The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner Michael A. Crane, d/b/a Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On October 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reimbursement of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Petitioner seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL. On September 23, 2005, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered its Final Order in the underlying case, in which it adopted the Recommended Order entered in the DOAH proceeding, thereby dismissing the charges that Petitioner had violated certain provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. In the underlying proceeding, Respondent charged Michael A. Crane with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, in his capacity as a certified general contractor holding Florida license No. CGC8644. Petitioner had entered into the contract which gave rise to the underlying proceeding as Accent Builders of Florida, Inc. (Accent). Respondent's disciplinary action was not directed at Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., but at Petitioner as the qualifying agent for the company. Petitioner is not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. Petitioner is neither a partnership nor a corporation. Petitioner does business in Florida as Accent, but at the time the underlying proceeding was initiated, Petitioner had not applied for and been granted a certificate of authority for Accent through himself as the qualifying agent. In September 2004, while the underlying proceeding was pending, Petitioner applied for and was granted a certificate of authority for Accent with Michael A. Crane as the qualifying agent. Despite the fact that Petitioner was granted a certificate of authority for Accent, the underlying proceeding was brought against the certified general contractor, Michael A. Crane, not against Accent as a corporate entity. In order to determine whether the underlying action brought by Respondent against Petitioner was substantially justified at the time it was initiated by the Agency, the information that was before the probable cause panel that directed the filing of the Administrative Complaint must be examined. In the underlying matter giving rise to Petitioner's request for attorney's fees, the Probable Cause Panel had before it a 188-page Investigative Report, as well as three supplemental Investigative Reports related to the alleged defects in the construction performed by Petitioner. The Probable Cause Panel convened on April 27, 2004, at which time it made a finding of probable cause that Petitioner had violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., (i), (k), and (m), Florida Statutes. The panel members reported that they had reviewed the investigative reports and draft complaints, and were advised by a member of the Attorney General's staff regarding their responsibilities in determining whether probable cause existed to file an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. The consumer complaint accompanying the Investigative Report alleged that the contractor did not properly supervise the project; that the construction has resulted in numerous leaks; that the steam shower was not installed as required by the manufacturer; that the decking was not installed according to the manufacturer's instructions; and that most of the punch list items had been left unaddressed. The Investigative Report also contained Petitioner's response, which stated that Petitioner was precluded from correcting the deficiencies by the consumer, and that, although responsive to the consumer regarding the leaks, Petitioner saw no damage as a result of the leaks. The Investigative Report contained numerous documents describing the efforts of contractors hired by the consumer to remedy the leaks and alleged defects in construction. The report also included documentation of payments made by the consumer to the various contractors called in to eliminate the problems the consumer was experiencing. The Probable Cause Panel's review of the materials before it resulted in a determination that a reasonable investigation had been conducted, and that a reasonable person could conclude that sufficient evidence existed to charge Petitioner with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. At the time the Probable Cause Panel reviewed the Investigative Report, it appeared that Petitioner's work had resulted in water damage, and that a valid subcontractor's lien had been placed against the consumer's property resulting in financial harm. The Probable Cause Panel's determination to direct Respondent to file an Administrative Complaint had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was made. Respondent was not a "nominal party" to the underlying proceeding according to the meaning of that term in Subsection 57.111(4)(d)1., Florida Statutes.
The Issue Did Respondent, LGI Homes-Florida, LLC (LGI), discriminate in housing against Petitioners, Bridget and Tonny Walker, on account of their race in violation of section 760.23 Florida Statutes (2018)?1 1 All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2018 compilation unless noted otherwise.
Findings Of Fact Mr. and Ms. Walker are African-American. Their claim in this matter arises out of their inquiry into buying a house from LGI in its Hill 'N Dale community. LGI is a national homebuilder. It develops residential communities consisting of homes that it built. It offers financing for those homes. LGI follows a specific, multi-step process for home sales. The process includes maintaining a log of contacts with potential buyers. The log includes the name of the sales representative who spoke to the potential buyers, the date of the contact, and the outcome of the contact. The process also includes a loan pre-qualification step. Using a Pre-Qualification Worksheet, a sales representative gathers basic financial information from a prospective buyer including employment, compensation, and bank account balances. In addition, LGI obtains a credit report for the prospective buyer. A determination that a buyer is qualified is effective for 30 days at any LGI property. After 30 days, a buyer who wishes to tour a home must undergo the pre-qualification process again. LGI does not give home tours to individuals unless they pre-qualify for financing. It follows this policy to conserve sales representative time by avoiding wasting time showing homes to individuals who are unlikely to be able to purchase them. LGI also says the policy avoids raising unrealistic expectations in would-be buyers who will not be able to finance a home. LGI's policies require every sales representative to first take each pre- qualified prospective buyer to a target home, identified as the lowest price home available, before viewing any other available homes on the property. On March 17, 2018, Mr. and Ms. Walker visited LGI's Ballentrae community. There they completed the pre-qualification process. An LGI representative advised them that they were pre-approved for a home valued around $150,000. The Walkers did not tour a home in the Ballentrae community. On June 16, 2018, the Walkers visited LGI's Hill 'N Dale community. They had scheduled an appointment with Danine Stratton, an LGI sales representative. After the Walkers arrived and seated themselves in the waiting area, a Caucasian couple arrived and sat down. When Ms. Stratton entered the waiting area she spoke to the Caucasian couple before acknowledging the Walkers. Ms. Stratton consulted with the Walkers and obtained the information needed for pre-qualification from them. This was necessary because more than 30 days had passed since they had pre-qualified at the Ballentrae property. She also asked for some demographic information. The Walkers inquired about purchasing a four-bedroom house. Ms. Stratton expressed skepticism that they could afford a four-bedroom home. During the consultation Ms. Stratton learned that Mr. Walker's name was spelled "Tonny," with two "n"s. She noted that the spelling was unusual. She went on to say, "It's either three things, your mother could not spell, your mother was on drugs, or just unique." The Walkers were justly offended and understandably perceived the comment as invoking racial stereotypes. Ms. Stratton maintains that this was just good natured, light-hearted, teasing meant to build rapport with the Walkers. She testified that she was "completely shocked" that they were offended. Ms. Stratton is not credible. It is not plausible that a sales person would expect insulting a customer's mother to build rapport with the customer. Ms. Stratton's comments are inexplicable. Nonetheless, Ms. Stratton gave the Walkers a tour of the community.2 She offered to show the Walkers a three-bedroom home, consistent with LGI's "target home" strategy. They asked about a four-bedroom home. Ms. Stratton said that a four-bedroom home was not available for showing. There is no persuasive evidence that one was available at that time or that a four- bedroom home was shown during that time period to non-minority persons. Ms. Stratton was willing to sell a three-bedroom home to the Walkers. By then they had decided they would not purchase a home from LGI. In 2 The testimony of Ms. Walker and Ms. Stratton differed on this point and others. Based on the demeanor of the witnesses, consistency with other evidence, and the implausibility of some of Ms. Stratton's testimony, the undersigned finds Ms. Walker more credible and persuasive. Ms. Walker's words, "I declined her offer to purchase any home with LGI." (Tr. p. 39). Upset by Ms. Stratton's comments about the spelling of Mr. Walker's name, the Walkers decided that they just wanted to leave. In order to do this peacefully they said they needed to check with an uncle to obtain funds for the required earnest money. They also refused to sign the pre-qualification form. On June 17, 2018, Ms. Stratton texted the Walkers saying, "Hey there, just touching base. Were you able to talk with your uncle about helping out?" This text demonstrated that Ms. Stratton wanted to sell the Walkers a home. On June 18, 2018, Ms. Walker replied that because of the comment about the spelling of Mr. Walker's name, "We will not be purchasing with LGI." Ms. Stratton replied: Oh my goodness, I'm so sorry that I offended you. I certainly didn't mean to. I was just making a joke and in hindsight was in poor taste. Again, I'm so sorry and best of luck to you guys." Ms. Walker went to an LGI property in Ruskin and spoke to a supervisor there named Joe Boyd. He assured her that LGI would take care of the problem and someone would call her. Ms. Walker also called LGI's home office in Texas. She was connected to the area director for Florida. He emailed Ms. Walker and said that he would have someone named Todd Fitzgerald contact her. Mr. Fitzgerald did not contact the Walkers. On Friday, June 22, 2018, at 12:52 p.m., Ms. Walker sent Mr. Boyd an email. It stated, "Myself and my husband recently visited one of your properties and received poor customer service and rude racist remarks from one of your employees. I have spoken to one of you[r] managers locally but I do not [know] if anything was done. There was no follow up. Please contact me at [phone number]." On Friday, June 22, 2018, at 10:13 p.m., Mr. Boyd replied: It is my understanding that our division president Todd Fitzgerald called you to discuss this. Please let me know if he hasn't and I will be happy to call. Please be assured that in no way was the intent of our representative to offend in any way. We apologize for you feeling that you received comments that were rude and even racist, that is definitely not like us, so from the bottom of my heart I am sorry on behalf of our company. I'll be available to discuss tomorrow if Todd has not already spoke with you. Have a nice evening! The next day Ms. Walker replied: "Thank you for your quick response. But I have not spoken to Todd Fitzgerald." There is no evidence of further communications between LGI and the Walkers. The Walkers did not offer to purchase a home from LGI. They would not purchase a home from LGI. From March 2018 through March 2019, LGI closed on the sale of 15 homes at Hill 'N Dale for which Ms. Stratton was the responsible sales representative. African-Americans purchased seven of those houses. On May 20, 2018, Ms. Stratton sold a four-bedroom home Hill 'N Dale to Alfreeda Harrington, an African-American, for $175,000.00. This was before her June meeting with the Walkers. Ms. Stratton sold a three-bedroom home in Hill 'N Dale to Tawanda Boyd, for $160,000.00. Ms. Boyd is an African-American. On August 11, 2018, Beverly Easton, an African-American, purchased a four-bedroom home in Hill 'N Dale for $175,000.00. Ms. Stratton was the sales representative for the transaction. On June 9, 2018, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to the Samuels family, who were African-Americans. On April 12, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Wheeler. On March 25, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Bacon. On January 28, 2019, Ms. Stratton sold a home in Hill 'N Dale to an African-American buyer whose last name is Swanson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Brett Purcell Owens, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP Suite 2350 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Bridget Trinettea Walker Tonny Walker 1144 Barclay Woods Drive Ruskin, Florida 33570 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Conval-Care, Inc., is entitled to the payment of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, from the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest to the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated November 4, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), notified Conval-Care, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Conval-Care"), that it intended to impose an administrative fine on Conval-Care pursuant to Section 409.913(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Conval-Care contested the proposed fine and requested a formal administrative hearing, including a request that it be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The matter was designated case number 92-0126 and was assigned to the Honorable Judge Robert T. Benton, then Hearing Officer Benton. On June 30, 1993, following a formal hearing held on March 24, 1993, Hearing Officer Benton entered a Recommended Order recommending dismissal of the sanctions letter of November 4, 1991. The findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton, in Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 92-0126, are hereby adopted to the extent relevant to this proceeding. On September 19, 1993, the Department entered a Final Order. The Department accepted and incorporated into its Final Order the findings of fact made by Hearing Officer Benton. The Department, however, rejected Hearing Officer Benton's conclusions of law to the extent that he not had concluded that Conval-Care lacked authority to reject the demand for its records which was the subject of the proceedings. The Department concluded that, in light of the fact that Conval-Care had acted on the advice of counsel, it would reduce the fine from $25,000.00 to $5,000.00. The Department's decision was appealed by Conval-Care. On December 16, 1994, the District Court of Appeal, First District, filed an opinion reversing the Department's Final Order. Mandate from the First District was entered January 3, 1995. On February 14, 1995, Conval-Care filed a Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs in this case. Conval-Care requested an award of $15,000.00 as a small business party pursuant to the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Attached to the Petition were the Final Order entered by the Department, the Recommended Order, the First District's Opinion and Mandate, an Attorney's Affidavit stating the nature, extent and monetary value of the services rendered and costs incurred in the proceedings, the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed by Conval-Care in 1991 and the Department's November 4, 1991 sanctions letter. On March 2, 1995, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the successor in interest of the Department (hereinafter referred to as "AHCA"), filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 10 In its Response, AHCA admitted all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 and 8 through 9 of the Petition. AHCA denied the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Petition. Paragraph 7 of the Petition alleged the following: 7. The action of DHRS, in filing the admini- strative complaint against CCI, was not sub- stantially justified because there was no reasonable basis in law or fact to support the issuance of its letter seeking to impose an administrative fine upon CCI. Attached to the Response was an Affidavit from John M. Whiddon in support of its position that its actions were substantially justified. The Affidavit does not add any alleged credible justification not presented to Hearing Officer Benton or the First District Court of Appeal. AHCA did not assert in it Response the following: that the costs and attorney's fees claimed in Conval-Care's affidavit were unreasonable; that Conval-Care is not a prevailing small business party; that circumstances exist that would make an award unjust; or that AHCA was a nominal party only. AHCA also did not "either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs claimed or file a counter affidavit [specifying each item of costs and fee in dispute] along with its response." Finally, AHCA did not request an evidentiary hearing in its Response. The only issue which AHCA asserted in its Response was at issue in this proceeding is whether AHCA's actions were substantially justified. On April 6, 1995, an Order to Provide Information was entered. Although the parties had not requested an evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered the Order soliciting input from the parties before the undersigned decided whether a hearing was necessary on the one issue raised by the Department. In the Order, the parties were given an opportunity to provide input concerning the procedures they believed should be followed to resolve this matter. The parties were specifically requested to answer certain specified questions, including the following: 1. Do the parties believe that an [sic] hearing is necessary to resolve any factual disputes and/or for purposes of oral argument before a decision is rendered? * * * 5. Do the parties agree that the documents attached to the Petition and the Response should be considered in rendering a decision in this case? . . ." Conval-Care filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that there was no need for a hearing. Conval-Care asserted that a hearing would be improper unless Conval-Care consents to one. Conval-Care also asserted that all of the documents attached to petition should be considered. AHCA filed a response to the April 6, 1995 Order indicating that "[t]he Respondent feels a hearing in this matter is essential." AHCA did not provide any explanation of why it believed a hearing was necessary or any discussion of whether a hearing was authorized under the applicable statutes and rules. AHCA also indicated in its response that it "agrees that the documents attached to the Petition and Response should be considered in this case " On May 19, 1995, an Order Concerning Final Order was entered. Based upon a review of the pleadings and the lack of explanation from either party to justify an evidentiary hearing, it was concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary. Therefore, the parties were informed in the May 19, 1995 Order that a hearing would not be held in this case. The parties were also informed that they could file proposed final orders on or before May 30, 1995. Conval-Care filed a proposed order. AHCA did not. Neither Conval-Care nor AHCA timely requested an evidentiary hearing in this case. Both parties agreed that the documentation filed with Conval- Care's Petition and AHCA's Response could be relied upon in reaching a decision in this case. Based upon AHCA's failure to contest most of the relevant issues in this proceeding, the only issue which requires a decision if whether the Department's actions against Conval-Care were substantially justified. The documents, including the Mr. Whiddon's Affidavit filed by AHCA with its Response, sufficiently explain why the Department took the actions it took against Conval-Care which led to this proceeding. No evidentiary hearing was, therefore, necessary. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department's actions in this matter were substantially justified. The Department could have sought the information it wanted by pursuing available discovery. Counsel for Conval-Care even remained the Department of the availability of discovery. The Department, however, rather than pursuing the information which it indicated it needed, elected to pursue a punitive action against Conval-Care rather than obtaining the information through discovery. The Department's reason for pursuing punitive actions against Conval-Care was not convincing to Hearing Officer Benton. Despite this fact, the Department entered a Final Order upholding its actions and imposing a fine of $5,000.00 for refusing to provide it with information which it could have obtained through other means. The First District Court reversed the Department's Final Order opining that the Department "lacked a legitimate investigatory purpose for demanding the records" which gave rise to its action against Conval-Care. Finally, the entire record in this case failed to indicate that there was any basis in law or fact to substantially justify the actions of the Department.
The Issue The issues remaining to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the above-named Petitioner is a "small business party" as described in Section 57.111(3)(d)1.a. b. and c., Florida Statutes (2007); whether the action of the above-named Agency in the underlying case was substantially justified in law and fact and whether an award of attorney's fees and costs would be unjust.
Findings Of Fact In the instant case the Respondent Agency (Department) does not dispute the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought in this proceeding and does not contest that the Petitioner is a prevailing party. Moreover, the Department admits that it was a real party in interest in the underlying proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint and was not merely a nominal party. The parties also waived an evidentiary hearing in this attorney fee proceeding. The parties, rather, submitted memoranda and affidavits in support of their respective positions. The present Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs is based upon the above-referenced Administrative Complaint action brought against Wittmer and JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., by the Department, which came before the Division of Administrative Hearings by a request for formal hearing filed by Wittmer. Prior to filing that Administrative Complaint the Department performed an investigation related to the Complaint which had been filed by Kenneth Hatin of Palm Coast, Florida, against Wittmer. The Complaint by Hatin alleged that on August 10, 2005, he and Wittmer had entered into a contract for the building of an addition to the complainant's home in Palm Coast, Florida. Hatin had alleged and testified at hearing that Wittmer was unlicensed to perform the work under the contract and had been paid in excess of $30,000.00 for the project. Hatin maintained that Wittmer had abandoned the job before completion and that he had to hire another person or entity to complete the work, at further expense. The Department considered the results of its investigation, in the form of an investigative report, and considered the investigative file it had developed concerning Hatin's complaint. This included the original contract on JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc.'s, stationary, signed by Wittmer, as well as copies of original checks amounting to approximately $30,000.00 written to Wittmer and/or his company or business. It also considered a copy of the local licensing records concerning Wittmer, revealing an expired occupational license, as well as records of the Department showing that Wittmer was unlicensed as any sort of contractor in the State of Florida. The Department also considered various invoices and receipts regarding the work contracted by complainant Hatin with another person or entity, to finish the job purportedly abandoned by Wittmer. During the investigation, the complainant and the complainant's fiancée were interviewed and made no mention of any familial relationship or friendship relationship between Wittmer and the complainant and his family members at the time of the investigation. Wittmer himself was interviewed by the investigator and did not mention any familial or personal relationship he had with the complainant or the complainant's family. The familial or friendship relationship between Wittmer and the complainant and the complainant's family only arose through the evidence adduced at the hearing. That evidence became a significant portion of the reason for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions which resulted in the Complaint against Wittmer being ultimately dismissed. JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., was dissolved by the State of Florida, Department of State, Division of Corporations on September 16, 2005, for failure to file required annual reports or Uniform Business Report. This fact was confirmed by Wittmer's affidavit submitted on January 18, 2008, in this proceeding, attesting that his corporation was dissolved and that it ceased business due to "financial hardship of the business." As a result of the hearing it was determined in the Recommended Order (with Findings of Fact adopted in the Final Order) that Wittmer performed work on the subject construction project without making any profit. It was performed, in essence, as a cooperative project between family and friends of Wittmer, in the sense that Wittmer's fiancée was related to the complaining witness's family and/or they were close friends. The circumstances established by preponderant evidence did not show that Wittmer was actually performing contracting, as defined in the above-referenced statutory authority underlying the charges in the Administrative Complaint. It was also determined, based upon the preponderant evidence at that hearing, that Wittmer made no profit on the project after paying all the subcontractors. The Department, in essence, adopted the Recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (with non-dispositive modifications of several Conclusions of Law) and entered a Final Order dismissing the charges in the Administrative Complaint. The subject Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs was thereafter filed and this case ensued. The Department proceeded against Wittmer by naming as Respondents, in the underlying, case JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., which corporation had actually already been dissolved at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint. It also named in that Complaint, and proceeded against, Willis Wittmer, Jr., personally. The Petitioners herein have established that Wittmer never had more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth in excess of two million dollars, whether functioning as JR Wittmer, Jr., an individual or as JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc. The Petitioner has also established that the construction contract at issue in the underlying case was entered into by the Petitioner herein under the name "JR Wittmer's Remodeling" and not "JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc." Moreover, that contact was not signed by Mr. Wittmer as president of JR Wittmer Remodeling, Inc. Aside from the fact that the Department filed the original Administrative Complaint against JR Wittmer Remodeling, Inc., it also named JR Wittmer individually as a Respondent in that Administrative Complaint, so he had defend against the action personally, regardless of the question of whether the corporation was in legal existence at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint. The evidence, as referenced above, shows that he met the requirements of having less than 25 full- time employees and a net worth of less than two million dollars. Thus, the totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Wittmer has standing, as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, to pursue the subject attorney's fee claim as a sole proprietor, even if not as a corporation or the president of the originally named, but now dissolved corporation. The Petitioner contends that the Department should have recognized the lack of a factual basis for the Administrative Complaint and, before finding probable cause, should have been able to determine that the construction arrangement between Wittmer and Hatin did not meet the legal definition of contracting or contracting services based upon the familial/friendship relationship of the protagonists. The Department, however, conducted a reasonable investigation and has been shown to have had a reasonable basis to determine, before hearing, that contracting and contracting services had been, in a legal sense, performed by Wittmer, based upon the results of its investigation (interviews, etc.). This is especially the case since Wittmer himself, when interviewed, had not revealed such exculpatory facts to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business engaged in the practice of psychology. Petitioner's business does not employ more than twenty-five (25) full-time employees and has a net worth not exceeding $2,000,000.00. Petitioner's residence, business domicile and principal office are located in Georgia. Petitioner's residence, business domicile and principal office have been so located since 1982. In DOAH Case No. 89-6811, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Psychologists, filed an Administrative Complaint, dated July 20, 1989. An Amended Administrative Complaint was filed on December 8, 1989. The Administrative Complaints alleged that the Petitioner was guilty of sexual misconduct in the practice of psychology. The case was voluntarily dismissed by the Department of Professional Regulation prior to the final hearing. The voluntary dismissal was adopted and incorporated into the Final Order entered by the Board in this matter. The Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed pursuant to Rule 221- 6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was timely, having been filed within sixty days (60) after the date on which the Petitioner had prevailed. According to the initial Affidavit filed by Petitioner's attorney, Petitioner initially incurred legal fees in the amount of $5,106.50 and costs in the amount of $210.05 in DOAH Case No. 89-6811. However, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs since the evidence clearly demonstrated that Petitioner's business or professional practice is neither domiciled in Florida nor has a principal office located in Florida. See, Section 57.111(1)(d)a., Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Respondent abandoned her position as a food service worker at the Polk Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Bartow, Florida, on or about October 27, 1989.
Findings Of Fact 1. On September 19, 1989, Verdale Baptiste was employed at Polk Regional Juvenile Detention Center (PRJDC) as a food service worker (cook). She had been so employed for approximately two years and was permanent career service. 2 2. On September 19, 1989, Respondent sat in a chair to record the groceries she had used in preparing the meal, the chair broke or collapsed, and Respondent fell to the floor with her head striking an adjacent brick wall rendering her unconscious. She regained consciousness enroute to Bartow General Hospital in an ambulance. At the hospital, she was treated by Dr. A. Blavatski. Medical examination revealed a sprained lower back and right knee. As a result of this fall, she was unable to return to work as a cook at PRJDC. Respondent, at the time of the accident, and subsequent thereto through October 27, 1989, was morbidly obese. She is 5 feet, 8 inches, tall and weighed close to 400 pounds (Exhibit 1 of Exhibit 2). Respondent did not respond to treatment of her injuries due primarily to her obesity. She continued to be unable to return to work and limited her medical visits to the emergency room at the hospital. The superintendent and assistant superintendent at PRJDC suspected Respondent was malingering and requested other employees visit her and report back on her physical condition. Respondent telephoned PRJDC several times to speak to the superintendent or assistant superintendent, but generally was told they were unavailable and to leave a message. By letter dated October 9, 1989, the superintendent acknowledged talking to Respondent on October 6, 1989, at which time he requested Respondent present medical certification to support her continued absence from work. Although the record is somewhat unclear in this regard, it is evident that Respondent produced some medical certification for a further short period of disability. At this time, Respondent had used all of her annual leave and sick leave and was in the status of absent on authorized leave without pay. On October 20, 1989, Respondent called the PRJDC and said she would return to work Monday, October 23, 1989. On October 23, 1989, she reported at her normal time, but within an hour of standing, her pain became intolerable, and she told the assistant superintendent that she had to leave. Before she departed, the assistant superintendent had Respondent sign for receipt of a memo which directed her to notify the office by 10:30 a.m. the following day whether or not she was able to work and provide a doctor's note for the time she missed work beginning 1:15 p.m., October 23, 1989. On October 23, 1989, Respondent was seen at the emergency room at Winter Haven Hospital and upon discharge was given a medical certificate of no work for four days (Exhibit 2 of Exhibit 2). Respondent contends that she telephoned PRJDC from the hospital late that afternoon to say she was awaiting a medical certificate, but the assistant superintendent to whom she alleged to have directed the call does not recall receiving such a message. Whether or not that call was made is immaterial to the results reached. On October 27, 1989, Respondent's husband delivered to PRJDC two doctor's certificates; one dated 10/23/89 saying Respondent was unable to return to work for four days, and a report dated 10/27/89 saying she was unable to return to work for five days. Earlier, on October 27, 1989, the letter notifying Respondent of her presumed abandonment was mailed. Respondent's husband was given a copy of the October 27, 1989, letter to Respondent when he delivered the two doctor's certificates to PRJDC on October 27, 1989. Respondent was first seen by Dr. Lerner on November 20, 1989. Dr. Lerner opined that Respondent has been unable to return to work as a cook at PRJDC from the date of her accident until the date of his deposition on March 7, 1990. He further opined that Respondent will remain unable to return to work until her weight gets below 300 pounds (preferably below 200 pounds), at which time he will be able to see if orthroscopic surgery is indicated on her knee and if such surgery will correct the problem. Respondent is currently on a weight reduction program and has lost some 40 pounds.
Recommendation It is recommended that Verdale Baptiste be returned to the employment roll of the Polk Regional Juvenile Detention Center with such back pay as she would have been entitled, absent the alleged abandonment. ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Brent Creighton, Esquire Post Office Box 1089 Lakeland, FL 33802 Jack D. Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 4000 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Tampa, FL 33614 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses, the documentary evidence received at the hearing, and the record in DOAH case no. 88-6257, the following findings of fact are made: On October 24, 1988, the Department notified Sophie DeRuiter and Ann & Jan Retirement Villa that the license to operate an adult congregate living facility expired on October 23, 1988, and that the application for renewal was denied. The specific reasons listed as the grounds for such denial were a determination of confirmed medical neglect of residents and the inappropriate retention of residents. Thereafter, Petitioner timely sought an administrative review of the denial by filing a petition for administrative hearing with the Department which was subsequently forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on December 16, 1988. That matter was assigned DOAH case no. 88- 6257. Hearing of case no. 88-6257 was originally scheduled for March 17, 1989, by notice of hearing dated January 18, 1989. Thereafter, Petitioner scheduled a number of depositions and requested a continuance in the case to accommodate Sophie DeRuiter. That motion was unopposed by the Department and was granted by order entered February 27, 1989. That order also rescheduled the hearing for April 14, 1989, and required the parties to file a prehearing statement no later than March 24, 1989. Neither party timely filed a prehearing statement. In fact, the parties were unable to agree on a statement due to their disagreement as to the issues of the case. The unilateral statements filed by the parties established that Petitioner sought review of all grounds for the denial of the license renewal. On the other hand, the Department took the position that since Sophie DeRuiter was listed on the Florida Abuse Registry for confirmed medical neglect of residents, that such listing precluded renewal of the license. The Department alleged that Petitioner had not timely challenged the abuse report, and that such record could not be challenged in the instant case. The Department's letter denying amendment or expungement of the medical neglect had been issued December 7, 1988. Given the confusion of the parties and their failure to file prehearing statements as required, the hearing scheduled for April 14, 1989, was cancelled. Subsequently, the Department moved to limit the issue to whether there was a confirmed record of an abuse report (and thereby presume the underlying report correct). Such motion was denied on June 1, 1989. On June 9, 1989, the hearing of this matter was convened. At that time, the Department moved to continue the case due to illness of counsel and her inability to review an amended witness list filed by Petitioner. The motion was granted after it was apparent counsel for the Department was unprepared to go forward on all issues of the case (she represented she had just received the order requiring her to go forward on all issues on June 8, 1989). The case was rescheduled for August 10, 1989. Subsequently, the matter was continued again at Petitioner's request. The case was finally scheduled for hearing for September 8, 1989. The Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on August 14, 1989. On September 7, 1989, the Department filed a notice of dismissal which was construed as an assent, in whole or in part, to the relief requested by the Petitioner. Consequently, the hearing was cancelled and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department for such further action as would be appropriate. It was presumed that the abuse record would be expunged which would result in the reinstatement of the license. The Petitioner in the instant case has not, however, established the final resolution of DOAH case no. 88-6257. Petitioner did not comply with Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code by attaching the documents on which the claim that the small business party prevailed was predicated nor was proof of such document offered at the hearing of this matter. Sophie DeRuiter is the administrator and owner of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa which is located at 3486 Rostan Lane, Lake Worth, Florida. According to the style of the initial pleading filed by Petitioner in the instant case, Ann & Jan Retirement Villa has been incorporated. The proof offered at hearing suggested that Sophie DeRuiter is the sole proprietor of a business known as "Ann & Jan Retirement Villa." In August, 1988, Ms. DeRuiter employed approximately four full-time employees. In the three years she has owned and operated the facility, Ms. DeRuiter has never employed more than twenty-five full-time employees. The net worth of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa is less than two million dollars. Ms. DeRuiter's personal net worth is less than two million dollars. The combined worth of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa and Ms. DeRuiter is less than two million dollars. Ms. DeRuiter employed the law firm of Weissman and Chernay, P.A. to represent her in connection with the allegations in DOAH case no. 88-6257. In connection with that case, Ms. DeRuiter incurred legal fees in the amount of $8587.50 together with costs in the amount of $897.59. The reasonableness of those amounts was not disputed.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes(2011).1/
Findings Of Fact On August 11, 2010, Judith Amadiz ("Amadiz") filed a complaint of housing discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") alleging disability discrimination. The Commission conducted an investigation of the complaint. During the investigation, the investigator obtained statements and documents from both parties. The investigator's final investigative report ("Determination") (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit numbered 2) detailed numerous materials submitted by the parties for review during the investigation. Some of the materials referenced included a Medical Certification Form submitted on September 3, 2010, from Carlos Sesin, M.D.; a copy of Complainant's Lease Application dated December 8, 2009; and six letters including a copy of correspondence from Complainant dated April 27, 2010, requesting steam cleaning, and a copy of correspondence from Complainant dated May 17, 2010, requesting steam cleaning. The Determination dated October 20, 2010, concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice occurred. The Commission forwarded the Determination to a staff attorney to review for legal sufficiency. The Commission's staff attorney reviewed the report and, on November 15, 2010, issued a Legal Concurrence: Cause citing both statutory and case law supporting the Determination. The Legal Concurrence concluded that there is reasonable cause to believe that Respondent discriminated against Complainant. On or about November 17, 2010, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination (Cause), charging Respondent with engaging in discriminatory housing practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act, reflecting the October 20, 2010, findings of the Determination. On or about March 2, 2011, the Commission filed a Notice of Failure of Conciliation after a conciliation agreement had not been entered into with Sunbeach, and the complaint had not been withdrawn. On or about January 26, 2011, Amadiz elected to have the Commission represent her and seek relief in the proceeding and resolve the charge in an administrative proceeding before DOAH. On or about March 3, 2011, the Commission filed the Petition for Relief before DOAH on Amadiz's behalf. On December 12, 2011, the Commission moved to withdraw from the underlying proceeding, citing "significant and irreconcilable differences." On December 13, 2011, after a hearing on the motion, the undersigned entered an Order allowing the Commission's withdrawal. The Order also cancelled the final hearing scheduled for December 14, 2011, and provided Amadiz until January 23, 2012, to obtain new counsel to represent her in the matter. Amadiz subsequently notified DOAH of her intent to proceed pro se. Amadiz proceeded to hearing without counsel. The final hearing was held before the undersigned on May 9, 2012. The undersigned entered a Recommended Order on August 16, 2012, recommending the dismissal of Amadiz's Petition for Relief in its entirety. On October 9, 2012, Sunbeach filed a Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs against the Commission. On October 30, 2012, the Commission entered a Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from Discriminatory Housing Practice, adopting the undersigned's Recommended Order and dismissing the action of Amadiz. Sunbeach was represented by counsel, a 30-year AV-rated lawyer, who defended the underlying action for a period of over two years. Sunbeach's counsel billed 75.8 hours of service at $150.00 per hour. The amount of attorney's fees claimed in this matter is $10,460.00 and costs of $2,277.47 for a total of $12,737.47, which is being sought in the matter.
Findings Of Fact On January 16, 1987, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services notified J. S. By letter that it had received a report of neglect regarding him and advised him of his right to request the report be amended or expunged. J. S. did so but on February 26, 1987, the Department advised him his request for expungement had been denied. Thereafter, J. S. requested a formal hearing which was held by the undersigned on October 27, 1987. After a full, formal hearing on the merits, at which both testimony and documentary exhibits were presented by both parties, the undersigned, on December 1, 1987, entered a Recommended Order in which it was found, as a matter of fact, that while the alleged victim of the neglect was incapable of totally caring for himself, the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the relationship between the victim and J. S. was a care-giving one or that J. S. had the responsibility to look out for the victim so as to bring him within the purview of the statute. The Department thereafter entered a Final Order consistent with the Recommended Order, amending the classification of the report to "unfounded" and expunging it from the Department records. Evidence introduced at the original formal hearing held herein established that J. S. was an employee, (resident manager) at the Royal Palm Retirement Home in Ft. Myers, Florida. He was not the owner of the facility nor was any evidence introduced to indicate he had any financial interest, other than as an employee, in the facility. Further, he was not engaging in the professional practice of a licensed profession. His relationship with the alleged victim was found to be no more than that of landlord-tenant. The Department's investigation of the alleged neglect, while not completely comprehensive, nonetheless was sufficiently thorough to meet the test of reasonableness.
Findings Of Fact On December 22, 1987, the undersigned held a formal hearing in the underlying case, (DOAH Case No. 87-3084), and on February 4, 1988, issued a Recommended Order to the Florida Real Estate Commission in which it was concluded that the Petitioners had violated various provisions of the Florida Statutes and that disciplinary action was appropriate. Specific disciplinary action was recommended as to each Petitioner. In its Final Order, predicated upon the above mentioned Recommended Order, the Commission adopted the undersigned's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law but found the recommendation for punishment as to both Petitioners was inadequate. The Commission increased each period of suspension, rejected the recommendation for stay and automatic remission as to the suspensions, and imposed an administrative fine on each Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the Second District Court of Appeal which, in an opinion filed February 17, 1989 affirmed the Commission's findings of guilt but reversed the penalties imposed by the Commission and remanded with instructions to approve the Hearing Officer's recommended penalties. It is on the basis of this appellate action that Petitioners, claiming to be prevailing small business parties, initiated the instant action. Petitioners are requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $5,261.28 for the appellate action which resulted in the District Court of Appeals reducing the penalty imposed by the Commission to that recommended by the Hearing Officer. This fee and cost figure is the cumulative of charges incurred and represented on 11 monthly billing statements starting 06-01-88 and extending through 04-01-89. Only the last eight, starting with the 09-01-88 billing, state the hours spent providing service. The Florida Legislature has defined a "prevailing small business party" at Section 57.111(3)(c), Florida Statutes.
