The Issue The issues concern the question of Petitioner's responsibility to pay additional insurance premiums related to Family I coverage in the State Employees' Group Health Insurance program for the period February 1981 through April 1982, based upon alleged underpayments of required premiums. See Section 110.123, Florida Statutes and Rule 22K-1.20, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact According to the Florida law which has application in this dispute, when a husband and wife were employed by separate agencies of the State of Florida, cost of the Family I coverage under the State Group Health Insurance Plan was defrayed by those state agencies. This is as contrasted with the circumstance in which one spouse would be responsible for contributing to the cost of the Family I coverage under the State Group Health Insurance Plan, should the second spouse cease to be employed by the second state agency. The State of Florida, Department of Administration, has she responsibility for administering the State Group Health Insurance Plan, to include collection of necessary premium payments. Both Petitioner and his wife had been reported in the records of the Department of Administration as employed by the Department of Corrections and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services respectively, as employees entitled to participate in the spouse program for payment of health care, i.e., the program in which no contribution is made by the employees toward payment of health insurance premiums. On October 28, 1982, the Petitioner informed the Department of Administration on a form provided by the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration that his wife, Caroline Wilson, had terminated her employment with Health and Rehabilitative Services effective March 23, 1982. This form was executed in cooperation with the Petitioner's employing agency. The second part of the form related to information to be provided by the wife and her employing agency on the question of her employment was not completed by the spouse nor signed off by her employing agency. A copy of this item or form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. As a result of information he provided, Petitioner was informed of an underpayment of premiums for the period May 1982 through November 1982, related to his wife's lack of eligibility for contribution from her employing agency and the responsibility of the Petitioner to substitute as payor of those premiums. This referred to the point of departure identified by the Petitioner allowing for a grace month of April 1982, thereby making the period of underpayment May 1982 through November 1982. The amount of nonpayment was $280.06, which was eventually reimbursed by the Petitioner. Subsequently, in January 1984, Respondent, Bureau of Insurance, in an attempt to ascertain why Health and Rehabilitative Services had not contributed the full amount of its share to the insurance related to Caroline P. Wilson in times before March 23, 1982, discovered that the wife, Caroline P. Wilson, had terminated her employment some time before March 23, 1982. As was revealed in the final hearing, the last day of employment with Health and Rehabilitative Services was January 3, 1981. After that date, Mrs. Wilson did not return to her job at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, and was eventually considered to have abandoned that job. (It was the first impression of the Department of Administration that she had last been employed in December 1980 and as a consequence this case pertains to the claim of the Department of Administration that there is an underpayment related to the family coverage which starts on February 1, 1981 and runs until April 1, 1982, allowing for a credit of overpayment in the amount of $48.46 for the month of September 1983, leaving a total claimed of $382.64. It is this amount that Petitioner took issue with and requested a timely formal Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes' hearing to resolve.) Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the date from which the responsibility of the husband to contribute the premiums share no longer being provided by Health and Rehabilitative Services would be January 1981, as opposed to December 1980. Allowing for the grace month of February 1981, the payments would be due for March 1, 1981, through April 1, 1982, allowing credit again for the $48.46 for the month of September 1983, leaving a total due and owing in the way of underpayment of $353.90.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent in the State of Florida licensed to sell health insurance. At all times material hereto, Respondent was not formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. However, Cleveland Insurance Agency often referred clients to Respondent for health and Medicare supplement policies because Cleveland Insurance Agency did not handle those type policies. Prior to November 1987, Respondent, working in conjunction with Cleveland Insurance Company, sold to Irene Goldberg a health insurance policy issued through Provider's Fidelity Insurance Company (Provider's Fidelity). On November 29, 1987, Ms. Goldberg paid $1,504.56 as the annual renewal premium for this health insurance policy which extended her coverage through December 4, 1988. In March of 1988, Ms. Goldberg contacted Cleveland Insurance Agency and requested that someone review her health insurance coverage. Cleveland Insurance Agency referred Ms. Goldberg's request to Respondent. Respondent was familiar with the terms and conditions of the health insurance coverage Ms. Goldberg had in place and he knew that she had paid the premium for this policy through December 1988. Upon visiting with Irene Goldberg on or about March 10, 1988, Respondent presented Ms. Goldberg with a business card that intentionally misrepresented his status with Cleveland Insurance Company. Because Ms. Goldberg had placed most of her insurance needs through Cleveland Insurance Agency during the past few years, Respondent intentionally misled Ms. Goldberg into thinking that he was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. During that visit, Respondent recommended to Ms. Goldberg that she purchase a policy of insurance issued by First National Life Insurance Company (First National) to replace her Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg specifically discussed with Respondent a preexisting medical condition which required periodic medical treatment and the need for the treatment required by this condition to be covered by the new policy. Respondent assured Ms. Goldberg that the preexisting condition would be covered by the new policy. Respondent also told Ms. Goldberg that he would cancel the Provider's Fidelity policy and that he would secure on her behalf a pro rated refund of the premium she had paid to Provider's Fidelity. Based on Respondent's representations, Ms. Goldberg agreed to purchase the First National policy. On March 30, 1988, Ms. Goldberg gave to Respondent a check made payable to First National Life Insurance Company in the amount of $1,892.00, the amount Respondent had quoted as the full annual premium. A few days later, Respondent contacted Ms. Goldberg and advised her that there would be an additional premium in the amount of $1,360.00, which Ms. Goldberg paid on April 4, 1988. This additional premium was, according to Respondent, for skilled nursing care coverage which First National had added as a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg had purchased. The skilled nursing care coverage was, in fact, a separate policy which was not a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg thought she was purchasing from First National. Respondent misled Ms. Goldberg as to the terms of the policies he had sold her and as to the number of policies he had sold her. Respondent represented that the premiums he had collected on behalf of First National were in payment of a single health insurance policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg four separate policies, and he collected a commission for each of the policies. When Ms. Goldberg received her insurance documents from First National, she learned for the first time that Respondent had sold her four separate policies of insurance, including a cancer policy that she and Respondent had never discussed. In addition to the health and cancer policies, Respondent sold Ms. Goldberg a home convalescent care policy and a separate skilled nursing care policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg policies of insurance that Ms. Goldberg had not requested and that she did not know she was buying. Upon reading the health policy, Ms. Goldberg discovered that her new First National Life policy excluded her preexisting condition. Ms. Goldberg contacted Respondent who told her that he had not cancelled the Provider's Fidelity policy as he had agreed to do and that he had not tried to get the pro rated refund of the Provider's Fidelity premium. Respondent told her that any claim she might have for the preexisting condition should be filed under the Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg then complained to First National which, after an investigation, refunded to Ms. Goldberg the premiums she had paid for the three policies. Respondent had received a commission on the policies of insurance he had sold to Ms. Goldberg. As of the time of the hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed First National for the commission he had received based on the premiums that were subsequently refunded to Ms. Goldberg. In February 1988, Respondent met with Helen Krafft to discuss her health insurance needs. During the course of the meeting, Respondent presented to Ms. Krafft a business card which intentionally misrepresented his affiliation with Cleveland Insurance Agency. This business card misled Ms. Krafft into believing that Respondent was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. On February 18, 1988, Respondent sold to Ms. Krafft a health insurance policy through First National and a health insurance policy issued through American Sun Life, at which time he collected a premiums in the total amount of $519.80 for six months of coverage from each of the two policies. In July 1988, Respondent visited with Ms. Krafft at her place of work and told her that she should pay her renewal premiums for the health insurance policies on or before August 1, 1988, to avoid a premium increases. Respondent knew, or should have known, that there were no premium increases scheduled for those policies and that there were no discounts for early payment of the premiums The renewal premiums Respondent quoted Ms. Krafft for the two policies totaled $485.40. At Respondent's instructions Ms. Krafft delivered to Respondent her signed check dated July 18, 1988, in the amount of $485.40 with the payee's name left blank. Respondent accepted these trust funds from Ms. Krafft in a fiduciary capacity. Instead of using these funds to pay the premiums as he had agreed to do, Respondent filled his name in on Ms. Krafft's check and cashed it. Ms. Krafft learned that Respondent had not used the funds she had given him to renew her two policies when she started getting late payment notices from the two insurance companies with accompanying threats of cancellation if the premiums were not paid. In late September 1988, Respondent paid to Ms. Krafft the sum of $485.40 in cash. In June of 1988, Steven R. and Marilyn Hill applied, through Respondent, for a health policy with First National. The Hills paid the initial premium of $304.37 by check made payable to First National on June 26, 1988. Because of underwriting considerations, First National informed Respondent that the Hills would have to pay a higher premium to obtain the insurance they wanted. The Hills were not willing to pay the higher premium and requested a refund of the amount they had paid. First National made the refund check payable to Steven Hill and mailed the check to Respondent. There was no competent, substantial evidence as to what happened to the check other than First National Life stopped payment on the check and it never cleared banking channels. A second refund check was later delivered to Steven Hill. First National contended at the hearing that Respondent had accrued a debit balance in the amount of $2,692.45 as a result of his dealings as an agent of the company. Respondent contended that he is entitled to certain offsets against the amount First National claims it is owed based on commissions he contends that he had earned but had not been paid. First National had not, prior to the hearing, submitted to Respondent any type of accounting of sums due, nor had it explicitly demanded any specific sum from Respondent. Instead, First National had made a blanket demand that Respondent return all materials belonging to First National and advised that future commission checks would be held in escrow. From the evidence presented it could not be determined that Respondent was indebted to First National.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the multiple violations of the Florida Insurance Code as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and which further revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer to Respondent, John Richard Klee. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3269 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected in part as being a conclusion of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. 10 are adopted in material part 11 are adopted in material part 12 are adopted in material part 13 are adopted in material part 14 are adopted in material part 15 are adopted in material part 16 are adopted in material part 17 are adopted in material part 18 are adopted in material part 19 are adopted in material part 20 are adopted in material part 21 are adopted in material part 22 are adopted in material part 23 are adopted in material part 24 are adopted in material part 25 are rejected as being The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 2 and 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 27 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 28 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 29 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 30 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy H. Schmidt, Esquire Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee Florida 32399-0300 Greg Ross, Esquire 400 Southeast Eighth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Marcus Paul, was employed part-time as a dentist by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Pensacola, Florida. As part of his employment Dr. Paul was enrolled in the State's Employee Health Insurance Plan. The State's Health Plan is a self-insurance plan. Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) of Florida is the State's agent for administering the Health Plan and is initially responsible for timely and promptly investigating and paying legitimate health claims. Under the State's Health Plan an employee is responsible for the first $1,000 of covered expenses. The Plan pays the balance of any covered expenses incurred by the employee. Covered expenses are defined in the plan. Such expenses are basically limited to reasonably necessary medical treatment or care of some kind. Dr. Paul also carried a direct pay health insurance policy with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania policy was a non-coordinating policy with the State's Health Plan. In essence, the Pennsylvania policy paid directly to its insured, Dr. Paul, regardless of the benefits paid by the State's Plan and the State's Plan benefits are not reduced by the Pennsylvania policy's payment of health benefits. Around September 15, 1984, Dr. Paul suffered a pulmonary embolism. He was hospitalized for his condition from September 15, 1984 to September 30, 1984. On admission, the hospital obtained Dr. Paul's health insurance information and had him sign the usual authorizations to allow the hospital to file his insurance claim. The total hospital charge resulting from Petitioner's hospitalization was $10,873.01 of which $10,582.30 was eligible for payment under the State Plan. The hospital filed a claim on both of Dr. Paul's contracts of insurance. Both contracts of insurance paid benefits to the hospital. BCBS of Pennsylvania paid approximately $9,500 and BCBS of Florida paid $9,582.00. The amount paid by BCBS of Florida represents the total covered expenses less the $1,000 the insured is responsible for. Because of the double payment the hospital told Dr. Paul that he was entitled to a refund from it. However, before the hospital refunded the money to Dr. Paul, BCBS of Florida discovered the double payment. No evidence was presented as to how BCBS of Florida discovered the other insurance company's co-payment. BCBS of Florida immediately demanded the hospital refund its payment. The hospital did so. BCBS of Florida mistakenly took the position that it was not the primary payor on the claim and refused to pay the claim. The hospital thereafter looked to the Pennsylvania proceeds for its payment. Dr. Paul was thereby prevented from receiving the monies due him under his Pennsylvania policy at a time when his need for funds was high since, due to his illness, he could not conduct a regular practice. For approximately one year Dr. Paul attempted to correct BCBS of Florida's mistake. However, he ran into a brick wall. Finally, after Dr. Paul retained an attorney to deal with BCBS, BCBS admitted its mistake and paid the hospital as the primary payor of Dr. Paul's claim. BCBS' failure to pay Dr. Paul's claim for over one year was a breach of his contract of insurance and negligent. BCBS' actions caused Dr. Paul not to be able to receive other monies that were rightfully his and at a minimum caused Dr. Paul to incur damages in the amount of attorney's fee he was forced to pay to rectify BCBS' mistake. When BCBS paid the claim the second time the company paid $10,281.93 to the hospital. Dr. Paul's $1,000 deductible was not subtracted from the amount BCBS paid. The hospital then refunded $10,105.70 to Dr. Paul. The discrepancy between the original `84 payment and the second `85 payment is $300.17. Therefore, only $699.83 could be attributable to Dr. Paul. Additionally Dr. Paul did not receive the full BCBS payment from the hospital. The amount he received was $176.23 less than the amount paid by BCBS. Therefore, the amount owed by Dr. Paul, if any, is $523.60. The hospital has possession of the other $176.23. BCBS later discovered its error and attempted to collect the full $1,000 deductible from Dr. Paul. He refused to pay since he had incurred and paid more than $3,000 in attorney's fees when he was forced to hire an attorney to obtain proper payment of his insurance claim. Since Dr. Paul refused to pay, BCBS turned his name over to DOA, its principal, for further collection action. DOA terminated further payment of Dr. Paul's ongoing insurance claims. 1/ Additionally, DOA unsuccessfully attempted to have the comptroller garnish Dr. Paul's wages. These actions were taken even in light of the breach of contract and negligent failure of DOA's agent to properly pay Dr. Paul's claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended: That the Department enter a final order determining that Dr. Paul is liable to it for the $523.60. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1989.
The Issue This case involves a dispute as to whether the Petitioner underpaid the premiums due on his health insurance coverage and, if so, what action should be taken by the Department of Administration as a result of any premium underpayments. By notice dated March 18, 1988, the Department of Administration notified the Petitioner that the Department records "show a total underpayment of $1,117.81 for the coverage periods 9/86 through 9/87." At the formal hearing, over the objection of the Petitioner, the Department was permitted to offer evidence regarding the Petitioner's premium history (both the amounts due and the amounts actually paid) for the entire period of the Petitioner's employment with the State of Florida, a period which runs from May 1978 until October 1988. At the formal hearing the Department of Administration presented the testimony of one witness and offered several exhibits, all of which were received. The Petitioner did not present any evidence, but did present oral argument on his own behalf. The parties were allowed 10 days from November 3, 1988, within which to file their post-hearing submissions with the Hearing Officer. The Department of Administration timely filed Proposed Findings Of Fact. Those findings are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order. The Petitioner did not file any post-hearing submission.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the formal hearing, I make the following findings of fact. From May 1, 1978, until August 1, 1978, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-insurance Plan. From November 1, 1978, until November 1, 1985, the Petitioner requested and received individual coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From November 1, 1985, until the date of the hearing, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From May 1, 198, until July 1, 1984, the Petitioner was a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .25 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .25 full-time equivalent position. From July 1, 1984, until at least the date of the hearing, the Petitioner has been a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .20 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .20 full-time equivalent position. During the period beginning May 1, 1988, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals S1,116.36. 1/ During the period beginning March 1, 1986, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $861.74. During the thirteen-month period beginning with September 1986 and ending with (but including) September 1987, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $258.36.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order to the following effect: Finding the Petitioner to be in debt to the State of Florida in the amount of $258.36 by reason of underpayment of premiums during the period of September 1986 through September 1987. Providing that the Petitioner's health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan will be cancelled unless within thirty (30) days following the entry of the final order the Petitioner either pays the full amount of $258.36 or enters into an installment payment program consistent with Rule 22K-1.049(1)(a)2., Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Aurelio Durana has been employed with the Department of Administration continuously since 1979. He enrolled in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self-Insurance Plan before the period in dispute and had maintained individual coverage until August 1, 1980. Alina Durana, Petitioner's spouse, was employed by the Department of State from 1977 until her resignation on March 9, 1981. From September 9, 1980, through March 9, 1981, Alina Durana was on maternity leave without pay from her position at the Department of State. This maternity leave expired March 9, 1981 (Exhibit 2). Alina Durana had enrolled in the Group Health Insurance Plan from the beginning of her employment and maintained individual coverage until August 1, 1980. Effective August 1, 1980, Petitioner and his spouse elected family coverage, entitling them to a State contribution covering the entire premium. On Application for Multiple Contributions dated 1 July 1980 (Exhibit 8), Petitioner agreed to be responsible for any underpayment of premium resulting from his wife's ineligibility for a State contribution and agreed that any such underpayment should be deducted from any salary due him. Under the State Health Insurance program the agency for whom the employee worked contributes one-half of the family premium of $69.96 per month. Since both Petitioner and his wife were working for the State, each agency contributed $34.98 per month, thereby covering the entire premium. The agencies contribute this sum to the trust fund from which medical claims of employees are paid. When an employee ceases to be on the agency's payroll the agency stops this contribution to the fund and is supposed to notify the Department of Administration so pay adjustments to employees' pay can be made if necessary. When Mrs. Durana commenced her leave without pay on September 9, 1980, the Department of State failed to notify the Department of Administration that they were no longer contributing $34.98 per month to the Durana family health plan. Had they done so, the Department of Administration would have notified Durana that he would have $34.98 deducted from his pay each month if he desired to remain in the program. In September 1981 Petitioner notified the Department of Administration Personnel Office that health insurance premiums were not being deducted from his pay. Thereafter, Respondent learned of the departure of Mrs. Durana from the Department of State payroll in September 1980 and made claim against Durana for $316.14 for underpayment of premiums from the period the Department of State had not contributed to the fund and no premiums were paid by Petitioner. During the period Mrs. Durana was not on the payroll and the Department of State was contributing nothing to the trust fund, no claims were submitted by Durana for medical costs. However, during this period Petitioner was included in the list of beneficiaries of the State Health Insurance Plan and medical bills submitted by him would have been paid by the administrator of the trust fund.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a health insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Michael Halloran, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a health insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Life Insurance Company (NSLIC) and Transport Life Insurance Company (TLIC). He was also under contract with Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida until that firm terminated his agency appointment on May 5, 1989. This proceeding involves the sale by respondent of various health insurance policies to four customers in January and February 1989. In 1987, Raymond H. Koester, a Largo resident, purchased from respondent a supplemental Medicare policy for both him and his wife. Their first policy was issued by American Integrity. A year later, respondent persuaded the Koesters to replace that policy with one issued by Garden State Insurance Company on the ground the latter policy represented an "improvement" over their existing policy. On January 10, 1989 respondent met with the Koesters for the purpose of selling them new health insurance coverage. During their meeting, respondent advised the Koesters that a new NSLIC policy would provide unlimited custodial and home health care, a type of coverage desired by the Koesters. Relying upon respondent's representation, the Koesters agreed to purchase two new policies. They filled out an application and paid Halloran $2,628 which was the premium for the first year. When the application was completed, respondent answered "no" to the question of whether the new policies were intended to replace existing coverage. This was a false representation. In June 1989 the Koesters learned that they had a problem with their new policies. This advice was conveyed to them by petitioner's investigator who advised them that the policies sold by Halloran loran did not provide any custodial or home health care benefits. Had the Koesters known this, they would not have purchased the insurance. On January 18, 1989 respondent visited Grace Miller, an elderly resident of Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. At that time Miller had an existing policy in force since 1983 which provided supplemental Medicare coverage. Respondent advised Miller that her existing coverage was inadequate and that more coverage was needed. More specifically, Halloran represented that a new NSLIC policy would supplement her basic Medicare coverage and increase her overall health insurance coverage. Based on that representation, Miller agreed to purchase a replacement policy issued by NSLIC. As it turned out, the policy sold to Miller was of little or no value to a Medicare recipient, such as Miller, and simply filled in the gaps on a major medical policy. Had Miller known this to begin with, she would not have purchased the policy. Respondent also persuaded Miller to purchase a long-term care policy from TLIC. She allowed respondent to fill out the application using information from her old policy. Without telling Miller, respondent misrepresented on the application her date of birth as December 2, 1921 when in fact she was born on December 2, 1911, or ten years earlier. By doing this, Halloran was able to reduce Miller's premium from $1,159.92 to $441.72. Had Miller known that she was responsible for paying a much higher premium, she would not have purchased the policy. On February 25, 1989 respondent accepted another check from Miller in the amount of $773.00 for an unknown reason. At about the same time, respondent submitted to NSLIC an application for a medical-surgical expense policy dated the same date purportedly executed by Miller In fact, Miller had not executed the policy and her signature was forged. NSLIC declined to issue a new policy to Miller since she already had a policy of that type in effect. On January 20, 1989 respondent visited Gertrude Simms, an elderly resident of Fort Myers. Simms desired to purchase a hospital expense insurance policy with a provision for dental insurance coverage. Simms desired such coverage because she had a medical condition that required her to have her teeth cleaned frequently to avoid an infection. Respondent was aware of this condition. Nonetheless, Halloran prepared an application with NSLIC for a limited medical-surgical expense insurance policy which did not provide any dental coverage. Respondent accepted a $1,100 check from Simms which he represented to her was the first year's premium. In fact, the first year's premium was only $506. Although respondent was supposed to return to Simms' home to explain the policy provisions, he never returned. At about this same time, TLIC received an application on behalf of Simms for a long-term care insurance policy bearing the signature of respondent as agent. However, Simms had no knowledge of the application and did not wish to purchase such a policy. The information contained in the TLIC application misrepresented Simms' age so that the premium was lower than it should have been. Although TLIC issued a policy and sent it to respondent, Halloran never delivered it to Simms. On February 1, 1989 respondent visited Velma Sonderman, who resided in Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. She had become acquainted with respondent through Grace Miller, who is referred to in finding of fact 4. Sonderman was then covered by a supplemental medicare insurance policy issued by United American Medicare. According to Sonderman, respondent gave a "snow job" and represented he could sell her better coverage through NSLIC. Sonderman agreed to purchase a new policy for supplemental medicare coverage to replace her existing policy and signed an application filled in by respondent. However, the application submitted by respondent was for a NSLIC limited benefit health insurance policy rather than the medicare supplement insurance policy Sonderman believed she was purchasing. Respondent also convinced Sonderman to purchase a long-term nursing home care policy issued by TLIC. When filling out the application on her behalf, but without telling Sonderman, respondent misrepresented Sonderman's birth date as July 11, 1915 instead of the correct date of July 11, 1911. By doing this, Sonderman's premium was reduced from $999.36 to $599.04 per year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's license as a health insurance agent be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 4 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4 day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-3. Substantially used in finding of fact 1. 4-17. Substantially used in findings of fact 4, 5 and 6. 18-29. Substantially used in findings of fact 9 and 10. 30-33. Substantially used in findings of fact 2 and 3. 34-45. Substantially used in findings of fact 7 and 8. 46. Substantially adopted in finding of fact l. Copies furnished to: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James A. Bossart, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Mr. Michael Halloran 2519 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, FL 34621 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire Department of Insurance Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Respondent's proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-149.022(3), which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Before that issue may be reached, however, it is necessary to determine whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact The Financial Services Commission ("Commission") is a four-member collegial body consisting of the governor and cabinet. The Office of Insurance Regulation ("Office") is a structural unit of the Commission. Giving rise to this case, the Office initiated rulemaking and made recommendations to the Commission concerning an amendment to rule 69O-149.022, which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, titled "Consumer Notice [Regarding] The Impact of Federal Health Care Reform on Health Plan Costs" ("Form 2112"). Whenever the Commission or the Office engages in rulemaking, the members of the Commission serve as the agency head. The Commission thus has the ultimate responsibility for approving and adopting the proposed rule. CHAIN is a nonprofit corporation which operates solely within the state of Florida. CHAIN is subject to the oversight of a voluntary board of directors. As a health-care advocacy organization, CHAIN is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and derives its income primarily from grants and contributions. CHAIN provides services to low- and moderate-income individuals who lack health insurance coverage or perceive their coverage to be unaffordable or inadequate. CHAIN provides health insurance purchased through Florida's small-group health insurance market to each of its five full-time employees. Greg Mellowe is a full-time employee of CHAIN who receives health insurance coverage through such employment. During the 2013 regular session, the Florida Legislature passed a bill, which the governor approved, enacting section 627.410(9), Florida Statutes. This section requires that insurers provide to policyholders of individual and small-group nongrandfathered plans a notice that describes the estimated impact of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA")——popularly and more commonly known as Obamacare——on monthly premiums.1/ An insurer that issues a nongrandfathered plan must give this notice one time——when the policy is issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2014——on a form established by rule of the Commission. (A "nongrandfathered" plan is a health insurance plan that must comply with all of Obamacare's requirements. For ease of reference, such plans will be referred to as "compliant plans.") Having been directed to act, the Office commenced rulemaking to establish the form of the notice to be sent to persons insured under compliant, individual and small-group plans, eventually proposing to adopt Form 2112. The Commission approved this form at a hearing on August 6, 2013. Form 2112 fills a single, one-sided page2/ and looks like this: CHAIN will receive the Obamacare notice when it renews its small-group health insurance plan, or purchases a new plan, on or after January 1, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance should discipline the Respondent on charges contained in the Administrative Complaint filed June 1, 1994. The Administrative Complaint charges that the Respondent failed to accurately disclose certain aspects of the true physical condition of two applicants for health insurance and failed to disclose to the applicants the existence of certain deductibles and a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Blair John Reuther, is eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as an insurance agent. At the times referred to in this case, the Respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (National States). Some time prior to April, 1993, National States solicited health insurance from Earl and Jessie Lane, an elderly couple who lived in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and invited them to return a postcard in order to express their interest in more information about health insurance policies National States had to offer. They sent in the postcard, and their names were referred to the Respondent. Without an additional contact with the Lanes, the Respondent went to their home during the week preceding April 3, 1993, and asked to be permitted to talk with them about National States health insurance policies in which they had expressed an interest. The Lanes invited him in, and the Respondent discussed their existing coverage. At the time, the Lanes had a Level A Medicare Supplement policy, which carried the standard deductibles for such a policy. After some additional discussion, the Respondent promised to return with his proposals and with applications. On Saturday, April 3, 1993, the Respondent returned to the Lane home and proposed to sell each of them a National States Level A Medicare Supplement policy and a limited benefit medical expense policy. It is found, contrary to the Lanes' testimony, that the Respondent did not tell the Lanes that the National States policies would "cover everything," that the Respondent told the Lanes that the National States Medicare Supplement policies had deductibles (just like their previous Level A Medicare Supplement policies), and that there was a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions under the National States limited benefit medical expense policies. (There was no waiting period for preexisting conditions under any of the Medicare Supplement policies.) After discussing the proposal, the Lanes decided to apply for the National States policies being proposed by the Respondent. It is found that the Respondent went over the applications for the National States policies with the Lanes and filled out the applications in accordance with the information given to him by the Lanes. As to the medical questions on the applications, it is found that the Respondent read the questions aloud and recorded the answers given to him by the Lanes. Specifically, question 5 on the Medicare Supplement applications asked, in pertinent part: Does the Applicant have or had within the past 5 years any of the following: (Underline condition) Tumor, cancer, malignancy or growth of any kind? * * * c. High or low blood pressure, varicose veins or disorder of the heart or circulatory system? * * * Amputation, because of sickness, paraplegia, disease of the back or spine? Disease of the rectum or intestine, stomach, kidney, prostate, urinary bladder, liver, gall bladder? Question 6.b. asked, "Has the Applicant been confined in a hospital in the last five years? The Lanes answered, "no," to all of the questions set out in the preceding paragraph. They also signed the applications, which state in part: "I agree that all answers above are true and complete to the best of my knowledge." Effective April 14, 1993, National States issued the limited benefit medical expense policies for which the Lanes had applied; the Medicare Supplement policies were issued with effective dates of April 18, 1993. All four policies were delivered on April 22, 1993. The Respondent returned to the Lane home on April 30, 1993, to go over the policies with the Lanes and answer any questions they had. During the review of the policies after delivery, the Lanes never expressed to the Respondent any dissatisfaction with any of the policies. To the contrary, they both signed a statement that they had reviewed their policies with the Respondent, who had explained them in full. Jessie Lane contends that she told the Respondent that she "had had a heart problem, a small heart problem." She testified that, at the time of her deposition, she had a pace maker but that, at the time of the application, she "wasn't that bad . . . I was just having--missing heart beats." She also testified that she has: "a light case of arthritis. . . . Not bad." She also testified that she had been hospitalized during the five years preceding the applications: "That's when I had my heart problem too." Earl Lane contends that he told the Respondent that he had a back injury that required hospitalization several times, but he did not testify that he told the Respondent that he was hospitalized, or that he continued to have back problems, within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had a swollen prostate that required surgery, but he did not testify that the surgery was within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had skin cancer "at one time," but that it "was successfully treated" and "didn't amount to nothing." He did not testify that the cancer or the treatment was within the five years preceding the application. He contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he had a "rupture," but not that he had it within the five years preceding the application. He testified during his deposition: "I've been in the hospital in the last five years." Later during his deposition, he was asked: "How many times have you been in the hospital in the last five years?" He answered: "Just once, I guess, before he was here." He did not clearly testify that he had been hospitalized within the five years preceding the application. Earl Lane also contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he told the Respondent that he had varicose veins, but he did not testify that they were not surgically removed or that he still had them within the five years preceding the application. The Lanes also filed a complaint listing other alleged violations by the Respondent: (1) that the Respondent misrepresented that the National States policies covered dental and eyeglasses; (2) that these coverages duplicated policies the Lanes already had; (3) that the National States policies were more expensive than policies the Lanes already had; (4) that the National States policies did not pay skilled nursing; and (5) that the Respondent tricked the Lanes into signing a bank draft agreement. The Department chose not to charge those alleged violations, presumably either because there was insufficient evidence that they were true or because they were not violations. It appears that someone helped the Lanes draft their requests for refunds from National States and their initial list of complaints against the Respondent. Although the evidence was not clear who helped, it may well have been the insurance agent whose Medicare Supplement policies were replaced by National States and who was trying to recover the business. In response to the Lanes' request, dated May 7, 1993, to cancel the policies, National States cancelled the Medicare Supplement policies as if the request had been made within the 30 day cancellation period and refunded all but 5 percent of the premium, which was retained as a processing fee. In their cancellation request, the Lanes' alleged: "Our health conditions were not accurately written on the applications by agent Blair Reuther and we will not take any chances on not being paid on future medical bills for misrepresentations by this agent." Nonetheless, National States refused to cancel the limited benefit medical expense policies. They remained in full force and effect until they lapsed a year later for failure to pay the premium when next due. There is no evidence that National States investigated the Lanes' true health status. During the year that the National States limited benefit medical expense policies were in effect, National States paid out more in claims under the policies than the Lanes paid in premiums.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated; however, the Respondent was responding to a "lead" given to him by his employer after the Lanes returned a postcard expressing interest. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (It was not clear from the evidence what the Respondent was told.) Accepted and incorporated; however, it is not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent should have answered the medical history questions on the application differently based on the information given to him by the applicants. First sentence, rejected as not proven. Second sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven that there were health conditions that should have been disclosed; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Last sentence, accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Blair John Reuther 8535 Blind Pass Drive, #202 Treasure Island, Florida 33706 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
