 Florida Statutes, concern whether the Petitioner was discriminatorily discharged because of her race and purported disability.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Escambia County Area Transit, Inc., operates a passenger bus service in the area of Escambia County, Florida. The Petitioner was employed as a bus operator since August of 1999. On September 7, 2006, the Petitioner took FMLA leave for a condition involving migraine headaches. That leave extended through October 9, 2006. The Petitioner returned to work from that FMLA leave on January 9, 2007, however. A notice was sent to the Petitioner from Dawn Groders, an administrator with the Respondent, on April 19, 2007, informing the Petitioner that she had exhausted her FMLA leave for the twelve month "rolling calendar year" and that she would not begin accumulating additional FMLA leave until October 9, 2007. The Respondent's policy regarding FMLA leave is as follows: "If a family leave of absence exceeds 12 weeks on a rolling twelve month period, the employment status may be in jeopardy, which could result in termination of employment." There is a labor contract between the Respondent and the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1395, the Petitioner's union. That contract contains no provision regarding warning or noticing an employee about obtaining exhaustion of FMLA leave. On October 19, 2007, the Petitioner commenced additional FMLA leave for an injury to her finger. The collective bargaining agreement contains a provision regarding a discretionary leave of thirty days which may be discretionarily granted by the employer. Because the Petitioner had previously exhausted her FMLA leave, based on the rolling twelve month calendar, and had yet to re-acquire any leave, the Petitioner was granted discretionary leave by the Respondent because of having exhausted her FMLA leave. The Petitioner contends that she should have been given alternative light-duty work by the Respondent. On December 3, 2007, however, the Petitioner received a letter from Richard Deibler, the Respondent's Director of Safety Training and Planning, which stated that there was no temporary alternative- duty work available at that time. (Respondent's Exhibit 4, in evidence). The witness for the Respondent established that there was no available part-time or light-duty work at the time the Petitioner was on FMLA leave or attempted to be on FMLA leave. The union contract does not require that part-time, light-duty work be available, with the exception of one individual who was so authorized and who was "grandfathered-in" in that status from a previous union contract. The Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence which would establish that light-duty, part-time work was available at the time in question, in late 2007. Thereafter, the Petitioner remained on re-activated FMLA leave due to her previous injury during the month of December 2007. On December 11, 2007, she received a notice from the Respondent to the effect that she must report for duty by December 27, 2007, because of exhaustion of her FMLA leave and was advised that her employment might be terminated if she were not at work by that date. On December 27, 2007, the Petitioner failed to return to work and her employment was terminated because of exhaustion of her FMLA leave, in accordance with the Respondent's policy. As of the date of her termination, the Petitioner had used a total of 64 days of FMLA leave during the course of the rolling calendar year, dating back to December 27, 2006. The Respondent was aware that the Petitioner had exhausted her FMLA leave based on a rolling calendar year in October 2007, and yet still extended her leave, not just for the referenced thirty days discretionary leave, but for nearly ninety additional days. The Petitioner has asserted no dispute with the number of days the Respondent contends (and the evidence supports) that she was not present at work due to using FMLA leave or other forms of leave, such as discretionary leave. The Petitioner offered no persuasive evidence to show that she was terminated from her employment due to her race or any other reason aside from exhaustion of her FMLA leave and the company's policy with regard thereto. The Respondent's representative and witness established, with her testimony, that the Petitioner was not terminated because of any perceived or actual disability. Although the Respondent knew of the medical reasons the Petitioner stated necessitated her absence, the Respondent was not aware that any physical impairment had resulted in an impairment of any major life activity of the Petitioner. The testimony of Ms. Chizek, is accepted as persuasive in establishing that the Petitioner was not terminated because of any perceived or actual disability or for reasons of her race, but rather was terminated solely because she had exhausted her FMLA leave and in fact the substantial amount of discretionary leave voluntarily granted to her by the Respondent. The Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that employees or former employees, outside her protected class (African-American) had been treated dissimilarly and more favorably, for the same or similar violations of company policy, to wit, the exhaustion of FMLA leave and subsequent continued failure to return to work. In fact, the persuasive, preponderant evidence shows that the Respondent uniformly applied its policy regarding FMLA exhaustion and subsequent termination of employment. Patty Chizek conducted an audit of all employee files in the fall of 2007 concerning the question of FMLA exhaustion. That audit was not an attempt to single out the Petitioner in any way due to her race or any disability, if one existed. Her investigation revealed that, in fact, a number of employees had exhausted their FMLA leave. They were all terminated during the month of December 2007, similarly to the Petitioner. Thus, Mary Nelson, Nadine Harris, Eurethia Davies, and Linda Donaldson, all of whom are Caucasian women, were terminated during December 2007 because of exhaustion of their FMLA leave. Derrick Roberts, an African-American male, was terminated during that month, for the same reason. All of these employees were terminated for that reason after not being able to return to work for a reasonable period of time after exhaustion of FMLA leave. Moreover, the Petitioner testified that she was first absent from work due to a migraine headache-related medical problem and, on the later occasion, due to injury of her finger, apparently caused by wrestling with the steering wheel of her bus, after it ran on the curb of a street she was traversing. Although it might be recognized, and indeed is undisputed, that these injuries or medical conditions were experienced by the Petitioner, the Petitioner did not establish that they truly impaired her in a major life activity. Even if they were significant, physical reasons for being absent from work for some of the time during which the Petitioner was absent, she did not establish, with persuasive evidence, that they impaired a major life activity and constituted any permanent, or relatively permanent, impairment of her ability to perform the duties of her job. Even if the Petitioner had established that there was a permanent impairment which might constitute a disability, she did not establish that the Respondent had refused a reasonable request for an accommodation therefor. Although the Petitioner requested light-duty employment, the Respondent established with persuasive evidence that, at the time it was requested by the Petitioner, there was no such employment available. Therefore, it was not an accommodation the Respondent could reasonably offer the Petitioner at that time, even if the Petitioner had a known, perceived or recognized disability at that time.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Marino, Esquire McMahon & Berger 2730 North Ballas Road Suite 200 St. Louis, Missouri 63131 James N. Foster McMahon & Berger 2730 North Ballas Road Suite 200 St. Louis, Missouri 63131 Tricia Dubose 1349 43rd Ensley Street Birmingham, Alabama 35208 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In a letter dated April 13, 1990, the Department informed the Petitioner, Cherokee Rental And Construction Co., Inc., that it was denying the Petitioner's request for refund of the $95.00 fuel tax and civil penalty assessment it had previously paid to the Department. In a letter received by the Department on February 13, 1990, the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Department's decision. The address included on the Petitioner's letter was the address used by the Department to notify the Petitioner of its decision to deny its request for a refund. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on June 1, 1990, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in its letter requesting a formal hearing. Neither party responded to the Notice. On July 12, 1990, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in his letter requesting a formal hearing. The Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Department was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Petitioner to appear, the hearing was commenced. At the commencement of the formal hearing the Department was informed that it could proceed with the formal hearing or, since Petitioner had the burden of proof in this case, move for dismissal of the case. The Department elected to make an ore tenus motion for dismissal. The Department was informed that a Recommended Order would be issued recommending dismissal of this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's request for hearing in this case for failure to appear at the final hearing. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Read Cherokee Rental & Construction Co., Inc. Post Office Box 850606 Mobile, Alabama 36685 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue relates to the amount of attorney's fees and costs owed Petitioner by Respondent The Leather Galleries, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has not challenged the reasonableness of the attorney's fees as set forth in Petitioner's claim. Petitioner's counsel spent a total of 10.40 hours preparing for the hearing, attending the hearing, drafting and filing Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, and preparing the statement relating to fees and the supporting affidavit. At $150 per hour, the fee for services performed by Petitioner's counsel is $1,560. Petitioner is not claiming reimbursement for costs. An attorney's fee in the amount of $1,560 is reasonable under the circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order awarding Petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of $1,560. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: David W. Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Dominic Persampiere The Furniture Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Lane Home Furniture 485 Suncrest Court Oviedo, Florida 32765 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether despondent had violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, in that no permits were secured for subject sign for the years 1972-1975.
Findings Of Fact No permits were applied for or secured.
