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STEVE FREEMAN vs LD MULLINS LUMBER COMPANY, 14-002139 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 12, 2014 Number: 14-002139 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2014

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, an African-American male, was employed by Respondent as a truck driver. In or around 1997, Respondent hired Petitioner as a forklift operator, a position he voluntarily abandoned (after roughly one year) to pursue other opportunities. Some six years later, in 2004, Petitioner returned to Respondent's employ as a truck driver. This second stint of employment continued until June of 2011, at which time Petitioner resigned his position——again, voluntarily——in order to "cash out" his 401K account. Tellingly, in his resignation letter, Petitioner thanked Respondent "for the opportunities [it] had provided [him] during the years," and noted that he "really enjoyed working for Mullins Lumber." Several months later, Respondent approached Petitioner about returning to his former truck-driver position. Petitioner agreed and resumed his employment with Respondent in August of 2011. For all that appears, Petitioner discharged his obligations suitably until the afternoon of August 14, 2012. On that occasion, Petitioner used a forklift to load materials onto his tractor trailer, a task he had performed numerous times. After the loading process was complete, Petitioner drove the forklift around the back of his truck and in the direction of the forklift shed. At one point along the way, it was necessary for Petitioner to make a blind turn around a truck belonging to a colleague, Wes Walker. Needless to say, such a maneuver presents a substantial danger to any person who might be nearby; for that reason, Respondent's forklift operator workbook, whose terms Petitioner was obliged to follow,2/ provides that drivers must: Slow down at cross isles [sic], exits, and blind corners; sound horn at once upon approaching any of these situations. (Emphasis in original).3/ Of the mistaken assumption that no other workers were in the immediate area because of inclement weather (a light rain was falling), Petitioner neither sounded the forklift's horn nor slowed to an appropriate speed as he negotiated the blind corner.4/ As a consequence, Petitioner accidentally collided with Respondent's vice president, Scott Mullins, who was conversing with Mr. Walker at the rear of the truck.5/ The evidence is undisputed that Scott Mullins suffered a broken tibia and fibula, injuries that required surgery and months of physical therapy to correct. Within hours of the accident, one of Respondent's owners and officers, Clarke Mullins, suggested to Petitioner (who was noticeably distraught) that he take the rest of the week off and return to work the following Monday. Petitioner agreed and departed the worksite shortly thereafter. Over the next several days, Clarke Mullins conducted a brief, yet adequate, investigation of the events of August 14, 2012. The investigation included an interview of Mr. Walker, an African-American, who confirmed that Petitioner's operation of the forklift was lacking. Upon the completion of his investigation, Clarke Mullins concluded that the accident of August 14 warranted the termination of Petitioner's employment.6/ Petitioner was thereafter replaced by an African-American driver some three years and seven months his junior.7/ During the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner offered no direct evidence in support of his claim of age discrimination. Although the age disparity between Petitioner and his replacement is sufficient to raise an initial inference of impropriety, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent's proffered reason for the firing——the accident——is a mere pretext for age discrimination. On the contrary, the undersigned credits Clarke Mullins' testimony that the accident was the sole basis for Petitioner's termination.8/ The charge of race discrimination fares no better. Petitioner's conclusory assertions notwithstanding, the record is devoid of any evidence, direct or otherwise, suggesting that Petitioner's termination was motivated by racial considerations. Quite the opposite, in fact: Petitioner was replaced by a member of his own race; and, as noted above, the undersigned credited Clarke Mullins' testimony that Petitioner was fired for the accident alone.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 2014.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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RAMURIEL A. ORLINO vs JUPITER MEDICAL CENTER, 05-002171 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 16, 2005 Number: 05-002171 Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2008

The Issue Whether Jupiter Medical Center committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charge filed by Petitioner and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations grant Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is from the Philippines and is a Filipino citizen. He is now, and has been since approximately February 2000, a legal resident of the United States. JMC operates a 156-bed hospital (Hospital) located in Jupiter, Florida, which has a medical laboratory (Laboratory) that is "open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week." At all times material to the instant case, Kathleen Rogers was the director of the Laboratory and Sherry Miller was the assistant director of the Laboratory. Petitioner was hired by JMC in October 2000, as a medical technologist to work in the Laboratory. He worked in the Laboratory as a medical technologist, under Ms. Rogers' supervision, from October 2000, until his employment was terminated on June 6, 2003 (Employment Period). During the Employment Period, Jeanne Wiley also worked as a medical technologist in the Laboratory under Ms. Rogers' supervision. Ms. Wiley did not exercise any supervisory authority over Petitioner, nor was she part of the JMC management team. Ms. Rogers was responsible for Petitioner's hiring. She "hired him at the maximum [salary] that anybody coming in at th[at] level could be paid" under JMC's race/religion/gender- blind pay scale. Petitioner received pay raises during the time that he worked for JMC. There were other Laboratory employees who were paid less than Petitioner. None of these employees was Asian. John Lambiase was hired by JMC as a medical technologist to work in the Laboratory in 2003, shortly before Petitioner's termination. At the time of his hiring, Mr. Lambiase had less education and experience than did Petitioner. Nonetheless, Mr. Lambiase's starting salary of $17.80 per hour was $0.38 per hour more than Petitioner was making.2 This disparity in pay was the product of market conditions and had nothing to do with either Mr. Lambiase's or Petitioner's race. The position that Mr. Lambiase filled had been vacant for approximately eight months despite JMC's recruiting efforts. "[D]esperate" to fill the vacancy, Ms. Rogers requested and obtained from JMC's human resources department "special permission" to hire Mr. Lambiase at the going market rate. During the Employment Period, JMC had a human resources administrative policy and procedure manual (Manual), which was made available to all employees, including Petitioner. The Manual contained, among other things, an anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy, a grievance procedure, a "Time and Attendance" policy, and a progressive discipline policy. The progressive discipline policy stated, in pertinent part, substantially the following with respect to "Verbal Warning[s]," "Written Conference Records," and terminations: Verbal Warning: "Informal counseling" will be regarded as a daily on-going process through which management may communicate necessary information to his/her staff. Such information may include both positive comments and/or areas in need of improvement. In either case, management may wish to utilize "Employee Action Assessment" for the following purposes: To justify pay for performance adjustment decisions and to confirm performance appraisal accuracy. To document excellence for promotional opportunities. To document "reoccurring" performance/behavior/work habit problems that individually do[] not yet require formal documentation, (i.e.) "Written Conference Record." Employee Action Assessment entries will be shared with the employee within a reasonable time of management's observation or date of discovery. Employee Action Assessments need not be shared with Human Resources but rather maintained by the appropriate manager to be used as outlined above. Written Conference Records: Unless immediate suspension pending investigation or termination is necessary, an employee will receive a documented "Written Conference Record" which will delineate steps toward correction of the problem. The completed Written Conference Record process should take place within (3) three business days of the date of discovery, unless the employee has been temporarily suspended pending investigation or if interrupted by a Medical Center holiday. In the case of the latter, the process should be completed by the next business day. The Chief Human Resource Officer or Assistant Director of Human Resources will review and approve all "Written Conference Records" prior to management meeting with the employee. All employee "Written Conference Records" shall be documented on a Jupiter Medical Center "Conference Record" form and ultimately filed in the Human Resources Department. The employee is encouraged to review and record personal comments and sign the form. While employees are encouraged to respond [to] and sign the form, responding to, or signing the form merely indicates that the action was discussed with the employee, not that the employee agrees or disagrees with the corrective action. All completed "Written Conference Record" forms should be received by the Human Resources Department within (3) business days. A completed "Written Conference Record" form will be appropriately signed and dated by the manager, employee, if agreeable, and a managerial witness from the same department. A witness's signature will acknowledge that the information was thoroughly discussed with the employee in an appropriate manner. Any combination of three appropriately documented "Written Conference Records" within an eighteen-month (18) period will constitute grounds for termination unless otherwise noted on the "Written Conference Record." In such instances, fewer than (3) repetitions of some violations may [warrant] termination. . . . No department, other than the Human Resources Department will maintain formal "Written Conference Records" in their files. Informal documentation such as "employee action assessments" and/or employee attendance record may be kept within individual department files. A "Written Conference Record" should be available to support any performance appraisal standard scored as "needs improvement." Suspension and Termination: * * * 5. Terminations reviewed and approved by the Senior Manger will be forwarded to the Chief Human Resource Officer or the Assistant Director of Human Resources for review and final approval. A letter of termination must be coordinated through the Asst. Dir. of Human Resource[s] outlining all documentation used to justify the termination and to act as a notice to the terminated employee regarding [his or her] grievance rights and need to return certain Medical Center property. * * * Petitioner's employment with JMC was terminated, consistent with the above-referenced progressive discipline policy, because, in less than 18 months, he had accumulated three "Written Conference Records" (all of which were given to him by Ms. Rogers and, before becoming a part of Petitioner's permanent record, were reviewed and approved by JMC's human resources department). Petitioner's race played no role whatsoever in his receiving these three "Written Conference Records"3 or in his being terminated. There has been no showing that any other employee at the Hospital received three "Written Conference Records" within an 18-month period and remained employed. Petitioner received the first of these three "Written Conference Records" in September 2002. It read as follows: REASON FOR CONFERENCE: . . . . On August 23, 2002, Ramuriel reported out a 7.3mmol/L potassium result.[4] Ramuriel did not meet laboratory competency standards because he did not follow the attached laboratory procedure: NOTIFICATION OF LABORATORY VALUES. Procedures specifically not followed are: -2.1.1 "Verify the quality of the specimen" and "Recollect specimens immediately if specimen is suspect" 2.1.3 "Notify the physician/patient care personnel when patient is outside the hospital." Ramuriel failed to meet Human Resources 6.7a, a Class II violation, "Performance of duties below standard that continue after a reasonable period of appraisal and training." ACTION PLAN FOR IMPROVEMENT: . . . Ramuriel will immediately improve his technical skills and follow all laboratory policies, especially G.4.2 "Notification of Laboratory Values." Failure to meet JMC standards of competency will lead to further disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Ms. Rogers learned of the violation cited in this "Written Conference Record" as a result of a "physician complaint" (and not from Ms. Wiley).5 In giving Petitioner this "Written Conference Record," she did not treat him any differently than she treated other medical technologists who committed similar violations. Petitioner did not grieve his receipt of this "Written Conference Record," nor did he write anything on this "Written Conference Record" in the space provided for "[e]mployee [c]omments." The next "Written Conference Record" Petitioner received concerned an on-duty verbal altercation Petitioner had in January 2003, with another medical technologist working in the Laboratory, Susan Goldstein. Ms. Goldstein also received a "Written Conference Record" from Ms. Rogers for her participation in the altercation. Petitioner's "Written Conference Record" read as follows: REASON FOR CONFERENCE: . . . . On January 17, 2003, Ariel requested another employee to work in the coagulation section. The fellow employee stated she was busy helping a new employee with chemistry. The workload did not justify his request (see attached report). The coworker stated Ariel called her lazy when she refused to leave chemistry. Coworkers and supervisors do not feel Ariel is a patient focused team player and are unable to discuss workflow and cooperation with him. It is the policy of the Laboratory and Jupiter Medical Center to complete all tasks and work as a team to the benefit of our patients. Ariel violated Personnel Policy 6.7 group II.y "Other actions determined by management to not be in the best interest of the Medical Center." ACTION PLAN FOR IMPROVEMENT: . . . Ariel will immediately put the patient first, and remain focused on patient testing. The evening shift must work together as a team, and Ariel needs to be a member of this team. Petitioner grieved his receipt of this "Written Conference Record." Petitioner's grievance was ultimately presented to JMC's Chief Operating Officer, who reached the following "conclusion," which she reduced to writing on March 25, 2003: This investigation has revealed substantial agreement about the facts of the incident itself by all parties. The facts regarding the incident do merit a Written Record of Conference in accordance with Jupiter Medical Center Policy. The Record should be amended to show that the lack of teamwork referenced was agreed by the Department Man[a]ger to be primarily limited to the one employee involved in this incident and does not extend to the entire Department. With the amendment, the Written Record of Conference should be a permanent part of the employment file of Mr. Orlino. Following his receipt of the Chief Operating Officer's written "conclusion," Petitioner took no action to "continue with [his] grievance." As a result, pursuant to the grievance procedure set forth in the Manual, the Chief Operating Officer's written "conclusion" became the final resolution of Petitioner's grievance. The last of the "Written Conference Records" Petitioner received was for repeatedly violating, after being warned on "multiple occasions" to stop,6 that portion of JMC's "Time and Attendance" policy, which provided that "employees will not badge in more than seven minutes prior to the start of their shift." This "Written Conference Record," which was given to Petitioner on June 6, 2003, read as follows: REASON FOR CONFERENCE: . . . . See attached list of dates and times of Ramuriel's timeclock punches. Beginning on March 17, 2003 through May 24, 2003, Ramuriel has failed to badge in at the correct time. Ramuriel is establishing an unacceptable pattern of badging in for work early and leaving early. Ramuriel has violated Human Resources Policy 6.7.a, "Insubordination- refusal or failure to follow instruction or established practices of the Medical Center," a Class I violation. Ramuriel was informed of the correct badging practice verbally on March 3, 2003 and by mailbox on March 17, 2003. Again the policy was reviewed at the April 2, 2003 general laboratory meeting, which Ramuriel attended, and [he] reviewed and initialed the minutes which included the time clock policy. ACTION PLAN FOR IMPROVEMENT: . . . See associated letter. There has been no showing that any other Laboratory employee engaged in similar insubordinate conduct and did not receive a "Written Conference Record." Petitioner did not grieve his receipt of this "Written Conference Record" because he knew that he was in the wrong; nor did he write anything on this "Written Conference Record" in the space provided for "[e]mployee [c]omments." The "associated letter" in the "Written Conference Record" was a June 6, 2003, letter to Petitioner from Ms. Rogers, advising Petitioner of his termination. It read as follows: On August 23, 2002, you failed to meet laboratory competency standards or follow laboratory procedure. This is a Class II violation of Human Resources Policy 6.7- Discipline (a) "Performance of duties below standard that continue[s] after a reasonable period of appraisal and training." On October 23, 2002, you failed to meet laboratory competency standards or follow laboratory procedure. This is a Class II violation of Human Resources Policy 6.7- Discipline (a) "Performance of duties below standard that continue[s] after a reasonable period of appraisal and training."[7] On January 17, 2003, you failed to work as part of a team. This is a Class II violation of Human Resources Policy 6.7- Discipline (y) "Other actions determined by management to not be in the best interest of the Medical Center." Beginning on March 17, 2003 through May 24, 2003, you failed to badge in at your scheduled time, which is a violation of Human Resources Policy 6.7- Discipline, "Insubordination - refusal or failure to follow instructions or established practices of the Medical Center." Mr. Orlino, as a result of your actions, as denoted above, Jupiter Medical Center is terminating your employment effective immediately. You have the prerogative to utilize Jupiter Medical Center's grievance procedure; human resource policy 4.1, if you feel your termination is unjust. If you decide to grieve such a decision should be made within five (5) business days of June 6, 2003. In your absence, Jupiter Medical Center has elected to hand deliver this correspondence to ensure your complete understanding of the above events. Any compensation that you are eligible to receive will be paid to you on the hospital's next regularly scheduled payday. Please be aware that any hospital property, such as your ID badge, employee handbook, keys, uniform, etc. should be returned to the Human Resources Department. The final decision to terminate Petitioner was made, in accordance with JMC policy, by JMC's human resources department. Ms. Wiley did not provide any input in the making of this decision. Petitioner did not grieve his termination. At no time during the Employment Period did Petitioner ever utilize the procedures available to him under the Manual to complain that he was being discriminated against or harassed on the basis of his race; and there is no indication in the evidentiary record that, as a JMC employee, he was ever the victim of race-based discrimination or harassment.8 On May 24, 2005, almost a year after his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination charge with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that he was the victim of anti-Asian discrimination. There are currently three or four Asian employees working in the Laboratory. They were all hired by Ms. Rogers following Petitioner's termination. None of these employees has received a "Written Conference Record."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding JMC not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioner and dismissing his employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 2006.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e CFR (1) 29 CFR 1601.70 Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.02760.10760.1195.051
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DEREK A. ROBINSON vs GULF COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 09-006377 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Nov. 19, 2009 Number: 09-006377 Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2012

The Issue Whether Respondent Gulf Coast Community College (Respondent or the College) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner Derek A. Robinson (Petitioner) to discrimination in employment or by subjecting Petitioner to adverse employment actions in retaliation of Petitioner’s opposition to the College’s alleged discriminatory employment practices.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. The College is a public institution of higher education located in Panama City, Florida. In 1998, Petitioner was hired by the College to work in its custodial department as a custodian. Petitioner held that position until his termination on February 11, 2009. The College's custodial department is part of the College's maintenance and operations division (collectively, ?Maintenance Division?) managed by the campus superintendent. The two other departments within the Maintenance Division are the maintenance and grounds departments. During the relevant time period, there were approximately 40 to 50 employees in the Maintenance Division. Of those, there were approximately 21 to 28 custodians in the custodial department. Most of the custodians were African-Americans and there were only three Caucasian custodians. The Caucasian custodians were Tom Krampota, Josephine Riley, and Tommy Gillespie. Custodial staff typically work shifts beginning at 2:00 p.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. They are generally assigned housekeeping duties for a specific building. In addition to Monday through Friday, the College is also open on most weekends. Prior to 2001, the College began designating one employee to work a non-rotating weekend shift. Unlike other custodians, the designated weekend custodian worked from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. on Fridays and 6:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. The weekend custodian was not assigned to a particular building, but rather worked in various buildings as needed and was to be available to open doors to campus buildings during weekend hours. Petitioner was the designated weekend custodian from 2001 until his duties were changed in September 2008. Dr. John Holdnak, who worked for the College for 26 years in various capacities, including four years as Director of Human Resources, was the one who established the position of designated weekend custodian. Dr. Holdnak served as the College's Vice-President for Administration Services for his last eight years of employment with the College until leaving in July, 2008. As vice-president, Dr. Holdnak reported directly to the president of the College, Dr. James Kerley. Sometime prior to 2008, Dr. Holdnak observed that the departments in the Maintenance Division were underperforming, not adequately supervised, and failing to meet expectations. Dr. Holdnak observed that the Maintenance Division employees took excessive breaks and showed lack of effort in their work. For example, mold was found in some of the classrooms, an open window with a bird's nest was found in another, maintenance orders were backlogged, and Dr. Holdnak received a number of complaints from faculty and College employees regarding the Maintenance Division's level of service. As a result of Dr. Holdnak's observations, the College removed the campus superintendent from his position because of the superintendent's inability to manage line supervisors, provide leadership, or supervise personnel. After that, Dr. Holdnak personally supervised the Maintenance Division for a time in order to assess and develop a solution to the problem. Based upon Dr. Holdnak's assessment, the College sought applications for a new campus superintendent who could change and clean-up the culture of the Maintenance Division. At the time, the three department supervisors within the Maintenance Division were: Carlos "Butch" Whitehead for maintenance, Dan Doherty for custodial, and Ronny Watson for grounds. All three supervisors were Caucasian. The vacancy for the campus superintendent position was advertised. Dr. Holdnak encouraged John Westcott to apply for the campus superintendent position because he had previously worked with Mr. Westcott on a College construction project and was impressed with his vigor and work ethic. Mr. Westcott, a Caucasian, applied. So did custodial department supervisor, Dan Doherty, and three other candidates. Mr. Westcott disclosed on his application that he had been convicted of a felony twenty years prior to his application. Dr. Holdnak determined that Mr. Westcott's prior conviction would not impact his candidacy for the position. The applicants were screened by a selection committee composed of a number of College employees from various divisions, including Petitioner. Of the five applicants who applied, the selection committee's first choice was John Westcott, who was qualified for the position. Petitioner did not agree with the selection committee's first choice and was not impressed with Mr. Westcott during the screening process because Mr. Westcott referred to himself as the "terminator." Based upon the selection committee's first choice and the conclusion that Mr. Westcott satisfied the necessary criteria to change the Maintenance Division's culture, Dr. Holdnak recommended that the College hire John Westcott as the new campus superintendent. John Westcott was hired as campus superintendent in January 2008. Once Mr. Westcott was hired, Dr. Holdnak specifically directed him to take control of his departments, ?clean up the mess? and hold his mid-level supervisors responsible for their subordinates' results. Dr. Holdnak instructed Mr. Westcott to take a hands-on approach, physically inspect and visit the buildings to ensure cleanliness, increase effectiveness, stop laziness, and decrease work order backlogs. During his tenure, Mr. Westcott increased productivity and reduced backlogs. Mr. Westcott took more initiative than previous superintendents with cleaning and maintenance, and he conducted weekly walkthroughs. While Mr. Westcott was campus superintendent, the backlog of 400 work orders he had inherited was reduced to zero. During Mr. Westcott's first month as campus superintendent, he had an encounter with a Caucasian employee named Jamie Long. On January 31, 2008, Mr. Westcott issued a written memorandum to Mr. Long as a follow-up from a verbal reprimand that occurred on January 28, 2008. The reprimand was Mr. Westcott's first employee disciplinary action as campus superintendent. According to the memorandum, the reprimand was based upon Mr. Long's confrontation and argument with Mr. Westcott regarding the fact that Mr. Westcott had been ?checking-up? on him. According to the memorandum, Mr. Westcott considered "the manner in which [Mr. Long] addressed [him as] totally inappropriate and could be considered insubordination." Mr. Long disputed Mr. Westcott's version of the incident and later sent a letter to College President Dr. Kerley dated June 23, 2008, complaining about "the alleged incident of insubordination" and the "almost non-stop harassment by John Westcott." There was no mention or allegation in the letter that John Westcott was racist or had discriminated against anyone because of their race. After Dr. Holdnak left the College in July 2008, John Mercer assumed his responsibilities. Mr. Mercer, like Dr. Holdnak, had the perception that custodial work was below par based on complaints and personal observations. He therefore continued to direct Mr. Westcott to address these deficiencies to improve the custodians' performance. Petitioner was the designated weekend custodian when Mr. Westcott was hired. In February 2008, Dr. Holdnak discovered a problem with the amount of paid-time-off Petitioner received as a result of his weekend schedule. The problem was that if a holiday fell on a weekend, Petitioner would take the entire weekend off, resulting in a windfall of 37.5 hours in additional paid-time- off for Petitioner over other employees because his work hours on the weekends were longer. In order to correct the problem, in approximately March 2008, Petitioner was placed on a similar holiday pay schedule as all other employees. At the time, the then-director of the College's Department of Human Resources, Mosell Washington, who is an African American, explained the change to Petitioner. According to Mr. Washington, Petitioner was not happy about the change in his holiday pay schedule. Petitioner, however, does not blame Mr. Westcott for initiating the change. Because of the change in his holiday pay schedule, Petitioner was required to work or use leave time for the additional working hours during the Fourth of July weekend in 2008. Petitioner called and asked to speak with Mr. Westcott regarding the issue. During the phone call, Petitioner used profanity. After being cursed, Mr. Westcott hung up the phone and then advised Mr. Washington, who told Mr. Westcott to document the incident. The resulting written reprimand from Mr. Westcott to Petitioner was dated July 11, 2011, and was approved by Mr. Washington. When Mr. Washington presented Petitioner with the written reprimand, Petitioner refused to sign an acknowledgement of its receipt and abruptly left the meeting without any comment. Petitioner did not tell Mr. Washington that he believed he was being targeted or discriminated against because of his race. In addition to setting forth Mr. Westcott's version of what occurred, the written reprimand advised Petitioner that the College had a grievance procedure, and also stated: I have an open door policy and will gladly address any concerns you may have whether personal or job related. If you have a grievance, tell me, but in the proper manner and in the proper place. Petitioner did not take advantage of either the College's grievance procedure or Mr. Westcott's stated open door policy. The College maintains an anti-discrimination policy and grievance policy disseminated to employees. The College's procedure for employee grievances provides several levels of review, starting with an immediate supervisor, then to a grievance committee, and then up to the College's president. Under the College's anti-discrimination policy, discrimination and harassment based on race or other protected classes is prohibited. Employees who believe they are being discriminated against may report it to the Director of Human Resources. Likewise, harassment is prohibited and may be reported up the chain of command at any level. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the College handbook and policies on August 17, 2007. In addition, both the College President, Dr. Kerley, and Vice President, John Mercer, maintain an ?open door? policy. After receiving the July 11, 2008, written reprimand, Petitioner spoke to both Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer, at least once, on July 15, 2008. Petitioner, however, did not tell them that he had been discriminated against because of his race. In fact, there is no credible evidence that a report of race discrimination was ever made regarding the July 11, 2008, written reprimand prior to Petitioner's termination. Petitioner, however, did not agree with the July 11, 2008 written reprimand. After speaking to Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer, Petitioner met with Jamie Long, the Caucasian who had earlier received a write-up from Mr. Westcott, for assistance in preparing a written response. The written response, dated August 4, 2008, and addressed to Mr. Washington, Mr. Westcott, and Mr. Mercer, stated: On July 25, 2008, I was called into Mosell Washington's office and was given a written letter of reprimand from John Westcott, the Campus Superintendent, which states that on July 3, 2008, I had used profanity in a phone conversation with him regarding my 4th of July work schedule. From the schedule that I received in February, from Mosell Washington, I believed I was off that weekend. I am writing this letter to dispute Mr. Westcott's version of our conversation and to protest the letter of written reprimand. Mr. Westcott says in the reprimand that I was insubordinate to him and had used profanity. I did not use profanity, and I do not believe that I was insubordinate in any manner to him during our brief conversation. I feel that my work record and my integrity speaks for itself. I have never been insubordinate, or been a problem to anyone until John Westcott, and had I known that I was supposed to be on the job that weekend, I would have been there. Mr. Washington, Mr. Westcott, and John Mercer all deny receiving the written response. In addition, contrary to the written response, at the final hearing, Petitioner admitted that he used profanity during the call and said ?ass? to Mr. Westcott. Moreover, the written response does not complain of race discrimination, and Dr. Kerley, Mr. Mercer, Dr. Holdnak, Mr. Washington, and Mr. Westcott all deny that they ever received a complaint of race discrimination regarding the incident. Evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that the written reprimand given to Petitioner dated July 11, 2008, was racially motivated, given in retaliation for Petitioner’s statutorily-protected expression or conduct, or that a similarly-situated non-African-American who used profanity to a supervisor would not be subject to such a reprimand. Mr. Westcott generally worked a more traditional Monday through Friday schedule and, because of Petitioner's weekend work schedule, had minimal contact with Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Westcott would not usually be on campus with Petitioner, except Fridays, and the two men rarely spoke until Petitioner's work schedule was changed in September 2008. During the weekends that he worked at the College, Petitioner was on-call and expected to return communications to his pager or mobile phone, even during his lunch breaks, regardless of his location. On Friday, August 22, 2008, after receiving a request from faculty member Rusty Garner, Petitioner’s supervisor Dan Doherty asked Petitioner to clean the music room floor. On Sunday afternoon, August 24, 2008, Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott were working when they received word from Mr. Garner that the music room floor had not been cleaned. After unsuccessful attempts to reach Petitioner by cell phone and pager, both Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott drove around the College campus to find him. They were unsuccessful. The reason Petitioner could not be reached was because he had left campus and had left his telephone and pager behind. According to Petitioner, he was on lunch break. Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott found another employee, Harold Brown, to help prepare the music room for Monday. Mr. Mercer was upset because he had to take time out from his own work to find someone to complete the job assigned to Petitioner. That same afternoon, Mr. Mercer reported the incident by e-mail to Mr. Washington and requested that appropriate action be taken. On August 27, 2008, Petitioner’s supervisor, Dan Doherty, issued a written reprimand to Petitioner for the August 24th incident. No evidence was presented indicating that the written reprimand was racially motivated, or that a similarly situated non-African-American who could not be located during his or her shift would not be subject to such a reprimand. In September 2008, Dr. Kerley unilaterally determined that no single employee should work his or her entire workweek in three days. He believed this schedule was unsafe, and not in the best interests of the college. He therefore directed Mr. Westcott and Mr. Mercer to implement a rotating schedule for the weekends. Mr. Westcott was not in favor of the change because it meant additional scheduling work for him to accommodate new rotating shifts. No credible evidence was presented that the schedule change was because of Petitioner’s race, or made in retaliation for Petitioner’s statutorily-protected expressions or actions. From August 27, 2008, through January 2009, there were no other disciplines issued to Petitioner or reported incidents between Petitioner and Mr. Westcott. In December, 2008, a group composed of most of the custodial employees, including Petitioner, conducted a meeting with the College's president, Dr. Kerley, and vice-president, Mr. Mercer. The group of custodians elected their new supervisor James Garcia, an Asian-Pacific Islander, as their spokesperson for the meeting. The custodians' primary purpose for the meeting was to address complaints regarding Mr. Westcott’s management style, his prior criminal conviction, and approach with employees. They felt that Mr. Westcott could not be pleased. Various concerns about Mr. Westcott expressed by the employees were condensed into three typed pages (collectively, ?Typed Document?) consisting of two pages compiled by Jamie Long and his wife Susan Long which contained 12 numbered paragraphs, and a third page with six unnumbered paragraphs. Mr. Garcia did not transmit the Typed Document to the president or vice- president prior to the meeting. Neither Jamie Long nor his wife attended the meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Garcia read several of the comments from the Typed Document and Dr. Kerley responded to each comment that was read. Mr. Garcia did not read through more than the first five of the 12 items listed on the Typed Document. The Typed Document was not reviewed by the president or vice-president and they did not retain a copy. Petitioner asserts the comment listed in paragraph 9 on the second page of the Typed Document constitutes a complaint or evidence of racial animus. Although not discussed at the meeting or reviewed by Dr. Kerley or Mr. Mercer, paragraph 9 states: During a recent candidate forum, Westcott used the term ?black ass? in regard to School Superintendent James McCallister. This was heard by at least two witnesses. Q. Are such racial slurs and inappropriate, unprofessional behavior condoned and acceptable? Mr. Westcott denies making the alleged statement referenced in paragraph 9 of the Typed Document. No evidence of other racial remarks allegedly made by Mr. Westcott was presented. There is no evidence that the College or its administration condoned the alleged statement. President Kerley, Vice President Mercer, and Mr. Washington all gave credible testimony that they were not made aware of the statement and that, if the statement in paragraph 9 of the Typed Document or any alleged racial discrimination by Mr. Westcott had been brought to their attention, immediate action would have been taken. As a result of custodial employees’ complaints about Mr. Westcott’s management style, Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer required Mr. Westcott to attend several sessions of management training. In addition, Dr. Kerley counseled Mr. Westcott against using harsh tactics and rough language that may be acceptable on a construction site, but were not appropriate on a College campus. On February 9, 2009, Mr. Westcott observed both Petitioner and a co-worker leaving their assigned buildings. He asked their supervisor, Mr. Garcia, to monitor their whereabouts because he thought that they appeared to not be doing their jobs. Mr. Westcott also told Mr. Garcia that, although the two workers may have had a legitimate reason for walking from their assigned buildings, he had not heard anything on the radio to indicate as much. The next day, on February 10, 2009, Mr. Garcia told Petitioner that Mr. Westcott had wanted to know where they had been headed when they left the building the day before. Petitioner responded by saying that if Mr. Westcott wanted to know where he was, Mr. Westcott could ask him (Petitioner). Later that day, Petitioner spoke to Mr. Washington on campus. Petitioner was very upset and said to Mr. Washington, ?What’s wrong with Westcott? He better leave me alone. He don’t know who he’s messing with.? Later that same afternoon, Petitioner had a confrontation with Mr. Westcott. According to a memorandum authored that same day by Mr. Westcott: I [John Westcott] had stopped outside the mailroom to talk with Beth Bennett. While talking with her I observed Derek [Petitioner] leave Student Union West. After seeing me, he returned to Student Union West and waited outside the door. Beth walked toward the Administration building and I headed through the breezeway. Derek approached me and said that he had heard that I wanted to ask him something. I asked him what he was talking about. He said that I wanted to ask him where he was going the evening before. I said ok, where were you going? Derek said that it was ?none of my f_ _ _ ing business.? I told him that since I was his supervisor, that it ?was? my business. At this time, he stepped closer to me in a threatening manner and said ?if you don’t stop f_ _ _ ing with me, I’m going to f_ _ _ you up.? I told him that if he would do his job, that he wouldn’t have to worry about me. He replied ?you heard what I said--- I’ll f_ _ _ you up?, as he walked back into SUW. I left the breezeway and went to John Mercer’s office to report the incident. Mr. Westcott’s testimony at the final hearing regarding the incident was consistent with his memorandum. While Petitioner’s version of the confrontation is different than Mr. Westcott’s, at the final hearing Petitioner admitted that Mr. Westcott had a legitimate question regarding his whereabouts and that he failed to answer the question. And, while he denied using the specific curse words that Mr. Westcott attributed to him, Petitioner testified that he told Mr. Westcott to leave him the ?hell? alone because he was doing his job. While there is no finding as to the exact words utilized by Petitioner to Mr. Westcott, it is found, based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence, that on the afternoon of February 9, 2009, Petitioner was confrontational towards Mr. Westcott, that Petitioner refused to answer a legitimate question from Mr. Westcott, that Petitioner demanded that Mr. Westcott leave him alone even though Mr. Westcott had a legitimate right to talk to Petitioner about his job, and that Petitioner used words that threatened physical violence if Mr. Westcott did not heed his warning. After Mr. Westcott reported the incident to Mr. Mercer, both Mr. Mercer and Mr. Westcott went to Dr. Kerley and advised him of the incident. Dr. Kerley believed the report of the incident and that Petitioner had threatened Mr. Westcott. Mr. Washington was then informed of the incident. After reviewing Petitioner’s employment history, including Petitioner’s recent attitude problems, as well as Mr. Washington’s own interaction the same day of the latest incident, Mr. Washington concluded that Petitioner should be terminated. Mr. Washington gave his recommendation that Petitioner be terminated to Dr. Kerley, who adopted the recommendation. The following day, February 11, 2009, Mr. Washington called Petitioner into his office and gave him a memorandum memorializing Petitioner’s termination from his employment with the College. The memorandum provided: This memorandum is written notification that because of a number of incidents which the administration of the college deems unprofessional, adversarial, and insubordinate, you are hereby terminated from employment at Gulf Coast Community College, effective immediately. At the time that he presented Petitioner with the memorandum, Mr. Washington provided Petitioner with the opportunity to respond. Petitioner told Mr. Washington, ?It is not over.? Petitioner did not state at the time, however, that he believed that his termination, change of schedule, or any disciplinary action taken against him were because of racial discrimination or in retaliation for his protected expression or conduct. Further, at the final hearing, Petitioner did not present evidence indicating that similarly-situated non-African- American employees would have been treated more favorably than was Petitioner for threatening a supervisor. Further, the evidence presented by Petitioner did not show that the decision to terminate him was based on race or in retaliation for protected expression or behavior, or that the facts behind the reason that Petitioner was fired were fabricated. Following his termination, Petitioner met with both Dr. Kerley and Mr. Mercer and apologized for acting wrongly. The empirical record evidence of discipline against College employees in the Maintenance Division during Mr. Westcott’s tenure does not demonstrate a tendency by Mr. Westcott or the College to discriminate against African- American employees. The majority of disciplines and the first discipline taken against Mr. Long by Mr. Westcott were administered to Caucasians. In total, Mr. Westcott only reprimanded five employees. Of these, three were Caucasian -- Mr. Long, Mr. Whitehead, and Mr. Doherty. Despite the fact that the majority of the custodians were African-American, only two African-Americans were disciplined -- Petitioner and Harold Brown. During Mr. Westcott’s employment, the only two employees who were terminated were Petitioner and a white employee, Mark Ruggieri. Excluding Petitioner, all African-American witnesses testified that Mr. Westcott treated them equally and not one, except for Petitioner, testified that they were treated differently because of their race. The testimony of Petitioner’s African-American co-workers is credited over Petitioner’s testimony of alleged discrimination. Harold Brown’s discipline was based upon the fact that he gave the College’s master keys to an outside third-party contractor. Although Mr. Brown disagreed with the level of punishment he received, in his testimony, he agreed that he had made a mistake. Mr. Brown further testified that he did not believe African-Americans were targeted. According to Mr. Brown, Mr. Westcott did not discriminate against him because of his race, and ?Westcott was an equal opportunist as far as his behavior? and ?seemed agitated towards everybody when he was in his moods.? Mr. Garcia was the lead custodian when Petitioner was terminated and is currently the College’s custodial department supervisor. While several employees told Mr. Garcia that they did not like Mr. Westcott’s management style, Mr. Garcia never heard a racist comment and testified that Mr. Westcott was strict and threatened the entire custodial and maintenance staff. Butch Whitehead believes that Mr. Westcott attempted to get him and his maintenance crew ?in trouble.? He had no personal knowledge of the manner in which Mr. Westcott treated Petitioner. Mr. Whitehead's testimony does not otherwise support a finding that Mr. Westcott was a racist or that the College discriminated against Petitioner because of his race. Tom Krampota, a Caucasian and longtime employee and former supervisor, agreed that Mr. Westcott was firm with all custodians and complained about everybody, but was not a racist. Lee Givens, an African-American, testified that his custodial work was monitored because Mr. Westcott took issue with dust and cleanliness, but that if he did his job Mr. Westcott did not bother him. Mr. Givens did not testify that he felt discriminated against because of his race, but rather stated that Mr. Westcott made the job hard for ?all the custodians.? Horace McClinton, an African-American custodian for the College, provided a credible assessment of Mr. Westcott in his testimony which summarized how Mr. Westcott treated all of his subordinates: There were certain things that he wanted us to do that we should have been doing already, and he was just there to enforce it . . . he did not think anybody was doing their job . . . . He was put there to make sure we were doing our job . . . . I don't think he was a racist. Mr. McClinton further testified that all Maintenance Division employees, including Caucasian supervisors, were afraid of Westcott because it was ?his way or the highway.? Latoya ?Red? McNair testified that he was being monitored like the other custodians but did not believe it was because of race. Just as Petitioner’s co-workers’ testimony does not support a finding that Mr. Westcott was a racist, Dan Doherty’s deposition testimony does not support a finding that Mr. Westcott’s actions against Petitioner were because of race. A review of Mr. Doherty’s deposition reflects that Mr. Doherty has no first-hand knowledge of actual discrimination. Mr. Doherty stated, ?I don't know? when asked how he knew Westcott was motivated by race. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Doherty, five African-Americans were singled out, including Petitioner, Mr. McClinton, Mr. Givens, Mr. McNair, and Mr. Brown. Two of these alleged ?victims? outright denied that Mr. Westcott treated them unfairly because of race. The others did not testify that they believed Mr. Westcott treated them differently because of race. Mr. Doherty testified that besides the five identified, the remaining African-Americans were not criticized or targeted. Mr. Doherty also conceded that it was possible that Mr. Westcott just did not like the five custodians. Further, despite the fact that Mr. Doherty was written up by Mr. Westcott more than any other employee, including Petitioner, Mr. Doherty never reported Mr. Westcott for discrimination and did not state in his exit interview from the College that Mr. Westcott was a racist or complain that race was an issue. Rather than supporting a finding that Mr. Westcott was motivated by race, Mr. Doherty’s testimony demonstrated that the problems he had with Mr. Westcott were similar with those pointed out by others—-namely, that Mr. Westcott had a prior criminal conviction, had a harsh management style, and closely scrutinized all workers. While Petitioner and Mr. Long contend that they raised the issue of discrimination with the College's management, the College's president, vice-president, director of human resources, former vice-president, and superintendent all deny receiving a report of discrimination or that any employment action was based on race or in retaliation. Mr. Long’s testimony that he complained of race is not substantiated because he did not witness any discrimination first hand. He also never documented his alleged concerns about racial discrimination prior to Petitioner's termination. In addition, in his testimony, Mr. Long admitted that he never heard Mr. Westcott use a racially discriminatory term. Likewise, Petitioner never documented alleged discrimination until after being terminated. Considering the evidence presented in this case, and the failure of Petitioner and Mr. Long to document alleged complaints when an opportunity was presented, it is found that the allegations of reported complaints of discrimination by Mr. Long and Petitioner are not credible. Further, the testimony from Petitioner’s co-workers and supervisors, which indicates that Mr. Westcott was harsh with all employees but not racially discriminatory, is credited. It is found that Petitioner did not show that any employment action by the College or Mr. Westcott against him was based on race. Rather, the evidence presented in this case demonstrates that Petitioner was not targeted or treated differently from any other employees based upon race. The evidence also failed to show that Petitioner was retaliated against because of his protected expression or conduct. In sum, the evidence did not show that Petitioner was subject to racial discrimination or wrongful retaliation, and Respondent proved that Petitioner was terminated for engaging in a pattern of unprofessional, adversarial, and insubordinate behavior, including a threat to his supervisor’s supervisor, John Westcott.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2011.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.216
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SYLVESTER R. BROWN vs FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY, 02-004175 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 25, 2002 Number: 02-004175 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 2003

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was subject to discrimination in employment for the reasons alleged in the Petition.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was terminated from his position as Laborer, position number 51343, within the Facilities Operation and Maintenance Department of Florida State University (FSU) on October 7, 1999, for violation of a Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner had been employed by FSU for 24 years. Petitioner's Disciplinary Violations Leading to Termination Attendance is a critical element of the Laborer's job because departmental productivity depends on the reliable availability of employees. The Petitioner received a copy of Rule 6C2-4.070, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Rules of the Florida State University Administrative Code on January 29, 1988, which provided notice to the Petitioner of FSU's standard of conduct and the associated penalties for violation. The Petitioner was cited for numerous disciplinary infractions prior to his dismissal. The Petitioner's work history documents a consistent trend of absences which grew progressively worse over time. A list of documentation in evidence, exhibiting disciplinary action taken by FSU against the Petitioner includes: A three day suspension for Absence Without Authorized Leave (AWOL) and Excessive Absences, dated January 3, 1997. A written reprimand for Excessive Absences and AWOL, dated August 6, 1996. An oral reprimand for excessive absences, dated April 26, 1996. 1996. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated February 29, A written reprimand for AWOL, dated August 14, 1991. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated June 5, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated February 22, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated July 8, 1988. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated May 25, 1988. The Petitioner was cited for excessive tardiness in an official written reprimand dated July 8, 1988, and the Petitioner was again reminded that his performance hindered the department's ability to perform its function. An oral reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated January 28, 1988. An oral reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment, dated July 11, 1985. A written reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment dated March 21, 1984. A written reprimand for excessive absences, dated February 7, 1984. A written reprimand for AWOL and misuse of state property and equipment dated, January 25, 1983. A three day suspension for AWOL, dated July 27, 1981. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated July 13, 1981. The Petitioner was directed in an August 14, 1991, written reprimand to phone his supervisor as close to 8:00 a.m. as possible on days he would be unable to report to work. The Petitioner was reminded in the February 29, 1996, written reprimand of the policy requiring employees to provide supervisors with advanced notice or documentation for leave to be authorized. The Petitioner was informed on April 26, 1996, that his absences, both excused and unexcused, exceeded established attendance and leave standards. Specifically, from January through April, the Petitioner used 33 hours of annual leave, 31 hours of sick leave, and 29 hours of leave without pay. FSU notified the Petitioner that his absences and sick leave totaling 33 hours during the period from April 26, 1996 to August 6, 1996, were deemed excessive and in contravention of departmental standards. The Petitioner was also cited for six hours of being absent without authorized leave. The Petitioner's chronic absenteeism did not improve. The period from August 6, 1996 through January 3, 1997, witnessed 46 hours of sick leave or unauthorized leave on the Petitioner's part. An inventory of the Petitioner's absences following his suspension from January 7-9, 1997 until August 22, 1997, catalogued 56 hours of sick leave, 16 hours of leave without pay and two hours of absence without authorized leave. This amount of leave was "considered to be excessive and completely unacceptable." [Id.] Further, the university did not receive any medical excuses for the Petitioner's use of sick leave during this period. [Id.] Counseling was provided to the Petitioner by FSU regarding the use of sick leave on August 17, 1998. An examination of the Petitioner's attendance revealed that he used 63 hours of sick leave from February 20, 1998 through August 6, 1998. [Id.] The university's standard for the same period of time was 33 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The Petitioner was further advised by FSU that he would not be compensated for three consecutive absences or three absences within a 30-day period without proper medical documentation. FSU assessed the Petitioner's attendance from January 8, 1998 through August 6, 1998, by comparing the standard allocated for sick leave to the Petitioner's actual use of sick leave. The sick leave standard for employees for the period under review was 44.16 hours whereas the Petitioner expended 67 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The record establishes that the Petitioner was warned 17 times in writing through reprimands, memorandums, and counseling notices dating back to 1981 that absenteeism was punishable under university employee disciplinary standards. Tardiness and absenteeism are, in fact, grounds for dismissal under the FSU Handbook for Employees. The Petitioner was warned twice in writing that failure to rectify his recurring absenteeism could result in his dismissal. Petitioner's Termination The FSU's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action are based on the concepts of progressive and cumulative discipline. The Disciplinary Guidelines outline standards to apply for punishable offenses to ensure similar treatment. Ms. Susannah Miller, Manager of Employees Relations at FSU, testified that the Petitioner's personnel file revealed the worst case of absenteeism she has seen at FSU. Excessive absences is defined in the Guideline for Disciplinary Action as "an attendance record of recurring absences, even though all or a majority of the absences were necessary and excused." Dismissal is allowed as proper punishment for an employee's fourth violation of the excessive absence rule. FSU notified the Petitioner of its intention to terminate him for excessive absences, effective on or shortly after October 12, 1998. In lieu of firing the Petitioner, FSU elected to allow the Petitioner to enter into a "Last Chance Agreement" (LCA) with FSU to avoid dismissal. Ms. Miller stated that Last Chance Agreements allow a final opportunity for employees to improve their performance. Ms. Miller further testified that to her knowledge FSU has never retained any employee that violated a Last Chance Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement required the Petitioner to (1) obtain prior written approval of requests for annual leave or leave without pay; (2) follow departmental policy and call-in between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. and speak personally with his supervisor or proper designee if he was sick and unable to report to work; and (3) agree that violation of any LCA provision would result in immediate termination for cause. The Petitioner violated the Last Chance Agreement when he did not report for work on August 27, 1999, because he neither obtained prior approval for the absence nor followed the call-in procedure. The Petitioner also failed to provide any documentation justifying his absence. The Petitioner was in violation of the Last Chance Agreement on August 31, 1999, when he was tardy without permission and failed to follow the call-in procedure. The Petitioner's breach of the Last Chance Agreement is even more egregious because he collected his paycheck prior to work and could have easily informed his supervisor or the designee that he needed leave that day. In addition to violating the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, the Petitioner was also AWOL on August 27 and August 31, 1999. AWOL is "failure to obtain approval prior to any absence from work" and is punishable by dismissal for the third occurrence. The Petitioner admitted that he violated the Last Chance Agreement. On September 15, 1999, FSU informed the Petitioner of its decision to terminate him for violating the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner was dismissed on October 7, 1999. Petitioner's Step One Grievance was denied on December 13, 1999. FSU's decision to terminate the Petitioner for violation of the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave was upheld by the State University System of Florida in its Step Two Grievance decision. Petitioner's Injury The Petitioner's Position Description reveals that lifting is an integral part of a laborer's duties. The Petitioner's 1995 Position Description allocates 85 percent of the job's essential function to lifting, moving and arranging university property and requires that the laborer be able to lift 30 pounds. The Petitioner sustained a back injury at work on September 4, 1997. The Petitioner's job duties changed as a result of the injury and he was tasked with inspecting fire extinguishers from September 10 through November 12, 1997. A physical capacity assessment performed on the Petitioner indicated that he was capable of performing at a medium demand level. The Department of Labor defined medium demand as capable of lifting 50 pounds and pushing and pulling 50 pounds. The Petitioner was temporarily re-assigned to the Grounds Section of the Facilities, Operations and Maintenance Department on December 23, 1997. The Petitioner testified that his job function involved re-cycling. The Petitioner's assignment in the Grounds Section was light duty and he was informed that his job duties could be modified after his physician reviewed the physical capacity assessment. Dr. Alexander, the Petitioner's physician, declared the Petitioner fit for medium demand duty with a 35-pound lifting limit on March 24, 1998. Robert Pullen, American Disabilities Act Coordinator at FSU, was directed by Carolyn Shackleford, under the University's Reasonable Accommodation Policy, to ensure that the Petitioner's job activities with the Grounds Section did not exceed the 35p-pound lifting threshold. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Pullen's office regarding reasonable accommodation. Mr. Pullen determined that the Petitioner's duties did not violate the lifting restriction and were in full compliance with the accommodation policy. The Petitioner testified that he could lift 35 pounds repetitively. The record reflects no evidence of age discrimination committed by the Respondent against the Petitioner. The record indicates no evidence that the Petitioner was terminated due to his race. The Petitioner presented no evidence or testimony regarding retaliation by FSU.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,

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ROBERT JOHNSON vs TREE OF LIFE, INC., 04-002659 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Jul. 28, 2004 Number: 04-002659 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2005

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his age.

Findings Of Fact Currently, Petitioner is a retired, 68-year-old male. He retired from Respondent at the age of 66. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a truck driver. The position of truck driver, involves many long hours of driving (sometimes over 56 hours) various interstate and intrastate truck routes, along with some lifting and exposure to diesel fumes. Petitioner attributed a variety of illnesses and health problems to his work as a truck driver. Some of the illnesses and health problems are hypertension and heart blockage and failure, which resulted in the implantation of a pacemaker, carpal tunnel syndrome, polyneuropathy, muscular and autonomic system problems and pathological hyper-insomnia. Petitioner offered no evidence that any of these conditions resulted from his employment with Respondent. Prior to September 9 or 10, 2000, at the age of 64, Petitioner was hospitalized for heart problems. Around September 9 or 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the hospital. Upon his return to work, he gave his employer a physician’s note indicating that his work duties be limited to 40 hours a week. Petitioner met with Respondent’s transportation manager regarding whether less lengthy routes were available or whether his schedule or work duties could be adjusted. The employer did not have the ability to adjust the length of the routes, but added a second driver to ride and help with the driving on any route that Petitioner drove. Petitioner inquired about office work and was told that if he was interested in such work he needed to apply at the main office to see what was available. In part, because Petitioner liked driving and in part because the lesser number of hours involved in office work would cause Petitioner to earn less, Petitioner elected not to pursue and did not apply for such office work. No adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner, and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. At some point during this meeting, Petitioner alleges that the transportation manager said, “Why don’t you just retire.” Petitioner offered no specific context for this statement other than it was a general conversation about his health and closeness to retirement age relative to the adjustments that could be made to his driving duties. One isolated statement such as the one above does not demonstrate any intent to discriminate on Respondent’s part based on Petitioner’s age, especially since no adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. Around January 1, 2001, for medical reasons, Respondent approved a Leave of Absence with pay for Petitioner. In June or July, 2002, Petitioner filed his first workers compensation claim with Respondent. Petitioner’s claim was turned over to Respondent’s workers' compensation insurer, Kemper Insurance Company. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Kemper was under the direction or control of Respondent in any decisions Kemper made regarding paying or litigating Petitioner’s claim. In any event, Petitioner’s claim was contested. The main reason the claim was contested was that Kemper alleged that Petitioner’s “injuries” were not work-related. Over the years, Petitioner has amended his claim to include, among other health claims, the health problems listed above. Kemper has maintained its defense. During a mediation session on December 11, 2002, at which the employer was not present and in response to an inquiry regarding Kemper’s defense, Kemper’s representative stated that except for the carpal tunnel claim, all of Petitioner’s medical conditions were due to the natural aging process. Petitioner claims this statement demonstrates an intent on his employer’s part to discriminate against him based on his age. Such an isolated statement does not demonstrate such an intent especially since such conditions can be age related, there was no expert medical evidence demonstrating the cause of Petitioner’s health problems, the statement did not come from the employer, and there was no evidence that the insurer was under the direction or control of the employer regarding decisions to litigate or the factual basis for the defenses that the insurer would raise. The workers' compensation litigation continues to date. In the interim, Petitioner remained on a leave of absence with pay until January 1, 2003. He retired thereafter. There was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or that Petitioner suffered any adverse employment action based on his age. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Glynda Copeland Qualified Representative Tree of Life, Inc. Post Office Box 410 St. Augustine, Florida 32095-0410 Robert C. Johnson 560 Florida Club Boulevard, Suite 112 St. Augustine, Florida 32084

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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DARCELLA D. DESCHAMBAULT vs TOWN OF EATONVILLE, 08-002596 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida May 28, 2008 Number: 08-002596 Latest Update: May 14, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her color and/or her age.

Findings Of Fact The Town is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired by the Town in November 2004 as an administrative assistant to Mayor Anthony Grant. Petitioner is a dark-skinned African-American woman who was 51 years of age at the time of the hearing. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by a committee appointed by Mayor Grant. The committee included town clerk Cathlene Williams, public works director Roger Dixon, and then- chief administrative officer Dr. Ruth Barnes. Mayor Grant did not meet Petitioner until the day she started work as his administrative assistant. The mayor's administrative assistant handles correspondence, filing, appointments, and anything else the mayor requires in the day-to-day operations of his office. For more than two years, Petitioner went about her duties without incident. She never received a formal evaluation, but no testimony or documentary evidence was entered to suggest that her job performance was ever less than acceptable during this period. In about August 2007, Petitioner began to notice a difference in Mayor Grant's attitude towards her. The mayor began screaming at her at the top of his lungs, cursing at her. He was relentlessly critical of her job performance, accusing her of not completing assigned tasks. Petitioner conceded that she would "challenge" Mayor Grant when he was out of line or requested her to do something beyond her job description. She denied being disrespectful or confrontational, but agreed that she was not always as deferential as Mayor Grant preferred. During the same time period, roughly July and August 2007, Petitioner also noticed that resumes were being faxed to the Town Hall that appeared to be for her job. She asked Ms. Williams about the resumes, but Ms. Williams stated she knew nothing and told Petitioner to ask the mayor. When Petitioner questioned the mayor about the resumes, he took her into his office and asked her to do him a favor. He asked if she would work across the street in the post office for a couple of weeks, to fill in for a post office employee who was being transferred to the finance department; as a team player, Petitioner agreed to the move. While she was working as a clerk at the post office, Petitioner learned that the mayor was interviewing people for her administrative assistant position. She filed a formal complaint with the Town. For a time after that, she was forced to work half-time at the post office and half-time in the mayor's office. On or about October 22, 2007, Petitioner was formally transferred from her position as administrative assistant to the mayor to the position of postal clerk in the post office. Her salary and benefits remained the same. At the hearing, Mayor Grant testified that he moved Petitioner to the post office to lessen the stress of her job. Based on his conversations with Petitioner, he understood that Petitioner was having personal or family problems. He was not privy to the details of these problems, but had noticed for some time that Petitioner seemed to be under great stress. The post office was a much less hectic environment than the mayor's office, and would be more amenable to her condition. Ms. Williams, the town clerk, testified that the mayor told her that Petitioner was stressed and needed more lax duties than those she performed in the mayor's office. Mr. Dixon, the public works director, testified that Petitioner had indicated to him that she was under pressure, but she did not disclose the cause of that pressure. He recalled that, toward the end of her employment with the Town, Petitioner mentioned that she felt she was being discriminated against because of her skin color. Petitioner denied ever telling Mayor Grant that she was feeling stressed. She denied telling him anything about her family. Petitioner stated that the only stress she felt was caused by the disrespect and humiliation heaped upon her by Mayor Grant. Petitioner's best friend, Gina King Brooks, a business owner in the Town, testified that Petitioner would come to her store in tears over her treatment by the mayor. Petitioner told Ms. Brooks that she was being transferred to the post office against her will, was being forced to train her own replacement in the mayor's office,3 and believed that it was all because of her age and complexion. Mayor Grant testified that he called Petitioner into his office and informed her of the transfer to the post office. He did not tell her that the move was temporary. He did not view the transfer from administrative assistant to postal clerk as a demotion or involving any loss of status. Mayor Grant testified that an additional reason for the change was that he wanted a more qualified person as his administrative assistant. He acknowledged that Petitioner was actually more experienced than her eventual replacement, Jacqueline Cockerham.4 However, Petitioner's personal issues were affecting her ability to meet the sensitive deadlines placed upon her in the mayor's office. The mayor needed more reliable support in his office, and Petitioner needed a less stressful work environment. Therefore, Mayor Grant believed the move would benefit everyone involved. Mayor Grant denied that Petitioner's skin color or age had anything to do with her transfer to the post office. Petitioner was replaced in her administrative assistant position by Ms. Cockerham, a light-skinned African- American woman born on October 17, 1961. She was 46 years of age at the time of the hearing. Documents introduced by the Town at the hearing indicate the decision to hire Ms. Cockerham was made on March 26, 2008. Ms. Williams testified that she conducted the interview of Ms. Cockerham, along with a special assistant to the mayor, Kevin Bodley, who no longer works for the Town. Both Ms. Williams and Mayor Grant testified that the mayor did not meet Ms. Cockerham until the day she began work in his office. Petitioner testified that she knew the mayor had met Ms. Cockerham before she was hired by the Town, because Mayor Grant had instructed Petitioner to set up a meeting with Ms. Cockerham while Petitioner was still working in the mayor's office. Mayor Grant flatly denied having any knowledge of Ms. Cockerham prior to the time of her hiring. On this point, Mayor Grant's testimony, as supported by that of Ms. Williams, is credited. To support her allegation that Mayor Grant preferred employees with light skin, Petitioner cited his preferential treatment of an employee named Cherone Fort. Petitioner claimed that Mayor Grant required her to make a wake-up call to Ms. Fort every morning, because Ms. Fort had problems getting to work on time. Ms. Fort was a light-skinned African-American woman. Under cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that Mayor Grant and Ms. Fort were friends, and that his favoritism toward her may have had nothing to do with her skin color. Petitioner claimed that there were other examples of the mayor's "color struck" favoritism toward lighter-skinned employees, but she declined to provide specifics.5 She admitted that several dark-skinned persons worked for the Town, but countered that those persons do not work in close proximity to the mayor. As to her age discrimination claim, Petitioner testified that a persistent theme of her conversations with Mayor Grant was his general desire for a younger staff, because younger people were fresher and more creative. The mayor's expressed preference was always a concern to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that she felt degraded, demeaned and humiliated by the transfer to the post office. She has worked as an executive assistant for her entire professional career, including positions for the city manager of Gainesville and the head of pediatric genetics at the University of Florida. She believed herself unsuited to a clerical position in the post office, and viewed her transfer as punitive. In April 2008, Petitioner was transferred from the post office to a position as assistant to the town planner. Within days of this second transfer, Petitioner resigned her position as an employee of the Town. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was being paid $15.23 per hour. Petitioner is now working for Rollins College in a position she feels is more suitable to her skills. She makes about $14.00 per hour. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that there was a personality conflict between Petitioner and Mayor Grant. Neither Petitioner nor Mayor Grant was especially forthcoming regarding the details of their working relationship, especially the cause of the friction that developed in August 2007. Neither witness was entirely credible in describing the other's actions or motivations. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's claims that Mayor Grant ranted, yelled, and was "very, very nasty" in his dealings with Petitioner.6 No other witness corroborated Mayor Grant's claim that Petitioner was under stress due to some unnamed family situation. The working relationship between Mayor Grant and Petitioner was certainly volatile, but the evidence is insufficient to permit more than speculation as to the cause of that volatility. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, due to this personality conflict, Mayor Grant wanted Petitioner transferred out of his office. He may even have used the subterfuge of a "temporary" transfer to exact Petitioner's compliance with the move. However, the purpose of this proceeding is not to pass judgment on Mayor Grant's honesty or skills as an administrator. Aside from Petitioner's suspicions, there is no solid evidence that Mayor Grant was motivated by anything other than a desire to have his office run more smoothly and efficiently. Petitioner's assertion that the mayor's preference for lighter-skinned employees was common knowledge cannot be credited without evidentiary support. Petitioner's age discrimination claim is supported only by Petitioner's recollection of conversations with Mayor Grant in which he expressed a general desire for a younger, fresher, more creative staff. Given that both Petitioner and Ms. Cockerham were experienced, middle-aged professionals, and given that Mayor Grant had nothing to do with the hiring of either employee, the five-year age difference between them does not constitute evidence of discrimination on the part of the mayor or the Town. Petitioner was not discharged from employment. Though Petitioner perceived it as a demotion, the transfer to the post office was a lateral transfer within the Town's employment hierarchy. Petitioner was paid the same salary and received the same benefits she received as an administrative assistant to the mayor. A reasonably objective observer would not consider working as a clerk in a post office to be demeaning or degrading.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Town of Eatonville did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2009.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.02760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.216
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ANNA M. PETTIGREW vs. REGENCY TOWERS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 80-000472 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000472 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondent Employer discharged Petitioner because of her sex, in violation of Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1979).

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings are determined and organized in accordance with the allocation of proof applicable to employment discrimination cases. I. The Parties The EMPLOYER is an incorporated condominium association responsible for the operation and maintenance of Regency Towers Condominium, a 171-unit condominium in Panama City Beach, Florida. In 1977, the developer of Regency Towers relinquished responsibility for and control over the completed condominium to the nearly formed association. The association ("EMPLOYER") is owned by the Regency Tower Condominium unit owners who elect a Board of Directors; the Board, in turn, hires and supervises a condominium manager who directs and is responsible for the day-to-day operations and maintenance of the facility. (Testimony of Pettigrew.) COMPLAINANT, a female, was employed by EMPLOYER as its manager from February 1976, until September 5, 1978, when she was terminated by its Board of Directors. In addition to her salary, the EMPLOYER allowed COMPLAINANT to engage in resale of condominium units through the office of a local real estate broker. (Testimony of Pettigrew.) During 1978, the calendar year preceding COMPLAINANT's termination, EMPLOYER employed 15 or more employees during 20 or more calendar weeks. In this connection, Findings of Fact Nos. 1 through 10 as contained in the previous Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, entered on August 6, 1980, are adopted and incorporated by reference. (Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, dated August 6, 1980.) II. Complainant's Initial Burden: Establish Prima Facie Case of Employment Discrimination Based on Sex COMPLAINANT presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of her sex, the EMPLOYER admits such prima facie showing was made. (See Respondent's Suggested Findings of Fact, p. 1.) COMPLAINANT is a female who was discharged by EMPLOYER; thereafter, her position was filled by a male, David Lacey. Prior to and after her termination, there was a small but vocal group of condominium unit owners who openly expressed a view that the job of condominium manager cold not be performed by a woman: that it could be better done by a man. Remarks were made such as: "we need a man to run this business"; (Tr. 79) "the place won't run with a woman in there . . ." (Tr. 116); "a man could do . . . [the job] better," (Tr. 131) and "a man [is] needed to have that position, that a woman could not . . . adequately fill, [or] fulfill the job." (P-2, p. 13) The COMPLAINANT testified that the sole basis for her termination was her sex. (Tr. 236) One of the owners who articulated such a bias in favor of a male, as opposed to a female manager, was Henry Christmas; he was also a member of EMPLOYER's Board of Directors, and made the motion which resulted in COMPLAINANT's termination. 2/ (Testimony of Pettigrew, Truman, Sullivan, Williams, Johnson, Christmas.) EMPLOYER's actions toward COMPLAINANT, infra, standing alone, support a reasonable inference that she was terminated because of her sex. The burden, therefore, shifts to EMPLOYER to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. III Employer's Burden: Articulate Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason for Complainant's Termination EMPLOYER denied that its termination of COMPLAINANT was motivated by her sex, and supplied a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: her poor work performance. Members of EMPLOYER's Board of Directors had received numerous complaints concerning COMPLAINANT's job performance from owners, renters, and employees. At the Board's meeting on September 3, 1978, the decision to terminate COMPLAINANT was preceded by a discussion of numerous examples of her inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and failure to satisfactorily perform her job. Specific deficiencies discussed and offered as cause for her termination were her: Refusal to implement Board directives; Inability to get along with owners; Inability to supervise and get maximum efficiency from employees, including high turnover and expense involved in training and hiring new employees; Failure to submit to the Board a job description for herself and other employees; Failure to place ads in newspapers for the condominium's rental program; and Failure to keep adequate records and daily check sheets required by the rental program. (Testimony of Truman, Hodges, Lee, Christmas, Rosborough; R-2) During 1978, complaints had been received by Board members from owners, renters, and employees claiming she: Failed to adequately maintain grounds, parking lot, walkways, and shrubbery; Was unable to get along with owners and renters; Was verbally abusive and rude toward renters and owners; and Inadequately managed employees. (Testimony of Lee, Hodges, Truman) EMPLOYER having articulated the above legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of COMPLAINANT, the burden then shifts to the COMPLAINANT to show that the stated reason--poor work performance--is, in fact, a pretext or mask for a discriminatory decision. IV. Complainant's Burden: Show Employer's Stated Nondiscriminatory Reason is Pretextual COMPLAINANT did not establish or provide a sufficient basis to infer that EMPLOYER's stated reason for her termination was pretextual, or a mask for a discriminatory motive. Events which occurred before and after COMPLAINANT's termination substantiate EMPLOYER's contention that there were numerous and serious deficiencies in COMPLAINANT's job performance, and increasing criticism of her actions by owners. (Testimony of Webb, Johnson) Charles T. Webb served as president of EMPLOYER's Board of Directors from September 1977 through August 1978. He had regular contact with COMPLAINANT and received numerous complaints from owners concerning her job performance and attitude toward owners. It occurred to him that, during 1978, COMPLAINANT became increasingly unable to effectively carry out her duties. She would call him at his business and his home--sometimes late in the evening--to discuss matters which, in his view, she should have routinely handled. (Testimony of Webb) Since her hiring in 1977, there was a small group of owners who openly and constantly criticized COMPLAINANT. J. H. Christmas and Otis Rosborough were its most vocal members. On most days, they and several others could be found in the lobby in the vicinity of COMPLAINANT's office. There, over coffee, they would continually criticize her actions in the presence of owners and employees. Sometimes they would interfere with her directives to employees, and attempt to undermine her authority. It seemed to the head housekeeper that nothing that COMPLAINANT did was acceptable to these critics, that they could not be satisfied. It is clear that the actions of this handful of owners were, at least in part, motivated by their frequently voiced belief, that a woman could not properly do the job, that a man could do it better. (Testimony of Williams, Pettigrew, Weaver, Truman, Williams, Lilly) The unrelenting criticism of this small group of owners, the pressing and sometimes unreasonable demands of owners and renters, employee turnover and complaints--all imposed a heavy burden on COMPLAINANT. Owners increasingly began to complain about her rude treatment; her job performance began to deteriorate. Friction and conflict between COMPLAINANT and others became more frequent. Incidents would upset her, and sometimes she would be crying when she called Webb for his assistance. Owner dissatisfaction became so widespread that, several times during Webb's term as president, the Board of Directors considered terminating her. (Testimony of Webb, Truman, Pettigrew, Williams; R- 7, R-9) In July 1978, Webb met with COMPLAINANT to discuss her worsening work performance. He gave her the choice of resigning, or improving her performance. She indicated she desired to remain. At 2:00 a.m., on July 21, 1978, she called him, in tears, to relate an incident involving an owner. On July 22, 1978, Webb wrote her a letter listing problems with her work performance, including her difficulties with employees and owners, and her failure to carry out one of his previous requests. He asked for attention to those problems, "so that no other administrative action will be necessary." (R-7) (Testimony of Webb, Pettigrew; R-7) On September 1, 1978, at the end of his term of office as president of the Board of Directors, Webb wrote the newly elected Board describing his problems with COMPLAINANT's work performance. He cited her "continuous turmoil" with owners and renters, her failure to carry out the Board's directives, and her inability to handle routine management problems. Two days later, the newly elected Board of Directors discussed numerous deficiencies in COMPLAINANT's performance and terminated her employment. (Testimony of Webb, Truman; R-6, R-2) At the time of COMPLAINANT's termination, the owners had split into factions opposing and supporting her. On September 21, 1978, Lomax Johnson, one of the owners who supported COMPLAINANT, polled, by written ballot, all unit owners and members of EMPLOYER for the purpose of "trying to right a wrong that has been done to an individual . . ." (R-3) The principle question on the ballot was whether they agreed or disagreed with the Board's termination of COMPLAINANT. Of the 54 owners' ballots responding, 26-27 disagreed with her termination, 24 agreed, and 3-4 abstained. (Testimony of Johnson; R-4) In a lengthy explanatory letter accompanying the ballot, Johnson gave COMPLAINANT's answer to each of the reasons given as cause for her discharge. He defended her work performance, and maintained that she had been unjustly treated. However, in criticizing the Board's treatment of COMPLAINANT, Johnson did not assert that it was motivated by sex discrimination. (Testimony of Johnson; P-3) The Board of Directors which terminated COMPLAINANT contained both males and females. Board members who testified denied that their action was motivated by her sex, and no member testified otherwise. Prior to and after her termination, both male and female owners expressed dissatisfaction with COMPLAINANT's job performance. The fact that some of the complaints were unwarranted and self-serving does not negate their existence or the Board's belief that complaints were occurring with increasing frequency. (Testimony of McKay, Wade, Thigpen, Davis, Martin, Lee, Truman, Webb; P-2, R-4)

Conclusions Petitioner established a prima facie case of sexual discrimination; Respondent stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that Respondent's stated reason--her poor work performance--is a pretext for a discriminatory motive. The Commission on Human Relations should, therefore, enter an order finding Respondent not guilty of the alleged unlawful employment practice, and denying Petitioner's petition for relief.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the EMPLOYER not guilty of the unlawful employment practice alleged by COMPLAINANT, and denying her petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January 1981.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DONALD A. GARREPY vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 98-003611 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 10, 1998 Number: 98-003611 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue With regard to DOAH Case No. 98-5090 (FCHR Case No. 95- 5752), the issue is: Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, by failing to select Petitioner for the position of environmental manager in the Fall of 1994 because of his age or gender. With regard to DOAH Case No. 98-3611 (FCHR Case No. 96- 1298), the issue is: Whether the Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by retaliating against Petitioner by terminating him from his position because the Petitioner had filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).

Findings Of Fact DOAH Case No. 98-5090 Discrimination Petitioner began his employment with Respondent in the Southwest District in Tampa on October 1, 1991, as an Engineer III with the air pollution program. He transferred to the Central District in Orlando, Florida, on June 3, 1994. Petitioner is an "employee" and Respondent is an "employer" under the statute. On or about September 26, 1994, Petitioner applied for the position of environmental manager in the Orlando Central District. At the time of his application, he had been with Respondent for almost two years but in the Orlando office for less than four months. Petitioner met the minimum qualifications for the position and is a male over 40 years of age. In September 1994, Alex Alexander was the director of the Central District and the hiring supervisor for the position of environmental manager. Alex Alexander conducted the interviews, decided who would be interviewed, and made the final decision regarding selection. He was assisted in the selection process by James Bradner, who had formerly occupied the environmental manager position. Bradner was an Engineer IV. The previous engineering position was reclassified to environmental manager, prior to advertising it, to eliminate the engineering functions. Alexander was seeking someone who could act as assistant to the director in environmental matters and to represent him on various matters before public and governmental bodies. Alexander determined that it was essential that the candidate have experience in a wide variety of Respondent's regulated programs, as well as with public presentations in dealing with Florida legislators and local government officials, and negotiating and managing Respondent's contracts. In 1994, Alexander was 69 years of age. From the evidence, it appears Alexander had no predisposition as to the age or gender of the selected candidate. He would have preferred a mature candidate if he could have found one who met all of the other requirements. There were 13 applicants for the position of environmental manager of whom nine, including Petitioner, met the minimum qualifications for the position. Four applicants were selected by Alexander to be interviewed, including three females and one male, all under 40 years of age. None of the three male applicants over the age of 40, who met the minimum qualifications for the position, were interviewed. In September 1994, T. Patrick Price was the operations manager for the Central District and his duties included serving as personnel liaison between the Central District and the Bureau of Personnel Services in Tallahassee. As a practical matter, Price's assistant, Minnie Yates, performed most of the clerical functions associated with personnel matters including recruitment and the preparation of recruitment and hiring packages. Price and the selectee, Ruth McLemore, had a "live-in, domestic relationship." They subsequently wed and were married at the time of hearing. Petitioner failed to show that Price was in a position to influence the selection of McLemore, either directly or indirectly. Price removed himself in the early stages from the selection process, when he learned that McLemore had applied for the environmental manager position. Furthermore, had Price not removed himself from the selection process, his role would have been limited to reviewing the applications to determine which applicants possessed the minimum qualifications for the position, and later ensuring that the selected applicant was among the most qualified applicants. The greater weight of evidence did not support the assertion that Price was in a position to influence directly or indirectly, the outcome of the selection process or which candidates were selected for interview. In September 1994, Petitioner had over 20 years of experience as an engineer at the United States Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. However, his experience with programs regulated by Respondent was limited to one year with an Orlando company involving domestic waste, approximately 20 months with the air program in Tampa, and less than four months with the industrial wastewater program in Orlando. Petitioner testified that he had dealt with legislators and their aides in New Hampshire and Maine but offered no proof of experience with the Florida Legislature. Petitioner testified that he did not have experience with or knowledge of Respondent's contracting procedures. While Petitioner testified that he had experience in making public presentations in New Hampshire, and in writing reports in the Southwest District, he failed to attach any writing samples or examples of relevant public presentations to his application. The selected applicant, Ruth McLemore-Price, f/k/a Ruth McLemore, is a white female under 40 years of age. In September 1994, she was an Environmental Specialist III in the Storage Tank program of the Division of Waste Management in the Central District of Respondent. From 1987 to 1988, McLemore was a Biological Scientist I in the Environmental Health Section of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. She was hired by Respondent in 1988 as an Environmental Specialist I in the Domestic Wastewater Section. At the time of her application, she had over seven years of professional experience with environmental programs in Florida, including but not limited to: domestic wastewater, industrial wastewater, drinking water, storage tanks, hazardous waste, and solid waste. Additionally, her application includes examples of her numerous public presentations and writing samples. She had extensive contract experience including contracting with local governmental programs. Whereas Petitioner had more years of professional experience, McLemore's experience was more relevant to the position of environmental manager and better met the required knowledge skills and abilities required of the position. Petitioner was unable to produce any proof of his assertion that the group of applicants interviewed must be in statistical parity with protected groups within the District or within Respondent. Rather, the evidence showed that there is no such requirement. Likewise, there was no evidence that merely meeting the minimum qualifications of a position requires that the candidate be interviewed, and the evidence demonstrated this not to be the case. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent classified applicants in such a way so as to discriminate against him due to his age and gender. The evidence showed that the classification of applicants by age, gender, and race was created after the selection process was completed in order to comply with Respondent's requirements, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Civil Rights Act. Further, there was no credible evidence that Respondent's actions were a pretext for discrimination, that the employment decision was grounded in discriminatory animus, or that a discriminatory reason motivated Respondent in its actions. DOAH Case No. 98-3611 In March 1995, following Alexander's retirement, Vivian Garfein became director of the Central District. Within a few days of her arrival, Petitioner approached her and lodged a complaint regarding his non-selection for the environmental manager position. Garfein looked into the matter, and subsequently, advised Petitioner that she found no irregularities in the selection process. Petitioner advised her that he was aware that he had formal remedies and on May 19, 1995, he filed his initial complaint with FCHR. Petitioner alleges that, within hours of complaining to Garfein, a course of retaliation commenced, perpetrated by his immediate supervisor Ali Kazi, which continued until, and was the cause of his resignation in December 1995. These acts included: In April 1995, Kazi returned Petitioner's April timesheet with instructions to complete and sign it before submitting it to his supervisor. Petitioner alleges that this was harassment because it was intended as a preliminary submittal and, therefore, was obviously incomplete. In November 1995, Petitioner alleges that Kazi conducted his performance evaluation and completed it within two minutes. The evaluation encouraged him to attempt to reduce his leave without pay. Petitioner asserted that all of his leave without pay was unavoidable and necessary; and, since he was the hardest worker in the District and kept his work up-to- date, Kazi had no basis for making such a recommendation. Petitioner further alleged that Kazi harassed and retaliated against him by forwarding an e-mail critical of Petitioner which Kazi had received from a supervisor in another program. The remaining incidents of alleged retaliation involve Kazi's refusal to allow Petitioner to make up leave days or requiring him to adjust his timesheet so as not to qualify for vacation pay in August and November 1995. The testimony showed, however, that the timesheet was submitted on the last day of the employee's work month, and it was entirely reasonable for his supervisor to assume that it was his final submittal. It was undisputed that Petitioner took substantial leave without pay (approximately 10 weeks between June 1 and November 7, 1995). This was reasonably perceived by Respondent to be excessive. Petitioner offered no evidence that a longer performance evaluation was in any way required. There was no evidence that Petitioner was ever counseled or otherwise disciplined as a result of the e-mail. Therefore, merely forwarding it could not be deemed as harassment or retaliation. The evidence showed Petitioner had accumulated excessive leave without pay. It was Respondent's policy to discourage excessive leave without pay. It was also undisputed that Kazi had the discretion to perform the acts alleged to be harassment. While it is true that Kazi's actions caused Petitioner to lose pay, the acts are permitted and justified by legitimate business reasons. Additionally, there was no credible evidence that Garfein or any other supervisor had instructed him to treat Petitioner any differently than any other employee.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Donald A. Garrepy, pro se Post Office Box 276 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802 For Respondent: Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED as follows: A final order be entered by FCHR dismissing with prejudice the petition of Donald A. Garrepy in DOAH Case No. 98- 5090 (FCHR Case No. 95-5752). A final order be entered by FCHR dismissing with prejudice the petition of Donald A. Garrepy in DOAH Case No. 98- 3611 (FCHR Case No. 96-1298). DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Donald A. Garrepy Post Office Box 276 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
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LINDA MARCHINKO vs THE WITTEMANN COMPANY, LLC, 05-002062 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bunnell, Florida Jun. 07, 2005 Number: 05-002062 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2006

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on November 17, 2004.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Marchinko, was employed by the Witteman Company, Inc., from 1966 until April 2003. The Witteman Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Inc.") was a division of the Dover Corporation. While employed by Inc., Petitioner held the position of traffic manager. The most recent description of the duties of the position of traffic manager reads as follows: Responsible for, but not limited to, traffic managerial duties, coordinate and arrange for all product shipments, required documentation, customer interaction, and providing back-up support as required to others within the Company. Work with minimum supervision, produce quality, complete and accurate work and be an active and positive participant on teams and committees to which assigned. In February 2003, Cryogenic Industries made an asset purchase of Inc. and established Witteman, LLC (hereinafter LLC). LLC engineers and sells carbon dioxide, recovery, and production equipment to soft drink and brewing companies. Whereas Inc. had a maximum of 110 employees, LLC was established with only 17 employees, as many departments such as purchasing, traffic, and accounting were eliminated or "farmed out." At the time of the asset purchase, all employees of Inc. were terminated due to the sale of the assets of Inc. Petitioner was terminated from employment with Inc. effective April 8, 2003. She signed a Severance Agreement and Waiver and Release of Claims, releasing Inc. from all claims, including any related to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act. The position of traffic manager has not and does not exist at LLC. Petitioner was not hired by LLC. Petitioner has never been employed by LLC and, therefore, was not terminated by LLC. A few employees of Inc. were hired by LLC. Petitioner was not one of them. Cara Brammer is one of the employees of Inc. who was hired by LLC. Her position is Comptroller. Petitioner contends that regardless of Ms. Brammer's title, Ms. Brammer performs the same functions that Petitioner used to perform for Inc. Petitioner believes that Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC because she is younger than Petitioner. At the time Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC, she was approximately 39 years old and Petitioner was 55 years old. Ms. Brammer's duties as Comptroller include accounts payable, cost accounting, and general ledger work. According to Ms. Brammer, the traffic manager duties previously performed by Petitioner were separated between two of LLC's sister companies in California, which handle all of the major equipment, including manufacturing and shipping for LLC. William Geiger is General Manager of LLC. According to Mr. Geiger, the manufacturing of the product was shifted to two divisions located in California. The primary shipping of the company's product was also shifted to California. This is consistent with Ms. Brammer's testimony. According to Ms. Brammer, a small portion of the shipping duties that had initially been sent to California are now handled by LLC. She estimates that she spends only four to five hours a week on these traffic duties, that Mr. Geiger handles some of these duties, and that "quite a bit" of these traffic duties have been farmed out to a company called Freight Forwarder. LLC employs people in their thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties. There is no competent evidence that LLC used age as a criterion in its determination of who would and who would not be hired for the newly formed company.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2005.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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GEORGE E. STOLWORTHY vs GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DIVISION, 91-005273 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Aug. 22, 1991 Number: 91-005273 Latest Update: Nov. 28, 1994

Findings Of Fact On January 2, 1992, Petitioner commenced an action in federal district court pursuant to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Action ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq. The summons and complaint were not served upon Respondent until May, 1992. By statute, the filing of said federal action stayed the matter pending before the Florida Commission on Human Relations. 29 U.S.C. Section 633(a). Petitioner could have but did not bring an age discrimination claim under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, in his federal court case. On February 23, 1993, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered an order granting summary judgment for Respondent, Grumman Aerospace Corporation against Petitioner George E. Stolworthy. The district court held that "there is simply no evidence that Plaintiff's termination was motivated by a discriminatory intent on the part of the Defendant. Petitioner appealed the decision of the District Court to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal. On or about February 14, 1994, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's order of summary judgment. Mr. Stolworthy's claim of age discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations arises out of the same common nucleus of operative facts as his age discrimination claim in federal court. Both cases allege age discrimination in the termination of Petitioner's employment. All of the issues in this case were decided in favor of Respondent by the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, on February 23, 1993. The district court held that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner. The district court's decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal on February 14, 1994. That decision effectively resolves this matter either through the doctrine of res Judicata or collateral estoppel. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed and jurisdiction relinquished to the commission for entry of the appropriate final order. Finally, Petitioner was aware that he commenced an action against the Respondent herein in federal district court alleging violations of the ADEA and involving the same set of operative facts before the administrative hearing was held in February 13, 1992. At the time of the hearing, Respondent's counsel was unaware that Petitioner had commenced the aforementioned lawsuit. Additionally, neither Petitioner nor his counsel advised the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Hearing Officer of the initiation of the federal lawsuit. Rather, Petitioner, through his counsel, continued to file documents with the Division in violation of Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Petitioner pursued the instant action for an improper purpose knowing full well that the agency's jurisdiction should have been suspended, and could only have intended to improperly harass Respondent; to improperly utilize the Divisions hearing process for either discovery for the federal case or a trial run for the federal case; to improperly cause needless increase in the cost of the litigation to Respondent; and to improperly waste this agency's time. Respondent incurred attorney's fees and costs and expenses in the amount of $13,506.39 dollars. Moreover, after review of the transcript and evidence in this case it is clear that this action had no basis in fact or law and was therefore frivolous in nature. Therefore Respondent is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $13,506.39.

USC (2) 29 U.S.C 62129 U.S.C 633 Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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