The Issue Whether the Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, the City of DeLand, on account of his race, or as retaliation for engaging in protected activities in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of the City, is African-American. Respondent is a Florida municipality established pursuant to Article VIII, § 2(b), Florida Constitution and chapter 166, Florida Statutes. Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was initially employed by the City in April 2010 as a Maintenance Worker II in the Parks and Recreation Department. On February 21, 2012, Petitioner was terminated by the City for failing to report to work for a period of days. He was considered by the City to be a “no call/no show.” Petitioner filed a complaint with the federal Department of Labor (DOL), in which he asserted that his absence from work was authorized under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On April 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the City?s decision to terminate him was based on race and age discrimination. The complaint was transferred to the FCHR for disposition. The DOL determined that Petitioner?s absence from work was warranted by application of the FMLA, upon which the DOL and the City reached an agreement to resolve the DOL complaint. On July 9, 2012, as part of the agreement, Petitioner was reinstated as a Maintenance Worker II, with back pay and benefits. When the decision was made to reinstate Petitioner, Petitioner withdrew the FCHR complaint. At the time of Petitioner?s reinstatement, the City did not have an opening in its Parks and Recreation Department, his previous position having been filled. The City did have an opening for a Maintenance Worker II in its Utilities Department. The Utilities Department opening had been advertised, the interview process for the opening had been completed, and a candidate had been selected. However, as the result of the DOL settlement, Petitioner was selected to fill the position. Petitioner was placed on the mowing crew, and was responsible for keeping areas around the City?s lift stations, well houses, and wastewater plant mowed. On July 13, 2012, the City issued a written reprimand to Petitioner. The reprimand related to Petitioner?s complaints to the City Utilities Director, Mr. Ailes, regarding Petitioner?s assignment to the mowing crew and his supervisory chain-of-command. The memorandum suggested that Petitioner was not “a team player.” There was no evidence of further adverse action relating to Petitioner?s job performance. After Petitioner settled into the job, he performed well. He was a hard worker, and never had to be coaxed into working. Mr. Swanson described Petitioner as a “go-getter,” who came up with more efficient ways of keeping up with the work and making the areas look nice. Mr. Swanson testified that it was good to have a third person on the mowing crew. On or about July 13, 2012, an equipment operator position came open. It was advertised, and applications were accepted. Petitioner submitted an application for the position. Petitioner was selected as one of five applicants to continue with the interview process.1/ Among the applicants was Jose Alejo. Mr. Alejo is Hispanic. Petitioner and Mr. Alejo were employees of the City, and were considered as “in-house” candidates. The interview team consisted of Mikel Grimm, a foreman with the City?s Utilities Department; Obadiah Henry, a Utility Locator with the City?s Utilities Department; and Danny Pope, a Supervisor with the City. Mr. Henry had been a foreman with the City?s Utilities Department before a voluntary break in service, and had extensive experience as an equipment operator. As a former foreman, Mr. Henry had been on numerous interview committees for positions including equipment operator. He was considered to be the best qualified to serve on the interview committee, even though committee members were typically at the foreman level or higher. Mr. Henry is African-American. Mr. Grimm and Mr. Pope are white. Petitioner had no “issues” with any of the members of the interview team, or with any of the other foremen in the Utilities Department. Petitioner was working on the day that interviews were scheduled. He was taken off of his mower at between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. for an interview scheduled for 2:00 p.m. Interviews consisted of a short oral interview, followed by a practical test in which the applicants were tested on a dump truck and a backhoe. The applicants were to drive the dump truck through a sort of “obstacle course” and, using a backhoe, dig a hole to a pre-established specification. The questions asked of each of the applicants during the interviews were identical. The equipment used and the layout of the practical test performed by each of the applicants were identical. Each of the members of the interview team independently prepared his own scoring evaluation, without comparison of notes, numbers, or scores of the other members. After the scoring was completed, the scores were tallied. Mr. Henry was surprised at how even the scores were between the evaluators for each of the applicants. Each of the members of the interview team generally thought Mr. Alejo performed better in the interview. As to the practical test, Mr. Alejo “just proved it on the machine that he was the better applicant.” In short, Mr. Alejo simply dug a better hole. Mr. Henry noted that the decision was based on how the applicant performed on that day. While he acknowledged that Petitioner, or one of the other applicants, may have performed better on another day, “that?s what I had to go off of was that day.” Mr. Henry testified credibly and convincingly that the interview team made the effort to handle the interviews in a professional and honest way. The interview team was not told by higher-level supervisors or anyone else who should be selected as the leading candidate. His testimony is credited. Mr. Henry testified that if he had seen any evidence of racial bias, he would have reported it. He saw none. The recommendation of the interview team was unanimous that the position of equipment operator should be offered to Mr. Alejo, who scored significantly higher than Petitioner. The City accepted the recommendation of the interview team, and offered the position to Mr. Alejo, who accepted.2/ The interview process, using standardized questions and procedures, has been the practice of the City for more than six years. The purpose of the interview and practical test process was to make the hiring process more equal, rather than being based on a “gut feeling” or on how someone may have “felt about the guy.” The interview and selection process raises no issue of discriminatory of retaliatory bias in its application. On or about September 14, 2012, Petitioner received an employee performance evaluation that Petitioner described as “a good evaluation.” During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, Petitioner did not complain to any co-worker or to supervisory staff that he was subject to discriminatory acts as an employee of the City. On May 3, 2013, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from employment with the City. The reason given by Petitioner was that he wanted to return to Minnesota. Petitioner had lived in Minnesota for 30 years, and planned to move back and get a job driving a truck. In his letter of resignation, Petitioner made no mention of any discriminatory or retaliatory act, stating that “[i]t has been a pleasure to work for the City.” The City currently employs six equipment operators. Of those, three are Hispanic, two are white, and one is African- American. Ultimate Findings of Fact The personnel decision to re-hire Petitioner to the position of Maintenance Worker II in the Utilities Department was made because there was an opening in that department. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision was made due to Petitioner?s race, or in retaliation for Petitioner?s earlier EEOC complaint. The decision to hire an applicant other than Petitioner for the position of equipment operator was made after a reasonable and fair applicant interview and evaluation process that was done in accordance with the City?s established and objective hiring practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that any persons who were not members of the Petitioner?s protected class, i.e., African-American, were treated differently from Petitioner, or were not subject to similar personnel policies and practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that the City?s decision to hire Mr. Alejo over Petitioner was made in retaliation for Petitioner?s earlier EEOC complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, the City of DeLand, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Ray Neloms, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012-02720. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to an unlawful employment practice on the basis of his age in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on exhibits admitted into evidence, testimony offered by witnesses, and admitted facts set forth in the pre-hearing stipulation. Mr. Ferrell is a 65-year-old male, who is employed at Florida A & M University as a registrar officer. Mr. Ferrell has worked in the registrar’s office in various positions since 2003. Florida A & M University is a university located in Tallahassee, Florida. At all times material to this matter, Florida A & M University employed more than 15 full-time employees. Mr. Ferrell alleged that four employees, Lefevere Jordan, Cornelius McGlockton, Dyamond V. Smith, and Antonio Witherspoon were treated more favorably than he was treated because they are younger than he is. Specifically, he asserted that Mr. Jordan received a pay raise; Mr. McGlockton and Mr. Witherspoon received a promotion; and Ms. Smith was hired at a higher pay rate for the same position that he holds (registrar officer). Mr. Ferrell’s job responsibilities as a registrar officer include maintaining the state course numbering system, maintaining the university course catalog, scheduling classes, and scheduling events. During the time that Mr. Ferrell has been employed by Florida A & M University, he has never been disciplined for poor work performance or otherwise. Mr. Ferrell testified that in 2012 or 2013, Dr. Onwunli promised him and Mr. Jordan a $5,000 raise. Dr. Onwunli denied she made the promise. The undersigned finds Mr. Ferrell more persuasive on that fact. Regarding Mr. Witherspoon, he is currently classified as a registration coordinator. His job responsibilities include supervising three employees, transferring credits, and project management. The coordinator position was advertised on May 20, 2016. Mr. Witherspoon applied for the position and was hired. Mr. Ferrell did not apply for the coordinator position. Similar to Mr. Ferrell, Mr. McGlockton is classified as a registrar officer. His job responsibilities include processing enrollment verifications and maintaining the electronic online catalog. Mr. McGlockton has website experience and successfully completed training for managing the electronic catalog system in 2015. Ms. Smith is also classified as a registrar officer. Her job responsibilities include processing test credits, maintaining the Ad Astra system, and assisting with the academic advisement module. On February 16, 2017, the registrar officer position was advertised. Ms. Smith applied for and was hired for the position. However, Mr. Ferrell did not apply for the position posted in February 2017. At hearing, Mr. Ferrell acknowledged that he did not apply for the coordinator or the registrar officer positions. He explained that he did not believe he was qualified for the coordinator position because he does not possess a master’s degree. However, despite not having a master’s degree, the position qualifications included “a bachelor’s degree in an appropriate area of specialization and two years of progressive experience in an academic environment.” Regarding the registrar officer position, understandably, he testified that he did not apply because his position carried the same title. There was no evidence offered at the hearing to demonstrate that Mr. Ferrell did not meet the qualifications for the advertised positions. Dr. Agatha Onwunli is the University Registrar at Florida A & M University. She supervises 20 employees, including Mr. Ferrell. Her job responsibilities include making hiring and promotion decisions, and training employees who work in the registrar’s office. As described supra in these findings of fact, several registrar officers perform different tasks and she makes hiring decisions based on the needs of the office. Mr. Ferrell alleges Florida A & M University unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of age. The crux of this case rests with the age of the other employees that are relied upon for comparison. Mr. Ferrell offered testimony regarding Mr. Jordan, Mr. Witherspoon, Mr. McGlockton, and Ms. Smith to prove a similarly situated employee outside his protected class, based on age, was treated more favorably than he was treated. Mr. Ferrell testified that the employees could not be his age for various reasons. However, there was no evidence presented at hearing regarding the age of the four employees offered as comparators. In his PRO, Mr. Ferrell attached exhibits that reflect the age of Mr. Jordan, Mr. Witherspoon, and Ms. Smith. However, the exhibits were not offered during the hearing and as a result, they are not evidence of record. A finding of fact may only be based exclusively on evidence of record.1/ Thus, the undersigned may not consider the exhibits offered post-hearing to make a finding of fact regarding the age of Mr. Jordan, Mr. Witherspoon, and Ms. Smith. The undersigned finds that there was not sufficient evidence presented at the final hearing regarding the age of Mr. Jordan, Mr. Witherspoon, Mr. McGlockton, and Ms. Smith.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2018.
Findings Of Fact James A. Bitting, Petitioner, was first employed by Crawford and Company in its Tampa office as a property appraiser in October 1973, and remained so employed until he was terminated in July 1988. Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in 1983 while on company business and sustained back injuries which thereafter was the source of lower back pain if he remained in one position (either standing or sitting) for an extended period. However, he made no claim and submitted no medical evidence of this handicap until after his termination from employment by Respondent. In 1987 and 1988, claims cases at Crawford decreased, and the regional office began telling the Tampa office that they should look to a reduction of personnel. Satellite offices at Brooksville and Plant City were closed and the adjustors in charge of those offices were brought in to the Tampa office. At the time of his termination there were four outside adjusters at the Tampa office with Respondent being the only designated property adjuster. The others dealt primarily with casualty claims. Property claims had declined to a point there were insufficient claims to occupy one adjuster full-time and Petitioner was being given a few simple casualty claims. The regional office and the Tampa office generally agreed that one appraiser should be terminated. At the time this determination was made Respondent had the lowest evaluations of the four adjusters. Further, he had received the second phase of a progressive discipline notice (Ex. 2) stating his work performance was unsatisfactory due to non-compliance with work standards. Petitioner presented no evidence to support his contention that his age was a proximate cause of his termination, other than his bare allegation that during this period no employee under 40 was terminated. Substantial evidence was presented that Respondent continues to have numerous people in it's work force older than 50 and 60 years of age. During the presentation of his case, Petitioner referred repeatedly to the failure of Respondent to provide him with a comfortable office chair in which he could sit without hurting his back. Although several employees of Respondent were aware that Petitioner had a back problem, Petitioner, prior to his dismissal, never presented any medical evidence that he needed special equipment, or was physically unable to perform any tasks. He had continued to climb ladders to the roofs of houses when necessary in his job as property adjuster. Following Petitioner's termination, his job was not filled. Respondent, as part of their reorganization, moved another adjuster into the department vacated by Petitioner, but this employee brought with her workers compensation claims which consumed 75-80% of her time. Later Respondent also transferred into the Tampa office a property general adjuster to drum up more casualty business. Upon his arrival he did the property claims formerly done by Petitioner using about 10% of his work time, and spent 80-90% of his time soliciting new business. A property general adjuster is qualified to handle complex claims involving industrial losses while a property adjuster like Petitioner is limited to handling less complex residential claims.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner has failed to prove that his termination from employment by Crawford and Company was influenced by Petitioner's age or handicap, and that his Petition for Relief be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: G. G. Harvey Manager, CFE Post Office Box 5047 Atlanta, GA 30302 James A. Bitting 11730 Marjorie Avenue Tampa, FL 33612 Louis P. DiLorenzo, Esquire One Lincoln Center Syracuse, New York 13202-1355 Dana Baird General Counsel and Acting Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Caucasian male, was born on March 23, 1949. At the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue in this case, Petitioner was 52-53 years old. Petitioner was employed by Respondent since 1973. He was terminated effective August 15, 2001. Respondent, at all times material to this case, is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent, at all relevant times, is in the business of providing telephone services to individuals and businesses in south Florida and elsewhere. At all relevant times, Petitioner was employed as a Service Technician. Service Technicians are responsible to install and repair telephone equipment in response to customer requests. At all relevant times, Respondent employs individuals as Service Technicians who are older than Petitioner. Many other individuals employed as Service Technicians are over the age of 40 at all times relevant to this case. Beginning in 1997, Respondent began to evaluate its Service Technicians according to a system called "Integrated Technicians Performance Plan [ITP].” The purpose of ITP was to improve customer service by evaluating Service Technicians and the individuals who manage them, on a regional basis, in accordance with standardized performance measures. Service Technicians whose ITP evaluations revealed deficiencies, including Petitioner, were provided assistance pursuant to individualized Technician Development Plans (TDP) and given a reasonable period of time to improve. From the time ITP was implemented in 1997, Petitioner was at all relevant times on a TDP because of deficiencies in his job performance. Petitioner's job performance was consistently deficient from 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment. From 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment Petitioner was provided assistance to help him improve his performance. Despite the assistance provided, Petitioner failed to improve his job performance to minimum levels required of all Service Technicians and required by his TDP. By August 2001, supervisors responsible for the training, evaluation and supervision of Service Technicians had determined that Petitioner did not maintain his job performance at the minimum levels required of Service Technicians and did not fulfill the requirements of his TDP. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner could have been terminated earlier than he was. In consideration of the fact that Petitioner had been a long-time employee of the company, he was given more time to improve his performance than company policy required. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that age played any role in Petitioner's termination. Petitioner did not prove that after he was terminated, a younger worker replaced him. Similarly, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act, or that any disability played any role in his termination. Petitioner alleged his disabilities as “war wounds, tinnitus and hearing loss.” Petitioner never informed Respondent that he suffered from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Petitioner never informed Respondent that the disabilities alleged would in any way prevent him from performing his job as a Service Technician, or from satisfying the TDP developed to assist in ameliorating his performance deficiencies. Petitioner never informed Respondent that the alleged disabilities substantially impacted any major life function, or affected Petitioner’s ability to perform the essential functions of his Service Technician job. Respondent was not, at relevant times, on notice that Petitioner might suffer from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Respondent never perceived Petitioner to be disabled at times relevant to this case. During his employment as a Service Technician, Petitioner did not indicate a need for or make any request to Respondent for accommodations for any physical condition. Finally, Petitioner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for complaints he had filed in another forum. This allegation was not proved; rather, the evidence established that Petitioner never opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent discharged Petitioner solely on account of inadequate job performance as a Service Technician, and not on account of his age, disability, or in retaliation for complaints filed in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2005.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent Community Education Partners, d/b/a Emerald Bay Academy, engaged in an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner Adam Killick, and, if so, what relief should be granted to Petitioner, if any.
Findings Of Fact On October 3, 2005, the Commission filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings Petitioner's Petition for Relief. On that same date, an Initial Order was entered by the assigned Administrative Law Judge requesting certain information for the scheduling of the final hearing in this cause. Due to the parties' failure to comply with that Order, venue rights were deemed waived. On October 14, 2005, a Notice of Hearing was entered scheduling this cause for final hearing on December 19, 2005. An Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions was entered that same day requiring the parties to disclose to each other no later than seven days before the final hearing the names of their witnesses and further requiring them to exchange copies of their exhibits by that same deadline. That Order further provided that failure to timely disclose could result in exclusion of that evidence at the final hearing. On December 12 Respondent filed its Motion for Continuance of the final hearing. On December 13 Respondent filed correspondence advising that Petitioner had agreed to the continuance, that Petitioner would be out of the country the entire month of January 2006, and that Petitioner and Respondent had agreed to certain dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. One of those dates was February 17, 2006. On December 14, 2005, an Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing was entered, scheduling this cause for final hearing on February 17, 2006, validating any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporating the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On January 26, 2006, Respondent filed its Agreed Motion for Leave to Present Testimony Telephonically, requesting that a witness who lives in New Mexico be allowed to testify telephonically at the final hearing on February 17, 2006. The Agreed Motion clearly set forth Petitioner's agreement to allow the telephonic testimony of that witness at the final hearing. On January 27, 2006, that Agreed Motion was granted, subject to Respondent making the necessary arrangements and subject to compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.213(5), which, inter alia, requires a notary public to be physically present with the witness to administer the oath. On February 3, 2006, Respondent filed its Notice of No Opposition advising that it did not oppose Petitioner's request for a continuance of the February 17, 2006, final hearing date. Petitioner's Motion for Continuance was filed on February 9, 2006. By Order Granting Continuance entered February 9, 2006, Petitioner's motion was granted, the final hearing scheduled for February 17, 2006, was cancelled, and the parties were afforded up to and including February 28, 2006, to advise the undersigned as to the status of this matter, as to the length of time required for the final hearing, and as to several mutually- agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. That Order further provided that failure to timely comply would result in the conclusion that this matter had been amicably resolved and the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings would be closed. Neither party filed any document or pleading on or before February 28, 2006. On March 3, 2006, Petitioner filed his first Request for Discovery and sent a letter to the Clerk of the Division requesting subpoenas and indicating that he would accommodate a hearing date convenient to the undersigned and to Respondent. The letter also advised that after he had received all materials, he needed time to prepare. The letter did not provide dates for re-scheduling the final hearing in compliance with the February 9, 2006, Order. Subpoenas were issued to Petitioner pursuant to his request in that letter. The Order Re-Scheduling Hearing entered March 6, 2006, recited the provisions of the prior Order giving a deadline for providing mutually-agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing and the failure of the parties to comply with that Order. It also recited that despite the earlier Order providing for the automatic closure of the Division's file if the parties failed to timely provide dates, since Petitioner had filed documents subsequent to the deadline, it was assumed that the case had not been amicably resolved. The Order re-scheduled the final hearing in this matter to be held on March 24, 2006, validated any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporated the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On March 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and a Motion for Rehearing. The Motion for Rehearing is confusing: it asks for reconsideration of his discovery request (no ruling had previously been requested or made); it complains about the December 2005 hearing date having been continued; it withdraws Petitioner's prior agreement to allow a witness to testify by telephone (which agreement had been subsequently ordered); it specifically states that Petitioner is not requesting another continuance but then speaks of requiring time to prepare that would extend well beyond the scheduled final hearing date. On March 16, 2006, Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Rehearing was filed, opposing the granting of Petitioner's pending motions. Petitioner's motions were heard telephonically on March 20, 2006. The manual he wanted produced, which Respondent agreed to give him, was ordered produced, but the remainder of Petitioner's requests were denied. An Order on Pending Motions was entered that same day to memorialize the rulings announced during the telephonic hearing. The Order specifically provided that Petitioner's request for a postponement of the final hearing was denied, a ruling made and discussed during the telephonic hearing. On March 17, 2006, Respondent filed its witness list, together with a cover letter advising that Respondent had provided Petitioner with its witness and exhibits lists in December. Petitioner has not filed any witness list in accordance with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions entered October 14, 2005. On March 22, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Subpoenas, together with a request that a hearing be held on the Motion that same day. A telephonic hearing was conducted on March 22, 2006, and an Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Quash Subpoenas was entered. During the course of that telephonic hearing, Petitioner indicated that he might not come to the hearing. In response to that statement, the undersigned explained to Petitioner that it was up to him whether he attended the hearing, dismissed his petition for relief, or withdrew his request for a hearing. The undersigned explained to the parties that the hearing would go forward as scheduled, that Petitioner had the burden of proof in this proceeding, and that not appearing or presenting evidence would prevent him from meeting his burden of proof. After normal business hours on March 22, 2006, and therefore on March 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Facsimile Letter to Judge Rigot. Although somewhat confusing, the Letter appears to re-argue points previously argued and memorialize Petitioner's understanding (and misunderstandings) of what transpired during the telephonic hearing on March 22, 2006. At 9:30 a.m., on March 24, 2006, Respondent's attorney and its witnesses were present for the scheduled final hearing. The undersigned waited for 35 minutes before opening the record and almost 10 minutes more before closing the record, with no appearance by Petitioner or anyone on his behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adam Killick Post Office Box 18331 Panama City, Florida 32417 M. Brenk Johnson Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C. 1201 Elm Street, Suite 5400 Dallas, Texas 75270
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against due to her age, with regard to her termination from employment on June 19, 1996, and, collaterally, whether her claim is barred by the doctrine collateral estoppel because of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by a hearing officer in an unemployment compensation appeals proceeding also related to her termination from employment.
Findings Of Fact Roberta McCabe, the Petitioner, was employed by the Respondent, Woodland Towers, Inc., as a dining room manager from October 22, 1991, through June 19, 1996. During her employment with Woodland Towers that entity employed more than fifteen employees. Ms. McCabe's initial date of employment was August 19, 1991, but she began her capacity as dining room manager on October 22, 1991. She served in that capacity until her termination date of June 19, 1996. She was terminated on that date against her will. Ms. McCabe was born on June 3, 1935, and at the time of her termination she was sixty-one years of age. After her termination, on June 21, 1996, the Petitioner filed a claim against Woodland Towers with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation. In that claim she first raised the issue that she had been discharged due to her age. That claim was filed, of course, before a different state agency, with a different jurisdiction, although the parties were the same. The legal issues were not established to be the same, however, with the exception that in that case, as in this one, the Petitioner raised the question of discharge due to age discrimination. The statutory standards for liability for unemployment compensation, however, were not shown to be co-extensive and identical to those statutory standards and statutory-based legal issues which prevail in the instant case before a different state agency. While the issue of age discrimination may have been the reason offered by the Petitioner in the employment compensation case for her separation from employment, as opposed to what was ultimately found (discharge for misconduct) that legal concept was not shown to have the same definition under the Unemployment Compensation statutes involved in that proceeding, nor was it shown that those statutes support the same or similar actions and remedies as does Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, under which the instant proceeding arises. Therefore it cannot be determined that the legal issues or, for that matter the factual issues in the instant proceeding, are substantially identical to those extant in the unemployment compensation proceeding. In any event, Ms. McCabe timely filed a charge involving age discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, on or about August 26, 1996. The matter ultimately came on for hearing before the undersigned judge. Ms. McCabe testified at hearing that the only act of discrimination she contends occurred with regard to her termination from employment, on June 19, 1996, occurred on that date and involved discrimination on account of her age. She did not, however, establish that anyone at Woodland Towers ever actually made any discriminatory comments or remarks regarding her age. Ms. McCabe essentially inferred from her status as an older employee, and the fact that she was terminated, the conclusion that Woodland Towers had terminated her on account of her age. She offered no testimony other than her own to support her claim of age discrimination. Conversely, Eleanor Gustavsson and Sidney Roberts both testified that age had nothing to do with their decision to terminate her. Their testimony was unrebutted by the Petitioner. The testimony supporting Petitioner's position that age discrimination or animus resulted in her termination is based solely on the Petitioner's own testimony, chiefly involving her conjectural position, without corroborating evidence, that Woodland Towers intended to terminate her because of her years of seniority which resulted in higher pay and benefits and that therefore, resultingly, her age, with attendant higher pay and benefits, in her position, caused her to be terminated in a discriminatory way, predicated upon her age. Moreover, the Petitioner failed to describe any other co-employee who committed a similar infraction but who was treated more favorably than the Petitioner and did not show that there was any other employee of a younger age who was treated more favorably after committing a similar infraction. The Petitioner did produce the testimony of two fellow employees and offered to produce others to testify that another employee was rude and hostile to the Petitioner. This is insufficient, however, to establish that she was discriminated against because of her age. It was not shown that that employee was in a supervisory position over the Petitioner and merely being rude and hostile to a fellow employee does not rise to the level of Ms. McCabe's infraction. It is therefore unpersuasive to show that Ms. McCabe was the subject of disparate treatment because of her age. Uncontradicted evidence was presented at hearing which establishes that the Petitioner was allowing employees under her supervision, in her capacity as dining room manager, to report for duty before normal working hours and begin work without compensation for the extra time. It was established that she was aware of and indeed responsible for these employees "working off the clock" or before "punching-in." The evidence establishes that she was aware that this was contrary to federal law and Woodland Towers' policy. She was also aware that she was responsible for supervising those offending employees and enforcing the law and policy concerning hours of employment. The Petitioner took full responsibility for the law and employment policy violation in this regard and admitted during the hearing that her actions violated Woodland Towers' employment hours policy. Additionally, Woodland Towers presented credible evidence that Ms. McCabe was terminated solely for reasons of violation of that federal law and policy concerning hours of employment. Woodland Towers' evidence establishes that her age was not the reason for her termination, but rather that her violation of federal law and employment policy concerning the working hours of her employees was that reason. That showing was not rebutted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lloyd, Esquire Cobb, Cole and Bell Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Roberta McCabe 701 North Ocean Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of Petitioner, because of his age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner by terminating him on October 3, 2005, after Petitioner filed a complaint with human resources alleging a hostile work environment.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Leviton Manufacturing Corporation manufactures electrical equipment and components. It is a New York corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Inter allia, Respondent employs a sales force that covers the entire State of Florida. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). Respondent has implemented an employee handbook aimed at fostering a work environment that is free from harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Respondent's policies contain reporting and investigation procedures that encourage employees to report any and all incidents of perceived discrimination or harassment, and ensure that all reported incidents are investigated. Petitioner was employed with Respondent from June 1995 until November 2003, and from July 2004 through October 3, 2005. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was 49 years old. Petitioner first began working for Leviton in 1995 as a Service Representative. He received merit pay raises and promotions until November 2003, when Respondent laid-off 150 people in the retail division, including Petitioner. Petitioner was rehired in July 2004, as a Sales Representative. Upon rehire, Petitioner was supervised by District Manager Scott Robbins ("Robbins"). Petitioner presented the testimony of three of Respondent's managers, one retired, who supervised Petitioner for various periods of Petitioner's nine and one-half year career with Respondent. Each of them testified that Petitioner was dedicated and professional in which ever position he was assigned, including two assignments as a manager. Scott Robbins, Petitioner's supervisor immediately prior to Goodman, recommended Petitioner for re-hire as a Sales Representative following a lay-off, and was satisfied with his work in that position. Petitioner also presented the testimony of 12 customers of Respondent, in the territory that he covered between July 2004 and October 2005. Each of them expressed their opinion that Petitioner was an honest, diligent, and professional sales representative for his employer. Respondent presented the testimony of one customer who was not satisfied with Petitioner's performance as a sales representative. In January 2005, District Manager Warren Goodman ("Goodman") replaced Robbins and assumed his territories as well as his role as Petitioner's supervisor. At the time Petitioner was terminated, Goodman was 48 years old. Goodman supervised, and currently supervises, at least, 12 Sales Representatives, the majority of whom are over the age of 40, to wit: Name Age Name Age Roy Boykin 59 Mickey Ferrell 49 Don Yeager 59 Jose Monzon 40 Michael O'Reilly 56 Duane Bishop 38 Dave Lenoir 37 Kevin Bouton 34 Ken Davis 54 Paul Dube 41 Brad Taylor 10. When Goodman 52 took over as District Manager, it became readily apparent that Goodman's management style was distinctly different from Robbins. Goodman is demanding, blunt and aggressive, and closely manages his sales representatives. He expected prompt and accurate responses to his requests from his sales representatives. Petitioner was required to fulfill the same job expectations that were demanded of all other Sales Representatives. It included, but was not limited to, the timely submission of complete and accurate paperwork, client follow up, and travel to specific areas within his designated territory. Petitioner's area extended from Lakeland, Florida, to Thomasville, Georgia. Goodman expected Petitioner to visit customers in his territory at least every three weeks, staying at least two to three days on each trip at each location. Goodman's job as District Manager is to oversee his sales force and to enforce Leviton's guidelines, as he interprets them. Moreover, Goodman is charged with measuring his employees' compliance with Leviton's policies and procedures. Over the course of his tenure, Petitioner failed to abide by company rules and policies, as well as the terms of his employment, as understood by Goodman. On more than one occasion, Petitioner failed to provide expense reimbursements in an appropriate and timely manner. He also failed to travel with the frequency required by his sales position. Additionally, on numerous occasions, Petitioner failed to verify the accuracy of orders he placed for customers. On May 2, 2005, Goodman sent Petitioner an email addressing the importance of administrative responsibility and consistency. Goodman had just reviewed Petitioner's expense reports and noted that they covered a ten-week period, clearly in violation of the requirement that they be submitted within 30 days. Goodman also noted that the expense reports reflected no travel over a two-month period to the Thomasville/Tallahassee area, which composed a large portion of Petitioner's territory. Goodman requested that, thereafter, Petitioner forward his itinerary weekly, attaching as an example a copy of itineraries submitted by Petitioner's colleagues. Petitioner responded, apologizing for the late expenses. He attributed his tardiness in part to a change in his cellular telephone carrier. Petitioner set forth all his travel dates within the northern portion of his territory since his re-hire. The dates provided demonstrated that he was not in compliance with the travel requirements established for all Sales Representatives. Goodman responded and reminded Petitioner of the importance of adhering to guidelines for travel and paperwork submission. He encouraged Petitioner to improve his performance and to do what was necessary to satisfy Goodman's expectations of the proper skills necessary to do his job effectively. On May 9, 2005, Petitioner sent Goodman an email indicating his car was being repaired. The repair estimates attached to the email evidenced that Petitioner had been driving a 12-year-old vehicle, which was not within Respondent's car policy guidelines. Petitioner had reviewed and signed the car policy guidelines on January 12, 2005, and began receiving monthly payments (including retroactive payments), effective February 11, 2005. On May 18, 2005, Petitioner received and signed an Employee Warning. Significantly, Petitioner signed the Employee Warning indicating that he read and understood it. The Employee Warning cited violations for substandard job performance and violations of company policies or procedures, with specific reprimands for: (1) failure to timely submit expense reports; (2) failure to travel as specified and agreed to; (3) sloppy submission of paperwork; (4) lack of involvement with customer; and (5) failure to maintain a proper company vehicle in accordance with company policy. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner purchased a new truck for the purpose of meeting the company vehicle policy. On May 31, 2005, Goodman reviewed numerous quotes submitted by Petitioner for review and renewal. Goodman informed Petitioner that upon review, the quotes prepared by Petitioner were inaccurate and required various revisions and corrections. Some quotes were priced higher than stock; different prices were entered for the same item in a different color (when there should have been no price difference); there were items on quotes that were never purchased; and there was no increase in items ordered/quoted. In August 2005, Goodman advised Petitioner that his sales goals were not ambitious enough and that Petitioner needed to re-evaluate and re-consider his year-end goals. Petitioner indicated that he would do as instructed. In mid-August 2005, Petitioner once again submitted an incomplete quote to Goodman for approval. When brought to Petitioner's attention, he added the items missing from the quote, offering no explanation for this oversight. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner submitted order adjustments to Goodman's administrative assistant for completion. When the request was forwarded to Goodman, he immediately reminded Petitioner that all changes were required to be submitted to him, not his assistant. Moreover, the requested changes contained errors. Goodman requested that Petitioner review the complete order and re-submit it when it was accurate. Three days later, Petitioner still had not acknowledged or responded to Goodman's request. Goodman completed and submitted Petitioner's performance review on July 25, 2005. Due to the fact that no prior goals or skills development were accomplished by Petitioner, his review was deferred until the end of 2005. Based upon his seven-month assessment of Petitioner, Goodman felt that Petitioner only partially met expectations. Rather than precluding a merit increase in salary, Goodman gave Petitioner an opportunity to improve his performance by deferring his review for several months. Petitioner signed this July review, indicating that Goodman discussed the review and appraisal with him. On September 5, 2005, (Labor Day, a holiday) Goodman sent an email to all of his Sale Representatives, which required a response to specific inquiries no later than 5:00 p.m. Petitioner did not respond until September 7, 2005, at 4:15 p.m. This was clearly past the deadline. Goodman reprimanded Petitioner in his responsive email, specifically advising Petitioner that his continued employment was in jeopardy. He invited Petitioner to call Goodman the next day to discuss Petitioner's lack of diligence and timeliness. Only after a telephone call on the morning of September 9, 2005, did Petitioner, for the first time raise the issue of unfair treatment, but he did not raise age as a factor. Petitioner requested, via email, that Goodman assist Petitioner in filing a complaint against Goodman with Leviton's Human Resource Department for creating a hostile work environment. In this same email, Petitioner informed Goodman that Petitioner had involved clients in his grievance by requesting that the clients evaluate Petitioner's performance and provide their input to Respondent. Based upon the preceding client involvement, Goodman advised Petitioner on September 12, 2005, that he was suspended immediately, with pay, pending the outcome of Respondent's investigation regarding Petitioner's inappropriate conduct. Petitioner was therefore instructed to maintain contact with only the Human Resources Department (HR) until further notice. Thereafter, Petitioner corresponded, via email, with Shephard. On September 13, 2005, Petitioner forwarded his May 5, 2005, email exchange with Goodman to Kimberly Shephard, Respondent's Corporate Human Resource Manager. On that same day, Petitioner sent another email to Shephard containing a list of items that were still incomplete and required follow up. In forwarding this lengthy "to do" list, Petitioner demonstrated his inattention to detail and inability to complete administrative tasks. On September 16, 2005, Shephard drafted Petitioner's allegations in memorandum format, the accuracy of which Petitioner verified and signed on September 20, 2005. Goodman was given a copy of the allegations and provided a written response on September 19, 2005, refuting each of Petitioner's allegations. Meanwhile, HR conducted interviews with a random selection of Goodman's employees in the district and noted each employee's assessment of Goodman. Goodman was determined by each of the interviewed employees to provide equal treatment to all employees. The employees interviewed ranged in age from 35 to 58. On or about September 20, 2005, Shephard completed her investigation of Petitioner's complaint and determined that there was no basis that Goodman created an unlawful hostile work environment. Rather, it was determined that Goodman set the same standards for all of his employees; treated them all the same; and that accordingly, there was no basis to conclude Petitioner was singled out. Petitioner was ultimately terminated on October 3, 2005. The reasons cited by Respondent were based on Petitioner's unsatisfactory job performance. The specific reasons given for Petitioner's termination were: (1) his inability to perform the tasks associated with the Sales Representative position; (2) his failure to develop end-users sufficiently; (3) his administrative inadequacies; (4) his failure to meet deadlines and failure to follow instructions; and (5) his choosing to enlist customers in an internal company matter pertaining to Petitioner's poor job performance. Although Respondent determined that Petitioner's involvement of customer's in an internal dispute was grounds for immediate termination, Respondent determined it would investigate Petitioner's complaint prior to taking other action, since it occurred at the same time as the allegations of improper conduct by Goodman. At no time was Petitioner's age raised as a factor in any of the terms and conditions of his employment by Respondent. Nor was it a factor in any work related complaints regarding his deficiencies. Petitioner never informed any member of Respondent's management that he believed he was treated differently during his employment because of his age, or that he had been terminated due to his age. After Petitioner was terminated, Respondent did not hire anyone to replace him. Rather, Respondent re-assigned Petitioner's territory to existing salesmen. Paul Dube ("Dube"), aged 41, inherited the majority of Petitioner's territory. Goodman did not require that Dube travel to, or invest time in customers that only did a nominal amount of business with Respondent. Petitioner attempted to establish that he was unable to respond to several of Goodman's inquiries in a timely manner, or at all, because Petitioner's computer was being repaired by Respondent's IT department. Nevertheless, Petitioner had access to his work email via Respondent's webmail program during this period. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated by Respondent because of his age. Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subject to retaliation after he filed a hostile work environment complaint with Respondent's HR department.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismissing his charge with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was demoted from his position as a security officer, and later terminated from his position with the Respondent as a groundskeeper on or about May 22, 1995, on the basis of his race (Black) or sex (male), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is an African-American male, and is licensed as a Class D security officer by the State of Florida. Respondent, Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc., is a not-for-profit corporation, based in Iowa, which owns Village on the Green, a community with 241 independent living units and 60 skilled health center beds in Longwood, Florida. Petitioner was hired by Respondent, on April 27, 1998, as a security guard at Village on the Green in Longwood, Florida. He worked in that capacity until May 12, 1995. In accordance with the company's standard procedure, all employees who have keys or access to resident's private property are required to have a criminal background check completed. Petitioner's position as a security guard required such a check. Petitioner signed a consent form and the background check was completed. The background check revealed that, in 1993, Petitioner was arrested for the felony of grand theft auto. The charge was later reduced from the misdemeanor charge of Trespass to a Conveyance. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge. Adjudication was withheld by the Court and Petitioner was placed on six months probation. Petitioner successfully completed probation. It is the policy of Respondent that an employee with a prior criminal record which involves theft may not be placed in a safety-sensitive position which permits employee access to a resident's living quarters or personal property. A security officer has such access. Petitioner was then informed that he would be removed from his position as a security guard. Petitioner was then offered a position in groundskeeping and Petitioner accepted. He was transferred to groundskeeping, at the same salary, and was employed from May 15, 1995, until May 22, 1995, at which time he was terminated. Between May 15 and May 22, 1995, Petitioner performed his job satisfactorily. On May 15, 1995, a severe electrical storm knocked out electricity to Petitioner's residence. As a result, Petitioner overslept and did not report to work at 7:00 a.m., the scheduled beginning of his shift. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Petitioner called the security guard on duty and advised her of the reason he was late and that he would not be in that day because the storm had caused damage to his automobile. The fact that Petitioner reported in on May 15th was not conveyed by the unidentified security guard to Petitioner's supervisor. Respondent's policy, as stated in the Employee Handbook, called "No show/no call," requires an employee to notify his supervisor if he is going to absent, or if he is unable to contact the supervisor, then he is to report his absence or tardiness to the switchboard operator. The Employee Manual, at page 45, states in pertinent part: ". . . Failure to report for duty without notification, failure to call in prior to shift change and tardiness will result in disciplinary action." After an internal investigation, which included an interview with Petitioner, Respondent was unable to determine that Petitioner had called in on May 15, 1995. Petitioner was terminated. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondent's reason for termination was pretextural, or that the employer engaged in unlawful hiring, firing, pay or promotion practices.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: John V. Griffin DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1998. Director of Human Resources Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc. d/b/a Village on the Green 200 East Grand, Suite 390 Des Moines, Iowa 50309 Terrance Davenport 861 Carver Street Winter Park, Florida 32789 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on November 2, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 74-year-old male who was employed by Respondent as Human Resources Director from July 1994 until January 30, 2009. His job was an office job that required him to sit at a desk, attend meetings, and occasionally visit people in other parts of the plant to discuss business. Respondent, Daws Manufacturing Company (Daws), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Daws is a Florida corporation with its principal office in Pensacola, Florida. Daws is a manufacturer that builds aluminum toolboxes for trucks, and other truck accessories. James Nowak is Daws' Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. According to Mr. Nowak, a decision to cut overhead was made in the summer of 2008, as a result of three years of significant economic losses. The decision was made to close the manufacturing component of its Pensacola facility so that the company could survive. To accomplish this, Daws implemented a reduction in force which involved two layoffs in 2008. As Human Resources Director, Petitioner played a significant role in the layoff process. Mr. Nowak described Petitioner's role as "orchestrating" the layoffs, meaning that Petitioner was the person "who managed it, who disseminated the information, and who was at the center point of getting the project completed." Harold Clinton "Clint" Daws is Respondent's President and Chief Executive Officer. While Petitioner and Mr. Nowak played significant roles in the reduction in force process, Mr. Daws was ultimately responsible for deciding which employees were to be laid off. Forty-seven employees were laid off in August 2008. Thirty-one employees were laid off on December 5, 2008. Only six employees remained in the Pensacola plant following the December 2008 layoff. Petitioner was one of the employees slated to be laid off in December 2008. However, Petitioner suffered a heart attack in mid-November 2008 and underwent open heart surgery. This happened prior to the December 2008 layoff. Because of Petitioner's medical situation, Mr. Daws agreed that Petitioner would not be laid off as scheduled in December 2008, but could remain employed through January 2009. Petitioner was the only employee scheduled to be laid off in December 2008 whose termination was deferred. Petitioner returned to work on January 19, 2009, and was scheduled to be laid off January 30, 2009, the last working day of that month. He requested to stay on longer than scheduled, but that request was denied by Mr. Daws. Petitioner remained covered under the company's health insurance through January. From January 19 through his last day of employment, Petitioner spent time cleaning his office and tending to other matters. During January 2009, Petitioner underwent cardiac rehabilitation. He left the office for a couple of hours during the work day to participate in his rehabilitation. This was handled the same as for any employee who had to go to a medical appointment. However, Petitioner did not request any accommodation regarding any disability during this time. Petitioner acknowledged at hearing that he never made a complaint of discrimination to Mr. Daws based on his age, gender, or perceived disability. Before leaving on his last day of employment, Petitioner wrote a letter to Workforce Escarosa, a local agency that handles unemployment claims, advising that he was "laid off today due to a reduction in force-job elimination." He again made this assertion to Workforce Escarosa in a February 27, 2009 letter in which he reiterated that he was "laid off due to a reduction in force, job elimination, and I am not to be considered a retiree." Upon termination, Petitioner was offered and accepted insurance under COBRA. The COBRA coverage was later rescinded by the insurance company, not by Daws, apparently because it discovered Petitioner was on Medicare and was not eligible. Mr. Nowak never discussed Petitioner's medical expenses from his heart attack or previous medical problems with the company's insurance agent or the company's president. Following Petitioner's termination from employment, the position of Human Resources Director was eliminated as part of its reduction in force. The remaining duties of the Human Resources Director position were apportioned between Mr. Nowak and Ms. Violeta Gordon, Petitioner's assistant. Daws did not hire anyone to serve as the Human Resources Director. At hearing, Petitioner alleged that he was discriminated against earlier in his employment. Specifically, he asserted that he did not receive a pay raise from 1995 until 2002 and that he was asked in 2006 when he was going to retire. While Mr. Daws testified as to legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Petitioner not receiving a pay raise and denied asking Petitioner when he was going to retire or encouraging him to retire, these allegations are untimely as will be more fully addressed in the Conclusions of Law. At the time of his layoff, Petitioner was 72. Petitioner alleged in his Employment Complaint of Discrimination that his assistant, Ms. Gordon, was 65. There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise and, based upon observations of her while testifying at hearing, 65 is a reasonable approximation of her age.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Daws Manufacturing Company is not guilty of the unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36-151 ("IHOP"), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2011),1/ by discharging Petitioner from her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding racial and religious discrimination in the workplace.
Findings Of Fact IHOP is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. IHOP is a restaurant in Leesburg. IHOP is owned by Pritesh Patel, who owns and operates a total of four International House of Pancakes stores in the Leesburg area through his corporation, Pritesh, Inc. Petitioner is a black female who is an observant Jew. Because of her religious beliefs, Petitioner does not work on the Sabbath, from sundown on Friday until sunset on Saturday. Petitioner was hired to work as a server at IHOP on March 19, 2012. She made it clear that she did not work on the Sabbath, and IHOP agreed to respect her religious beliefs. There was some difference in recollection as to the notice Petitioner gave to IHOP. Petitioner testified that she made it clear she could not work until sundown on Saturdays. The store manager, Brian Jackson, also recalled that Petitioner stated she could only work Saturday evenings. Mr. Patel testified that Petitioner said that she could work on Saturday "afternoon." Petitioner's version is credited as being more consistent with her stated beliefs, though there is no doubt that Mr. Patel was testifying honestly as to his recollection. Petitioner was the only black server working at IHOP at this time. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson credibly testified that IHOP has had many black servers through the years. Mr. Jackson noted that Petitioner only worked for IHOP for a period of two weeks and therefore was in no position to judge IHOP's minority hiring practices. Petitioner testified that assistant manager Hemanshu "Shu" Patel, a relative of the owner, created a hostile working environment for her from the time she started on March 19. She complained that Shu would alter the seating chart so that she would have fewer tables to cover, meaning a reduction in her tips. Petitioner also stated that Shu was disrespectful and rude, in a manner that caused her to believe there was a racial motivation behind his actions. Despite the fact that Shu was subordinate to Mr. Jackson, Petitioner believed that Shu was really in charge because he was a relative of Mr. Patel and therefore "untouchable" as an employee of IHOP. Petitioner's main complaint was that Shu, who was in charge of work schedules for the restaurant, scheduled her to work on Saturdays. Petitioner testified that on the first Saturday of her employment, March 24, Shu called her to come into work at noon. She replied that she could not come in until after sundown. This problem was apparently worked out to Petitioner's satisfaction, and she was not required to report to work on Saturday afternoon. However, when Shu posted the next week's schedule on the following Tuesday, Petitioner saw that she had been scheduled to work on the morning of Saturday, March 31. Petitioner complained. Both Mr. Patel and Mr. Jackson testified that Shu had merely made an error in scheduling that was rectified as soon as Petitioner notified them of the problem. Petitioner did not deny that the problem was resolved mid-week, well before any Sabbath conflict could arise. Mr. Patel testified that he wanted Petitioner to work from 4 p.m. until midnight on Saturday, March 31, so that she would not lose a day's work due to the scheduling error. Shu phoned Petitioner early on Saturday afternoon and asked her to come in. Petitioner told Shu that she could not come in until 8 p.m. Mr. Patel testified that he did not need someone to work a four-hour shift, and that Petitioner was told not to come in. As a further reason for declining to work on Saturday evening, Petitioner testified that she had only been trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson testified that the only distinction between the dayshift and the nightshift is that the latter is less busy. All servers are trained for the morning shift. Mr. Jackson stated that, once trained for the morning shift, a server would find the night shift "a piece of cake." Petitioner's reason for not working in the evening was not credible in this respect. Mr. Patel testified that he had no problem with Petitioner's not working on that Saturday, provided that she understood she was going lose a day. Mr. Patel stated that from his point of view the problems began when Petitioner insisted that he give her weekday hours to make up for the lost Saturday hours. Mr. Patel declined to cut another employee's hours for Petitioner. Petitioner came in to work on the morning of Sunday, April 1. Sunday morning is a busy time for IHOP. According to head server Bernadine Hengst, Petitioner stood near her at the register and voiced her complaints about Shu, who was working in the kitchen. Shu heard Petitioner and stepped into the dining room, asking her, "You got something to say to me?" Petitioner and Shu became loud, and their argument was moved outside for fear of disturbing a restaurant full of people. Petitioner finished her shift then went home and composed a letter to Mr. Patel. She made copies of the letter for every employee at IHOP. Ms. Hengst was the first to see the letter. She phoned Mr. Jackson at home to tell him about it, and Mr. Jackson phoned Mr. Patel. The letter read as follows: On March 19, 2012, I was hired to work as a server. I am a professional, pleasant, respectful, prompt and dutiful individual. As the only African-American server, it is imperative that you know since I have arrived at IHOP, I have faced fierce blatant hostility from a manager ("Shu") and co- workers ("C.C., Misti and Cherish"). I feel Shu has deliberately created a divisive and hostile working environment. It is my understanding Shu is a family member yet his behavior is definitely bad for business. On two separate occasions, Shu altered the seating chart that Brian originally created and took two tables from me. He lacks proficient management skills and is totally unprofessional, disrespectful and rude. On Sunday, April 1, 2012, Shu spoke to me in a loud, impolite manner in front of staff and customers. Shu communicated in a very bellicose fashion and for a moment, it felt as though he would physically attack me. You must take it serious that Shu's conduct is detrimental to your business. When Shu hired me I made it clear that I am Jewish and do not work on the Sabbath ("Saturday"). Nevertheless, Shu called me to come into work on Saturday about noon; I told him I would come in after the Sabbath at 7:00 p.m. The following week I was scheduled to work a Saturday, which in turn caused me to lose a day of work. Also on April 1, 2012, Shu assigned me only two booths for the whole day; when I spoke up about it he threatened to take another booth from me. This type of attitude and his unfair behavior cannot be tolerated in the United States of America in 2012. Shu is outwardly mean, discriminative, and racist towards me. He acts like a tyrant, a bully and he feels he is untouchable. On Sunday, April 1, I was only assigned two booths while my co-workers had four to six tables. This was unfair seating arrangements. At the end of the day, Bernie [Hengst] told all the servers to tip out the busboy, yet I did not because I was unjustly treated by only being assigned two tables. This was one-sided and insulting. I am an exceptional waitress and I depend on this job to pay my bills. During my first week, I was scheduled to work 36.10 hours and this week I was only given approximately 23.0 hours. Everyone should be treated fairly and equally. I ask that you continue to give me a full schedule each week. This letter officially informs you of the battles I have dealt with in your establishment and I have not worked here for one whole month. All Americans have the right to work without being harassed. I urge you to intervene and equitably resolve this issue. Ms. Hengst testified that Shu is a loud person who "talks with his hands," but she saw nothing that gave her the impression that Shu would "physically attack" Petitioner. She did not detect that Shu treated Petitioner any differently than he treated other servers. Ms. Hengst saw Petitioner as an equal participant in the April 1 confrontation. As to Petitioner's complaint about the number of tables to which she was assigned, Mr. Jackson testified that servers are always trained on two booths and then moved to four booths after training is completed. He stated that Petitioner was doing a "terrible" job working four booths, which caused Shu to move her down to two. Mr. Jackson stated that it is counterproductive to overwhelm a new server, and that the server must demonstrate the ability to perform the basics before taking on more tables. On the morning of April 2, after reading Petitioner's letter, Mr. Patel went to the IHOP and sat down for a meeting with Petitioner in hopes of addressing her complaints. Mr. Patel testified that the first thing Petitioner asked him was, "Do you know how many black employees you have?" Though he had been willing to discuss Petitioner's grievances concerning scheduling, Mr. Patel decided to fire Petitioner when she started "threatening us" based on claims of "black and white discriminating." He decided to fire Petitioner for the future of his business, because he did not want the problems associated with allegations of discrimination. Mr. Jackson was also at the April 2 meeting, and testified that Petitioner claimed she was being singled out because of her race. Based on all the testimony, it is found that Petitioner had little basis for claiming that IHOP was discriminating against her based on her race or religion during the actual course of her job. She was mistakenly scheduled to work on Saturday, but was not required to come in to the store once she made management aware of the error. She did lose one shift's worth of work for March 31, but that was partly due to her declining to work the evening shift. The evidence established that Shu Patel was loud, somewhat hotheaded, and perhaps not the ideal choice for managing a busy restaurant, but did not establish that he singled out Petitioner for particular abuse because of her race or religion. The evidence established that Petitioner's poor job performance was the cause of at least some of the friction between her and IHOP management. However, Mr. Patel's own testimony established that he dismissed Petitioner in direct retaliation for her complaint of discriminatory employment practices. IHOP offered no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Petitioner's dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Pritesh, Inc., d/b/a IHOP 36- 151 committed an act of unlawful retaliation against Petitioner. It is further recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary proceeding to establish the amount of back pay/lost wages owed to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2013.
