The Issue Whether Petitioner, K. S. Ravines Corporation, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, K. S. Ravines Corporation, is the owner of real property located in Middleburg, Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property, known as the "The Ravines," is being developed as a 435-acre residential and golf course development. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied upon by Silver Sands. On or about June 1, 1990, the Applicant entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement agreeing to purchase The Ravines. Subsequent to the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Applicant pursued a due diligence effort. In particular, the Applicant contacted Clay County to confirm that The Ravines had been zoned as a Planned Unit Developed as represented by the seller of The Ravines. The Applicant also sought to confirm that the property possessed the development capabilities associated with the zoning. In response to the Applicant's inquiries, Keith I. Hadden, then Director of Development for Clay County, informed the Applicant of the following in a letter dated August 7, 1990: The property commonly known as The Ravines, as shown on that certain map of J. M. Ard & Associates, Inc., dated May 30, 1990, (Job No. 3751B), together with a parcel commonly referred to as the McCumber Contracting Parcel as shown on said map, and the access road from County Road 218 to the main property of The Ravines commonly known as Ravines Road (all hereinafter "The Ravines") is currently zoned "PUD" Planned Unit Development. . . . Mr. Hadden also confirmed that The Ravines was approved for development of 261 single family lots, 49 condominiums, 107 hotel units, and 60 patio homes; a total of 477 units. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Mr. Hadden's representations as Clay County Director of Planning, the Applicant purchased The Ravines for $10,709,423.00. At the time of the purchase the golf course was valued at $6,900,000.00. The Applicant purchased 168 single-family lots (44 developed and 124 undeveloped) and 60 undeveloped patio home lots. The undeveloped lots and the existing developed single- family lots purchased by the Applicant were valued at $3,943,000.00. The Applicant also spent $495,115.00 to make capital improvements to The Ravines after it purchased The Ravines. Rights that will be Destroyed. In January 1992 Clay County adopted a comprehensive plan pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Ravines was designated with a land use designation in the plan of "Rural Residential." The "Rural Residential" land use classification of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan allows development of one residential unit per one acre of land. As a result, The Ravines may be developed at a total of 435 units instead of the 477 units that Clay County informed the Applicant The Ravines could be developed for in the August 7, 1990, letter from Mr. Hadden. As a result of the "Rural Residential" land use classification, the total developable lots at The Ravines would be reduced from 228 lots to 186 lots, or a reduction of 42 lots. This reduction represents a reduction of 18.4% of the total lots purchased by the Applicant. It is possible that this reduction could result in an 18.4% loss of the $3,943,000.00 paid for the lots, or approximately $496,000.00. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, H.A.P. Partnership, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. The Petitioner, H.A.P. is a general partnership. The partners of the Petitioner are Billy G. and Jeanette Smith, Earl and Marie Womble, Mr. W. H. Sharp, Larry and Hilda Strom and Charles and Margaret Fulton. The Petitioner's address is 5174 Maddox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. In May, 1985, the Petitioner purchased approximately 3.1 acres of land, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20-409 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 1"). Parcel 1 is located at 4015 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. At the time of purchase by the Petitioner, Parcel 1 was zoned R-3, single and two-family residential. Under R-3 zoning, a maximum of 7.2 units per acre of land could be constructed. Parcel 1 was purchased by the Petitioner from Billy Hatcher. In December, 1986, the Petitioner purchased an adjoining parcel of property consisting of approximately 3.5 acres, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20- 408 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2"). Parcel 2 is located at 3969 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. Parcel 2 was zoned R-3 at the time of its purchase by the Petitioner. Parcel 2 was purchased by the Petitioner from Marie Bannerman. Development of the Property; Prior to the Petitioner's Purchase. The previous owner of Parcel 1, Billy Hatcher, had retained Poole Engineering to develop plans for site location on Parcel 1, of multi-family dwellings. A stormwater management permit, number 4241, was issued by Leon County to Mr. Hatcher on June 25, 1984. Mr. Hatcher also obtained a permit from the State of Florida Department of Transportation for a driveway onto Parcel 1 from North Monroe Street. The permit was approved June 12, 1984. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for Parcel 2 prior to the Petitioner's purchase of Parcel 2. The Petitioner relied upon the zoning on Parcel 1 and 2 and the permits that had been issued with regard to Parcel 1 at the time that the Petitioner purchased Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Parcel 1 and 2 would not have been purchased otherwise. Development of the Property; Subsequent to the Petitioner's Purchase. In November, 1987, the Petitioner retained PVC Corporation to plan the development of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), and to provide project management services for the development of multi-family residences on the Property. Consistent with R-3 zoning, PVC Corporation proposed a development consisting of 42 units on the 6.6 acres of the Property. In the Summer of 1989, the Petitioner sought a change in zoning for the Property. The Petitioner's request to have the Property zoned commercial was denied by Leon County. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for the Property subsequent to the Petitioner's purchase of the Property. Except for the stormwater management permit, no other permits were obtained from Leon County by the Petitioner and no request for building permits, plots or site plans were submitted to Leon County. Development of the Property was not commenced by the Petitioner. Alleged Change in Position or Obligations and Expenses Incurred. The total purchase price for Parcel 1 was $156,000.00. The total purchase price for Parcel 2 was $110,000.00. The Petitioner paid a total of $106,572.87 in interest on the Property, $15,109.67 in real property taxes and $2,300.00 in engineering fees. Vadden Shadden, M.A.I., appraised the Property on January 18, 1988, prior to the effective date of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, at a value of $417,500.00. On November 3, 1990, Mr. Shadden appraised to value of the Property to be $41,750.00, taking into account compliance with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property is located in an area designated as Lake Protection Land Use. Property in the Lake Protection Land Use category may be developed by the construction of one dwelling unit for residential purposes per two acres, plus minor commercial uses (retail but not office uses) of up to 20,000 gross square feet. Site plan approval for all commercial property over five acres is required by the Leon County Subdivision Regulations. Procedure. On or about November 12, 1990, the Petitioner filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. By letter dated February 26, 1991, from Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, the Petitioner was informed that the staff of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department had recommended that the Application be denied. Mr. Gumula also informed the Petitioner that a hearing before a Staff Committee could be requested. Charles Fulton, general partner of the Petitioner, informed Leon County that the Petitioner waived its right to a hearing before the Staff Committee and requested a formal hearing before a Hearing Officer. By letter dated March 19, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing in this case.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether a land development regulation adopted as City of Key West Ordinance 98-31, and approved by a Final Order of the Department of Community Affairs, DCA Docket No. DCA98-OR-237, is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development for the City of Key West Area of Critical State Concern set forth in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. All of the Petitioners in Case No. 99-0666GM, except Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Abbe Petitioners"), are all involved in the rental of real property in Key West, Monroe County, Florida. No evidence was presented concerning the identity of Mr. Hirsh or Property Management of Key West, Inc. The Abbe Petitioners are involved in the rental of Key West real property as owners or as rental managers of residential properties which are rented to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month (hereinafter referred to as "Transient Rentals). None of the properties used as Transient Rentals by the Abbe Petitioners constitute the Abbe Petitioners' primary residences. Petitioner in Case No. 99-0667GM, Jerry Coleman, owns residential property located in Key West. Mr. Coleman rents the residential property owned by him to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month. Mr. Coleman also resides in Key West. Petitioner in Case No. 99-1081DRI, John F. Rooney, failed to present any evidence in support of his case or his standing. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for, among other things, the approval or rejection of the comprehensive growth management plan, plan amendments, and land development regulations adopted by the City of Key West. Intervenor, the City of Key West (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Consistent with the requirements of Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, the City has adopted a comprehensive growth management plan, the City of Key West Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "City's Plan"). The City's Plan became effective in 1993. The City's Plan consists of twelve elements: (a) Land Use; (b) Historic Preservation; (c) Traffic Circulation; (d) Housing; (e) Public Facilities; (f) Coastal Management; (g) Port Facilities; (h) Conservation; (i) Open Space and Recreation; (j) Intergovernmental Coordination; (k) Capital Improvements; and (l) General Monitoring and Review. Data Inventory and Analysis in support of the City's Plan was compiled by the City. The City has been designated as an area of critical state concern (hereinafter referred to as the "City ACSC"), pursuant to Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes, since 1974. Rule 28-36.001, et seq., Florida Administrative Code. As an area of critical state concern, all comprehensive plan amendments and land development regulations adopted by the City must be reviewed by the Department for consistency with the Principles for Guiding Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Principles"), set out in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Principles were adopted by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, in February 1984. Intervenors, Henry and Martha duPont, reside at 326 Whitehead Street, Key West, Florida. The duPonts reside in an area known as the "Truman Annex." The properties on both sides of the duPonts' residence are used as Transient Rentals. Key West History and Tourism. The City is located primarily on the southern-most bridged island of the Florida Keys, a chain of islands, or keys, which run in a generally southwesterly direction from the southeastern tip of the Florida peninsula. The City, like the Florida Keys, is bounded on the west by the Gulf of Mexico and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The City is connected to the Florida peninsula by a series of bridges which connect the keys. The road which runs the length of the Florida Keys is designated U. S. Highway 1. It is approximately 112 miles from the Florida mainland to the City. Prior to the early 1970s, the two most significant components of the City's economy were commercial fishing and the military. Tourism also played a role, but not to the extent that it does today. Toward the middle and end of the 1970s the military presence in the City was significantly reduced and the fishing industry was on the decline. To replace the fading fishing and the lost military components of the City's economy, the City turned to tourism. The City's efforts began in earnest during the 1980s and have continued through the present. The City is now a major tourist destination. The City's most attractive features include its historic character, especially the area of the City designated as "Old Town," its warm climate, its extensive shoreline, and its water resources, including coral reef systems. Approximately two-thirds of the City's economic base is now associated with tourism. While the City shares many of the characteristics of most tourist-resort destinations, it also features certain unique characteristics not found in other destinations. Those features include its geographic remoteness and its limited size. The island where the City is principally located is only approximately eight square miles. Currently, approximately 6.82 million tourists visit the City annually. Approximately 62 percent, or 4.25 million visitors, stay overnight in the City. Approximately 480,000 tourists, or about 11 percent of the overnight guests, stay in Transient Rentals. Tourism in the City represents, directly and indirectly, approximately 66 percent of the economic base of the City. The City's economy in turn represents approximately half of the economy of Monroe County. Approximately 15,000 of the 23,000 jobs in Monroe County and Key West are associated with the tourist industry. Of those jobs, 54 percent of all retail sales jobs are involved in the tourist industry. Approximately 50 percent of the estimated $187 million of Monroe County-wide personal income comes from the tourist industry. The tourist industry should continue to prosper in the City as long as the natural environmental characteristics of the City (the climate, surrounding waters, and tropical features of the Keys) and the unique historical and "community" character of the City remain vibrant. It is the natural environment, the climate, and local community character in combination with the historical and cultural attractions of the City that create a diverse mix of attractions which make the City a unique vacation destination. The City's mixture of attractions must be served by a mixture of tourist accommodation services, including hotels, motels, guest houses, and Transient Rentals. Those accommodations are currently available. There are approximately 3,768 hotel/motel rooms available in the City. There are also approximately 507 residential properties with 906 units which are licensed as Transient Rentals in the City and approximately 647 unlicensed residential properties used for Transient Rentals. The loss of the availability of unlicensed Transient Rentals will not have a lasting adverse impact on tourism in the City. The City's Plan recognizes the importance of tourism. Objective 1-1.3, "Planning for Industrial Development and Economic Base," of the land use element of the City's Plan provides, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Tourism is the most significant component of the City of Key West economic base. The City of Key West is a major tourist destination. It's principal attributes are its historic character, warm climate, extensive shoreline, water resources, the coral reef system, abundant water related and water-dependent activities, and the ambiance of Old Town. The historic district contains many old structures which do not comply with the City's size and dimension regulations since many structures pre-date these local regulations. Realizing the significant contribution of Old Town, especially the unique character of its structures and their historic and architectural significance, and realizing the substantial impact of tourism to the economic base, the City shall direct considerable attention to its growth management decisions to maintaining the historic character of Old Town and preserving tourism as a major contributor to the City's economic base. Similarly, the City shall carefully consider supply and demand factors impacting tourism and the local economy to ensure the long term economic stability. The two policies adopted to implement Objective 1-1.3, Policies 1-1.3.1, "Mandatory Planning and Management Framework for Industrial Development," and Policy 1- 1.3.2, "Pursue Nuisance Abatement Standards and Criteria," provide for measures to deal with industrial development and not tourism. Reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan by Petitioners' witnesses is misplaced. While the Objective does reflect the importance of tourism in the City, it does not provide any guidance concerning appropriate land uses which may be allowed throughout the City. There is no direction in the Objective concerning land uses which the City must maintain. Land uses are considered and dealt with in other provisions of the City's land use element. Additionally, the reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan fails to give adequate weight to other provisions of the Plan. The Historic Significance of the City and "Old Town." The importance of the City's history is recognized throughout the Plan. Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan quoted, supra, points to the City's history and the role it plays in tourism. An area of the City has been designated as the Key West Historic District. The area is described in the Data Inventory and Analysis as the "physical manifestation of the 170 year existence of [the City]." Page 1A-11 of the Data Inventory and Analysis. Objective 1-2.3 of the Future Land Use Map Goal of the City's Plan deals with the importance of the Key West Historic District and an area which is largely located within the historic district known as "Old Town": OBJECTIVE 1-2.3: MANAGING OLD TOWN REDEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION OF HISTORIC RESOURCES. Areas delineated on the Future Land Use Map for historic preservation shall be planned and managed using a regulatory framework designed to preserve the form, function, image, and ambiance of the historic Old Town. The City's Historic Architectural Review Commission (HARC), in addition to the Planning Board, shall review all development proposals within the historic area designated by the National Register of Historic Places. The land development regulations shall be amended upon plan adoption to incorporate design guideline standards recently adopted by HARC. Development in any area of Old Town within and outside the HARC review area may impact the historic significance of Old Town. Any development plans for these areas shall be subjected to site plan review and shall be designed in a manner compatible with historic structures within the vicinity. While Objective 1-2.3 makes reference to the preservation of the "function" of Old Town, the Objective does not require that any particular "land use" which may exist in Old Town be preserved in perpetuity. The Objective and other provisions of the City's Plan addressing the historic significance of the City evidence a concern for the overall character of the area, not particular land uses. That character is described in, and adopted as part of, the Future Land Use Map of the City's Plan. See Policy 1-3.4.1 and Objective 1-3.4 of the City's Plan. Objective 1-1.5 of the Land Use element emphasizes the importance of maintaining and enhancing the appearance of gateway corridors into the City and the "major activiy centers such as Old Town." The Historic Preservation Element of the City's Plan, Chapter 1A, deals with historic resources, structures, and sites. No particular land use of these resources, structures, and sites, other than "housing," is mentioned. Throughout the history of the City, residents have to varying degrees rented their residences or parts of their residences on a short-term basis to tourists and other guests to the City. Most of the rentals involved the rental of portions of a residence while the owner of the property continued to reside in the rest of the property. Monroe County Commissioner Wilhelmina Harvey, Joe Crusoe, Robert Lastres, Vincent Catala, and Olivia Rowe, all long-term residents of the City, all testified about such rentals. The evidence failed to prove, however, that the types of rentals historically undertaken in the City constitute a part of the significant "history" of the City, at least not in the context of the historical significance of the City addressed in the City's Plan. Nor were the historical rentals testified to during hearing of the scale and scope of the rentals that now exist in the City. Additionally, to the extent that Transient Rentals are considered to be part of the significant "history" of the City, nothing in the land development regulation which is the subject of this proceeding absolutely prohibits such rentals. In fact, Transient Rentals of property for which a transient rental license has been obtained are not impacted by the land development regulation. Transient Rentals will, therefore, continue in the City. Nothing in the City's Plan dealing with the historical significance of the City requires that the City allow Transient Rentals of residential property to continue unregulated in the City. Regulation of the extent and location of Transient Rentals in the City does nothing to harm the historical significance of the City. In suggesting that Transient Rentals constitute part of the "history" of the City, and in particular, a part of the history of Old Town, the Abbe Petitioners have relied upon Policy 1-2.3.9, which provides, in part, the following: Policy 1-2.3.9: Retention of Historic Character and All Permanent Single Family Housing Units. The City desires to retain in perpetuity the existing character, density, and intensity of all historic sites and contributing sites within the historic district; and shall protect all the City's permanent single family housing stock citywide which was legally established prior to the adoption of the plan or a legal single family lot of record. Therefore, the City shall protect and preserve these resources against natural disaster, including fire, hurricane, or other natural or man-made disaster, by allowing any permanent single family units within the City, or other structures located on historic sites or contributing sites, which are so damaged to be rebuilt as they previously existed. . . . The reliance upon Policy 1-2.3.9 is misplaced. First, this Policy deals with all permanent single-family housing stock of the City and not just housing used for Transient Rentals. Secondly, the Policy does not provide for the protection of any particular use of single-family housing stock; it provides for the protection of the structures used as single-family housing. It recognizes the unique, historical construction of homes in the City and provides for their continued protection. The Impact of the City's Limited Land Mass and the City's Effort to Control Transient Rentals. As a relatively small island, the City has a limited land area and little opportunity for expansion without significantly altering the traditional character of the City. Because of the limited land area, maintaining adequate housing, including affordable housing, is a significant concern in the City. Residential property in the City has been used by tourists for accommodations for many years, long before the tourist boom now being experienced in the City. Transient uses of residential property were less organized and were less available than they are today, however. Often times, transient uses of residential property consisted of people renting out rooms in their residences to tourists. While the extent to which residential property has been used historically for tourist accommodations was not accurately quantified by the evidence, the evidence did establish that the use of residential property for Transient Rentals has significantly increased since the 1980s. As tourism has increased since the 1980s, there has been an increasing demand for tourist accommodations of all types. This demand for tourist accommodations, especially the demand for Transient Rentals, has adversely impacted the need and demand for residential housing in the City. In an effort to address the problem the Key West City Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "City Commission"), adopted a Growth Management Ordinance in 1985 mandating a ratio of Transient Rentals to residential units for the City. The intent of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance was to maintain a suitable balance between tourist accommodations and housing for permanent residents of the City. In 1993 the City Commission adopted a dwelling unit allocation ordinance, or the "rate of growth ordinance," which was designed, at least in part, to achieve a balance between the demand for tourist accommodations and the need for permanent housing, including affordable housing. The 1993 rate of growth ordinance was subsequently incorporated into the City's Plan as Objective 1-3.12. Pursuant to the City's Plan, Transient Rentals are not to exceed 25 percent of single family units permitted annually. Note 2 to Policy 1-3.12.3 of the Plan provides that "[t]he number of transient units reflect a preference for preserving housing opportunities for permanent residents as opposed to transient residents since historical trends indicate an erosion of the permanent housing stock which is largely attributed to conversion of permanent housing units to transient housing." The City's Failure to Control Transient Rentals; The "50% Rule." In 1989, the City required that an occupational license be obtained by property owners using their property for both long-term rentals and Transient Rentals. These occupational licenses were not subject to review by the Department for consistency with the City's Plan and land development regulations. Occupational licenses are essentially a revenue raising requirement. The issuance of an occupational license does not constitute a zoning decision or otherwise constitute the approval of a land use. By the time the City adopted the 1993 rate of growth ordinance and the City's Plan, the number of occupational licenses issued for Transient Rentals had already exceeded the allocation of Transient Rentals which are allowable in the City. As a consequence, owners of residential property who desired to use their property for Transient Rental purposes have been unable to obtain an occupational license for such use. The lack of allowable Transient Rentals under the City's Plan did not, however, actually stop individuals from using their property for Transient Rentals. In addition to licensed Transient Rentals, there are approximately 647 unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City. Properties owned by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman are among these unlicensed Transient Rentals. The Abbe Petitioners who own Transient Rentals rather than manage them have occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license issued by the City. Mr. Coleman has a "nontransient" license issued by the City and occupational licenses issued by the State and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license from the City. The number of unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City has been contributed to, in part, by an interpretation of a former definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" found in the City's land development regulations. The definition was adopted in 1986. Accommodations meeting this definition were prohibited in a number of zoning districts in the City. Accommodations which did not come within the definition were not prohibited in those districts. The 1986 definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" (hereinafter referred to as the "Former Transient Definition"), was as follows: Tourist and transient living accommodations. Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days. Pursuant to this definition, any property used "principally" for visitors for less than 28 days constituted a tourist or transient living accommodation. There were some who advocated that the term "principally" meant that a residence had to be used as a 28-day short-term visitor accommodation for at least 50 percent of the year. Pursuant to this definition, any residence used at least 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rentals is considered to constitute a "tourist and transient living accommodation." Conversely, if a residence was used less than 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rental the property is not considered to constitute a tourist or transient living accommodation. This interpretation of the Former Transient Definition has been referred to as the "50% Rule." Pursuant to the 50% Rule, the owner of residential property in the City could rent the property for periods of less than 28 days without obtaining an occupational license for the property as long as the property was not rented more than half of the year. This rationale was assumed to apply regardless of where the property was located; even in land use districts where Transient Rentals were prohibited. The developer of Truman Annex, an area formerly owned by the Navy located to the immediate south of Old Town, advocated the 50% Rule in his dealings with the City in the early 1990s. The City's licensing department also issued "non- transient" licenses for residences which met the 50% Rule. Code enforcement citations against owners of residences used as Transient Rentals for less than 50 percent of the year without an occupational license were withdrawn. Despite the foregoing, the evidence at hearing in these cases failed to prove that the 50% Rule became an official "policy" of the City Commission. What the evidence proved was that the City took no action to adopt or reject the 50% Rule as an official position. The City simply failed to take any action to reject the 50% Rule and interpret the definition of tourist and transient living accommodations in a more reasonable manner. Given the City's efforts to limit Transient Rentals through the adoption of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance, the 1993 rate of growth ordinance, and the City's Plan, it is clear, however, that reliance upon the 50% Rule is not reasonable. See findings of fact 39 through 45 of the Department of Community Affairs and City of Key West's Joint Proposed Recommended Order, which are hereby incorporated herein by reference. Finally, even if the 50% Rule did constitute the legislative intent of the City Commission in adopting the Former Transient Definition, it was eliminated by the City Commission in 1997 by the adoption of City Ordinance 97-20. City Ordinance 97-20 was adopted September 16, 1997, and was approved by Final Order of the Department dated November 19, 1997. The new definition of transient living accommodations adopted by City Ordinance 97-20, and still in effect today, is as follows: SECTION 5-21.2: DEFINITION OF TERMS TRANSIENT LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place regularly rented to transients. (Emphasis added). The current definition of transient living accommodations has eliminated the reference to properties "principally" used as a Transient Rental. The new definition includes any residence rented for any period of time, even once a year, as long as the rental is for a period of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Former Transient Definition and, consequently, the 50% Rule, was also superceded by the adoption of the City's Plan. The City recognized the foregoing history in the ordinance which is the subject of this proceeding. In rejecting the notion that the City had adopted the 50% Rule as City policy, the City stated the following in the ordinance: . . . . In 1986, the City enacted former zoning code Section 35.24(44) which provided the following definition of a transient living accommodation "Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days." (This definition shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Former Transient Definition.") Some property owners and developers interpreted the Former Transient Definition to mean that an owner could rent his or her residential dwelling for less than half the year without the dwelling losing its residential status, and therefore without the need for City-issued transient license . . . . This interpretation went unchallenged by the City. . . . . . . . Therefore, the City of Key West intends by these regulations to establish a uniform definition of transient living accommodations, and to halt the use of residences for transient purposes in order to preserve the residential character of neighborhoods. . . . Based upon the foregoing, any reliance by Petitioners in these cases upon the 50% Rule as City policy is rejected. The City's Adoption of Ordinance No. 98-31. During 1997 and 1998 the City conducted workshops and held public meetings to consider and develop an ordinance regulating Transient Rentals. The workshops were conducted by City staff and were attended by representatives of essentially all those interested in the Transient Rental issue. An effort was made to achieve consensus on the issue. During these workshops, the 50% Rule and the history of Transient Rentals in the City were fully considered. In addition to the workshops conducted by the City, the City hired Frank Pallini with PRG, Real Estate Research and Advisory Services, Clearwater, Florida, to conduct an analysis of the economic impact of an ordinance limiting Transient Rentals. The report prepared by Mr. Pallini (hereinafter referred to as the "Pallini Report"), was submitted to the City on August 28, 1998. The Pallini Report and, consequently, the negative economic impact of the ordinance at issue in this proceeding was fully considered by the City when it adopted the ordinance. On June 2, 1998, the City Commission adopted Ordinance 98-16, which amended the definition of "transient living accommodations" in the City's land development regulations. Unlicensed short-term Transient Rentals were expressly prohibited by Ordinance 98-16 with the exception of four specified City land use districts. Those districts, referred to during the hearing as "gated communities," are all single, contiguous zoning district areas of the City with controlled access and which are governed by homeowners' or condominium associations. Truman Annex was one of the four excluded gated communities. Ordinance 98-16 was found by the Department to be inconsistent with the Principles on July 29, 1998, by Final Order DCA98-OR-135. The Department concluded that Ordinance 98- 16 was inconsistent with the Principles because it allowed the use of residential property as Transient Rentals in areas where, according to the Department, such rentals were prohibited under the City's Plan. The City initially challenged the Department's decision, but subsequently withdrew its challenge. The City subsequently repealed Ordinance 98-16. On November 10, 1998, the City adopted Ordinance 98-31 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance"), which is the subject of this proceeding. The Ordinance contains the same provisions, except the exception for gated communities, that had been contained in Ordinance 98-16. The Ordinance is a "land development regulation" as defined in Section 380.031(8), Florida Statutes. It is, therefore, subject to review for consistency with the Principles by the Department. During the process of adopting the Ordinance the City recognized the confusion that the 50% Rule had caused concerning the intent of the City's Plan with regard to Transient Rentals. The City expressly dealt with the 50% Rule and rejected it as policy of the City. In particular, the Ordinance provides that the City's purpose in enacting the Ordinance was to phase out unlicensed transient uses of residential properties in land use zoning districts in which they are not permitted. This goal is accomplished by further modifying the definition of "transient living accommodations" adopted in 1997 in Section 5-21.2 of the City's land development regulations: Sec. 5-21.2 Definition of terms. Transient Living Accommodations. Or Transient Lodging. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for a period or periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place rented to regularly regularly rented to transients. , regardless of the occurrence of an actual rental. Such a short-term rental use of or within a single family dwelling, a two family dwelling or a multi-family dwelling (each also known as a "residential dwelling") shall be deemed a transient living accommodation. (Words struckstruck through were eliminated from the definition and underlined words were added). The Ordinance also adds Section 2-7.21 to the City's land development regulations explaining its action in modifying the definition of transient living accommodations and expressly prohibiting unlicensed Transient Rentals of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Ordinance does not provide for a complete ban on Transient Rentals. On the contrary, Transient Rentals of properties for which transient occupational licenses have been issued by the City are expressly allowed by the Ordinance. The City estimated that 507 residential properties containing a total of 906 transient units hold such licenses. Under the Ordinance, these units may continue to be used as Transient Rentals. The Department's Review of the Ordinance. On November 24, 1998, the City transmitted a copy of the Ordinance to the Department for approval or rejection pursuant to Section 380.05(6), Florida Statutes. The Department conducted its review of the Ordinance following its customary procedures for review of land development regulations that impact an area of critical state concern. The review included a consideration of Chapter 28-36, Florida Administrative Code, including the Principles, the City's Plan, and the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The Ordinance was directed to Kenneth Metcalf, the person in the Department responsible for supervision of the City ACSC. Mr. Metcalf reviewed the ordinance and assigned it to the Department's Field Office with directions as to which issues the Field Office should address during its review. Following staff review, an evaluation was prepared addressing the Ordinance's consistency with the Principles. The evaluation was reviewed by Mr. Metcalf. After receipt and review of the evaluation, it was discussed at a meeting of Department staff. As a result of the meeting, it was recommended that the Secretary of the Department find the Ordinance consistent with the Principles. On January 5, 1999, the Department entered a Final Order, DCA98-OR-237, finding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles. The Department caused notice of the Final Order to published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Petitioners' Challenge to the Ordinance. The Abbe Petitioners, Mr. Coleman and over 200 other owners of property in Truman Annex, and Mr. Rooney all timely filed petitions challenging the Department's Final Order pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, to the Department's Final Order approving the Ordinance. The petitions were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Department. The petitions were designated Case Nos. 99-0666GM, 99-0667GM and 99-1081DRI, respectively. Following dismissal of the petitions in all three cases, amended petitions were filed. Mr. Coleman's amended petition, filed on or about June 14, 1999, named Mr. Coleman as the only Petitioner remaining in that case. Standing. The parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the standing of the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman. In addition to stipulating to the facts found, supra, concerning the ownership and use of real property by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman in the City, it was agreed that the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman have transient occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County for their City real property. The Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman suggested in their proposed orders that it had been stipulated during the hearing that they have standing to initiate, and participate in, this proceeding. A close reading of the stipulation of the parties, however, fails to support this contention. What the Department, City, and the duPonts stipulated to were certain underlying facts; they did not stipulate to the ultimate finding. The Department, City, and duPonts did not stipulate to whether the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman will suffer an immediate injury as a result of the Ordinance. The evidence proved that, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman do not have the legal right to use their properties as Transient Rentals. Neither a reasonable interpretation of existing land development regulations nor the 50% Rule legalizes such use. As a consequence, the Ordinance cannot have the effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from using their properties for Transient Rental purposes because that is not a purpose for which they are legally authorized to use the properties anyway. The evidence also proved, however, that the City has allowed the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman to continue to use their properties as Transient Rentals, legally or not, and that, without the City's taking some action, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman would continue to do so. As a consequence, the Ordinance will have the practical and real effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from continuing to use their properties as Transient Rentals, to their economic detriment. The Abbe Petitioners, other than Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Coleman have proved that they have standing to institute and participate in this proceeding. The duPonts proved that they have standing to participate in this proceeding. The City proved that its substantial interests were determined by the Department's decision in this matter. The City has standing to participate in this proceeding. Mr. Hirsh, Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Rooney failed to prove that they have standing to institute or participate in this proceeding. The Principles. Rule 28-36.003, Florida Administrative Code, contains the Principles: Strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development; Protection of tidal mangroves and associated shoreline and marine resources and wildlife; Minimize the adverse impacts of development of the quality of water in and around the City of Key West and throughout the Florida Keys; Protection of scenic resources of the City of Key West and promotion of the management of unique, tropical vegetation; Protection of the historical heritage of Key West and the Key West Historical Preservation District; Protection of the value, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities, Sewage collection and disposal facilities, Solid waste collection and disposal facilities, Key West Naval Air Station, The maintenance and expansion of transportation facilities, and Other utilities, as appropriate; Minimize the adverse impacts of proposed public investments on the natural and environmental resources of the City of Key West; and Protection of the public health, safety, welfare and economy of the City of Key West, and the maintenance of Key West as a unique Florida resource. In determining whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles, the Principles should be considered as a whole. No specific provision should be construed or applied in isolation from the other provisions. The Ordinance has little or no impact on those Principles that relate to the natural resources of, and public facilities in, the City. Those Principles include Rule 28- 36.003(1)(b), (c), (d), (f), and (g), Florida Administrative Code. Those Principles are considered neutral in the determination to be made in these cases. The determination of whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles is limited to a balancing of the Principles listed in Rule 28-36.003(1)(a), (e), and (h), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as "Principles A, E, and H," respectively). Principle A: The Ordinance Strengthens the City's Capabilities for Managing Land Use and Development. In order for the Ordinance to be considered as strengthening the City's capabilities for managing land use and development, the Ordinance must be consistent with the City's Plan. The evidence proved that it is. The City's Plan contains various land use districts, all of which have certain allowable and prohibited uses. The districts established in the City's Plan and the relevant prohibition of transient lodgings are as follows: Coastal Low Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Single Family Residential Development district: prohibits "transient accommodations" and "transient rental housing." Medium Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Mixed Use Residential/Office: prohibits "transient lodging." Limited Commercial Development: Prohibits "transient residential land use activities." Historic High Density Residential Development and Historic Medium Density Residential Development districts: prohibit "transient residential uses, including guest homes, motels, or hotels." Historic Residential Commercial Core 2: prohibits "transient residential uses." Historic Residential/Office district: prohibits "transient lodging or guest houses" unless previously licensed. Conservation, Military, and Public Services districts: prohibit transient uses. The following districts established by the City Plan allow Transient Rentals: Salt Pond Commercial Tourist: allows "motels, [and] limited scale tourist facilities." General Commercial Development: allows "transient lodging including hotels and motels, timesharing or fractional fee residential complexes, and other transient quarters." Mixed Use Planned Redevelopment and Development districts: uses are determined, not by the City's Plan, but the land development regulations and development approvals for these large scale development districts. Historic Residential Commercial Core 1 and 3 districts: allow "transient residential accommodations" and "tourist accommodations." Historic Neighborhood Commercial: allows "transient rental accommodations" in HNC-1 and HNC-3 districts as long as they do not displace permanent resident housing and "transient accommodations" in HNC-2 districts. Historic Commercial Tourist: allows "hotels, motels, and/or transient lodging facilities." The most reasonable interpretation of the restricted and allowable land uses for the land use districts established under the City's Plan is that references to "transient rental accommodations," "transient residential uses," "transient rental housing," and "transient lodging facilities" are intended to include Transient Rentals. One other district is established by the City's Plan which is relevant to this matter: Historic Planned Redevelopment and Development districts (hereinafter referred to as "HPRD" districts). Land uses allowable in an HPRD district are to be established by land development regulations. The only HPRD district in the City is currently the Truman Annex. Truman Annex was being developed at the time the City's Plan was adopted. While the City's Plan provides that the specific requirements for any HPRD district is to be provided by land development regulations, Policy 1-2.3.4 of the City's Plan does provide, among other things, that the regulations are to "[a]void replacement of permanent housing stock with transient lodging." The Ordinance, and its application to Truman Annex, is consistent with this direction of the City's Plan. Truman Annex was developed as a development of regional impact, or "DRI." As a DRI and HPRD district, land uses in Truman Annex are subject to development agreements between the City and the developer of Truman Annex. Those agreements have been amended 12 times. The Truman Annex development agreements allow the development of "housing units," which included both transient and non-transient uses. "Housing units" were further broken down into the following types: "affordable," "hotel transient housing units," "time share transient housing units," and "other residential housing units." "Affordable" and "other residential housing units" are intended to be "residential" development in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements; "hotel transient housing units" and "time share transient housing units" are intended to be Transient Rentals in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements. Given the distinction between "transient" housing units and other uses in the Truman Annex development agreements, no approval of Transient Rentals of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" was contemplated or allowed by the City. The Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations do not authorize the use of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" in Truman Annex as Transient Rentals. The Ordinance is, therefore, consistent with the Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations. The Ordinance, if nothing else, clarifies the state of the law with regard to which Transient Rentals are allowed and which are prohibited in the City. The Ordinance eliminates any lingering confusion caused by the failure of the City to reject the 50% Rule in all circumstances and to properly interpret the Former Transient Definition. The suggestion of the Abbe Petitioners that the 50% Rule was adopted as a part of the City's Plan because it existed when the City's Plan was adopted is not supported by the evidence. Again, the 50% Rule was never adopted as the official policy of the City; it simply went unchallenged by the City. In fact, the 50% Rule was allowed to be advanced by some despite the adoption of the City's Plan and its prohibition against Transient Rentals in the land use districts described, supra. Nor does Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan support the Petitioners' position in these cases. That Objective does not require that any particular land use be continued in the City. Nor do those provisions of the City's Plan dealing with the historic significance of the City detract from the conclusion that the Ordinance is consistent with the City's Plan. The provisions dealing with the historic significance of the City are concerned with the significance of structures which have been a part of the history of the City's existence. The City's Plan also evidences a desire to preserve historically significant housing, not any particular use of those structures. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal A. Principle E: Protection of the Historic Heritage of the City and the Key West Historical Preservation District. Principle E requires a consideration of significant events in the history of the City, famous visitors and residences of the City throughout its history, the architectural history of the City, and other aspects of the City's character. This conclusion is supported, in part, by Rule 28-36.003(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code: (e) Historic Resource Protection. A management and enforcement plan and ordinance shall be adopted by the City of Key West providing that designs and uses of development reconstruction within the Key West Historical Preservation District shall be compatible with the existing unique architectural styles and shall protect the historical values of the District. The City of Key shall maintain an architectural review board established pursuant to Section 266.207(2), Florida Statutes. . . . . The evidence in these cases proved that the Ordinance will preserve and ensure the preservation of the City's historical significance. It will do so by limiting the destruction of the character and community of the City, as discussed, infra. Principle E does not support a conclusion, as argued by Petitioners, that Transient Rentals have played such a large part in the history of the City that they should not be regulated in the manner the Ordinance provides for. Petitioners' argument also fails because the Ordinance only regulates Transient Rentals, it does not eliminate historical Transient Rental uses. The City's Plan also fails to support Petitioners' argument. The City's Plan does not address, or require, the continuation of "historical" land uses such as Transient Rentals. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, it is concluded that the Ordinance is consistent with Principal E. Principle H: Public Health, Safety, and Welfare and the Economy of the City. Principal H requires a consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, and the economic viability of the City. These factors are inextricably tied to the tourist industry of the City. Without the tourist industry, the City's economy would likely falter to the detriment of the public health, safety, and welfare. A large part of what makes the City attractive, to tourist and residents alike, is the unique community atmosphere and the historical character of the City. The health of the tourist industry in the City is, in part, caused by the City's vibrant and viable communities. An essential characteristic of that vibrancy is the fabric of the people that inhabit the City and the interactions of those inhabitants among themselves and with tourists. As long as tourists continue to enjoy the unique character of the City, they will continue to enjoy their experience and will continue to come back to the City. If that unique character is significantly diminished or lost, so too will be the tourist industry. A number of factors threaten the quality of the tourist experience in the City and, therefore, the continued viability of the tourist industry. Those factors include the shortage of available and affordable housing, a shortage of labor to serve the tourist industry, crowding, and conflicts between tourist and residents of the City. All of these factors are related and must be adequately addressed in order to protect the economic viability of the City. Left unchecked, tourism in the City will likely be seriously impacted. Tourism requires a large labor force to provide the services which tourist expect. The labor force must provide lodging, food, retail sales, amusements, and other services. Indirect services, such as fire protection, police, and others must be provided for also by the labor force. The labor force necessary to serve a tourist industry must be provided with adequate housing. The ability to meet this need must be balanced with the need to provide adequate accommodations to the tourists who visit a destination. The need to balance these competing interests is an even greater challenge in the City because of the existing shortage of available residential property in the City and the lack of viable measures which can be taken to address the shortage. The City's shortage of residential property is caused by the fact that the supply of available land in the City is so restricted it simply cannot meet the demand. The problem caused by the lack of available land is exacerbated by restrictions on development, including those imposed by the rate of growth ordinance and the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission. Actions of the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission cause increases in the cost of redeveloping property and limits the types of redevelopment that may be pursed. Alternatives, like housing the labor force some distance from a tourist destination and providing transportation to bring the labor force into the destination, cannot be utilized in the City to meet the demand for housing for its labor force. The unavailability of adequate land is a problem throughout the length of the Florida Keys. Tourist are now demanding a variety of accommodations. The national trend has seen a increase in the demand for accommodations other than the traditional hotel or motel. Many tourists desire accommodations that include multiple rooms, including kitchen facilities. Transient Rentals have become increasingly available in order to meet part of this demand. Hotels and motels have also begun to offer efficiency- like units. Transient Rentals have also increased because of 1986 changes in federal income tax laws. Those changes have resulted in more owners of vacation housing turning their properties into Transient Rentals in order to offset the cost of the properties. The availability of Transient Rentals has significantly increased in scope and magnitude over what was historically experienced in the City. In addition to the impact on the types of accommodations desired by tourist and the tax benefits of converting property to Transient Rental use, tourism itself has increased dramatically during the past 30 years, further increasing the demand for tourist accommodations. According to a report on housing in the City known as the "Shimberg Report," from 1990 to 1995 the number of housing units decreased from 12,221 to 11,733, a decrease of 488 units. Despite this decrease, the number of households in the City during the same period increased from 10,424 to 11,298, an increase of 874. Economically, a commercial-type use, such as Transient Rentals, will usually be more profitable than a residential use of the same property. The City has experienced this economic impact. As a result of the higher economic value of using a residence as a Transient Rental, tourist use of residential property have in many cases displaced the residential use of property. The demand for Transient Rentals and the need to provide for housing for the labor force necessary to serve the City's tourist industry involve competing and inconsistent goals. In order to meet the need for Transient Rentals in the City, it has been necessary to convert housing formerly used to house the City's residents, including those who make up the labor force. The resulting decrease in residential housing and the increase in Transient Rentals also result in crowding, with members of the labor force in the City being required to share available space with tourists. Crowding results in unacceptable densities of use and increased user conflict. The resulting decrease in residential housing caused by the increase in Transient Rental use in the City has not only resulted in permanent residents leaving the City's communities, but in their departure from the City and the Florida Keys altogether. In addition to the negative impacts on housing, a tourist destination can become so popular that the very quality of the location is negatively impacted or even destroyed. John Pennekamp State Park, located in the northern part of the Florida Keys, has been so successful at attracting visitors that it has been negatively impacted. Although tourism has not reached a point where it is destroying the unique character of the City, the very thing that attracts many visitors to the City, it has the potential of reaching that stage without adequate planning by the City. Shopping by residents in the "downtown" area of the City has already been displaced by shopping areas located away from Old Town. Dr. Virginia Cronk testified during the hearing of these cases concerning what can happen to a community's identity if tourism becomes too dominate. The City is already showing some signs of the negative impact tourism can have on a community. As more stress from overcrowding is placed on the City's communities, the very base of the City's tourist industry is impacted. Not only will the labor force be moved out, the community atmosphere of communities that is so attractive in the City may be diminished or even destroyed. As in many other tourist destinations, the activities of tourists and permanent residents the City are often incompatible. This is especially true in the City because much of what attracts tourists to the City is associated with the City's residential neighborhoods. Part of the tourist destination of the City is its neighborhoods. The type of visitors attracted to the City over the last decade has changed significantly. Many tourists now come to "party" on Duval Street, often late into the night and the early morning hours. The partying often continues back to, and at, the accommodations that the tourists utilize. Many tourists make every effort to maximize their "fun time" by staying up late and playing hard. Because tourists are on vacation, they are not as concerned about when they go to sleep and when they enjoy the City. They are not required to keep any particular schedule, so they are more at liberty to stay up into the early morning hours. Because tourists are only in the City for a short time, they are also less concerned with getting along with their neighbors. They want to have a good time and assume that everyone around them is there for the same reason. Permanent residents of the City are much like permanent residents everywhere. The adults are employed during the day and their children attend school. They go to bed and rise earlier than tourists generally do. Because of the differences in the goals of tourists and permanent residents, inevitable conflicts arise when tourists and residents mix. Unless those conflicts are controlled in the City, permanent residents will be forced out, threatening to end one of the very features that has made the City so attractive to tourists: the unique community atmosphere and historical character of the City. Dr. Cronk explained the different social forces which impact the behavior of tourists and residents. Tourists are simply not subject to the same informal social controls that residents are. As a result, the behavior of tourists often comes into conflict with the behavior normally associated with a true community neighborhood. Because the behavior of tourists is not subject to the same informal social controls as residents, residents must turn increasingly to more formal social controls such as the police and private security forces. These controls often do not work and are more expensive than the informal social controls normally associated with neighborhoods. Witnesses during the hearing of these cases gave examples of clashes between permanent residents and tourists. Those incidents are fully reported in the transcript of the hearing of this matter and are summarized in the proposed orders filed by the Department and City, and the duPonts. The need to resort to more formal social controls, such as the police and private security was also explained by these witnesses. The credible testimony of Ms. Rowe, Margaret Domanski, and Martha duPont accurately describe the types of conflicts the Ordinance is intended to reduce. The impact which the conversion of residential properties to Transient Rentals has on affordable housing in the City is difficult to measure. The Department has suggested that it is significant. Petitioners argue that there is no impact and that, even if there were some impact, affordable housing is not one of the Principles and, therefore, should play no part in the review of the Ordinance. The principles which apply to Monroe County require that Monroe County "make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys." Section 380.0552(7)(j), Florida Statutes. This principle is consistent with the legislative intent set out in Section 380.0552(2)(d), Florida Statutes, that a local government provide affordable housing in close proximity to places of employment in the Florida Keys. The Principles applicable to the City ACSC do not contain a principle specifically requiring that affordable housing be maintained. The lack of a specific requirement concerning affordable housing does not, however, support a conclusion that affordable housing should be ignored when applying the Principles to land development regulations adopted by the City. On the contrary, Principle H is broad enough to require a consideration of affordable housing. After all, any consideration of the "public health . . . welfare, and economy" of the City, necessarily must include a consideration of affordable housing. Without adequate housing for all sectors of the City's population, the public health and welfare of the City cannot be maintained. Nor can the economy of the City survive without adequate housing for all segments of the work force. "Affordable housing" does not mean housing for the poor. "Affordable housing" is defined in terms of the percentage of a household's income spent on housing which is considered "affordable" by very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income persons. What is considered affordable is based upon the median household income of a community's very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income population. The approximate median household income of City residents is $49,000.00. In order for the City to be considered to have adequate "affordable housing," persons making between 80 and 120 percent of the median household income, or $39,000 to $59,000, should be able to afford a house. The average value of a single-family house in the City, however, is $300,000, well above the price affordable to persons with a household income of between $39,000 and $59,000. Because of the disparity between the average price of homes and the low median household income of City residents, an enormous burden is placed on residents to fund any type of housing. As much as 30 percent of residents' income must be spent on housing. The number of residents spending at least 30 percent of their income on housing increased significantly between 1990 and 1995. That number is likely to continue to increase. As the cost of residential property increases, the economic burden on residents for housing continues to increase. The cost of residential property is increasing, and will continue to increase, because of the conversion of residential property to Transient Rentals. If the City takes no action with regard to balancing tourist accommodations, particularly Transient Rentals, and housing for its residents, the ability of residents to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted. Even though it is doubtful that the Ordinance will increase the ability of residents to actually own their own home, there is no doubt that their ability to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted if Transient Rentals continue to displace the use of property for residential purposes. In adopting the Ordinance, the City recognized the negative impact that tourism is having on the City: . . . the transient use of residential dwellings has had deleterious consequences in the residential neighborhoods of Key West; and . . . the increase in the conversion of residential dwellings to transient use is, in part, responsible for the affordable housing shortage in Key West, a shortage confirmed in a study of the City by the Shimberg Center of the University of Florida . . . The finding concerning affordable housing is consistent with the City's Plan. Objective 3-1.1 and Note 2, Policy 1-3.12.3 of the City's Plan. In adopting the Ordinance, the City took a reasonable step to address the problems associated with tourism. The Ordinance, while causing an initial negative impact to the economy, will promote the protection of residential neighborhoods from unnecessary intrusion, promote affordable housing, and ultimately ensure the continued viability of the tourist economy of the City. By limiting the intrusion of Transient Rentals into most residential neighborhoods in the City, the Ordinance will limit the intrusion of negative tourist activities into those neighborhoods. Those negative impacts testified about by Ms. Rowe, Ms. Domanski, and Ms. duPont will be, in most cases, prevented or at least reduced. The reduction of tourist intrusions into neighborhoods will also ensure that the unique community character of the City remains viable. The Ordinance will go a long way in keeping the charm of the City's neighborhoods intact for tourists and residents both. The Ordinance goes a long way in planning for tourism in the City. Reducing economically competitive uses of property in the City, such as the use of property for Transient Rentals, will ensure that the scarce supply of residential property is not further reduced. Stabilizing the supply of residential property, while not eliminating cost increases, will at least eliminate the increase in housing costs associated with the conversion of residential property to Transient Rental use. Eliminating the unlicensed use of Transient Rentals, which the Ordinance will do, will have the effect of actually returning some residential property to the supply of property available to residents. By prohibiting the use of residential properties as Transient Rentals, the total properties in the City available for housing, including for long-term rentals, for permanent residents, will increase. As supply increases, the demand for all housing, including to a very limited extent affordable housing, will be better met. By reducing the drain on residential properties in the City, the strain on the work force necessary to serve the tourist economy of the City will also be reduced. The City recognized and accepted the fact that the Ordinance will have an initial negative impact on the economy of the City. The Pallini Report was commissioned by, and considered by the City Commission. There will be an immediate reduction in revenues from unlicensed Transient Rentals that comply with the Ordinance and the income associated with providing services to those Transient Rentals. Some tourists who would otherwise select the City as their vacation destination will go elsewhere. Unlicensed Transient Rentals (taxed and untaxed), however, make up no more than ten percent of the total accommodations available in the City. It is estimated that the Ordinance will result in a loss in gross sales of $31 million, a loss in personal income of $9 million, and a loss in City revenues annually of $260,000. It is also estimated that there will be a loss of approximately 500 jobs associated with unlicensed Transient Rentals. These estimates are the "worst case" scenario figures. Actual losses will likely be somewhat less. The losses associated with the Ordinance will, however, not be long-term. Gradually, the tourist industry will adjust to the decrease in tourist accommodations and the negative impact on the economy. Some tourists will adjust the time of year they come to the City, resulting in greater tourist business during traditionally slower times. Persons who experience unemployment as a result of the Ordinance will also very likely find other employment relatively quickly because of the tight labor market in the City. The negative economic impacts to the City caused by the Ordinance should not last longer than three to five years. After that time, the economy will adjust. The overall impact of the Ordinance will be to help balance the need to provide tourist accommodations and the need to protect the charm of the City and the ability of the City to provide a work force. Protection of residential neighborhoods in the City comes within the City's responsibility to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and is a necessary consideration in providing for the economic well- being of the City. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H. Truman Annex. It has been argued by Mr. Coleman that the application of the Ordinance to the Truman Annex supports a conclusion that the Ordinance is not consistent with the Principles. The evidence failed to support this contention. Truman Annex is located within walking distance of most tourist destinations in the City. The character and atmosphere of Truman Annex makes it an attractive tourist destination in itself. The "Little Whitehouse," a house utilized by President Harry Truman, is located within Truman Annex as is a tourist destination itself. While the Truman Annex is located in an area conducive to use as tourist accommodations, nothing in the City's Plan or land development regulations, the development orders associated with Truman Annex, the historic use of Truman Annex, the public health, safety and welfare, or the continued economic viability of the City depends upon such use. Truman Annex consists of residential housing and tourist accommodations, as well as some commercial facilities. Those activities are, however, largely buffered from each other. Most of the commercial activities are located in the western portion of Truman Annex. The residential housing is located primarily in the eastern portion of Truman Annex. Truman Annex without Transient Rentals constitutes appropriate planning by the developer of Truman Annex and the City. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, constitutes an appropriate effort of the City to manage land uses and development. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, will protect the historic heritage of Truman Annex and, more importantly, the City. Finally, the evidence proved that the application of the Ordinance to Truman Annex will not adversely impact the public health, safety, welfare, or the long-term economy of the City. Consideration of the Principles as a Whole. The evidence in these cases supports a conclusion that the Ordinance has no or little impact on most of the Principles, except Principles A, E, and H. The evidence proved that the Ordinance is neutral with regard to the other Principles. When Principles A, E, and H are considered individually and together, the evidence proved that the Ordinance is consistent with Principles A, E, and H. The Ordinance constitutes an effort of the City to manage land uses and development in the City, consistent with Principal A. The Ordinance will also help to protect the historic heritage of the City by preserving the character of the City's neighborhoods and, as a result, will preserve the tourist industry, consistent with Principal E. Just as clearly, the Ordinance will enhance the safety, health, and welfare of the residents of the City. Finally, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H because it will benefit the public health, safety, and welfare of the City by protecting neighborhoods from the intrusion of tourists, reducing the impact of the conversion of residential housing for Transient Rentals, and ensuring the continued character of the City. While there will be an initial negative impact on the economy of the City as a result of the Ordinance, ultimately the Ordinance will have a positive impact on the economy of the City due to the positive impact on the City's tourist industry which will result from the regulation of Transient Rentals. Abbey Petitioners' Rule Challenge, Constitutional Issues, and Other Issues. In the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing (hereinafter referred to as the "Amended Petition") filed by the Abbe Petitioners, the Abbe Petitioners attempted to challenge pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, portions of the Final Order of the Department as an unpromulgated rule. The Amended Petition was not, however, filed consistent with the requirements of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. This challenge was required to be filed in a separate petition filed solely with the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter referred to as the "Division") and not through an amendment to a petition originally filed with the Department which was subsequently filed by the Department with the Division with a request that the Division hear the matter. Additionally, even if the issue were properly before the Division, the evidence in this case failed to prove that the statements in the Final Order have any application other than to the Ordinance. Therefore, those statements are not "agency statements of general applicability." The statements are not, therefore, "rules" as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. The Abbe Petitioners also raised issues in the Amended Petition other than the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles. Other than the question of the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles, the evidence failed to support the Abbe Petitioners' argument that the issues raised in the Amended Petition are relevant to this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving City of Key West Ordinance 98-31 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development of Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey M. Bell, Esquire Ritter, Chusid, Bivona & Cohen, LLP 7000 West Palmetto Park Road, Suite 400 Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Jerry Coleman, Esquire Post Office Box 1393 Key West, Florida 33041 John F. Rooney 208-10 Southard Street Key West, Florida 33040 Andrew S. Grayson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Robert Tischenkel, City Attorney City of Key West Post Office Box 1409 Key West, Florida 33041 David J. Audlin, Jr., Esquire Eaton Street Professional Center 524 Eaton Street, Suite 110 Key West, Florida 33040 Lee R. Rohe, Esquire Post Office Box 500252 Marathon, Florida 33050 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carol A. Licko, General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed real estate salesman, is guilty, as charged, of fraud, misrepresentation, culpable negligence or breach of trust in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact I. At all times material to the charges, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., in Melbourne, Florida. He obtained his real estate salesman's license in 1982. On March 14, 1985, became a licensed real estate broker and now operates his own business under the name of Peter Frontiero Realty. His office is located in his residence at 3247 West New Haven Avenue, Melbourne, Florida. II. On or about April 7, 1983, while employed as a real estate salesman at Apollo Realty, Inc., Mary E. Sousa obtained a listing on a tract of land owned by John and Janet Biansco. In connection with the listing, an Exclusive Right of Sale Contract was executed. This contract contained the following legal description of the tract to be sold: Parcel of land lying in the County of Brevard in the southwest 1/4 of Sec 11, TW 28 South Range 36E more particularly described as follows: S 2/3 of the following tract: commence at SE corner of W 1/2 of Sec 11 TW 28 South Range 36E, thence along south line of said Sec 11, 589-54-14 West for 30 feet., thence north 1- 17-00E for [sic] 43 feet to the point of beginning thence south 89-54-14 west along the north R/W line Melbourne Tillman Drainage district canal #63 for 297.43 feet, thence north 1-15-49 east for 353 feet, thence north 89-54-14 east for 297.55 feet, to the west R/W line of Arizona Street; thence south 1 17-00 West along R/W line for 353.00 feet, to the point of beginning. (P-4, Admissions No. 5, 6) As so described, this tract of land measures 235.34' x 297.47' and contains approximately 1.61 acres. (Admission No. 7) Mary E. Sousa and her broker, Peter Sergis, however, incorrectly determined that the legal description described a tract of land measuring 297' x 353' feet, containing 2.4 acres. (They determined this by examining the legal description attached to the Listing Contract and relying on Mr. Biansco's representation that the tract contained 2.4 acres.) Mary E. Sousa then had the property listed in the Melbourne Multiple Listing Service (MLS) on or about April 26, 1983. The MLS listing reflected the incorrect measurements and size of the tract, as submitted by Ms. Sousa. (P-3, Admission No. 8) III. During May, 1983, Karen Dunn-Frehsee and Paul Winkler (her fiance), contacted Respondents, a real estate salesman associated with Woodlake Realty, Inc., about purchasing a home. After Respondent showed them a house they were interested in, Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler decided that what they really wanted was to buy land on which they could build a residence. They told Respondent that they would need a minimum of two acres since they had two horses: local zoning requirements required at least one acre of land per horse. (Admission No. 10, Testimony of Dunn-Frehsee) Respondent checked MLS and found the listing (containing the incorrect measurements and size) of the Biansco property. He showed the land to Ms. Dunn- Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, who liked it and decided to make an offer. (At that time, Respondent was unaware that the MLS listing erroneously described the tract to be 297' x 353', containing 2.4 acres, when in fact it was 297.47' x 235.34', containing approximately 1.61 acres.) On or about May 5, 1983, Respondent prepared a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" containing the offer of Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. After she signed it, it was presented to the Bianscos, who subsequently accepted it. (Admission No. 12, P- 1) The Contract for Sale and Purchase contained, on the attached addendum--a correct legal description of the tracts as the description was taken from the listing agreement, not the erroneous MLS listing. Prior to closing, Respondent contacted Ms. Dunn-Frehsee several times to advise her regarding efforts being made by Lawyers Title Insurance Company to locate the prior owner of the property and secure a quitclaim deed covering a 30-foot strip of land bordering Arizona Street on the east side of the property. He was still unaware of the discrepancy between dimensions of the property contained on the MLS listing and the Contract of Sale. He did not tell Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had personally measured the property, or that he had confirmed the accuracy of the listing information. He was concerned only with the problem of obtaining access to the property through the 30-foot strip bordering Arizona Street. Although he told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he thought she was getting 2.7 or 3.0 acres by virtue of the additional strip of land which was to be quitclaimed to her at no additional cost, this belief was based on his reasonable assumption that the original tract contained 2.4 acres, as represented by the listing agents (Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty) and reflected in the Multiple Listing Book. Respondent also contacted Mr. Winkler, but similarly, did not represent to him that he (Respondent) had personally measured the property or confirmed the MLS information. (Testimony of Respondent) Prior to the closing, Respondent discussed with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee the need to order a survey of the property. She then ordered a survey, which was completed a week and a half before closing. After picking it up, Respondent telephoned Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. There is conflicting testimony about the conversation which ensued. Respondent testifies that he telephoned her and asked if she would like him to deliver the survey to her house or mail it to her, or if she would like to pick it up at his office. (TR-30) Ms. Dunn- Frehsee, on the other hand, testified that Respondent telephoned her stating that he had looked the survey over and there was no reason for her to drive out to his office to pick it up, that he would bring it to the closing. (TR-48) Neither version is more plausible or believable than the other. Both Respondent and Ms. Dunn-Frehsee have a discernible bias: Respondent faces charges which could result in the revocation of his professional license; Ms. Dunn-Frehsee has sued Respondent for damages resulting from her purchase of a tract of land which was smaller than what she was led to believe. Since the burden of proof lies with the Departments, the conflicting testimony is resolved in Respondent's favor as it has not been shown with any reliable degree of certainty that Respondent told Ms. Dunn-Frehsee that he had looked the survey over and that there was no need for her to examine it before closing. Both witnesses agree, however, and it is affirmatively found that Ms. Dunn-Frehsee agreed that Respondent should bring the survey with him to the closing, which was imminent. The surveys prepared by Hugh Smith, a registered land surveyors correctly showed the property to be approximately 235.33' x 297.43', but did not indicate the size by acreage. (Admission No. 20, P-2) At closings on or about June 23, 1983, Respondent showed the survey to Ms. Dunn-Frehsee. Ms. Dunn- Frehsee questioned the measurements as not being the same as she recalled being on the MLS listing. Neither Ms. Sousa nor Respondent, both of whom were in attendance, had a copy of the MLS listing so that the measurements on the two documents were not compared. (Admission No. 22-23) Ms. Dunn-Frehsee chose to close the transaction anyway after her questions regarding the property were apparently resolved to her satisfaction by Kathleen Van Mier, the agent for Lawyers Title Insurance Company which was handling the closing. Ms. Dunn-Frehsee signed a contingency statement indicating that all contract contingencies had been satisfied and that she wished to proceed with the closing. (TR-4O-41; 77-78) Respondent was misinformed regarding the dimensions and size of the property by the listing agents, Mary Sousa and Peter Sergis of Apollo Realty, who had provided inaccurate information to the Multiple Listing Service. Respondent reasonably relied upon the listing information and the representations of the listing agents concerning the size of the property. In his discussions with Ms. Dunn-Frehsee and Mr. Winkler, he drew reasonable inferences from such (incorrect) representations. He did not intentionally mislead anyone. It has not been shown that, under the circumstances, he failed to exercise due care or that degree of care required of a licensed real estate salesman. Nor has it been shown that he violated any professional standard of care adhered to by real estate salesmen and established by qualified expert testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges against Respondent be DISMISSED for failure of proof. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1985.
The Issue Whether Petitioners have standing to initiate formal proceedings under the City of Tallahassee Code of Ordinances. Whether the Planning Commission has jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the City's vested rights determination. Whether the Respondents Barnette W. Allen and Sally P. Allen's (Allens) proposed development, known as the Allenwoods Apartments project, is exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City of Tallahassee's (City) Comprehensive Plan.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Downtown Park Avenue Neighborhood Association (Neighborhood Association), Inc., is not-for-profit corporation organized on August 18, 1997, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Neighborhood Association's principal office is located at 858 East Call Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The purpose of the Neighborhood Association is to preserve the residential nature and stability of the members' neighborhood. The members of the Neighborhood Association reside in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Some members of the Neighborhood Association own property within 500 feet or less of the subject property. Petitioner Dana Plummer resides at 133-9 Oak Street, Tallahassee, Florida, which is in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Mr. Plummer owns property less than 300 feet from the subject property. Plummer is the President of the Neighborhood Association. Respondent City of Tallahassee is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. The City's DRC approved a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Respondents Allens are the owners of the property on which the proposed Allenwoods Apartments are to be located, and which property is designated as Blocks D and F in the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. Allenwoods Apartments The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to be constructed in approximately 8.64 acres, and is located on the north side of Call Street. The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to consist of 88 apartment units. The apartments will be located within three three-story buildings and one two-story building, with a total of 202 parking spaces. The density of the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project is approximately ten units per acre. On October 24, 1996, the Planning Department issued Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 which stated that: This site is eligible for development of 110 multi-family dwelling units developed at the RM-1 standards in Hays Subdivision, an exempt subdivision. Type B review required in proximity with existing low density residential uses. Notice of the Planning Department's decision to issue Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 was not provided to any members of the Neighborhood Association nor to Plummer. In May 1997, the Allens submitted a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. In mid-June 1997, during the City's review of the proposed project, the City determined that the Allens' two lots qualified as lots located within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the development of the property was completed prior to that date. Accordingly, the City staff determined that, pursuant to Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project did not have to comply with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Consequently, the City staff did not review the Allenwoods Apartments project for consistency with the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan, nor did the City review the project for concurrency. On August 11, 1997, the City's Development Review Committee approved the Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Single-family residences are the primary use of the properties immediately adjacent to the Allens property. All existing multi-family units that have been constructed in the neighborhood were constructed prior to the adoption of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. History of the Subject Property On May 1, 1910, J. L. Hays recorded a subdivision known as the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. The plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division is recorded at Deed Book "KK," page 600, of the Public Records of Leon County. The plat depicted a street running between Blocks F and G. The plat also depicted a street between Blocks D and F. These streets were never constructed. On January 15, 1946, H. H. Wells acquired certain Blocks of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division, including all of Blocks D and F, and a portion of Block E. On March 11, 1946, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells replated all of Block C and a portion of B, D, E, F, and G. The new subdivision was named "Magnolia Manor," and is recorded at Plat Book 3, page 6, of the Public records of Leon County. On January 6, 1948, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells sold all of Blocks F and G, and Lots 9, 10, and 11 in Block D, of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to the Glover Construction Company. On July 22, 1948, the Glover Construction sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Willie Mae Hampton. On November 1, 1963, Glover Construction Company sold a portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Harlem J. Allen, Clyde P. Allen, Barnette W. Allen, and Sally Procter Allen. On February 13, 1964, Willie Mae Hampton sold her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Canal Timber Corporation. On December 2, 1964, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen entered into an agreement to purchase that portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division owned by the Canal Timber Corporation. On November 20, 1972, Canal Timber Corporation sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Grace H. Gibson. On December 26, 1974, Grace H. Gibson transferred her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen. On December 15, 1976, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen acquired whatever property interests that Harlem J. Allen and Clyde P. Allen possessed by virtue of the acquisition that occurred on November 1, 1963. The City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance The City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan on July 16, 1990. Concurrently with the adoption of its 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the City adopted its Vested Rights Review Ordinance, Ordinance No. 90-O-0043AA. This ordinance was codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances. Article VII (Sections 18-101 through 18-106) of the Tallahassee Code of Ordinances establishes the standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Section 18-101 of the Code is a statement of intent in regard to the Vested Rights Ordinance, which reads: This article establishes the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Said administrative procedures shall provide determinations of consistency of development with the densities and intensities set forth in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and that development is not subject to the concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The City established three categories for which property owners could apply to establish their vested rights to continue development of their property without complying with the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. These categories are contained in Sections 18-104(1) and (2), Code of Ordinances. The three categories were denominated as "common-law vesting," "statutory vesting," and developments of regional impact, which were approved pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 18-103(2), property owners who contended that they had vested rights pursuant to one of these three categories were required to request a determination of vested rights by filing an application with the Planning Department within 120 calendar days of July 16, 1990. The failure to timely file an application for a vested rights determination within the prescribed time limits constituted a waiver of any vested rights claims. The city's Vested Rights Review Ordinance also expressly states that a property owner cannot receive vested rights based upon a zoning classification. In addition to the three categories for which property owners could apply to establish vested property rights, the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance included a provision by which certain property owners were presumptively vested and, therefore, were not required to file an application for a vested rights determination. Section 18-103(1) reads, as follows: The following categories shall be presumptively vested for the purposes of consistency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and concurrency as specified in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and shall not be required to file an application to preserve their vested rights status: All lots within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, or lots in approved subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development have been completed as of July 16, 1990. The Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department shall maintain a listing of such exempt subdivisions. All active and valid building permits issued prior to July 17, 1990. All technically complete building permit applications received by the building inspection department on or before July 2, 1990, and subsequently issued, shall be vested under the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, regardless of date of issuance. Any structure on which construction has been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued if a certificate of occupancy was required at time of permitting. All lots of record as of July 1, 1984, not located within a subdivision, but only to the extent of one (1) single-family residence per lot. If a property qualifies as an exempt or vested property pursuant to the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the property owner does not have to comply with the consistency and concurrency provisions of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Such properties are allowed to be developed pursuant to the 1971 zoning code that was in effect until the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The City staff and DRC determined that the subject property was vested because it fulfilled the requirements of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) as a lot "within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990." The basis for this determination was that the property was located within the plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division which was recorded in 1910. The plat does not contain any statements as to use or density, however. The subdivision, known as Magnolia Manor, plated in 1946, has its own separate subdivision number, and consists of a portion of property that was originally part of the Magnolia Heights Addition to the Hays Division. A small portion of the Allens' property is located within the Magnolia Manor subdivision. Although from 1948 to 1974, Blocks D and F were both divided and transferred in a manner differently than that depicted on the 1910 Plat, all conveyances of the property subject to the Site Plan have been by reference to the lot and block of Magnolia Heights Addition. Subsequent purchasers of the property conveyed the lots subject to the Site Plan to the Allens, and described the lots as part of the original subdivision rather than by any reference to "Magnolia Manor." The replatting of certain lots within the subdivision to create "Magnolia Manor" did not affect or otherwise change any of the property subject to the Site Plan. On August 20, 1990, the City determined that the Magnolia Heights Addition was an exempt subdivision pursuant to the provisions of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of City Code of Ordinances, and was placed on the Planning Department list of exempt subdivisions. As such, the subdivision was exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. The subdivision is one of more than 300-350 subdivisions determined to be exempt as recorded subdivisions. The exemption was based upon the fact the project was located in a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the subdivision and for development of the property was in place and complete as of that date. The City staff has been guided in its interpretation and application of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance by a memorandum dated August 27, 1990, written by then Assistant City Attorney John Systma. The August 27 memorandum states, in pertinent part, that: This memo is in response to your questions about the proper procedure to follow in determining if a subdivision recorded in 1906 should be declared exempt under the provisions of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance. The critical element that must exist for the subdivision to be exempt is that the current subdivision must be identical to the plat that was created when the subdivision was initially recorded. Any resubdivision, replatting or other changes made to the original recorded plat invalidates that plat. An excellent example of an invalid plat is the original plat recorded for the Pecan Endowment, which has subsequently been changed many times, thereby invalidating it. The subdivision was recorded as of July 16, 1990. The resubdivision of a part of an exempt recorded subdivision, which does not affect the property under review and subject to development approval, has never been the basis of denial of the recorded subdivision exemption provisions of the Vested Rights Ordinance. City staff have never denied the exemption or vesting based upon a replatting of other lots in a subdivision which were not included in the proposed exempt development. Respondents clearly established that such replatting has not been a basis for denial of the exemption by City staff in applying the Vested Rights Ordinance since its adoption in 1990. The development approvals for the Allenwoods Apartments are valid if it is determined that the project is exempt or vested under the Vested Rights Ordinance. The property, at the time of adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, was zoned RM-1, and allowed development of a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens. The current zoning of the property is MR1 and would permit the development of the property as a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission find that Respondents Allens' lots are vested for the purposes of consistency and concurrency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, and, it is further RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission approve the Site Plan for the Allenwoods Apartment Project, as consistent with the requirements of Chapter 27, Article XXI, Section 21.4.G.8. of the Code of Ordinances. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Francis, Esquire Francis & Sweet, P.A. Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David A. Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst Assistant City Attorney City Hall 300 South Adams Street Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Gumula Director of Planning Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Gregory Clerk of the Planning Commission Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert B. Inzer City Treasurer-Clerk 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues presented for determination are whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (FHFC) determinations regarding the applications responding to Request for Applications 2019-116 SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Development to Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits (the RFA), were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious; and whether the award to Respondent Christian Manor Restoration, LLC (Christian Manor), is contrary to governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications of the RFA.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Parkwood is an applicant responding to the RFA. The Parkwood application, assigned number 2020-422BS, was deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Respondent Christian Manor is an applicant responding to the RFA. The Christian Manor application, assigned number 2020-405BS, was deemed eligible and was selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. FHFC is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. The purpose of FHFC is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. FHFC is tasked with allocating a portion of the certain Disaster Recovery funding allocated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to the State of Florida Action Plan for Disaster Recovery. Waterview was an applicant responding to the RFA. The Waterview application, assigned number 2020-424BSN, was deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. FHFC is authorized to allocate housing credits and other funding by means of requests for proposals or other competitive solicitation. See § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code Ch. 67-60 (governing the competitive solicitation process). FHFC allocates its competitive funding pursuant to the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). Funding is made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (RA). An RA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA was issued on November 6, 2019. It was modified several times, and the final RFA was issued on December 20, 2019. The application deadline was December 30, 2019. Sixty-five applications were submitted in response to the RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to FHFC’s Board of Directors (the Board). The Review Committee found 57 applications eligible, seven applications ineligible, and one application withdrew from the selection process. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, 13 applications were preliminarily recommended for funding, including Christian Manor. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On March 6, 2020, the Board met and considered the recommendations of the Review Committee for the RFA. At 9:35 a.m. that same day, all RFA applicants received notice that the Board determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for funding consideration and that certain eligible applicants were preliminarily selected for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets on the FHFC website, www.floridahousing.org: (1) listing the Board-approved scoring results for the RFA, and (2) identifying the applications which FHFC proposed to fund. There is no dispute that Petitioner and Christian Manor received this notice. In the March 6, 2020, posting, FHFC announced its intention to award funding to 13 applications including Christian Manor. No challenges were made to the terms of the RFA. RANKING AND SELECTION PROCESS Through the RFA, FHFC seeks to award an estimated total of $71,360,000 in SAIL Financing, as well as tax-exempt bonds, to assist in financing the development of affordable rental housing for tenants who are either low-income or extremely low-income. The available SAIL financing was to be divided so that a certain amount was targeted both geographically, between Large, Medium, and Small Counties, and demographically, between applicants proposing housing for families and those proposing housing for the elderly. Applicants who are awarded tax-exempt bond financing are also entitled to an award of non-competitive federal low-income housing tax credits. FHFC made approximately $5,611,650 in National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) funding available to applicants committing to build either new construction or rehabilitation of family or elderly housing for “Persons with Special Needs.” Applications in this RFA are scored in two categories for a possible total of ten points. Five points each can be awarded for Submission of Pre- Approved Principal Disclosure Form and Local Government Contributions. Because so many applicants achieve a perfect score of ten, the RFA establishes a series of tiebreakers referred to as a “sorting order,” designed to rank order applications for funding selection. The RFA set the following sorting order, after listing applications from highest score to lowest score: By eligibility for Proximity Funding Preference; then By eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference; then By Leveraging Level number 1 through 5; then By eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Preference; then By randomly assigned lottery number. The RFA also established a series of funding goals. Those goals were: One New Construction Application in a Large County serving Elderly residents. Three New Construction Applications in a Large County serving Family residents, with a preference that at least two of such Applications being from “Self-Sourced” Applicants. One New Construction Application in a Medium County serving Elderly residents. Two New Construction Applications in a Medium County, with a preference that at least one such Application being from a self-sourced Applicant. The RFA designated each county in Florida as either Large, Medium, or Small. The RFA also allowed an applicant to designate itself as “Self- Sourced,” which requires applicants proposing new construction family projects to provide a portion of their development funding themselves, in an amount of at least half of its SAIL Request Amount (or $1 million, whichever is greater). The RFA provided that eligible applicants be assigned a Leveraging Level 1 through 5, with 1 being the best score, based on the total Corporation SAIL Funding amount relative to all other eligible applicants’ total Corporation SAIL Funding amount. The Leveraging Level is a comparative tool to rank applicants based on how much SAIL funding each applicant has requested per affordable housing unit (Set-Aside Unit) it proposes to construct. Calculation of the Leveraging Level includes adjusting the total amount of SAIL funds requested by an applicant based on a variety of factors, including development type, development location, construction method to be employed, and whether a Public Housing Authority is part of the applicant, then dividing that adjusted amount by the applicant’s proposed number of Set-Aside Units. For example, the SAIL Request per Set-Aside Unit is reduced by ten percent for applicants proposing a Mid-Rise Four-Story building, while applicants proposing Garden Apartments or Townhouses do not receive this adjustment, and applicants proposing Five-Story or Six-story Mid-Rises or High-Rises get a greater reduction. Applicants whose adjusted SAIL Request per Set-Aside Unit is among the lowest ten percent of all calculated SAIL Request amounts per Set-Aside Unit in this RFA are assigned Leveraging Level 1; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 2; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 3; the next 20 percent are Leveraging Level 4; and the highest 30 percent are Leveraging Level 5. The RFA employed a “funding test,” requiring that the full amount of an applicant’s SAIL request be available for award when that applicant is under consideration for funding; partial funding awards are not permitted. Sufficient SAIL funding must be available in both the county size group (Large, Medium, or Small), and the demographic category (elderly or family) for an applicant to be selected. Within the county size group, the RFA contains a pour-over provision for any unallocated Small County funding to be divided between the Medium and Large County funding availability; and any unallocated Medium County funding would be made available to Large County applicants. Further, in order to promote geographic distribution of funding awards, the RFA included a County Award Tally mechanism. If an applicant was selected in a particular county, a second applicant would not generally be selected from that same county if there was any eligible applicant available (even with a lower total application score) from any other county, from which an applicant had not already been selected for funding. The RFA set forth a very specific funding selection order, taking into consideration two specific counties (Miami-Dade and Broward), county size groups, development category (new construction or rehabilitation), demographic group (elderly or family), and self-sourced status. CHRISTIAN MANOR’S APPLICATION One of the criteria in the RFA for scoring and ranking applications involves proximity to certain services. The RFA provides in relevant part: e. Proximity The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point [(DLP)] and the Bus or Rail Transit Service (if Private Transportation is not selected at question 5.e.(2)(a) of Exhibit A) and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points are awarded according to the Transit and Community Service Scoring Charts outlined in Item 2 of Exhibit C. Proximity points will not be applied towards the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference, as outlined in the chart below. Requirements and Funding Preference Qualifications All Large County Applications must achieve a minimum number of Transit Service Points and achieve a minimum number of total proximity points to be eligible for funding ... All Applications that achieve a higher number of total proximity points may also qualify for the Proximity Funding Preference as outlined below. Community Services (Maximum 4 Points for each service, up to 3 services) Applicants may provide the location information and distances for three of the following four Community Services on which to base the Application’s Community Services Score. The Community Service Scoring Charts, which reflect the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances, are outlined in Exhibit C. Location of coordinates for Community Services Coordinates must represent a point that is on the doorway threshold of an exterior entrance that provides direct public access to the building where the service is located. * * * Eligible Community Services Grocery Store - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Public School - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected only if the Applicant selected the Family Demographic Commitment. Medical Facility - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Pharmacy - This service is defined in Exhibit B and may be selected by all Applicants. Scoring Proximity to Services (Transit and Community) (b) Bus and Rail Transit Services and Community Services Applicants that wish to receive proximity points for Transit Services other than Private Transportation or points for any community service must provide latitude and longitude coordinates for that service, stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place, and the distance between the [DLP] and the coordinates for the service. The distances between the DLP and the latitude and longitude coordinates for each service will be the basis for awarding proximity points. Failure to provide the distance for any service will result in zero points for that service. The Transit and Community Service Scoring Charts reflecting the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances are in Exhibit C. (emphasis added). Applicants from a Large County, including Palm Beach County (where Christian Manor is located), must receive at least 10.5 Proximity Points (including at least 2.0 Transit Service points) to be eligible for consideration for funding, and at least 12.5 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. In its Application, Christian Manor selected three public bus stops for its Transit Services, at claimed distances of .04 miles, .03 miles, and .51 miles from its proposed DLP. It was awarded 5 points for Transit Services. The validity of Christian Manor’s claimed Transit Services is not disputed. For its Community Services, Christian Manor identified the following services: Grocery Store - Aldi Food Market, 2481 Okeechobee Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33409, at a distance of 0.73 miles Medical Facility - MD Now Urgent Care, 2007 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33409, at a distance of 0.82 miles Pharmacy - Target (CVS Pharmacy), 1760 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida 33401, at a distance of 0.70 miles. The Aldi Food Market meets the definition of a Grocery Store in the RFA. The MD Now Urgent Care meets the definition of a Medical Facility in the RFA. Christian Manor identified each service by latitude and longitude coordinates and by distance. These coordinates, however, did not accurately reflect the doorway threshold of either the Aldi Food Market or the MD Now Urgent Care Center. The latitude and longitude coordinates provided for the Grocery Store were erroneous. The listed coordinates identify a point over 0.9 miles away from the doorway threshold of the Aldi Food Market. The latitude and longitude coordinates provided for the Medical Facility identify a point over 0.8 miles away from the doorway threshold of the MD Now Urgent Care Center. The actual distance between the Aldi Food Market and the DLP is .73 miles. The actual distance between the street address of the MD Now Urgent Care Center and the DLP is .82 miles. Based on these identified services, Christian Manor was awarded 3 points for the Grocery Store, 3 points for the Pharmacy, and 2.5 points for the Medical Facility. The points awarded for the Pharmacy are not disputed. Parkwood argues that Christian Manor should be awarded no proximity points for its identified Grocery Store or Medical Facility. Parkwood does not argue that the Aldi Food Market is not a Grocery Store as defined by the RFA, nor does it argue that the MD Now Urgent Care is not a Medical Facility as defined by the RFA. Parkwood does not question the identified addresses for the Community Services or contest that the distances between the identified Aldi Food Market and the MD Now Urgent Care and the DLP are .73 miles and .82 miles respectively. Rather, Parkwood’s argument is narrowly focused on the fact the erroneous longitude and latitude coordinates for the grocery and medical services are not at the doorway threshold. Parkwood would have FHFC ignore the actual addresses and distances because of the error in coordinates. Respondents argue the mistake in coordinates was a minor irregularity. The RFA specifically gives FHFC the right to waive minor irregularities. Rule 67-60.008 provides the criteria that FHFC is to consider when evaluating whether an error should be waived as a minor irregularity. Minor irregularities are those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Ms. Button testified that an evaluating FHFC Review Committee member does not use the latitude or longitude coordinates to confirm the accuracy of the distances provided. Rather, the inclusion of the requirement for such coordinates dates back to when measurements were done by surveyors, who would certify the distances on a special form. FHFC no longer requires the surveyor certification form. FHFC now requires an applicant to self-designate the community services and proximity requirements. FHFC considers the actual distances as the most relevant factors when evaluating points awarded for proximity from the DLP to a selected Community Service. Ms. Button also testified that listing the incorrect latitude and longitude coordinates could, in this particular case, be waived as a minor irregularity. She explained that because the proximity points are based on the distance between the DLP and the identified services, and because the distances claimed in Christian Manor’s application were correct, the proximity points awarded were also correct. Ms. Button opined that Christian Manor did not garner a competitive advantage from the coordinate errors in the application. The coordinates did not create any uncertainty in the application as to what Community Services were identified or how far they were from the DLP. Petitioner pointed to no evidence of any such advantage. Ms. Button also testified that the error in coordinates did not result in any harm to the public or to FHFC. Again, Petitioner provided no evidence of such harm. Rather, Petitioner relies on a different application in a different RA, where the scorer for FHFC had determined that an applicant should be found ineligible because that applicant had failed to list the proper coordinates for one of its listed Community Services. That applicant, however, never challenged FHFC’s finding, and therefore never presented evidence or argument contesting this finding of ineligibility. It is unclear whether the applicant in the other case was found ineligible for other reasons as well, where that applicant was ranked, and whether there were other circumstances that would have affected the scoring and ranking in that particular RA. Ms. Button testified that if the error in coordinates had been challenged, FHFC would then have examined the particular circumstances of the situation to determine whether or not the error should have been waived as a minor irregularity. There is no dispute that the Christian Manor application contained a similar error, and that if Christian Manor had not been able to demonstrate that the claimed distances to the grocery store and medical facility were accurate, that error would have resulted in the application being found ineligible. But there is insufficient evidence to determine whether Petitioner is comparing “apples to apples” when relying on this other situation. Any reference to this other applicant in the other RA is unreliable and unconvincing. Regardless, in this case, the undersigned examined the circumstances of Christian Manor’s application and finds based on the preponderance of the evidence (made up of the stipulated facts and Ms. Button’s unrefuted testimony) any inaccuracies in the longitude and latitude coordinates provided by Christian Manor constitute a minor irregularity that may be waived by FHFC. Based on the facts established, the award to Christian Manor is reasonable and neither erroneous, arbitrary, nor capricious. WATERVIEW’S APPLICATION One of the requirements of the RFA is that applicants demonstrate certain Ability to Proceed elements. One of those elements is as follows: Appropriate Zoning. Demonstrate that as of the Application Deadline the entire proposed Development site is appropriately zoned and consistent with local land use regulations regarding density and intended use or that the proposed Development site is legally non-conforming by providing, as Attachment 9 to Exhibit A, the applicable properly completed and executed verification form: The Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification that Development is Consistent with Zoning and Land Use Regulations form (Form Rev. 08-18) [(Zoning Form)]. As part of its application, Waterview submitted a Zoning Form executed by Elisabeth Dang, a City Public Official. The Zoning Form states, among other requirements: The undersigned service provider confirms that, as of the date that this form was signed, the above referenced Development’s proposed number of units, density, and intended use are consistent with current land use regulations and zoning designation or, if the Development consists of rehabilitation, the intended use is allowed as a legally non-conforming use. To the best of my knowledge, there are no hearings or approvals required to obtain the appropriate zoning classification. Assuming compliance with the applicable land use regulations, there are no known conditions that would preclude construction or rehabilitation of the referenced Development on the proposed site. Once it receives the Zoning Form, FHFC does not require that an applicant demonstrate in its application that it will be capable of constructing the proposed development, nor does FHFC attempt to independently verify that an applicant will be capable of constructing the proposed development during the application process. FHFC does not require an applicant to submit engineering drawings or final site plans during the application process, nor does the RFA contain any restrictions or requirements concerning the height of any proposed buildings. All of the details and verifications concerning the actual construction of the proposed project are evaluated during the credit underwriting process. Based partially on its identification of Development Type in its application to FHFC as “Mid-rise 4 stories,” Waterview’s adjusted SAIL request per affordable unit resulted in it being assigned Leveraging Level 4. If it had instead identified a Development Type of “Garden Apartments,” it would have received Leveraging Level 5. Petitioner argues that Waterview will be unable to construct the four- story mid-rise building identified in its application while also meeting a 40- foot height limitation in the local zoning code. As explained above, for the same reasons the undersigned sustained the objections to Petitioner’s exhibits relating to zoning issues and feasibility of constructing the proposed development, the undersigned finds at this stage (eligibility, scoring, and ranking), FHFC was not required to independently verify that the proposed development would comply with all building and zoning regulations.4 The evidence established that Waterview submitted the required Zoning Form executed by a person with authority from the City to execute such a form. There was no evidence presented that Waterview’s Zoning Form was improperly completed, or that it was obtained through fraud or illegality. Moreover, there was no convincing evidence that the Zoning Form was improperly completed. FHFC did not make an independent determination as to whether a proposed project would comply with all local zoning requirements, but instead relied on the representation of the local official who executed the Zoning Form. Petitioner also argues Waterview should be deemed ineligible because it presented different information to the City than it presented to FHFC in its application. Specifically, Petitioner challenges use of the term “garden apartment” by Waterview in materials it submitted to the City, but not submitted to FHFC; and the impact of Waterview’s proposed development on wetlands. The undersigned rejects these arguments for multiple reasons. 4 Had Waterview been awarded funds, but its proposed development could not be built due to zoning restrictions, that would be addressed during the credit underwriting process. First, Petitioner alleges that the presentation of additional information to the City somehow conflicts with the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form that applicants are required to sign which provides in relevant part: “In eliciting information from third parties required by and/or included in this Application, the Applicant has provided such parties information that accurately describes the Development as proposed in this Application.” Ms. Button, however, testified that providing more information to the local government than is presented to FHFC would not in itself conflict with this statement in this form. Second, Mr. Savino’s deposition testimony established he had a number of communications with the City regarding the proposed project and submitted numerous documents for the City to review. Mr. Savino testified he used the term “garden apartments” when discussing the project with the City to refer to apartment complexes, not to the FHFC definition of “garden apartments” as being three stories or less. There is no evidence rebutting Mr. Savino’s version of events, nor is there any indication what the City understood the term to mean. Third, Petitioner argues that Waterview’s proposed project might have impacted wetlands on the property, contrary to relevant regulations. However, Mr. Savino testified that Waterview could build the project without impacting wetlands. Waterview also included among the documents submitted to the City a Revised Preliminary Site Plan which indicated that the Waterview development would not impact wetlands. Regardless, even if it had been shown that the Waterview project would impact wetlands, this would only impact its ability to receive NHTF funds; it would not have any impact on whether FHFC deems an applicant eligible for funding under this RFA. Ms. Button testified that each applicant is required to check a box on the application indicating whether it is seeking this special funding, but none are required to take it. This special funding is not considered by FHFC when evaluating an applicant’s funding sources during the application review process, and FHFC does not even evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for the NHTF during the scoring process. Even if Petitioner could prove Waterview would not be able to qualify for the special funding, there would be no impact on the scoring of its application. Ultimately, Petitioner presented no evidence that the City had somehow been misled into signing the Zoning Form required by the RFA, or that it had not understood that the proposed project involved a four-story building. The fact that the Ms. Dang did sign the Zoning Form indicates that she believed the City had all the information it needed to do so. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, Waterview’s application is eligible for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation, enter a final order consistent with its initial decisions: (1) finding the applications of Waterview Preserve, LLC, and Christian Manor Restoration, LLC, eligible for funding; (2) awarding the RFA funding to Christian Manor Restoration, LLC; and (3) dismissing the formal written protest of BDG Parkwood Lofts, LP. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James Barker (Barker), has been a city commissioner for the City of Coral Gables (City) since 1989. The Country Club of Coral Gables (Country Club) was established by City founder George Merrick, prior to the City's incorporation. Since 1929, the City which owns the land and buildings from which the Club operates, has leased the property to private entities. Since 1935, the lessee of the property has been the Country Club, a non-profit corporation run by a board of directors elected by the Country Club membership. Between 1935 and 1958, the lease underwent various modifications and extensions. In 1958, the City Commission voted to extend the lease to July 31, 1990. Under the terms of the lease, the Country Club paid three percent of its gross annual income, but in no case less than $5,000 per year, to the City as rent. In 1977, the Country Club again came before the City Commission requesting a lease extension, this time to the year 2002. There was no change in the rent amount. The request for extension was to allow the Country Club to borrow money for construction, and the request was approved. In 1978 the Country Club asked the City Commission for rezoning so that it could expand its tennis courts. This request was approved. In May, 1980, the Country Club asked the City Commission for a $23,000 loan to repair its roof. The City Attorney advised that the City could not lawfully make such a loan, and no further action was taken on the matter. In 1981 the Country Club asked to expand its tennis club facilities, and this request was approved. In 1983 a significant portion of the Country Club burned down. A request by the Country Club to support its efforts to raise funds from citizens for the Country Club, was on the July 26, 1983, City Commission agenda, but was not taken up. A discussion of the status of the building was held on that date, but no action was taken. Instead of rebuilding the burned section with the insurance money, the Country Club decided to construct an already planned new section. On November 22, 1983, representatives of the Country Club presented a plan for restoration to the City Commission, which on motion of Commissioner Kerdyk, approved the plan. On March 27, 1984, the City Commission authorized the City Manager to sign an affidavit needed by the Country Club to obtain a building permit. In April 1984, the Country Club requested extension of its lease to the year 2020. On motion of Commissioner Kerdyk, the City Commission agreed to the extension. In September 1984, the Country Club asked that the lease be reworded in order to satisfy the lending institutions from which the Country Club was borrowing money for renovations. The request was approved. When the Country Club initially undertook its restoration and remodeling plan, the Country Club leadership believed that there would be sufficient funds to accomplish both the rebuilding and the new construction. Cost overruns, diminishing membership, and other factors combined, however, to leave the Country Club with a new section, an old, burned-out section, and a significant debt. In 1987, the Country Club asked the City Commission to assist it, by contributing funds or otherwise, in overcoming that debt. On November 24, 1987, the City Commission met and discussed the problem. The only action taken was to invite the Country Club leadership to an up coming City Commission meeting to discuss proposed improvements. On January 26, 1988, the City Commission met with the Board of Directors of the Country Club to discuss the Country Club's request. The City Commissioners were informed that the Country Club's rent payments had been generating approximately $40,458.64 per year in income to the City. The Country Club vice-president proposed that the City rebuild the outside shell of the building, at a cost of $1,000,362 and the Country Club finance the remainder of the construction, about $1,900,000. The City Attorney advised that the City could not loan funds to the Country Club, because it was a private club. However, he opined that the City could participate in the rebuilding because it was the owner of the property. Action was postponed until the next meeting. On February 3, 1988, the Country Club made an offer to the City to increase its rent payment from three percent to six percent, if the City would rebuild the shell. The matter was raised at the February 9, 1988, meeting of the City Commission. Mayor Corrigan proposed that the City finance the rebuilding, but made no motion. Commissioner Wolff proposed that the City obtain funds from the Sunshine State Governmental Financing Commission and lend that money to the Country Club. The motion was seconded by Commissioner Kerdyk, and ultimately the City Commission resolved to refer the matter to the acting city manager to "work out financing without using taxpayer dollars." At the February 9 meeting, discussion was had on the issue of whether the City Commissioners had conflicts of interest, since they all had complimentary memberships to the Country Club. Mr. Zahner, the City Attorney, advised that they had no conflict. The issue of conflict of interest was again raised at subsequent meetings. Alternative proposals identified by the City Manager for funding the Country Club's rebuilding were discussed at the City Commission's March 8, 1988 meeting, but no action was taken. On June 30, 1988, the Country Club proposed that the City forgive lease payments until the year 2000. On August 30, 1988, the City Commission voted to suspend the lease payments, with the funds going instead to the maintenance and reconstruction of the facility. Membership in the Country Club is open to any person, provided they can pay the initiation fee and membership dues. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the initiation fee was $1,000, although it sometimes was reduced to $500 during membership drives. The annual fee was $750. Membership entitles the member and his or her family to use the swimming pool, health club, tennis courts, and bar and restaurant. Members must pay for their meals. Occasionally Barker would stop by the Country Club for cocktails or brunch. For more than twenty years the Country Club has traditionally awarded memberships to city officials and various other persons. The Country Club bylaws provide for such memberships. The bylaws provide for honorary memberships and complimentary memberships. Only one honorary membership has been given. The only difference between what the Country Club calls a complimentary membership and an honorary membership is the duration of the membership. Complimentary memberships run from year to year. Persons awarded complimentary memberships include the City Commissioners, Mayor, City Manager, Assistant City Managers, the City Clerk, City Attorney, Director of Public Works, Finance Director, City Architect, Fire and Police Chief, the University of Miami President, Football Coach, and Assistant Athletic Director, the Golf Pro at the City golf course, and the editor of the local social magazine. The complimentary memberships are reviewed each year and are not renewed after the recipient leaves his or her office. The Coral Gables Executive Club (Executive Club) is located in an office building at 550 Biltmore Way. The building and the Executive Club are owned by Albert Sakolsky, a local real estate developer. The Executive Club, which opened in the late 1980's, consists of a dining room and health club. Membership costs $700.00 initiation, and $50.00 per month dues. Mr. Sakolsky hired a public relations firm to promote the Executive Club. The firm recommended that complimentary memberships be given to community leaders and developed a list of persons who receive memberships. Over a hundred free memberships were granted. In February, 1989, Mr. Sakolsky wrote to City Manager Jack Eads, presenting the City with a "permanent corporate membership." Although the letter appeared to infer that the use of the health facilities would be free to those applying through the City's corporate membership, the practice was to change holders of complimentary memberships such as Barker $30 a month for the use of the health facilities if they desired to use them. With his letter, Mr. Sakolsky included membership applications for all the City Commissioners, as well as the Mayor the City Attorney, and Mr. Eads. Mr. Sakolsky and the City had had numerous disputes over the years on various issues. His presentation of the free corporate membership was an effort to, in his words, "bury the hatchet." A complimentary membership entitled the member to use the dining facilities. Soon after its inception the Executive Club was opened to the pubic. The only privilege members received over non-members was a discount on their meals. A non-member could be given a complimentary membership after first visit, thereby entitling him to receive a discount on subsequent visits. In September, 1989, the City Commission voted to lease space in the 550 Building. The rental rate was $20 per square foot. When the lease expired, the owner of the building proposed a higher rate, which the City did not accept. The City vacated the building and rented space elsewhere. Barker has been a member of the Country Club since 1986, and was a member when he was elected to the City Commission in 1989. Barker's private employment is in marketing. Until he was elected to the City Commission, Mr. Barker's employer paid his membership dues. Subsequent to his election, Barker's membership was changed by the Country Club to a complimentary membership. Under the terms of the complimentary membership, Barker was not allowed to vote in Country Club elections or hold an office in the Country Club, but continued to retain all the other benefits he had been entitled to as a paying Country Club member. The Country Club dues were paid by Barker's employer until Barker was elected to the City Commission. Barker understood that the complimentary memberships were a tradition in the City. No one from the Country Club ever asked him for favors. No vote concerning the Country Club was pending before the City Commission when Barker received his complimentary membership. The only vote concerning the Country Club in which Barker participated while a Country Club member was a vote to postpone action. No one from the Country Club ever asked Barker for any favors. No vote concerning the Executive Club was pending before the City Commission when Barker received his complimentary membership. Barker thought that his membership to the Executive Club was a public relations gesture. He viewed the Executive Club not as a private club but as a restaurant. Barker usually went to the Executive Club as someone else's guest. Barker never voted on a matter concerning the Executive Club. The Executive Club and Country Club memberships were given to a variety of private community leaders as well as City officials. Barker cancelled his complimentary memberships when the State advised him of his position regarding a conflict of interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that James Barker violated Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes, by accepting a free membership to the Coral Gables Country Club and by accepting a free membership to the Executive Club. I therefore recommend a civil penalty of $750 and restitution of $750 for the violation involving the Coral Gables Country Club and a civil penalty of $1,000 and restitution of $600 for the violation involving the Executive Club for a total penalty $3,100. The civil penalty for the violation involving the Country Club is mitigated due to the advice given to Barker by the City Attorney that there was no conflict of interest. The restitution in both cases is the amount a member of the general public would have had to pay for one year's dues. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3911EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-18: Accepted. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23-26: Accepted. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: Accepted. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 30-34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is Rejected as constituting a Conclusion of Law. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. There is no paragraph 36. Paragraphs 37-38: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 39: Accepted. Second Paragraphs 38-39: Accepted. Paragraph 40: Accepted. Paragraph 41: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the City officials who were receiving complimentary memberships through the City's corporate membership could use the health facilities for a fee of $30 per month but Rejected to the extent that it implies that the City officials could use the health facilities at no cost. Paragraphs 42-43: Accepted. Paragraph 44: The first sentence is Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The second sentence is Accepted. The third sentence is Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 45-46: Rejected as constituting argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 6: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted. Paragraphs 9-12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: The last sentence is Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The remainder of the paragraph is Accepted as substance. Paragraphs 14-15: Accepted in Substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. 10 Paragraph 17: Accepted in Substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted. Paragraphs 19-23: Accepted in Substance. Paragraph 24-25: Accepted. Paragraph 26-34: Accepted in Substance. Paragraph 35: The first sentence is Accepted in Substance. The second sentence is Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: Accepted. Paragraph 37: Accepted in Substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Raoul G. Cantero, Esquire Suite 1600 2601 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahasee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether Development Order 13-87 issued by the Monroe County Planning Commission on January 21, 1988, granting major conditional use approval to a project known as Residence Inn Resort should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wigwam, Inc., is the present equitable owner of the subject parcel of land, is the successor to the development authorizations for a proposed hotel and marina known as Residence Inn Resort to be constructed on that parcel, and is the developer of the project. Respondent Peter Louis Edwards is the legal owner of the subject parcel of land. The subject parcel is a tract of land located at Mile Marker 52.4 on U.S. 1, on a portion of Government Lot 2, in Section 6, Township 66 South, Range 33 East on Key Vaca, Marathon, Monroe County, Florida. The site plan prepared for Ocean Resort now know as Residence Inn Resort, Marathon, Florida, by Kris Mihelich, Inc., last revision 9/3/87, pages SD-1 to SD-6 is the site plan approved by Monroe County for the subject parcel. The subject parcel consists of 4.82 acres of land above water located between U.S. 1 and the Atlantic Ocean. The subject parcel includes within its boundaries a dredged harbor at least 8 feet deep below mean sea level at mean low tide. The current Monroe County Land Use Maps show the land use designation for the subject parcel as Destination Resort (hereinafter "DR") for the oceanward three-quarters of the parcel and Suburban Residential (hereinafter "SR") for the landward one-quarter of the parcel adjacent to U.S. 1. The companion case, Residence Inn Resort v. Department of Community Affairs, DOAH Case No. 88-3469RGM (Final Order issued simultaneously herewith), is a challenge to a proposed rule of the Department of Community Affairs rejecting a portion of a Monroe County ordinance which would change the designation of the "SR" portion of the parcel to "DR" so that the entire parcel would be designated "DR." That rule challenge has been dismissed in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order. Accordingly, the designations for the subject parcel remain "DR" for the oceanward portion and "SR" for the landward portion. Even if the rule challenge had been successful thereby allowing the entire parcel to be designated "DR," the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law contained within this Recommended Order would remain the same. The Development Order under appeal in this cause, Planning Commission Resolution No. 13-87, would approve a major conditional use for the subject parcel. That Development Order would allow construction of a 96-unit hotel resort and would allow the harbor located within the property to be used as a marina. The 96-unit density is computed by including 24 transferrable development rights known as TDRs purchased by Wigwam, Inc., which increase the density on the subject parcel to 96-units. The maximum permittable density for this parcel designated "DR" in part and "SR" in part is not sufficient to allow a 96-room hotel. The maximum permittable density if the entire parcel were designated "DR," or as the parcel is now designated as partially "DR" and partially "SR," will not allow the development of 96 permanent dwelling units. Section 3-101.P-4. of the Monroe County Land Development Regulations provides that "permanent residential unit means a dwelling unit that is designed for, and capable of, serving as a residence for a full housekeeping unit which includes a kitchen composed of at least a refrigerator and stove." Section 3-101.T-2 of the Monroe County Land Development Regulations provides that "temporary residential unit means a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel, motel or guestroom that does not contain a kitchen " The 96 hotel rooms approved by Monroe County in the Development Order under review herein each include a kitchen. If each unit of the proposed Residence Inn Resort is constructed with a kitchen, as Resolution 13-87 would allow, each of the 96 units would be a permanent unit. The Institute of Transportation Engineering (hereinafter "ITE") Trip Generation Manual is a compilation of traffic data that has been accumulated over a number of years by transportation engineers on many types of land uses. The data has been categorized by land use and summarized in terms of average number of trips generated by each individual type of land use. The ITE studies of trip generation rates are performed by placing a standard traffic counter with a pneumatic hose at the entrances and exits to the land use in question. The traffic counter records both hourly and daily summaries of vehicle trips over the traffic counter. The ITE trip generation rate for hotels and motels is 10.189 daily trips per occupied room. The ITE trip generation rate for hotels is 8.7 trips per room on a weekday basis. The ITE definition of a hotel for the purpose of that trip generation rate is a place of lodging, providing sleeping accommodations, restaurants, a cocktail lounge, meeting and banquet rooms with convention facilities, and other retail and service shops. The only significant difference between the proposed Residence Inn Resort and the typical hotel studied in the ITE Trip Generation Manuel is that the proposed Residence Inn Resort has a marina. All of the other proposed amenities are typically found in ordinary hotels. The proximity of the proposed Residence Inn Resort to an airport is also not unusual for hotels. As discussed hereinafter, the marina, which is the only real distinguishing feature between hotels and the Residence Inn Resort, does not qualify for approval as part of this project since it is not in compliance with the Monroe County Land Development Regulations. A hotel providing 50 or more rooms is permitted as a major conditional use in a destination resort district only if the applicant has demonstrated through a traffic impact study prepared by a qualified professional that traffic generated by the use will not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the Institute of Transportation Engineering Trip Generation Manual. Section 9-213.B.1.c., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. Prior to the issuance of the subject Development Order by Monroe County, Respondent Wigwam, Inc., prepared a transportation study for the proposed development. That transportation study did not demonstrate, and made no attempt to demonstrate, that the traffic generated by the proposed Residence Inn Resort would not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. On the contrary, the transportation report submitted to Monroe County simply utilized the same trip generation rates that appear in the third edition of the ITE Trip Generation Manual. A June 21, 1988, letter directed to Monroe County from Post, Buckley, Shuh and Jernigan after the Development Order under appeal in this cause had already issued indicates that Monroe County simply assumed that the proposed Residence Inn Resort would have a trip generation rate 50% less than the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. No traffic impact studies submitted to Monroe County prior to the issuance of the Development Order under review in this case support such a conclusion. Respondent Wigwam, Inc., presented the testimony of two experts in the field of transportation engineering, Dan Hoyt and Richard Mercer. Both Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer had prepared transportation reports subsequent to the issuance of the Development Order under review in this cause, which concluded that the traffic generated by the proposed Residence Inn Resort would not exceed 50% of the trips generated by a hotel or motel as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. Both believed that the number and type of amenities included in the proposed Residence Inn Resort would be so attractive that the hotel guests would not want to leave the premises. However, Mr. Hoyt's opinion is based upon a list of amenities significantly larger than the amenities actually approved for the Residence Inn Resort. A large part of Mr. Mercer's opinion is based on the assumption that the type of people that will be guests at the proposed Residence Inn Resort simply will not want to leave the hotel, and not upon any particular merit to the amenities planned for the hotel. Both experts testified that their conclusions were based upon their overall professional judgment rather than upon specific empirical data. The Department presented the testimony of one transportation expert, Rick Hall. Mr. Hall testified that there are two methods of demonstrating an "internal trip capture rate" (the retention of guests on-site due to the number of amenities which guests would normally have to travel to off-site) that is greater than what is normally expected. The first and best method is to take empirical measurements of similar types of facilities that are already constructed. In the case of Residence Inn Resort, an existing hotel or motel with a marina located in Monroe County would be a similar facility for purposes of taking traffic generation measurements. No one has performed such an empirical study for the proposed Residence Inn Resort. The second method of demonstrating a greater internal capture rate is to move into the theoretical realm, as was attempted by Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer. However, when the internal capture rate predicted by Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Mercer is tested with common sense, as was ably done on cross-examination, it is apparent that the amenities of the proposed Residence Inn hotel are not sufficient to keep 50% of the average number of trips on-site. For example, 112 trips per day would have to be assigned to the 5-table barbecue picnic area, 50 trips per day assigned to the small beach, and numerous trips to the other small amenities. Messrs. Hoyt and Mercer did not increase the number of trips off-site for persons to purchase those items necessary to utilize the barbecue/picnic area or for preparing meals and snacks in the kitchens provided in each unit, did not consider the fact that the small beach anticipated to keep the guests of the 96- room hotel on-site would only be approximately 50 feet by 150 feet once constructed, and considered no data regarding actual use by hotel guests of the proposed small sports court based upon such usage at similar facilities. A more reasonable internal trip capture rate for the Residence Inn Resort is 20% of the ITE Trip Generation Manual rate. However, this 20% is attributed to the marina proposed for the project, which marina is disapproved in this Recommended Order as set forth below. The dredged harbor within the subject parcel is at least 8 feet deep. Just oceanward of the project boundary, the undredged ocean bottom shoals to less than 4 feet at mean low tide. This area is more than 4 feet deep measured from mean sea level. A marina is permitted as a major conditional use in a destination resort district provided that "the parcel proposed for development has access to water of at least 4 feet below mean sea level at mean low tide." Section 9- 213.B.2.a., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. The Land Development Regulations define the phrase "water of at least 4 feet below mean sea level at mean low tide" to mean locations that will not have a significant adverse impact on off-shore resources of particular importance. For the purposes of this definition, off-shore resources of particular importance shall mean ... shallow water areas with natural marine communities with depths at mean low tide of less than four (4) feet ... Section 3-101.W-1., Monroe County Land Development Regulations. The shallow water area just oceanward of the project boundary is comprised of a natural marine community of seagrass beds. The dominant species is turtle grass, also known as Thallassia. Monroe County Development Order No. 13-87 was rendered to the Department on April 7, 1988, and no earlier. The Department timely filed the Notice of Appeal and Petition in this cause. There is no basis for application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this proceeding, requiring the Department of Community Affairs and the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission to approve the Development Order issued by Monroe County which is the subject matter of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission issue a Final Order: Denying the proposed 96-unit Residence Inn Resort and marina as preliminarily approved by Monroe County in the Development Order appealed herein; Providing that the proposed hotel without marina may be approved if: None of the hotel rooms contain kitchens; The density is reduced to comply with the current "DR" and "SR" land use designations; and Wigwam, Inc., is able to demonstrate a 50% reduction in trips from the motel and hotel rate as shown in the ITE Trip Generation Manual. Providing further that a different project may be approved so long as it complies with the Monroe County Land Development Regulations. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of October, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-3450 Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-24 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1-3, 5, and 7-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 4 and 6 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues under consideration herein. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 13 and 21-25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting statements of a party's position. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Findings of Fact numbered 14-20 and 26-32 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Finding of Fact numbered 33 which is 2 1/2 pages long has been rejected primarily because it is contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent Wigwam, Inc.'s, proposed Finding of Fact numbered 34 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: David Jordan, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William J. Roberts, Esquire Roberts, Egan and Routa 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred Tittle, Esquire Tittle & Tittle, P. A. Post Office Drawer 535 Tavernier, Florida 33070 Lucien Proby, Esquire Monroe County Attorney 310 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Keesey, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Patty Woodworth, Director Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Planning and Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
