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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs A-1 SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., STEPHEN V. ROZZI, PRESIDENT, 97-005969 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 22, 1997 Number: 97-005969 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2004

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether A-1 Security and Detective Agency’s Class B security agency license, and Mr. Rozzi’s Class MB security agency manager license should be disciplined because of the matters set out in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, between May 5 and August 4, 1997, the Petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division) was the state agency responsible for the licensing of security agencies and security agency managers in Florida. Respondent, A-1 Security and Detective Agency, Incorporated (A-1) held a Class “B” security agency license number B89-0115; and Respondent, Stephen V. Rozzi, held a Class “MB” security agency manager’s license number MB89-00186. Respondent Rozzi was President and operating manager of A-1. At some point during the period in issue, Gary Q. Floyd, an investigator with the Division, received a call from the owner of another security agency who reported a potential problem. At the time, Mr. Floyd was nearby and responded immediately to the apartment complex which belonged to a client of the individual who had called in. His review of the security logs revealed abnormal entries. Returning to the Division office, Floyd checked on the license status of the guard in question who had made the questionable entries and found that this guard was not licensed. The guard, Carmen Santiago, had applied for a class “D” license as a security guard, but because of a prior disciplinary problem out-of-state, the Division had indicated its intent to deny the license. Santiago was employed by Respondent, A-1. Coincidentally, the following morning, Respondent Rozzi came to the Division office on another matter and Floyd showed him the questioned logs. Respondent agreed that the entry was unusual, but said he had terminated Santiago from employment with A-1 as a guard on July 30, 1997, before the date of the questioned entry. Floyd asked Rozzi which guard had worked on the site on Wednesday, July 30, 1997, and on Thursday, July 31, 1997, after Santiago had been terminated. Respondent indicated the replacement guard was a Mr. Michelin. The log entries in question, which got the interest of Floyd, indicated that Santiago, who was not properly licensed as a Class “D” security guard, had served as such at the Whisper Woods Apartments. By pre-hearing stipulation dated June 10, 1998, Rozzi agreed that he had employed Santiago at Whisper Woods Apartments during the period July 30 to July 31, 1997, and that Santiago did not have the proper license at the time. Rozzi indicated at hearing that he received notice from the Division to the effect that Santiago’s application for licensure as a security guard was being denied, but claims he did not receive the notice until he picked up his mail at about 9:00 p.m., on July 31, 1997. As soon as he got that word, Rozzi claims, he called Santiago at home but was unable to reach him. Nonetheless, he left word on Santiago’s answering machine for him not to report for work that evening. In his report to the Division made previously, he indicated he had fired Santiago on July 30, 1997. At hearing Rozzi claimed he back-dated the firing to the date he received the information on the denial, which would have been July 30, not July 31, 1997. However, Rozzi had already indicated he had notified Mr. Michelin, who was scheduled to work on July 30 and 31 at Fletcher Woods Apartments, to go instead to Whisper Wood Apartments to relieve Santiago. Mr. Carter, another employee, was to take Michelin’s place at Fletcher Wood Apartments. When asked to asked to explain the inconsistencies, he could not do so. Carter, when interviewed by Floyd on August 5, 1997, as a part of the investigation, stated he did not work at Fletcher Woods Apartments that night nor has he ever worked there. Carter also indicated that when he was contacted by Rozzi shortly before August 5, 1997, Rozzi told Carter, to say, if he were asked, that he had worked at Fletcher Woods on the night of July 31, 1997. When Floyd advised Rozzi of Carter’s story, Rozzi still declined to change his version. Santiago is disqualified from licensure as a security guard in Florida because of his conviction of a felony in another state. Nonetheless, he applied for a security guard license in Florida in April or May 1997. At the time he applied, he received a temporary Class “D” license which allowed him to work pending action on the permanent license application, and he started work at A-1 as a security guard at different locations wherever he was posted. From time to time, including on July 30 and 31, 1997, he worked at Whisper Woods Apartments. On July 30, 1997, Santiago went to work at 4:00 p.m., intending to stay until relieved at the end of his shift, at 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997. At the time he went to work, he did not know that his application for licensure had been denied, nor did he know of the denial when he went to work on July 31, 1997. He claims he did not go home after work on either July 31 or early on August 1, 1997. Santiago claims he first learned of the denial when he got home later in the day on Friday, August 1, 1997, to find Floyd at his door. During the conversation he had with Floyd which followed, Floyd advised him that his license had been denied. This was the first he had heard of the denial, he claims. Santiago indicates that as soon as Floyd told him that, he left Floyd in his apartment and immediately went to his mailbox where he found the denial letter from the Division. There is some evidence to indicate that Santiago told Floyd in another interview prior to the hearing, that he had received the letter informing him of the denial on either July 30 or July 31, 1997. At hearing he claims that he was referring to a letter from the Division soliciting more information. This contention is rejected, however, since it is considered unlikely the Division would seek additional information and reject the application almost concurrently with the request. After Floyd left Santiago on August 1, 1997, Santiago immediately called Rozzi to tell him he could no longer work. Santiago claims Rozzi was upset with him when he called, claiming that he, Rozzi had tried to call Santiago a few days earlier to tell him not to go to work, but Santiago had not received the message or called him back. However, Santiago was at work at Whisper Woods Apartments from 4:00 p.m., on July 30, 1997, until 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997, and again that evening, and no one came to the job site either evening to talk with him about his status. This was, he claims, even after he told Rozzi that he, Rozzi, was going to get a letter indicating Santiago’s license was denied. Santiago claims that at no time after that notice did Rozzi terminate him or advise him he would be terminated when the letter came in. Rozzi contended at hearing that the first time he heard anything about the problem with Santiago working was on August 1, 1997, when he was in the Division office on a probation matter. It was at that time that Floyd showed him the logs from Whisper Woods Apartments and asked him about what appeared to be differences in the handwriting on them. Floyd also asked him at that time if he knew Santiago’s license was going to be denied. Rozzi said then that he had first learned of the problem on July 31, 1997. That same day, Rozzi claims, he made arrangements for someone else to cover that post so that Santiago would not be on duty, and Rozzi insists he did not know that this had not happened until the next day. Analysis of and comparison of the varied stories told by Rozzi regarding when he found out that Santiago’s license was being denied results in the conclusion that Rozzi found out on July 30, 1997. Had he not known, he would have had no reason to contact Michelin and tell him to switch duty assignments or to call Santiago and leave the message not to go to work any more. However, Michelin did not testify at the hearing, and the evidence of what he told Floyd regarding this is hearsay evidence. Even if Rozzi received the notice on July 30, 1997, as it appears, by his own admission he did not receive it until mid- evening, at a time when Santiago would have already been at work on the 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. shift. There is no way he could have reached Santiago that evening. Knowing this, Rozzi still did not make any effort to contact Santiago by going to the work site and relieving him by taking a relief guard with him. Consequently, it is found that regardless of which day Rozzi found out about Santiago’s disqualification, he did nothing to ensure that Santiago did not serve as a security guard without a license. Merely calling Santiago and leaving a message on the answering machine is not enough. At the least, he should have gone to the site to insure Santiago was not on duty. At this initial interview, Floyd also showed Rozzi a copy of one of A-1’s invoice forms which reflected at the bottom that the firm was available to perform certain tasks which were limited to a licensed detective agency and not permitted to a security agency. Rozzi indicated that he had copied the information from an advertisement of another agency, but assured Floyd that A-1 was not doing the unauthorized work. No evidence was introduced to indicate it was, and it is so found. Rozzi agreed to remove the inappropriate language from any form or communication used by the firm immediately. He did so. On December 31, 1996, the Director of the Division of Licensing entered a Final Order in Case No. C96-00855 relating to the two Respondents herein, adopting and incorporating the terms of a Stipulation and Settlement entered into between the division and the Respondents in that case. None of the documentation submitted in connection with that case indicates what offenses were alleged to have been committed by either Respondent. The terms of the Stipulation and Settlement called for the Respondents’ licenses to be placed on probation for a period of two years, and for Respondents to pay an administrative fine of four thousand dollars.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of employing an unlicensed employee to perform services which require the possession of a license; of advertising the business of a private investigative agency without possessing the proper license; of failing to respond truthfully to questions asked by an authorized investigator during an official investigation; and of violating the terms of probation by committing violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondents’ class “B” and Class “ MB” licenses as a security agency and security agency manager respectively, be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Rayford H. Taylor, Esquire Stiles, Taylor, Grace & Smith, P.A. Post office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (2) 120.57493.6118
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HARRY L. HOFFMAN vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 94-003219 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 08, 1994 Number: 94-003219 Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License should be granted or denied.

Findings Of Fact On or about January 4, 1994, the Petitioner filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 1994, the Respondent sent a letter to the Petitioner advising him of its intention to deny his application. The sole stated ground for denial was described as "[f]ailure to qualify under Section 493.6118(1)(j). You committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of yourself or another." The denial letter also made specific reference to the date of February 21, 1993, and specifically referred to criminal charges allegedly brought against the Petitioner on that date for battery and aggravated battery. With regard to the Respondent's basis for denial, the proof demonstrates that during the early afternoon of February 21, 1993, the Petitioner became involved in an argument with Jessica Favata, an adult female with whom he was acquainted. The intensity of the argument escalated and at one point the Petitioner physically pushed Ms. Favata. At that point a male friend of Ms. Favata, one Bradley Watson, injected himself into the argument. As the intensity of the argument between the Petitioner and Mr. Watson continued to increase, the Petitioner retrieved an aluminum baseball bat from his motor vehicle and began swinging the bat in the general direction of Mr. Watson. During the course of one of the swings of the bat, the Petitioner struck Ms. Favata on the hand with the bat. As a result of being struck by the bat, Ms. Favata's hand was visibly injured. During the course of the events described in the preceding paragraph neither Ms. Favata nor Mr. Watson were armed with any type of weapon. Similarly, neither Ms. Favata nor Mr. Watson were causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the Petitioner.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case denying the Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1994.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57493.6118
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KENNETH DUNNING vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 98-005572 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 18, 1998 Number: 98-005572 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 1999

The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent’s application for a Class G Firearms license should be approved and whether his existing Concealed Weapons license should be revoked.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the licensure and sale of weapons in the State of Florida. By letter dated November 5, 1998, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, notified Kenneth Dunning that his application for a Class “G” license had been denied. The grounds for the proposed denial are as follows: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6118(4), Florida Statutes, in that you were convicted of a felony and your civil rights, including the specific right to possess firearms, have not been restored by the State of Michigan. For information, please contact the state (sic) of Michigan. In 1960, Mr. Dunning was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, in the State of Michigan. On December 23, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Dunning, seeking to revoke his Concealed Weapons license, number W98-00504. As grounds for the proposed revocation, the Complaint states as follows: On or about June 17, 1960, in the State of Michigan, Respondent was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, and has not had the right to own or possess firearms restored in the State of Michigan. Respondent is ineligible for licensure pursuant to Sections 790.06(2)(d) and 790,23, Florida Statutes. There is no evidence that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights were lost as a result of his 1960 conviction. The evidence, including Mr. Dunning’s uncontradicted testimony and available documents, establishes that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights, if impacted at all by his 1960 conviction, have been restored without reservation. By Order dated May 23, 1997, from the Office of Executive Clemency, Mr. Dunning was granted a restoration of civil rights “except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm” by the Governor of the State of Florida with the concurrence of the requisite members of the State Cabinet. The Certificate of Restoration indicates it is valid “in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in the state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court. . . .” By Executive Order dated September 10, 1998, and signed by the Governor of the State of Florida, Mr. Dunning was granted “the right to own, possess or use firearms.” Department Exhibit numbered 1 is a letter dated September 28, 1998, from “Anthony P. Gledhill” who is identified as “Division Counsel, Detroit” for the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to John P. Booth, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The letter is a legal analysis of case law related to restoration of an individual’s civil rights after conviction. The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored. Department Exhibit numbered 2 is a letter dated September 24, 1998, to Mr. Dunhill from Mr. Booth. The letter identifies as the reason for FDLE’s nonapproval of Mr. Dunning's attempt to purchase a firearm under Section 790.065, Florida Statutes, “the determination by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that your civil rights have not been fully restored by Michigan. . . .” The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order granting the application of Kenneth Dunning for a Class “G” firearms license and dismissing the Administrative Complaint addressed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kenneth Dunning 806 Walker Drive Tampa, Florida 33613 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Lever 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (8) 120.57493.6118775.082775.083775.084790.06790.065790.23
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GENERAL G. FOREMAN vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 82-003085 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003085 Latest Update: Feb. 03, 1982

Findings Of Fact Based on the documentary evidence received, the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. By letter dated October 18, 1982, Mr. General G. Foreman, Petitioner herein, was advised that his application for Class "D" and "G" unarmed/armed security guard licenses had been denied based on "fraud or willful misrepresentation in application for or in obtaining a license." Chapter 493.319(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner timely applied for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, concerning the denial of his application for Class "D" and "G" unarmed/armed security guard licenses by the Division of Licensing. 1/ Documentary evidence herein reveals that the Petitioner has been arrested ten times during the period April, 1950 through May, 1982. On Petitioner's application filed during approximately July, 1982, he listed two arrests during the period March, 1955 through approximately November, 1970. Petitioner listed (on the subject application) a trespassing charge which occurred during April, 1950, the outcome of which resulted in a conviction, and during November, 1969 or 1970, a rape charge which was "thrown out, dismissed." In the processing of applications for guard licenses, the Respondent conducts background investigations through fingerprint checks with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other local law enforcement agencies. The Respondent reviewed a "rap" sheet from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and based on a consideration of the ten (10) occasions which the Petitioner had been arrested, an administrative determination was made that the Petitioner failed to fully disclose arrests. For that reason, Petitioner's application for the above-referred guard licenses was denied. (Testimony of Debbie Richards, Respondent's guard license application investigator). The Petitioner listed the tow charges which "bears" on his mind and the other arrests were not listed since they had no "bearing on his mind." Petitioner contends that he made no effort to "hide" anything. Further, Petitioner related that he, to this date, is unable to recall, with any specificity, the exact number of times that he has been arrested.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for statewide Class "D" and "G" security guard licenses. 2/ RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1983.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs GERALD BROWN, 95-001850 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 18, 1995 Number: 95-001850 Latest Update: Sep. 11, 1995

The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner on the basis of an alleged violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by sleeping while on duty.

Findings Of Fact Respondent currently holds a Class "D" Security Officer License, Number D92-08606, issued pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, effective June 2, 1994. During September and October of 1994, Motivated Security provided security services to Shurgard Storage, located at 1650 West Oakland Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On September 30, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a security officer by Motivated Security. On that date the Respondent's assigned post with Motivated Security was at the Shurgard Storage premises described above. On that date, the Respondent was assigned to the 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on September 30, 1994, while the Respondent was on duty at the post described above, the Respondent was sound asleep in a golf cart for a period of at least one-half hour.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case finding that the Respondent committed the violation charged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a penalty consisting of a six-month suspension of the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August 1995. APPENDIX The following are the specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner. Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. (All of these proposed details are essentially correct; it is simply not necessary to repeat them.) Findings submitted by Respondent. (None.) COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Gerald Brown 3551 N.W. 41st Street Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33309 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (3) 120.57493.6118493.6121
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DIVISION OF LICENSING vs. STUART PHILLIP COON, 84-000831 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000831 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1991

Findings Of Fact Based on the exhibits received in evidence and the testimony of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent holds a Class "D", unarmed security guard license, No. GD-0106713, which was most recently renewed on July 3, 1983. The Respondent also holds a Class "G", statewide gun permit (armed security guard license) , No. GG-0025231, which was issued on July 3, 1983. The Division of Licensing of the Department of State did not approve or deny the Respondent's application for a Class "G" license within a 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division was required to, and in fact did, issue a Class "G" license to the Respondent. Except for the operation of the 90-day provision in Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent a statewide gun permit because of the Respondent's criminal record. For the same reason, it was a mistake for the Division of Licensing to renew the Respondent's Class "D" license in 1983. On February 28, 1977, the Respondent was arrested on the roof of a department-store and charged with burglary, to which he entered a plea of nolo contendre. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for 5 years. During the summer of 1980, the Respondent and two of his friends apprehended two thieves who had stolen some personal property from a vehicle. Later, the Respondent appeared in court to testify against the two thieves. On April 15, 1981, the Respondent was arrested for grand larceny. On November 9, 1981, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to a larceny charge of failing to redeliver a hired motor vehicle. Adjudication was withheld and the Respondent was placed on probation for one year.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is recommended that the De- partment of State issue a Final Order which (a) Would revoke Respondent's Class "D" and Class "G" licenses and (b) would order Respondent to forthwith return such licenses to the Department of State. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of September, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1984 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James V. Antista, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Stuart Phillip Coon 12824 Southwest 114 Terrace Miami, Florida 33183

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.60
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RICK STEPHEN SEAVER vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 91-000947 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Feb. 12, 1991 Number: 91-000947 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 1991

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, was the state agency responsible for the licensing of security guards in Florida. On September 19, 1990, Petitioner, Rick Stephen Seaver, submitted an application for an unarmed security guard license and statewide gun permit to the Division. In Part V of the application, dealing with criminal history, Petitioner indicated he had not ever been convicted of a crime, and further stated he had not been convicted of any felonies. In reality, however, Respondent had been convicted of possession of marijuana in Johnson City, Tennessee, on February 19, 1981, and on October 23, 1986, was convicted of one charge of simple assault and one charge of carrying a firearm. This latter series of offenses also took place in Johnson City. When this information was made available to the Department, by a letter dated January 24, 1991, an Amended Letter of Denial, the Division denied the Petitioner's application for an unarmed security guard license, alleging that he had been guilty of fraud or willful misrepresentation in applying for or obtaining a license, in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(a), Florida Statutes; had been convicted of crimes which directly relate to the business for which the license was sought, in violation of Section 493.6118(1)((c), Florida Statutes; and failed to have the requisite good moral character called for under the provisions of Section 493.6118(3), Florida Statutes. At the hearing, Respondent withdrew as a basis for denial the allegation of fraud or willful misrepresentation and further stipulated that none of the offenses of which the Petitioner had been found guilty were felonies. It is so found. Petitioner has been married to his wife for five years. Though he did not adopt her son by a previous marriage, he has provided the sole support and guidance to the boy since the marriage, and in Mrs. Seaver's opinion, has been a good father and good husband. For the five months prior to his dismissal from employment with Jewell Security Agency, as a result of the Division's action denying him a license, Mr. Seaver worked as an unarmed security guard in Bradenton. He worked as an outdoor guard at night, unarmed, at various establishments throughout the City of Bradenton, and during his term of employment, only one business where he was on guard, was ever robbed. That one occasion took place before he came on duty the day in question and the police were able to identify the perpetrators. According to James E. Jewell, owner of the agency and Petitioner's employer, Petitioner was an outstanding employee who was always on time, never called in sick, and performed his duties in a manner felt to be a credit to the company. Jewell found Petitioner to be completely honest and trustworthy. Before working with Jewell, Petitioner worked as a baker in Sarasota for 2 1/2 years after his move from Tennessee. He left that job only because of a dispute he had with the manager over some vacation time which previously had been approved, but which was later denied him. He quit and was not discharged. Before coming to Florida he also worked as a baker in Tennessee for about 13 to 14 years without difficulty and without any criminal record other than the offenses forming the basis for the denial here. The assault charge occurred just before he and his wife were married when he used a firecracker to blow out the window of the house of an individual, then under charges for rape, who was harassing and annoying his intended wife. The charge of carrying a weapon arose out of an unloaded gun which was found under the passenger seat of a vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger when he was stopped for the assault. The assault did not involve the use of the weapon, but as a result of his plea, he was convicted and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in jail, all of which was suspended. Prior to the trial on those offenses, from the time of his arrest, he was free on bond. The possession of marijuana charge took place in 1981 at which time Petitioner was approximately 24 years old. At that time, he was found guilty of possession of less than an ounce of marijuana and was sentenced to pay a fine of $250.00. Mr. Seaver has not had any other infractions and according to his wife, has not been cited with so much as a traffic ticket in the five years they have been married. No evidence to the contrary was presented.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case granting Petitioner, Rick Stephen Seaver, a Class "D" Unarmed Security Officer License. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1991. Copies furnished: Henri C. Cauthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Rick Stephen Seaver 4411 21st Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34209 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (6) 120.57493.6101493.6105493.6106493.6118493.6121
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