The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Porky's Barbeque Restaurant, engaged in an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner, Susan Coffy, from her position.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female and, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was over the age of 40. From March 1, 2003, until October 28, 2003, Petitioner was employed as a waitress at Porky's, a barbecue restaurant. On October 28, 2003, Petitioner was terminated from her job as a waitress. Prior to March 1, 2003, Petitioner had worked as a waitress at another restaurant, Fat Boy's Restaurant (Fat Boy's), that had been operating at the same location as Porky's. Fat Boy's closed after the building in which that restaurant was located was purchased by Walter Milton. After Mr. Milton purchased the building, he opened his own business, Porky's, at that location. After Mr. Milton opened his restaurant, he employed many of the individuals who had been employed by Fat Boy's, but told them that their employment with Porky's was for a "trial period." Immediately after Porky's opened for business, Mr. Milton initiated operational directives that he believed were essential business needs for operating a barbecue business. He introduced these new directives to the employees of Porky's, many of whom had previously worked for Fat Boy's. While some of these employees were successful in making the transition to the new operation, there were employees, including Petitioner, who were resistant to the operational directives initiated by Mr. Milton. Even though Petitioner was resistant to the new operational directives that were implemented at Porky's, Mr. Milton continued to try to work with Petitioner. In fact, Petitioner worked as a waitress at Porky's the first eight months the restaurant was open. During the course of her employment, Mr. Milton found that Petitioner was an employee who failed to follow simple instructions. For example, Mr. Milton directed employees to knock on his office door when the door was closed. Notwithstanding this very simple directive, Petitioner refused to comply. One day Petitioner went to Mr. Milton's office and found the door to the office was closed. Instead of knocking as she had been previously directed, Petitioner simply barged into the office and stated that she needed a band-aid. After Petitioner barged into the office without knocking, Mr. Milton reminded her that she should knock on the door and wait for a response before coming into his office. About three minutes after this admonition, Petitioner returned to Mr. Milton's office. Although the office door was closed, Petitioner, again, did not knock on the door, but simply opened the door and went into the office. Mr. Milton was not pleased with Petitioner's failure to embrace the directives he initiated and implemented for Porky's. However, the "final straw" that resulted in Mr. Milton's terminating Petitioner's employment was an incident about a menu item. On October 28, 2003, Petitioner was very upset that Mr. Milton had included an item on the Porky's menu that also had been on the Fat Boy's menu. That menu item was referred to as "Jim's Special Burger." Mr. Milton included that item on Respondent's menu to honor Jim Kenaston, who had been the owner of Fat Boy's. On October 28, 2003, Petitioner "flew off the handle" and confronted Mr. Milton about his decision to include the item, "Jim's Special Burger," on the Porky's menu. Petitioner, who admits she was upset about this matter, confronted Mr. Milton and argued to him that he had no right to put the "Jim's Special Burger" on Respondent's menu. The confrontation started in the kitchen of the restaurant, but continued after Petitioner left the kitchen and proceeded into the restaurant's dining room. Although there were customers in the dining room, Petitioner continued to argue with Mr. Milton about the menu item. Petitioner's verbal criticism and objection to Mr. Milton's decision to include "Jim's Special Burger" on Respondent's menu created such a commotion in the restaurant that Respondent's bookkeeper heard Petitioner's outbursts from her office located behind the cashier's counter. After the bookkeeper heard Petitioner arguing with Mr. Milton, the bookkeeper left her office and in an effort to de-escalate the situation, escorted Petitioner out of the dining room to a back hall of the restaurant where there were no customers. On October 28, 2003, as a result of Petitioner's inappropriate and unprofessional conduct described in paragraphs 10 through 13, Mr. Milton terminated Petitioner's employment at Porky's. The same day that he terminated Petitioner's employment, Mr. Milton completed a "Separation Notice" on which he indicated that Petitioner was laid off due to lack of work. The reason Mr. Milton wrote this on the form was so that Petitioner could receive unemployment compensation. Petitioner presented no competent and substantial evidence that she was terminated from employment because of her age. Likewise, Petitioner presented no evidence that after she was terminated, she was replaced by a younger worker. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent had four or five employees who were over 40 years of age. Petitioner presented several witnesses who testified that she was an excellent waitress when she was employed at Fat Boy's. However, Petitioner's job performance while working for her previous employer is not at issue or relevant in this proceeding. Even if that testimony is accepted as true, no inference can be drawn that Petitioner's performance remained the same or was viewed as such by her new employer. Notwithstanding the opinions expressed by her previous employers and co-workers, Petitioner was terminated from her employment at Porky's as a result of her unacceptable and unprofessional conduct on October 28, 2003.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Porky's Barbeque Restaurant, did not commit any unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Walter Milton Porky's Barbeque Restaurant 4280 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780 Susan Coffy 2966 Temple Lane Mims, Florida 32754 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by committing unlawful employment practice (discrimination) on the basis of Petitioner's sex (female), National Origin (Hispanic), handicap when it terminated Petitioner from employment, or on the basis of sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact As noted above in the Preliminary Statement, the parties have entered into an Agreement of Settlement and Mutual and General Release. Their agreement, in pertinent part, includes the following: "DM, on the one hand, and JBF (under the name Joe Blasco Cosmetics), on the other hand, are parties to proceeding which took place before the State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, in Case No. 01- 2328, on about June 28, 2001, with respect to DM's claims of discrimination against JBE (the"Action"). Each of the parties hereto considers it to be in its best interest, and to its advantage, forever to settle, adjust, and comprise all claims and defenses which have been, or could have been, asserted in connection with the employment relationship, the Action, and/or in an other action or proceeding arising out of any employment or other relationship between the parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are contractual, not a mere recital, and this Agreement is the result of negotiation between the parties, each of whom has participated in the drafting hereof, through each of the parties' respective attorneys. Diana Morales shall dismiss with prejudice Case No. 01-2328 pending before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings. Diana Morales agrees to execute and file any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any investigative bodies, administrative bodies and/or courts that she has withdrawn, dismissed and resolved any and all claims with Joe Blasco Cosmetics, Joe Blasco Enterprises and/or Joe Blasco." The parties' stipulated settlement agreement constitutes an informal disposition of all issues in this proceeding.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit any evidence to support findings of fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioner and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg Chapman 2727 Frontage Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Laura I. Korson, Esquire John Baird & Associates 360 Campus Lane, Suite 201 Fairfield, California 94533-1400 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, C and C Enterprises, Inc. (“C and C Enterprises”), discriminated against Petitioner, Leslie D. Richardson, in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Richardson is a Caucasian female who at all times relevant to this proceeding was an employee of C and C Enterprises, Inc., and worked at the Restaurant. Mrs. Richardson primarily served as a bartender, with most of her shifts placing her at the bar located outside the Restaurant on a deck or patio adjacent to the Restaurant. Sandy Bottoms is a family oriented restaurant located in Fernandina Beach, Florida. It has normal restaurant seating, plus two bars. One bar is located inside the restaurant; the other is located outside. The outside bar has fairly tight quarters, allowing only one person comfortably behind the bar at a time. The outside bar is frequented by customers more than the inside bar, so working outside is more lucrative for the bartenders. Mrs. Richardson began working at Sandy Bottoms in January 2013. She was hired as a bartender and, by most accounts, was very proficient at her job. She quickly chose the outside bar as her preferred spot when working and had many regular customers. Mrs. Richardson was even featured in a local newspaper article in January 2015, wherein she was touted as a particularly well-liked bartender. When she began working at Sandy Bottoms, Mrs. Richardson formed good relationships with its owner, Claude Hartley, and her fellow workers. She also had a good relationship with the manager, Russell McNair, and with the Restaurant’s bookkeeper, Natalie Thelemann. Mrs. Thelemann is Claude Hartley’s daughter. According to Mrs. Richardson’s testimony at final hearing, she began to have “issues” with Mr. Hartley beginning about a year into her tenure at the Restaurant, i.e., around “early to mid 2014.” Conversely, in her Employment Charge of Discrimination, the first alleged incident she reported occurred in “late winter-early spring 2015.” Mrs. Richardson generally claims Mr. Hartley sexually harassed her and even perpetuated potentially criminal or tortious touching. In her complaints to FCHR, Mrs. Richardson reported incidents which allegedly occurred between August 2015 and November 2015. She maintains that Mr. Hartley continued to act inappropriately towards her until her employment ended on November 2, 2015, and even once after she left Sandy Bottoms. Mr. Hartley denies there was any sexual harassment or inappropriate touching at any time during Mrs. Richardson’s employment at Sandy Bottoms. Neither Mr. McNair nor Mrs. Thelemann saw any such things occurring while Mrs. Richardson was working at Sandy Bottoms. Mrs. Richardson’s employment ended abruptly on November 1 or 2, 2015. On Sunday, November 1, 2015, she had shown up at work for her regular shift. She clocked in a couple of minutes late that day, but she blames the Restaurant’s timeclock for that. The time on that clock (referred to by staff as “Aloha time”), was always, according to Mrs. Richardson, five or so minutes ahead of the “actual” time. Mrs. Richardson was late for her shifts approximately 67 percent of the time, but she says she would sometimes work a bit around the Restaurant before clocking in, even if she got there on time.1/ In light of credible testimony from the manager and bookkeeper that all personnel clocked in immediately upon arrival, Mrs. Richardson’s testimony is not persuasive. The only other non-manager employee who testified, Danielle Guidry, did not corroborate Mrs. Richardson’s testimony concerning how staff clocked in for work. After clocking in late on November 1, 2015, Mrs. Richardson took a telephone call from her mother, who was ill at the time. She walked around outside during the telephone call. When she came back to the outside bar area to begin her shift, she was told that she would be working the inside bar on this day. Apparently another bartender, who had prepared the outside bar for opening in Mrs. Richards’s absence, asked to staff the bar even though she had been scheduled to work the inside bar. The outside bar is generally busier and generates more tips than the inside bar. Mr. McNair granted the other bartender’s request because Mrs. Richardson was late for her shift. According to the Restaurant’s Server Operational Manual, a server/bartender should arrive at least 10 minutes prior to their shift. Otherwise, the shift would “go up for auction” to another employee. Upon hearing the news that she had to work the inside bar, Mrs. Richardson became irate. She stormed into the restaurant and angrily confronted Mr. McNair, but he stood by his decision. When Mr. McNair refused to budge, Mrs. Richardson cursed at him and exited the Restaurant loudly, all the while with customers sitting within hearing range. Mrs. Richardson went home, where she received a call from Mr. Hartley within half an hour or so. Mr. Hartley asked her to come back to the Restaurant and do her shift, but Mrs. Richardson refused. Mr. Hartley discussed the situation with his “management team” which included his wife, Rita Hartley, Mr. McNair, and Phil Thelemann, another manager (who is also Mr. Hartley’s son-in-law). The consensus was that Mrs. Richardson had abandoned her job by walking out without notice or cause. Mr. Hartley then called Mrs. Richardson again, this time leaving her a message wherein he told her not to come in the next day as scheduled. It was the decision of management that Mrs. Richardson’s employment with Sandy Bottoms was over. Mr. Hartley left the following message on Mrs. Richardson’s phone: “Leslie, this is Claude. There’s no sense in coming in tomorrow. My family is ‘bout to kill me. And, uh… I’m sorry. Call me and talk to me. I’ll help you out if I can. Goodbye.” Mrs. Richardson considers that message evidence that Mr. Hartley’s family was angry with him because of his infatuation with her. No competent or persuasive evidence was presented to support her theory. Mr. Hartley said the message reflected the fact that his family was upset with him for trying to preserve Mrs. Richardson’s job at Sandy Bottoms despite the team consensus that she had abandoned her position. His explanation seems more credible. Mr. Hartley and other Restaurant employees soon began hearing rumors that Mrs. Richardson was planning to file a lawsuit against Sandy Bottoms alleging wrongful termination. When she came in to pick up her final paycheck a week or so after being let go, Mr. Hartley asked Mrs. Richardson if she was planning to sue him or the Restaurant. Mrs. Richardson was friendly (or at least “not unpleasant”) and indicated she would not “do something like that.” It does not appear that anyone at the Restaurant knew Mrs. Richardson had actually hired a lawyer until she had filed her complaint with FCHR. Mrs. Richardson struggled to find good employment after leaving Sandy Bottoms. She worked for two other restaurants tending bars, but neither job was as lucrative as her bartender position at Sandy Bottoms. She believed some restaurants refused to hire her because she had been fired by Sandy Bottoms, but could identify only one potential employer who brought up her tenure at Sandy Bottoms. That person did not testify at final hearing to confirm or deny Mrs. Richardson’s contention. Mrs. Richardson is the sole breadwinner for her family. After losing her job at Sandy Bottoms she was evicted from her home and had to move to Yulee, a less attractive community off the island of Fernandina Beach. She is now working as a housekeeper. Her husband, who was a frequent customer at Sandy Bottoms while she was working there, is disabled and cannot work. Ultimately, Mrs. Richardson did hire legal counsel and file a complaint against Sandy Bottoms. In her “Employment Charge of Discrimination,” Mrs. Richardson alleged a number of instances wherein Mr. Hartley had acted improperly towards her. The majority of the allegations could not be substantiated or corroborated by any other witness. Those “he said - she said” allegations will only be referred to in passing and as necessary to elaborate on the two somewhat verifiable allegations. The two alleged incidents for which other eyewitness testimony exists are generally described as follows: On or about October 4, 2015, Mrs. Richardson was working behind the outside bar. Mr. Hartley, who kept a bottle of port wine in a cooler behind the bar for his personal consumption, came behind the bar. Mrs. Richardson felt a bottle being shoved between her legs, scaring her and making her very uncomfortable. Mr. Hartley supposedly laughed and asked a customer “wasn’t that funny?” or “isn’t that fun?” In the late winter or early spring of 2015, Mr. Hartley approached Mrs. Richardson as she was working at the bar and – staring at her breasts – said, “It’s not that cold in here.” A customer sitting at the bar overheard the statement. As to the first incident, Mrs. Richardson’s description in her diary of allegations said Mr. Hartley “shoved the neck of the bottle between my legs from behind.” Despite the egregiousness of the allegation, whether it occurred exactly as alleged is unclear from the evidence. Her testimony about the event at final hearing was wanting. Mrs. Richardson testified as follows, first in response to questions from her counsel, then from Respondent’s counsel: Q: Did Mr. Hartley shove a bottle of port into your genital area? A: Yes, the very top of my legs where my shorts were, yes. Q: Okay. A: My shorts were wet from it, and my shorts were not short shorts, but they were short enough to be to the upper part of my legs, not my calves. Transcript, page 59. Q: You stated on direct that you were –- you felt degraded [by the bottle incident]. A: Yes. Q: Can you explain what you mean by degraded? A: I felt like an idiot. I mean that I couldn’t believe that he had the nerve to come behind the bar and stick a bottle of port anywhere on me. It wouldn’t have been funny, let alone where it was. Transcript, pp. 100-101. Though it was suggested a number of times, Mrs. Richardson’s testimony never directly alleged that Mr. Hartley put the bottle against her vagina or anus, only that he poked her with the bottle in some fashion. In fact, Mrs. Richardson never specified exactly where the bottle had touched her body. Mr. Hartley testified he went behind the bar on the day of the incident to retrieve his bottle of port. When he reached down to pick up the bottle cap which he had dropped, he intentionally touched the cold bottle to Mrs. Richardson’s leg. It was meant to be playful, a joke, consistent with his normal behavior towards her – and like her playfulness with him. He touched the cold bottle to her bare leg, causing her to jump. There were many other people in the restaurant at the time. Mr. Hartley’s testimony seemed credible, even though there was some testimony from others that he generally asked the bartender to pour his port wine rather than getting it himself. He maintains that on the day in question the bar was quite busy and he did not want to distract Mrs. Richardson from her duties. The perceptions of the two other people in attendance must also be considered. First, a long-time friend of Mrs. Richardson, Deborah Botke, was sitting at the bar. She saw Mr. Hartley’s arm move toward Mrs. Richardson’s legs. From her vantage point, she could not actually see below Mrs. Richardson’s waist, but from the angle of Mr. Hartley’s arm-–and Mrs. Richardson’s reaction–-Ms. Botke presumed that the man had poked the bottle “in the direction of her private regions.” She said, “I saw him take it and shove it like this. I don’t know where it landed.” She did note that Mr. Hartley was approximately waist-high to Mrs. Richardson, i.e., he did not bend over so as as to touch her ankle or lower leg. Ms. Botke was a credible witness. She holds a very significant security clearance at her job managing all the navigational equipment for the U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class ballistic submarines. It is unlikely she would perjure herself in a proceeding such as this and put her clearance at risk. It is clear she saw something and was convinced that Mr. Hartley acted improperly, even if she could not actually see what he did. To the detriment of her believability, she is a close friend of Mrs. Richardson and obviously wants to support what her friend alleges. And, she has had some past trouble with Sandy Bottoms. She was once removed from the Restaurant by the police when she became extremely drunk after breaking up with a boyfriend. All in all, Ms. Botke’s belief that Mr. Hartley utilized the bottle in a sexual manner is not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. Botke also provided hearsay testimony concerning other allegations Mrs. Richardson had made concerning Mr. Hartley, but those allegations were not corroborated by other competent evidence. For example, she suggested that security cameras at the Restaurant were installed for the primary purpose of allowing Mr. Hartley to remotely look at Mrs. Richardson’s breasts. In fact, Ms. Botke says that Mrs. Richardson came home crying one night when she (Richardson) discovered that fact about the cameras. No persuasive evidence was presented, however, to establish the legitimacy of that allegation. Also, Ms. Botke said that Mr. Hartley appeared to “make contact with” Mrs. Richardson unnecessarily when he went behind the bar one time. Mrs. Richardson acknowledged the area behind the bar was very small and it was difficult for two people to be there at one time. From the totality of the evidence, it is certain that Mr. Hartley touched a cold bottle of port wine to Mrs. Richardson’s body. It cannot be confirmed where on her body the bottle touched Mrs. Richardson, i.e., whether it was her backside, her crotch, or on one of her legs. Nor can it be reasonably ascertained whether Mr. Hartley’s purpose was playful or sexually motivated. Regarding the comments Mrs. Richardson made about the security cameras, again there was no corroboration. Mr. Hartley and Mr. McNair say the cameras were installed for security purposes only. One reason the cameras were required was to make sure staff were not drinking on the job and/or drinking without paying for the drinks. In fact, in September 2015, the cameras recorded Mrs. Richardson taking alcohol “shots” at the bar during one of her shifts. She was reprimanded and written up for the infraction. As to the second incident, i.e., that Mr. Hartley allegedly made inappropriate comments while looking at Mrs. Richardson’s breasts, the evidence is even more scant. At final hearing, Mrs. Richardson’s attorney asked if Mr. Hartley had made a specific reference to her nipples in late winter- early spring 2015. She replied, “Yes sir.” In her written list of allegations given to FCHR, she said Mr. Hartley said, “It’s not that cold in here” in reference to her nipples while looking at her breasts. Mr. Hartley testified only that he did not make any such comment concerning Mrs. Richardson’s breasts or nipples. There was another person, Robert Pelletier, sitting at the bar at the time of the alleged incident. Mr. Pelletier, who is a managing broker for a real estate firm, is also a licensed attorney. At the time of the alleged incident, he had visited the bar on half a dozen occasions. He was sitting at the inside bar when an “older man” went behind the bar and said something to Mrs. Richardson about her nipples being hard. He found the comment to be very offensive. He was told by Mrs. Richardson that the man was the owner of Sandy Bottoms. At final hearing Mr. Pelletier could not say whether Mr. Hartley, who was sitting some six feet away from him, was the man he saw speaking to Mrs. Richardson that day in the bar. In an affidavit he prepared in May 2016, Mr. Pelletier did not mention that the man had commented specifically about Mrs. Richardson’s nipples. Nor did he mention that the man had gone behind the bar to talk to Mrs. Richardson. The only consistency between Mr. Pelletier’s testimony and his affidavit was that he heard something inappropriate said to Mrs. Richardson as he sat at the bar. By his own admission, Mr. Pelletier’s memory of the event was cloudy. No one else witnessed this encounter. It happened very quickly, according to Mr. Pelletier, and was not that memorable an event. While it is certainly possible that the event happened exactly as Mrs. Richardson remembers it, there is not a preponderance of evidence to that effect. Besides the two incidents discussed above, Mrs. Richardson also alleges a history of unwanted advances and comments from Mr. Hartley. She describes incidents where she felt like Mr. Hartley’s interactions with her or comments to her were sexual in nature. Both Ms. Botke and Ms. Guidry reported some other general comments allegedly made by Mr. Hartley that Mrs. Richardson had reported to them, but their testimony in that regard was not particularly persuasive. Mr. Hartley describes the same incidents as completely non-sexual in content or intent. Ms. Guidry had worked at, and been fired from, Sandy Bottoms several times. She once heard Mr. Hartley tell Mrs. Richardson that he wanted to buy her a red dress; that statement seemed to make Mrs. Richardson uncomfortable. Ms. Guidry thought Mr. Hartley hung around Mrs. Richardson too much. However, she never saw anything untoward happen between the two. Had she seen something improper happen, she would have reported it to someone. She never reported anything to anyone. Ms. Botke said that Mrs. Richardson would complain to her about Mr. Hartley as the two women sat on their decks enjoying a drink after work. None of those complaints, however, were substantiated by other evidence. Watching the demeanor and apparent sincerity of the two (Richardson and Hartley) at final hearing, it is quite possible each is telling the truth as he or she believes it to exist. That is, Mrs. Richardson sincerely believes that some of Mr. Hartley’s actions and words were provocative and meant to be sexual in nature. Mr. Hartley honestly believes that he was joking with Mrs. Richardson in a friendly and joking fashion, never crossing the line into inappropriate behavior. Mrs. Thelemann believed she and Mrs. Richardson got along quite well. They both had children and would talk about “kid things” with each other. Mrs. Thelemann saw her father (Hartley) and Mrs. Richardson talking quite frequently but never saw anything improper or questionable. Mrs. Richardson told Mrs. Thelemann once that Mr. Hartley was “an old flirt,” but not in a complaining way. Once, when Mrs. Richardson was distraught about being “written up” for drinking liquor while on duty, Mrs. Thelemann consoled Mrs. Richardson and let her know all was well. Mrs. Thelemann said Mrs. Richardson was, after all, a good employee. Another time, when Mrs. Richardson had to go visit her ailing mother, Mrs. Thelemann and her parents offered Mrs. Richardson money and the use of one of their cars. Mrs. Thelemann, an accountant, offered to help Mrs. Richardson with some IRS tax issues. And Mr. Hartley offered to loan Mrs. Richardson some money to buy Capri pants to replace short pants which had been deemed inappropriate. In short, there appears to have been a friendly relationship between Mrs. Richardson and the Hartley family. Speaking of inappropriate shorts, one of Mrs. Richardson’s unverified allegations had to do with Mr. Hartley allegedly telling her to turn around and bend over so he could inspect her shorts. Someone had complained that she and another waitress, Brittany, were wearing shorts that were too revealing. She says Mr. Hartley directed her to bend over so he could tell if the shorts were okay. At some point, Mrs. Thelemann told Mrs. Richardson that the shorts she was wearing on a particular day were too short. Later, Mrs. Richardson came to Mrs. Thelemann and said Mr. Hartley had inspected the shorts and overruled her, saying the shorts were okay. Mrs. Thelemann was angry that her father would undercut her authority, but there was no mention in the conversation that Mr. Hartley had acted inappropriately towards Mrs. Richardson. Mr. Hartley remembers visually inspecting Mrs. Richardson’s shorts, but not in a suggestive or inappropriate way. Again, there is no independent corroboration of either person’s testimony. Mrs. Richardson had a fairly clean record during her time at Sandy Bottoms. Besides the aforementioned write-up for drinking on the job, she was written up once for failing to timely enter drinks into the Point of Sale (“POS”) system. It is imperative that wait staff and bartenders timely enter drink orders into POS so that they do not forget to do so (and, apparently, to prevent them from giving away drinks). Mrs. Richardson had not timely entered some orders into the POS system and was written up for it. She signed the disciplinary action form, but wrote, “I did not do anything wrong on Sunday.” She maintains she entered the drinks as soon as practicable based on how busy she was with customers at the time. Mrs. Thelemann said that drinks actually were supposed to be entered into POS prior to being poured. Mrs. Richardson was also late for her shifts fairly frequently, roughly two thirds of the time. Otherwise, she was a model employee. Despite the numerous allegations in her written complaint, Mrs. Richardson noted only one time that she complained to management about specific harassment. She purportedly told Mr. McNair about the incident with the port wine bottle. She also said she complained to Mr. McNair at least ten other times about Mr. Hartley. Mr. McNair, however, does not remember her coming to him with that complaint (or any other, for that matter). Mrs. Richardson did express hesitation about going to management, as Mr. Hartley was the owner and ultimate authority at the Restaurant. Mrs. Richardson contends Mr. McNair is simply afraid of testifying against Mr. Hartley, but inasmuch as Mr. Hartley no longer owns the Restaurant, that contention loses credence. Besides, Mr. McNair appeared very credible while testifying at final hearing. Mrs. Richardson suggested that Mr. McNair lied on his affidavit, which had been sworn to while he was still an employee of Sandy Bottoms. Now, she reasons, he must maintain his lie in order to avoid perjuring himself. While there is logic to the reasoning, there is no evidence to support the contention. At best, the evidence at final hearing supports a finding that: 1) Mr. Hartley made an inappropriate comment about Mrs. Richardson’s breasts; and 2) Mr. Hartley touched Mrs. Richardson’s body with a wine bottle. Neither of these incidents rises to the level of sexual harassment. Mrs. Richardson also claimed retaliation by her employer, specifically that she was fired from her job because of the complaints she made against Mr. Hartley. There is no persuasive evidence in the record to support that claim. In fact, it is clear that Mrs. Richardson voluntarily walked away from her job–-at least for her November 1, 2015, shift--and was thus deemed to have abandoned her position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations Issue a Final Order finding that Respondent, C and C Enterprises, Inc., did not discriminate against Petitioner, Leslie Richardson. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition For Relief.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer for the purposes of this proceeding. Respondent's principal place of business is in Orlando, Florida. In 1982, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a houseman at one of Respondent's hotels located at Marco Island, Florida. Respondent worked continuously in that location until he requested a transfer to the Orlando World hotel in 1986 and received his transfer in the same year. While employed at the Orlando World hotel, Petitioner refused to follow instructions, had excessive absences and was late to work repeatedly. Petitioner received the following disciplinary warnings which finally resulted in his termination on or about October 7, 1991: March 8, 1991 - Written Warning (refused to follow a reasonable job order) March 17, 1991 - Verbal Warning (reporting to work later on 3 occasions within a 90 day period), 2/27/91, 3/3/91, 3/17/91 May 15, 1991 - Written Warning (failure to follow Respondent's work policies) July 30, 1991 - Termination Recommendation (changed to a written warning) August 2, 1991 - Written document (explaining to Petitioner his problems with respect to attendance and tardiness) October 7, 1991 - Suspension and Termination Recommendation. Respondent's rules require employees to call in at least two hours in advance of their shift starting time to report a planned absence from work. Petitioner failed to comply with Respondent's rules by failing to give Respondent timely notice of his planned absence for October 7, 1991. On October 7, 1991, Petitioner called in to report his absence 15 minutes before 8:00 a.m. when his shift started. Petitioner failed to provide credible and persuasive evidence that the Respondent's disciplinary warnings were fraudulent or untruthful. Petitioner was replaced by Mr. Martin Gamey, an Hispanic male. Respondent did not conduct an unlawful employment practice in terminating Petitioner. Respondent did not act with any bias or animus against Petitioner. Petitioner's termination was based upon Petitioner's failure to satisfy his job requirements, failure to follow instructions, excessive absences, and failure to give timely notice for planned absences.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued denying Petitioner's claim of unlawful discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1302 Respondent's paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 were rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Respondent's paragraph 1, 2, 5 and 6-10 were accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Carlton J. Trosclair, Esquire Marriott Corporation One Marriott Drive, Department 923 Washington, D.C. 20058 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Nicolas Polanco 88-05 71st Street Apartment 1-K Jamaica, New York 11432
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by subjecting Petitioner to gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Southgate is a student housing and dining facility located in Tallahassee, Florida, near the campuses of Florida State University, Florida A&M University, and Tallahassee Community College. On September 16, 2004, Southgate hired Petitioner Devon Rozier as a dishwasher in the cafeteria dish room. The cafeteria is open seven days a week and currently employs approximately 34 employees, some part-time and some full-time. Petitioner had just turned 16 years old when Ken Mills hired him based upon a long-standing relationship with Petitioner's father, who had worked at Southgate for many years and was an exemplary employee. Petitioner worked as a part-time employee on the night shift, 3:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., for a total of 20-25 hours per week. Petitioner later received a promotion out of the dish room to the grill, and also worked other positions such as attendant and greeter. Petitioner also worked in various positions to assist as needed, as did other employees in the cafeteria. At the beginning of his employment, Petitioner exhibited good performance. As time progressed, Petitioner's performance began to decline, and he openly disrespected management. Various disciplinary techniques were employed by his supervisors in efforts to improve his performance, but the improvements always proved to be short-lived. On April 30, 2009, Petitioner and his supervisor, Rasheik Campbell, had an altercation, and Petitioner left the facility. Mr. Campbell warned Petitioner before he left the facility that such action would constitute job abandonment. Despite Mr. Campbell's warning, Petitioner left the facility. Mr. Campbell took the position that Petitioner abandoned his employment with Southgate. Petitioner was no longer placed on the schedule. On May 4, 2009, Southgate sent Petitioner a letter confirming his resignation. As months passed, Petitioner made attempts to regain his position with Southgate by calling his supervisors Mr. Campbell and Mr. Jason McClung. When his attempts were met with resistance by his supervisors, Petitioner bypassed them and went directly to Ken Mills, Southgate's General Manager and Petitioner's former supervisor. Petitioner presented his case to Mr. Mills in July and August 2009, regarding his desire to return to work. Mr. Mills had previously intervened on Petitioner's behalf, out of respect for Petitioner's father, to help him keep his job when difficulties with management had arisen. This time, Mr. Mills instructed Petitioner that Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell were his direct supervisors and that they had ultimate responsibility regarding his desired return to work at Southgate. In August 2009, at the request of Mr. Mills, once again doing a favor for Petitioner based upon the long-standing work history of Petitioner's father at Southgate, Mr. Mills, Mr. McClung, and Mr. Campbell met with Petitioner and his mother, Jennifer Rozier. At the meeting, they discussed Petitioner's request to return to work at Southgate. During the meeting, Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell did not feel that Petitioner exhibited any improvement in his behavior and respect for authority. As a result, Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell chose not to re-hire Petitioner. Petitioner claims the following conduct he witnessed while working at Southgate was discriminatory: a) females were allowed to sit down at tables and eat while on the clock; b) females were allowed to use the computer while on the clock; and c) Petitioner was required to perform the females' work when they failed to show up or wanted to leave early. Petitioner further claims that his firing was retaliatory based upon one complaint he made to Mr. Campbell in February 2009 about having to perform the tasks of others who failed to come to work. Other employees, including Jodece Yant, Petitioner's girlfriend, and Darnell Rozier, Petitioner's own brother, testified that both males and females could be seen eating or using the computer while on the clock, and all were told to perform others' tasks when they failed to come to work or left early. Petitioner conceded that on occasion he engaged in the same behaviors he alleges to be discriminatory. Petitioner obtained a full-time job at Hobbit American Grill on January 21, 2010, and, as of the date of the hearing, continued to work there. His rate of pay at Hobbit American Grill is currently $7.25 per hour, and he testified he is better off there than at his former employer, Southgate. Petitioner is currently earning the same hourly wage ($7.25) as he was earning when employed at Southgate. Southgate had policies and procedures in force that prohibited, among other things, discrimination on the basis of gender or any other protected characteristics. Southgate's policies and procedures also prohibited retaliation. Petitioner received a copy of the employee handbook, which contained Southgate's anti-discrimination policies and was aware that Southgate had such policies in place.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Desiree C. Hill-Henderson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 1250 Orlando, Florida 32801 Micah Knight, Esquire 123 North Seventh Avenue Durant, Oklahoma 74701 Devon A. Rozier 7361 Fieldcrest Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent corporation in one of its general retail merchandise stores in Ocala, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent's white male store manager, Mr. John Sasse, on October 20, 1992, as a stock clerk in the shoe department. Petitioner was terminated on January 10, 1993, within the ninety day probationary period published in Respondent's employee handbook. In making the foregoing finding of fact, it is recognized that Petitioner attempted to show that the probationary period for new employees was only sixty days. However, she only showed that the sixty day period was applicable in a different time frame than is material here. On October 31, 1992, while working in a stock room, Petitioner's back and neck were injured when a box fell on her. Supervisors called an ambulance, and Petitioner was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital. She was treated but not hospitalized. Respondent duly filed the "Notice of Injury" as mandated by Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Act," and began to pay Petitioner's medical expenses. Prior to her injury, Mr. Sasse considered Petitioner to be only a marginal employee. Petitioner was released by hospital doctors for return to work as of November 6, 1992. At that time, she had no work restrictions imposed by a doctor, so Mr. Sasse reassigned Petitioner to her usual duties. Petitioner worked at the tasks she felt she could do until November 11, 1992, when she returned to the hospital. She was examined and medicated. Later that same day, as is standard procedure with workers' compensation injuries wherein the employer pays for an injured worker's medical care and as a result has the legal right to specify which doctors attend the employee, Mr. Sasse ordered Petitioner to go to "Care One," a "walk-in" medical facility specializing in occupational medicine. Petitioner went to Care One, where she was again examined and medicated. Petitioner was released for work the same day with written work restrictions from the Care One doctor. Petitioner's resentment against Respondent that she had been injured in the first place apparently was a motivating force in her actions after she returned to work the second time. Petitioner's candor and demeanor while testifying, as well as her persistence in returning her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the box falling upon her in the storeroom, made it very clear that she considered it discriminatory, or at least unfair, that Respondent had "forced" her or anyone to work under the cluttered stock room conditions that had resulted in her initial accident or injury. In Petitioner's mind, at least, the fact that an accident or injury had occurred in the first place was sufficient to establish "dangerous working conditions" and "an unlawful employment practice." After November 11, 1992, she persisted with these complaints to the employer. However, no competent evidence established a nexus between Petitioner's race and her pre-injury job assignments, and no evidence demonstrated that after her accident, the Respondent-employer handled her workers' compensation medical care any differently because she was black. On November 11, 1992, Care One's written restrictions provided: Restricted Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and working above the shoulders. Employee should avoid lifting > 20 pounds, avoid frequent bending and twisting of the back, and avoid strenuous pushing and pulling. Mr. Sasse and his subordinate supervisors assigned Petitioner tasks consistent with Mr. Sasse's interpretation of Petitioner's written restrictions, as modified over time by subsequent information. On November 11, 1992, a position was created for Petitioner in the soft goods department. At this time, Petitioner became the only black clerk in the soft goods department. Initially, Mr. Sasse told her she was not to reach above her shoulders or bend to pick up anything below her knees. Petitioner complained that these tasks constituted too much physical exertion for her due to her physical condition. Petitioner continued to complain about the accident and her pain. The employer and insurance carrier continued to refer her back to Care One. There was a short delay with regard to some medical services requested by Petitioner or by referring and consulting doctors under the workers' compensation medical care delivery system, but the employer/insurance carrier in due course authorized physical therapy, a consultation with an orthopedic specialist, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for further diagnosis. Derrick Proctor, a black male employee and Petitioner's friend, presented as a credible witness, even though he claimed to have been fired by Mr. Sasse under what Mr. Proctor termed "suspicious circumstances" and at the time of formal hearing had some type of action pending against this employer. Mr. Proctor described Petitioner as "embittered" against the employer because of the employer's refusal or delay in dealing with Petitioner's medical concerns and stress. However, it appears that Petitioner's problems, if any, were common disputes and communication delays inherent in the workers' compensation medical care delivery system. For instance, when asked, the doctors reported directly to the employer, insurance carrier, and store manager concerning the Petitioner- employee's medical condition, consultant treatment, and recovery progress. On December 10, 1992, Mr. Sasse told Petitioner that he had received an oral report on her December 9, 1992 MRI results and that they were negative. This conversation occurred before any of the doctors had reported the MRI results to the Petitioner, and Petitioner inferred therefrom that information was being withheld from her. Later, on December 22, 1992, Petitioner learned, during a reprimand and counselling session for insubordination and failure to work up to her capacities, that the employer had been informed much earlier that she could return to work with no restrictions. (See Findings of Fact 32-36) Although Mr. Sassy and others had told her this before December 22, 1992, the events of December 22, 1992 triggered a belief in Petitioner that the employer was "out to get" her. Notwithstanding the extreme light duty assigned her, Petitioner complained about the work assigned and was uncooperative about helping supervisors find a job description she felt she could perform. Although Petitioner may not have known about it until November 25, 1992, on November 20, 1992 Care One deleted the prior restrictions on lifting items over 20 pounds, bending, and strenuous pushing and pulling, and narrowed her restrictions to the following: Restricted. Employee should avoid movements of the upper body and neck that would place undue stress on the neck, such as strenuous pushing and pulling, heavy lifting, and work above the shoulders. In December 1992, Mr. Proctor was required to close his department, hardware, every night, and Petitioner closed the soft goods department some nights. Petitioner considered being required to close some nights to be discrimination against her since she was the only black employee in the soft goods department at that time and the white female employee in soft goods had been switched to the day shift in Petitioner's place. The greater weight of the evidence shows that the whole store's evening hours increased from midnight to 1:00 a.m. due to the Christmas season, and on December 6, 1992, Petitioner was assigned to work nights so that she could go to daytime medical and physical therapy appointments. The employer's accommodation of Petitioner's situation in this respect was comparable to the accommodation given a white female employee in soft goods. Beginning November 23, 1992, that white female employee, Ms. Audrey, had been assigned to a daylight shift so that her husband, who had bad night vision, could drive her to and from work. Race was not a factor in the accommodation rendered Ms. Audrey or Petitioner. Who closed the store during December 1992 depended upon who worked the evening shift, not race. It is not entirely clear on the record whether, on December 3, 1992, Petitioner withdrew from physical therapy because she could not do the weight training assigned her or was rejected by the physical therapist as a client because she would not cooperate in weight training. Petitioner testified that she returned to physical therapy thereafter for ultrasound treatment. It is clear that Petitioner believed she was rejected by the therapist because she could not lift the heavy weights assigned her by the therapist as part of Petitioner's planned recovery. It is also clear that the decision to end the weight phase of Petitioner's treatment did not have employer input. By December 5, 1992, Petitioner's personally professed physical limitations and complaints about Mr. Sasse's treatment of her had resulted in Mr. Sasse accommodating her by creating a "make-work" job description. Under it, she was asked to push a cart that other employees had hung clothes on; she was not required to load the car with clothes. She was required only to pick up single articles of clothing that were left in the women's dressing rooms and return them to the racks. She was told only to bend if an occasional article of clothing was found on the floor. She was also told to open dressing room doors for customers and, if requested, fetch more clothes for them to try on while they remained in the dressing room. Petitioner was permitted to wear her softly padded neckbrace at all times, even though she presented no written doctor's instructions to do so. Petitioner described it as an "agony" imposed on her by the employer when, on December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse ordered her not to sit continuously on the sales floor in a chair she had removed from the women's dressing room. Petitioner had previously complained because she had been required to sit for long hours on a very hard chair Mr. Sasse had provided for her, and this time she had gotten a different chair herself. On December 5, 1992, Mr. Sasse told her she must leave the dressing room chair in the dressing room for the customers, that she was not permitted to sit all the time on the sales floor where customers could see her, and she must not just sit without doing any work, until all her work was done. He told her to do a variety of the tasks of which she was capable, including but not limited to sitting while pricing goods. Petitioner considered these orders to be contrary to her doctor's limitations and to constitute "physical abuse." Petitioner repeatedly requested time off with pay so that she could recover completely through bed rest. Mr. Sasse would not allow her time off for medical reasons without a doctor's written approval. Petitioner considered this condition imposed by management to be "abusive." Petitioner described Mr. Sasse as being rude to her on December 6, 1992, when he refused to discuss her accusations of "physical abuse" and her request for time off in the presence of other employees and customers in the public buffet area of the store, and walked off, leaving her there. Petitioner referred to this incident as at least part of her "opposition to unlawful employment practices" which she believed resulted in her termination. Petitioner presented no evidence that a doctor had ever recommended that she stay at home and do nothing so that she could heal. From all the evidence, it is inferred that as a probationary employee, Petitioner had no accrued sick leave to expend for this purpose. Ms. Gardner was a long-time white female employee who had her doctor's approval for knee surgery and who required a month of bed rest at home afterwards. The employer allowed Ms. Gardner to use earned compensatory time as sick leave for that purpose during the month of December 1992. By mid-December, 1992, Mr. Sasse was frustrated because Petitioner refused to do every job he devised, even the "make work" ones, and he believed that she only pretended to be busy when he was watching her. Mr. Sasse had told Petitioner that she could do normal work again and she would not accept this from him without hearing it also from her doctor. Mr. Sasse decided to discipline Petitioner for not working up to her limitations as he understood them and for insubordination. He directed the soft goods manager trainee, Ms. Lynn Tyler, a white female, to "write up" Petitioner. Ms. Tyler and the assistant store manager, Ray Harding, a white male, met with Petitioner on December 22, 1992 to discuss the contents of the prepared memo. One of the supervisors' concerns at the time Petitioner was "written up" was that they could not get Petitioner to do anything at all without an argument, even after pointing out various light work job duties on a walk around the whole store. They were also concerned that without Petitioner doing some tasks, the employer had to pay other employees overtime to accomplish what Petitioner was not accomplishing in her regular shift hours. It was stipulated that Petitioner was never asked to work overtime. Petitioner refused to sign the December 22, 1992 memorandum of reprimand because she did not agree with it and because Tyler and Harding were, in her opinion, "grudgeful." Petitioner was informed later on December 22, 1992 by her Care One doctor that he had, indeed, released her for normal work activities effective December 16, 1992. His December 16, 1992 report which had been previously received by the employer read: Please note employee's current duty status is as follows: Regular May return to normal work activities full time. After her accident, Petitioner was observed by Derrick Proctor doing some of the same types of physical exertion the employer had required that she do before the accident, including reaching above her head to put clothes on and take them off clothes racks and picking clothes up from the floor, but he never knew her medical restrictions other than what she told him. He also observed her in agitated conversations with Ms. Tyler and Mr. Sasse while she was wearing a neck brace. On January 7, 1993, he saw Ms. Tyler "very out of sorts" when talking to the Petitioner. At first, he stated that he did not consider Petitioner to be rude or insubordinate on these occasions because the topic was working conditions, but later he admitted that he could not overhear what was actually said on all these occasions. Mr. Proctor also observed that, "Mr. Sasse rode everybody pretty hard," including white workers. It was "his way of getting things done." Mr. Proctor once observed Petitioner hiding in another department, behind racks, to avoid management. Petitioner acknowledged and described her "hiding out" at that time to Mr. Proctor as due to her "feeling mistreated" and "avoiding management." In her formal hearing testimony, Petitioner described it as "opposing unlawful work practices and abusive treatment." After learning on December 22, 1992 of her release from all medical restrictions, Petitioner continued to be uncooperative with management. Petitioner's testimony conceded that she had understood that all doctors had released her with no restrictions as of December 28, 1992 and that she had still refused to reach and bend in the stock room when ordered to do so by Mr. Sasse and Ms. Tyler on January 7, 1993. After evaluating Petitioner's continued failure or refusal to perform even the lightest of duties, Mr. Sasse decided to terminate Petitioner before her ninety days' probationary period ended. Mr. Sasse, who was terminated by Respondent-employer sometime later in 1993 and who, at the time of formal hearing, was litigating an unemployment compensation claim against Respondent, had no reason to fabricate information or testify favorably for the Respondent-employer. He was credible to the effect that the decision to terminate Petitioner in January 1993 was his unilateral decision and that he made his decision without reference to, or motivation by, Petitioner's race. Specifically, it was Mr. Sasse's foundational assessment that Petitioner could physically do the light work he assigned her after reasonable accommodation for a temporary disability but that she would not do the work assigned by him that caused him to terminate her. Petitioner testified that she was replaced by a white female. In fact, a white female was hired approximately one or two weeks prior to Petitioner's January 10, 1993 termination, with a due date to report to work on January 11, 1993, which subsequently turned out to be the day immediately following Petitioner's termination. The employer did not hire this white female with the intent of replacing Petitioner, but she was ultimately placed into the soft goods department. Mr. Proctor testified that other blacks worked in soft goods after Petitioner's termination. Within four weeks of Petitioner's termination, three new employees were hired. None of these were assigned to the soft goods department. Mr. Standley Gillings, a black male, was originally employed in another of Respondent's Ocala stores. In October 1993, Mr. Gillings was demoted with a loss of pay and transferred to the store from which Petitioner had been fired ten months earlier. His new immediate supervisor in that store was also black. Respondent continued to employ Mr. Gillings under the black supervisor until Mr. Gillings found another job and quit.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1994.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating in employment against Petitioner on the basis of her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, who is black, as an inspectress on April 11, 1988. An inspectress supervises the work of maids, who are responsible for cleaning the hotel rooms. On July 3, 1988, the housekeeper, Mr. Douglas Knight, who supervised Petitioner, informed her that, due to an excess of personnel, she was no longer needed as an inspectress. He offered her a position as a maid. The record does not reveal whether the change in duties would have resulted in less pay. Petitioner apparently declined the position. When she did so, Respondent terminated her. Although Respondent had received no warnings concerning unsatisfactory job performance, the work of the maids had clearly been unsatisfactory up to the time of her offered reassignment. The white woman who allegedly replaced Petitioner as an inspectress was Mrs. Triplett, who was married to the head maintenance manager of the hotel. Shortly after losing her job elsewhere, she was hired by Respondent around June 9, 1988, to replace the assistant housekeeper, who was on maternity leave until July 6, 1988. Mrs. Triplett was reassigned to the position of inspectress around June 18, 1988, and later promoted to housekeeper about two weeks after Petitioner's departure. Mr. Knight, who hired Mrs. Triplett, was friends with Mr. Triplett and later terminated for inefficiency in performing his work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Latricia W. Dukes 4189 Tatum Street Orlando, FL 32811 Gale Brandy Ramada Main Gate Resort 2950 Reedy Creek Boulevard Kissimmee, FL 32741
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment discrimination practices alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. At all times pertinent to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an equipment operator in the golf course maintenance department. Respondent has been employed by Respondent for approximately 20 years. Respondent is a golf and country club.1/ Respondent's employment policies are contained in its "Employee Handbook."2/ The Employee Handbook provides that a "[v]iolation of any of the rules or policies set forth in this Handbook may lead to discipline, up to and including immediate discharge." Respondent's Employee Handbook contains a section on absenteeism and tardiness, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Excessive absenteeism or tardiness can result in discipline up to and including discharge. If you are going to be late or absent from work for any reason, you must personally notify your Supervisor as far in advance as possible (but no later than 2 hours before your scheduled start time) so proper arrangements can be made to handle your work during your absence. Of course, some situations may arise in which prior notice cannot be given. In those cases we expect you to notify your Supervisor as soon as possible. Leaving a message, sending a text, or having someone else call on your behalf, does not qualify as notifying your Supervisor- you must personally contact your Supervisor. If you are required to leave work early, you must also personally contact your Supervisor and obtain his/her permission. Absences of more than one day should be reported daily, unless you have made other arrangements with your Supervisor or the Human Resources Office. (emphasis in original). * * * Although an employee may be terminated at any time for failing to report to work without contacting the Club, if an employee fails to report for work or call in for three (3) consecutive calendar days they will be considered to have abandoned their job and will be terminated. Respondent's Employee Handbook also contains a provision concerning workplace violence. Employees are notified that, "[v]iolations of this policy may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." The workplace violence policy provides in pertinent part: The Club has a zero tolerance policy regarding violent acts or threats of violence against our employees, applicants, members, vendors, or other third parties. We do not allow fighting or threatening words or conduct. We also do not allow the possession of weapons of any kind on the Club's premises, except as required by law. No employee should commit or threaten to commit any violent act against a co-worker, applicant, member, vendor, or other third party. This includes discussions of the use of the dangerous weapons, even in a joking manner. May 3, 2013, Incident On May 3, 2013, Petitioner was not at work, but rather, performing work for a resident in the community. Petitioner's vehicle was apparently parked on the wrong side of the road. Mike Jones, a security guard, advised Petitioner to move his vehicle or he was going to receive a ticket. Petitioner informed Mr. Jones that he was not going to receive a ticket, and followed Mr. Jones back to the guard gate. Thereafter, Petitioner and Mr. Jones became engaged in "some words." According to Petitioner, after the verbal altercation he left the guard gate. On May 4, 2013, Petitioner presented to work and performed his duties. The following day, May 5, 2013, Petitioner was arrested for the May 3, 2013, incident and charged with battery on a security officer. Petitioner testified that the arrest occurred in Mike Ballard's office.3/ Mr. Ballard was Petitioner's superintendent at some point in his employment. Beth Sandham, Respondent's Human Resources Director, was not present at the time of arrest. Petitioner remained in custody throughout May 6, 2013. When Petitioner did not appear for work on May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that the Human Resources department, as well as his supervisors, attempted to contact Petitioner. After several attempts to reach him by phone, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner via Federal Express.4/ Petitioner testified that he contacted his supervisor on May 6, 2013, and was advised that he had been terminated. Petitioner contends that his termination was racial in origin because Respondent did not obtain his account of the altercation prior to his termination. On this point, Petitioner testified as follows: That why I say this is a racist thing because they listen to what their two security guards say, but they never gave me the chance to explain myself. On May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham terminated Petitioner's employment on the grounds of failing to report to work and the alleged violent behavior. As an additional basis for alleging racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that Mike Ballard was a racist. Specifically, Petitioner testified that on one occasion he overheard Mr. Ballard advise another employee, Jeff Beneclas, to "[t]ell that nigger mind his own f***en business." Petitioner explained that Mr. Ballard was referring to him. Mr. Beneclas was terminated on June 25, 2010. Addressing this allegation, Ms. Sandham explained that, if the alleged statement had been made over Respondent's radio system, said statement would have been heard by the tennis department, the golf professionals, facilities maintenance, the superintendents, and golf course maintenance. Ms. Sandham credibly testified that neither Petitioner nor any other employee notified her of such a statement or made a complaint. Additionally, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that Petitioner never made a complaint to her regarding Mr. Ballard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief against Wycliffe Golf and Country Club. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2015.
