The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex, by sexual harassment, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1) and/or (2), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult female, and as such, is a member of a protected class. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to protect the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and to rehabilitate offenders, pursuant to Section 20.315, Florida Statutes. In August 2007, Petitioner applied for a job as a correctional officer with the Florida Department of Corrections through the Charlotte Correctional Institution (the Facility) located in Punta Gorda, Florida. Petitioner's contact person during the application process was Recruitment Sergeant Dennis Britton. Petitioner was initially interviewed by Sergeant Britton. At the conclusion of the interview, Petitioner was about to leave when Britton grabbed her by the shoulder, pulled her to him and bent down to her face in a kissing position. Petitioner put her hands on his chest, pushed him away and left. On other occasions during the interview process, specifically on August 21, 2007, and October 1, 2007, Briton coerced Petitioner to come into his office at the Facility and proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton would grope, grab, and forcibly kiss Petitioner against her will. Throughout the recruitment process, both Britton and Petitioner exchanged e-mails of a professional and personal nature. On or about September 10, 2007, Warden Adro Johnson approved Petitioner for employment with the DOC. Warden Johnson, not Sergeant Britton, made the hiring decisions at Charlotte Correctional Institution. November 30, 2007, was Petitioner's first day of employment at the Facility. On November 30, 2007, Petitioner was again compelled to appear at Britton's office where he proceeded to physically and sexually assault Petitioner. Britton groped, grabbed, and forcibly kissed Petitioner against her will. On several other occasions between November 2007 and March 2008, Britton would summon Petitioner to his office and proceed to make sexual advances on her against her will. In December 2007, Petitioner completed New Employee Orientation. A component of the New Employee Orientation is training with regard to Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and, specifically, the Sexual Harassment policy. Petitioner completed the computer-assisted training on sexual harassment in December 2007. In addition, new employees are routinely provided with hard-copy pamphlets on sexual harassment. Respondent's sexual harassment policy is also posted at various locations at Charlotte Correctional Institution. At no time during this period did Petitioner complain, verbally or in writing, to her supervisor or anyone else at the Facility. On March 14, 2008, Petitioner started the correctional officer training academy at the Facility. On March 17, 2008, Petitioner filled out an incident report stating she had been sexually harassed by Sergeant Dennis Britton. The report was sent up the chain of command, and Warden Johnson immediately removed Sergeant Britton from his position as the recruitment sergeant and reassigned him to a position on the compound. An investigation into the allegations was started on March 19, 2008, by Respondent's Office of the Inspector General. The investigation was led by Inspector Daryl J. McCasland of the Office of the Inspector General. The findings of the investigation were that Britton violated Section 784.03, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-208.033(22) (Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee). On April 9, 2008, while the investigation was still pending, Sergeant Britton submitted his resignation, effective May 1, 2008. Britton admitted to the accusations of sexual battery against Petitioner to the warden of the Facility. Britton was removed from the Facility on or about April 9, 2008. Petitioner testified that on at least five separate occasions between April 23, 2008, and May 23, 2008, Respondent allowed Britton to return into the Facility and granted Britton access into the restricted-access inner-compound where Petitioner worked so that he was able to continue to harass Petitioner. However, this testimony was uncorroborated and deemed unreliable. At no time during Petitioner's employment did Sergeant Britton supervise Petitioner or work directly with her. He did not discipline her, set her schedule, or assign her duties. From November 30, 2007, until March 14, 2008, Petitioner worked inside the secure perimeter, while Britton worked as the recruitment sergeant outside the secure perimeter in the administration building at the Facility. Petitioner was in the academy beginning March 14, 2008, and Sergeant Britton had no supervisory or training responsibilities over officers in the training academy. Petitioner was continually in the correctional officer academy from the time she filed her initial complaint on March 17, 2008, until Britton's resignation became effective on May 1, 2008. While in the academy, Petitioner was continually with other trainees and other instructors. Sergeant Britton never made any additional sexual advances or had any conversation with Petitioner following her complaint on March 17, 2008. Inspector Daryl McCasland substantiated the complaint against Sergeant Britton for battery, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and failure to follow written procedures. The inspector forwarded his results to the Office of the State Attorney in Punta Gorda which declined to prosecute. Respondent acted in a prompt and reasonable manner to stop the harassment and address it once it was known. Petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care in the reporting of the harassment. Petitioner presented no evidence on the issue of retaliation. Petitioner presented no evidence of quantifiable damages. Her testimony was that she felt harassed and physically upset by the conduct of Britton and that she felt harassed and physically upset by her fellow officers after her complaint become known, but no proof of an adverse employment action was presented. Given the lack of evidence to support Petitioner's allegations, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issued a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sojourn Hospitality-Naples Bay Resort, discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner, Richard Puccini, on the basis of his sex, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The record is comprised solely of Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 and 2, which constitute inadmissible hearsay for which no exception to the hearsay rule has been established.3/ Because no testimony or other admissible evidence exists, as to which such hearsay could be used to explain or otherwise supplement, there can be no findings of fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order in this proceeding finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his sex or retaliating against him and dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent violated section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioners on the basis of their sex with respect to the provision of housing services or facilities; and (2) whether Respondent violated 760.37 by unlawfully harassing or intimidating Petitioners on the basis of their sex in the exercise of their protected housing rights.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioners are gay females, both retirees, who own property and reside at 5305 Saddlebag Lake Road, No. 66 Silversides Street, Lake Wales. The property is located in the Saddlebag Lake Resort, a gated adult recreation vehicle community, which consists of approximately 800 units or lots and has private roads, a private sewer system, swimming pool, and community center. More than half of the current residents are women, and some residents are gay. Respondent is the homeowners' association for the community. Its primary function is to run the day-to-day business required to maintain the common areas. Each unit/lot owner is a member of the Association and pays dues or assessments, which are used to maintain and operate the common facilities. The Association uses a professional property management company to manage the property. The Association does not receive federal funding. The Association is overseen by a nine-person Board elected by all community members, three of whom were women when this dispute arose. The Association writes rules and regulations for the community. The parties have stipulated that the Complaint was filed with the FCHR on November 12, 2015, and an Amended Complaint was filed on January 28, 2016. By law, this means that only those acts that occurred within the preceding 365 days of each filing can be considered. See § 760.32(2), Fla. Stat. Although the Complaints rely on statutes that prohibit sex discrimination, Petitioners contend that sexual orientation discrimination is per se "sex discrimination" within the meaning of the law. The chronology of events which led to the filing of the Complaints is summarized below. Petitioners first resided in the community as renters from November 2011 until April 2012. In March 2012, they purchased a lot with an existing mobile home. In December 2013, Petitioners decided to purchase a new mobile home. The existing home was removed in February 2014 and replaced with a new one in March 2014. A dispute between the parties arose concerning whether the porch on the new home complied with the Association's building restrictions. There is no credible evidence that the Association's decision to enforce what it believed were valid building restrictions was based on Petitioners' sexual orientation. When the dispute could not be informally resolved, the Association filed a lawsuit against Petitioners seeking a court order requiring Petitioners to comply with applicable building restrictions. Petitioners countersued on the grounds the Association's governing documents had expired. Until that time, it is fair to say that Petitioners and other residents in the community had a harmonious relationship. In fact, the record shows that respondents Jensen and Haven were good friends with Petitioners and sometimes socialized together. As a result of the dispute, an acrimonious relationship developed between the parties. From that point forward, Petitioners blamed unlawful discriminatory animus on the part of residents, Board members, and employees as the reason for virtually every action they considered objectionable. During the following months, Petitioners lodged various complaints with the Sheriff's Office and sought a stalking injunction against the property manager in circuit court. The complaints were determined to be unfounded by law enforcement and the injunction was denied. In October 2014, Tomayko wrote a letter to the Board complaining about "neighbors go[ing] against neighbors creating casualties among themselves," but she did not mention any specific individuals or incidents or suggest that sexual orientation was the source of this conflict. See Resp. Ex. 14. In February 2015, while the lawsuit was still pending, she wrote a letter to a revitalization proponent complaining about a series of incidents, all stemming from the property dispute. See Resp. Ex. 21. No claim was made that discriminatory animus was the underlying cause of the incidents. For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, incidents occurring more than a year before the Complaints were filed are time-barred. For the purpose of making a complete record, however, the incidents are summarized below. Only two allegations are lodged against Jensen, the current president of the Board, and a Board member since 2012. First, it is alleged that while the building restriction dispute was being discussed at a closed Board meeting on February 27, 2014, Jensen made a derogatory statement about Petitioners' sexual orientation. However, Petitioners did not attend the meeting, and repeated only what they were told by a third party, who did not testify at hearing. Second, Austin testified that while attending a band concert with Jensen in April 2014, he called Tomayko "evil," and Austin assumed this referred to Petitioners' lifestyle. Austin also testified that Jensen told her that Petitioners "will have to answer to God for [their] lifestyle." Jensen denied these assertions, and his testimony is accepted as being more credible. Ironically, Austin admitted at hearing that she never personally heard Jensen make any discriminatory remarks based on a person's sex or sexual orientation. On February 28, 2014, while discussing the property dispute, Board member Braden, now deceased, said words to the effect that people like Petitioners move into a community just to do this. Although Petitioners ascribe a different meaning to the words, there is no evidence that Braden's statement was referring to Petitioners' sexual orientation. More than likely, he was referring to Petitioners' assertion, unpopular with most residents, that the Association's governing documents had expired. In March 2014,1/ while playing a game of pool, Braden stated in the presence of witness Park that the property dispute might have been "sorted out" were it not for Petitioners' lifestyle. There is no evidence that the statement was made in Braden's official capacity as a Board member. Other minor incidents included a police report of vandalism to Petitioners' property in June 2014, and a claim by Tomayko in October 2014 that a Board member almost struck her with his automobile while she was standing in the road. There is no evidence to connect these incidents with the charges in the Complaints. The Charges The initial Complaint alleges that, on the basis of their sexual orientation, Board members or employees discriminated against Petitioners with respect to the provision of housing services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Amended Complaint adds a statutory allegation that on the basis of their sexual orientation, Board members or employees unlawfully intimidated or threatened them in order to interfere with their exercise of protected housing rights. Both filings rely on the same underlying charges, which are based on acts occurring more than a year before the Complaints were filed, some that are undated, and some that occurred within the one-year period. Petitioners have requested compensation for medical bills and other damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Before she moved to Florida, Austin was diagnosed with lupus, an autoimmune disease. In October 2014, or more than a year before the Complaints were filed, and again in November 2014, she was hospitalized because of a flare up of her lupus. Austin says the flare up was due to stress caused by unlawful interactions with Board members or employees prior to the hospitalization. No medical testimony supports this charge, and all interactions would have occurred more than a year before the Complaints were filed. Assuming arguendo the charge is true and time-barred events can be considered, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the interactions were the result of the acrimonious relationship between the parties that arose when the new home was installed, and not because of Petitioners' sexual orientation. In January 2015, Petitioners and the Board jointly sponsored a town hall-type meeting to discuss their lawsuit, a second lawsuit involving another resident, and the revitalization of the Association's governing documents extinguished by the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA).2/ Without revitalization, the Association could not enforce restrictions that had been in effect for many years. Because Petitioners were concerned there might be an incident at the meeting, they contacted the Polk County Sheriff's Office to request assistance. Deputies from that office attended the meeting, encountered no problems, and left without incident. Austin testified that during the meeting, she encountered "hostility" from other participants and had a verbal argument with one Board member, but no derogatory comments were directed at her by any attendee. After the meeting, a picnic was held, which was attended by Petitioners. The revitalization issue was a significant one and caused a split in the residents of the community. One Board member estimated that around 90 percent of the residents supported revitalization, while only ten percent opposed it. In light of the pending lawsuit between the parties, many in the community believed that Petitioners opposed revitalization. In fact, Petitioners described the divide on the issue as "us" versus "them." On February 18, 2015, proponents of revitalization sponsored a parade. Approximately 250 golf carts participated in the event, as well as a number of residents on foot, all in support of revitalization. Many carried signs urging a yes vote on the issue. Tomayko testified that when the large parade crowd passed her home, horns were blown and the participants yelled and booed. Because of the noise, she could not understand what they were saying. She did hear "go to hell" one time, but she has no idea who made the comment and acknowledged no comments of a sexual nature were made. She admitted that the parade participants probably thought Petitioners were opposed to revitalization and this may have prompted the jeers. Tomayko testified she was "frightened" by the crowd. However, Petitioners were invited by parade participants to a picnic later that day, which they attended. At the picnic, Austin became involved in a verbal argument with a female Board member, who Austin says called her "evil." During the encounter, Austin grabbed the Board member by her shoulders and began violently shaking her. The Board member filed criminal charges against Austin, who was arrested for violating section 784.03(1)(a)1., a first degree misdemeanor. The victim later agreed to withdraw her complaint and the charges were dropped. Austin acknowledged that people in the community might be wary of associating with her after finding out about the assault. While at home on the evening of February 20, 2015, Tomayko heard someone trying to open her door, and then observed someone running down the stairs with a flashlight. That individual was never identified, and Petitioners did not report the incident to the police. Around 3:00 a.m. on February 21, 2015, a wooden cross was set on fire in Petitioners' yard. Apparently believing that the Association had more resources than law enforcement in finding the culprit, Petitioners complained that the Association provided no assistance in discovering who was responsible, a "service" to which they were entitled. However, law enforcement was called and an investigation was conducted by multiple members of the Sheriff's office. The Association did not deny Petitioners a "service" by relying on law enforcement to find the culprit, rather than undertaking its own investigation. No suspect was identified and no charges were ever filed. Based on speculation, Austin believes a female resident, not a Board member or employee, was responsible for the cross burning, but there is no evidence that any Board member, employee, or even a resident participated in, or had knowledge about, the incident. Both Petitioners say they felt intimidated and frightened by the incident. On February 27, 2015, the Board, Petitioners, and another resident with a pending lawsuit mediated a global settlement of their lawsuits. As a part of the settlement, the Association agreed to pay Petitioners' costs in their lawsuit and to terminate the employment of its property manager. A condition in the agreement required that Petitioners not oppose revitalization. Austin testified that after the mediation, two neighbors, Bob Amick and Terry Haven, occasionally stood in Amick's porch across the street "yelling stuff at us" and laughing. Neither was a Board member or employee at the time, and the content of the "stuff" being yelled is unknown. Tomayko was one of a group of 16 residents, consisting of four males and 12 females, who regularly played pinochle at the community center every Thursday. No player was a Board member or employee. The card game is a voluntary endeavor by pinochle enthusiasts and an activity over which the Association has no control. The Association merely handles or assists with reservations for the use of the clubhouse, and nothing more. A female member of the group decided to move the game scheduled on April 6, 2015, to a private home. She notified every member except Tomayko, who arrived at the community center that day expecting to join her group. Tomayko considers that action to be a denial of a "service" available to all other residents, and contends the change in location was made because of her sexual orientation. No credible evidence supports this assertion. While attending a pinochle game on another occasion, Tomayko testified that when she sat down at a table, a male player got up and left. No derogatory statements of a sexual nature were made. Tomayko regularly attended a "Koffee Klatch," a group of residents who met periodically for coffee and conversation. Like the card games, the Klatch is something over which the Association has no control. In April 2015, she sat down at a table and a "couple [of] people got up and walked away." Another unnamed female "got up and left," presumably to sit elsewhere. Tomayko acknowledged, however, that no derogatory comments of a sexual nature were directed towards her by any person at the Klatch. Austin testified that around "once a week" from November 2014 until March 2015, Terry Haven, who lives catty- corner from Petitioners and also worked as a security guard during that period of time, yelled at Petitioners while driving past their home in a golf cart. Austin acknowledged that she would yell sarcastic things back to him. She says Haven sometimes used profanity and called them "dykes." However, no specific dates were provided, and it is highly unlikely the name-calling occurred while he was working his midnight shift. There is no evidence that Petitioners reported Haven's use of the word "dykes" to the Board. Tomayko testified that Haven would purposely drive by their home and cause the golf cart engine to backfire. On one occasion, he threatened to poison their dogs. She also stated that in December 2015, he stood across the street and took some photographs of their home, and this upset her. No evidence was presented that linked this conduct to the charges in the Complaints. There is no evidence that Petitioners were treated differently because they are women. Other gay persons reside in the community, both male and female. There is no evidence that any other gay residents have been subjected to discriminatory treatment because of their sexual orientation. In sum, the record shows a few isolated instances in 2014 and 2015 where actions by residents might arguably be perceived by Petitioners as being objectionable and based on discriminatory animus. The more persuasive evidence supports a finding that these actions were motivated by Petitioners' opposition to revitalization, the pending lawsuit, or personality conflicts, and not because they were gay. Even assuming arguendo the actions were based on discriminatory animus, which they were not, the FCHR has no authority to dictate how neighbors choose to treat one another. And there is nothing in the law that imposes a duty on a homeowner association to intervene in a neighbor-to-neighbor dispute. Assuming that Haven called Petitioners "dykes" on several occasions between November 2014 and March 2015, this more than likely occurred when he was off-duty and not in his capacity as an employee. All other incidents were attributable to the lawsuit, revitalization, or personality disputes and were not based on Petitioners' sexual orientation. Damages To support their damages claim, Petitioners submitted Composite Exhibit 1, mostly hearsay, consisting of 66 pages of Austin's personal notes; medical, dental, and drug bills; housekeeping charges; veterinary bills for Austin's dog; and mileage charges. The bills total $15,950.01, mainly those not covered by insurance. Austin contends Association-induced stress was the cause of all of these charges and required her (and her dog) to seek medical and dental treatment and other services to alleviate a flare-up of lupus, depression, and other ailments triggered by the Association's actions. Some charges, not distinguished from others, were incurred before November 12, 2014. Notably, there is no credible evidence to establish a nexus between any of the bills and the acts of Board members or employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2016.
The Issue Whether petitioner suffered sexual harassment for which respondent is answerable, or whether, on account of her sex, respondent discriminated against her by paying her unequal wages, or whether, in terminating her employment, respondent retaliated against her on account of statutorily protected activity?
Findings Of Fact In April, of 1982, the year after her 19-year marriage to a Mr. Powell, whose surname she originally kept, came to an end, petitioner Gloria Patricia Hord, as she has been known since her remarriage in August of 1984, began work for respondent Bell Aerospace Textron, which has since become the Textron Marine Systems Division of Textron, Inc. (Textron). A defense contractor that builds landing craft air cushion vehicles and trains Navy personnel to operate them, Textron employs perhaps 130 persons in Panama City alone. Textron has a written policy against sexual harassment by or of its employees. As Textron's director of logistics at its Panama City facility, George Gust Alepakos, told the petitioner she was hired on April 3, 1982. Robert L. Ormsby and Albert Eugene "Bud" Small, the supervisor of inventory control who, as her immediate supervisor, shared an office with her when she began, had already interviewed her. Bell hired her as a clerk, general class III in labor grade N-6. The duties of general class III clerks are: Under general supervision, performs a variety of clerical work, where there is individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of important records and where decisions within the limits of policies or rules are required. Performs duties such as or similar to the following: supervises and works with a small group of clerks; sets up and maintains record systems of a widely varying nature, including secret or confidential material or information; prepares and issues reports as required; contacts other personnel as necessary in maintaining accurate records; reads reports, correspondence, publications, etc., and abstracts therefrom information pertaining to a particular subject; may perform miscellaneous duties relate dot office work, such as filing, operating various machines, etc. (sic). Respondent's Exhibit No. 23. According to Bell's job description, "demonstrated supervisory ability", is a desirable qualification for general class III clerks. In addition to processing receipts and keeping inventory logs, Patty Powell, as her co-workers then called her, typed and did other secretarial chores for Textron. She worked in a trailer which housed other offices and other workers, including Carol Bjorgan, Robert L. Ormsby, Monica Mitchell, Mike Pate, Mike Smith, Betty Brandon, and George Alepakos, to whom Mr. Small reported. Mr. Alepakos was in the adjoining office. Witnesses described Mr. Alepakos as personable, fun loving, happy go lucky, warm, friendly, outgoing, talkative, loud, sometimes grouchy, displaying a temper at times without being a screamer, dedicated, conscientious, a hard worker and a firm manager. He looked at the hearing to be in his sixties. The time Ms. Powell told him he reminded her of her grandfather, he said she had hurt his feelings. One day as Ms. Powell, then 36 years old, was typing, Mr. Alepakos stood behind her and placed his hands on her shoulders, watching her finish a memorandum. Mr. Alepakos invited Ms. Powell to lunch on several occasions. He regularly took employees in his group to lunch, both male and female, individually and in groups. Conversations at lunch were "business-related" and "very professional" at first. The third or fourth time they ate lunch together, however, Mr. Alepakos professed his love for Ms. Powell. Thereafter, when Mr. Small left the office, Mr. Alepakos would stop in. Within a week of declaring himself at lunch, he said, "I really mean it." He told her she would grow to love him, would learn to, and began leaving notes for her, typically like the one that said, "I love you," signed "George ." She "tried to laugh it off," questioning his sincerity. He was married, and she had a boyfriend. Beginning in the summer of 1982, he asked her almost daily for lunch. He telephoned to inquire, "Have I told you today that I love you?" Sometimes she went to lunch with him during this period, but more often she declined. He promised to behave if she accepted his invitations for lunch, but, in Ms. Powell's view, he welshed on these promises. She had mixed feelings about George Alepakos. She discussed with Carol Bjorgan the possibility of a relationship with him. By this time, her boyfriend Chip McDill had left her in the lurch. It would be nice to have someone older to take care of her, she mused aloud; and she felt she would be better off materially. Never once did she complain to Carol Bjorgan about Mr. Alepakos' romantic interest in her. She left him notes. One note, signed "Patty" and written on notepaper depicting two smiling bees among azalea blossoms, read, "Have a wonderful vacation, then hurry back." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One night she and Carol were drinking during "happy hour." Saying she wanted to talk to George, she telephoned his home, but hung up when his wife answered. She sometimes seemed to boast about Mr. Alepakos' taking her to lunch, asking, "Guess who I'm going to lunch with?" At Peddlers Alley one night, Mlles. Hord and Bjorgan met Mr. Alepakos for drinks. When they arrived, Ms. Hord playfully pretended to sit in Mr. Alepakos' lap, and said to Ms. Bjorgan, "We can handle it from here." In December of 1982, both Mr. Alepakos and Ms. Powell attended a party at a bar or restaurant. Mr. Alepakos "didn't think much" of her going out with the 23-year old man who escorted her to the party, danced with her, kissed her while they were on the dance floor, and, later in the evening, wrestled with her in the back seat of an automobile parked outside the establishment. He felt that "it looked bad for the company." The next morning, he called her into his office, told her she had "fallen off [her] pedestal," and that somebody had said she had behaved like a slut. Over the Christmas holidays she was in the hospital, and afterwards visited her mother in Atlanta. Mr. Alepakos called her there at the number she had given him, to ask about her health and to learn when she was coming back to work. On her return she talked things over with Mr. Small, her immediate supervisor, although she never told him about Mr. Alepakos' touching her. He advised her to decline the luncheon invitations and avoid Mr. Alepakos as much as possible. He spoke to Mr. Ormsby about the matter, at her request. In deference to Ms. Powell, who asked that nobody say anything to Mr. Alepakos, Mr. Small spoke to Mr. Ormsby "off the record." At some point, Mr. Alepakos called on Ms. Powell at the apartment she had recently moved into at Panama City Beach. She had invited him. When he arrived he found her with her daughter and stayed only about 20 minutes. Eventually Patty Powell went herself to Mr. Ormsby, and Mr. Ormsby took the matter up with Clarence L. Forrest, then the vice-president in charge of Textron's Panama City operations. Messrs. Ormsby and Forrest decided to transfer Ms. Powell to a general secretarial and word processing assignment in "the training trailer." The transfer was "lateral" in the sense that neither Ms. Powell's official job description nor her labor grade changed. In her new situation, she was involved in the production of training manuals. Bell hired two other word processing clerks to assist in this effort, Diane Ansell and April Dawn Day. Ms. Powell had recommended both Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day. She helped train them when they began. Even after they had learned the ropes, she gave them work to do which she proofread afterwards. If she was out, Ms. Ansell would assume these duties. Ms. Powell wrote out evaluations for Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day, although she never signed them. She did once sign an overtime authorization form, but Mr. Forrest sent it back for Mr. Higgins' signature and resubmission. She assumed her new duties in February of 1983, but invitations to lunch and expressions of affection continued after the transfer. One afternoon, just after Ms. Powell left the office, Mr. Alepakos said to Diane Ansell, "I love that girl," referring to Ms. Powell. After she told Mr. Ormsby that Mr. Alepakos would not leave her be, Mr. Forrest instructed Mr. Alepakos to cease and desist from any activity involving Ms. Powell unrelated to professional requirements, and directed him to communicate with her, if at all, through third parties. During the ensuing eight or nine months, Mr. Alepakos avoided Ms. Powell entirely. He "went the other way around when he saw her coming." In the fall of 1983, however, they were both at an office party at the Long Glass. She grabbed his shirt and led him into another room, where she asked him why he had been avoiding her. According to a friend and co-worker, petitioner was not "an outward flirt," except when she drank. Encouraged by the evening's events, Mr. Alepakos resumed his attentions. He telephoned several times a day, unless he was angry, and they began lunching together again. At various times, she told him she was at the point of reconciliation with her ex-husband, that she was seeing a boyfriend, and that she was gay. But she accepted a good many of his luncheon invitations, which was enough to inspire him to several proposals of marriage. In November of 1983, Ms. Powell came to work early one morning and made her way in the still dark trailer to the word processing room. Suddenly Mr. Alepakos, whom she had not seen nor expected to be there, embraced her and tried to kiss her. When the lights came on, he said, "I'm sorry", and left. During this period, Ms. Powell worked under the immediate supervision of Frank Higgins, who left civilian employment with the Navy and began with Textron in August of 1983. In early December of that year, Ms. Powell spoke to Mr. Higgins about Mr. Alepakos. After a second conversation on the subject, on February 9, 1984, Mr. Higgins stated, in a "Memo For the Record": FOR BACKGROUND, PATTY IS AN EXTREMELY QUIET, SHY PERSON WITH A RATHER "FRAGILE" QUALITY. SHE IS A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL IN HER APPROACH TO HER JOB. SHE HAS NEVER APPEARED TO PROJECT (AVERT OR OTHERWISE) HER SEXUALITY AT WORK, DRESSES CONSERVATIVELY - AN IDEAL FEMALE WORKER IN TERMS OF NOT BEING INVOLVED TO ANY EXTENT WITH HER MALE CO- WORKERS OTHER THEN PROFESSIONALLY. SHE HAS NOT AND PROFESSES NO[T] TO WANT TO DATE ANYONE FROM WORK. GEORGE IS APPARENTLY "LEANING" ON HER AT WORK TO THE POINT SHE'S BECOMING EMOTIONALLY FRAZZLED OVER IT. HE PROFESSES TO BE IN LOVE AND "WANTS HER." GEORGE IS INSANELY JEALOUS OF HER BEING SURROUNDED BY ALL THESE MEN AND TOLD HER THAT DAVE STULTS, BOB NISSLEY AND MYSELF ARE OR MAY WANT TO BE ROMANTICALLY INVOLVED. HE CALLS HER SEVERAL TIMES SOME DAYS, SOMETIMES ASKING HER TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE "COMMENTS ARE MADE" TO HER. SHE IS AFRAID NOT TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE - APPARENTLY FEELS GEORGE IS A POWER BROKER AND IF SHE GETS HIM MAD, HE'LL TAKE IT OUT ON TRAINING BY NOT SUPPORTING OUR NEEDS. PATTY SAYS SHE HAS TRIED EVERY CONCEIVABLE APPROACH TO TELL GEORGE SHE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HIM AND HE'S ANNOYING HER & SHE WANTS IT STOPPED. YET HE REFUSES TO LEAVE HER ALONE. I TOLD HER THAT SHE NEEDS TO THREATEN HIM WITH HARASSMENT CHARGES & BE WILLING TO FOLLOW UP ON THEM TO THE BITTER END - IF GEO. KNEW SHE WAS SERIOUS AND HIS JOB WAS IN DANGER, I HOPE HE WOULD BE PRUDENT ENOUGH TO BACK AWAY. PATTY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO PRESS CHARGES FOR FEAR THAT SHE WILL END UP BEING FIRED AND PERCEIVED AS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. SHE FEELS CASEY WILL PROTECT GEORGE AND WOULD CONSIDER GEO. MORE IMPORTANT TO BELL THAN PATTY. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASEY DATING BACK TO DECEMBER, I TOO SENSED THAT EITHER CASEY WASN'T BE[ING] OBJECTIVE OR FAIR IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PATTY OR THAT POSSIBLY GEORGE HAD BEEN FEEDING CASEY LIES AND INNUENDO ABOUT PATTY'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH PERSONNEL IN TRAINING. THE APPARENT STRATEGY IS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT PATTY'S CHARACTER SUCH THAT IF HIS SITUATION EVER BOILED TO THE SURFACE HE COULD BLAME IT ON HER TO SAVE HIS JOB. I BELIEVE THERE IS ENOUGH INFO AVAILABLE TO HAVE GEO. REPRIMANDED OR FIRED OVER THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN OR HEARD GEO. MAKE APPROACHES TO HER WHO I'M SURE WOULD COME FORWARD TO SUPPORT PATTY'S POSITION. SINCE THE DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD I AGREED NOT TO APPROACH CASEY YET. I OFFERED TO SPEAK WITH GEO. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES ME AS A COMPETITOR FOR PATTY, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD MISCONSTRUE MY INTENTIONS. I DO INTEND TO SPEAK TO LENNY MORGAN "OFF THE RECORD" NEXT WEEK IN NEW ORLEANS TO GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INSIGHT IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In a second "Memo For The Record," Mr. Higgins reported discussing the situation with Mr. Morgan, and summarized the latter's advice. * * * LENNY'S BOTTOM LINE WAS AS I SUSPECTED - DON'T LEAVE IT SIMMERING TAKE FIRM ACTION. BRING IT TO CASEY'S ATTENTION. LENNY INDICATED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME OVER AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS. * * * Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Although Mr. Higgins never showed these memoranda to "Casey" Forrest, who only learned of them after the present proceedings began, he did mention the situation to Mr. Forrest, who indicated that he wondered whether there was a "problem on both sides," but agreed to speak to Mr. Alepakos. By the time Mr. Higgins left Panama City, in July of 1984, he thought the situation had been resolved. About this time, Ms. Powell told Mr. Alepakos she planned to remarry. He responded that he would be there, if it did not work out. He said he still loved her, and he did not stop asking her out, although, after she became Mrs. Hord, she consistently declined. He continued to declare his love. Mrs. Hord again complained, this time to B. L. Nissley, Textron's director of training documentation, on or about December 15, 1985. Her complaint notwithstanding, she sent Mr. Alepakos a poinsettia for Christmas. At some point, she left a note on his desk, saying "Missing you, P.H." By a memorandum dated January 29, 1985, Mr. Nissley asked Mr. Forrest for a formal investigation "to assure that this problem be resolved once and for all." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. On January 31, 1985, Mr. Forrest interviewed Mrs. Hord in Mr. Ormsby's presence. She reported the frequent invitations to lunch and a suggestion by Mr. Alepakos that they take a vacation together, but said nothing about his touching her. Messrs. Forrest and Ormsby also interviewed Mr. Alepakos. They decided it might be well for a disinterested third party to investigate, and asked Textron's Mr. Morgan to come over from New Orleans for the purpose. Mr. Morgan interviewed Mrs. Hord for two and a half hours on February 10 or 11, 1985. In answer to his questions, Mrs. Hord said that Mr. Alepakos had not asked her for sexual favors, and had not behaved vulgarly, lewdly or indecently. Nor did she advert to the early morning incident in the trailer, which Mr. Alepakos admitted at hearing, while denying any attempt to kiss her. When Mr. Morgan asked her if Mr. Alepakos had ever touched her, or tried to kiss her or to force himself on her, she answered no. Mr. Morgan asked Mrs. Hord to name others who could support her claim of harassment. She gave him only one name, Ms. Ansell's. Mr. Morgan also interviewed George Alepakos at length, and asked him to name others who could support his assertions. Mr. Alepakos gave him some five names. After interviewing these people and Ms. Ansell, Mr. Morgan returned to New Orleans and stated his conclusions in a memorandum dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Forrest wrote Mr. Alepakos a memorandum advising him that his "conduct in the matter lacked professionalism and good judgement." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. He was "warned to confine ... communications and relationships with Mrs. G. Hord to a professional/business environment." Id. This February 25, 1985, memorandum raised "the possibility of termination of [Alepakos'] employment," id. in the event "the cited harassments reoccur[ed]." Id. But the phrase "cited harassments" was a reference to the February 15, 1985, memorandum, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, in which Mr. Morgan stated: Since the evidence indicates that the relationship was two sided, I find it difficult to describe the activity of Mr. Alepakos as one of harassment. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, p. 2. Mr. Forrest did not warn or reprimand Mrs. Hord because he felt a supervisor or manager had a different responsibility in matters of this kind than an employee under supervision. At no time, did Mr. Alepakos tell her off color stories, show her pornographic photographs, explicitly solicit sexual favors, or make obscene gestures to or from Mrs. Hord. It fell to Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley to relay the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation to Mrs. Hord. The three of them gathered in Mr. Nissley's office, and he furnished her a copy to read. She had gotten part way through when she exclaimed, "That's a lie. I never sent him flowers. I never left notes on his desk." She threw down the report, and left the office, despite Mr. Nissley's telling her to stay. She dismissed the February 15, 1985, memorandum as a "bunch of bullshit." Mr. Nissley spoke to her afterwards and told her that he would not tolerate vulgar outbursts in the future. She telephoned Mr. Morgan and complained to him about the result of the investigation. She told him she did not think the report was fair or that it reflected what had happened. She became upset and characterized the report as "bullshit." To this he replied, "Wait a minute. I'll answer any question you want to ask." But she hung up the telephone. On January 30, 1985, Mrs. Hord had asked to take a leave of absence. Her request approved, she began thirty days' leave soon after she learned the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation. Upon her return, Mr. Nissley told her about the results of her annual evaluation, and informed her she had been given a raise of $.20 per hour. The $.20 raise took effect March 16, 1985. With the raise, Mrs. Hord was paid $7.90 per hour, a dollar an hour more than Diane "Dee" Ansell was paid. And Ms. Ansell was paid more than April Dawn Day, the third word processing clerk who helped produce training materials for Navy personnel. Mrs. Hord requested a meeting with Mr. Forrest to discuss the raise, which brought her salary to the highest authorized for her position; it was the same amount as the raise the other two word processing clerks in the training program received. But, since she was paid more than they were, the raise represented a smaller percentage of increase, and she objected. On the morning of March 27, 1985, when Mrs. Hord met with Mr. Forrest, Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley were also present. She told them Bell could keep the raise. Mr. Forrest began to explain the mechanics of Bell's merit raise system, when Mrs. Hord interrupted, "It's a bunch of bullshit. You can do anything you want." As she started to leave, Mr. Forrest told her to stay, but she refused. At one point, she called her bosses "jackasses." According to Mr. Forrest's secretary, who was outside, she "had a wild look" as she slammed the door on her way out. Before they dispersed, Mr. Forrest and the others decided to terminate her employment, unless Mr. Morgan advised against it. Mr. Forrest thought her language "unbecoming a lady." He certainly would not have expected a woman to use such language, and it did not affect him in the same way as it would have, if a man had used the same language. On the other hand, he would not have expected any of Bell's Panama City employees to use language of this kind in such a setting. Mr. Forrest testified under oath that Mrs. Hord was not fired because he found her language the more offensive on account of her femininity. Apprised of the situation, Mr. Morgan consulted a New York lawyer, then told management in Panama City he had no objection to firing Mrs. Hord. Mr. Ormsby then caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mrs. Hord, notifying her that her employment was "terminated as of this date (27 March 1985), for gross disrespect, incertituded (sic), premeditated and continued disregard for all levels of Management ... so as to challenge the management of this company and to incite disrespect of other employees ...." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Gloria Hord's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2, the evidence showed that she worked as an acting supervisor for Columbia Research but not, as far as the hearing officer's notes reflect, for CSC. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that Mr. Small interviewed her first. Mr. Alepakos, as his supervisor, could presumably have overruled Mr. Small's choice even if Mr. Small made the "basic decision" to hire. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that he placed his hands on her shoulders more than once. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10, the evidence did not reveal any sexual advances at this point, aside from declarations of love, which were not entirely unwelcome. Except for the last sentence, petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the final sentence of No. 11 and the word "Again" in No. 13, it was not clear from the evidence that she went to Mr. Ormsby before Christmas. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mrs. Hord did not always go "to great lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Alepakos during this time period." She not infrequently accepted his invitations to lunch. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except that Mr. Alepakos was not put on any formal probation. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 21 and 22, the evidence showed that he resumed his attentions because of her advances. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the evidence showed that he called, but not that he called frequently. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, he did not come by uninvited. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 31, he said she needed to see a doctor but not, in so many words, that the marriage would fail. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 34, nobody placed limits on Mr. Morgan's investigation. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 35 has been rejected as contrary to the evidence. She was not told she would be reprimanded for making good faith complaints. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, the first two sentences of No. 38, Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70 and 72 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, she lived at Panama City Beach at one point. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10 are immaterial or subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Ms. Bjorgan's testimony was that she was not sure Mrs. Hord wanted to see him that night. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been accepted, in substance, insofar as material, except for Small's suggested advice to change her manner of dress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, Mrs. Hord was ambivalent about Mr. Alepakos before as after the incident. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 27 is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 28 blows a single incident out of proportion. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 30 is rejected. The final sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38 is rejected, as is No. 39 to the extent it proceeds on the assumption there was any hiatus. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 44 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that the poinsettia was flowering. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57, the epithet was "jackasses." With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 59 and 64, Alepakos had no input, but the fact of her complaints was considered and inspired the call to Morgan. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 63 is immaterial, except that Alepakos' attentions did not cause great mental stress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, his overtures were romantic. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 68, he did propose marriage. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 69 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except for the final clause of the final sentence which is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 71 is immaterial or subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvin L. Peters, Esquire 36 Oak Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 William B. deMeza, Jr., Esquire Holland and Knight Post Office Box 241 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of Petitioner on July 31, 2000, because of his race and/or age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Argenbright Security, Inc., now known as Cognisa Security, Inc., is an Atlanta, Georgia-based corporation that provides commercial security services to customers on a nationwide basis. Respondent employs security officers who are placed on assignments at customers' premises. Relevant to this action, Respondent maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, to support its commercial security services in Central Florida. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Petitioner was employed with Respondent from May 1998 to July 31, 2000. Petitioner is an African-American male who was 50 years of age upon hiring and 52 years of age upon his discharge from Respondent's employ. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was provided with Respondent's employment policies, including the equal employment opportunity policy which prohibits all types of unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Throughout his employment with Respondent, Petitioner worked as a district manager and was supervised by Buckwalter, who was Respondent's vice president and general manager of the Southeast region. Buckwalter made the decision to hire Petitioner and made the decision to discharge him. Based on a decline in business and a lack of work, Buckwalter himself was discharged by Respondent in January 2002. Petitioner's job duties as a district manager included supervising Respondent's account managers who managed security officer accounts and ensured overall customer satisfaction. Petitioner was responsible for supervising the management of approximately 60 customer accounts in Orlando, Jacksonville, Tampa, and St. Petersburg. Petitioner supervised a staff of approximately 33 employees, excluding Respondent's security officers. The list of Respondent's customers in Petitioner's region included, but was not limited to, the following entities: the City of Orlando, U.S. Airways, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Orange County, C&L Bank, Citrus Center (also known as Tricony Management), Florida Power Corporation, Solivita (also known as Avitar), and Ocwen. Respondent alleges that Petitioner's performance deteriorated during the last six months of his employment, and as a result, Petitioner was discharged on July 31, 2000. Buckwalter testified that he made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment based on his receipt of numerous customer complaints regarding Petitioner's management of accounts and failure to resolve problems, numerous complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management style and lack of guidance, and Petitioner's failure to properly perform his administrative duties. Buckwalter received eight to ten complaints from Respondent's customers about Petitioner's management of their accounts. Several of Respondent's customers repeatedly complained about Petitioner's management skills. Buckwalter received complaints from Respondent's customers regarding Petitioner's lack of attentiveness towards their accounts, failure to conduct client meetings, and inability and unwillingness to resolve client problems. When Buckwalter discussed the customer complaints with Petitioner, Petitioner sometimes acknowledged the seriousness of the concerns and sometimes became defensive and dismissed the complaints as unreasonable client demands. Two of Respondent's customers, Tricony Management and C&L Bank, specifically demanded that Petitioner be removed from the management of their accounts based on his lack of service and "cavalier" attitude toward their requests. Linda Mansfield, who was the client contact at Tricony Management, sent an e-mail complaint to Respondent's business development manager, Warren Bovich, in regard to Petitioner and Robert Stevenson on February 8, 2000. Tricony Management did not cancel its account with Respondent. However, they insisted that Robert Stevenson and Petitioner be removed from the account. Petitioner admitted that the following customers complained regarding his servicing of or management of their accounts: Ocwen, Citrus Center/Tricony Management, City of Orlando, Avitar/Solivita, C&L Bank, and Florida Power Corporation. Petitioner disagreed with the substance of those complaints. Petitioner also admitted that he had a personality conflict with a Citrus Center employee. Regarding the City of Orlando account under Petitioner's supervision, Petitioner admitted that employee turnover was a problem, that the account was not meeting the budgeted goals, and that Respondent's employees routinely missed their scheduled work shifts. Petitioner further admitted that Avitar/Solivita was upset with him about his unauthorized recruiting efforts. In addition to the customer complaints, Buckwalter received approximately 30 to 35 complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management style. Petitioner's subordinates complained that Petitioner was not concerned with their career development, failed to provide them with timely performance evaluations, failed to conduct staff meetings on a routine basis, failed to attend staff meetings which he had scheduled, did not provide proper support and mentoring for customer accounts, and was generally unavailable to them based on his lack of time in the office. Petitioner admitted that a subordinate complained to Buckwalter regarding Petitioner's failure to provide him with a performance evaluation in a timely manner. Petitioner also acknowledged that Buckwalter received a complaint from Respondent's employee regarding his failure to properly process administrative paperwork. Petitioner admitted that he does not know whether Buckwalter received additional complaints from his subordinates regarding his management. Accordingly, Buckwalter's testimony that he received 30 to 35 complaints from Petitioner's subordinates regarding Petitioner's management is credible. Buckwalter's decision to discharge Petitioner was also based, in part, on Petitioner's failure to properly process administrative paperwork. Buckwalter informed Petitioner, in writing, that his neglect of his administrative duties was unacceptable. Buckwalter also determined that on several occasions, Petitioner provided misleading information about his whereabouts by falsely reporting that he was out of the office conducting client appointments. In addition to Petitioner, Buckwalter supervised several other of Respondent's district managers, including Blake Beach (Beach) and Scott Poe (Poe)--both of whom were formerly employed as district managers in South Florida. While serving as Beach's supervisor, Buckwalter received a single complaint from Respondent's customer, United Airlines (United), regarding Beach's sending of an inappropriate e-mail. United's compliant did not concern Beach's servicing or management of United's account. Other than United's single compliant, none of Respondent's other customers submitted complaints regarding Beach. Based on United's complaint regarding Beach's inappropriate e-mail, Respondent transferred Beach from South Florida to the Baltimore/Washington, D.C., area. While serving as Poe's supervisor, Buckwalter received complaints from two of Respondent's customers (in the South Florida region) regarding Poe's management of their accounts. Because Poe had been successful with other accounts, Buckwalter believed that the two complaints might have been based on a personality conflict. Buckwalter decided to transfer Poe from the district manager position in South Florida to the district manager position in Central Florida. Buckwalter never received complaints from Poe's subordinates regarding Poe's management or supervision. After Poe became the district manager in Central Florida, Respondent received additional complaints from several customers regarding Poe's handling of their accounts. Based on these complaints, Buckwalter made the decision to terminate Poe's employment with Respondent. Buckwalter made the decision to discharge Poe and Petitioner based on a similar number of complaints received from customers in their respective regions; but unlike Poe, Petitioner was discharged for additional reasons: the numerous complaints from his subordinates and the neglect of his administrative duties. Robert Matecki, who was 55 years old when he was hired, replaced Petitioner as Respondent's district manager in Orlando. Petitioner does not allege that Respondent discriminated against him at any time prior to Petitioner's termination on July 31, 2000. Petitioner does not contend that Buckwalter (the decision-maker in this case) ever made any discriminatory comments to him. Petitioner admits that he does not know what factors Respondent considered in making the decision to terminate his employment. Buckwalter testified that he did not consider Petitioner's age and race in making the decision to discharge Petitioner. Instead, he based the decision on customer and subordinate complaints about Petitioner's management style and Petitioner's failure to perform his administrative duties. Because Petitioner admits that he does not know upon what factors Buckwalter based his decision, Buckwalter's testimony is undisputed. Petitioner bases his allegations on his own personal beliefs about his performance and his disagreement with the substance of the complaints made by Respondent's customers and his subordinates.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which denies Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismisses his complaint with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne Johnson, Esquire DeCiccio, Johnson, Herzfeld & Rubin 652 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 John S. Snelling, Esquire James P. Ferguson, Jr., Esquire Duane Morris, LLP 1180 West Peachtree Street, Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's allegation of subjection to an unlawful employment practice is barred by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was previously employed by Respondent until her termination on November 15, 1996. Petitioner discussed the firing with her attorney in January of 1997. Petitioner was apprised by the attorney that she could file a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Prior to August of 1997, Petitioner's attorney informed her that he had filed a Charge of Discrimination on behalf of Petitioner with the EEOC. Petitioner was led to understand that an investigator for EEOC would contact her. Petitioner was never contacted by the EEOC. On April 14, 2000, Petitioner received a notice from her attorney that apprised Petitioner that the attorney had been suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court for a period of 10 days. Later in either May or June, Petitioner read a newspaper article that recounted the suspension of Petitioner's attorney from the practice of law. Petitioner then determined to consult her present counsel in this matter, David Glasser, Esquire, to handle the charge she believed had been filed with the EEOC. Petitioner learned through Glasser that her previous counsel had not filed a complaint or charge with the EEOC. On July 10, 2000, Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR. Petitioner has neither filed a complaint with the Florida Bar Association or filed a legal malpractice suit against her previous counsel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 David Glasser, Esquire Glasser and Handel 150 South Palmetto Avenue Suite 100, Box N Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Douglas Kreuzkamp, Esquire American Red Cross Blood Services King & Spalding 191 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1763 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether transsexualism is a disability that is protected by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Whether an allegation of discrimination based on transsexualism is sex discrimination, pursuant to the FCRA.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined by the FCRA. Petitioner, Connie Fishbaugh, is a transsexual woman who has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), also known as transsexualism. Transsexualism is a recognized mental health disorder that causes a desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex. It is usually accompanied by the wish for one's body to be congruent with the preferred sex. When left untreated, persons diagnosed with transsexualism display symptoms of severe anxiety, severe depression, and dysfunction. GID is recognized as a medical condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disabilities (4th ed.) and the International Classification of Disease (World Health Organization 10th ed.). Gender identity, which is established at an early age, is an individual's internal psychological identification as male or female. A transsexual person is someone whose gender identity is in conflict with the person's anatomical sex at birth. This conflict creates emotional pain and suffering. A person's gender identity cannot be changed through psychotherapy or through any other known treatment. Based on contemporary medical knowledge and practice, sex-reassignment is the only effective, medically prescribed treatment for this condition. The medical process of sex reassignment takes place over several years and requires life-long medical treatment and monitoring. Sex reassignment relieves the distress caused by GID for the great majority of transsexual people. Nonetheless, sex reassignment is not a cure. A person who undergoes sex- reassignment continues to carry a diagnosis and requires lifelong medical monitoring and treatment. Prior to undergoing sex-reassignment, Petitioner experienced sever anxiety, depression, and distress based on her lifelong gender dysphoria. As the years progressed, Petitioner's depression, anxiety, and distress about her gender dysphoria became more acute. Although, during this period, Petitioner fathered three children. Petitioner took part in the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, the accepted medical protocol for the diagnosis and treatment of transsexual persons. As part of this protocol, Petitioner's treatment included: psychological evaluations, during which time she was diagnosed with GID; completion of the "real life experience," which required her to live full-time as a female; administration of hormone therapy to create desired secondary sex characteristics; and sex-reassignment surgery. Petitioner completed sex-reassignment surgery in July 1995. Sex-reassignment surgery is an accepted treatment for transsexualism. Petitioner completed psychiatric and psychological treatment following surgery. She has been undergoing hormone therapy as part of her treatment regime since approximately 1992. Although Petitioner completed sex-reassignment surgery and is now considered medically female, she must continue to undergo hormone treatments and medical monitoring for the rest of her life. Also as a result of the irreversible medical treatment she received, Petitioner is unable to bear or produce children. Several years after completing sex-reassignment, Petitioner applied for a position with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office in the spring of 2001. Petitioner notified the Sheriff's Office of her transgender status before she applied for the position. Petitioner successfully completed Respondent's required pre-employment medical and psychological testing prior to her hire. She did not have any restrictions or request any accommodations on her ability to perform the essential functions of her position. She was hired as a deputy sheriff in May 2001 and was terminated on January 27, 2002. On July 5, 2002, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR alleging employment discrimination under the applicable state and federal law. Following the Determination: No Jurisdiction, Petitioner is pursuing her disability claim only under state law and her sex discrimination claim under both state and federal law. In her Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner alleges that she was harassed based on her transsexuality. When she reported this harassment, Petitioner alleges that Respondent did not take steps to respond to the harassment. Rather, the Inspector stated that she "should have known that it would be hard" and that "because of [her] situation, no one wanted to hire [her]." It is alleged that no steps were ever taken by Respondent to respond to the complaints of harassment. Eventually, Petitioner was terminated based on allegations of insubordination. On February 21, 2003, FCHR issued a determination letter stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's claims of discrimination on the basis of handicap or on the basis of sex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination with prejudice because there is no basis to conclude that transsexualism is included in the class of persons protected by the FCRA, under either handicap or sex discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Bond, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karen M. Doering, Esquire National Center for Lesbian Rights 3708 West Swann Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609-4452 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her sex or age, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment based on her sex or age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Frito-Lay, Inc. ("Frito-Lay"), makes and sells snack foods, including many familiar brands of chips. Petitioner Frances G. Danelli ("Danelli") is a former employee of Frito-Lay. Frito-Lay initially hired Danelli in or around 1998 as a packer for its West Valley, Utah, plant. When Danelli's husband was transferred to Florida, she took a job for Frito-Lay in Pompano Beach, Florida, and later moved to the company's West Palm Beach Distribution Center as a route sales representative ("RSR"). Danelli worked in Florida as a Frito-Lay RSR for more than 15 years, and her routes eventually included such large stores as Publix, Walmart, Winn-Dixie, and Target.1/ RSRs sell and deliver Frito-Lay products to retail stores, and these stores, in turn, sell the products to consumers. RSRs are responsible, as well, for presenting the company's products to shoppers in the best way possible to increase sales. So, RSRs not only sell and deliver products to stores, but they also unload the products, stock the shelves, set up displays, and remove unsold items whose sell-by dates have expired. RSRs are paid an hourly wage plus commissions. RSRs are required to compete for sales against other companies' vendors, who (like Frito-Lay's personnel) are trying to place as many of their products as possible onto the shelves of the snack food aisle. Shelf space is essential for growing sales, and competition for product placement can be fierce. There is no dispute that Danelli's performance as an RSR was fine, perhaps even exemplary. Frito-Lay considered her to be a good employee. Danelli went to work early each morning, usually arriving at the warehouse by 4:00 a.m. so that she could get to her first store by 5:00 a.m., which would give her a head start on other vendors. When Danelli got to the warehouse, she would clock in on her handheld computer, which she also used to track the goods she delivered to each store. Upon returning to the warehouse, she had paperwork to complete and print from the handheld computer. In 2013, Frito-Lay started requiring drivers of delivery trucks over a certain size, including RSRs such as Danelli, to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. As relevant, these regulations require an RSR to take at least a ten-hour break before driving a commercial vehicle, and they prohibit an RSR from driving a commercial vehicle after 14 consecutive hours on duty. Frito-Lay programmed its employees' handheld computers so that an employee subject to the DOT regulations would receive a conspicuous warning if he or she attempted to clock in to work less than ten hours after last going off duty. As Danelli testified at hearing, if the computer told her to wait, she would go to the warehouse, pick up some product, fix her truck, and then sign in when the handheld said she could go. Evidently, however, to get the warning, an employee needed to log on as a "regulated" employee; if, by mistake, a "regulated" employee logged on as "non-regulated," she would not get the warning. Danelli found it difficult to comply with the DOT regulations, which led to Frito-Lay's imposing discipline against her in accordance with the company's Corrective Action Process set forth in its Sales National RSR Handbook, which governed Petitioner's employment. The handbook prescribes a process of progressive discipline that begins with "coaching," which is a form of pre- discipline. As the name suggests, a "coaching" is, essentially, a nondisciplinary intervention whose purpose is to correct an issue before the employee's conduct warrants stronger measures. If coaching is ineffective, the Corrective Action Process calls for increasingly severe steps of discipline. The steps of discipline consist of a Step 1 Written Reminder, a Step 2 Written Warning, a Step 3 Final Written Warning, and a Step 4 Termination. The particular discipline to be imposed depends upon the severity of the infraction and the step of discipline, if any, the employee happens to be on when the infraction is committed. Steps of discipline remain "active" for six to nine months, depending on the step. If the employee does not commit any further disciplinary infractions during the active period, the step "falls off." If the employee commits another disciplinary infraction within the "active" period, however, he or she moves to the next disciplinary step in the Corrective Action Process. On June 5, 2014, after having previously been coached to maintain compliance with the DOT regulations, Danelli received a Step 1 Written Reminder for four violations of the 10-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. On July 25, 2014, Danelli received a Step 2 Written Warning for a new violation of the 10-hour rule. Once again, Danelli did not appeal the discipline. On October 7, 2014, Danelli was given another coaching, during which she was informed that (i) an investigation into her DOT hours was in process, and (ii) the company was concerned that she might be getting assistance on her route from her husband in violation of the RSR Performance Standards. On January 27, 2015, Danelli received a Step 3 Final Written Warning for violating the 14-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. Under the Corrective Action Process, a Step 3 Final Written Warning remains "active" for nine months and is the final step prior to a Step 4 Termination. On May 2, 2015, Danelli committed another DOT violation. Because she was already on a Step 3 Final Written Warning, she was suspended pending further investigation. Danelli maintains that this violation, and others, resulted from her making a simple mistake with the handheld computer, namely failing to log on as a "regulated" employee, which cost her the electronic warning she otherwise would have received. She points out, too, that in this instance, the violation was minor, merely clocking in ten minutes early. These arguments are not wholly without merit, and if Frito-Lay had fired Danelli for a single, ten-minute violation of the DOT regulations, the undersigned would question the company's motivation. But that is not what happened. Danelli did not just violate the ten-hour rule once or twice, but many times, after multiple warnings, and in the face of increasingly serious disciplinary steps. Further, Frito-Lay did not terminate Danelli's employment over this latest violation of the ten-hour rule, even though it would have been justified in doing so within the parameters of the Corrective Action Process. Instead, the company placed Danelli on a Last Chance Agreement. Last Chance Agreements are not specifically provided for in the Corrective Action Process but are used, at the company's discretion, as a safety valve to avoid the occasional unfortunate termination that might result from strict adherence to rigid rules. In this regard, the agreement given to Danelli, dated May 15, 2015, stated as follows: We strongly considered [terminating your employment]. However, due to the unique facts and circumstances involved here, as well as your 15 years of service with the Company, the Company is willing to issue this Last Chance Warning. This step is over and above our normal progressive disciplinary process, and is being issued on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis. . . . [A]ny subsequent violations by you may result in discipline up to and including immediate termination. More specifically, any future violations [of the DOT regulations] will result in your immediate termination. As Danelli put it, the Last Change Agreement was a "sign of grace" from Frito-Lay. By its terms, it was intended to be "active and in effect for a period of 12 months." The undersigned pauses here to let the Last Chance Agreement sink in, because the fact that Frito-Lay did not fire Danelli in May 2015 when——for objective, easy-to-prove reasons, after a by-the-book application of progressive discipline——it clearly could have, is compelling evidence that the company was not harboring discriminatory animus against Danelli. After all, if Frito-Lay had wanted Danelli gone because of her age or her gender, why in the world would the company not have jumped at this golden opportunity, which Danelli had given it, to fire her with practically no exposure to liability for unlawful discrimination? The irony is that by showing mercy, Frito-Lay set in motion the chain of events that led to this proceeding. In or around November of 2015, Danelli underwent surgery, which required her to take some time off of work. For several years before this leave, Danelli's route had consisted of a Super Walmart and two Publix stores. When she returned, the Super Walmart had been assigned to another RSR, and to make up for its loss, Danelli's supervisor, Stanley Gamble, put a third Publix grocery on Danelli's route, i.e., Publix #1049 located in Tequesta, Florida. Danelli was acquainted with one of the managers at the Tequesta Publix, a Mr. Morgan. On her first day back, Danelli and Mr. Gamble went to that store, where Mr. Morgan told Mr. Gamble that he was "glad Frances is here." Mr. Morgan had complained to Mr. Gamble about the previous RSR, who left the store "all messed up," according to Mr. Gamble. Danelli also met Sarah Oblaczynski, the store's "backdoor receiver," which is the Publix employee who checks in merchandise. On her new route, Danelli usually went to the Tequesta store first, early in the morning. She soon ran into a vendor named Tony who worked for Snyder's of Hanover ("Snyder's"), a snack food company that competes with Frito-Lay. From the start, Tony was nasty to Danelli and aggressive, telling her that "there is no space" for two vendors. Tony was possessive about shelf space within the store, as well as the parking space close to the store's loading dock. Danelli thought, because of Tony's behavior, that he might be using drugs. On Tuesday, April 6, 2016, Petitioner had an argument with Tony over the shelf space that the store manager previously had awarded to her for the display of Frito-Lay products. Tony asserted that he had been promised the same space and said to Danelli, "You're going to take that stuff out of the shelf." Danelli told him, "No, Morgan said that's still my space." At this, Tony began cursing and pushed Danelli's cart into her, yelling, "That fucking Morgan!" Danelli later spoke to Mr. Morgan, who assured Danelli that the shelf space in question was hers and said he would leave a note to that effect for Ms. Oblaczynski. There is a dispute as to when Danelli reported the forgoing incident to Frito-Lay. She claims that, before the end of the day on April 6, she told Mr. Gamble, her supervisor, all about the matter, in detail, and requested that someone be assigned to accompany her on her route the next day because Tony planned on taking her shelf space. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble just laughed and said he did not have anybody to help her. Mr. Gamble testified, to the contrary, that Danelli had neither reported the April 6, 2016, incident to him nor asked for any assistance. (Danelli admits that she did not report the incident to Mr. Canizares, sales zone director, or to Human Resources ("HR")). Without written documentation regarding this alleged discussion, it is hard to say what, if anything, Danelli reported on April 6, 2016. It is likely that Danelli did complain to Mr. Gamble about Tony on some occasion(s), and might well have done so on April 6. What is unlikely, however, is that Danelli notified Mr. Gamble that she felt she was being sexually harassed by Tony. Tony's boorish and bullying behavior, to the extent directed at Danelli, seems to have been directed to her qua competitor, not as a woman. At the very least, the incident is ambiguous in this regard, and one could reasonably conclude, upon hearing about it, that Tony was simply a jerk who resorted to juvenile antics in attempting to gain the upper hand against a rival vendor. The undersigned finds that if Danelli did speak to Mr. Gamble about Tony on April 6, he—— not unreasonably——did not view the incident as one involving sexual harassment. As far as Mr. Gamble's declining to provide Danelli with an escort, assuming she requested one, his response is reasonable if (as found) Mr. Gamble was not clearly on notice that Danelli believed she was being sexually harassed. Danelli, after all, was by this time an experienced and successful RSR who undoubtedly had encountered other difficult vendors during her career. Indeed, as things stood on April 6, a person could reasonably conclude that Danelli in fact had the situation under control, inasmuch as Mr. Morgan had clearly taken Danelli's side and intervened on her behalf. What could a Frito-Lay "bodyguard" reasonably be expected to accomplish, which would justify the risk of escalating the tension between Tony and Danelli into a hostile confrontation? During the evening of April 6, 2016, Danelli talked to her husband about the problem at Publix #1049, and they decided that he would accompany her to the store the next morning before reporting to his own work, to assist if Tony caused a scene. On April 7, 2016, Danelli's husband drove to Publix #1049 in his own vehicle. Although no longer an employee of the company, Danelli's husband entered the store wearing a Frito-Lay hat, and he stayed in the snack aisle while Danelli went to the back to bring the order in. Ms. Oblaczynski, the receiver, presented Tony with a note from Mr. Morgan stating that Danelli's products and sales items were assigned to aisle one. In response, Tony started swearing about Mr. Morgan and the denial of shelf space, made a hand gesture indicative of a man pleasing himself, and told Ms. Oblaczynski that "they can take a fly[ing] F'n leap." Tony had made this particular hand gesture about Mr. Morgan on a number of previous occasions, in front of both men and women. Mr. Danelli left to go to work once Danelli's product was placed, and she left to go to the next store on her route. When Danelli returned to the warehouse, she went to Mr. Gamble's office and told him about the April 7, 2016, incident. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble laughed in response. Danelli asked Mr. Gamble if the company would conduct an investigation, and he said yes. She recalls that every day thereafter, she asked Mr. Gamble if he had heard anything because she thought "we [Frito-Lay] were investigating" and that HR was on top of it. Danelli admits, however, that she "intentionally" did not tell Mr. Gamble that her husband had accompanied her to Publix #1049 to assist her in the store that morning. She did not report this detail because she knew it was "bad." In conflict with Danelli's account, Mr. Gamble testified that Danelli did not report that Tony made a sexual gesture in front of her or used coarse or profane language in her presence on April 7, 2016. The undersigned finds that Mr. Gamble most likely did not laugh at Danelli or otherwise treat her dismissively upon hearing her report of the incident. If Mr. Gamble had believed the matter were so trivial or amusing, he would not likely have agreed to investigate. The undersigned finds, further, that however Danelli described the incident, she did not make it clear to Mr. Gamble that she perceived Tony's behavior as a form of sexual harassment. Danelli did not make a formal written complaint to that effect at the time, and the situation at Publix #1049 was, at the very least, ambiguous. More likely than not, Mr. Gamble viewed the troublesome vendor from Snyder's as an unwelcome business problem to be dealt with, not as a perpetrator of unlawful, gender-based discrimination. To elaborate, putting Tony's "sexual gesture" to one side momentarily, the rest of his conduct, even the cursing, while certainly objectionable, is not suggestive of sexual harassment; it is just bad behavior. Tony's temper tantrums and outbursts no doubt upset Danelli and others, but that does not turn them into gender discrimination. Further, Danelli seems to have handled the situation well until she resorted to self-help on April 7, 2016. The responsible Publix employees were already aware of the problem, and in due course, they complained to Snyder's, which unsurprisingly removed Tony from that store. Meantime, had Danelli felt physically threatened or afraid as a result of Tony's more aggressive antics, she (or Publix) could have called the police; this, indeed, would have been a safer and more reasonable alternative to bringing along her husband or another civilian for protection, which as mentioned above posed the risk of provoking a fight, given Tony's volatility. Ultimately, it is Tony's "sexual gesture" that provides a colorable basis for Danelli's sexual harassment complaint. But even this gives little grounds for a claim of discrimination, without more context than is present here. To be sure, the "jerk off gesture" or "air jerk" is obscene, and one would not expect to see it in polite company or in the workplace. Yet, although it clearly mimics a sexual practice, the air jerk is generally not understood as being a literal reference to masturbation. That is, the gesture is not typically used to convey a present intention to engage in masturbation or as an invitation to perform the act on the gesturer. Rather, the jerk off gesture usually signifies annoyance, disgust, disinterest, or disbelief. As with its cousin, the "finger" (or bird) gesture, the sexual connotations of the air jerk are (usually) subliminal. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Tony's jerk off gesture was undertaken in pursuit of sexual gratification or was intended or perceived as a sexual advance on Danelli (or someone else)——or even as being overtly sexual in nature. (Obviously, if the evidence showed that, under the circumstances, Tony was, e.g., inviting Danelli to participate in sexual activity, this would be a different case. The undersigned is not suggesting, just to be clear, that the air jerk gesture is inconsistent with or could never amount to sexual harassment, but only that it is not unequivocally a sign of such harassment, given its commonly understood meanings.) To the contrary, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that Tony made the gesture to indicate that he regarded Mr. Morgan's note as pointless and annoying. It was roughly the equivalent of giving them the bird, albeit arguably less contemptuous than that. For these reasons, the undersigned finds it unlikely that, assuming Danelli described the gesture (which is in dispute), Mr. Gamble thought Danelli was complaining about sexual harassment, as opposed to a very difficult vendor. On April 13, 2016, Mr. Gamble visited Publix #1049 and spoke to Ms. Oblaczynski about the situation. During this conversation, Ms. Oblaczynski stated that the "Frito-Lay people" did nothing wrong. She further specified that "the person [Danelli] had with her did nothing wrong." After speaking with Ms. Oblaczynski, Mr. Gamble met with Danelli while she was servicing her second account. Right off the bat, Mr. Gamble asked Danelli who was with her at Publix #1049 on April 7, 2016. She eventually admitted that her husband was with her in the store that day. Aware of the seriousness of her offense and the active Last Chance Agreement, Danelli asked Mr. Gamble, several times, if she would be fired. That same day, Mr. Gamble called Carlos Canizares to tell him what he had learned. Mr. Canizares instructed Mr. Gamble to stay with Danelli while she finished servicing her accounts and then to obtain a written statement from her about the incident. Later on April 13, 2016, Danelli provided a written statement in which she confirmed that her husband had been working with her at Publix #1049 the previous week. Danelli has since described this statement as a "full written account of the harassment [and] rude sexual gestures." Danelli knew, of course, that HR would review her statement, and yet she said nothing therein about having complained to Mr. Gamble or any supervisor about harassment generally or Tony in particular; about Tony's use of course or improper language; or about having requested an escort to help keep Tony in line. On the instructions of the company's HR department, Mr. Gamble conducted an investigation into the "rude sexual gesture" about which Danelli had complained. Specifically, he called Mr. Morgan, the Publix manager, and asked him about the incident. Mr. Gamble also requested that he be allowed to review any videotapes and documents concerning the incident. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Gamble that Publix was investigating the matter. Mr. Gamble's request to allow Frito-Lay access to Publix videotapes and documents was, however, turned down. Tony's boorish behavior aside, the fact remained that Danelli, without prior approval, had allowed a non-employee to perform work or services for Frito-Lay at one of the stores on her route, which the RSR Performance Standards specifically prohibit without express authorization. RSRs who are found to have permitted non-employees to accompany them on their routes are either discharged or issued multiple steps of discipline, as Danelli knew. Because Danelli violated this rule while on an active Last Chance Agreement, Frito-Lay decided to terminate her employment. On April 26, 2016, Mr. Canizares met with Danelli to inform her that she was fired. Danelli timely appealed her termination pursuant to the company's Complaint and Appeal Procedure, electing to have her appeal decided by a neutral, third-party arbitrator. The arbitration hearing took place in January 2017. Three months later, the arbitrator ruled that Danelli's termination had been proper and carried out in accordance with Frito-Lay's employment policies. Danelli does not presently deny that she violated the DOT regulations and the company policy forbidding the use of non-employees as helpers while on duty, nor does she dispute that Frito-Lay had sufficient grounds for imposing the disciplinary steps leading to the Last Chance Agreement. Indeed, she does not contend that it would have been wrongful for Frito-Lay to have fired her in May 2015 instead of offering the Last Chance Agreement. Her position boils down to the argument that because Frito-Lay could have exercised leniency and not fired her for bringing her husband to work at Publix #1049 (which is probably true2/), its failure to do so can only be attributable to gender or age discrimination. Put another way, Danelli claims that but for her being a woman in her 50s, Frito-Lay would have given her another "last chance." This is a heavy lift. As circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Danelli points to the company's treatment of another RSR, a younger man named Ryan McCreath. Like Danelli, Mr. McCreath was caught with a non-employee assisting him on his route. Unlike Danelli, however, Mr. McCreath was not on any active steps of discipline at the time of the incident, much less a Last Chance Agreement. Although Mr. McCreath's disciplinary record was not unblemished, Frito-Lay did not terminate his employment for this violation of the RSR Performance Standards. Instead, he received three steps of discipline and was issued a Final Written Warning. Mr. McCreath's situation is distinguishable because he was not under a Last Chance Agreement at the time of the violation. Moreover, it is not as though Mr. McCreath got off scot-free. He received a serious punishment. Danelli could not have received a comparable punishment for the same offense because she was already beyond Step 3; her record, unlike his, did not have room for the imposition of three steps of discipline at once. The McCreath incident does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Frito-Lay unlawfully discriminated against Danelli when it terminated her employment for committing a "three-step violation" while on an active Last Chance Agreement. There is simply no reason to suppose that if Danelli, like Mr. McCreath, had not had any active steps of discipline when she violated the rule against having non- employees provide on-the-job assistance, Frito-Lay would have terminated her employment for the April 7, 2016, infraction; or that if Mr. McCreath, like Danelli, had been on a Last Chance Agreement when he violated the rule, Frito-Lay would have issued him a Final Written Warning in lieu of termination. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of Frito- Lay's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Danelli, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age- or gender-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age or gender discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay took any retaliatory action against Danelli for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay committed or permitted sexual harassment of Danelli or otherwise exposed her to a hostile work environment. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Frito-Lay did not discriminate unlawfully against Danelli on any basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Frito-Lay not liable for gender or age discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Is Respondent employer guilty of an unlawful employment practice, pursuant to Section 760.10, F.S., for discrimination on the basis of handicap, to wit: diabetes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed part-time at Respondent Jackson County Hospital as an x-ray aide. In this position, he transported patients to and from the x-ray department. Petitioner had diabetes when he was hired by Respondent. He disclosed his diabetes on his initial health information sheet. The employer was aware of Petitioner's diabetes when he was hired. However, on his initial health information sheet Petitioner also represented his health status as "excellent" and denied having any physical condition which impaired his body as a whole. He further represented that he had no defect "which may prevent your performance in the job. . . ". Accordingly, the employer did not know that he had a handicap, if any, when it hired Petitioner. While he was employed as an x-ray aide, Petitioner had two "reactions" on the job due to his diabetes, and he was laid off immediately prior to having a third "reaction." Petitioner did not describe the nature of his diabetic "reactions", and no other record evidence revealed their symptomatology. Nonetheless, Petitioner felt that he did his job well and got along well with everyone. This testimony was unrefuted. Indeed, both of Respondent's witnesses acknowledged that Petitioner performed his job duties acceptably. Petitioner went to Respondent hospital's emergency room as soon as he had these reactions. He assumed that some of the x-ray technicians whom he worked with in the hospital x-ray department talked to Wayne Austin, the head of the x-ray department, about his situation. No other witnesses supported his assumption. No forms reporting either of Petitioner's "reactions" were received by Jim L. Treglon, Respondent hospital's assistant administrator. Wayne Austin knew of Petitioner's diabetes but had no knowledge of either of Petitioner's "reactions" prior to laying him off. When Mr. Austin laid Petitioner off on August 15, 1994, he told Petitioner that it was due to the hospital's economic restructuring. Petitioner believed, upon the basis of conversations with other employees who were not called to testify, that he was laid off due to his diabetes. According to Mr. Treglon and Mr. Austin, the employing hospital underwent a personnel restructuring process by reduction of work force for financial reasons, and Petitioner was laid off as part of the larger financial conservation scheme. Petitioner had the least seniority and was a part-time employee, so his position was eliminated. There is no evidence that Petitioner's position was ever recreated or refilled. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, another x-ray aide with more seniority was allowed to work weekends only, thereby reducing the hours for which that aide was paid. It is possible, but not proven, that this other aide's hours were eventually increased or restored when the hospital's economic situation improved. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, the x- ray department's clerk-secretary was allowed to resign, and that position was not filled. As part of the employer's restructuring process, a total of 17 employees were eliminated from the employer's total work force based only upon seniority at approximately the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated. Mr. Treglon testified that as of the date of formal hearing, the employer employed at least 40 people who have disclosed disabilities. The definition of "disability", as used in his testimony, was not given.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief herein and determining that Petitioner recover nothing thereby. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1996.
