Findings Of Fact Facts Stipulated to by the Parties: Respondent Platinum Motor Cars, Inc. (Platinum), holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, number VI-17331, issued by the Department. Joseph A. Camino III was formerly the principal and licensee of an entity known as J & J Auto Sales. The Department filed two Administrative Complaints against J & J Auto Sales, Case Nos. DMV-88-42 and DMV-90-01. After informal hearings on each of those Complaints, J & J Auto Sales was assessed and subsequently paid civil fines. No license held by Joseph A. Camino III has ever been revoked by the Department. Joseph A. Camino III has never been convicted of a crime which resulted in his being prohibited from continuing to hold a motor vehicle dealer license under Section 320.27(9)(s), Florida Statutes. Lynette Bowman Camino was listed as an officer and director of Platinum Motor Cars, Inc., on the initial application for licensure filed by the corporation. Lynette Bowman Camino is the wife of Joseph A. Camino, III. Lynette Bowman Camino has never held a motor vehicle dealer license in her individual name. Lynette Bowman Camino has never been convicted of a crime which would prohibit her from holding a motor vehicle dealer license under Section 320.27(9)(s), Florida Statutes. Before the issuance of the license to Platinum, Lynette Bowman Camino withdrew as an officer or director of the corporation. The Department advised Platinum in a letter dated April 8, 1992, that its application was initially denied for the reasons set forth in that letter. On April 13, 1992, Michael J. Smith, President of Platinum, executed an affidavit as a condition of the Department's approval of the application for license. The salient portions of that response to the April 8, 1992 denial letter are set out in Finding 22 below. Joseph A. Camino III is currently employed by Platinum as a motor vehicle buyer and is an authorized agent of Platinum at the Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, an auction for dealers and wholesalers. Joseph G. Camino, father of Joseph A. Camino III, was a co-owner of J & J Auto Sales. Joseph G. Camino, father of Joseph A. Camino III, has never been associated with Platinum in any capacity. Joseph A. Camino III was not the licensee, owner or undisclosed principal of International Motor Cars. At the time of the issuance of Platinum's license, all shares in the Respondent corporation were jointly held by Michael J. Smith and Sandra J. Smith. To date, the Department has not sent notice to Lynette Bowman Camino individually of any right to request a hearing on the agreement between the Department and Platinum embodied in the April 13, 1992 affidavit of Michael J. Smith. (See Finding 22 below). To date, the Department has not sent notice to Joseph A. Camino, III individually of any right to request a hearing on the agreement between the Department and Platinum embodied in the April 13, 1992 affidavit of Michael J. Smith. (See Finding 22 below). The April 8, 1992 letter disclosing the Department's "Intent to Deny License Application" contained a clear point of entry for Platinum giving notice that the applicant could request a Chapter 120 proceeding to contest the Department's expressed intention to deny the license sought. Joseph A. Camino III as an authorized agent of Platinum, is authorized to transact business, including vehicle sales and purchases, on behalf of the Platinum at Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, Inc. The affidavit executed by Michael J. Smith, President of Platinum (Joint Exhibit 1), contains the following paragraphs: That as of this date, neither LYNETTE BOWMAN CAMINO, JOSEPH A CAMINO, III, JOSEPH A. CAMINO, JR., nor any other member of said Camino family has any interest or position whatsoever in or with Platinum Motorcars, Inc. That from this day forward, no member of the aforesaid Camino family shall be involved with Platinum Motorcars, Inc., on a financial management, operational or sales basis. That affiant acknowledges and understands that if any member of the aforesaid Camino family shall in the future be involved with Platinum Motorcars, Inc., on a financial, management, operational or sales basis, such involvement shall result in the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles taking administrative action to revoke the license to do business of Platinum Motorcars, Inc. (underlining added; capitalization and boldface in original) As the authorized agent for Platinum with the authority to buy and sell vehicles at the Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction, Joseph A. Camino III is involved with the Respondent on an "operational or sales basis." Based upon the foregoing Finding, Platinum has breached its undertaking embodied in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Smith Affidavit set out above in Finding 22. The authorization of Joseph A. Camino III to act for Platinum contained in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 is dated April 22, 1992, only nine days after Joint Exhibit 1 (the affidavit quoted in Finding 22) was signed under oath by Platinum's President. Based on this, I infer that the promises set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit were made with no intention of honoring them. The affidavit was executed in bad faith and constitutes a willful misrepresentation made in an attempt to obtain licensure, and to avoid a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the licensure application of Platinum Motor Cars, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order revoking the Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of July 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Barbara K. Sunshine, Esquire 2395 Davie Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by June C. McKinney, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s letter of withdrawal of protest of the establishment of AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc., a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, AutoNation Dodge of Pembroke Pines, Inc. be granted a license for the sale and service of Jeepr passenger cars and light trucks manufactured by Chrysler (JEEP) 13601 Pines Boulevard, Pembroke Pines (Broward County), Filed January 27, 2012 3:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Florida 33027 upon compliance with all applicable requirements of section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. DONE AND ORDERED this A‘! day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. skill, Assistant Deputy Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this | __ day of January, 2012. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Ycense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. MDM/jde Copies furnished: Thomas H. Yardley, Esquire Law Office of Thomas H. Yardley 1970 Michigan Avenue, Building D Cocoa, Florida 32922 Phil Langley Chrysler Motors, LLC 10300 Boggy Creek Road Orlando, Florida 32824 R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS MASSEY-YARDLEY CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC., Petitioner, vs. Case No. 11-6492 CHRYSLER GROUP CARCO, LLC, AND AUTONATION DODGE OF PEMBROKE PINES, INC., Respondents.
Conclusions This matter came on for determination by the Department upon Respondent’s submission of a Motion to Dismiss as Moot, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED this ON day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ie ulje Baker, Chief ureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this _L2Myday of March, 2012 VWakins Vinagelk Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Yicense Administrator Filed March 13, 2012 7:31 AM Division of Administrative Hearings NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within 30 days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: John W. Forehand, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Claude B. Arrington, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED Filed July 7, 2011 7:53 AM Division of Administrative Hearings © DONE AND ORDERED this day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. pe Oe Sandra C. Lambert, Director Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A435, MS 80 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this__A2“day of July, 2011. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Wcense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. SCLivlg Copies furnished: J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Mikhael Ann Bortz-Buchanan, Esquire Zarco Einhorn Salkowski & Brito 100 Southeast Second Street, Suite 2700 Miami, Florida 33131 Claude B. Arrington Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to the specific exemption in Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes, from the general notice and protest provisions in Section 320.642.
Findings Of Fact Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., d/b/a A1 Mandel Chevrolet ("Landmark") operated a Chevrolet dealership located at 15455 West Dixie Highway, North Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida until August 2, 1989. Landmark operated the dealership pursuant to: (a) a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (the "Dealer Agreement") between Landmark and Petitioner; and (b) a Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer License from Respondent, License Number 9VF-10574. On August 2, 1989, Landmark ceased customary sales and service business operations. Respondent revoked Landmark's license on October 12, 1989. The license revocation resulted from an independent investigation conducted by Respondent. Petitioner notified Landmark on August 17, 1989, of Petitioner's intent to terminate the Dealer Agreement pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes. A copy of the notice of intent to terminate was furnished to Respondent in accordance with the requirements of Section 320.641. Landmark filed a Complaint with Respondent on November 15, 1989, contesting Petitioner's termination of the Dealer Agreement. The Complaint invoked the protection of Section 320.641, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 320.641(7), Petitioner was prohibited from terminating the Dealer Agreement prior to a final adjudication in the franchise cancellation proceeding. Landmark's Complaint was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 6, 1989. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. Petitioner's motion to dismiss was granted in a recommended order entered by Hearing Officer Michael Parrish on January 22, 1990. A final order dismissing Landmark's Complaint was entered by Respondent on April 30, 1990. The time for appealing the final order expired on May 30, 1990, without appeal. Petitioner notified Respondent on December 5, 1990, of Petitioner's intent to open a successor dealer for Landmark. Respondent determined in a letter dated December 19, 1990, that the proposed opening of the successor dealer was not exempt from the notice and protest provisions of Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. Respondent determined that the 12 month period of exemption began to run on October 12, 1989, when Landmark's license was revoked and expired prior to the date of the proposed opening of the successor dealer. Petitioner had no prior notice of either Respondent's intent to revoke Landmark's license or the actual revocation of Landmark's license. Petitioner first learned of Respondent's revocation of Landmark's license on December 19, 1990. At that time, Respondent notified Petitioner that the 12 month period of exemption from protest had expired for purposes of the proposed opening of the successor dealer in North Miami Beach. Respondent's determination that the 12 month period of exemption in Section 320.642(5), Florida Statutes, began on the date that Landmark's license was revoked constituted incipient agency action. The incipient agency action taken by Respondent deviated from Respondent's prior practice. Respondent's action determined the substantial interests of Petitioner. Petitioner was prohibited by Section 320.641(7), Florida Statutes, from opening a successor dealer pursuant to Section 320.642(5) until a final adjudication was entered in the franchise cancellation proceeding under Section 320.641. Landmark's license was revoked on October 12, 1989. The franchise cancellation proceeding began on November 15, 1989, when the Landmark filed its complaint. A final order was entered in the franchise cancellation proceeding on April 30, 1990. The time for appeal expired on May 30, 1990. Petitioner did not notify Respondent of Petitioner's intent to open a successor dealer until December 5, 1990. Proposed Rule 15C-7.004 was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 16, at page 1721, on April 19, 1991. Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(a) provides: Application for Reopening or Successor Dealership, or for Relocation of Existing Dealership. If the license of an existing franchised motor vehicle dealer-is revoked for any reason, or surrendered, an application for a license to permit the reopening of the same dealer or a successor dealer within twelve months of the license revocation or surrender shall not be considered the establishment of an additional dealership if one of the conditions set forth in Section 320.642(5) is met by the proposed dealer. (emphasis added)4 Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4)(a) was published prior to the formal hearing but will not become effective until after the formal hearing.5 Respondent's determination in this proceeding, that a closing occurs upon the revocation or surrender of a dealer's license, is consistent with Proposed Rule 15C-7.004(4) (a).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order should be entered denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from protest under Section 320.642(5), Florida Statues, for the proposed opening of a successor dealership. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of July, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1991.
The Issue The primary issues for determination are whether Respondent committed a myriad of violations of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, which provides certain requirements applicable to motor vehicle dealers. The violations alleged to have been committed by Respondent are inclusive of failures to display a consumer sales window form, to keep certain records of purchases and sales, to keep proper records of temporary tags, and not possessing required proper proof of ownership of two vehicles. In the event that Respondent committed these violations, an additional issue is what administrative penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida, having been issued license number VI-13051. Petitioner issued the license based upon an application signed by Sudarshan Kuthiala, as President. Respondent's address of record is 5895 St. Augustine Road, Suite No. 8, Jacksonville, Florida 32207. Respondent's president is Sudarshan Kuthiala. On or about March 12, 2004, Petitioner's compliance examiner conducted an annual records inspection of Respondent's dealership. The purpose of that inspection was to determine whether the dealership was complying with statutory and rule requirements. Arrangements to conduct the inspection were made at least a week ahead of time. At the time of the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner found that Respondent did not have the "Buyer's Guide" required by federal law and known as a “consumer sales window form,” properly displayed on a vehicle, a 1995 Nissan, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 1N6SD16S25C386012, being offered for sale by Respondent. Also, during the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner reviewed five purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent. The examiner discovered that records of two of the vehicles involved did not contain any documentation of the method or proof of purchase or the required odometer disclosure statement at time of acquisition. Another of the vehicles did not have the odometer disclosure statement upon its disposition. An examination during the March 12, 2004 inspection of Respondent's temporary tag log found that the log was incomplete. Respondent's temporary tag log did not include the name and address of the person to whom a temporary tag for a vehicle had been assigned. A follow-up inspection of Respondent's dealership was conducted on June 23, 2004. An appointment for that inspection was made at least one week ahead of time. In the course of that June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner discovered Respondent did not display the required "Buyer's Guide" or “consumer sales window form” required by federal law on a 1992 Mercury automobile with VIN 1MEPM6043NH616615, being offered by Respondent for sale. Further, Respondent's records did not contain the odometer disclosure statement of that vehicle when it was acquired. Additionally, Respondent did not have a title or other proof of ownership of the 1992 Mercury automobile. During the June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner also discovered that records of three purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent were deficient. Records for two of the vehicles did not have the method or proof of purchase or odometer disclosure statement upon acquisition. Records for one of the vehicles did not have the required odometer disclosure statement upon disposition of the vehicle. The June 23, 2004 inspection also revealed that Respondent's temporary tag log was incomplete. The log did not reveal the name and address of a person to whom a temporary tag was issued or the vehicle identification number of the vehicle for which the temporary tag was issued. Following both of the inspections recounted above, neither Sudarshan Kuthiala nor anyone else on behalf of Respondent offered to provide the missing records or account for them. In the course of attendance at training school for dealers, Sudarshan Kuthiala was informed of the required forms and the process for their preparation. Also, Respondent's records have been inspected in the past and recordkeeping requirements further explained to Kuthiala.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sudarshan K. Kuthiala 2961 Bernice Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Fred O. Dickinson, III, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
