The Issue The issues are (1) whether the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner was timely under Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, and (2) whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 when it terminated Petitioner's employment as a retail sales associate in May 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Parties Petitioner is an African American female. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding (i.e., January through May 1998), Petitioner was 49 years old. Respondent is a retail department store chain with stores located throughout Florida, including a store in Oviedo, Florida. Respondent is an employer subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner's Employment With Respondent On or about January 30, 1998, Petitioner was hired by Respondent to work as a retail sales associate in Respondent's Oviedo store. She was originally assigned to work in the women's clothing department. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by Heidi Jensen, a white female. Ms. Jensen was the assistant sales manager responsible for the women's clothing department, and was Petitioner's direct supervisor throughout the course of Petitioner's employment. Petitioner was hired as a part-time employee at a rate of $9.00 per hour. As a part-time employee, she worked approximately 20 hours per week. Petitioner's schedule was flexible; she worked eight hours on some days and four hours or less on others. She was typically scheduled on the closing shift (i.e., nights), rather than the opening shift. On February 7, 1998, Petitioner signed a certification indicating that she had read and agreed to abide by Respondent's work rules and policies. Those rules include the following directive, hereafter referred to as "Work Rule 10": Associates must exhibit positive behavior toward their job, Management, supervisors, and co-associates in all of their actions and speech. Customers must always be treated courteously. Anything to the contrary will not be tolerated. On February 8, 1998, Petitioner attended a general orientation at which the work rules and policies were discussed. That orientation was also attended by other recently-hired employees, including non-African American employees. Petitioner received additional training from Respondent throughout her employment, including customer service and sales training and direction for handling merchandise returns. That training was also provided to other employees, including non- African American employees. Petitioner never received formal training on how to "open" the store. However, as noted above, Petitioner typically worked during the closing shift rather than the opening shift. Slightly more than a month into her employment, Petitioner's co-workers began complaining about her unprofessional behavior. The complaints alleged that Petitioner yelled at co-workers; that she initiated arguments with co- workers in front of customers regarding who should get credit for the customer's purchases; that she referred to the customers in the woman's department (which caters to larger women) as "fat pigs"; that she stole customers from her co-workers; that she referred to some of her co-workers as "vultures" and others as "bitches" or "wolves," often in front of or within "earshot" of customers; and that she generally upset or harassed co-workers through her attitude and derogatory comments. The complaints came from eight different co-workers, at least one of whom was an African American female. The complaints were made in writing by the co-workers, typically through signed, hand-written statements given to Ms. Jensen or the store manager. Petitioner denied making any of the statements or engaging in any of the conduct alleged in the complaints. In response to the complaints, she took the position that she was being "singled out" by her co-workers because her aggressive tactics made her a more successful salesperson than most of her co-workers. Despite Petitioner's denials, Ms. Jensen determined that disciplinary action was appropriate based upon her investigation of the complaints. Ms. Jensen gave Petitioner a verbal warning "concerning using a positive attitude towards merchandise and customers" on March 7, 1998, and she gave Petitioner a formal written warning for her lack of positive attitude towards customers and co-workers on March 19, 1998. Both warnings cited Work Rule 10 as having been violated. Despite the warnings, Petitioner's conduct continued to generate complaints from her co-workers. She received another verbal warning from Ms. Jensen on April 17, 1998, and she received a formal written warning from the store manager on April 22, 1998. Again, the warnings cited Work Rule 10 as having been violated. Petitioner continued to deny any wrongdoing. She again claimed that she was being "targeted" by her co-workers because of their "jealousy and envy" over her success as a salesperson. The April 22, 1998, written warning stated that "[i]f there is one more report of negativity or verbal abuse of customers or associates, [Petitioner] will be terminated." It also enumerated Respondent's "expectations" with respect to Petitioner's conduct, including a requirement that Petitioner "never confront an associate in front of a customer" (emphasis in original). At some point after the April 22, 1998, written warning, Petitioner was transferred from the women's department to the casual department to give her a "clean slate" with her co-workers. Despite the transfer, Petitioner's co-workers continued to complain about her behavior. The complaints were of the same nature as the complaints discussed above, e.g., stealing sales from other co-workers and initiating confrontations with co-workers over customers in the customer's presence. On May 22, 1998, Petitioner and a co-worker, Brenda Ross, "had words" over a customer. When confronted about the incident by Ms. Jensen, Petitioner "was loud and aggressive" towards her. As a result of this incident and the prior warnings, Ms. Jensen recommended that Petitioner's employment be terminated. The store manager accepted Ms. Jensen's recommendation, and, Petitioner was terminated on May 22, 1998. Thus, the term of Petitioner's employment with Respondent was less than four months. After she was fired, Petitioner returned to her work station to retrieve her belongings. While doing so, she confronted Ms. Ross and called her a "lying bitch" (according to Petitioner's own testimony at the hearing) or something similarly derogatory.1 There are no videotapes of the incidents described above. None of the co-workers who reported the incidents testified at the hearing. Nevertheless, the co-worker's contemporaneous hand-written reports of the incidents which were received into evidence (Respondent's Exhibits 21-30) are found to be credible based upon their general consistency and the corroborating testimony of Ms. Jensen at the hearing. By contrast, Petitioner's testimony regarding the incidents was not credible. There is no credible evidence to support Petitioner's allegations that she was denied the opportunity to file complaints against her co-workers. Nor is there any credible evidence that Petitioner did file complaints (alleging discrimination or anything else) which were ignored by Respondent's management. By all accounts, Petitioner was a good salesperson; her sales per hour were high and, on several occasions, they were the highest in the department where she was working. Ms. Jensen complemented Petitioner on at least one occasion for her high level of sales. Petitioner was also punctual and had a good attendance record. She was on track to receive a pay increase at her next review. However, as a result of the unprofessional behavior detailed above, she was fired prior that review. Petitioner is currently unemployed. She has not held a job since she was fired by Respondent in May 1998. However, she has only applied for four or five other jobs since that time. Petitioner's Discrimination Claim Petitioner first contacted the Commission regarding her allegation that Respondent discriminated against her on or about June 29, 1998. On that date, she filled out the Commission's "intake questionnaire." On the questionnaire, she indicated that she had sought assistance from attorney Anthony Gonzales, Jr. (Attorney Gonzales) regarding the alleged discrimination by Respondent. Petitioner also listed Attorney Gonzales as her representative on the "intake inquiry form and complaint log" completed on or about July 10, 1998. Petitioner consulted with Attorney Gonzales in April 1998, prior to her termination. Although Petitioner claimed at the hearing that Attorney Gonzales did not agree to represent her beyond the initial consultation, Petitioner provided the Commission a copy of Attorney Gonzales' business card and a copy of the check by which Petitioner paid Attorney Gonzales' consultation fee with the Commission's intake documents. Based upon those documents, the Commission apparently (and reasonably) assumed that Attorney Gonzales was Petitioner's attorney because it subsequently directed various letters to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address. Petitioner filed her formal charge of discrimination on November 9, 1998. The charge did not reference Attorney Gonzales. Nevertheless, on December 7, 1998, the Commission sent a letter to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address confirming receipt of the charge of discrimination. The record does not include any correspondence from Attorney Gonzales to the Commission in response to the December 7, 1998, confirmation letter. However, Attorney Gonzales continued to receive correspondence from the Commission regarding Petitioner's charge of discrimination after that date. On February 2, 1999, the Commission sent a letter to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address indicating that Petitioner's charge of discrimination had been pending for over 180 days and identifying the options available to Petitioner. The letter was accompanied by an "election of rights" form which was to be completed and returned to the Commission. Attorney Gonzales apparently forwarded the form to Petitioner because Petitioner completed and signed the form and returned it to the Commission on June 17, 1999. This strongly suggests that there was an attorney-client relationship between Attorney Gonzales and Petitioner at the time. Indeed, if there was no attorney-client relationship, either Petitioner or Attorney Gonzales would have informed the Commission in connection with the return of the form that Attorney Gonzales was not representing here. However, neither did. The record does not include any additional communications between the Commission and Petitioner and/or Attorney Gonzales between June 1999 and August 2001. Notably absent from the record is any notice to the Commission that Attorney Gonzales was no longer representing Petitioner. On August 31, 2001, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a "no cause" determination on Petitioner's charge of discrimination. On that same date, the Clerk of the Commission sent notice of the determination to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address. The notice stated that "[c]omplainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE" (emphasis supplied and capitalization in original), and further stated that the claim "will be dismissed" if not filed within that time. Attorney Gonzales contacted Petitioner by telephone after he received the notice of determination. The record does not reflect the date of that contact. However, Petitioner testified at the hearing that Attorney Gonzales informed her during the telephone call that the deadline for requesting a hearing had not yet expired. Accordingly, the contact must have occurred prior to October 5, 2001, which is 35 days after August 31, 2001. Despite the notice from Attorney Gonzales, Petitioner did not immediately file a Petition or contact the Commission. She did not contact the Commission until October 16, 2001. On that date, she spoke with Commission employee Gerardo Rivera and advised Mr. Rivera that Attorney Gonzales was not representing her. Mr. Rivera indicated that the Commission would send an "amended" notice directly to her. An "amended" determination of no cause was issued by the Executive Director of the Commission on October 26, 2001. On that same date, an "amended" notice of determination was mailed to Petitioner. Included with the "amended" notice was a blank petition for relief form. Petitioner completed the form and mailed it to the Commission. The Petition was received by the Commission on November 28, 2001,2 which is 33 days after the date of the "amended" determination, but 89 days after the date of the original August 31, 2001 determination. Mr. Rivera's affidavit (Exhibit P1) characterized the mailing of the original determination to Attorney Gonzales as "our [the Commission's] error" and a "mistake." The preponderance of the evidence does not support that characterization. Specifically, the record reflects that it was Petitioner who gave the Commission the impression that Attorney Gonzales was representing her, and neither Petitioner nor Attorney Gonzales did anything to advise the Commission otherwise during the two and one-half years that the Commission investigated Petitioner's charge of discrimination and sent letters to Attorney Gonzales on Petitioner's behalf. Indeed, Petitioner testified at the hearing that the October 16, 2001, conversation with Mr. Rivera was the first (and only) time that she informed the Commission that Attorney Gonzales was not representing her.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002.
Findings Of Fact The City and Charging Party executed their first collective bargaining agreement on November 5, 1974. This agreement under its terms was made retroactive to October 1, 1974. Among the provisions of the agreement is Article 9, which sets forth the grievance procedure. Its last step is final and binding arbitration. Paul Williams, a firefighter employed by the City and covered under the agreement, had apparently had a history of pay problems going back to 1973 when Williams was allegedly placed in the improper pay classification based upon his years of service. The exact nature of the difficulty was not explored because it is not material to the issue present in this case. However, Williams subsequently sought to correct this situation, which apparently adversely affected his pay, by various means to include discussing the matter with various superiors in both the fire department and city administration. This matter was never officially resolved or a decision reached which was satisfactory to Williams. In December 1974, Williams received his first check under the newly negotiated contract. He went immediately to his union representative and complained that he was not being paid in accordance with the contract's terms and the service which he had. In short, the alleged error about which Williams had complained nearly 18 months had been continued under the computation of Williams' pay under the newly negotiated contract. Williams filed a grievance under the contract in December 1974, disputing his pay classification and seeking adjustment to his wages from October 1, 1974, the effective date of the contract. His grievance was therefore filed within six months of the date the alleged dispute arose regarding his classification and wage under the contract. The grievance was approved by the union grievance committee, as the first step in the grievance procedure. Thereafter, the grievance was submitted to the fire chief, who requested that he be given several days to check around and see what he could do. On or about December 20, 1974, the fire chief advised the men that he lacked authority to change the pay status of Williams, thus leaving the matter unresolved at the second level. The matter was pursued to the third step, referring it to the city manager. During the latter part of December and January, the city manager discussed the Williams' grievance with the union representative. By January 14, 1975, there had been no progress in resolving the matter, and the union representative notified the City of its intent to invoke Step 4 of the grievance procedure outline in Article 9, supra. The City has refused to move to Step 4, which is submission to a grievance committee whose decision is final and binding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends the Commission order the Employer to cease and desist from refusing to take Williams' grievance to the final step in the grievance procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the Hearing Officer recommends that an appropriate public notice to employees of the Public Employer be posted in conspicuous placed where notices to employees are usually posted for a period of time determined by the Public Employees Relations commission. This report is respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen M. Blake, Esquire Alley and Alley, Chartered Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Tom Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert W. Vause, President Tarpon Springs Professional Fire Fighters, Local 2353 1408 Ledgestone Drive New Port Richey, Florida
The Issue Whether respondent discharged petitioner on account of his national origin? Whether respondent refused to rehire petitioner on account of his national origin and/or because he filed a complaint alleging discrimination?
Findings Of Fact Born in Uvalde, Texas, petitioner Nicasio Guadalupe Ramos, 42 years old at the time of the hearing, is an American citizen of Hispanic or Mexican race, ancestry, heritage and national origin, who, since 1971, has lived in Defuniak Springs, county seat of Walton County, Florida. Walton County's written personnel policies refer to a "PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT" and to a "personnel department . . . under the direction . . . of the personnel director," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but other County employees or county commissioners themselves effectively decide before the Commission officially hires and fires. Responsibility is diffuse. E.g., T.284, 309. Hard Worker Mr. Ramos started work at the Walton County landfill on February 2, 1988, at $3.35 an hour. At first he spent most of his time picking up stray paper, opening the gate for garbage trucks, and "tripping" trailers to unload the garbage. Like other landfill employees, Mr. Ramos worked more or less steadily while the landfill supervisor, Clinton Earl "Frog" Ward was at the landfill. After three or four months, Mr. Ward, Clarence Johnson and John "Big John" Curry began teaching petitioner to use heavy equipment including the excavator or "pan," the "chipper" and the "dozer" ("how to work the blade, how to spread the dirt.") T.237. According to a co-worker, Mr. Ramos performed "different jobs like all the rest of us." T.31. When the sign maker quit, Mr. Ramos was assigned that job. If "somebody was missing on the dump truck or the garbage boxes," (T.240) he filled in there. He never turned down requests to work as a night guard, requests that sometimes came only near the end of a full day's work. He once operated the excavator every day for two successive work weeks. On September 16, 1988, he was promoted to "Landfill Equipment Operator." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. He became a "permanent" instead of a "temporary" employee, and his wages increased to $5.15. T.240. A cost of living increase in the fall of 1988 raised his wages to $5.35 an hour. T.258. Unfriendly Overseer With one exception, Mr. Ramos got along well with his fellow workers, none of whom was Hispanic. "Nick was one of the boys." T.44. The exception was James Ellis, the assistant landfill supervisor who had moved to Walton County from Lake Placid, Florida. Mr. Ellis once expressed the opinion that "the only thing [Mexicans are] good for is to knock their heads [off]." T.255, 280. He referred to Mr. Ramos as a "gook," a "dago" (T.85) and "that Mexican." T.96. A "long time before" (T.42) it happened, Billy Franklin Reynolds heard Mr. Ellis "say that he was going to get rid of Nick Ramos as soon as he got in a position to do that." T.42. Another co-worker, Harold Ross Daughtery, heard Mr. Ellis say that "whenever he got to be in charge . . . the first one he would fire would be Mr. Ramos." T.44. Harold Eugene Floyd heard Mr. Ellis say "if he ever got to be boss, he would run [Mr. Ramos] off." T.68, 74. Mr. Curry, who heard Mr. Ellis make such remarks (T.77-8) four or five times (T.82), "didn't figure he was joking." T.83. Unlike Mr. Curry (or Mr. Floyd who was uncertain), Messrs. Reynolds and Daughtery testified that they did not take seriously Mr. Ellis' threat to get Mr. Ramos fired. But, in this regard, events proved Mr. Ellis' sincerity. 1/ Mr. Ellis' used racial or ethnic epithets repeatedly to refer to petitioner. Perhaps that is what led Mr. Ramos to ask him one day why he did not like him. When, in the course of the same conversation, Mr. Ramos asked Mr. Ellis whether he had "ever met any Mexicans that [he] like[d]," (T.256) Mr. Ellis answered abusively, in the negative. If Mr. Ward left Mr. Ellis in charge of the landfill, many of the men loafed inside a shed while Mr. Ramos continued working, doing "the dirty stuff" (T.256) that Mr. Ellis assigned him. On such occasions, Mr. Ramos was often "the only one picking up papers or being in the pit, pulling tires out" (T.255) of garbage. T.86. At hearing, nobody except Mr. Ellis had anything unfavorable to say about Mr. Ramos' job performance. In fact, Mr. Ramos did a good job despite the unfair treatment he received at Mr. Ellis' hands. Petitioner was never disciplined, counseled or warned about his work performance even by Mr. Ellis. T. 251. Highly reliable, he "worked in the tire pit" (T.252) the day after the doctor drained his knee. On another occasion, to avoid infection, he wanted to follow his doctor's advice to take "a couple of days" (T.252) off after he had some "lumps" surgically excised. But, even though he arranged to swap shifts with Dewey Collinsworth, Mr. Ellis refused to allow the exchange, and Mr. Ramos reported for work. Reduction In Force In the summer of 1989, the Walton County Commission decided to reduce expenses by discharging County employees. T.11. It fell to Charles R. "Ronnie" Hudson who, as Walton County's public works director for the last three and a half years, reports directly to the Walton County Commission, and is responsible for (among other things) the County's landfill, to lay off landfill workers. Mr. Hudson asked Mr. Ward, the landfill supervisor, to list four employees he could do without (T.151) and to "make an evaluation on the men . . . [explaining] that there was going to probably be a layoff." T.91. The "next day probably," (T.216) Mr. Ward gave Mr. Hudson a written list and evaluation, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, and "told him [he] could get by with three men laid off, but . . . couldn't get by with any more than that." T.220. They talked about the three men Mr. Ward had selected. When Mr. Ward handed Mr. Hudson the list and evaluation, he understood Mr. Hudson to agree that "there needed to be three men laid off" (T.220) instead of four. On one page and a fraction of another (T.153) from a legal pad, Mr. Ward had written: Clarence Hobbs Harold Daughtry Earl Robinson NO COMPLAINT Earl Griggs ON THESE MEN John Mann KEEP THESE MEN Dewey Collinsworth Nick Ramos E.B. Phillips Billy Reynolds Clarence Hobbs truck driver Harold Daughtry operator Earl Robinson operator Earl Griggs clerk and signs maker Dewey Collinsworth clerk and sign maker John Mann operator Nick Ramos operator John Curry truck driver or Lee S. Campbell I need to keep 8 of these men until something changes need men [fo]r now Johnny Peters E.B. Phillips night guards Billy Reynolds I need to keep these men for now if I use another man to replace one of the Night Guards it will short me to[o] bad. We can let 3 men go but any more than that will short me to[o] much when something change[s] I can get by with less men Harold Floyd - operator Not dependable calls in sick a lot and has been siding around on roads and don't give notice until the day he is going to be off and won't do any thing unless we tell him to do something and don't look after the equipment at all John Curry - operator a good worker but keeps confusion between the other men and that causes lot of trouble he has already got one complaint form turned in on him Lawton Mathews - garbage truck he is a good worker and reports to work but he is old enough to retire he is failing fast he works with Clarence Hobbs on Garbage truck Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On what may have been the other part of the second or evaluation sheet of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, see Appendix A, 2/ Mr. Ward wrote: Lee S. Campbell Garbage truck he has been parked at his house on truck when he was on job it takes him to[o] long to go from box to the other and don't see after his truck to[o] good but he shows up to work good Johnny Peters - Night Guard he has had one complaint form turned in on him becuase there was about 48 or 50 gallons of Fuel went missing out of the DU cat ? on the night he was there Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Whatever Respondent's Exhibit No. 2's origin, Mr. Ward did not give it to Mr. Hudson. Mr. Ward did not and would not have recommended Mr. Ramos' layoff, even if convinced that four men had to be laid off. If Mr. Hudson had asked him to suggest a fourth candidate for a layoff, Mr. Ward would have suggested John Scott Mann, (T.214) or so he testified at hearing. 3/ Later on, when Mr. Ramos asked, Mr. Ward told him not to worry about being laid off. Having "heard there was a layoff coming" (T.244), Mr. Ramos also spoke to Walton County Commissioner Wilson Holley, and asked him if there were vacancies on the road crew he supervises. Commissioner Holley, who had known Mr. Ramos for several years and had employed him on a road crew for about a week once, when over 16 inches of rain fell and "they needed some help," (T.242), told petitioner "that he had been checking up on [him], that [he] was doing good out there and not to worry about it." T.244. Meanwhile, without discussing the matter with Mr. Ward, Mr. Ellis also prepared and furnished Mr. Hudson a list of names and evaluations. Three of the evaluations had a familiar ring but the fourth was all Mr. Ellis' work: Harold Floyd: Not dependable. Days out of work, and when he is out, he does so without notice. In my opinion when he is at work, he don't give 100%. His work ability if fair. John Curry: He keeps confusion among the men and also between the foreman and the asst. foreman. He has also been written up once concerning the matter. His work ability is good. Nick Ramos: Was hired on as a laborer, then transferred to chipping machine, then to sign machine. He's been on the sign machine four weeks now, and he's not catching on to it very fast. I have tried him on the equipment, and he didn't catch on to it either. His work ability is fair. Lawton Mathews: He is eligible for retirement. He has talked about retiring. His work ability is fair. We may talk to him about cutting back and he may go ahead and retire. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Hudson recommended that the Walton County Commission let all four men go. Mr. Ramos did not stop to pay for his coffee on his way out of the restaurant to see Ronnie Bell the morning the news broke. Like other men who were fired, Mr. Ramos first learned about the decision when he read about it in the newspaper on July 12, 1991. Not Rehired Mr. Bell, Walton County's administrative supervisor, had nothing to do with the decision to discharge Mr. Ramos, and told him as much. Mr. Ramos then left Mr. Bell's office in the courthouse annex for the landfill where Mr. Ward assured him he had not recommended his layoff. When he tried to talk to Mr. Ellis about it, "he walked off and he mumbled something." T.247. Mr. Ramos and the three other landfill employees laid off at the same time received official notification in letters dated July 13, 1989, that their employment would end on July 31, 1989. Mr. Mathews decided to retire. The letter to Mr. Ramos stated: Please be advised that if any openings become available in the future for which you are qualified, you will be one of the first considered to fill that opening. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. Mr. Ramos again sought out Commissioner Holley to ask for work, and also approached Commissioner W. F. "Rabbit" Miles, asking him if work was available. Some weeks after the layoff, Commissioner Holley telephoned with news of an opening for a night guard at the landfill. The next day, petitioner spoke first to Mr. Bell then to Mr. Hudson, to whom Mr. Bell referred him, about the position. Mr. Hudson said he knew nothing about an opening, but suggested Mr. Ramos check back. Mr. Ramos returned that afternoon, the next morning and every morning thereafter "for about a week." T.161, 247. Each time Mr. Hudson professed ignorance of the job vacancy, until the last time, when he told Mr. Ramos that "they had done hired Harold." T.249. Not only was Mr. Hudson in fact aware of the opening, he was actively recruiting to fill it. He offered the job to John Curry (T.184), who turned it down because he had found other, better-paying work. "Why don't you call Nick?" Mr. Curry asked Mr. Hudson at the time. "I wouldn't hire him back," was Mr. Hudson's answer. T.87. Harold Floyd got the job. T.163. Complaint Filed Mr. Ramos retained a lawyer who wrote the Walton County Commission on August 4, 1989, requesting petitioner's reinstatement, or in the alternative, a grievance hearing. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9. (The request was never honored, although a like request by a non-Hispanic employee was.) Harold Burkett began work as a night guard on September 13, 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14. On November 8, 1989, Mr. Ramos filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The number of "personnel at the landfill now [not counting prisoners assigned to work there after County employees were laid off (T.270)] is roughly fifty per cent of what it was at the time of Nick and them's layoff." T.175 But Walton County has "replaced, . . . transferred . . . [and] hired," id., employees at the landfill since then, rehiring Harold Floyd temporarily and adding Harold Burkett, Danny Burgess, Timmy Ray Jones and Russell Floyd, all "white Americans" given jobs for which petitioner is qualified, or would have been (T.257) but for his wrongful termination. Messrs. Burgess, Jones and Russell Floyd began work after County officials learned that Mr. Ramos had complained to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Asked why petitioner was not offered the job given to Mr. Burgess, who was hired as an equipment operator, Mr. Hudson testified that there was no reason "that I know of, you know, other than - - well, no one ever said anything about Nick, you know, being interested . . . ." T.172. In fact, Mr. Hudson was well aware that petitioner wanted a job with Walton County government, as were Mr. Ellis, who succeeded Mr. Ward as landfill supervisor, Mr. Bell and more than one county commissioner. Asked why petitioner was not offered the job Mr. Russell Floyd was given, Mr. Hudson said he knew of no reason. T.173. Commissioner Miles told Mr. Ramos 4/ that Commissioner Sam Pridgen "wouldn't hire [him] back . . . since [he] had filed a complaint against the County." T.284-5. Commissioner Holley testified, "Nick has a record of suing people that he's worked for and that weighs heavy on people's mind, I would imagine." T.310. (No Walton County Commissioner ever said anything to petitioner about his race. T.285.) Lost Wages County employees got a four percent raise on October 1, 1989, another four percent raise on October 1, 1990, and a three percent raise on October 1, 1991. The County made unspecified contributions to the Florida Retirement System at all pertinent times. For single employees, the County paid monthly insurance premiums of $120.10 in 1989, $123.66 in 1990 and $132.12 ($126.62 + $5.50) in 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Assuming no promotions and only cost of living raises, if petitioner had continued working for the County in the same position through the date of the final hearing, he would have received pay and insurance benefits totalling $33,015.60. Instead, after Mr. Ramos lost his job, he mowed grass, cut trees down, painted houses, washed cars and did other odd jobs to make what money he could. T.251, 282. He earned about $2,000 from such jobs in the last five months of 1989. His 1990 income was more than $2,800 but less than $2,900; and his 1991 income was "three thousand." T.282. He has been unable to find regular employment, but has "never been on food stamps or any kind of assistance." T.251. Before the final hearing began, one of petitioner's two attorneys, Mary Koch Polson, had reasonably expended 14.95 hours, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 16, pursuing this claim, and costs aggregating $234.49 had reasonably been incurred. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17. Ms. Polson bills her time at $125 an hour, and the reasonableness of this rate was not called into question. (Mr. Ramos paid his first attorney $1500, but the reasonableness of this fee was not stipulated and has not been established by evidence.) Aside from the first attorney's fees, prehearing costs and fees aggregate $1868.75.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR enter a final order (a) directing respondent to rehire petitioner as soon as an opening arises that he is qualified to fill that pays at least $5.95 an hour plus benefits; (b) awarding back wages (net of offsets) in the amount of twenty-five thousand, two hundred fifteen dollars and fifty- nine cents ($25,215.59) plus interest; (c) awarding costs and fees in the amount of eighteen hundred sixty-eight dollars and seventy-five cents ($18,868.75); and (d) awarding such additional amounts as are necessary to compensate him for lost wages including interest until he returns to work with the County or spurns a suitable offer, plus attorney's fees and costs reasonably incurred since the final hearing began. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1992.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief. AUTHORITY Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, D. Paul Sondel, was born August 13, 1928, and was, at the time of final hearing, 65 years of age. On April 11, 1993, Petitioner saw a newspaper advertisement for the position of Analyst I with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (FBOBE). On April 12, 1993, Petitioner went to the office of the employment agency which the FBOBE was using to locate and screen applicants. Petitioner was told that he would not be allowed to apply or take the pre- employment test for the position because he had a graduate degree and only persons who have a Bachelor's degree but no graduate degree(s) were allowed to apply. On June 1, 1993, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which he alleged that the FBOBE requirement that no one would be considered for the position of Analyst I who had a higher level degree than the minimum required Bachelor's degree, served the "intended purpose" of eliminating older applicants, especially those over Petitioner further alleged that the existence and implementation of such FBOBE policy was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Respondent hired two persons to fill the April 1993 advertised position of Analyst I. One of the persons hired was 24 and the other was 23 years of age. The FBOBE is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida and charged by the court with the responsibility of evaluating the character, fitness and competence of each applicant for admission to the Florida Bar. Petitioner has established that he is a person in a protected group; that adverse employment action was taken against him; that the persons hired for the position in question were outside the protected group; and that, but for his graduate degree, he was qualified for the position in question. The FBOBE has a current staff of 29 full time employees. As of March 30, 1994, of those employees, three were 40 years or older at the time of employment. Nine of these employees are currently 40 or older. The employment application used by the FBOBE does not request any information regarding an applicant's age. The FBOBE have hired individuals in the past who were 40 years of age or older. The FBOBE uses the American Employment Agency, Inc. to advertise vacancies and to conduct preliminary screening. Kathryn E. Ressel has been employed by the Respondent for over 22 years and is currently the Deputy Executive Director of the FBOBE. Ms. Ressel is responsible for the instructions given to the employment agency concerning the qualifications for the position of Analyst I. Ms. Ressel testified that the reason for the FBOBE policy of excluding applicants with post graduate college or university degrees is not intended to restrict employment opportunities to younger persons and is not related to the age of any applicant. Ms. Ressel's testimony is that past experience in hiring persons with graduate degrees has indicated that such persons tend to stay in the Analyst positions for short periods of time and leave when an employment opportunity presents itself in the field for which the person is educated. Ms. Ressel testified that the Analyst I position is an entry level position and that the Analyst receives extensive on-the-job training to enable the newly hired employee to perform assigned duties and meet job related responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. Therefore, according to Ms. Ressel, when Analyst I's leave the employment of the FBOBE after a short time on the job, the Respondent is unable to recoup the time, energy and expense involved in training such individuals. Ms. Ressel's testimony articulates a reasonable nondiscriminatory basis for the employment practice at issue. Ms. Ressel's testimony indicates that the employment policy at issue is age neutral in that it is applied to all individuals who apply for the position of Analyst I, regardless of age. Ms. Ressel's testimony in this regard is unrefuted. Official notice is taken that a given individual is generally older at the time such person receives a graduate degree than when the same individual receives a Bachelor's degree. It does not follow, however, and Petitioner has failed to prove (statistically or otherwise), that in any specific job applicant pool available to the Respondent to fill Analyst I positions, potential applicants with graduate degrees are older than potential applicants who possess only Bachelor's degrees. Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the employment policy at issue has a disparate impact on persons 40 years of age or older. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the FBOBE as the basis for rejecting Petitioner's application is in fact a pretext and/or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed in this case be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1994.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief served by mail March 20, 1987. Ten subparagraphs of that Petition address individual allegations, each of which are discussed fully in the following conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Brahim Derder is a citizen of Algeria with permanent resident status in the United States. At all times relevant, he was an adult male resident of the State of Florida, classified by his employer as "Black." Petitioner is a person within the meaning of Section 760.02(5), Florida Statutes. Petitioner graduated from the University of Miami with a Bachelor's Degree in Industrial Engineering in 1980. Prior to his employment with Respondent American Telephone and Telegraph Information Systems (ATTIS), he was employed from 1981 to 1983 by another subsidiary (Southern Bell) of Respondent's parent company, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), as a marketing representative in Miami, Florida. Respondent ATTIS is in the business of selling and leasing data and voice terminal equipment. Petitioner became an employee of ATTIS in 1984. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was terminated by Southern Bell as a result of his alleged failure to pass one of its required training courses. He was subsequently reinstated as a result of a complaint resolution pursuant to Southern Bell's own internal affirmative action program, also known as an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint resolution. Thereafter, Petitioner continued to be uneventfully employed by Southern Bell for about a year. Approximately August 1983, AT&T began preparation for court-ordered divestiture. Divestiture required the separation of the Bell operating companies from AT&T. Petitioner was assigned to a division within ATTIS in Miami due to the divestiture and its resulting reorganization. Once within ATTIS, Petitioner successfully protested through internal ATTIS-EEO channels a "limited contribution" performance rating given him upon his exit from Southern Bell, and obtained a change to "not rated," which rating, in turn, resulted in a modest pay increase. The subsidiaries of AT&T, like their parent company, had established formalized but voluntary internal EEO/Affirmative Action programs. At no time prior to Petitioner's termination by ATTIS in November 1985, did Petitioner file any charges of discrimination with any external governmental agency, including but not limited to the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the State of Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1984, ATTIS downsized its work force and Petitioner's position was "surplused." Petitioner was offered a position with ATTIS in Atlanta, Georgia but rejected it and located a job at ATTIS' Data Systems operation in Orlando, Florida. Once at ATTIS in Orlando, Petitioner worked under the supervision of four different managers in the course of approximately two years until his involuntary termination on November 18, 1985. This was a period of ongoing reorganization for the AT&T subsidiary and personnel changed frequently. Also, normal employee review and appraisal procedures were not always followed to the letter. Nonetheless, none of the four different ATTIS supervisors for whom Petitioner worked in that period of time found Petitioner's job performance to be satisfactory. Petitioner worked under Lowell Rogers' direct supervision from approximately April 1984 until the end of that year. Because Mr. Rogers accepted a position in New Jersey, he was not always available on ATTIS' Orlando jobsite even though he technically continued to have an office there until well into 1985. The written performance appraisal prepared for Rogers' signature reads in pertinent part: Based upon his exposure to training in the areas listed above, his performance has not been what would normally be expected within the given time frames. * * * Mr. Derder must devote both the time, motivation, and sincere desire to learn and adapt to both technical and development tasks which would allow him to be a more productive employee. It appears that other factors (relocation and job classification issues, etc.) consume far too much time and as a consequence, his training and productivity has suffered to date. (P-3, P-4) The appraisal was not, however, wholly negative. Steve Holmes, Petitioner's second supervisor, showed Rogers' appraisal to Petitioner approximately April 22, 1985 without Rogers' signature thereon (P- 3), and Petitioner made the cognitive leap without any valid foundation, that Holmes (not Rogers) had negatively rated Petitioner for discriminatory reasons only. Rogers did not physically sign this negative appraisal until May 16, 1985 (P-4). Petitioner's confusion concerning Rogers' negative appraisal is reasonable because the appraisal had been signed first by Rogers' supervisor, the District Manager, on January 22, 1985, before being returned for Rogers' signature and Petitioner had received a merit increase on his year's employment anniversary in April 1985 based on his 1984 service, but no discriminatory motivation or act was proven with regard to Rogers' evaluation. Steve Holmes was Petitioner's supervisor at ATTIS in Orlando from January 1985 until May 16, 1985. His exit evaluation of Petitioner was also negative as follows: Brahim has been substantially distracted from the performance of his job by an almost obsessive belief that he has been unfairly treated with regard to his transfer into AT&T-IS ... Brahim needs to treat deadlines with more urgency. He needs to plan his work more effectively so as to identify possible problem areas and develop remedies before they become overwhelming. He needs to double check his work for errors in data (typo's) and information ... (P-12) Petitioner's work for Holmes was to gather data for a report on the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) project. The project involved conversion of several small lines and switches to bigger ones at many locations nationwide. The information gathered was generated from numerous sources geographically scattered throughout the United States. Although component information changed daily as the actual switchovers progressed, the overall intent behind the report was to assemble data, collate it into meaningful graphic tables and verbal explanations, and present it as a finished printed report which could be published monthly and presented to higher levels of management so that the past month's progress could be assessed and future planning decisions could be wisely made. Petitioner's view was that a computer/word processor was necessary to complete his task, whereas management felt Petitioner's input prior to typing of the report could be done with paper and pencil or possibly with paper and pencil and a calculator. Petitioner was nonetheless permitted to use an IBM-PC computer assigned to a peer employee. Petitioner felt his ISDN report had to be rewritten entirely each time there were any data changes whatsoever because the different sections within the report were interdependent. Management had contemplated that because the report would be published monthly, at some point each month Petitioner would reconcile all available data for that month and publish the report. Although Petitioner submitted many draft versions of the ISDN report, which was intended to be published monthly, a final version of the report was never completed by Petitioner to Holmes' satisfaction over at least four months of report drafts. Mr. Holmes felt that the Petitioner was not properly assessing the interdependent sections and relating them to one another so as to give an accurate overview for any single month. Early in their association, Holmes called these problems to Petitioner's attention. Holmes had contemporaneously provided Petitioner with an analysis of his May 1985 ISDN submission, pointing out over 300 alleged errors by Petitioner. At formal hearing, Holmes expressed his concerns with regard to several months' submissions by showing one mathematical error of $300,000 on one of Petitioner's submissions, and by indicating that such an error was one example of several similar significant errors made repeatedly by Petitioner. Holmes indicated that the $300,000 error illustrated how the interdependence of rapidly changing data had not been accounted for by Petitioner, who apparently changed data entries piecemeal, as the data became available, without reconciling data as of one single given date each month. Holmes made distinctions between Petitioner's errors of omission, which Holmes had called to Petitioner's attention and which Petitioner often could rectify, and Petitioner's errors of internal contradiction within the reports which Petitioner seemed unable to comprehend. Simply stated, Petitioner always had some part of the report "out of sync" with another or other parts. Petitioner incorrectly attributes Holmes' criticisms of this and all of his ISDN report submissions to mere cosmetic or stylistic opinions or to Holmes' unawareness of the most up-to-date data. Holmes eventually would not accept Petitioner's relying on ISDN project delays (field implementation delays not attributable to Petitioner) as excuses to cover up ISDN report delays which clearly were attributable to Petitioner. Holmes described Petitioner's problem with the entire project as one of Petitioner's inability to conceptualize the project as opposed to Petitioner's unwillingness to do the project. In assessing the two witnesses' respective approaches to the report, Mr. Holmes' explanations are less emotional, more reasonable, more detailed, and more credible than are Petitioner's. Petitioner used ATTIS' internal EEO procedures to protest his performance appraisals by Rogers and Holmes and to object to the paygrade assigned to him when he came to work with Orlando ATTIS. Once in Orlando, Petitioner had discovered that the maximum of his paygrade range at Orlando ATTIS was lower than the maximum of his paygrade range at Miami ATTIS had been. Petitioner showed no reason management should correct Petitioner's inadvertent error but claimed Holmes blocked attempts which otherwise would have been successful to upgrade Petitioner's paygrade. Holmes denies it, stating he had no such authority. Concerning Petitioner's paygrade adjustment request, there is no space on the form requiring anyone in Holmes' position to approve it. Apparently, a higher superior named Ron Phillips signed the request for a concurrence by David L. Oertle and then signed "R.E. Phillips for David L. Oertle" [emphasis supplied] in the space wherein Mr. A Oertle's concurring signature was required (P-10). Why the paygrade adjustment did not go through under these peculiar circumstances or if there were other management considerations why it was not consummated is anybody's guess, but discrimination or interference by Mr. Holmes with regard to the paygrade adjustment request was not proven. Holmes admits he became aware of an internal EEO investigation of himself requested by Petitioner with regard to the failed pay adjustment request as set out infra. The paygrade adjustment was never a "promotion" as characterized by Petitioner. Mr. Holmes does not deny that he was aware in December 1984 that Petitioner had filed two previous internal EEO complaints at Southern Bell and at Miami ATTIS. He discussed these with Petitioner when Petitioner first joined his workforce because one complaint was ongoing and Holmes was afraid it would detract from some of Petitioner's work time. Early in 1985, Holmes noted these concerns in a personal journal he used to record many different kinds of events at his office. Petitioner acknowledged that he threatened Holmes with an EEO complaint at Orlando ATTIS if Holmes would not sign off on the paygrade adjustment request (TR 91). Holmes, already leery of Petitioner, and increasingly dissatisfied with Petitioner's job performance, gradually began to record in his personal journal reminders relating to Petitioner's job performance. In approximately April, 1985, upon suggestions from internal EEO personnel, Holmes began to more carefully document in his journal his confrontations with, and performance-related concerns about, Petitioner. When Petitioner discovered that portions of Holmes' journal relating to him had been circulated by Holmes to upper management, Petitioner perceived Holmes' actions as purely retaliatory for his EEO involvement and prepared by Holmes solely to get Petitioner fired for discriminatory reasons attributable to racial, ethnic, and national bias. I find that although Holmes' journal includes references to Petitioner and Petitioner's EEO involvement, the entries taken as a whole are reasonable under the circumstances and anticipatory of future need to document employee problems rather than evidence of discrimination against an employee for that employee's exercise of EEO involvement. Petitioner's allegations that Steve Holmes was improperly and unlawfully motivated for this journal are not adequately substantiated. Holmes declined Petitioner's request to sign his AB-36 form (P-19) so as to permit Petitioner to transfer divisions within ATTIS because Holmes felt Petitioner's past job performance for him did not merit the transfer to another job in the international or out-of-state geographic areas and in the substantive areas Petitioner had requested and because Petitioner presented the form to him simultaneously with Petitioner's move to another workforce within the same district. Also, the jobs listed were not necessarily open. In that new workforce, Petitioner was supervised by his third supervisor, Gus Schulties, for what was admittedly a very short period of time, approximately three months, one month of which Petitioner was on vacation. The credible evidence as a whole does not establish that Petitioner was transferred due to any belief in the truth of Petitioner's charges against Rogers or Holmes, but that it was in the nature of diffusing a bad situation created by Petitioner and giving Petitioner an opportunity to perform better. Around August 20, 1985, Schulties was reassigned and replaced by Barbara Wayne. Schulties' evaluation of Petitioner includes the following commentary: I think he should have been able to do more on his own effort. I do not believe he has the initiative to get deeply involved. * * * This employee needs development in many aspects of the data communications environment. (P-32) Schulties' written evaluation was signed by Petitioner's next supervisor, Barbara Wayne, because Schulties had been relocated on the date it was due. Later, Schulties concurred in the decision to terminate Petitioner. Mr. Schulties was present when Ms. Wayne fired Petitioner on November 18, 1985. Petitioner had worked for Wayne for approximately three months. While working for Ms. Wayne, Petitioner was orally counselled several times concerning his inability to conceptualize job assignments so as to achieve results, and these sessions were contemporaneously documented by Wayne, whose testimony at hearing was consistent and credible. Petitioner never achieved the objectives which directly applied to his job and which were set for him by Ms. Wayne. While working under Holmes, Schulties, and Wayne, Petitioner produced a number of what might be termed "self-assigned projects" of cosmetic or internal employee relations value, but these projects were not always directly related to the Petitioner's job or his employer's project objectives. While Petitioner established that ATTIS management would not approve all of the company training he wanted, his requests for such training were not always reasonable in relation to the subject matter of projects to which he was assigned, nor were his requests always reasonable in relation to management standards of cost-effectiveness and the employer's need for Petitioner's presence on the job. All of management's denials or non-approvals of training were reasonable in the context of balancing of costs against expected productivity to be gained from the training. Petitioner was, in fact, approved for, and attended, several training courses, and was paid overtime when he taught himself computer programs on nights and weekends, even though the use of the computer was nonessential to his job duties from management's perspective. Petitioner never established by direct credible evidence that other employees in similar circumstances at ATTIS Orlando were given the training he was denied or that his job truly required the training which he was denied. Petitioner speculated that certain employees resented him because he had a Bachelor's Degree which they did not have, but "college graduate" is not a statutorily protected classification. Several employee witnesses had at least some college courses. A college degree was not necessary for employment or promotion at ATTIS. Employee resentment that Petitioner did not meet deadlines and avoided necessary tasks he felt were below him did exist. Petitioner's initial internal (P-15, P-16) and external (P-40, P-41) complaints did not raise an issue of verbal slurs of national or racial tone, but his Petition for Relief does. At hearing, Petitioner initially accused supervisors Wayne and Holmes, and a coworker, Shipp, of making ethnic jokes and derogatory comments about Petitioner's race and national origin. However, Petitioner conceded that neither Schulties nor Rogers were ever out of line and that Wayne had very little conversation with Petitioner about his ethnic background or race. Petitioner testified that his relationship with Mr. Shipp was satisfactory except that Mr. Shipp repeatedly made comments and jokes concerning Petitioner's light skin and not being as black as a typical African; wanted to know about Petitioner's wife when Petitioner told Mr. Shipp that he had married a black woman; made some discriminatory comments concerning Petitioner's education and schooling in Africa; referred to Petitioner's family as "zebras" and "camel drivers," and suggested Petitioner had bought his University degree. As might be expected, all ATTIS personnel denied making any racial or ethnic slurs. Giving Petitioner every benefit of the doubt that some hurtful, biased comments may have been made by Shipp and Holmes, Shipp was only Petitioner's team leader for a short period of time when Petitioner was assigned to Barbara Wayne, and he was essentially Petitioner's peer. Shipp, like other employees, had input to Wayne's final evaluation, but he was not the sole source of Wayne's displeasure with Petitioner's performance, and Shipp never evaluated Petitioner. Petitioner was transferred away from Holmes' supervision in response to Petitioner's internal EEO complaints against Holmes, which complaints apparently were never verified by EEO and which complaints apparently never alleged any record of ethnic or racial slurs by Holmes. Petitioner concedes that he did not wish to make much of the comments and jokes around him and also took offense at most of his coworkers declining his invitations to coffee and lunch. Shipp did occasionally eat and take breaks with him. There apparently was little socializing in this workforce and Petitioner seemed to misunderstand that. It was also clearly established that the Respondent employer has in place an aggressive internal anti-discrimination grievance and affirmative action policy and procedures which Petitioner had free access to and which repeatedly gave him the benefit of the doubt. It was also affirmatively put forth by Petitioner that he made a point of confronting Mr. Schulties, Ms. Wayne, and Mr. Shipp and of telling each of them that he had had successful internal EEO actions, and/or that he had complained about Holmes before any one of them had any significant contact with him. (TR 176-177, 242, 251-252). Petitioner also affirmatively put forth that he "begged" Schulties and Wayne not to be prejudiced against him almost upon first meeting with each. I conclude that this overly aggressive and hypersensitive behavior on Petitioner's part resulted in his misconstruing some conversations and constituted a non- pretextual reason for Wayne to carefully document each meeting with Petitioner. Petitioner showed that one employee (Karnes) was negatively rated by Ms. Wayne for the first time but was permitted additional time to improve his performance without immediate termination, but Karnes' single negative evaluation does not correlate to Petitioner's negative ratings from four successive supervisors so as to demonstrate unequal treatment of Petitioner. Petitioner perceives all criticisms of, or negative comments about, his job performance as incorrect and without merit but the accuracy of his perception has not been adequately substantiated in this proceeding, and I find that his poor job performance was his employer's and supervisors' primary motivation in terminating Petitioner's employment. Petitioner's charges of discriminatory treatment are based largely on his perception or conjecture that there could be no nondiscriminatory reason for management's actions since he had the academic qualifications to do the job and the willingness to do it. However, his repeated failure to timely complete projects to his employer's specifications is sufficiently documented in the record. Petitioner's education and ability notwithstanding, Petitioner's performance was unacceptable.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1258 The following constitute rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon Petitioner's and Respondent's respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF 1-2. Except as subordinate or unnecessary covered in FOF 1. 3-4. Irrelevant. Except as irrelevant, covered in FOF 1. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible competent evidence but see FOF 22. 7-18. The only relevant and material history of Petitioner's relationship with Southern Bell is set forth in FOF 3. To the extent these proposals are not covered there, they are irrelevant or immaterial to any dispositive issue in this cause. 19. Covered in FOF 6. 20-23. Except as covered in FOF 6-7, rejected as immaterial. Covered in FOF 8. Not supported by the greater weight of the credible competent evidence as set forth in FOF 8. Job descriptions are not dispositive of any material issue in this cause. Petitioner received oral and written job descriptions at appropriate times. Covered in FOF 9. Covered in FOF 9-10. 28-29. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible competent evidence which resulted in the FOF 12-13. Had uppermost management approved the change, it would have gone through and there is insufficient proof it was justified just because Petitioner inadvertently accepted a lower pay grade and meant to accept a higher pay grade or that Petitioner interpreted a lateral transfer as being lateral in all respects including salary, when it was not. Peripherally, see the conclusions of law (COL). 30-32. Subordinate and unnecessary but it is noted that Petitioner's PFOF 31-32 admits receipt of a job description in this position and workforce. See peripherally FOF 11. Covered in FOF 11. Immaterial. 35-40. The proposals are mostly mere recitations of part of Petitioner's testimony as opposed to statements of ultimate or even material fact. Additionally, as stated, these proposals are not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. See FOF 11. 41-42 and 44. Immaterial and not dispositive of any issue at bar. 43 and 45. Covered in FOF 10-11, and 22. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. Moreover, Petitioner admits elsewhere in the record that if being told why and how his job performance needed improvement was counselling, the counselling occurred. The Hearing Officer recognizes that "counselling," "criticism," and "harassment" are all subjective words and has considered both the credibility and perspective of all witnesses' testimony and has considered all the documentary evidence in making these findings of fact. Covered in FOF 11. 49. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence and as related in FOF 11. 48, 50-52. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 8- 10. Except as subordinate and unnecessary, covered in FOF 19. Covered in FOF 12-13. Covered in FOF 10. There was some overlapping of supervisory- authority as found in FOF 7-12. However, the minimum inconsistencies in testimony and documentation recited by Petitioner's proposal are accounted for due to early failure to document, the on-again, off-again supervision of Mr. Rogers, and Petitioner's mid-year transfer to Mr. Schulties' supervision. Petitioner's proposal is therefore not consistent with the record as a whole, is immaterial, and is not dispositive of any material issue at bar. 56-72. FOF 13-14 cover relevant facts as supported by the greater weight of the credible competent evidence as a whole. Petitioner's proposals are not consistent among themselves and are mostly recitations of Petitioner's testimony concerning his own internal but unsubstantiated perceptions of events, and are rejected for those reasons and in certain respects, as demonstrated by the facts as found in FOF 13-14 and FOF 22, are not supported by the record as a whole. Other rejected material is rejected as subordinate or unnecessary as is also demonstrated by the ultimate facts as found in the recommended order. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. See FOF 11. Most of this proposal is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. See facts as found in FOF 12- 15, and 20. Covered in FOF 20. 76 and 78. Subordinate and unnecessary and not dispositive of any issue at bar. 77. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole except as covered in FOF 18. 79. Covered In FOF 17. 80-81. To the extent supported by the greater weight of-the credible competent, substantial evidence of record, these PFOF are covered in FOF 15-16; otherwise rejected as not so supported. 82, 86, 87. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole and as not dispositive of any issue at bar; Petitioner received a job description under a different title plus considerable oral explanation. If Wayne did not reply in writing to every memorandum, it is immaterial. 83-85. Rejected as-covered in FOF 18. Petitioner did not establish that employees in similar circumstances were given more or different training than he was denied. 88-99. Again these are largely recitations of Petitioner's testimony rather than statements of ultimate fact. None are necessary or dispositive of a material issue at bar. The requests for additional work are immaterial since Petitioner was consistently being told he was not satisfactorily completing his basic assignments. See FOF 16, 20, and 22. Petitioner's PFOF 97 and 98 are also immaterial in that Petitioner appropriated all team credit to himself and passed off all personal inadequacies onto the team. See FOF 17 and 22. Except as set out supra, the PFOF 88-99 are subordinate and unnecessary. 100. Subordinate and unnecessary, but see FOF 16 and 17. 101-104. Except as subordinate and unnecessary or as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence, covered in FOF 19-20. 105-107. Rejected as stated because they are misleading of the record as a whole. Subject matter covered in FOF 15-16 and 20. 108-114. Except as subordinate or unnecessary or as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, covered in FOF 15-16. 115. Unnecessary. Respondent's PFOF 1,3. Covered in FOF 1. 2. Covered in FOF 2-6. Covered in FOF 7, 15-16. Covered in FOF 1-6. 6-8. These proposals are generally rejected because they consist of many paragraphs, sentences, footnotes, and quotations which are not appropriately divided out and numbered pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and Rules 22I-6.24 and 22I-6.31, Florida Administrative Code, and instructions contained in the post-hearing order and authority cited therein, and which contain lengthy and burdensome recitations from documentary exhibits and of testimony rather than statements of ultimate facts to be found. Further, they contain large quantities of subordinate and unnecessary material interspersed with mere argument of counsel. Where they could be accepted, they are covered in FOF 7- 22. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Vidal Marino Velis, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Number 300 Miami, Florida 33145 Sherryll Martens Dunaj, Esquire 501 City National Bank Building 25 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has a claim that is cognizable under Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes, and if so, whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a black female, began working for Respondent as a child protection investigator (PI) in Respondent's District 13, Unit 42, Ocala, Marion County, Florida, in 1993. Petitioner transferred to Respondent's Marion County office from Dade County, where she held a similar position. Petitioner's supervisor in Marion County was Ms. Charlene Bartsch. At first, Petitioner and Ms. Bartsch had a good working relationship. Ms. Bartsch did not testify at the hearing. In 1994, Petitioner learned that she was diabetic. From that time forward, Ms. Bartsch occasionally expressed her concern to Petitioner that the stress of the job was exacerbating Petitioner's medical condition. Petitioner's testimony that Ms. Bartsch made these comments to persuade Petitioner to find another job is not credible. Persuasive evidence indicates that in the beginning of their professional relationship, Petitioner often freely discussed the stress of her job and personal life with Ms. Bartsch. Moreover, there is no evidence that Ms. Bartsch ever suggested that Petitioner think about looking for another job. Ms. Bartsch gave Petitioner an "achieves" on an annual performance appraisal signed by Ms. Bartsch on February 11, 1994, and by Petitioner on February 14, 1994. The appraisal gave Petitioner an overall rating of "achieves performance standards." Petitioner believed that she had earned the higher overall rating of "exceeds performance standards" on the appraisal. Ms. Bartsch wrote the following comment in the February 1994 performance appraisal: During this period of time, Ms. Ausby has found herself on numerous occasions apologizing for something said that was misunderstood or taken wrongly. Ms. Ausby is aware that others at times have difficulty coping with her admittedly outspoken nature. Since she is aware of the problem, I'm sure that she will now work on the professional demeanor needed for working with co-workers and the public. It is only because of this area that Ms. Ausby does not meet the "exceeds overall." Petitioner complained to Respondent's personnel manager about her performance appraisal. The personnel manager did not change the rating but gave Petitioner an opportunity to respond point-by-point in writing to the appraisal. Petitioner testified that Ms. Bartsch gave Gerard King, a white male PI, an "achieves below performance standards" on a performance appraisal in January 1994. Petitioner also testified that Respondent's management subsequently changed Mr. King's appraisal to "achieves." The basis for Petitioner's knowledge of these facts is unclear. In any event, there is no competent evidence that the circumstances under which Respondent changed Mr. King's performance appraisal were similar to the circumstances under which Respondent declined to change Petitioner's performance appraisal. In January 1994, Ms. Bartsch decided to let the employees have the option of working a four-day week. Petitioner opted to work Monday through Thursday with Friday through Saturday off. Petitioner, and all other employees who elected to do so, worked this four-day work schedule for approximately four months. In May 1994, Ms. Bartsch required all employees to return to a five-day work schedule. Persuasive evidence indicates that the unit as a whole voted to return to a five-day work schedule on a day that Petitioner was not in the office. A subsequent memorandum written by Petitioner shows that she believed she had a right to negotiate her work schedule with Ms. Bartsch on an individual basis because Ms. Bartsch was the person who hired her. There is no credible evidence that Ms. Bartsch made this decision based solely on the complaint of a white male PI who claimed that the unit received more cases on Friday, a day that Petitioner was off and the white male was at work. On February 15, 1994, Ms. Bartsch had a conference with Petitioner. A memorandum created during this conference and signed by Ms. Bartsch and Petitioner contains the following comments: Strengths: being perfectionist; works in timely manner helps other people; always available lot of knowledge re HRS/investigations hard worker organized Areas Needing Improvement: (1) personality problems with co-workers The following changes will be made: isolate and stay from others letting Gloria speak in place On April 14, 1994, Ms. Bartsch had another conference with Petitioner. The memorandum documenting this conference and signed by Ms. Bartsch and Petitioner states as follows: Issues: court problems. calendar needs organization getting not enough support from attorneys doing better at getting along with people continue not allowing others to lean too much There is no credible evidence that Ms. Bartsch ever yelled at Petitioner for helping her co-workers. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Bartsch at times commended Petitioner and her co-workers for helping each other and working as a team. Petitioner testified that Ms. Bartsch began to assign Petitioner to more "on-call" weekend duty than other PIs in May 1994. The documentation that Petitioner offered to support her testimony is not competent. Petitioner's testimony in this regard did not take into consideration the different lengths of employment and levels of experience of other PIs, as well as their race and gender. Petitioner's testimony alone is not credible and is insufficient to determine at any point in time that Ms. Bartsch assigned Petitioner more "on-call" duty than other similarly situated white and/or male PIs. On May 10, 1994, Ms. Bartsch had a third individual conference with Petitioner. The purpose of the conference was to discuss Petitioner's work and interpersonal relations in the office. The memorandum documenting this meeting and signed by Ms. Bartsch and Petitioner states as follows: Issues: fantastic - no backlog work on trying to UPS or petition without removing kids if not in imminent danger interpersonal relations ignore other's comments say nothing to hurt people's feelings Cindy feels co-workers are venting their anger and causing friction in the unit and specifically towards her She feels best way to handle is to withdraw On May 26, 1994, Ms. Bartsch assigned a June 1994 "on-call" weekend to Petitioner when she had plans to attend a social function. As a general rule, Ms. Bartsch let employees switch "on-call" weekends with each other. Petitioner testified that Ms. Bartsch questioned a colleague's offer to switch "on-call" weekends with Petitioner on the relevant weekend. According to Petitioner's testimony, Ms. Bartsch became upset and stated that she wanted Petitioner to work her assigned weekends. Petitioner's testimony did not consider whether there were other circumstance existing in the unit at the time, making it necessary for all PIs to abide by the pre-assigned weekend duty roster, established by a rotating log. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she and her co-worker were allowed to switch "on-call" duty in the month of June 1994. Respondent requires its investigators to keep their cases updated in the computer. In June 1994, Ms. Bartsch told Petitioner to update her cases on the computer. Petitioner only had one case, which she was unaware of, to update. There is no credible evidence that Ms. Bartsch treated Petitioner differently from her white male co-workers in this regard. This is true even if one co-worker, a white male, had cases that had not been updated since 1993. During some staff meetings, Petitioner felt that Ms. Bartsch allowed other supervisors and/or co-workers to treat Petitioner rudely. On one occasion, Respondent's operations program assistant, Lynn Peirson, agreed with Petitioner that Ms. Bartsch should have intervened on Petitioner's behalf during a meeting. There is no evidence that Ms. Peirson's comment related to a specific incident where a white and/or male employee was rude to Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Bartsch often inappropriately tolerated unprofessional conduct among all members of her staff, regardless of their race or gender. Additionally, there is no credible evidence that Ms. Bartsch assigned Petitioner to an "on-call" weekend in retaliation for complaining to Ms. Peirson. Petitioner testified that Ms. Bartsch assigned Petitioner more cases to work than other investigators. Petitioner also testified that Ms. Bartsch gave Petitioner the most difficult cases. There is no competent evidence that the case assignments given to Petitioner were more numerous or difficult in relation to the race, gender, length of employment, or experience of other PIs. Petitioner often expressed her opinion and complained to her co-workers that she worked harder than they did. There is evidence that Petitioner was the most experienced PI in the unit and that she worked hard but no harder than other similarly situated PIs. Petitioner testified that Ms. Bartsch interpreted Petitioner's complaints about her workload as meaning that Petitioner felt she worked harder than her co-workers. There is no competent evidence to support this testimony. There is persuasive evidence that Petitioner often misinterpreted Ms. Bartsch's statements. There is no credible evidence that, at some point in time, two of Respondent's white male employees called Petitioner "nigger" or that Ms. Bartsch ever called Petitioner an "uppity nigger." Likewise, there is no credible evidence that a white male co-worker left one of Ms. Bartsch's staff meetings, calling Petitioner a "bitch" and slamming the door. In fact, the most persuasive evidence indicates no one in Respondent's employ ever used such inappropriate language directed toward Petitioner. To the extent that such inappropriate language was used, Petitioner never informed anyone in a position of authority in time to give Respondent an opportunity to correct the transgression. Petitioner did not include a timely reference to any of these racial slurs in any of her numerous memorandums that expressed her displeasure in the unit's operations or Ms. Bartsch's management style and that set forth her claims of discrimination and disparate treatment. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she was raising the allegation that Ms. Bartsch called Petitioner an "uppity nigger" for the first time. There is competent evidence of friction and personality conflicts between the employees in general, and specifically between Petitioner and her co-workers. On October 13, 1994, Ms. Bartsch sent a memorandum to her staff. In the memorandum, Ms Bartsch announced that Petitioner and Erwin Crawford would be the designated staff to take cases to court. Ms. Bartsch asked her staff to properly investigate and document each of the cases before transferring them to Petitioner or Mr. Crawford. The October 13, 1994, memorandum requested the staff to propose new performance standards for the office and to put future complaints in writing. Ms. Bartsch stated that she would start responding to the staff's concerns in writing. Ms. Bartsch's October 13, 1994, memorandum encouraged the staff to work as a team. She acknowledged that everyone was at each other's throats. She wanted staff members to find a way to solve problems with their co-workers. Ms. Bartsch advised that she would start documenting more and using more oral and written reprimands. Ms. Bartsch's October 13, 1994, memorandum listed some regulations that she thought were problems in the office and added her comments. Regarding "disruptive conduct," including speaking rudely or contemptuously to others and the slamming of doors, Ms. Bartsch stated that problems occur when people accuse each other of things. She stated as follows: "Shouting matches are out. Swearing is out. Yelling at your clients is out. Rudeness to anyone is out." Ms. Bartsch advised everyone to sign up for a class entitled "Working with Difficult People" and also suggested that everyone take a stress management class. Regarding "failure to follow instructions," Ms. Bartsch's October 13, 1994, memorandum instructed the staff to take whatever cases they are assigned without complaint. This included taking cases as they were received according to the rotation of names on a rotation log. Ms. Bartsch's October 13, 1994, memorandum also included definitions of insubordination and falsification of records or statements. On December 7, 1994, Petitioner sent Ms. Bartsch a memorandum. Petitioner explained that she no longer wanted to represent the office in filing legal petitions to remove children from their homes with the court. Petitioner made this decision because she felt her co-workers did not respect and appreciate her. Instead, Petitioner believed that the other PIs, regardless of race or gender, left work undone on cases before prematurely transferring the cases to Petitioner, making her job more difficult. On one occasion, Petitioner had so much work to do preparing three court petitions, with no help from any other PI except for one white male, that she was late getting to court and had to apologize to the judge. In this memorandum, Petitioner announced that she was returning all cases to Ms. Bartsch for reassignment that were not originally assigned to her. Petitioner's memorandum makes it clear that from that time forward she was only willing to help one other PI who appreciated her work. On December 19, 1994, Ms. Bartsch wrote a memorandum to Petitioner. This memorandum was subsequently placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Ms. Bartsch's December 19, 1994, memorandum discusses Ms. Bartsch's concern for the stress that Petitioner was experiencing at work and the negative impact that the stress was having on Petitioner's job performance. The December 19, 1994, memorandum states as follows in pertinent part: Admitted stress of dealing with your co-workers. It is my understanding at the class on "How to Deal with Difficult People," you made it very clear to the group that your problem was getting along with your co-workers. You also dramatically distanced yourself from other members of your unit. The stress of trying to work court cases. This was impacted by what you felt was lack of support from your co-workers. Stress affecting your judgment on some cases. I.E. Spragg--where you did not want to shelter even though I insisted; Coleman where the doctors adamantly state it was a situation of child abuse. Our attorney states you have a misperception of what it takes to shelter a child. Your method of coping with others in the unit by distancing yourself by staying in your room with the door shut and not interacting unless absolutely required causes other concerns. There is added stress when you compare your reputation and acceptance working with Dade County judges and attorneys with how the Marion County judicial process works. Stress from me, your supervisor. Our communication has had some strains because you interpret things differently than what I feel I've expressed to you. You've shared some personal stressors from your home situation. No doubt the stress as well in your personal life only helps to compound the issue. * * * This is to be considered a letter of counsel. The next step in the changed order of career service rules is what is called a PIP or Performance Improvement Plan. There are two "core" standards which must be met on the new RAPP form. They are: Courtesy - Treats customers, the public and staff with courtesy, respect and dignity and presents a positive public image. Team Work - Supports the unit, department and/or organization and works with others in an effort to accomplish the goals of the unit, department and/or organization. You have made tremendous strides in the aspect of courtesy with our clients. I have not been receiving the phone calls of complaints as I used to do. Your ability to make corrections in this area has obviously been dramatic. Now I would ask that you also make those changes towards your co- workers. You view them as people who do not work as hard as you. You are critical of the way they work their cases. You have been quite vocal to everyone about this. They strongly take this as lack of respect towards them on your part. Team work is an issue that we have been addressing for months. I'm sure the easiest way for you to deal with the stress has been through isolation. But I did not make the new standard; I do strongly endorse it and encourage you to make changes in this area also. You have tremendous skills and abilities that have been of great help to children and families in the past. I want this to continue. But I'm also very serious about the fact that you must get the help you need, now, for the stress you are under before your health is more seriously affected. In the past you have made great strides to correct things that have been pointed out to you. No one doubts your conscientiousness about the way you approach your work. I'm sure you will see the importance of dealing with these issues. Petitioner responded to the December 19, 1994, memorandum with a long memorandum dated January 3, 1995. Petitioner's written response was directed to Don Dixon, Respondent's assistant district administrator who was a black male, requesting him to remove Ms. Bartsch's December 19, 1994, memorandum from Petitioner's personnel file. Petitioner's January 3, 1995, memorandum responded point-by-point to the matters of concern raised by Ms. Bartsch's December 19, 1994, memorandum. In general, Petitioner denied that she had a stress problem. Instead, Petitioner indicated that Ms. Bartsch was the problem because of Ms. Bartsch's failure to address Petitioner's complaints and Ms. Bartsch's retaliatory conduct. Specifically, Petitioner disputed Ms. Bartsch's representation of the facts as follows: (a) Regarding the class on "How to Deal with Difficult People," Petitioner denied that she isolated herself from the other staff members because she always chose to sit up front when given the opportunity and admitted making the statement that she wanted to determine if her problems with her co-workers were her own fault, and if so, what she needed to do to change; (b) Regarding Petitioner's management of her court cases, Petitioner claimed that on December 7, 1994, Petitioner had to prepare three court cases and was late to court because only one person offered to help; In regard to the Coleman case, Petitioner insisted that there was not enough evidence to show that the child was abused until a doctor provided that evidence at a later date; (d) In regard to the Spragg case, Petitioner stated that, based on later evidence, a court petition to remove the children for neglect would have been rejected because the family had access to electricity; (e) Petitioner admitted that she and Ms. Bartsch occasionally disagreed on the removal of children from their homes, but asserted that no attorney on Respondent's legal staff made a statement regarding Petitioner misunderstanding of what it takes to shelter a child; (f) Petitioner asserted that she works with her door closed to avoid distractions and so she can concentrate on her work like other employees do without receiving a letter of counsel; (g) Petitioner took the position that most employees have trouble with the judicial system but accept what cannot be changed; (h) Petitioner asserted that in reprisal for her complaints, she received more cases to work than her co-workers as reflected by her overtime hours; (i) Petitioner asserted she revealed her diabetic condition, which was controlled by taking medicine, and the problems she had with a child in her custody only for purposes of stating a reason for taking leave and that in the future, the only reason Petitioner would give for taking leave would be to state it was "personal." In conclusion, Petitioner's memorandum stated that she agreed to attend a stress class but requested a job transfer. On January 19, 1995, Petitioner wrote a memorandum to Respondent's personnel manager, Jeff Carr. She again responded to Ms. Bartsch's December 19, 1994, memorandum, requesting that it be removed from Petitioner's personnel file. On January 19, 1995, Mr. Crawford complained to Ms. Bartsch that he had 24 court cases and needed some relief. Ms. Bartsch sent Mr. Crawford's memorandum to the office staff asking everyone to help Mr. Crawford. Mr. Crawford was sick at the time with AIDS. On January 24, 1995, Ms. Bartsch wrote a memorandum to her staff. In the memorandum, Ms. Bartsch explained that Mr. Crawford would no longer just handle court cases. Instead, Mr. Crawford would carry a normal caseload and everyone would be responsible for his or her own court cases. There is no credible evidence that Ms. Bartsch treated Petitioner differently than Mr. Crawford in this regard. In fact, Ms. Bartsch seemed to agree that the staff had not treated Petitioner and Mr. Crawford fairly by stating as follows in her memorandum: "Would you want to do that . . . many court cases in a row: I think you were being somewhat unfair if you weren't willing to be a partner for awhile with either Cindy or Erwin. Anyway, it is too late now." In 1995, Petitioner was a member of Respondent's equal employment opportunity committee. In time, one of Petitioner's co-workers asked Petitioner to represent her in an employee grievance hearing. There is no credible evidence that the head of the committee told Petitioner she might be blackballed if she got involved in the grievance proceeding. During the hearing, Petitioner presented insufficient details about the alleged grievance proceeding to determine whether there were any repercussions. Sometime thereafter, Respondent's personnel manager and Ms. Bartsch pulled Petitioner's mileage reimbursement/travel vouchers for audit. Ms. Bartsch took the time to verify Petitioner's mileage claims, finding numerous errors and miscalculations. On May 23, 1995, Petitioner wrote Ms. Bartsch and Ms. Peirson a memorandum. The memorandum reviewed the issues discussed in a meeting that Ms. Bartsch and Ms. Peirson had with Petitioner concerning her travel vouchers from March 15, 1995, through May 7, 1995. The memorandum also outlines Petitioner's responses to each allegation that her travel vouchers needed to be corrected. Persuasive evidence indicates that Petitioner did not dispute the need to correct some of the vouchers. There is no competent evidence that Ms. Bartsch and Ms. Peirson singled Petitioner out from her white and/or male co-workers to audit her travel vouchers or that they did so for any retaliatory purpose. On June 20, 1995, Petitioner wrote a memorandum to Respondent's assistant district administrator, Don Dixon, regarding the removal of Ms. Bartsch's December 19, 1994, memorandum from Petitioner's personnel file. At this time, Petitioner advised that she had accepted a job with Respondent's office in Lake County, Florida. At some undetermined point in time, Ms. Bartsch accepted Petitioner's suggestion that the office go into the community schools to advise teachers about abuse and neglect of children. Ms. Bartsch then assigned a co-worker to perform this function. This action by Ms. Bartsch may have caused Petitioner to feel slighted, but is not evidence that Ms. Bartsch was deliberately harassing Petitioner. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever requested to be designated as the unit's spokesperson. On June 14, 1995, Petitioner resigned from Respondent's equal employment opportunity committee. Petitioner resigned from the committee because she felt she was being discriminated against. There is no credible evidence to indicate that any of Respondent's employees told Petitioner that she would be blackballed if she filed a civil rights action. Persuasive evidence indicates that Petitioner voluntarily resigned from the committee because she no longer had confidence in an organization that she believed was discriminating against her. On July 20, 1995, Ms. Bartsch wrote Petitioner a "Letter of Counsel." This letter advised Petitioner that her failure to properly claim mileage reimbursement in the future could result in discipline, including dismissal. The letter states that the current problem would be dealt with under a performance improvement plan (PIP). On or about July 21, 1995, Ms. Bartsch prepared a PIP for Petitioner. The plan was based on the following work deficiency: "Travel vouchers not being filled out properly not in a timely manner." The plan included an attachment, outlining the corrective action to be taken. The corrective action included the following statement: "These corrective actions may be modified to meet Lake County guidelines, if so desired by your new supervisor, Chuck Herkel." When Petitioner got the job in Lake City, Florida, a copy of the July 20, 1995, memorandum and the July 21, 1995, PIP was sent to Mr. Herkel. Petitioner's testimony that Ms. Bartsch's sent this information to Mr. Herkel in an effort to continue her alleged discrimination, harassment, or retaliation is not supported by competent evidence. Moreover, the sending of the information to Mr. Herkel necessarily occurred after July 21, 1995, the date that FCHR has identified as the last date that an alleged violation occurred. On July 28, 1995, Petitioner began working for Respondent in Lake City, Florida. On January 19, 1996, Mr. Herkel, her supervisor, made the following comments about Petitioner's job performance on a review and performance planning form covering the period of time from July 28, 1995, through January 19, 1996: Cindy transferred to Lake County from Marion County 07-28-95. Cindy is an experienced P.I. who has excellent knowledge of her program. Cindy believes in child protection and family preservation. Cindy has an excellent work ethic, is dependable, and believes in teamwork. Cindy is commended for her good work. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner continued to work for Respondent as a specialist, providing policy and guidance for Respondent's protective services and foster-care programs in Lake City, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter an order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cynthia Ausby 5 Hemlock Loop Lane Ocala, Florida 34472 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, Leona Sanders, a black female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by unlawfully failing to consider her for employment based on her race. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record complied herein, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action. Petitioner timely filed her complaint and Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Chapter 9D-9.08, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Leona Sanders, is a black female who filed an application for employment with the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, for a factory worker's job on July 13, 1978. 1/ The Respondent, having employed fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks during times material herein, is an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Petitioner satisfied Respondent's listed requirements for the position of factory worker and sought factory employment based on the advice of her doctor. Petitioner was unable to obtain a personal interview from Respondent when her application was originally filed inasmuch as Respondent's Personnel Director and Executive Secretary, Dorothy Russell (Director), was then on vacation. Petitioner was informed by a Personnel employee that she would be scheduled for an interview when the Director returned from vacation on July 17. Petitioner, after having waited until Wednesday, July 19, without receiving a call from Respondent, called the Director, since in her opinion the Director would not be granting her request for an interview without some prodding on her (Petitioner's) part. Petitioner was unable to schedule an interview with the Director on the following day, Thursday, July 20, at which time she was told by the Director that a full complement of employees had been hired. The Director assured Petitioner that she would be called during the following week should any vacancies occur. Petitioner was assured that in any event she would be notified if she would be hired by July 25. During the interview, Petitioner expressed a desire in being considered for work on the first and second shift inasmuch as she had four children who ranged in ages from ten to sixteen. However, she advised the Director that she would accept a position on any shift. From the date of the interview, July 20, through August 7, Petitioner was not called or otherwise notified of any vacancies for factory workers by Respondent. While reading the employment section of the classified ads in the local newspaper on August 7, Petitioner noted an advertisement by Respondent's Personnel Office for factory workers. Upon reading the ad for the factory workers, Petitioner immediately visited Respondent's factory and reported to the Personnel Office in hopes of being employed. Petitioner was again told by Respondent's Personnel Director that a full complement of workers had been hired but that she would be notified should any vacancies occur. Respondent hired sixteen non-black females as factory workers during the period July 15 through August 23. All of the sixteen newly hired employees made application for employment after Petitioner, i.e., July 15. Respondent, in completing the final phase of its heavy seasonal hirings, hired its first black factory worker on approximately August 28, 1978. Petitioner has suffered from hypertension in the past. As stated, she was encouraged to seek factory work by her physician. Petitioner has an automobile to commute from her home to Respondent's factory if offered a position. Petitioner passed a test designed to measure dexterity and aptitude. Results of the tests were provided to the Personnel Director. Petitioner has sought, and continues to seek, employment from neighboring employers. The list of employers she has applied to for employment includes St. Joseph Medical Center, The News Press, R. L. Polk & Company, and all local nursing homes. Petitioner's interim earnings during times material amount to $968.16. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Respondent's Personnel Director testified that the number of applicants greatly outnumbered the available factory worker positions. Director Russell considered Petitioner better suited for employment at a hospital, nursing home or for clerical work and suggested that she seek employment in those areas. According to Director Russell, Petitioner displayed a poor attitude during the interview since she attempted to dictate the hours that she was willing to work and she concluded that Petitioner would not work out satisfactorily in the factory based on her expressions as to the hours and positions for which she wanted to be considered for employment.
Conclusions The Florida Commission on Human Relations, a Section 706 deferral agency for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, administers the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. The intent of the Human Rights Act of 1977 (Act) is to eradicate employment discrimination based on certain protective classifications, including race. Chapter 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). Respondent is an employer subject to the guides of the Act. Respondent, as an employer, has an established affirmative action policy and employee selection plan which guides it in its search of employees on an equal opportunity basis. Respondent also has a policy of attempting to hire those employees with children to work on the first shift. (Testimony of Director Russell.) During the months of July and August, Respondent repeatedly placed ads for employees in the local newspaper. Petitioner, during this period, repeatedly sought employment at Respondent's factory, as well as with other employers. As reflected by all the available criteria required by Respondent for its selection of employees. Despite Petitioner's continuing efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent, she was repeatedly told that a full complement of employees had been selected. On the other hand, Respondent continued to advertise for factory employees. Given the above factors which reveal that Petitioner satisfied the eligibility criteria for employment selection as required by Respondent; Petitioner's continued efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent; Respondent's continued search for employees by the placing of ads in the local newspaper and the rejection to Petitioner based on the claim that the full employee complement had been selected, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent in violation of Section 23.167(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979). I shall so recommend. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in order to effectuate the purposes of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order requiring Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, to: Cease and desist from discriminatorily denying or limiting Petitioner's employment opportunities. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended: Make Petitioner whole by: Reimbursing Petitioner for the difference in wages between what Petitioner would have earned as a factory worker and what she earned in other employment from July 13, 1978, plus interest until Petitioner is offered employment by Respondent as a factory worker. Back pay is to be computed in accordance with Schedule "A" attached here. Offer to Petitioner the next available factory worker position on the first shift. Post, for a period of sixty (60) days, in Respondent's facilities in places where notices to employees are usually posted, copies furnished by the Commission to the effect that Respondent will not discriminate because of race in affording equal employment opportunities and terms and conditions of employment to all its applicants and employees. Report to the Commission, within thirty (30) days of the Commission's order, steps taken by it respecting the fulfillment of the above conditions. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August 1980.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed by the Brevard County School District on January 15, 1990, as a Secretary III, Classified. She was assigned as secretary to Margaret Lewis, Director of Vocational Education. Classified employees are distinguished from certified employees who are teachers or administrators who hold teaching certificates. Respondent's duties included typing, handling and filing documents and correspondence, keeping budget and payroll records, copying and receiving incoming phone calls to the Department of Vocational Education. For approximately six months, Respondent and her supervisor had a good working relationship. Both were new to the Brevard County School District, and Margaret Lewis felt that together they could make positive changes in the unit. Respondent's personnel evaluation dated March 15, 1990, rates her in the "exceptional high" range in every category, with the highest possible rating being given in the categories, "work attitude," "cooperativeness," "personal appearance" and "tardiness." Something happened in the summer of 1990 around the time that the unit was moving from its office in Rockledge to the new district building in the Brevard County Governmental Center at Viera. The relationship between the two women rapidly deteriorated, a phenomenon observed by co-workers and the assistant superintendents, including Margaret Lewis' supervisor, Daniel Scheuerer. The circumstances were confusing, even to Jerry Copeland, Assistant Superintendent of Personnel Services. None could pinpoint the cause of the rift, although both Ms. Cooper and Ms. Lewis offered their own theories. Ms. Cooper described her supervisor arriving at work one morning crying and upset over some domestic situation. She went into Ms. Lewis' office with her and urged her to go home. Ms. Lewis eventually did leave and was gone for several days. Upon her return, Ms. Cooper felt that Ms. Lewis was very cool toward her and began communicating with her through notes or through messages to other staff. Ms. Lewis believes Ms. Cooper's work attitude changed radically after she was passed over for a secretarial position in the School Board attorney's office. On two occasions, Ms. Cooper approached Abraham Collinsworth, the Superintendent, with concerns she had about Margaret Lewis. Mr. Collinsworth referred the matter back to Dr. Scheuerer, Ms. Lewis' supervisor and the Assistant Superintendent for Instructional Services. Dr. Scheuerer told the superintendent that he had a very disruptive situation with loud conversations and people not feeling good about each other. During the several months period, July through September 1990, Dr. Scheuerer met with the women individually and together. Ms. Cooper complained that Ms. Lewis required her to make too many copies of things, that she communicated with her through yellow stickers, "post-it" notes, and that she, Ms. Lewis, would not tell her where she was going. Dr. Scheuerer counselled Ms. Cooper to adapt to her supervisor's way of doing things and also made suggestions to Ms. Lewis of ways to improve communications, for example, allowing her secretary to keep the calendar. The meeting he had with both women together was very unpleasant. It was obvious that there was a lot of hostility and animosity, tension and stress between the two. Generally, however, Ms. Lewis conducted herself in a professional manner. Ms. Cooper kept a tape recorder that she used to play subliminal tapes. Ms. Lewis felt that she was using the tape recorder to tape their conversations. Ms. Lewis felt that Ms. Cooper spent an inordinate amount of time away from her desk and abused break periods. Ms. Cooper said that she was making deliveries or copying. Ms. Lewis begin writing notes of their confrontations in order to avoid getting emotionally involved. This seemed to inflame Ms. Cooper. Ms. Cooper's reaction to direction was often either a sullen shrug or a verbal retort. Ms. Cooper felt Ms. Lewis gave her conflicting or serial requests. She also kept notes of their interactions. Early on the morning of October 8, 1990, several employees in the area of Ms. Cooper's and Ms. Lewis' office overheard a verbal confrontation between the two. Ms. Cooper had her voice raised and when Ms. Lewis asked her not to talk so loud, she replied she wanted everyone to hear. It was obvious to Daniel Scheuerer, who also overheard part of the confrontation, that Ms. Cooper was the one doing the yelling. On October 9, 1990, Ms. Lewis gave Ms. Cooper the following written reprimand: This is a formal letter of reprimand as a result of your unacceptable behavior on the morning of October 8, 1990. It is being issued as a result of your intentional (you stated that you wanted to be heard by everyone when I asked you to lower your voice) vociferous and disruptive shouting at me in your work area and the disrespect which you displayed toward me as your supervisor after I had made reasonable requests. This type of behavior is unacceptable, disturbing and disruptive to the work effort of the department and the entire area. This is to inform you that any similar outburst of this matter will result in your immediate termination. CC: Personnel File (Petitioner's exhibit No. 5) Sometime around the end of September, or early October, Karen Denbo, the district Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, had a secretarial position open that would have been a lateral transfer (same level, same pay) for Janice Cooper. She applied, and Dr. Scheuerer asked Ms. Denbo to interview Ms. Cooper. Ms. Denbo asked if he was telling her to hire Ms. Cooper. Dr. Scheuerer was given the impression by both Ms. Cooper and Ms. Denbo that they had misgivings about Ms. Cooper performing in a position requiring a lot of technical filings for which there would be no training. Ms. Cooper was not offered the transfer and no other efforts were made to find Ms. Cooper alternative employment. On October 26, 1990, Ms. Lewis gave Janice Cooper a memorandum titled "Job Expectations." It informed her that her supervisor had concerns regarding job performance, relationships with other employees, work attitude and failure to follow administrative directives. It directed her to take specified times for break and it stated she must be accurate, careful, effective and courteous. It stated that her performance was not satisfactory and warned that "failure to make necessary adjustments will result in additional disciplinary action." (Petitioner's exhibit No. 6) On November 1, 1990, near the end of the work week, Ms. Lewis needed some coping done and could not find Janice Cooper. She filled out a copy request form and put Ms. Cooper's name as the contact person. Ms. Cooper returned and Ms. Lewis asked if the form was completed properly. Ms. Cooper looked at it and then replied, "It if says what you want it to say, then its alright." After Ms. Lewis returned to her office, Ms. Cooper followed her in and said if she was going to use her name she needed to get her permission first. As Ms. Lewis began writing down Ms. Cooper's comments, Ms. Cooper reached across the desk, knocking off pencils and paper, and tore the paper out of her hand. Ms. Lewis reached for the phone and asked Dr. Scheuerer to come immediately. Ms. Cooper left and did not return until November 5th, after the weekend. In the meantime, Ms. Lewis met with Dr. Scheuerer; the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel, Jerry Copeland; and the Labor Relations Director, Bob Barrett. Upon Ms. Cooper's return to work, Ms. Lewis called her in to her office. Bob Barrett was also present. She was given this letter: November 5, 1990 Ms. Janice Cooper, Secretary Vocational Education Department Dear Ms. Cooper: This is to inform you that your employment with the School Board of Brevard County is terminated effective immediately, November 5, 1990. The reason for this termination is your unsatisfactory performance. You have been counseled and warned on several occasions regarding the need to improve your performance. On October 26, 1990, you were provided a memorandum which outlined your responsibilities and gave you direction for improving your performance. You were notified that your performance was unsatisfactory and that your failure to make the necessary adjustments would bring additional disciplinary action. Since October 26, 1990, your performance has continued to deteriorate to the point that your unwillingness to make the effort required to function as a Secretary III necessitates this action. Prior to your departure from the work site today, you should turn in any keys or other such School Board material which was issued to you to uses in your job. Sincerely, Margaret Lewis Director, Vocational Education (Respondent's Exhibit No. 2) (emphasis in original) When asked if she had anything to say, Ms. Cooper made no response and refused to acknowledge receipt of the letter. She was directed to collect her personal items and to leave the office. With guidance from the State Department of Education, the Brevard County School District has a policy of discipline of all employees which it calls, "NEAT." The acronym stands for the right to "Notice," followed by "Explanation," followed by "Assistance," within a reasonable "Time." If the deficiencies are not corrected at the end of this process, the employee may be terminated. The School Board's adopted rule 6Gx5-7.05, provides in pertinent part: Suspension/Dismissal. A certificated employee may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the work year pursuant to provisions set forth in Florida Statute 230.33(7)(h), 231.36(4)(6) and the Rules of the Educational Practices Commission. A classified employee may be dismissed for cause. The immediate supervisor shall suspend the employee and notify him/her in writing of the recommendation for dismissal, stating the cause. Termination Date. The effective date of any termination of employment or suspension shall be the last day on which the employee works. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1) In addition to the above, the School Board's administrative staff acknowledge an employee's right to a pre-termination process that gives her an opportunity to explain why she should not be terminated. The record in this proceeding establishes that Janice Cooper was insubordinate on several occasions. She yelled at her supervisor, disrupting the workplace; she refused to follow instructions or was insolent; and finally, she virtually assaulted her supervisor when she grabbed the paper and tore it up. There is little specific evidence, however, of her poor job performance. Her only evaluation during the ten months of her employment was exceptionally positive. The "Job Expectations" memorandum was provided four days before the incident leading to Ms. Cooper's separation, which incident was plainly insubordination or misconduct, but not "poor job performance." The administrative staff make no apparent distinction between "termination" and "suspension" as both are separations from employment; and they do not view Ms. Lewis' letter, therefore, as a violation of the policy described in paragraph 18 above. Practically, there is no distinction, as no separation is final until the Board takes its action. In the meantime, the employee is no longer on the payroll. In Ms. Cooper's case, the time off of the payroll has been two years, most of which time has been the result of circumstances beyond the control of the School Board. Neither before, nor immediately after her termination by Margaret Lewis, was Janice Cooper offered reasonable opportunity to explain why she should not be terminated. She was given the letter and asked if she had a response. The letter states that termination is a fait accompli. She did not respond, and was told to leave. No evidence was presented as to the need to take immediate action. Both the district and Ms. Cooper could have benefited from a brief cooling off period; the district, by taking the time to draft a letter reflecting the proper cause for its action; and Ms. Cooper, by having an opportunity to reflect on her employment jeopardy and to prepare a response. The district presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of cause to terminate Ms. Cooper. It did not, however, prove that the cause was "poor performance." For that reason, and because the employee was not offered a reasonable opportunity to respond, the termination procedure was fatally flawed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the School Board of Brevard County enter its final order reinstating Janice Cooper to full back pay and benefits from November 9, 1990, until and including October 7, 1992, and approving her termination effective October 7, 1992. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of January 1993. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 7. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 11. With the exception of the October 26, 1990 memo, the facts proposed here are rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Poor performance was not proven, nor was it proven that Respondent was taping conversations, rather than playing her own "subliminal tapes." Adopted in substance in Paragraph 14. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 16. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Moreover, there was some mention of a grievance, but no evidence of what this process was or whether it was actually filed and withdrawn. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, as to unsatisfactory job performance, which is distinguished, according to the School Board's witness, from "insubordination" or misconduct. (Transcript, p. 70-71) Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 16. Adopted in Paragraph 18. 4-8. Rejected as argument or conclusions, or summary of testimony rather than discrete findings of fact. Some of those arguments and conclusions have been adopted in the conclusions of law herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold T. Bistline, Esquire Building E 1970 Michigan Avenue Cocoa, Florida 32922 F. Michael Driscoll, Esquire Suite 58 3815 North Highway One Cocoa, Florida 32926 Abraham L. Collinsworth, Superintendent Brevard County School Board 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940-6699 Betty Castor, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent, First Coast Technical College (Respondent) retaliated against Petitioner, Gregory R. Lulkoski (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), section 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes?1/ Secondary issues raised by Respondent are whether the St. Johns County School Board (School Board) is immune from Petitioner’s allegations, and, if not, whether the School Board was Petitioner’s employer during the relevant period.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the School Board by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). A charter technical school is a creature of Florida statute, distinct from school boards and districts, including those school districts in which they are located, which act as the sponsor of the school. FCTI and the School Board entered into a charter which governed the operating relationship between them. The last operative charter between FCTI and the School Board became effective July 1, 2013. The School Board was the sponsoring entity of FCTC under the charter. The School Board had no involvement in the day to day operations of FCTC when it was operated by FCTI. FCTI had its own management team and board of directors. FCTI had its own articles of incorporation, employment handbook, organizational structure, management plan, human relations (HR) director and department, and its own legal counsel. FCTC’s president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, entered into a contract of employment with FCTI. No one from the School District is on FCTI’s organizational chart. FCTI and FCTC management, and not the School Board, were responsible for the daily operations of FCTC and all personnel matters of FCTC employees. FCTI had its own procedure in its employee handbook for reporting discrimination and harassment. FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees solely for wage payments, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes under the charter. For this reason, FCTC employees received checks and tax documents from the School Board and the School Board remitted contributions to the Florida Retirement system on their behalf. FCTI reimbursed the School Board for these pass-through expenditures, and the School Board charged FCTI a fee for this service. The School Board’s only involvement in personnel- related decisions of FCTC was the ministerial act of the School Board superintendent signing off on employment decisions made by FCTI officials, which were then placed on the consent agenda of the School Board to be approved at its next meeting. This process--which was necessary given the fact that FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees under the charter for wage payment, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes-- involved ensuring the statutory requirements to take an employment action were met, but did not involve second-guessing the merits of the personnel decisions made by FCTI. Indeed, the charter expressly provides that the School Board assigns and FCTI assumes and retains all responsibility for FCTC employees, including responsibility for the selection and discipline of employees, and all other aspects of the terms and conditions of employment at FCTC. Petitioner submitted his application for employment to FCTC. Petitioner had an FCTC e-mail address and not a school district e-mail address. The School Board was the signatory to some grant applications for funding to be expended at FCTC, however, FCTI was responsible for fulfilling the obligations relating to the grant awards, and appropriately utilizing those funds at FCTC. The School Board was not involved in the day to day administration of programs funded by those grants at FCTC. During the spring of 2016, district personnel became aware of financial irregularities at FCTC through its monitoring of FCTI’s unaudited financial statements. Under state statute, the School Board was required to take certain actions as the sponsor of FCTC when put on notice that FCTC might be in a deteriorating financial condition. The School Board investigated those irregularities and found significant financial mismanagement and budgetary shortfalls at FCTC under FCTI’s administration. On May 3, 2016, the School Board declared that the school was in a deteriorating financial condition. This declaration triggered statutory obligations on the part of the School Board and FCTC to develop a corrective action plan to address these issues. On May 26, 2016, the School Board served a notice of financial emergency stating that it had reason to believe that there was a financial emergency at FCTC and that there was no way to save FCTC other than to terminate the charter and begin operating the programs at FCTC itself. The School Board Superintendent sent a letter to FCTI’s board on June 8, 2016, detailing the findings of the School Board’s investigation into FCTC and the financial issues plaguing the school. On June 14, 2016, FCTI’s board voted to terminate the charter with the School Board and cease operating the programs at FCTC, effective June 31, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the School Board voted to approve an agreement to terminate the charter with FCTI and to take over the programs at FCTC effective July 1, 2016. As part of this transition of the responsibility for operating FCTC, the School Board and FCTI entered into an agreement specifically stating that any liabilities of FCTC arising prior to July 1, 2016, would not be assumed by the School Board. Just before the School Board began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed his Complaint with FCHR. In that Complaint he alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Petitioner specifically listed two discrete instances of alleged protected activity in his Complaint: I am being discriminated against on the basis of retaliation by my employer. I began employment with Respondent on 11/7/2007, as a Case Manager and most recently as a Grant Writer. On 5/21/2015, I filed a formal grievance due to harassment and nepotism; creating a hostile work environment. This grievance was investigated internally but I never received a response. On 6/30/2015, I filed a second grievance after experiencing retaliation by my Supervisor, Renee Stauffacher. Up to date, both grievances remain unanswered and I continue to experience harassment and retaliation. Petitioner’s claim of discrimination was based solely upon a charge of retaliation. Petitioner did not allege that he was discriminated against based upon race, religion, age, marital status, or any other protected class. Petitioner filed the first grievance referenced in the FCHR Complaint on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then- president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and over e-mail. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was mistreated by any School Board employee, and he did not direct the grievance to anyone at the School Board. Petitioner filed this grievance with FCTC’s human resources office. In his second grievance, filed June 26, 2015, Petitioner alleges that Renee Stauffacher, his supervisor at the time, retaliated against him for naming her in his May 21, 2015, grievance by giving him an evaluation on June 26, 2015, that contained some information or statements with which he disagreed, even though he thought the evaluation itself was good and that he was given high numbers. No one from the School Board was involved in this evaluation. When Ms. Stauffacher gave Petitioner this evaluation, she was an employee of FCTC and not the School Board. Petitioner alleges that Sandra Raburn-Fortner retaliated against him for his first two grievances by giving him another position. That change, from “Career Pathways Supervisor” to “Grant Writer” occurred on or about August 4, 2015. Petitioner’s salary did not change. At this time, Ms. Raburn-Fortner, who had a contract with FCTI, was an FCTC employee, and not an employee of the School Board. Later, in the Spring of 2016, Petitioner submitted numerous other grievances, a total of nine more, to FCTC officials and FCTI’s board. Petitioner only introduced his ninth and tenth grievances into evidence at the final hearing. Both are similar. Those grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Raburn-Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s human resources director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Both grievances state that Petitioner believed he was disclosing violations of equal employment opportunity law. During the time that Petitioner submitted these additional grievances, the School Board was in the process of investigating the financial irregularities at FCTC. Petitioner submitted some of these grievances to School Board officials, who told him he needed to take his concerns to the FCTI Board who was still operating FCTC at the time pursuant to the charter. None of Petitioner’s complaints, including those relayed to the School Board and its officials, concerned complaints of discrimination based on a protected class, or retaliation for complaining about discrimination based on a protected class. Petitioner stated he believed he was reporting equal employment opportunity violations in alleging Ms. Raburn-Fortner was hiring or favoring friends and family, because this action prohibited members of many different protected classes from getting a fair shot at positions that would go to family, friends, or associates of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. Petitioner admits all protected classes were treated similarly in this regard and that all protected classes lacked equal access to positions if they were not friends or family of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. While Petitioner does not allege any discrete instances of retaliation that occurred after his title change, Petitioner also contends that he was harassed, including that he felt harassed about how data at the school was handled, the pressure put on him by financial difficulties brought about by the administration of FCTI, and that he was given the cold shoulder by peers. By May 2016, Ms. Raburn-Fortner was no longer working at FCTC.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2018.
