The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against due to her age, with regard to her termination from employment on June 19, 1996, and, collaterally, whether her claim is barred by the doctrine collateral estoppel because of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by a hearing officer in an unemployment compensation appeals proceeding also related to her termination from employment.
Findings Of Fact Roberta McCabe, the Petitioner, was employed by the Respondent, Woodland Towers, Inc., as a dining room manager from October 22, 1991, through June 19, 1996. During her employment with Woodland Towers that entity employed more than fifteen employees. Ms. McCabe's initial date of employment was August 19, 1991, but she began her capacity as dining room manager on October 22, 1991. She served in that capacity until her termination date of June 19, 1996. She was terminated on that date against her will. Ms. McCabe was born on June 3, 1935, and at the time of her termination she was sixty-one years of age. After her termination, on June 21, 1996, the Petitioner filed a claim against Woodland Towers with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation. In that claim she first raised the issue that she had been discharged due to her age. That claim was filed, of course, before a different state agency, with a different jurisdiction, although the parties were the same. The legal issues were not established to be the same, however, with the exception that in that case, as in this one, the Petitioner raised the question of discharge due to age discrimination. The statutory standards for liability for unemployment compensation, however, were not shown to be co-extensive and identical to those statutory standards and statutory-based legal issues which prevail in the instant case before a different state agency. While the issue of age discrimination may have been the reason offered by the Petitioner in the employment compensation case for her separation from employment, as opposed to what was ultimately found (discharge for misconduct) that legal concept was not shown to have the same definition under the Unemployment Compensation statutes involved in that proceeding, nor was it shown that those statutes support the same or similar actions and remedies as does Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, under which the instant proceeding arises. Therefore it cannot be determined that the legal issues or, for that matter the factual issues in the instant proceeding, are substantially identical to those extant in the unemployment compensation proceeding. In any event, Ms. McCabe timely filed a charge involving age discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, on or about August 26, 1996. The matter ultimately came on for hearing before the undersigned judge. Ms. McCabe testified at hearing that the only act of discrimination she contends occurred with regard to her termination from employment, on June 19, 1996, occurred on that date and involved discrimination on account of her age. She did not, however, establish that anyone at Woodland Towers ever actually made any discriminatory comments or remarks regarding her age. Ms. McCabe essentially inferred from her status as an older employee, and the fact that she was terminated, the conclusion that Woodland Towers had terminated her on account of her age. She offered no testimony other than her own to support her claim of age discrimination. Conversely, Eleanor Gustavsson and Sidney Roberts both testified that age had nothing to do with their decision to terminate her. Their testimony was unrebutted by the Petitioner. The testimony supporting Petitioner's position that age discrimination or animus resulted in her termination is based solely on the Petitioner's own testimony, chiefly involving her conjectural position, without corroborating evidence, that Woodland Towers intended to terminate her because of her years of seniority which resulted in higher pay and benefits and that therefore, resultingly, her age, with attendant higher pay and benefits, in her position, caused her to be terminated in a discriminatory way, predicated upon her age. Moreover, the Petitioner failed to describe any other co-employee who committed a similar infraction but who was treated more favorably than the Petitioner and did not show that there was any other employee of a younger age who was treated more favorably after committing a similar infraction. The Petitioner did produce the testimony of two fellow employees and offered to produce others to testify that another employee was rude and hostile to the Petitioner. This is insufficient, however, to establish that she was discriminated against because of her age. It was not shown that that employee was in a supervisory position over the Petitioner and merely being rude and hostile to a fellow employee does not rise to the level of Ms. McCabe's infraction. It is therefore unpersuasive to show that Ms. McCabe was the subject of disparate treatment because of her age. Uncontradicted evidence was presented at hearing which establishes that the Petitioner was allowing employees under her supervision, in her capacity as dining room manager, to report for duty before normal working hours and begin work without compensation for the extra time. It was established that she was aware of and indeed responsible for these employees "working off the clock" or before "punching-in." The evidence establishes that she was aware that this was contrary to federal law and Woodland Towers' policy. She was also aware that she was responsible for supervising those offending employees and enforcing the law and policy concerning hours of employment. The Petitioner took full responsibility for the law and employment policy violation in this regard and admitted during the hearing that her actions violated Woodland Towers' employment hours policy. Additionally, Woodland Towers presented credible evidence that Ms. McCabe was terminated solely for reasons of violation of that federal law and policy concerning hours of employment. Woodland Towers' evidence establishes that her age was not the reason for her termination, but rather that her violation of federal law and employment policy concerning the working hours of her employees was that reason. That showing was not rebutted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lloyd, Esquire Cobb, Cole and Bell Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Roberta McCabe 701 North Ocean Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Born in Rio de Janeiro, petitioner Paul Sergio Inacio emigrated to the United States from Brazil in 1961, when he was still a teenager. He first worked for respondent for a brief time in 1976. On June 6, 1980, he returned to respondent's employ as a journeyman welder mechanic at Crist Electric Generating Plant, a position he still held at the time of hearing. A "mile square with seven generating units" (T.187), the plant is in Florida, as are respondent's headquarters. Several hundred people work for respondent at Crist Electric Generating Plant alone. In "late June, 1980" (T.235) somebody began calling Mr. Inacio "Julio," nicknaming him after a Hispanic character in a television series (Sanford & Son). The actor portraying Julio "used to drag a goat through the living room . . . and acted . . . stupid." T.236; T.64. Despite (or perhaps because of) petitioner's telling people he did not like being called "Julio," the sobriquet caught on. Even during his initial eight-month probationary period, he made his objections known. T.115, 180. He felt freer to press the point, once the probationary period ended, although at least one friend advised him to do so might be counterproductive T.235-6. Mr. Inacio never referred to himself as Julio. T.28, 99-100, 115, 146-7, 180, 194, 198. Once "he almost got in a fight with [a co-worker] because the guy called him my little Puerto Rican buddy Julio." T.28. Before he retired from his employment as a supervisor with respondent, on July 30, 1987, Murdock P. Walley repeatedly addressed, or referred to petitioner in his presence, as "Julio," "wop," "spic," and "greaser." Mr. Walley's last day at work was "in April or along about then." T.472. Behind petitioner's back, Mr. Carnley heard Mr. Walley refer to petitioner as "wetback," "wop" or "the greaser." T. 27. Co-workers have called him "spic," "wetback," and "greaser" to his face, (T.30) as well as behind his back. Mr. Peakman, another maintenance supervisor, testified that he was guilty of a single lapse: I didn't see him and I asked, "Where's Julio?" And then I caught myself, I said, "Excuse me, where's Mr. Inacio?" I corrected myself right then. T.455. In or about January of 1989, (T.271), Jimmy Lavon Sherouse, maintenance superintendent since May of 1987, referred to petitioner as "Julio" at least once, in the break room. Willard A. Douglas, a supervisor of maintenance at the plant since December of 1981, referred to petitioner as "Julio" frequently. Described as abrasive, Mr. Douglas, also known as "Bubba," has "single[d] Paul out." T.46. But it appeared at hearing at least as likely that Mr. Douglas singled petitioner out because of a run-in which had nothing to do with Mr. Inacio's background, as that he discriminated against him on account of national origin. Prior to June of 1989, continuously since 1981 (T.29), Howard Keels, Calvin Harris, Mike Taylor, Ronnie Yates, and Bill Sabata, Control Center supervisors, C. B. Hartley, supervisor over the coal docks, John Spence and David Hansford, both maintenance supervisors at the time, Mike Snuggs, Joe Patterson, Ed Lepley, Tommy Stanley and Dennis Cowan, supervisors of the laboratory department, Dennis Berg and Joe Kight, schedulers, Tom Talty, the assistant plant manager, Joe Lalas and Larry Swindell, both operations supervisors, all called petitioner "Julio" "[t]o his face in [the] presence" (T.27) of Ricky Carnley, a fellow welder mechanic who testified at hearing. T.21-26. Others also heard supervisors call petitioner "Julio." T.79-80, 110, 144-6, 178-9, 195-6, 237-9, 537-8. Not without reason, petitioner came to feel that "(a)nything associated with Hispanic heritage that could come up, I was called at some point or other by practically anybody." T.267. Angelo Grellia, a fellow mechanic who testified "I'm a wop, you know" (T.79) (emphasis added) remembered co-workers calling petitioner a "wop." A newspaper cartoon posted on a bulletin board in the employee break room (not the bulletin board reserved exclusively for management's use) depicted a man using a two-by-four. Petitioner "is known for using two-by-fours a lot to move stuff, pry stuff for leverage." T.34. The cartoon was labelled "Julio." Another time somebody posted a newspaper clipping, a report of a parricide, complete with picture; the killer's name had been lined through and Mr. Inacio's had been substituted. T.112, 158, 179. After two days, a fellow employee took it down (T.158), apparently without Mr. Inacio's ever seeing it. Still another time somebody posted "a National Geographic picture" (T.181) that resembled petitioner "and the caption said, can you guess who this is." T.181. Somebody had guessed and written in "Julio." T.243. According to uncontroverted testimony, white Anglo-Saxon men "were not selected to be the butt of these sorts of jokes." T.159. Over the plant's public address system, in Mr. Talty's presence, Charles Brown referred to petitioner as "Paul Inasshole," a play on his surname. T.25. No other employee was ridiculed in such a fashion, as far as the evidence showed, (T.49) but broadcasts in a similarly offensive vein ("An asshole" "A nasty hole") took place repeatedly over respondent's public address system. T. 24-25, 48-49, 71, 144-146, 163, 240. At all pertinent times, respondent had widely disseminated written equal opportunity and affirmative action policies with the stated "intent . . . to provide all employees with a wholesome work environment." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. "Company policy prohibits intimidation or harassment of its employees by any employee or supervisor." Id. But, as Barbara Louise Mallory, an "Equal Employment Opportunity representative" (T.477) in respondent's employ, conceded, the "conduct that went on was against [Gulf Power's] policies and against the law." T.484. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 stated that employees "subjected to conduct which violates this policy should report such incidences to their immediate supervisor, a higher level of supervision, or the Company's Equal Employment Opportunity Representative in the Corporate Office." Id. In the present case, both respondent's immediate supervisors and "a higher level of supervision," were well aware of the harassment to which petitioner was subjected, before he officially reported it. Supervisors were themselves guilty of harassment. On February 8, 1988, Mr. Sherouse, the maintenance superintendent, addressed "a routine shift meeting with employees [and] discussed with them the need to refrain from destruction of employees' or company property." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Mr. Sherouse "essentially said . . . some employees . . . were being singled out . . . . " T.295. He told employees at the meeting that "such an incident . . . could result in an action up to termination." Id. At the same meeting he "also discussed cartoons and calendars that could be considered . . . racial or sexual harassment . . . [directing that] they must be removed now." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. These matters were also discussed at an employee information meeting in January of 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. But harassment of petitioner continued. "[Q]uite frequently . . . thick heavy grease would get smeared on his toolbox, underneath the drawers of his toolbox." T.34. The lock on his locker was glued or "zip-gripped" shut several times, and had to be cut to open the locker. Respondent's Exhibit No. He is the only employee (T.39) who had to change clothes because some sort of itching powder was put in his clothes. Somebody put "Persian Blue," a particularly persistent dye, in his glove. At respondent's counsel's behest a list was prepared of "employees who have experienced problems with someone tampering with their tools or person[a]l lockers," Respondent's Exhibit No. 10, during the two years next preceding the list's preparation on August 4, 1989. Of the nine employees listed, seven were white Caucasians whose tools or books had been lost or stolen. 1/ Unlike the native-born men on the list, petitioner and Debbie Mitchell, the only other person listed, were subjected to repeated instances of vandalism and other harassment, including unflattering references in cartoons posted on the bulletin board in the break room. Although petitioner did not request it, management assigned him a new locker, something they did for no other employee. According to a co-worker, petitioner, who once taught welding at Pensacola Junior College, "likes to do a good, clean, responsible job" (T.185) of welding. But, on October 22 and 23, 1988, when petitioner and Millard Hilburn worked on "the #7 bottom ash discharge piping," Respondent's Exhibit No. 21, at Willard Douglas' behest, they failed to stop seepage from the pressurized pipe (which was in use while they worked) by welding, and resorted to epoxy which, in Mr. Douglas' "opinion[,] . . . [was] bad judgement and very poor workmanship." Id. Of 30 or 40 welders respondent employed at Crist, only one or two "still have a clean record. Eventually somebody is going to get a leak." T.202. Petitioner's work record is basically a very good one, although not perfect. Nevertheless Mr. Sherouse, after putting petitioner's name on a list of three "employees who for different reasons are not performing their jobs," Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, summoned petitioner to a conference about his job performance, on January 20, 1989. The other two employees were Scott Allen, whose problem was "attitude . . . distrust, dislike . . . just unbelievable" (T.443; 420) and Ed Lathan who "hadn't been there since June of '87" (T.420) except sporadically "working light duty." T.420. Mr. Sherouse also prepared various memoranda concerning petitioner; and caused other managers to prepare still other memoranda. Only after the January conference was petitioner involved in the repair of a boiler tube that failed. (He welded one end of a replacement piece that may have been improperly sized and had already been welded in place by others.) In contrast to petitioner's involvement in two incidents (only one of which occurred before the filing of the complaint), at least one other welder mechanic working for respondent had made five welds that failed in short order. On April 11, 1989, petitioner was assigned the job of cleaning plugged nozzles on intake screens for units four and five (although ordinarily operators themselves did such routine maintenance.) He first went to the control room for units four and five and asked directions to the intake screens, which are part of the cooling system. Misunderstanding directions, he went to the wrong cooling system intakes, those for units six and seven, instead of those for four and five, and started work without finding a red tag (used to indicate that somebody from operations had "isolated" the equipment) and without placing his own tag on an electrical switch that equipment operators use. He did, however, place tags on valves that had to be opened in order for the system to operate. When Mr. Sherouse heard what had happened he sent Mr. Inacio home from work. Although Mr. Sherouse did not at that time "announce termination or non- termination, pay or no pay" (T.436), petitioner was eventually paid for the time off, which lasted two days during the purported pendency of an investigation, which consisted of "going back and looking at his files." T.437. Without credible contradiction, several people testified that mistaking one piece of equipment for another occurred not infrequently (T.85) at the Crist plant. The evidence showed that much more serious safety lapses had, in general, elicited much milder responses from management. Petitioner was criticized more harshly than non-minority employees for the same or comparable performance. T.31-33, 73-74, 112-120, 130-131, 148-9, 150-4, 186-7, 197, 257- 263. Petitioner's safety record was "better than most." T.424. An Indian who works at the Crist steam plant, Ron Taylor is known as "Indian" or "Chief." T.52. Supervisors referred to Nicholas Peterson as "a damned Greek" (T.111) when he worked at respondent's Crist plant. "From January 1982 until March 1990," just about every supervisor at Crist "refer[red] to some . . . blacks as being niggers." T.135. Objection was sustained to admission of colored Beetle Bailey comic strips crudely altered to depict cartoon characters engaged in oral sex. But Ms. Mitchell testified without objection to other "extremely vulgar cartoons" (T.157) she saw posted on the bulletin boards including one with her name on it. T.159. (When she complained to Mr. Sherouse, he eventually reported back to her that the reference was to a different Debbie.) At Crist Electric "they use the good ole boy theory . . . [i]f you fit into their select group, you're taken in, you're trained . . . you get better selection of jobs. If you're not, you're an outcast." T.136. Petitioner "definitely" got more than his share of "dirty jobs," specifically precipitator work and condenser work. T.183; 85-86, 147-8. Petitioner's "pride was hurt." T.265. He felt humiliated. Unfair criticism affected his morale. T.36. At least one co-worker "could sense . . . that he felt like he was not wanted there." T.37. He considered leaving his employment and even told at least one Gulf Power official that he was doing so. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Discriminatory treatment affected his ability to concentrate, and so his job performance. T.36, 37.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR order respondent to refrain from harassing or otherwise discriminating against petitioner on account of his national origin. That the FCHR award petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1991.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
The Issue Was Petitioner denied a promotion on account of her gender?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed by the Department since 1991. Petitioner is a Field Biologist, Grade Level I. Among other things, she monitors surface water quality by collecting water in various environments and analyzing it in a laboratory. Early in 1994, there was a reorganization of her section and she began to work in the laboratory under the supervision of Jerry Owen. In the middle of 1994, Jim Wright became the supervisor of the laboratory section and, thus, Petitioner's supervisor. Subsequent to Mr. Wright becoming her supervisor, she experienced problems with regard to work assignments. Petitioner had been trained to operate the section's motorboats in 1991, and had operated them in the past. In January 1995, there were questions about Petitioner operating the boats. Subsequently, Environmental Specialist III Lee Banks told her she could no longer operate the boats. Under the supervision of Mr. Wright, Petitioner was assigned many secretarial duties. She was criticized for her lack of skill in filing. Mr. Wright suggested that she get some advice on how to properly file. She was instructed to learn to type and criticized when she failed to learn that skill. She was told that she couldn't travel to meetings and seminars until she completed a typing tutorial. During this period at least two informal documents were circulated in the section which were derogatory toward women. They could be considered offensive to someone with tender feelings, but they contained no vulgarity and were not outrageous. The origin of the documents was not demonstrated. Mr. Wright sometimes belittled the employees who were under his and he or others in the section sometimes told jokes, including "dumb blonde" jokes. On October 15, 1996, Petitioner learned that a co- worker, Pat O'Conner, a Field Biologist, Grade Level I, had his position upgraded to Field Biologist, Grade Level II. Pat O'Conner is a male and had less seniority in the Department than Petitioner. The position upgrade was not advertised and was not open to competition. Petitioner complained about this and was told to "sit tight" until an ongoing investigation of Mr. Wright was completed. Mr. Wright was removed from his position in March 1997. Petitioner prepared a complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission, which was signed on September 20, 1997, and filed sometime shortly afterward. Petitioner's complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations was filed on November 14, 1997.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and because of the reasons set forth in paragraphs 21 and 28, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon gender. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Amy B. Kalmbacher 600 Domenico Circle, A-10 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6515 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, or sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, an African-American male, as a nursing assistant at the community healthcare facility known as Jackson Hospital in Marianna, Florida, at all times relevant to these proceedings. Petitioner obtained his designation as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) subsequent to his employment by Respondent. Petitioner entered into a conversation with a female co-worker and CNA at Jackson Hospital on or about June 12, 2003. In the course of the conversation, he made an unwelcome sexual request of the co-worker. Petitioner was not on duty at the time and had returned to the hospital for other reasons. Subsequently, on June 12, 2003, the female co-worker filed a complaint with Respondent's human resource office at the hospital alleging unwelcome requests for sexual favors by Petitioner, inclusive of a request that the co-worker engage in sexual relations with Petitioner. In the course of his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was made aware of the strict guidelines and "zero tolerance" policy of Respondent toward sexual harassment. Respondent's policy expressly prohibits sexual advances and requests for sexual favors by employees. Discipline for a violation of this policy ranges from reprimand to discharge from employment of the offending employee. Petitioner has received a copy of the policy previously and he knew that violation of that policy could result in dismissal of an erring employee. Violations of this policy resulted in dismissal of a non- minority employee in the past. Corroboration of Petitioner’s policy violation resulted from interviews with other employees in the course of investigation by the hospital director of human resources. Further, in the course of being interviewed by the director, Petitioner admitted he had propositioned his co-worker for sexual favors. As a result of this policy violation, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on June 16, 2003. At final hearing, Petitioner admitted the violation of Respondent's policy, but contended that termination of employment had not been effected for white employees for similar offenses in the past. This allegation was specifically rebutted through testimony of Respondent's hospital human resources director that a white male employee had been previously discharged for the same offense. Accordingly, allegations of Petitioner of dissimilar treatment of employees on a racial basis for violation of Respondent's policy are not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Bowles 4193 Evelyn Street Marianna, Florida 32446 H. Matthew Fuqua, Esquire Bondurant and Fuqua, P.A. Post Office Box 1508 Marianna, Florida 32447 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a correction officer for the 16-month period between March, 1981 and July, 1982. She was assigned to the St. Johns County Jail, where her duties included booking and releasing both male and female inmates, taking mug shots, obtaining fingerprints, delivering food and mail, and providing general security. Petitioner satisfactorily completed a one-year probationary period and achieved permanent status. She became aware of her pregnancy in March, 1982, and informed her supervisor of this fact. 1/ She was initially told by her supervisor to report "downtown" for reassignment. However, the officer in charge of that department knew nothing of the proposed change in assignment and sent Petitioner back to the jail. Petitioner then resumed her correctional duties but was assigned exclusively to the booking desk based on her pregnancy. Around May, 1982, Petitioner was reassigned within the jail to the canteen, where her duties were clerical rather than correctional. On May 28, 1982, the jail administrator wrote to Petitioner's physician inquiring as to whether Petitioner could continue to perform correctional duties based on her physical ability and safety considerations. The physician's reply established that her physical ability would permit her to continue working until the date of her confinement, which he anticipated would occur about October 14, 1982. The physician declined to evaluate her condition in terms of job safety. In mid-July, Petitioner was told by her immediate supervisor, Sgt. Threet, that she should take maternity leave. Petitioner declined in the belief that she had a choice in the matter and that she was able to continue working. However, her unwillingness to take leave was not communicated to Captain Janson, who advised her by letter that he was placing her on leave as agreed. A meeting was held to discuss the proposed leave, but apparently the misunderstanding continued. Petitioner reported for work on July 21, 1982 and was directed to leave by her former supervisor, who advised Petitioner that she was no longer on the payroll. Petitioner's apparent termination on July 21, 1982 was confirmed by a letter from the St. Johns County Sheriff dated July 30, 1982 (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). The Sheriff's letter and other after-the-fact statements of subordinate officials indicated their belief that Petitioner and her fetus were in "obvious jeopardy" (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), so long as she continued to have contact with jail inmates. Additional reasons given for her removal were that she could not backup her commands to inmates because of her physical condition, and that she was becoming too large physically to work behind the booking desk (Respondent's Exhibit 1). The lack of any policy with respect to pregnancy and the confusion in this case were evident in the two attempted reassignments of Petitioner prior to her discharge and referral of the matter, at one point, to Petitioner's physician. Both Petitioner and her immediate supervisor, Sgt. (now Lieutenant) Threet are women of small physical stature. They are essentially unarmed while on duty and must rely on outside help if there is a major disturbance within the jail. Lieutenant Threet concedes that she would not be able to overpower a strong male prisoner if confronted by one. Therefore, the physical demands of the correctional officer position must be considered limited. There was no medical evidence presented that indicated Petitioner was unable to perform her assigned duties at the time of her discharge. She was aware of the physical risk to herself and fetus (although the degree of such risk was not established) and accepted this responsibility as a condition of her continued employment. The argument regarding Petitioner's alleged physical difficulty at the booking desk is rejected as pretextual and was not pursued at the hearing. Her alleged inability to backup commands to inmates due to her condition is likewise rejected in that she, as well as her female supervisor, were not at anytime capable of physically enforcing their commands with respect to the large and stronger male prisoners.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that Petitioner be reinstated by Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1984.
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Trend Offset Printing Company (Respondent or Trend), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, purportedly, a printing company located in Jacksonville, Florida. Specific information as to the company is limited, since the company did not appear at the final hearing. Based on Petitioner’s testimony, it is inferred that Respondent meets the definition of an employer in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. On Saturday, September 28, 2019, the printing plant was open, though the office was closed for the weekend. Petitioner was at work that day. On September 28, 2019, Petitioner had some vegetables that she had placed in a personal refrigerator that she kept at work. She intended to take the vegetables to her aunt. Several of the bags in which the vegetables had been placed had broken open. Therefore, after she clocked out of work, Respondent took a box from a trash receptacle located on the plant floor in which to place the vegetables. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, there was a cell phone in the discarded box. She loaded the box, and took it to her aunt’s house. Upon arrival, Petitioner unloaded the box and, at that time, discovered the phone at the bottom. The screen of the phone was cracked and broken. There was no evidence as to how or when the phone was damaged, nor was there any evidence that Petitioner was responsible for the phone’s condition. Petitioner’s aunt recommended that Petitioner discard the damaged phone. Petitioner, wanting to ensure that the phone was returned to its rightful owner, 1 Section 760.10 has been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of classifications protected from discriminatory employment practices. Ch. 2015-68, § 6, Laws of Fla. regardless of its condition, decided to return the phone on Monday, September 30, 2019, when the office would be open. Upon her return to work on Monday, September 30, 2019, Petitioner immediately turned in the phone to her supervisor, and accurately explained the circumstances of how it came into her possession. On October 2, 2019, Petitioner was presented with a letter of termination from Respondent’s Human Resources Manager, which provided that: After reviewing the pertinent evidence on the evening of Sept 28th, 2019, we have determined to terminate your employment with Trend Offset Printing immediately. Any remaining hours worked and any unused vacation hours will be paid out in full on our next payroll cycle, Oct 11th, 2019. Those worked hours and unused vacation hours will be paid as directed via direct deposit or physical check. I've tried to reach out to you several times but unable to leave a message.[2] Please make arrangements with me to pickup any personal belongings that you may [sic]. If we don't hear from you in a reasonable time your personal belongings will be discarded. The evidence in this case establishes that Petitioner did nothing to warrant her termination. It is unreasonable to think that Petitioner would steal a phone, and then return it at the earliest opportunity. She had no desire or use for a cell phone. She did not try to use it. She had no idea to whom it belonged. That the phone ended up in her possession was entirely accidental. Though there was no evidence as to how or why the phone ended up in the box in the trash, the condition of the phone suggests that it may have been discarded by its owner. In any event, the evidence was persuasive that Petitioner did not intentionally take the phone. 2 The difficulty in reaching Petitioner may have been due to the fact that she did not own a cell phone, did not want a cell phone, and, according to both Petitioner and her sister, did not know how to use a cell phone. The letter of termination was vague, unusually and unnecessarily harsh, and not based on fact. Petitioner testified, for good reason, that “they didn’t treat me fair, at all.” However, Petitioner did not testify or present evidence at the hearing that Respondent’s action was based on discrimination due to race, sex, or age, or was the result of retaliation. As will be discussed herein, the failure to prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 3 Petitioner requested, as relief, that she be reinstated to her previous job with Respondent, because she loved working with her co-workers, who she described as family; and that her name be cleared of the unwarranted allegation of theft. Due to the outcome of this proceeding, the undersigned is unable to recommend Petitioner’s reinstatement. However, this Order is intended, and should be treated, as determining that Petitioner engaged in no theft, or any other conduct vis-á-vis the cell phone, that warranted her termination. RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Annette Johnson’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 202126948. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Annette Y. Johnson 635 Luna Court Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Trend Offset Printing Company 10301 Busch Drive North Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap or disability, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact North Florida Sales Company (North Florida), the Respondent in this case, is a beer and ale wholesaler that does business in Florida and employs over 15 people. Window Mitchell, Petitioner in this case, began working at North Florida as a custodian in the maintenance department on June 22, 2009. His normal schedule at North Florida was Monday through Friday. Near the time he was hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's "Employee Information Handbook." The handbook advised Petitioner of North Florida's "open door" policy that permitted employees to take any complaints or problems directly to the Human Resources Manager, the General Manager, or the President. It further advised employees that it was North Florida policy to treat all employees equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, disability, or national origin. It stated that any violation of North Florida's equal opportunity policies must be reported immediately to the Human Resources Manager or General Manager without delay. The employee handbook also advised Petitioner of North Florida's policies on attendance. It required employees to give advance notice of any absence or lateness, and noted that employees who fail to maintain an acceptable attendance record would be subject to disciplinary action. On September 10, 2009, Petitioner received an Employee Warning Report noting that Petitioner had missed six days of work during his 90-day probationary period. The report stated that this amount of absenteeism was considered excessive and that immediate improvement was expected. It was signed by Petitioner and Petitioner's supervisor. On November 10, 2009, Petitioner received another Employee Warning Report. It stated that Petitioner's attendance continued to be a problem and that it was creating a burden on the maintenance department. It stated that further incidents of absenteeism, or arriving late or leaving early, would result in termination. It was signed by Petitioner, Petitioner's supervisor, and Margaret Lombardi, Human Resources Manager. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever received any further "Employee Warning Reports." On June 3, 2010, Petitioner received an Employee Performance Review. In his review, Petitioner was given a rating of "3" out of "10" on "dependability." The comment under that heading indicated that Petitioner was "out from work too many days." Petitioner received two other "3"s on his evaluation and received no evaluation above a "5" in any area. In the final section, entitled "Objectives for the Next Review Period," the first of two objectives listed was "keep all curbs in warehouse painted." The second was, "try to be at work all of the time." On July 17, 2010, Petitioner was returning from a barbecue with four friends. He testified that he had not been drinking. The car he was driving ran into a pole head-on. Petitioner's knee and leg hurt and became badly swollen. He had "little chunks of meat" missing from his left elbow and forearm. He was seen by an emergency doctor at Baptist Medical Center about 9:45 p.m., released, and given discharge instructions. On July 19 or 20, 2010, Ms. Lombardi received a paper entitled Adult Discharge Instructions on a Baptist Health form dated July 17, 2010. It indicated that Petitioner had been in the vehicle collision and had been treated for abrasions and a contusion on his right knee. In the instructions, Petitioner was told to take medications as instructed, follow up with the doctor in two days, and return to the emergency room for worsening symptoms. A box was checked indicating "no work for 2 days." Ms. Lombardi interpreted the note as excusing Petitioner from work on Sunday and Monday, and therefore expected Petitioner to return to work on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. When Petitioner did not return to work on Tuesday, Ms. Lombardi called him. Petitioner said he did not realize that the doctor's note had excused him for only two days. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that it did, and she told him he needed to come to work that day. Petitioner complained that his arm and leg were still hurting. Petitioner said he would return to work that afternoon, but did not. Petitioner did not come to work on Wednesday, July 21, 2010. Petitioner left a message for Ms. Lombardi and she called him about 10 a.m. Petitioner told Ms. Lombardi that he had gone to the doctor the day before and had another note excusing him from work. Ms. Lombardi asked Petitioner why he had not called her or the supervisor to let them know. Petitioner stated that he had called the supervisor, but had been unable to reach him and had been asked to call back. Petitioner said he did not call back because he did not get out of the doctor's office until after 5:00 pm. Ms. Lombardi directed him to have the note sent to her by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Lombardi received a form faxed from Baptist Health entitled "Discharge Instruction" about 4:38 p.m. that day, as indicated in her note prepared for Petitioner's file. It had a subtitle of "Work Release Form." The form stated that Petitioner had been seen again on July 21, 2010, and that he could return to work on July 25, 2010. The form had date and time blocks indicating "July 21, 2010" and "4:31 p.m." Ms. Lombardi testified that the form from Baptist Health indicated that Petitioner had been seen by a doctor that same day and that "I received it shortly after-–there was a discharge time on it." On the following day, July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi again called Petitioner. When asked about an excuse from the doctor whom Petitioner had seen on July 20, 2010, Petitioner replied, "Oh, that was a different doctor." Petitioner said that the excuse from the visit on July 21, 2010, was from the same doctor he saw on July 17, 2010. Ms. Lombardi's file note stated that this was "the second time that Mitchell has incurred absences with inconsistency in the facts surrounding that absence." Petitioner gave evasive and inconsistent testimony at hearing about whether there was ever a third doctor's excuse, in addition to the excuses of July 17, 2010 and July 21, 2010. Any of Petitioner's testimony suggesting that there was third excuse was not credible. There were only two doctor's excuses. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi filled out a "Status/Payroll Change Report" that discharged Petitioner from employment at North Florida. In the "Reason" portion of the form, Ms. Lombardi wrote, "Excessive absenteeism and multiple incidences of inconsistent facts surrounding his absences." Petitioner was immediately notified by telephone that his employment had been terminated. In that conversation, Petitioner asked Ms. Lombardi why he was being discharged. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that the basis for his discharge was his poor attendance. Petitioner was recovering from the injuries he received in the accident for about a week-and-a-half. After that he was fully recovered. Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by Respondent's decision to discharge him. It has been difficult to find work in the depressed economy and Petitioner has financial responsibilities. Petitioner has three children. Petitioner was employed by Wage Solutions, working the warehouse at Liberty Furniture, unloading furniture and bringing it to the showroom from March 2011 to August 2011. Petitioner lost that job because that business closed. At the time of hearing Petitioner was not employed. Petitioner went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He did not complain to them that he had been discriminated against on the basis of a handicap or disability. He just wanted an investigation into his discharge because he believed he had been terminated unfairly. He testified: Doing – I guess, telling my side of the story to file whatever they wanted me to file. I didn't even know it was doing – about the disability or not. I didn't know they signed me up under that. The only thing I thought, they were going to investigate to see why I got terminated. * * * And from there, I guess that – that's it. I knew I had to come to court from there, so I was just really based on that. I knew I had to show up to court for – I wasn't looking for all of this to come down to this. The only thing – I just wanted to know why I got fired, because I – about my attendance or being absent, but I had excuses for them. On October 12, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief against Respondent claiming an unlawful employment practice, alleging that he was wrongfully fired because of a mishap, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings the same day.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Diana Sexton and Freddie Sexton were carriage drivers for Gam-San, Inc., which was known by the fictitious name of St. Augustine Transfer Company. They conducted ghost tours and history tours in the historic district of St. Augustine. No evidence was presented regarding Mr. Sexton's race or either Petitioners' age. At the time of the incident giving rise to this proceeding, Diana Sexton had worked for Respondent for approximately one and a half years. Freddie Sexton has worked for the company in the same type of position for a shorter period of time. Petitioners are married to each other. Petitioners drove carriages pulled by horses, and gave tours to the public. They sometimes stayed overnight at the barn owned by Respondent in order to water the horses. They did not have permission to stay at the barn, but Ms. Sexton considered it to be a benefit in exchange for watering the horses at night. Diana Sexton acknowledged that Petitioners had been informed that they were expected to find another place to stay before the end of the "Nights of Lights" (although no explanation was provided regarding what time frame this entailed), but denied that Petitioners were ever told to leave or not to stay at the barn. Employees hired by St. Augustine Transfer were usually hired as carriage drivers, stall people, or barn managers. Both stall people and barn managers were paid minimum wage. Carriage drivers, like waitresses, receive tips from customers as part of their pay. Generally, with tips, drivers are the highest paid employees of the business. It would not be considered a promotion to go from a position as driver to either stall person or barn manager. Petitioners did not work on December 25, 2007. They apparently spent the night at the barn the night before and left the work premises in the morning. At some time in the evening, Petitioners returned to the business premises, ostensibly to retrieve some of their belongings that were in the barn. While they were present on the property, the police came, indicating that they had received a call complaining of a disturbance. Petitioners were believed to be the cause of the disturbance and were asked to leave. Petitioners refused to leave without speaking to Stuart Gamsey, and denied creating any type of disturbance. Eventually they left the premises at the insistence of the police. They claim they were not allowed to return to retrieve their belongings for several days, and were discharged from their jobs. The evidence is in conflict over what, if anything, was occurring on the premises of the business the evening of December 25, 2007. However, the more credible admissible evidence indicates that at least two calls were made to Stuart Gamsey, the then owner of St. Augustine Transfer Co. The calls involved complaints about Petitioners' drinking, yelling, and generally creating a disturbance on the property. One call was made by police officers on the scene. Mr. Gamsey had not given Petitioners, or any other employees, permission to stay on the premises when not working. He could not say whether there was actually a disturbance on the premises, but confirmed that in response to the calls he received, he asked the police to do "whatever it took" to get Petitioners to leave the property. His goal was simply to end whatever disturbance might be occurring. Petitioners' employment was terminated by St. Augustine Transfer. It is not entirely clear from the evidence presented whether the December 25, 2007, incident formed the basis for the termination or whether other factors were involved. It is clear, however, that Petitioners resisted leaving the premises at a time when they did not have permission to be there. Stuart Gamsey sold the business in the summer of 2008. He currently has no responsibility for the hiring practices of St. Augustine Transfer Co. or its successor. No competent, credible evidence was presented indicating that any other employee was allowed to stay on the premises outside of work hours. Petitioners also claim that Mr. Sexton was discriminated against based upon his marital status because someone, presumably another employee, left K-Y jelly in his carriage, and on one occasion, a patron tipped another employee to make sure she could ride in his carriage and engage in inappropriate behavior designed to seduce him. However, no competent, credible evidence was presented to show who placed the K-Y jelly in Mr. Sexton's carriage or for what purpose, if any, it was left. Likewise, no competent, credible evidence was presented to support the allegation that placing the patron in Mr. Sexton's carriage was for any discriminatory purpose. No evidence was presented regarding any other proceedings of any type involving Petitioners and Respondent.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petitions for Relief and denying Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Freddie J. Sexton Diana J. Sexton Post Office Box 105 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Regina Sargeant, Esquire 2820 US 1 South, Suite F St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
