Findings Of Fact David Keesler was a licensed general contractor holding license #40094 issued by Department of Professional Regulation at all times relating to the allegations which are the basis of this case. David and Sandra Pedersen contracted with Mr. Keesler to construction a house for $88,500 for them on a lot they owned. Mr. Pedersen was aware that Mr. Keesler was over extended financially because Mr. Keesler was building several houses. As a result, Mr. Pedersen opened up an account at Lowes in his name for Mr. Keesler to order building supplies. Mr. Keesler contracted with other material men and subcontractors for other materials and services. A schedule of payments on the construction loan to the Pedersens was established by the lending institution based upon progress of construction. The Pedersens, in turn, released the money to Mr. Keesler for payments to material men and contractors. Mr. Pedersen made periodic payments directly to Lowes. Prior to the last payment, Mr. Keesler asked Mr. Pedersen for additional money to settle with subcontractors and materialmen. Mr. Pedersen and his lending institution made this money available to Mr. Keesler. At the closing, Mr. Keesler was asked to provide affidavits of satisfaction from the materialmen and subcontractors. Mr. Keesler could not provide these affidavits, and turned the matter over to his attorney. Mr. Pedersen contacted an attorney when the lending institution advised them that they looked to him for the payments on the construction loan, and were initiating a foreclosure action. Mr. Pedersen's attorney contacted the materialmen and subcontractors concerning their liens. The money owed to these lien holders exceeded the amount of the last payment less the advance. Mr. Pedersen's attorney made arrangements to settle with the materialmen and subcontractors, with the exception of Lowes, to settle their liens proportionally based upon the money available. Mr. Pedersen, because he was personally obligated, paid Lowes in full. As a result of the failure of Mr. Keesler to complete the house for the contract amount, the Pedersens suffered financial loss and the materialmen and subcontractors suffered financial losses. Notice of the hearing was given to Mr. Keesler in accordance with the statutes and rules. The Petitioner has substantiated by affidavit costs in the amount of $3,079.40.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for a period of two years. That costs of prosecution be awarded in the amount of $3,079.40. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Cummings, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 David Keesler 2172 San Pablo Court Middleburg, FL 32068 Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director DPR - Construction Industry Licensing Board 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the assessment of the documentary stamp surtax in the amount of $2,436.50 and the penalty in a like amount, for a total assessment of $4,873.00, be upheld. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Gerald J. Biondo PAUL, LANDY, BAILEY & YACOS 200 Southeast First Street Miami, Florida 33131 Mr. Edwin J. Stacker Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(r), Florida Statutes (1995), 1/ by failing to satisfy a civil judgment relating to Respondent's contractor's license and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed in accordance with Florida Administrative Rule 61G4-17.001. 2/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating contractors in the state. Respondent is licensed as a contractor pursuant to license number CR C056639. Respondent has been a licensed contractor since January 22, 1993. Respondent is the primary qualifying agent for Accurate Development, Inc. ("Accurate") within the meaning of Section 489.1195(1)(a). In April 1995, Respondent entered into two oral agreements with Mr. Randall Bischoff, d/b/a Custom Glass and Mirror ("Custom"). Custom was to supply glass, mirrors, shelving, shower enclosures, and labor as subcontractor for Accurate at two construction sites on which Respondent was constructing new residential homes. Respondent and Accurate agreed to pay for all materials and labor. Mr. Bischoff provided all of the materials and labor required by the terms of the contract. Neither Respondent nor Accurate ever paid for the materials or labor. Mr. Bischoff spoke with Respondent on several occasions in unsuccessful attempts to obtain payment of the sums owed to him and to resolve the matter amicably. Mr. Bischoff then filed mechanic liens against the real property on which he performed work for Respondent. At their own expense, the home owners attempted to remove the liens without paying Mr. Bischoff. After protracted litigation, Mr. Bischoff agreed to remove the liens. Prior to their removal, the liens clouded the titles of the homeowners. On June 8, 1995, Mr. Bischoff sued Respondent and Accurate in Brevard County Court for the money owed to him. On July 10, 1995, the court issued two final judgments in favor of Mr. Bischoff for $2,381.41 and $1,297.23 for each of the two residences on which Mr. Bischoff performed as Respondent's subcontractor. Neither Respondent nor Accurate ever satisfied all, or part, of either judgment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(r) and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1997.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of making misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 289.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes; mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h)2, Florida Statutes; failing to comply with any of the provisions of Chapter 489, Part I, or a rule or lawful order of the Construction Industry Licensing Board, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes; abandoning a construction project, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes; committing fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes; two counts of committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes; and failing to satisfy, within a reasonable time, a civil judgment obtained against him, or a business entity that he has qualified, and related to the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(r), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified general contractor, holding certificate number CR C016649. He has been continuously certified since 1980 and has been licensed since 1988 as the qualifier of Dunbar Development, Inc. On August 19, 1994, Carla and Vernon Prevatt entered into a contract with Dunbar Development, Inc., for the construction of a residence. The contract calls for Dunbar Development, Inc. (Dunbar), to construct the "Horizon" model home on two platted lots for the sum of $73,395 plus an additional $7400 for Addendum 2. The contract permits Dunbar to cancel the contract if the Prevatts timely apply for a mortgage, but are denied. However, in such event, the contract requires Dunbar to return to the Prevatts all of their money. The contract acknowledges that the Prevatts paid Dunbar the sum of $1500 at the time of entering into the contract. A handwritten note states: "June 06, 1995—Rec'd $17,000.00 ck no. 16655 to initiate construction application for permits & building." Although the contract was originally signed by John Danzy, as "authorized representative" for Dunbar, this handwritten note bears the initials, "WB." The contract does not contain Respondent's certificate number. The contract does not contain a completion date. The contract provides that Dunbar will "commence construction . . . after full down payment and mortgage financing is received" and "will complete the same as soon as practicable, subject to the availability of labor and supplies [and] delays not within the control of [Dunbar]." Another clause in the contract states that Dunbar shall complete construction within two years of the date of the contract. On August 30, 1994, the Prevatts applied for a construction mortgage loan with the First Bank of Clewiston. The bank processed the loan application without any delays or problems. However, there was a substantial delay not attributable to the Prevatts or Respondent in obtaining an appraisal. The appraiser completed the appraisal before March 5, 1995, but probably not much prior to that date. By letter dated March 5, 1995, from Dunbar's financial officer to the Prevatts, Dunbar acknowledged the receipt of the appraisal and proposed a draw schedule totaling $80,795. The first payment under the draw schedule was $18,500 for "applicable fees and permits, plus, the plylon engineered foundation and engineered septic field construction initiation." The policy of First Bank of Clewiston is to match the value of the work to the payments to the contractor. The first payment due under Dunbar's draw schedule called for a payment substantially in excess of the value of the goods and services rendered. However, the bank acceded to the schedule and delivered a check dated June 6, 1995, in the amount of $17,000 payable jointly to the Prevatts and Dunbar. As Dunbar had done with the $1500 down payment received at the time of the execution of the contract, Dunbar deposited the $17,000 check and received payment of these funds. On behalf of Dunbar, Respondent hired Johnson-Prewitt & Associates, Inc., in early November 1995, to prepare the engineering drawings for the septic tank and foundation. These materials are specific to the Prevatts' homesite. By invoice dated November 13, 1995, Johnson-Prewitt & Associates, Inc., invoiced Respondent at Dunbar a total of $1700 for the completed work. After a credit of $700, the outstanding balance was $1000, which remains unpaid. From 1994 through 1995, Respondent, on behalf of Dunbar, provided information to Alpha Engineering, which was retained to prepare the plans for the Horizon model that the Prevatts were building. Most of this work was for the prototype Horizon home, but the work reflected by an invoice dated March 16, 1996, was exclusively for the home to be built for the Prevatts. Respondent and Dunbar never paid this invoice and never picked up the plan revisions that were the subject of this invoice. In fact, Respondent and Dunbar never commenced construction of the Prevatts' home and refused to return any portion of the $18,500 that the Prevatts paid to Dunbar. Although the bank never made any additional disbursements, the Prevatts nevertheless owed the bank the $17,000 disbursed as the first draw and, at the time of the hearing, had paid the sum of $6522.96 in interest and closing costs on this loan. With two checks totaling $2800 that, in June 1995, Yvonne Bushnell delivered to Respondent, on behalf of Dunbar, Ms. Bushnell entered into a contract with Dunbar for the construction of a residence. After Dunbar declined to construct a house or return the money, Ms. Bushnell filed an action against Respondent and Dunbar in Lee County Court on January 31, 1997. On March 12, 1997, the court entered a default judgment against Dunbar Developing, Inc., for the sum of $2800 and costs of $79.50. Following entry of the judgment, on September 14, 1998, Ms. Bushnell and Respondent agreed to settle the matter with the payment of $1600. However, upon payment of only $800, Respondent obtained Ms. Bushnell's signature on a letter dated September 14, 1998, to Petitioner acknowledging the full settlement of the case. Respondent then proceeded to obtain court issuance of a satisfaction when Ms. Bushnell refused to sign a satisfaction, absent payment of the remaining $800. By Order to Set Aside Settlement Agreement entered November 24, 1998, the court reinstated the original judgment. The judgment remains unsatisfied.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order revoking Respondent's certificate as a general contractor and imposing an administrative fine against him of $4000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 6th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul F. Kirsch, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 P. Michael Villalobos Sussman Law Group, P.A. 1375 Jackson Street, Suite 201 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of employment discrimination by reason of his being terminated, allegedly on account of his physical disability.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an "employee" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and the Respondent meets the statutory definition of "employer" appearing in that Chapter. The Petitioner is a truck driver by occupation and was employed by the Respondent, Gurley Refining Company, in that capacity from February, 1982 until February 11, 1988, with the exception of a very brief period of time when he performed some other duties for that firm. This cause arose under the auspices of the Florida Human Relations Commission, an agency of the State of Florida constituted in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It is charged by that Chapter with oversight of working conditions and circumstances between employers and employees in Florida to the extent that the agency, under the mandate of Chapter 760, provides a procedure whereby employee claims of employment discrimination on account of race, age, sex, religion, national origin or disability can be adjudicated in a due process hearing environment, including hearings before the Division of Administrative Hearings in the event such claims culminate in formal disputes. During the course of the Petitioner's employment with Gurley Refining Company, in addition to being employed as a truck driver (the vast majority of his duties with that company), the Petitioner also had significant experience as a warehouse employee, handling the company's inventory and freight. The Petitioner had an unblemished record as a truck driver for the Respondent company. He had no disciplinary altercations with his supervisors and his attendance record was characterized by very few absences, sick leave and little tardiness. In approximately early January of 1988, the Petitioner suffered an acute myocardial infarction (heart attack), which necessitated his absence from work for a period of approximately thirty days. His treating physician, a cardiologist, Dr. Story, of Orlando, released him approximately a month after his heart attack, but admonished him to engage in light duties, and restricting him against lifting weight in excess of seventy pounds. During the course of his illness, the operations manager of the Respondent's Lake County facility and Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Kenny Hart, had assured the Petitioner that his job would be waiting for him as soon as he recovered from his illness. In fact, however, in early February, when the Petitioner was released by his doctor to return to his job, with the restrictions mentioned above, the Petitioner requested his former job back and was refused. Mr. Hart indicated to the Petitioner that he would not hire him back, and in fact terminated him due to his medical condition, as Mr. Hart explained it. The Petitioner's doctor had not restricted him from doing his same job or from working an eight hour day, but merely had restricted him against lifting more than seventy pounds at any one time. When Mr. Hart refused to put him back to work in his old job, the Petitioner requested to be assigned to duties in the company's warehouse or bottling plant. The company had an operation involving bottling of windshield washer detergent fluid. The Petitioner had had substantial experience in those operations, especially as a checker of merchandise and as a forklift operator in the company warehouse. His physical disability would not preclude him from performing those functions. Mr. Hart, and his superior, Mr. Helton of the company's office in Memphis, Tennessee, declined to place the Petitioner in such an employment position with the company. There have been a number of instances in which the company accommodated employees by placing them at work at various positions in the company operations during the period of time they were on medical restrictions by their doctors due to some disability or illness. The Petitioner described one case in particular involving an employee who had surgery for amputation of his leg and who was allowed to come back to work performing various minor jobs during his convalescence in order to allow him some gainful employment, later being restored to more meaningful permanent duties. The Petitioner was not thus accommodated, however. The Petitioner could have performed any of the types of duties mentioned above, involving the warehouse or the bottling plant or driving a truck once again, because all were within the scope of his years of experience with the company and his physical abilities, even as restricted by his doctor. The Petitioner was making $7.80 an hour when he was terminated and during the year after his termination from February 11, 1988 to approximately February 1, 1989, the Petitioner was not able to get regular employment. For a time after termination, he was receiving unemployment compensation and thereafter worked at casual labor jobs involving loading and unloading trucks for a trucking company. He also worked at laying sewer lines, doing manual labor. During the year after his termination, the Petitioner and his wife earned approximately $18,000. Four thousand dollars of that sum was from the wife's part-time employment. The Petitioner had grossed approximately $30,000 in the past full year he worked for the Respondent company, that is, 1987. In February, 1989, the Petitioner again obtained full-time employment in a truck driving position with another firm. He is again making approximately $30,000 gross salary per year. At the time Petitioner was off work from his job with the Respondent due to his heart condition, and at the time of his termination, no mention was made or information given him about any right to medical disability to leave. The Petitioner apparently missed approximately thirty days of work, and then was terminated under the above conditions and circumstances.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice occurred by Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner on account of his handicap, and that he be accorded all relief allowed under the above-cited authority, including back pay of $16,000 and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 16th of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. P MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings, The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Allen Reynolds 2356 Oliver Avenue Leesburg, FL 32748 Mr. R. D. Helton Director of Operations Gurley Refining Company Post Office Box 626 Memphis, Tennessee 38101 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 240, Building F 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, properly assessed a penalty of $90,590.42 against Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC, was a corporation domiciled in Florida. S.A.C.'s 2007 Limited Liability Company Annual Report lists its principal place of business as 626 Lafayette Court, Sarasota, Florida, 34236, and its mailing address as Post Office Box 49075, Sarasota, Florida 34230. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William R. Suzor was the president and managing member of S.A.C. Collen Wharton is an Insurance Analyst II with the Department. In this position, Ms. Wharton conducts inspections to ensure that employers are in compliance with the law. On June 20, 2007, Ms. Wharton conducted a compliance check at 2111 South Osprey Avenue in Sarasota, Florida. During the compliance check, Ms. Wharton observed three males working at that location. The three men were framing a single-family house that was under construction. This type of work is carpentry, which is considered construction. During the compliance check, Ms. Wharton asked David Crawford, one of the men working at the site, who was their employer. Mr. Crawford told Ms. Wharton that he and the other two men worked for S.A.C., but were paid by a leasing company. Mr. Crawford told Ms. Wharton that the company was owned by Mr. Suzor and, in response to Ms. Wharton's inquiry, he gave her Mr. Suzor's telephone number. In addition to Mr. Crawford, the other workers at the site were identified as Terry Jenkins and Frank Orduno. By checking the records the Department maintains in a computerized database, Ms. Wharton determined that S.A.C. did not carry workers' compensation insurance, but had coverage on its employees through Employee Leasing Solutions, an employee leasing company. She also determined, by consulting the Department's database, that none of the men had a workers' compensation exemption. Ms. Wharton telephoned Employee Leasing Solutions, which advised her that two of the workers at the site, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Jenkins, were on the roster of employees that the company maintained. The company advised her that the other worker, Mr. Orduno, was not on its roster of employees. This information was verified by an employee list that the leasing company provided to Ms. Wharton. On June 20, 2007, after determining that one worker at the work site had no workers' compensation coverage, Mr. Wharton prepared a Stop-Work Order. She then telephoned Mr. Suzor, told him that he had one worker at the site who did not have workers' compensation coverage and requested that he come to the work site. During the conversation, Mr. Suzor advised Ms. Wharton that Mr. Crawford was in charge at the work site, that she could give the Stop-Work Order to Mr. Crawford, and that he (Mr. Suzor) would meet her the following day. Ms. Wharton, after she telephoned Mr. Suzor, she conferred with her supervisor and then issued Stop-Work Order No. 07-125-D3, posting it at the work site and serving it on Mr. Crawford. On June 21, 2007, Mr. Suzor met with Ms. Wharton at her office. During that meeting, Ms. Wharton served a copy of Stop-Work Order No. 07-125-D3 on Mr. Suzor. She also served him with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Request for Business Records"). The Request for Business Records listed specific records that Mr. Suzor/S.A.C. should provide to the Department so that the Department could determine the workers who S.A.C. paid during the period of June 19, 2004, through June 20, 2007. The Request for Business Records notes that the requested records must be produced within five business days of receipt. According to the Request for Business Records, if no records are provided or the records provided are insufficient to enable the Department to determine the payroll for the time period requested for the calculation of the penalty in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, "the imputed weekly payroll for each employee, . . . shall be the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), F.S. multiplied by 1.5." S.A.C. did not respond to the Department's Request for Business Records. On July 17, 2007, the Department had received no records from S.A.C. Without any records, Ms. Wharton had no information from which she could determine an accurate assessment of S.A.C.'s payroll for the previous three years. Therefore, Ms. Wharton calculated the penalty based on an imputed payroll. In her calculations, Ms. Wharton assumed that Mr. Orduno worked from June 21, 2004, through June 20, 2007, and that he was paid 1.5 times the state-wide average weekly wage for the class code assigned to the work he performed for each year or portion of the year. The Department then applied the statutory formula set out in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes. Based on that calculation, the Department correctly calculated S.A.C.'s penalty assessment as $90,590.42, as specified in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated July 17, 2007. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment reflecting the correct penalty amount was served on S.A.C.'s attorney, John Myers, Esquire, by hand-delivery, on July 17, 2007.3/ On July 21, 2007, S.A.C., through its former counsel, filed a Petition for Hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order which affirms the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued July 17, 2007, assessing a penalty of $90,590.42, and the Stop-Work Order issued to Petitioner, S.A.C., LLC, on June 20, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2008.
The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452
