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BIGHAM HIDE COMPANY, INC. vs L. A. WOOTEN COMPANY, INC., AND THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-006193 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Coleman, Florida Oct. 14, 1992 Number: 92-006193 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1993

The Issue Whether Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products (watermelons) purchased by Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., is a licensed dealer in agricultural products. During times relevant, Respondent had a bond posted through Cincinnati Insurance Company as surety. During times material, Respondent employed Grady Smith as a field representative. As such, Smith had authority to, and on numerous occasions, purchased watermelons on behalf of Respondent. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products, specifically watermelons. Petitioner has been growing melons for approximately 30 years. Petitioner has known Smith for the duration of his production of agricultural products and has had business dealings with Smith as a representative of Respondent Wroten on numerous occasions during the past two years. During May and June of 1992, Petitioner sold 21 loads of melons to Respondent Wroten. Four of those loads are at issue in this case. (The remaining 17 loads Smith purchased from Petitioner as representative of Respondent, are not at issue herein.) On June 11 and 12, 1992, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to buy the loads of melons in controversy here. Smith purchased Sangria watermelons at four and one-half cents per pound. When the loads were loaded, graded and weighed, Smith was on hand and the totals were as follows: Load #6149 44,460 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,000.70 Load #6351 43,870 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,974.15 Load #5898 49,140 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $2,211.30 Load #5900 43,660 pounds x 4-1/2 cents = $1,964.70 The total agreed price for the melons at issue was $8,150.85. Respondent Wroten has previously paid Petitioner $4,456.13 of the amount due which, when deducted from the amount claimed together with $45.71 in melon promotion fees, leaves a balance claimed by Petitioner in the amount of $3,649.01. Beginning in 1991 and continuing through 1992, Petitioner and Smith, as representative of Respondent Wroten, agreed to the sale of melons under an understanding that the transaction was F.O.B. at Coleman, Florida, acceptance final at shipping point. This agreement included an understanding that Respondent would provide a trailer to haul the melons and would pay all transportation charges. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, payment for the melons was due "when they moved over the scales", i.e., as soon as the trucks were loaded and weighed or on the following day. Finally, the understanding and agreement between the parties was that the title and risk of loss to the melons passed to Respondent Wroten on the day of shipment. The growers receipt submitted in evidence clearly showed the essential terms of the agreement and contained no language which would indicate that the sale was conditioned in any manner respecting Respondent Wroten's claim that Petitioner agreed to "ride the load". The admitted growers receipts and other testimony supports Petitioner's claim that Respondent's representative Smith offered the same terms to other producers and growers in the area. The referenced understanding/agreement was the focal point of the terms under which Petitioner conducted business with representative Smith. Although the growers receipt did not contain a price for the melons, Petitioner's president, Greg Bigham, credibly testified that the agreed price between Bigham and Smith was 4 1/2 cents per pound. Further, Respondent offered no testimony and presented no documentary evidence establishing that the price was other than as stated by Bigham. Respondent Wroten contests that it owes the sum claimed by Petitioner based on a phone conversation allegedly had between Lee Wroten and Greg Bigham in which it is contended that Bigham agreed to bear the risk of loss of the melons to their ultimate destination. This method of sale in the industry is known as offering "protection" or "riding-the-load". Bigham acknowledged a phone conversation respecting loads of royal sweet melons which had been previously rejected by Respondent Wroten, however he did not agree to offer "protection" or otherwise "ride-the-load" as to the Sangria melons questioned here. Likewise, Smith could not remember telling Bigham that the terms of sale had changed nor did he attempt to confirm that Petitioner was required to assume the risk of loss for the Sangria melons. Likewise, the growers receipts issued thereafter to Petitioner contained no changed conditions or restrictions respecting the terms of sale. Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner offered protection or otherwise agreed to "ride the load", Respondent offered no credible evidence to establish that the melons were either defective or that there was any other fault with the melons when shipped or upon arrival at destination which would somehow require that a set off be issued to Respondent. As stated, Smith was present on June 11 and 12, 1992 and witnessed the loading and graded the melons as they were being placed on the trailers provided by Respondent Wroten. Smith, while inspecting and grading the melons, eliminated those melons which were not acceptable to him. After the melons were loaded, Smith, acting as representative of Respondent, accepted the load and observed the weighing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order requiring that: Respondent L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,649.01. In the event that Respondent, L. A. Wroten Company, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioner the sum of $3649.01 as ordered, that the Respondent Cincinnati Insurance, as surety, be ordered to pay the Department a like sum as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes and that the Department timely reimburse Petitioner in accordance with that subsection. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 6, adopted in part, Paragraph 9, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Marchbanks, Esquire MARCHBANKS DAIELLO & LEIDER 4800 North Federal Highway #101-E Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Don Davis L.A. Wroten Company, Inc. Post Office Box 2437 Lakeland, Florida 33806 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0810

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68211.30604.15604.17604.20604.21604.34
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R. L. LAWSON vs F. H. DICKS, III, AND F. H. DICKS, IV, D/B/A F. H. DICKS COMPANY; AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, 92-000901 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Live Oak, Florida Feb. 07, 1992 Number: 92-000901 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Respondents, F. H. Dicks, III; F. H. Dicks, IV; and F. H. Dicks Company, are wholesale dealers in watermelons which they purchase and sell interstate. The Respondents' agents during the 1991 melon season in the Lake City area were Harold Harmon and his son, Tommy Harmon. The Harmons had purchased watermelons in the Lake City area for several year prior to 1991, and the Petitioner had sold melons to them in previous seasons. The terms of purchase in these prior transactions had always been Freight on Board (FOB) the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. The terms of purchase of the melons sold by Petitioner to the Respondents prior to the loads in question had been FOB the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. One of the Harmons would inspect the load being purchased during the loading and at the scale when the truck was weighed out. After this inspection, the melons accepted by Harmon were Respondents'. Price would vary over the season, but price was agree upon before the melons were loaded. Settlement had always been prompt, and the Harmons enjoyed the confidence of the local farmers. In June 1991, the Harmons left the Lake City area. There were still melons being picked in the area, and Harold Harmon advised the Petitioner that Jim would be handling their business. On June 30, 1991, load F 267 of 48,600 pounds of watermelons was sold to the Respondents through their agent, Jim, for 4 per pound. Fifteen thousand pounds of this load of melons was purchased by Food Lion in Salisbury, NC, for $1,450, and the remaining 33,600 pounds were refused. That portion which was refused was transported back to Respondents' workplace, and 33,600 pounds of the melons were sold at 3 per pound, or $1,008. The Respondents received a total of $2,458 for load F 267, and had transportation cost of $1,202.50 on this load. On July 1, 1991, load F 269 of 43,710 pounds of watermelons was sold to the Respondent through his agent, Jim, for 4 per pound. This load was to be shipped to Rich Food, Richmond, VA. An annotation on the Bill of Laden indicates the load was returned to Respondent and subsequently dumped. The load was not inspected after refusal, and there is no evidence that the load did not grade to standard. Petitioner's testimony is uncontroverted, and there is no indication that the terms for these two loads were different from the earlier transactions between Petitioner and Respondent, that is, FOB the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. Under the terms of sale, FOB purchaser's truck at seller's field, the Respondent bore the costs of transportation and the risk of refusal of the produce. Respondent's recourse was against the purchaser who refused delivery. If there was a problem with the grade, the Respondents also bore the risk of loss on sales which they made and which were rejected. The Petitioner is entitled to his full purchase price on both loads: $1,748.40 on F 269 and $1,944 on F 267.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: Respondents be given 30 days to settle with the Petitioner in the amount of $3,692.40, and the Petitioner be paid $3,692.40 from Respondents' agricultural bond if the account is not settled. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McDavid, Esquire 128 South Hernando Street Lake City, FL 32055 F. H. Dicks, III c/o F. H. Dicks Company P.O. Box 175 Barnwell, SC 29812 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lady Street Columbia, SC 29202 Victoria I. Freeman Seibels Bruce Insurance Companies Post Office Box One Columbia, SC 29202 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (2) 120.57672.606
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SCOTT TUCKER AND PHILLIP WATSON vs EDDIE D. GRIFFIN, D/B/A QUALITY BROKERAGE AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-007490 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Trenton, Florida Dec. 23, 1992 Number: 92-007490 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $5,640.19 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality. Petitioners' claims against the dealer and his bond are listed in the Amended Complaint in the following amounts and categories: 6-18-92 Inv. #657 45,580 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $2,279.00 Advance - 700.00 NWPB* - 9.12 $1,569.88 6-19-92 Inv. #668 2,490 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 124.50 (paid for 42,860 lbs. short 2,490 lbs.) NWPB* - .50 124.00 6-20-92 Inv. #695 6,818 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 340.90 (paid for 39,062 lbs. short 6,818 lbs.) NWPB* 1.36 339.54 6-20-92 Inv. @ #702 .05 39,880 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $1,994.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 7.98 Pmt. - 90.00 1,186.02 6-21-92 Inv. @ #706 .05 44,740 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $2,237.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 8.95 1,518.05 6-22-93 Inv. @ #716 .04 11,280 lbs. Crimson melons lb. NWPB* - 2.32 460.88 6-22-92 Inv. @ #709 .04 46,740 lbs. Crimson melons lb. $1,869.60 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 9.35 1,150.25 Deducted for #706 - 441.82 441.82 PAID 708.43 Total Claimed $5,640.19 *NWPB = National Watermelon Promotion Board Fee Petitioners and Respondent dealer have had an oral business relationship for four to five years. Both parties agree that their oral agreement initially called for a federal inspection to be done on each load if the load were refused in whole or in part by the ultimate recipient. Respondent Griffin contended that over the years there had been further oral agreements to "work out" or "ride out" small discrepancies or partial refusals of loads without resorting to federal inspections, the cost of which inspections could eliminate the entire profit on single loads. Petitioners denied that such an amended oral agreement was ever reached and further maintained that the amounts of the loads at issue herein could not be considered "small" by any interpretation. Respondent submitted no evidence as to what the relative terms, "large" and "small," mean in the industry. Consequently, it appears that there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties on the alleged oral contract amendments relied upon by Respondent. Respondent testified that in past years, prior to 1992, he had interpreted the term "ride it out" to mean that he would simply accept the hearsay statements of ultimate recipients that named poundages of melons were bad and he would let the ultimate recipients pay for only the melons they said were good. Respondent would thereafter absorb any losses himself, not passing on the loss by deducting any amount from the full amount he would normally pay to the growers within ten days. However, 1992 was such a bad year for melons that the Respondent dealer chose not to absorb the greater losses and passed them on to the growers by way of deductions on "settlement sheets." In 1992 Respondent sent Petitioners the settlement sheets with the deductions explained thereon with the net payments as much as thirty days after the ultimate sales. Upon the foregoing evidence, it appears that Respondent had established a course of business whereby Petitioners could reasonably have expected him to absorb any losses occasioned by Respondent's reliance on hearsay statements of the ultimate recipients concerning poor quality melons unless Respondent chose not to test the questionable melons with a federal inspection. Petitioners obtained Exhibit P-5 for load 657 at Respondent dealer's place of business, but were not certain it applied to the load Mr. Tucker claimed he delivered to Respondent on 6-18-92 because Mr. Tucker did not know his load number that day. The exhibit represents the weight ticket Petitioners believe applies to the load which Mr. Tucker claimed to have delivered to Respondent dealer on 6-18-92. However, the exhibit bears two other names, "Jones and Smith," not Petitioners' respective names of Tucker or Watson. It has "WACC" handwritten across it, which Mr. Tucker claimed signified the name of his watermelon field. The number "657" also has been handwritten across it. There is no evidence of who wrote any of this on the exhibit. Respondent denied that load 657 was received from Mr. Tucker. The exhibit shows a printed gross weight of 78,900 lbs., tare weight of 32,860 lbs. and net weight of 66,800 lbs. Net weights are supposed to signify the poundage of melons delivered to the dealer. Nothing on the exhibit matches Mr. Tucker's journal entry (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) of delivering 45,580 lbs. of watermelons to Respondent dealer on 6- 18-92. Mr. Tucker testified that he was never paid for his delivery. Respondent denied there was such a delivery and testified that he paid Jones and Smith for load 657. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $1,569.88 on Invoice 657. Petitioners' Exhibit P-4 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records that Petitioners contend apply to load 668. The first page has "45,350/6-19-92/Scott Tucker WACC" handwritten across it. None of the four poundages imprinted thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 668, and subtracting amounts testified to also does not conform these figures to Petitioners' claim on load 668. The second page weight ticket shows a date of 6-18-92 and a weight of 34,260 lbs. It also does not match Petitioner's claim that they were owed for 45,350 lbs. but were paid for only 42,860 lbs., being paid 2,490 lbs. short. Exhibit P-8 is the 668 invoice/settlement sheet which Respondent provided to Petitioners and shows invoice 668 with date of 6-19-92, tare and pay weight of 42,860 lbs. at $.05/lb. for $2,143.00 less $8.57 melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB, see supra) for $2,134.43, less a $700.00 advance and $10.00 for packing straw for a total due Petitioners of $1,424.43 which Respondent has already paid. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $124.00 on Invoice 668. Petitioners Exhibit P-6 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records. The first page has "45,880 lbs./6-20-92/Scott Tucker Crimson WACC 695" handwritten across it. None of the printed gross, tare, or net weights thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 695. The second page shows the date 6-20-92 and a printed net weight of 32,000 lbs. Respondent dealer provided Petitioners with Exhibit P-7, invoice/settlement sheet 695 dated 6-20-92 showing tare and pay weights of 39,062 lbs. priced at $.05/lb. totalling $1,953.10, less melon adv. assoc. (a/k/a NWPB) fee of $7.81, for $1,945.29, less $700.00 advanced, less $10.00 for packing straw for a total of $1,235.29. The foregoing do not support Petitioner Tucker's claim based on his journal entry (P-3) that he was entitled to be paid for 45,880 lbs. he claims he delivered that day instead of for 39,062 pounds (short by 6,818 pounds) with balance owing to him of $339.54. Respondent has paid what was owed on invoice 695. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 9 shows that Petitioner Tucker delivered 39,880 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-20-92 and Petitioner Watson received back from Respondent dealer an invoice/settlement sheet 702 showing 39,880 pounds @ $.05/lb. equalling $1,994.00 and that although $1,994.00 was owed Petitioners, Respondent thereafter subtracted for $800.00 worth of returned melons, a $700.00 advance, $7.98 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), and $10.00 for packing straw, and that a balance was paid to Petitioners of only $90.00. This is arithmetically illogical. The subtractions total $1,517.98. Therefore, if all of Respondent's subtractions were legitimate, the total balance due Petitioners would have been $476.02. If the right to deduct for the $800.00 in returned melons were not substantiated by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners would be due $1,276.02. Since all parties acknowledge that $90.00 was already paid by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners are due $1,186.02 if Respondent did not substantiate the right to deduct the $800.00. Load 702 was "graded out," i.e. accepted as satisfactory, by a representative of Respondent dealer or a subsequent holder in interest when the melons were delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer. That fact creates the presumption that the melons were received in satisfactory condition by the Respondent dealer. Nothing persuasive has been put forth by the Respondent dealer to show that the situation concerning the melons' quality had changed by the time the load arrived at its final destination. Respondent got no federal inspection on this load and relied on hearsay statements by persons who did not testify as to some melons being inferior. In light of the standard arrangement of the parties over the whole course of their business dealings (see Findings of Fact 5-7 supra), Petitioners have proven entitlement to the amount claimed on load 702 of $1,186.02. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite 10 shows Petitioners Tucker and Watson delivered 44,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-21-92. At $.05/lb., Petitioners were owed $2,237.00, less melon adv. association fee (a/k/a NWPB) of $8.95, $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for straw. Those deductions are not at issue. Therefore, Petitioners would be owed $1,518.05, the amount claimed, from Respondent. However, the invoice also notes that Respondent made a $268.18 deduction for melons returned. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1 purports to be a BB&W Farms Loading Sheet and Federal Inspection Sheet. Respondent offered this exhibit to show that only $68.18 was realized by him on load 706 which he attributed to Petitioner Watson. However, the federal inspector did not testify as to the results of the inspection, the inspection sheet itself is illegible as to "estimated total," the "estimated total" has been written in by another hand as "$62.60," and there was no explanation on the Composite Exhibit or in testimony as to how Respondent dealer came up with $200.00 in "return lumping charges" as also indicated on Exhibit R-1. Accordingly, Petitioners have established that with regard to load/invoice 706, they delivered watermelons worth $2,237.00 to Respondent dealer and Respondent dealer did not affirmatively establish that any melons were bad, despite the federal inspection sheet introduced in evidence. Petitioners have proven entitlement to their claim on invoice 706 for $1,518.05. However, Petitioners conceded that Respondent actually paid them $441.82 on invoice/settlement sheet 706. Therefore, they are only entitled to recoup a total of $1,076.23 on their claim for Invoice 706. In the course of formal hearing, Respondent dealer admitted that, with regard to load invoice 716, (Tucker) he did owe Petitioners $460.88 for 275 watermelons, and that it had not been paid purely due to clerical error. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 12 (Invoice and Weight Tickets 709, Watson) shows Petitioner Watson delivered 46,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-22-92 and at $.04 lb., Petitioners were owed $1,869.60, less appropriate deductions. Petitioners conceded that Respondent dealer appropriately deducted $9.35 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for packing straw, bringing the amount they were owed to $1,150.25. Petitioners and Respondent are in agreement the Respondent paid only $708.43 of the $1,150.25 owed on invoice/settlement sheet 709 because Respondent dealer also deducted from the amount owed on invoice 709 the $441.82 he had previously paid out on Invoice 706. See, Finding of Fact 13, supra. Since Petitioners have established that they were owed $1,518.05 on invoice 706 but were paid only $441.82 thereon, it appears that Petitioners should be paid $1,076.23 on Invoice 706 and realize nothing on Invoice 709.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioners $1,186.02 on invoice 702, $1,076.23 on invoice 706, and $460.88 on invoice 716 for a total of $2,723.13, dismissing all other claimed amounts, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $2,723.13, which in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Tucker and Phillip Watson Route 2 Box 280 Trenton, FL 32693 Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage Post Office Box 889 Immokalee, FL 33934 William J. Moore USF&G Post Office Box 31143 Tampa, FL 33631 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21604.34
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RONALD BASS vs KELLY MARINARO, D/B/A SUNNY FRESH CITRUS EXPORT AND SALES COMPANY AND UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, 96-005172 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Nov. 05, 1996 Number: 96-005172 Latest Update: May 19, 1997

The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to all or part of $12,732.61 he claims as a result of eight loads of watermelons brokered by Respondent Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Respondent Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida is surety for Respondent Sunny Fresh. Petitioner's father had long done business with Kelly Marinaro's father, Frank Marinaro, before each father's retirement. Upon what basis the fathers traded is not clear on the record. Petitioner approached Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh on three occasions with written proposals, two of which involved some front money being put up by Kelly Marinaro to help Petitioner grow and sell watermelons. One proposal suggested a standard broker's fee to be taken off loads. In each instance, Kelly Marinaro rejected the proposals, explaining that he was not a grower or a buyer but only "brokered" melons other people grew. On or about June 15, 1996, Petitioner telephoned and requested that Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh assist him in the sale of watermelons he had already grown on a 40 acre field near Wildwood, Florida. Earlier in the 1996 watermelon season, Carr Hussey had taken two loads of melons from Petitioner's field. Hussey had advanced Petitioner $3,000 for harvesting of the melons. Although Petitioner claimed that Mr. Hussey bought his melons in the field, he also conceded that the melons he sold Mr. Hussey did not net that amount when sold to the ultimate purchaser, and therefore, neither Mr. Hussey nor Petitioner made any profit on those two loads. Mr. Hussey did not require reimbursement of the $3,000 he had advanced and proposed that Petitioner and he "work it out" the following season. However, Mr. Hussey took no more loads of Petitioner's melons and "went off to Georgia." This left Petitioner in need of some immediate help in selling his remaining melons. In the June 15, 1996 phone call, Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh agreed to "broker" Petitioner's remaining watermelons to ultimate buyers in the north and northeast United States whom Marinaro lined up by telephone before shipping the melons. That is, he agreed to use his best efforts to sell the watermelons on Petitioner's behalf to ultimate consumers, charging Petitioner one cent per pound or $1.00 per hundred weight sales charge. The parties' arrangement depended upon the sale of the watermelons and the price actually paid at the ultimate destination, rather than the price the watermelons ideally could be sold for on the day they left Petitioner's field. The parties' agreement by telephone was not reduced to writing, but Findings of Fact 8 and 9 are made contrary to Petitioner's assertion that "they (Sunny Fresh) inspected; they bought the melons as is" for the following reasons. Kelly Marinaro had previously rejected any different risk for his company than selling the melons at the ultimate destination. He produced a written notation he had made contemporaneously with his telephone negotiation with Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's vague testimony to the contrary, it appears that Petitioner had had arrangements with other brokers in the past whereby he knew no profit would be made if the melons did not arrive in good condition, and he should have been aware that the actual sale price received at the point of delivery was the standard of doing business. Petitioner did not dispute that the sales charge was to be deducted by Kelly Marinaro from the ultimate price obtained. This is consistent with a dealer selling on behalf of a grower at the ultimate destination. Petitioner relied on prices given in the standard "Watermelon Reports" as F.O.B. (F.O.B. usually signifies delivery at a certain price at the seller's expense to some location.) I also find that the parties agreed to the price of the melons being based upon the amount they netted at the melons' ultimate destination for the reasons set out in Findings of Fact 13 and 16-21. Frank Marinaro, the father of Kelly Marinaro, is retired and regularly resides outside the State of Florida. He is unable to drive himself due to age and infirmity. He has a hired driver named James Hensley. The senior Mr. Marinaro is not a principal or employee of Sunny Fresh, but he likes to visit his son and his old cronies in Florida's watermelon belt during the growing season, for old times' sake. He was visiting his son in June, 1996. Kelly Marinaro arranged for Frank Marinaro to be driven by Mr. Hensley to Wildwood. Kelly Marinaro then transferred $6,300 of Sunny Fresh's money to a Wildwood bank where it was withdrawn in cash by Frank Marinaro. Frank Marinaro, driven by Mr. Hensley, then delivered the cash in three incremental payments authorized by Kelly Marinaro to Petitioner to pre-pay Petitioner's harvesting costs. The senior Mr. Marinaro also helped with the incidental duties of meeting trucks at the Wildwood weighing station or local truck stops and directing them to Petitioner's farm. He was not paid by Sunny Fresh or by Petitioner for these services. Petitioner testified that Frank Marinaro was present in his field for the loading of several truckloads of melons on different days, that he cut open some melons in the field and pronounced them "good" after sampling them, and that Frank Marinaro asked Petitioner to pay Mr. Hensley $50.00 for helping around the field and with physically loading some melons while they were there. This testimony is not evidence of Frank Marinaro's "apparent agency" to engage in the more complicated and technical process of "grading" watermelons on behalf of Sunny Fresh. These activities of Frank Marinaro did not alter Petitioner's agreement with Kelly Marinaro on behalf of Sunny Fresh so that Frank Marinaro's and James Hensley's actions constituted a direct sale to Sunny Fresh of all the melons loaded at Petitioner's farm (the point of embarkation) because both Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro clearly testified that the $6,300 cash harvesting costs constituted advances against receipts of the sale of watermelons when sold by Sunny Fresh at the ultimate destination. Further, the request that Petitioner pay Mr. Hensley for helping load the watermelons is in the nature of Petitioner paying a casual laborer for harvesting rather than it is evidence that any Sunny Fresh authority resided in Mr. Hensley. Between June 17, 1996 and June 21, 1996, Petitioner loaded eight truckloads of watermelons onto trucks for sale to various customers in the north and northeast United States. Of the eight truckloads loaded, the breakdown of actual costs and expenses worked out as follows: ACCOUNTING OF R. BASS LOADS Sunny Fresh #93775 Sold to: Frankie Boy Produce Frankie Boys #96095 New York, NY Weight shipped: 41,250 Unloaded weight: 40,400 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $1,212.00 Sales charge: (404.00) Watermelon promotion board tax: (8.08) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2 cents/lb $ 799.92 Sunny Fresh #93791 Sold to: Fruitco Corp. Fruitco #1880 Bronx, NY Weight shipped: 40.800 Unloaded weight: 39,180 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 - ½ cents/lb Net return $ 974.71 Sales charge: (391.81) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.84) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 2.49 cents/lb $ 575.06 Sunny Fresh #81312 Crosset Co. #67012 Sold to: Crosset Co. Cincinnati, OH Weight shipped: 45,860 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 41,762 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,134.42 Shipping charges (freight): (1,712.63) Net return: 2,421.79 Sales charge: (438.48) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.75 cents/lb (8.35) $1,974.96 Sunny Fresh #93804 Sold to: Tom Lange Co. Lange #3344 St. Louis, MO Weight shipped: 44,550 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 39,760 5 cents/lb Gross return $2,584.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,455.96) Net return: 1,128.44 Sales charge: (445.50) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 1.72 cents/lb (7.95) $ 674.99 Sunny Fresh #93802 M.A. Fruit #N/G Sold to: M.A. Fruit Trading Corp New York, NY Weight shipped: 40,130 Unloaded weight: 36,720 Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $3,797.40 Shipping charges (freight): (1,758.55) Net return: 2,038.85 Sales charge: (401.30) Watermelon promotion board tax: (7.34) Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb $1,630.21 Sunny Fresh #93817 Sold to: C. H. Robinson Company C.H. Robinson #379035 Cleveland, OH Weight shipped: 43,300 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to 42,147 grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $4,440.21 Shipping charges (freight): (1,930.27) Net return: 2,509.94 Sales charge: (411.02) Watermelon promotion board tax: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 5 cents/lb (8.43) $2,090.49 Sunny Fresh #93819 Sold to: Isenberg #N/G Joseph Isenberg, Inc. Buffalo, NY Weight shipped: Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 45,100 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 500.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,877.98) Net return: (1,377.98) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.06 cents/lb (451.00) $(1,828.98) Sunny Fresh #81334 Sold to: Palazzola . Palazzola #N/G Memphis, TN Weight shipped: 47,700 Unloaded weight: Initial price at shipment to grower for good watermelon: 5 cents/lb Gross return $ 0.00 Shipping charges (freight): (1,553.30) Net return: (1,553.30) Inspection: (65.00) Bins: (30.00) Sales charge: Return to R. Bass due to bad melons: 4.46 cents/lb (477.00) $(2,125.90) Kelly Marinaro testified credibly that the resultant low prices paid by the ultimate purchasers was the result of the poor quality of Petitioner's melons upon their arrival at their ultimate destination. Exhibits admitted in evidence without objection verified the poor condition of five of the loads. In those instances in which there were United States Department of Agriculture Inspection Reports, I accept those reports as clearly dispositive of the issue of the melons' poor condition upon arrival. Petitioner's more vague testimony that he doubted any load could ever pass such an inspection as "A-1," does not refute them. Kelly Marinaro testified credibly and without contradiction that each time he was informed by a potential buyer that a load of melons was in poor condition upon arrival at their destination, he faxed, mailed, or telephoned Petitioner with the "trouble report" information as soon as feasible and tried to involve him in the decision as to what should be done. This is consistent with a sale at the ultimate destination. Kelly Marinaro further testified credibly and without contradiction that for two loads he recommended to Petitioner that they not obtain a federal inspection because it was not cost efficient. He made this recommendation for one of these two loads because it reached its destination on a Friday and the fruit would have to stand and deteriorate further in quality and price over the weekend if they waited on an inspection. Petitioner agreed to waive at least one inspection. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did not agree as to the number of times they spoke on the phone about "trouble reports", but Petitioner acknowledged at least four such phone conversations. Petitioner and Kelly Marinaro did agree that in each phone call, Petitioner told Kelly Marinaro to "do the best you can," and stated he did not want to pay any freight. This type of conversation is not indicative of a relationship in which the melons have been purchased outright at the site of embarkation, Petitioner's field. I have considered the testimony of Petitioner and of Kelly Marinaro, respectively, on the issue of whether or not Petitioner was required to pay the freight on the watermelons from their first oral contract by telephone call on June 15, 1996. Without attributing any ill-motive to either party- witness, I find they did not initially have a meeting of the minds as to how the cost of freight was to be handled, and that Petitioner assumed at some point he would not have to pay freight. However, it is clear from the evidence as a whole that Kelly Marinaro did everything possible to avoid freight charges to Petitioner and would not have meticulously informed and received oral waivers of inspections from Petitioner if there had been any clear agreement either that Sunny Fresh was purchasing the watermelons "as is" in Petitioner's field or that Sunny Fresh Produce was paying all the freight. Indeed, Petitioner was not charged for freight when Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh provided the trucks. It is also clear from the evidence as a whole that Petitioner was informed on or about the date that each load arrived at its ultimate destination that he was going to be charged for at least some freight charges out of the ultimate price received for the melons. Bill Ward has acted as a broker of watermelons for many years. I accept his testimony that there can be varying grades of watermelon within one field or one harvest. The several "Watermelon Reports" admitted without objection show that the demand for Florida watermelons was light or fairly light in June 1996, that the price was down or to be established, and that all quotations were for stock of generally good quality and condition. There had been a lot of rain in Florida during the 1996 watermelon season and rain unfavorably affects the quality of melons. Melons from further north where there had been less rain were able to be shipped to northern and northeastern buyers in less time than were Florida melons. Northern and northeastern buyers did not have to select from inferior melons that year. Petitioner's testimony and supporting documentation that he sold to other purchasers two truckloads of good quality, top price melons from the same field between June 17 and June 21, 1996 does not overcome all the evidence that the majority of melons he sold through Sunny Fresh were of the poor quality reported by the ultimate buyers and federal inspectors or that the melons sold to Sunny Fresh deteriorated due to slow transport.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint.RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Bass 32510 Sumter Line Road Leesburg, FL 34748 Arthur C. Fulmer, Esquire Post Office Box 2958 Lakeland, FL 33806 Mr. Robert Waldman American Bankers Insurance Company Claims Management Services 11222 Quail Roost Drive Miami, FL 33157-6596 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800

Florida Laws (3) 120.57440.21604.15
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ROBIN SHIVER vs. A. J. SALES COMPANY AND HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, 85-002827 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002827 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, and at the subsequent deposition, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Sales was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4103 by the Department, and bonded by Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast (Hartford) in the sum of $20,000 Bond No. RN 4429948. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Hartford was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). On June 12, 1985, Respondent Sales, acting through its agent William C. Summers (Summers), contracted with Petitioner to purchase several loads of watermelons which were to be loaded by Petitioner on trucks furnished by Respondent Sales at Petitioner's watermelon field. Summers acting as Respondent Sales' agent had the authority to purchase, inspect, accept and pay for the watermelons. Petitioner agreed with Summers to load "field run" watermelons that were not "too big" or not "too small". Respondent did not request that the load be small, medium or large. Small being watermelons ranging in size from 11 to 17 pounds medium being watermelons ranging in size from 17 to 24 pounds and large being watermelons ranging in size from 24 to 40 pounds. Although Petitioner did not agree to furnish any specific grade of watermelon, the evidence shows that it was understood by Petitioner that Summers was contracting for "good quality" watermelons. On the second load Summers instructed the Petitioner to eliminate the large watermelons and this was done while harvesting and packing. The agreed upon price per pound of watermelons was $0.03 and the total price of each load of watermelons was to be determined by multiplying the price per pound by the net weight of each load of watermelons. The net weight of the load of watermelons in dispute was 46,260 pounds which when multiplied by $0.03 per pound equals a total price of $1,386.90 which Respondent Sales has refused to pay. Under the agreement it was Petitioner's responsibility to harvest and pack the watermelons on the trailer in accordance with Summers instructions but at Petitioner's expense, and it was Summers' responsibility to inspect the watermelons as to size and quality during the harvesting and packing and to reject any watermelons not conforming as to size and quality under the agreement. Upon the watermelons being loaded, inspected, accepted and weighed, the sale was to be final and Petitioner was to receive payment with title and risk of loss passing to Respondent Sales at point of shipment. Although Petitioner loaded approximately 2 1/2 loads of watermelons for Respondent Sales, only the last load or the second full load, which Petitioner started loading on June 12, 1985 and finished loading on June 13, 1985, is in dispute. On June 13, 1985, Summers issued a check on the account of Respondent Sales for payment of the 2 full loads of watermelons, which included payment for the load in dispute, but later that same day demanded that Petitioner return the check or Summers would stop payment on the check. Petitioner returned the check and was later paid for the first load but Respondent Sales has refused to pay for second load alleging that the quality of the watermelons did not conform to the agreement. There was no problem as to the size of the watermelons. Respondent Sales, after Summers accepted and issued the check for the watermelons in dispute, decided to make payment of the watermelons contingent on acceptance at destination rather than acceptance by Summers at the point of shipment as agreed earlier and refused to pay Petitioner for the watermelons in dispute because allegedly they had not been accepted at their destination. When advised of this change, Petitioner refused to sell any more watermelons to Respondent Sales. Although Respondent's exhibit 1 and 2 show that a load of watermelons loaded by Petitioner was federally inspected on June 17, 1985 at its destination, the evidence is insufficient to prove that the load of watermelons in dispute was inspected on June 17, 1985. In any event, only the condition of the watermelons was reported on the inspection report and no determination made by the inspector as to size, quality or grade, and there was no evidence to show that the condition of the watermelons at their destination would result in the watermelons failing to conform to the agreement; i.e., good quality. The watermelons were culled in the field during harvesting, at the trailer during packing and were additionally culled by Summers during the packing while he was present. Summers was not present full time while the watermelons were being harvested and loaded but was present on several occasions for periods up to 20 or 30 minutes for a total time of approximately 1 1/2 hours. Summers was allowed to inspect the watermelons in the field before harvesting and during harvesting and, in addition to the culling of the watermelon during harvesting and loading by Petitioner, Summers was allowed to cull, while he was present during loading. The evidence is sufficient to show that Summers had ample opportunity to inspect the watermelons and that he did inspect and accept the load of watermelons in dispute at point of shipment. The testimony of Petitioner and Bill Lamb that the watermelons in dispute were of the size and quality to conform to the agreement when loaded on the trailer on June 12 and 13, 1985 was credible.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Sales be ordered to pay to the Petitioners the sum of $1,386.90. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Sales fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Hartford be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Terry McDavid, Esquire 200 North Marion Street. Lake City, Florida 32055 Robin C. Shiver Route 3, Box 248 Mayo, Florida 32066 Carl Boyles A. J. Sales Company P. O. Box 7798 Orlando, Florida 32854 Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (5) 120.57604.15604.17604.20604.21
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JAMES M. O`DELL, JR., AND RONALD LEWIS vs. RONALD JUSTICE, 77-001874 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001874 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1978

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Ronald Justice, is indebted to the complainants, James M. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis, d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms.

Findings Of Fact This cause is being considered pursuant to Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes procedure for settlement of controversies between Florida produce farmers and dealers involved with farmers' products. James M. O'Dell, Jr. and Ronald Lewis filed a complaint against Ronald Justice contending that the Respondent had not paid for two loads of watermelons as follows: May 27, 1977, invoice number 387664, 46,640 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,865.60 May 29, 1977, invoice number 387670, 43,910 lbs Grey Watermelons at 4 cents per lb. totaling $1,756.40 The Petitioners contend, "Mr. Justice placed this order over the telephone, at which time the price had been agreed upon. He sent his own truck and his own driver to pick up these watermelons. The trucks were loaded according to his instructions while his own drivers were present and observed the loading. We had sold watermelons from this same field prior to these and the same day as well as after these dates and there had been no problem with quality. These watermelons were produced here by us at Oxford, Florida. We had expected payment within a few days after arrival, when he was expected to wire money to our bank. Thus far he has not sent this money which is for the above load while previous loads have been paid for." Respondent contends "As the Respondent in this case I wish to state again that I cannot ignore the first load of melons involved, (which I readily paid for sight unseen) as settled even though O'Dell and Lewis wish to ignore it as they had no grievance in the first load transaction. As my own personal affidavit states and as the affidavit of the driver John Braziel, supports; the first load was the greenest of the three loads which it naturally would be as it was clipped from the vine before the next two loads, also it was the inspection of the first load and the second load that made me feel justified that I had paid O'Dell and Lewis an appropriate sum of money until I was more certain how I could come out financially in the freight, sorting and handling of their melons, also please bear in mind that I suffered a business reputation damage that I am now willing to forego in an effort to settle this matter." The Petitioners sold the Respondent three loads of watermelons. Respondent's drivers loaded the watermelons on or near the farm of Petitioners. The first load was paid for and is not a part of the complaint of the Petitioners. The second and third loads ordered by the Respondent and filled by the Petitioners are the points of controversy. The watermelons were delivered to the Respondent in Mississippi where he had sold them to various stores. He stated that of the first load which he bought from the Petitioners that he could use but 50 percent inasmuch as the watermelons were unripe. He states that of the second load 30 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used and that of the third load 25 percent of the watermelons were unripe and could not be used. He states that he was compelled to dump the part of the watermelons that could not be used and so dumped them. He contends that his loss on the first load was $1,640.34; that his loss on the second load was $356.80; and that his loss on the third load was $298.58 for a total loss on the three loads from the Petitioners of $2,295.72 actual money out of pocket. Mr. Justice states that he intended to cancel the third load inasmuch as a large percentage of the first two loads were unripe, but that it was his understanding by a telephone call to the Petitioner Ronald Lewis that Lewis had the intention of standing behind his loss and that therefore he did not cancel the order for the third load. The Petitioners claim that the watermelons were loaded into trucks sent there by the Respondent with his drivers, each of whom inspected the watermelons at the time of loading. They contend that no more than 1 percent of the watermelons loaded were unripe. They also contend that had the Respondent employed a certified inspector to inspect the watermelons at the point of delivery and the inspector had stated that the watermelons were unripe that they would have accepted the inspector's report, but that no inspection was made. Affidavits from the truck drivers who were not growers or inspectors were submitted. Each stated that a large percentage of the watermelons were not ripe.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioners $3,622.00 for the watermelons purchased from the Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ronald Justice 500 South Main Street Dermott, Arkansas 71638 James A. O'Dell, Jr., and Ronald Lewis d/b/a O'Dell & Lewis Farms Post Office Box 268 Oxford, Florida

# 6
RANDAL ROBERTS; RANDAL ROBERTS, JR.; AND HUGH MARTIN, D/B/A M AND R FARMS vs EDDIE D. GRIFFIN, D/B/A QUALITY BROKERAGE AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-007440 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bell, Florida Dec. 17, 1992 Number: 92-007440 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $10,258.98, or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and his surety company.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage. This cause is governed by the claims made in the amended complaint. (Exhibit P-13) That amended complaint sets out the parameters of the claimed amounts as follows: AGREED PRICE PAID PRICE DIFFERENCE CLAIMED 6-13-92 Inv.#573 45,429 lbs. Jub. melons @ .04/lb.$1,816.80 (paid on 41,720 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.08 1,107.72 950.46 157.26 6-14-92 Inv.#586 48,060 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,403.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.61 1,693.39 1,202.79 490.60 6-14-92 Inv.#587 50,610 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,530.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 10.12 1,820.38 1,304.28 516.10 6-15-92 Inv.#592 44,800 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,240.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.96 1,531.04 1,153.04 378.00 6-15-92 Inv.#593 46,340 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,317.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.27 1,607.73 1,144.33 463.40 6-16-92 Inv.#598 47,170 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,358.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.43 1,649.07 1,177.37 471.70 6-16-92 Inv.#607 48,320 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,416.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.66 1,706.34 1,223.14 483.20 6-17-92 Inv.#628 1/ 40,890 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,044.50 (no inv.# provided producer) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.18 1,336.32 .00 1,336.32 6-17-92 Inv.#626 36,690 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 1,834.50 (paid on 27,890 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 7.34 1,127.16 688.92 438.24 6-17-92 Inv.#627 37,300 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 1,865.00 (paid on 30,500 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 7.46 1,157.54 818.90 338.64 6-17-92 Inv.#642 43,350 lbs. Job. melons @ .05/lb. 2,167.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.67 1,458.83 1,025.33 433.50 6-18-92 Inv.#643 44,150 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,207.50 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.83 1,498.67 1,057.17 441.50 6-18-92 Inv.#644 45,060 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,253.00 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.01 1,543.99 .00 1,543.99 6-18-92 Inv.#646 43,180 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,159.00 (paid on 38,380 lbs.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.64 1,450.36 1,211.32 239.04 6-18-92 Inv.645 47,070 lbs. Jub. melons @ .05/lb. 2,353.50 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 9.41 1,644.09 .00 1,644.09 6-19-92 Inv.#663 43,520 lbs. Crim. melons @ .05/lb. 2,176.00 (paid @ .04/lb.) Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.70 1,467.30 1,032.10 435.20 6-19-92 Inv.#685 44,820 Crim. melons lbs. @ .05/lb. 2,241.00 Adv. -700.00 NWPB - 8.96 1,532.04 1,083.84 448.20 TOTAL DUE $10,258.98 The amended complaint admits that Respondent's deductions for advances and NWPB were appropriate on each load/invoice, and these are not in contention. The amended complaint admits that Respondent has already made the payments to Petitioners, which are indicated. It is only the claimed shortfall on each load that is at issue. At formal hearing, Petitioners discussed a load they claimed they had delivered to Respondent on 6-20-92. They had neither receipts, weight tickets, nor settlement sheets, (invoices) nor payment from Respondent on this load. This "lost load," as the parties described it, is not named in the amended complaint. Therefore, no findings of fact can be made thereon, due to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 appears to apply to loads 560, 561, 562, and 563, all loads occurring on 6-11-92. That date and those load numbers also are not listed in the amended complaint. Accordingly, no findings of fact will be made with regard to loads 560, 561, 562 or 563, due to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners delineated two theories of recovery as to the seventeen claims actually named in the amended complaint. Petitioners claimed the right to recover from Respondents due to Respondent dealer's failure to pay for all or some of the poundage delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer on the following loads: 6-13-92 #573, 6-17-92 #628, 6-17-92 #626, 6-17-92 #627, 6-18-92 #644, 6-18-92 #646, 6-18-92 #645, 6- 19-92 #685. Petitioners claim the right to recover from Respondents due to Respondent dealer's failure to pay per pound at the rate of one cent below the "wire price" per pound on the following loads: 6-14-92 #586, 6-14-92 #587, 6- 15-92 #592, 6-15-92 #593, 6-16-92 #598, 6-16-92 #607, 6-17-92 #642, 6-18-92 #643, and 6-19-92 #663. For 6-15-92 18-24 lb. average 4.50 - 5.00 cents, few 6.00 26-32 lb. average 4.50 - 5.00 cents, few 6.00 For 6-16-92 18-24 lb. average 5.00 - 6.00 cents 26-32 lb. average 5.00 - 6.00 cents For 6-17-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 cents, few higher and lower 26-32 lb. average 6.00 cents, few higher and lower For 6-18-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, "Wire prices" are printed in "spread" form. Evidence was presented (Composite Exhibit P-14), and the parties are agreed, that the following were the "wire prices" at certain times material. Otherwise, there is no evidence in this record concerning amounts or dates of "wire prices." mostly 6.00, few higher 26-32 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, mostly 6.00, few higher and lower For 6-19-92 18-24 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents, mostly 6.00, few higher 26-32 lb. average 6.00 - 6.50 cents mostly 6.00, few higher and lower Since no "wire prices" were proven up for the days involved in loads 586, and 587, Petitioners are not entitled to recover on their theory of entitlement for those loads. Upon the allegations of the amended complaint and the "wire prices" proven, it appears that Petitioners have already received payment from Respondent dealer at one cent (or better) below the proven low-end "wire price" on loads 592, 593, 598, and 607. Therefore, Petitioners are not entitled to recover on their theory of entitlement for those loads. Petitioners (grower-producers) believed that they had negotiated an oral contract with Respondent dealer to the effect that the dealer would pay Petitioners at the rate of one cent below the "wire price" per pound on those days that Respondent took delivery from them of their watermelons. Respondent testified contrariwise that although such an arrangement was discussed, the parties' final oral agreement was concluded in terms of an excellent quality of every melon, and after negotiations were completed, the dealer understood that the price he was to pay the producers was just the same price per pound he paid all his other producers on any given day. In determining the daily uniform price per pound, Respondent admitted that he used the "wire price" as a guideline, but never explained exactly how the "wire price" constituted a guideline. The Petitioners and Respondent dealer had dealt with one another over a period of years. In past years they had discussed what was to occur if any loads were refused, in whole or in part, by retail buyers at their ultimate destinations. Over the years, the parties had agreed that for loads involving a "small deduct," that is, a small amount of refused melons, Respondent had unilateral authority to informally agree to dump the bad melons or take whatever he could get for the load and pass on the monetary loss to Petitioners. Petitioners conceded that the discretion to take or not take such losses always had been entirely that of Respondent during the parties' several years of past dealing, and that before 1992, whenever an ultimate recipient had refused melons, the "deduct" had been "worked out" this way with no prior notice to Petitioners. In short, by Petitioners' own evidence, it appears that up until the loads at issue in 1992, Petitioners had always simply accepted the Respondent's calculations concerning refusals for quality without requiring proof by way of a federal inspection. Mr. Randal Roberts Sr. testified that in his opinion, any "deduct" over 300 pounds was not "small." However, no evidence defining an industry standard for the relative terms of "small deducts" or "large deducts" was introduced. In light of the parties' standard arrangement over the whole course of their business dealings, it is deemed that Respondent continued to be within his rights in 1992 to unilaterally decide which melons to pay Petitioners for and which melons not to pay Petitioners for where quality became an issue between himself and the ultimate recipients. Petitioners estimated that on a scale of one to ten, the melons they had delivered to Respondent dealer in 1992 were "about a seven" when they delivered them to him, even though Respondent's agents culled out the really bad melons. It may be inferred therefrom that the loads were no better and were probably in worse condition when they reached their ultimate destinations. Respondent testified that he had dumped all or part of the remaining loads in question or reduced the price per pound from that of the "wire price" due to the poor quality of the melons based on complaints or refusals by the recipients when the melons reached their ultimate destinations. These are loads 573, 628, 626, 627, 644, 646, 645, 685, 642, 643, and 663. Although Petitioners adamantly denied that they had ever agreed to rely on federal inspections to determine which melons were bad and which were good, Respondent had gotten federal inspection sheets (R-2) to support his decision to dump all or part of loads 628, 643, 645, 663, and 685. Respondent dealer introduced his business journal (R-3) to show that load 643 was "bad" and load 644 was "dumped" due to poor quality. Respondent dealer introduced his contemporaneous business journal (R- 3) to show that except for loads 607, 643, 644, 663, and 685 he had paid as much to Petitioners per pound as to anyone else on the respective days he had taken delivery. On those loads he had paid Petitioners less than some other producers whom he dealt with on those days, but contended that he had reduced the price per pound paid to Petitioners on those days on the basis of poor quality, too. Nonetheless, 607 was paid at least at one cent below the "wire price" (See Finding of Fact 14), 643 was shown bad by inspection, 644 was dumped in its entirety per the dealer's journal, and 663 and 685 were shown bad by inspection. Upon the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent was within the parameters of his standard dealings with Petitioners where he reduced the price per pound of loads 643 and 663 on the basis of quality, just as he was within his clear unilateral authority and discretion to dump or discard whole melons from loads 628, 644, 645, and 685. After accounting for the foregoing loads, that leaves only loads 573, 626, 627, and 646 left in issue as to poundage and only load 642, (for which Respondent paid 4 cents per pound instead of one cent below the "spread" of the "wire price" for that day) at issue as to price per pound. As to each of these loads, Respondent produced business records wherein he had made contemporaneous notations concerning the quality complaints and/or number of melons rejected by the ultimate recipients. (R-2) Respondent did not pay Petitioners anything on load 645 because of freight deductions and Respondent also made freight deductions on some other invoices. There is no evidence in this record regarding how the parties had negotiated who would bear the ultimate cost of the freight. However, the Petitioners have not proven any entitlement to recover these charges which Respondent advanced and paid. Likewise, Petitioners also have not set out any trail by which the undersigned can trace any mathematical errors on any loads/settlement sheets to the Respondent dealer over Petitioners. Under the parties' standard mode of doing business, Respondent had clear unilateral authority and discretion to dump or discard whole melons for quality and pay Petitioners nothing for the whole melons dumped or discarded in loads 573, 626, 627, and 646. Upon the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent was also within the parameters of his standard dealings with Petitioners in not paying full negotiated price per pound on load 642 where some lesser price per pound could be negotiated with the ultimate recipient as to quality.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing all named claims against Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1993.

Florida Laws (11) 10.12120.57153.04157.26177.37211.32450.36532.04604.157.347.46
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EARL DICK vs. J. R. SALES, INC., AND AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, 85-000055 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000055 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1985

The Issue The issues that were considered in the course of the hearing were those related to a claim by the Petitioner of entitlement to receive an additional $5,581.00 in proceeds related to the sale of watermelons to J. R. Sales, Inc. In this case Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent J. R. Sales, Inc. in the person of its representative, one Carr Hussey, had agreed to pay a fixed price of four cents per pound for large grey watermelons and 3.5 cents per pound for medium grey watermelons and that four cents per pound was due the Petitioner for the delivery of large jubilee watermelons. It is further alleged that those prices were not paid. If the Petitioner's assertions are correct, the additional amount owed would be $5,581.00. In reply Respondent J. R. Sales, Inc. denies the claim of $5,581.00 and in its defense states that all money due and owning to the Petitioner has been paid.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Earl Dicks, is a farmer in Columbia County, Florida. In 1984 Petitioner grew two varieties of watermelons in Columbia County for the purpose of selling those crops commercially. Those watermelon varieties were greys and jubilees. As of June 21, 1984, Petitioner had not sold his crop of watermelons. On that date Petitioner was introduced to Carr Hussey, President of J. R. Sales, Inc. This introduction was made by another farmer, one Doyle Ottinger. The purpose of this introduction was to ascertain whether Hussey would be interested in purchasing the watermelons which Petitioner had available for sale. J. R. Sales, Inc. is a company which purchases watermelons in Florida for delivery and further sale in markets outside of Florida. Following the introduction of the Petitioner and Hussey, those two gentlemen, Ottinger and Petitioner's son, Edward Dicks, went to see Petitioner's grey watermelon crop in Columbia County. Prior to arriving at the field, no discussion had been entered into between the Petitioner and Hussey as to price. While at the field Petitioner offered to sell the entire field of watermelons, and Hussey declined the purchase. At that juncture Hussey was not aware of any particular market in which he might place the Petitioner's watermelons. Hussey did indicate that if he were able to find a market for those crops, he would pay Petitioner the fair market value per pound for those watermelons on a given day. He further stated that the fair market price on June 21, 1984, was four cents a pound for large and 3.5 cents a pound for medium greys. The market price considerations at work, as Hussey envisioned them, had to do with the market conditions in New York, New England and Canada, places where the watermelons would be delivered. It also was important that the watermelons be delivered prior to July 4, 1984. The importance of this date had to do with the demand for watermelons for retail purchase prior to July 4, 1984, and a softening market immediately subsequent to that date. The discussion as to price was made in the presence of Petitioner, his son, and Hussey. There was no other discussion concerning the purchase price of the grey variety of watermelon, and no written document evidences this oral discussion of price. Following the conversation of June 21, 1984, in which price was discussed between the Petitioner and Hussey, the grey watermelons which Petitioner had in Columbia County were available for harvesting. One or two days after this conversation, the first loads of watermelons were harvested. Although Petitioner believes that 17,000 pounds of medium watermelons were harvested with the balance of the watermelons taken on that day being large watermelons, it is found that the 17,000 pounds related to large watermelons with the balance being medium watermelons. This pertains to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1 admitted into evidence which contains the composite invoices for those loads together with poundage and price. Seventeen thousand pounds relates to the large at 3.5 per pound with the balance of the weights pertaining to mediums at three cents per pound. The net amount paid after deducting the cost of harvesting was $3,085.78. On July 2, 1984, additional medium and large grey watermelons were harvested from the Petitioner's Columbia County fields, through J. R. Sales, Inc. A copy of the composite invoices related to the latter, together with a description of the sizes, weights, and prices paid with deduction of harvesting cost, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit Number 3 admitted into evidence. Price paid was 2.5 cents per pound for medium greys and three cents per pound for large greys. These watermelons were watermelons which would not have arrived at J. R. Sales' markets in time meet the July 4, 1984, peak sales period. The total amount paid for this July 2, 1984, harvest of greys was $5,104.75. 6..Watermelons purchased from the Petitioner had to be placed in markets other than those normally served by J. R. Sales, Inc. In the period June 23 through June 25, 1984, J. R. Sales, Inc. bought watermelons from other farmers in the growing area and paid prices for large greys which varied from three cents to 3.5 cents per pound. The price being paid for medium greys in that time frame was three cents per pound, to a farmer other than Petitioner. In the same sequence of days, 3.5 cents per pound was paid for a purchase of large jubilees from another farmer. On the subject of large jubilees, Hussey had been shown a field of jubilee watermelons that were grown by Petitioner in Columbia County. When shown the melons, he indicated that he was not interested in purchasing them. Nonetheless, J. R. Sales, Inc. harvested large jubilee watermelons from that field and paid $1,529.15 for them. Payment was made to Petitioner at a rate of three cents per pound less harvesting cost. Petitioner's son was aware of this harvesting of the large jubilees. The composite invoices related to the large jubilees may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit Number 2 admitted into evidence, a copy. This document shows the invoice numbers, the size, the price per pound and weight together with the gross price less harvesting cost and the net payment price. These watermelons were harvested on June 28, 1984. Even though there was no discussion as to price of the jubilees, Petitioner was of the opinion that four cents a pound for large jubilees should be the price, a price never agreed to by J. R. Sales, Inc. Sherod Keen, another individual who brokered and purchased watermelons in the area of Columbia County, Florida, in 1984 gave testimony. His testimony established that in the period June 21 through June 28, 1984, he was paying farmers a price between 3.5 cents to four cents per pound for medium greys and four to 4.5 cents per pound for large greys. On July 2, 1984, Keen was paying 3.5 to four cents for large greys. Keen agreed with Petitioner and Hussey that the cutoff date prior to July 4, 1984, is critical in terms of the price to be paid, in that watermelons delivered to the market prior to July 4, 1984, would bring a better price than those prices immediately following July 4, 1984. Keen sells in places such as Florida, Maine and Wisconsin. Keen was not interested in purchasing the watermelons which Petitioner sold to J. R. Sales, Inc. Hussey, Keen and Ottinger established through their testimony that the prices for watermelons varied day to day within the relevant time frame, June and July, 1984.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68672.201672.724
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BASS FARMS, INC. vs THE HEIDRICH CORPORATION AND AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 96-005579 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Nov. 25, 1996 Number: 96-005579 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 1998

The Issue Whether the Respondent owes the Petitioner money for watermelons purchased from Petitioner. The factual issues are whether the contract between the parties limited the warrantee of merchantability, and whether melons were of good quality on arrival, and, if not, who was responsible for the failure to meet quality standards.

Findings Of Fact During the 1996 season, the Petitioner contracted with Respondent to sell several loads of watermelons. The claim identified the various loads of melons by date and weight as follows: DATE POUNDS PRICE CLAIM 6/23 44,010 $.04 $1760 6/25 40,300 $.04 $1612 6/25 40,260 $.04 $1610 6/25 41,640 $.04 $1666 6/26 15,750 $.04 $ 600 The Respondent used file numbers to identify the loads which were purchased from Petitioner. These were co-related with the Petitioner’s information by date. The Respondent reduced the amount remitted to the Petitioner on the following loads due to shrinkage (loss of weight during transit) and loss of decayed melons on file number 96057. The Petitioner stated at hearing that, while he had added them to the claim, the differences between his claims and Respondent’s accounting were within the shrinkage and loss limits. The Respondent owed the Petitioner $4,832 on the following: DATE FILE NO. WEIGHT PAID 6/23 96055 43,659 $1746 6/25 96056 39,240 $1570 6/25 96057 38,080 $1516 The controversy between the parties centered upon file numbers 96058 and 96065. Both parties agree regarding the weight of the melons shipped and the price per pound. File number 96058 consisted of 41,640 pounds of melons sold at $.04 per pound. The shipment was sold to Provigo Distribution, Inc. on June 25, and the melons were to be Peewee sized melons (melons weighing 14-17 pounds). The Petitioner loaded the melons on a truck provided by Provigo, and Respondent did not have a person present to inspect the load when it was loaded. The Petitioner asserts that title to the melons transferred when they were loaded on the truck, and that Respondent was liable for the product thereafter. The Respondent acknowledges that it accepted title for the melons when loaded on the truck at the field, but that terms also provided that the melons would be of a specified size and would be of good quality upon delivery. There was no written contract limiting the warrantee of merchantability. Provigo refused acceptance of the melons because they were too big. The melons were around 21 pounds or small mediums (18-24 pounds). When the Respondent sought to sell the melons to another buyer, the buyer had the melons inspected, and 57 percent of the melons were rejected: 15 percent for sunburn, 7 percent for bruising, 10 percent for whitish pink flesh, and 25 percent as overripe. The Respondent introduced a copy of the documents showing the original sale price to Provigo, rejection, inspection and accounting upon resale. The Respondent had sold the melons related to file number 96058 to Provigo for $.06 a pound with Provigo paying the freight. The Respondent would have made $2498.40 on the sale to Provigo. Upon rejection, the Respondent was responsible to Provigo for the transportation costs ($.05 per pound) for the entire load or $2082. The Respondent obtained $613.84 from the sale of the melons after their rejection. File number 96065 related to a partial load which Petitioner had sold on June 26th to Respondent in response to Respondent’s request for Peewee size melons. Petitioner was only able to supply a partial load of 15,750 pounds. These were moved on June 26th from Florida to Georgia, where on June 27th, the truck was finished off with large melons from another farmer. The Respondent had an agent who was in Georgia where the melons were shipped immediately in order to add additional melons to the load. This agent had the authority to purchase melons and cull melons for Respondent, and was in contact with Respondent during the period the truck carrying Petitioner’s melons was waiting. The agent also knew the load was to be shipped to Canada for sale. Respondent’s agent in Georgia saw that the Peewees loaded from Petitioner were spotted, leaking, and decayed prior to loading the large melons. These melons were shipped to Canada at a cost of $.05 a pound for a total of $1138 where the Peewees from Respondent were rejected because of decay. Their condition was such that they could not be given away, and a disposal charge of $350 was charged to Respondent. The Respondent in rendering an accounting of the transaction to Petitioner charged Petitioner $1138 for the transportation of the 15,750 pounds of melons to Canada and $350 for their disposal.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order finding that the Respondent owes the Petitioner a total of $2523 and providing Respondent a reasonable amount of time to produce proof of payment of this amount to Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bo Bass, President Bass Farms, Inc. 2829 Southwest SR 45 Newberry, FL 32669 H. Joseph Heidrich 260 Maitland Avenue, Number 1000 Atlamont Springs, FL 32701 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (2) 120.57672.314
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RAIFORD DUNN vs. RONALD RENTZ, D/B/A R AND R BROKERS AND NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 85-003924 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003924 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Rentz was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 4103 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Nationwide in the sum of $14,000 - Bond No. LP 505 761 0004. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Nationwide was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Petitioner harvested, loaded and shipped sixteen (16) loads of watermelons to various receivers on instruction from Respondent Rentz during the 1985 watermelon season but only four (4) loads were in dispute on the date of the hearing with a claim of $3,807.98. 1/ Petitioner in previous watermelon seasons loaded and shipped watermelons for Respondent Rentz and on all occasions, including the 1985 season, had been paid for the watermelons either in cash by Respondent Rentz or by check drawn on Respondent Rentz's account. The invoicing of all loads of watermelons shipped by Petitioner for Respondent Rentz was done by Respondent Rentz and payments made by the various receivers were made to Respondent Rentz. Petitioner's understanding that Respondent Rentz was acting as a buyer and not a broker was credible and supported by Respondent Rentz's actions subsequent to the watermelons being loaded and shipped. 2/ Although Respondent Rentz contended that he was acting as a broker, the more credible evidence shows that Respondent Rentz was acting as a buyer and that risk of loss passed to him upon shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to him. For purposes of Sections 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes, the Department's policy is to consider a person a broker, requiring only a minimum bond ($13,000.00) for licensure, when that person does not take title to the product and whose function is to bring buyer and seller together and assist them in negotiating the terms of the contract for sale but not to invoice or collect from the buyer.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Rentz be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,807.98. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Rentz fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Nationwide be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1986.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57604.15604.17604.20604.21
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