The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should receive a passing score on the December 2001 dental license examination.
Findings Of Fact In December 2001, Petitioner took the dental licensure examination and failed to pass the clinical portion of the exam. The examination is a three-day process involving two days of clinical examination. Those two days of clinical examination consist of nine procedures. Four of the nine procedures were challenged by Petitioner. The clinical portion is where the candidate is required to perform certain patient procedures. The work product of the student, or candidate, is evaluated following the performance of those procedures by three examiners. Each examiner grades the candidate independently of whatever score the other examiners may award on a particular procedure. Then the average grade for each procedure is weighted in accordance with requirements of Rule 64B5-2.013, Florida Administrative Code. This produces the overall score for the entire clinical exam. The Department uses three examiners' scores because this provides a more reliable indication of the candidate's competency and true score. Further, each examiner must be a licensed dentist for a minimum of five years and have no complaints or disciplinary actions against their license. Examiners have no contact with the candidate taking the examination and, accordingly, have no idea of who they are grading. To further ensure fairness, each examiner must attend and successfully complete a standardization session. The purpose of these sessions is to ensure that each examiner is trained to use the same internal grading criteria. In standardization, each examiner is thoroughly taught specific grading criteria with the result that examiners are instructed on how to evaluate the work of the candidates. The examiners who graded Petitioner’s examination had successfully completed the foregoing standardization session. Also, the Department’s post-exam check found these examiners’ grading to be reliable. Petitioner contested the score he received on Procedure 4, the Endodontic procedure, a root canal. The Endodontic procedure required removal of infected nerve tissue and blood vessels pulp from the tooth. Petitioner was required to access the canal and pulp tissue from the outside. Then, Petitioner was required to remove the bad nerve and cleanse the canal. Finally, Petitioner was required to seal the canal to prevent recurring bacteria. Petitioner failed to observe a fracture in the tooth. He claimed that a fracture to the root of the tooth was caused by the Department after he reviewed his examination and that no one advised him the root was fractured. Petitioner requested a score of 3.00 for this procedure. However, the Department's witness, Dr. William F. Robinson, a licensed dentist for 32 years who examined the tooth and X-ray prepared by Petitioner, testified that the fracture to the root was noticed in both the X-ray and on the tooth when he examined the same. Additionally, two of the three re-graders also noted the fracture of the root. With regard to Petitioner's preparation of the X-ray at the conclusion of the examination, Dr. Robinson opined that Petitioner caused the fracture to the root during the examination and not the Department, as alleged by Petitioner. Dr. Robinson further opined that even without a fracture to the root of the tooth, Petitioner failed the procedure and the failing grade he received was fair. Dr. Robinson would not recommend that Petitioner receive a passing score of 3.00 on the procedure. The examiners' comments and grades and the testimony of Dr. William F. Robinson establish that Petitioner failed to properly perform this procedure. The grade Petitioner received was fair. Petitioner challenged the grade he received on Procedure 5, the Class IV Composite Restoration of the front tooth, but did not offer any testimony at the hearing as to why the score was not correct for the procedure. Petitioner requested that the score of 1.00 given by one of the examiners be thrown out, thus giving him a passing grade on this procedure. Procedure 5 of the dental licensure examination is a procedure that involves the candidate’s ability to replace the edge of the front tooth with a composite resin material, which is a tooth-colored filling. As established by the examiners’ comments and grades and the testimony of Dr. William F. Robinson, Petitioner failed to properly perform this procedure and the grade Petitioner received was fair. Specifically, the examiners found that the tooth was abraded and the re-grader noted, as did the examiners, the excessive “flash” on the tooth. Dr. Robinson also noted both deficiencies in the procedure. Petitioner contested the score he received on Procedure 6, the Class II Composite Restoration procedure in his original petition, but offered no testimony at the hearing concerning this procedure. Dr. Robinson reviewed the examiners' grades and the tooth prepared by Petitioner and opined that Petitioner’s grade of 2.66 for this procedure is fair. Based on the examiners’ comments and grades and the testimony of Dr. Robinson, Petitioner failed to properly perform this procedure and the grade Petitioner received was fair. Petitioner contested the score he received on Procedure 7, the preparation for a 3-unit Fixed Partial Denture, claiming that on the re-grade one of the examiners reviewed the wrong procedure. The Preparation for a 3-unit Fixed Partial Denture procedure of the dental licensure examination is a procedure that involves the candidate’s ability to provide preparations of two (2) teeth in order to replace a missing tooth with a fixed bridge. Dr. Robinson established that Petitioner’s work on this procedure resulted in one tooth, No. 29, being grossly over reduced and tooth No. 31 was insufficiently reduced. The result of such work is that it is impossible to place a bridge on such an improper preparation. As established by testimony of Dr. Robinson, Petitioner's problem with this procedure resulted from Petitioner’s undercut. This undercut indicated that Petitioner’s preparations were not properly aligned to accept a bridge. Based on the examiners’ comments and grades, and the testimony of Dr. Robinson, Petitioner failed to properly perform this procedure and the grade Petitioner received was fair. The Department's “re-grade” process was utilized in this case. Used to give all candidates who timely request a hearing another chance at passing, the re-grade process allows the Department to go back and determine whether any grades rendered were inconsistent. The Department selects the top three examiners who had the highest reliability from that examination to participate in the re-grade process. The Department maintains post-standardization statistics of the examiners’ performance. In this case, those statistics indicated that Petitioner’s examiners graded reliably. In addition, the Department calculates post- examination statistics for the examiners, which are as follows for the examiners who graded Petitioner’s challenged procedures: Examiner Accuracy Index & Rating #206 95.8-Excellent #375 98.8-Excellent #380 92.1-Good #334 97.8-Excellent #298 95.9-Excellent #375 98.8-Excellent-was an original and a re-grader. All of Petitioner's examiners exhibited a reliability significantly above the minimum acceptable accuracy index of 85.0.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the grade assigned him for the December 2001 dental licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Renee Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Jason S. Baker, D.M.D. Westchester Medical Center 95 Grasslands Road, Box 572 Valhalla, New York 10595 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be issued a license to practice dentistry pursuant to Chapter 466, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dr. Lester Altman is a licensed dentist in the State of New York who practices dentistry in Brooklyn , New York. He has been in the private practice of dentistry since 1948. (Testimony of Petitioner) Petitioner applied for licensure as a dentist in Florida on two occasions in 1976 and took the necessary examinations for such licenses. On both occasions, he failed to achieve a satisfactory grade of 75 on the clinical examinations. He applied again in March, 1978, and was examined in June, 1978. He was informed by Respondent on July 5, 1978, that he had not achieved a final grade of 75 on the clinical examination and therefore did not qualify for licensure. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for an administrative hearing which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 27, 1979. (Testimony of Petitioner, Case pleadings, Exhibit 13) The June, 1978, clinical examination was conducted in Gainesville, Florida, by a group of examining dentists which consisted of certain members of the Board of Dentistry and other selected Florida dentists. Approximately 75 percent of the group had served previously as examiners. The clinical examination extends for a period of two days and applicants are tested in the areas of cast gold restoration, amalgam restoration, laboratory, denture setup, periodontal evaluation, and professional evaluation. Two separate grades are given for the cast gold restoration, amalgam restoration, and laboratory portions of the examination. Each of the six major parts of the examination is weighted for grading purposes and all scores are considered in arriving at a total score for the test. Each scored portion of the examination receives a grade ranging from 0 to 5, with 5 representing 100 percent and 3 being an average grade of 75 percent. The subject matter of the examination is determined by the Board of Dentistry and the individual grades for each portion of the examination are entered by two examiners on a grading form designed by a professional testing organization in conjunction with the Board for computer scoring. In order to ensure the validity and fairness of the examination, it is necessary that grading procedures be standardized by the examiners. This process is to preclude to the extent possible widely divergent scores being assigned to a particular portion of the examination by individual examiners. Such a standardization process takes place a short time prior to the administration of the examination at which all examiners are in attendance. At that time various criteria are established and the examiners practice grading various parts of the examination using models of teeth, slides, and the like. Grades are compared among the examiners and guidelines are established so that all examiners will be grading on the same criteria. During these sessions, Department Heads and other faculty personnel of the University of Florida Dental School participate and lecture to the examiners. The "professional evaluation" portion of the examination includes grading criteria for clinical judgment, professional judgment, instruments, patient management, clinical examination, and operatory arrangement. "Clinical judgment" deals primarily with the applicant's competence in diagnosing and performing the necessary dental work required in the examination. "Professional judgment" includes considerations of the applicant's concern for and demeanor toward patients as to prevention of pain, courtesy in avoiding appointment delays, and other matters reflecting his interest in the patient. Similarly, the applicant's treatment of his dental assistants is considered in this category. The other areas of patient management, instruments, clinical examination, and operatory arrangement deals with the cleanliness and appropriateness of instruments, extent of dental knowledge and decision making, and treatment of patients. In particular, the areas of clinical judgment, professional judgment, and patient management overlap one another in varying degrees. The professional evaluation segment of the examination is standardized at the early meetings of the examiners by full discussion of the grading criteria among the participants and arrival at a consensus as to uniformity. The examiners are instructed to make notations or check marks on the grading form in cases where a below average grade is entered. The standardization procedures were employed for the June 1978 clinical examination. (Testimony of Hite, Bliss, Santin, (Deposition - Exhibit 2), Dannahower (Deposition- Exhibit 3), Mullens (Deposition - Exhibit 1), Exhibits 4, 8, 12) At the time an applicant reports for the examination, he is assigned a random number which is placed on the various examination forms to provide anonymity. He is assigned his own operatory or treatment area to work in and his own laboratory desk. Various periods of the two-day examination session are spent in the laboratory and clinic areas. Two examiners grade the laboratory work. In the clinic there is an examiner in charge and normally two other examiners who view the candidates's work after each step of the examination and independently enter a grade on the scoring form. After the second examiner has entered the grade, he notes the grade given by the first examiner and, in rare instances where there is more than one grade difference between the two, a third examiner is called in to enter an independent grade of his own. Such an instance did not occur with respect to Petitioner's examination. The "professional evaluation" grade is entered during the last clinic session based on the examiners' observations of the applicants during the cast gold and amalgam restoration and periodontal parts of the examination. The two examiners who grade professional evaluation will have graded the applicant for at least 50 percent of the clinical subjects from which the professional evaluation grade is derived. These examiners also may observe notes or deficiencies entered by other examiners for other clinical portions of the examination and may take these into consideration when entering the professional evaluation grade. Each applicant retains a check sheet throughout the examination on which each step is initialed by the examiner contemporaneously with entry of the grade on the grade sheet to ensure that the applicant has completed each successive step of the examination. The check sheets are monitored by examination assistants to verify that each section of the examination has been completed and graded. There is no place on the check sheet concerning the "professional evaluation" segment of the examination because the grade is entered by the examiners without any prior request from the applicant to be graded in that area. The examiner in charge of the clinic at the time the professional evaluation grade is entered always is one of the graders for that part because he is an experienced Board member. In the case of Petitioner, two Board members graded the professional evaluation part of the examination. (Testimony of Hite, Bliss, Santin (Deposition) Dannahower (Deposition) , Mullens (Deposition), Exhibit 11) After completion of the examination, the scores on the grade sheets are tabulated and weighted to arrive at a final grade. Various statistical studies are made concerning the grading by new examiners to determine if their grading practices produce valid results. The two Board members who graded Petitioner's "professional evaluation" portion of the examination are experienced and considered to be valid graders by Respondent's testing consultant. Each examiner is assigned a number which is entered on the grading form by him at the time he grades a segment of the examination. As a matter of Board policy, the grade for "professional evaluation" is considered by the examiners to be a "3" which is a passing score unless the examiner determines that the grade should be raised or lowered based on the applicant's performance during the examination. Although a computer error was made on a December 1978 examination, none was made on Petitioner's grade sheet for the June 1978 examination. The 1978 computer error was corrected and the applicant was eventually permitted to retake a portion of his examination based on a separate erroneous grading procedure and thereafter obtained a license. The grading form includes blocks at the top of each segment of the examination which the examiner may use to enter his number and a grade for the second time. Although the entry of such items would be helpful in the event there is a conflict in the computer grade marked below the block, such entry is not required of the examiner and would not be "read" by the computer. One of Petitioner's examiners who was examiner Number 5 incorrectly entered the number "4" on the grade sheet portion of the examination. In the opinion of the Board testing consultant, such an entry by an examiner of an incorrect examiner number on the grade sheet would not affect the validity of any grade entered at that time. (Testimony of Hite, Bliss, Santin (Deposition), Dannahower (Deposition, Exhibits 8-9, 11) Petitioner's scores for the June 1978 practical examination were as follows: Amalgam Restoration 81.25; Cast Gold Restoration 70.87; Periodontal Evaluation 79.12; Professional Evaluation 62.50; Laboratory Evaluation 68.75; Denture Set-up 56.25. His overall average for the examination was 72.61. (Exhibit 12) Petitioner was unsatisfactory in four parts of the six-part clinical examination. These were denture setup, laboratory, professional evaluation, and cast gold restoration. Notations or check marks were entered on the grading form by examiners as to the deficiencies which prompted the unsatisfactory grades. As to cast gold restoration, one examiner noted "watch calculus" on the cavity preparation segment, and both examiners checked "margins" and reflected "open contact." Although the latter deficiency obviously existed at the time of the examination, a subsequent check of the patient after the examination revealed that the lack of contact was cured by the passage of time. In the laboratory portion both examiners observed "no contact" in the wax pattern portion, but only one examiner noted bubbles, pits, and sprueing in the casting part of the laboratory work. One examiner entered seven check marks on the denture setup portion of the examination and the other examiner entered four check marks for that part. In professional evaluation, one examiner checked "clinical judgment" and the other examiner checked both "clinical judgment" and "professional judgment." The one who entered a deficiency for clinical judgment did so due to the fact that calculus was present during the cavity preparation portion of the cast gold restoration procedure. The second examiner did not recall why he had entered the professional evaluation deficiencies on the grade sheet. Six different examiners participated in the grading of Petitioner's examination. In four of the nine areas which were graded by two examiners, the same grade was entered by both examiners. In the remaining five portions, the two examiners did not deviate by more than one grade score. Three examiners graded the Petitioner in the three areas of work upon which the professional evaluation grade was based. Two of these three examiners graded the professional evaluation portion of the examination. The patients upon whom Petitioner performed dental work during the examination experienced no pain or discomfort during the examination and are of the opinion that Petitioner treated them in an exemplary and professional manner at that time. (Testimony of Hite, Bliss, Dannahower (Deposition) Santin (Deposition), Weissman, Solomon, Exhibits 8-9, supplemented by Exhibits 5-7) Petitioner's scores for the December 1976 clinical examination were higher that those on the June 1978 examination for laboratory and professional evaluation. They were the same for periodontal evaluation and amalgam restoration. The cast gold restoration score was lower in the December 1976 examination. (Exhibits 12-13) Petitioner has had an active practice for many years in Brooklyn, New York, with an average of 15 to 20 patients per day and an annual gross income of over $100,000. The former owner of a large dental laboratory in New York City which produced dental appliances for Petitioner over many years found him to be extremely competent in the work provided to the laboratory. Several of his patients attested to Petitioner's excellent dental work and professional demeanor, and expressed the desire to have him serve as their dentist in Florida. (Testimony of Tauman, Karlin, Cohen, Solomon, supplemented by Exhibit 5)
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for a license to practice dentistry be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Hixson, Esquire Room 1501 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Fuller, Esquire Fuller, Feingold, Weil and Scheer No. 802 Flagship Bank Building 1111 Lincoln Road Mall Miami, Florida 33139 Florida State Board of Dentistry Attn: Leah Hickel Administrative Assistant 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DR. LESTER ALTMAN, Petitioner, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS vs. CASE NO. 79-1639 BOARD OF DENTISTRY, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Florida, having been issued license number DN-0000975. Respondent has been licensed to practice dentistry in this State since 1944, and there is no evidence in the record to indicate that he has previously been the subject of a complaint, investigation or license disciplinary action. Respondent was a participant in the Medicaid program, at all times material hereto. He executed a provider agreement with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, under the terms of which Medicaid paid a total of $300 for a set of upper and lower dentures, and he was allowed to bill the patient for a 5% co-payment in addition to the amount paid by Medicaid. Participants in the program specifically agreed to accept the Medicaid-payment in lieu of their usual and customary charges, and not to bill or accept payments from patients, with the sole exception of the 5% co-payment for dentures. Billings to Medicaid could only be made after services were rendered. The Medicaid program reimbursed providers $8.00 for a single surface amalgam restoration, $16.00 for two surfaces, and $24.00 for three of more surfaces. The maximum allowable fee under the Medicaid program for a complete upper set of dentures was $150.00, and for a complete lower set, $150.00. Alveolectomies were reimbursed at $35.00 per quadrant. Between November 4, 1983 and December 15, 1983, Respondent rendered dental services to Geraldine Jones, for which he subsequently billed, and was paid by, Medicaid. The billings were for extracting fifteen teeth, performing three alveolectomies, and fitting the patient with complete upper and lower dentures. Respondent did not perform any of these services for Jones. Therefore, the $423 paid to him by Medicaid was an overpayment, and a payment for services not performed. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services rendered to Velma Mondy between May 11, 1983 and June 16, 1983. The billings were for restoration of a total of eighteen tooth surfaces. On or about June, 1985, an examination of Mondy's teeth by Dr. Charles Kekich, dental consultant with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, who was accepted as an expert in dentistry, revealed that she had a total of only six surfaces restored. Therefore, Respondent billed and received an overpayment from Medicaid in the amount of $96.00 for services not rendered to this patient. Dental services which were allegedly rendered to Bridget Bryant by Respondent between September 12 and 26, 1983, were billed to Medicaid, and Respondent received payment for restoring twelve teeth, with a total of thirty surfaces. On or about June, 1985, an examination of Bryant by Dr. Kekich revealed that no more than fifteen restorations had been performed, resulting in an overpayment from Medicaid to Respondent of at least $120.00. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for services rendered to Joyce Johnson between December 22, 1983 and January 1, 1984. These billings were for extracting three teeth and restoring ten, with a total of twenty surfaces. During June, 1985, Dr. Kekich examined Johnson and found that none of the work billed by Respondent had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $184.00 was made by Medicaid for services billed, but not rendered by the Respondent. Between January 25, 1984 and March 21, 1984, Respondent performed certain dental work on Ernest Macon, for which he billed and was paid by Medicaid for extracting two teeth and restoring nine teeth, with a total of twenty-three surfaces. Dr. Kekich's examination of Macon during June, 1985, revealed that only one tooth had been extracted and no more than four surfaces had been restored. Therefore, Respondent over billed and received payment from Medicaid for services not rendered to Macon in the amount of $159.00 Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services rendered to Derrick Ealy between March 15 and 27, 1984. These billings were for restoring four teeth, with a total of eleven surfaces. An examination of Derrick Ealy by Dr. Kekich in June, 1985, revealed that only two surfaces had been restored, resulting in an overpayment by Medicaid of $72.00 for services billed, but not rendered. An examination of Kimberly Ealy in June, 1985, revealed that none of the dental services for which Respondent had billed and been paid by Medicaid had, in fact, been performed. Respondent had billed Medicaid for extracting one tooth and restoring a total of thirteen surfaces on five teeth between March 13 and 22, 1984. Therefore, an overpayment of $114 was made by Medicaid for services billed, but not rendered to Kimberly Ealy. Respondent performed dental services for Corey Oliver between March 27, 1984 and May 6, 1984, and in connection therewith, he billed Medicaid for extracting one tooth and restoring seven teeth with a total of seventeen surfaces. An examination of Oliver by Dr. Kekich in June, 1985, revealed that roots of the tooth supposedly extracted by Respondent remained, and that eleven of the surfaces for which bills had been submitted had not been restored. Therefore, an overpayment of at least $95.00 was made by Medicaid for services billed, but not rendered to this patient. From April 16, 1984 to August 7, 1984, Respondent extracted twenty- seven teeth from Lillian Corouthers, and fitted her for a full set of dentures. He billed Medicaid for a total of $1,215 for these services, and received payment from Medicaid of $620.35. In addition thereto, he billed and received from this patient a total of $269. This co-payment exceeds the allowable 5% co- payment under the Medicaid program by $236.35. There is no evidence that Respondent ever refunded any portion of this overpayment to Corouthers. Although Respondent billed and was paid by Medicaid for services performed on Shawn Smith between July 11 and 24, 1984, which allegedly consisted of restoring eight teeth with a total of twenty-one surfaces, an examination of this patient by Dr. Kekich in May, 1985, revealed that none of this work had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $168 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered by Respondent. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services rendered to Allan Smith between July 6 and 23, 1984. The billings were for extracting two teeth and restoring a total of seventeen surfaces. Dr. Kekich's examination in May, 1985, revealed that only one extraction had been performed, and no restorations. As a result, an overpayment of $146 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered to Allan Smith. Respondent pulled one tooth and provided a complete set of dentures to Mose Tobias in July, 1984. For these services Respondent billed Medicaid for a total of $490, and received payment from Medicaid in the amount of $321.10. He also billed and received payment from this patient in the amount of $119, which exceeds the co-payment allowable under the Medicaid program by $112.11. Between July 6 and August 14, 1984, Respondent performed dental services for Angela Pleas, and in connection therewith, he billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for two extractions and sixteen surface restorations. During a June, 1985, examination of Pleas, it was revealed that no more than one extraction and nine restorations had been performed, resulting in an overpayment by Medicaid of $82.00 for services billed but not rendered to Pleas by the Respondent. Callie Wilson was treated by the Respondent between August 2 and 23, 1984, and in connection therewith, he billed Medicaid a total of $470.00 for an examination, x-rays, and a complete set of dentures. Respondent received payment from Medicaid in the amount of $162.45 for these services. In addition thereto, Respondent billed and received from Wilson an amount that exceeds the allowable 5% co-payment under the Medicaid program. The exact amount of this overpayment, however, cannot be determined, but it appears to have been an overpayment of between $45.00 and $95.00. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for extracting one tooth and restoring twenty-two surfaces for Maruise Woods between September 4 and 25, 1984. An examination of Woods by Dr. Kekich in May, 1985, revealed that no surface restorations had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $172 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered. Between September 21 and 27, 1984, Respondent claims to have performed dental services for Sharon Woods, for which he then billed and subsequently received payment from Medicaid for the restoration of four teeth, with a total of twelve surfaces. In May, 1985, Dr. Kekich examined Sharon Woods, and found that none of this work had been performed. Therefore, Respondent overbilled Medicaid $96 for services not rendered to this patient. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services rendered to John Aberdeen between September 27 and November 21, 1984. These billings were for extracting fifteen teeth, and providing a complete set of dentures. A June, 1985 examination of this patient by Dr. Kekich revealed that only one tooth had been extracted. Respondent received an overpayment from Medicaid in the amount of $389.85 for services not rendered to Aberdeen. Bills were submitted to Medicaid and payment received for services Respondent claims to have performed on Mercedia Lanier between October 1 and 19, 1984. These billings were for restoring seven teeth, with a total of eighteen surfaces. Dr. Kekich's examination of Lanier in May, 1985, revealed that none of the work billed by Respondent had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $144.00 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered to Lanier by Respondent. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services rendered to Patricia Hall between November 20 and December 7, 1984. These billings were for seven extractions, and the restoration of five teeth with twelve surfaces. In June, 1985, Dr. Kekich examined Hall and found that no more than four extractions, and five surface restorations had been done. Medicaid made an overpayment of $83.00 in connection with services billed, but not rendered to Hall. Claims were submitted to Medicaid by Respondent in connection with services allegedly performed on Eugenie Perry between January 17 and February 11, 1985. These billing were for the restoration of twenty-two surfaces, but Dr. Kekich found in May, 1985, that none of these restorations had been performed. As a result, Medicaid made an overpayment to Respondent of $176.00 for services not rendered. Tessie McRae was a patient of Respondent's in 1985, and claims were filed with Medicaid by Respondent for services between February 5 and March 28, 1985, consisting of ten extractions, four alveolectomies, and a complete set of dentures. When Albert Ravenna, special agent for Medicaid fraud with the Auditor General's Office interviewed McRae in June, 1985, she still had her own teeth and did not have dentures. Respondent did provide her with dentures subsequent to payment for these services by Medicaid. However, an overpayment of $401.55 was made by Medicaid since the services for which billings were submitted by the Respondent had not been performed prior to the filing of these claims. Respondent billed Medicaid for a total of $600 in connection with services he provided to Cora Griffin between February 3 and 11, 1985. Specifically, these bills were for an exam, x-rays and a complete set of dentures. Medicaid paid Respondent $311.60 for these services, and in addition thereto, he billed and collected from Griffin a total of $180. This amount paid by the patient exceeds the allowable co-payment under the Medicaid program. Respondent billed and subsequently received payment from Medicaid for services rendered to Kenneth Gainer between January 25 and March 22, 1985. The billings were for restoring ten teeth with a total of twenty-six surfaces. An examination of Gainer by Dr. Kekich in June, 1985, revealed that none of this work had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $208.00 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered. Billings were submitted to Medicaid by Respondent for services allegedly performed on Lawrence Harvey between March 14 and 19, 1985, and consisting of two extractions and eight surface restorations. Dr. Kekich found, upon examining the patient in June, 1985, that none of this work had been performed. Therefore, an overpayment of $84.00 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for services rendered to Brian Harvey between March 13 and 29, 1985. These billings were for restoring six teeth with a total of twelve surfaces. Respondent did not perform these services, and, therefore, the payment of $96.00 which he received for these services from Medicaid represents an overpayment for services not rendered. According to billings submitted by Respondent to Medicaid, he treated Felicia Harvey between March 21 and 29, 1985. These billings were for restoring four teeth, with a total of eight surfaces. An examination of this patient by Dr. Kekich in June, 1985, revealed that none of this work had been performed, and, therefore, an overpayment of $64.00 was made by Medicaid for services not rendered. On or about December 19, 1986, Respondent plead nolo contendere to seventeen counts of grand theft and five felony counts of public assistance fraud in violation of Sections 812.014 and 409.325, Florida Statutes, and was adjudicated guilty. The billings that Respondent signed and submitted to Medicaid, which are referenced in the above findings of fact, were prepared by his office receptionist, Ida Roundtree, who has been employed by him for twenty-two years, and who is responsible for the preparation and filing of all insurance claims based upon patient dental charts prepared by Respondent or his dental hygienist. Respondent testified that he does not consider it to be his responsibility to familiarize himself with the various requirements for insurance or Medicaid reimbursement. He relies entirely on Roundtree for this, and clearly does not consider the preparation of reimbursement or billing "paperwork" to be within the practice of dentistry. Roundtree admitted that she prepared Medicaid billings for work which was yet to be done in some cases. She would just fill in dates when the work supposedly had been done so that Medicaid would pay the claim. She testified she was unaware that Medicaid allowed a 5% co-payment only for dentures, and that no co-payment could be made for any other dental services under the program. Further, she admitted that she falsified billings by including services not performed so that Respondent would receive more money under the Medicaid program. The evidence does not establish that she was directed to falsify Medicaid billings by the Respondent or that she informed him of her practices, but it was established that he did not check, or in any way attempt to verify, the billings which she prepared before he signed them.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license for a period of THREE months, and imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $6,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 88-2961) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6-8 Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 9-16. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 30 and 31. Rejected as unnecessary and as legal argument. 19-25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 30 and 31, but otherwise rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 26. Rejected as unnecessary. 27-30. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4. 31-34. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 5. 35-39. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. 40-42. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 6. 43-45. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 7. 46-48. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8. 49-51. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 9. 52-55. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 10. 56-62. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 11. 63-65. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 12. 66-68. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 13. 69-72. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14. 73-76. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 15. 77-82. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 16. 83-86. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 17. 87-90. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 18. 91-93. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 19. 94-97. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 20 98-100. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 21. 101-103. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 22. 104-109. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 23. 110-116. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24. 117-119. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 25. 120-122. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 26. 123-127. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 27. 128-130. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 28. Rejected as unnecessary and duplicative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. (Note: In addition to adopting, in part, proposed findings of fact 27-130, as shown above, these proposed findings are otherwise rejected as unnecessary or as not based on competent substantial evidence.) Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant. 5-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 8. Rejected as irrelevant. 9-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 11-17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 30 and 31. 18-19. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and otherwise as irrelevant. 22-23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. 24. Rejected as irrelevant. 25-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. 29-30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30 and 31. 31. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and otherwise as irrelevant. 32-36. Rejected as irrelevant. 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 38-47. Rejected as irrelevant. 48-49. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 50-55. Rejected as irrelevant. 56-60. Adopted and Rejected in Finding of Fact 21, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as argument on the evidence, not a finding of fact. Rejected in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected in Finding of Fact 16. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire 730 South Sterling Street, #313 Tampa, Florida 33609-4582 John A. Powell, Esquire Florida Federal Building One Fourth Street, North Suite 800 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 William Buckhalt Executive Director Board of Dentistry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Petitioner held an active license as a dentist (No. 4385) in the State of Florida. On July 29, 1981, Respondent performed a difficult maxillary hyperplastic surgery on Mrs. Jeanette Remington which required several follow-up visits and treatment. Sometime after the surgery, Mrs. Remington made a trip to Bolivia. Upon her return in either September or October, 1981, she called Respondent regarding her treatment. He felt it was necessary for her to come to his office for further examination and treatment. However, because she was suffering from acute diarrhea, she was unable to leave the house. As a result, Respondent prescribed paregoric for her to control the diarrhea so that she could leave her home to come to his office for required dental examination and treatment. Paregoric, as a derivative of opium, is a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes (1979 and 1981). As a result, a prescription was required to obtain it. It is not generally used in the practice of dentistry. Dr. Edgar Allen Cosby, a dentist since 1950 and a former chairman of the Florida Board of Dentistry in 1979, testified, and I so find, that often a dentist will treat minor, unrelated medical problems for the purpose of getting a patient into the office. It is only recently that prescription of any drug by a licensed dentist was limited. Prior to that time, a dentist could prescribe any drug provided his license and Drug Enforcement Agency certificate were current. In November, 1981, Dr. Peters called in a prescription for Tylenol IV for Fred Remington to Sharon S. MacMahon, a registered pharmacist at the Gainesville Pic 'N Save drugstore. Ms. MacMahon filled the prescription, which had a refill authorization on it. Mr. Remington went back two days later and requested a refill. Since Ms. MacMahon felt this was too soon for a refill, she refused to do so and attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach Respondent. The following day, when Mr. Remington came back, she was able to contact Respondent, who approved the prescription. When she asked Respondent what the prescription was for, he indicated it was for a head injury resulting from a fall. Mr. Remington, on the other hand, indicated to Ms. Collins, the investigator, the prescription was for pain resulting from an auto injury. Regardless of which one was accurate, neither relates to the practice of dentistry. Tylenol IV is a derivative of codeine and is designated as a controlled substance in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes (1979 and 1981). At some time during Respondent's first year of dental practice (in 1971 or 1972), Respondent prescribed amphetamines on one occasion to a student at the University of Florida who was studying for examinations. The amphetamine was in the form of Dexedrine, the trade name for dextroamphetamine, and is currently designated as a Schedule II controlled substance in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes (1979 and 1981). Amphetamines, in 1971, were considered as a "central nervous system stimulant," as defined in Section 404.01, Florida Statutes (1971), and a prescription was required to obtain them. Ms. MacMahon has never filled a prescription for amphetamines by Respondent during her 8 1/2 years as a pharmacist. An audit of 15 to 20 pharmacies in the Gainesville area conducted by investigators for the Petitioner failed to reveal any prescriptions for amphetamines written by the Respondent during the two or more years records were kept. At some point, well prior to March, 1982, Respondent administered nitrous oxide gas to himself for purposes not related to the practice of dentistry. Respondent was divorced in 1976 and utilized the gas to relax himself, not while engaged in practice, as a result of the stress involved with his divorce. Nitrous oxide is a gas used in the practice of dentistry to relax or sedate patients prior to dental treatment. It is a form of anesthetic. Respondent's nitrous oxide equipment has been inoperative for several years because the storage tanks were stolen and not replaced. This theft was reported to the police. Respondent is considered by Petitioner's investigator and by other practitioners to be very conservative in his prescription of drugs. He does not prescribe large quantities of Schedule II drugs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Counts I and III be dismissed for lack of evidence and that Respondent be assessed an administrative fine of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Gallagher, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 788 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Mr. Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Fred Varn Executive Director Board of Dentistry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF DENTISTRY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, CASE NOS. 0017971 (DPR) v. 82-2128 (DOAH) LICENSE NO. DN 0004385 PAUL E. PETERS, JR., D.D.S., Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 466.028(1)(j), (l), (m), (n), (u), and (y), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of dentistry pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 455 and 466, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Michael Freedman (Dr. Freedman), is and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed dentist in the state of Florida, having been issued license number DN0010221. From June, 1988 through February, 1989, Dr. Freedman billed Medicare and received compensation for dental treatment of three elderly patients, L.S., E.K., and K.K., who resided in a nursing home, Meadowbrook Manor of Boca Cove (Meadowbrook). Patient L.S. At all material times to this proceeding, L.S. was a 93- year-old female who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. At the time of Dr. Freedman's treatment of L.S., Ms. Aurelia DaPra acted as L.S.'s legal guardian. She was also L.S.'s close personal friend and visited L.S. on a daily basis. During these visits Ms. DaPra would attend to L.S.'s personal needs. On or about July 7, 1988, patient L.S. was presented to Dr. Freedman for a consultation at the nursing home where L.S. resided. Dr. Freedman's examination revealed edentulism and/or prosthetic related problems. His recommendations included further diagnostic investigations, surgical procedures, and rehabilitative measures. Dr. Freedman billed $173.00 and was subsequently paid $107.84 by Medicare for services rendered. The "Next Patient Appointment/Service Record" contained in Dr. Freedman's records indicate that dental X-rays were taken of L.S. on July 25, 1988. On July 25, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for office services for L.S. On August 8, 1988, Dr. Freedman gave telephone orders to the staff at Meadowbrook to premedicate L.S. prior to Dr. Freedman's visit on the next day. On August 9, 1988, Dr. Freedman visited L.S. Other than rendering an X-ray report, the records do not indicate any other service performed by Dr. Freedman on that date. On August 9, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $225.00 and was subsequently paid $108.80 by Medicare for X-rays and supplies for L.S. The Medicare category under which supplies are billed is entitled "supplies/prosthesis." Dr. Freedman's customary practice was to make the X-rays at the nursing home using a mobile X-ray machine and to develop the films in his office the next day. He rendered an X-ray report on the dental X-rays of L.S. on August 9, 1988. On August 17, 1988, Dr. Freedman visited L.S. and did a behavior adjustment evaluation. Premedication was given to L.S. on site. On August 17, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for office services for L.S. On August 26, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for office services for L.S. The dental records of L.S. do not indicate that any service was provided to L.S. on August 26, 1988. Based on the unrebutted evidence presented at the final hearing, no services were provided to L.S. by Dr. Freedman on August 26, 1988. Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 for office services on September 2, 1988, and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for such services. The records of Dr. Freedman include a draft letter to Dr. Janotta, L.S.'s physician, stating that L.S. needed to have intrabony lesions removed and would require premedication to facilitate the procedure. Notes in his records indicate that by September 18, 1988, Dr. Freedman had not heard from Dr. Janotta. Dr. Freedman billed $72.70 for supplies for L.S. on November 1, 1988, and was subsequently paid $43.88 by Medicare. On November 1, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $374.00 and was subsequently paid $160.00 by Medicare for surgery on L.S. On November 1, 1988, Dr. Freedman performed a debridement procedure on L.S., which was surgical in nature and was not a routine cleaning of the teeth. Another behavior management evaluation was done on L.S. on November 1, 1988. On January 13, 1989, Dr. Freedman billed $133.00 and was subsequently paid $69.60 by Medicare for X-rays and supplies for L.S. Dr. Freedman's records did not indicate that any services were provided to L.S. on that date. Based on the unrebutted evidence presented at the final hearing, no services were provided to L.S. by Dr. Freedman on January 13, 1989. Dr. Janotta's progress notes concerning L.S. indicate that he was contacted by Dr. Freedman on February 5, 1989. On the same date, Dr. Janotta ordered that L.S.'s legal guardian be contacted to get L.S.'s private dentist to look at L.S.'s dental problems. After Ms. DaPra was informed that Dr. Janotta had left orders that L.S. should see a dentist, she told the nurse that she did not want Dr. Freedman to be used as the dentist. On January 26, 1989, Dr. Freedman's office called Dr. Janotta's office and stated that Dr. Freedman intended to do some minor dental work on L.S. and inquired whether the dental work should be done and whether L.S. should be premedicated. On February 10, 1989, Dr. Freedman billed $52.00 and was subsequently paid $22.72 by Medicare for office services for L.S. Dr. Freedman's records do not indicate that any services were performed for L.S. on that date. Based on the unrebutted evidence presented at the final hearing, no services were performed for L.S. by Dr. Freedman on February 10, 1989. On February 13, 1989, Dr. Hagquist, a dentist, did an oral exam of L.S. and concluded that several of her teeth needed to be extracted. On February 28, 1989, Dr. Hagquist extracted six of L.S.'s teeth. On December 13, 1990, L.S. was examined by Dr. Robert W. Williams, Petitioner's dental expert. Dr. Williams' examination revealed a completely mutilated dentition with serious carious breakdown and several teeth in poor repair. He further discovered gross calcus and debris present with chronic gingival irritation, inflammation, and periodontal breakdown. No evidence was presented as to what dental care L.S. received from February 14, 1989 to December 13, 1990. Patient E.K. At all times material to this proceeding, E.K. was an 84-year-old female who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. On June 6, 1988, patient E.K. was presented to Dr. Freedman for consultation at the nursing home where she resided. Dr. Freedman billed $173.00 and was subsequently paid $107.84 by Medicare for services rendered on June 6, 1988. On July 12, 1988, Dr. Freedman made dental X-rays of E.K. The dental records do not contain either the x-rays or a report on the findings of the x-rays. On July 12, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $238.00 and was subsequently paid $134.08 by Medicare for X-rays and supplies for patient E.K. Dr. Freedman's records indicate that on August 9, 1988, Dr. Freedman gave some medication as part of a procedure performed on E.K. in the maxilla area. The records do not indicate exactly what the procedure was; however based on the testimony of Dr. Bayloff, Respondent's expert witness, the procedure was not a routine cleaning. On August 9, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $33.75 and was subsequently paid $10.72 by Medicare for supplies for patient E.K. According to Dr. Freedman's "Tissue Repair/Debridement/ Treatment Report", on November 1, 1988, Dr. Freedman performed the following on E.K. in the mandible area: "brush", "dentifrice," and "dentition." No evidence was presented to establish whether this procedure would not qualify as surgery for purposes of payment from Medicare. On November 1, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $33.75 and was subsequently paid $14.00 by Medicare for supplies for patient E.K. The procedure performed on November 1 did require the use of some supplies. On November 1, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $200.00 and was subsequently paid $80.00 by Medicare for surgery on patient E.K. Patient K.K. K.K. is an 85-year-old male who has been described as mentally alert, physically impaired as to sight, and well aware of his surroundings. On June 13, 1988, patient K.K. was presented to Dr. Freedman for a consultation at the nursing home where K.K. resided. Dr. Freedman made a preliminary evaluation. Dr. Freedman billed $173.00 and was subsequently paid $107.84 by Medicare for consultation services rendered to K.K. on August 13, 1988. It appears that the date which appeared on the Medicare payment report was a scrivener's error and should have read June 13, 1988. On June 20, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for office services for K.K. This billing was for a trip by one of Dr. Freedman's staff to Meadowbrook to copy parts of K.K.'s records. On July 12, 1988, Dr. Freedman made dental X-rays of K.K. and rendered an X-ray report. On July 12, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $283.00 and was subsequently paid $134.08 by Medicare for X-rays and supplies for patient K.K. On July 29, 1988, Dr. Freedman billed $70.00 and was subsequently paid $34.88 by Medicare for office services for patient K.K. Dr. Freedman's records indicate that his staff called Dr. McKay to inquire whether K.K. needed to have premedication prior to minor oral surgery and if so, what medication would be needed. MITIGATION Dr. Freedman had practiced dentistry at other nursing homes in the area and had not received any complaints concerning the services that he provided. Between 1985 and 1989, Dr. Freedman developed and maintained a practice exclusively limited to patients requiring special care. The majority of his patients resided in nursing homes or ACLF's and were frail and elderly. He was the Dental Director for 23 long-term care facilities and served 50 other facilities on a more limited basis. At any given time he was serving between 1000 to 2000 patients in a 150 mile area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Freedman did not violate Sections 466.028(1)(j)(l) and (u), Florida Statutes as alleged in Count I, finding that Dr. Freedman did violate Section 466.028(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), in Count I as it related to the X-rays, dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint, dismissing the portions of Counts I and III alleging a violation of Section 466.028(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), finding that Dr. Freedman did not violate Sections 466.028(1)(m) and (y), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), as alleged in Count III, finding that Dr. Freedman violated Section 466.028(1)(j) and (l), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), as alleged in Count III, imposing a $750 administrative fine and placing Dr. Freedman on probation for one year under the terms and conditions to be set forth by the Board of Dentistry. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3391 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted except as to a prosthesis. The evidence showed that the Medicare category was supplies/prosthesis. Dr. Freedman was billing for supplies not for a prosthesis. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: Rejected as to the amount billed. The evidence showed that Dr. Freedman billed $70.00. The remainder is accepted. Paragraph 14: Rejected that he billed for supplies and prosthesis. The records indicate that he billed for office services. Paragraph 15: Rejected that Dr. Freedman billed for a prosthesis. The remainder is accepted. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraphs 17-18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. There was no evidence presented to link the blank X-ray with the X-rays that were taken on July 25, 1988. Paragraphs 20-21: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 22: Rejected as to billing for a prosthesis. The remaining is accepted. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: Accepted. Paragraphs 25-26: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Accepted. Paragraphs 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 31-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected. The evidence does not support such an opinion. Paragraphs 36-38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 39: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 40-41: Accepted. Paragraphs 42-43: Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 44: Accepted. Paragraph 45: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 46-47: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 48-50: Rejected as to the prosthesis. The remainder is accepted. Paragraph 51: Accepted. Paragraph 52: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 53: Rejected. His conclusion is not supported by the evidence presented. Paragraph 54: Rejected as unnecessary and repetitious. Paragraph 55: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 56-57: Rejected as based on hearsay. Paragraph 58: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 59-61: Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraphs 62-66: Accepted. Paragraph 67: Rejected as to prosthesis. The remaining is accepted. Paragraph 68: Accepted. Paragraph 69: Rejected. The evidence established that K.K. was actually seen twice by Dr. Freedman. Paragraph 70: Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: The third sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remaining sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 2: The first sentence is accepted. The remaining sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 3-10: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 11: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remaining is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remaining is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 15: The third sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. There was no paragraph 16. Paragraph 17: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 20-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The last sentence is rejected as immaterial. Paragraph 24: The first two sentences and the last sentence are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 25: The first and last sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 26: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: The first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is accepted in substance. Sentences 4-13 and 42 are rejected as immaterial to the issues. Sentences 14, 29, 31, 38, and 40 are rejected as constituting argument. Sentence 15 is accepted in substance. Sentence 16 is rejected as not supported by the evidence presented. Sentences 17-28, 30, 32-37, 39, and 41 are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 29(1): The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The second sentence is accepted. Sentences 3-8 are rejected as subordinate to the facts found that Dr. Williams was an expert. Sentence 9 is rejected as constituting argument. Sentences 10-13 and 15-18, are accepted in substance. Sentence 14 is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remaining sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 29(2): Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 29(3): Sentences 1-11 are rejected as mere recitation of testimony. The remaining is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found and as constituting argument. Paragraph 31: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 32: The last two sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as mere recitation of testimony and subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 33: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 34: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 35: Sentences 1, 2 6, 7, 12, 13, 56 are rejected as unnecessary. Sentences 3-5, 10, 23, 24, 32, 35, 36, 37, 52, 55, 58 and 59 are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Sentences 8, 9, 11, 28, 30, 51, 71, 72 are rejected as constituting argument. Sentences 14-22, 25-27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 39-50, 53, 54, 60-63 are accepted in substance. Sentence 38 is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Sentence 57 is not a complete sentence. Sentences 64-70 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 29 (Keene pg. 15 of PRO): The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Sentence 2(1) is accepted in substance. Sentence 2(2) is rejected as based on hearsay. Sentence 2(3) is accepted in substance. Sentence 2(4) is rejected to the extent that the opinion was not supported by the evidence. Sentence 3 is rejected to the extent the opinion is not supported by the record. Paragraph 30 (pg. 15 PRO): Sentences 1-3, 5, and 6 are rejected as based on hearsay. Sentences 4 and 27 are rejected as constituting argument. Sentences 7-10, 15, 23, and 24,are accepted in substance. Sentences 11-13 and 16 are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Sentences 14, 17, 41, 42, are rejected as unnecessary. Sentences 18-22, 28-40, and 43 are accepted in substance to the extent that X-rays were made. Sentences 25 and 26 are rejected as not credible given that Dr. Freedman was able to produce the records of the patients at issue. The testimony at the hearing dealt with his inablity to produce copies of the Medicare forms that he received from Medicare. Paragraph 31 (pg. 16 PRO): The first two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remaining is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 32 (pg. 17 PRO): Sentences 1-10 and 17-19 are rejected as irrelevant. The remaining is accepted in substance. Paragraph 33 (pg. 17 PRO): Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 34 (pg. 18 PRO): Sentences 1-10 are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 35 (pg. 18 PRO): The last three sentences are rejected as irrelevant. The remainder is accepted in substance to the extent that Dr. Bayloff was qualified as an expert witness. Paragraphs 36 (pg. 19 PRO): Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 (pg. 19 PRO): Sentences 1-2 are rejected as unnecessary. Sentences 3-7 are rejected as irrelevant. Sentences 8-10 are accepted in substance to the extent that L.S.'s file did contain adequate records. Sentences 11-14 are accepted to the extent that they apply to the records of L.S. and K.K. but not as to the records of E.K. as it relates to the X- rays. There were no X-rays or X-ray report in E.K.'s file. Paragraph 38 (pg. 19 PRO): Sentences 1-2 are accepted in substance as it pertains to L.S. Sentences 3-4 are rejected as irrelevant. Sentences 5-6 are accepted to the extent that the expert reviewed records which were present. There were no records for treatment of L.S. on August 26, 1988, January 13, 1989, and February 10, 1989. Dr. Bayloff did not render an opinion on whether services were provided on those dates. The remaining is rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Natalie Duguid, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michael Freedman 421 Lakeview Drive, Suite 201 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33326 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Findings Of Fact Dade Dental Laboratories was opened in 1973-74 by a nonprofit corporation which leased dental facilities contiguous and internally connected thereto to dentists. One of the original organizers of the laboratory, Samuel Kushner, was a laboratory technician who had so worked in New York for many years. Respondent was employed on a salary (hourly) basis in 1978 to work as a dentist at the dental facility located at 1225 Washington Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida and known as Dade Dental Associates (hereinafter referred to as Dade Dental). At this time, Dade Dental Laboratories was owned by the wives of Samuel Kushner and Frank Schiller. Schiller was employed as office administrator. Dade Dental Laboratories owned the lease of the premises and equipment located therein. In 1978, the dental office spaces were leased to Frederick Stang, D.D.S., who employed Respondent and other dentists on a salary basis. Effective 1 July 1979, Respondent's wife purchased the fifty percent interest in the laboratory previously owned by Mrs. Kushner and the sub1ease of the dental offices was given to Respondent. Stang continued as an employee of Respondent until September 1979. Frank Schiller spoke Yiddish and was often used as a translator for some of the older Jewish clients who came to Dade Dental. After the sublease was given to Respondent, Schiller continued as administrator until September 1979. The ownership of the fifty percent interest in the laboratory owned by Mrs. Schiller, if not still held by Mrs. Schiller, was not shown. Inspections of the premises at 1225 Washington Avenue were conducted in August, September and October 1979 and again in January 1980. The inspection conducted by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on September 24, 1979 revealed X-ray equipment that was defective by reason of not being properly shielded and having a timer operating erratically (Exhibits 4 and 5); the inspections conducted September 6 and 13 revealed old equipment, improper sterilization of instruments, a very dirty laboratory, dirty impression trays, bite blocks with teeth marks indicating prior use, rusted instruments where chrome had chipped off the underlying steel, no sterile sutures, and a cold dry-heat sterilizer. Following these inspections, Respondent ordered a new X-ray machine and new instruments. No evidence was presented that the rusty instruments found in the dental operatories were ever used on a patient. Respondent's testimony, which was not rebutted, was that he didn't like the instruments located in the operatories when he started working there and he brought his own instruments which he used. The charges of allowing unauthorized persons to perform acts constituting the practice of dentistry, malpractice, misconduct in business or personal affairs of a nature to bring the dental profession into disrepute, and failing to exercise proper care in the treatment of patients involved Joseph Cedar and Hilda Hirschman. After receiving a high estimate of the cost for needed dental work from his dentist, Joseph Cedar, at the recommendation of a friend, went to Dade Dental for a second estimate. He first saw Frank Schiller, who took Cedar to Seymour Rickles, D.D.S., one of the dentists employed at the facility. Cedar described Schiller as the "boss" who gave orders and who looked into his mouth. No evidence was presented that Schiller ever put his hands or any instrument in Cedar's mouth while Cedar was being treated by Respondent or any other dentist at Dade Dental. After examination and impression, Rickles prepared crowns and a partial denture. Although Cedar testified that Rickles performed all the work done on him, the dental record (Exhibit 14) shows 5 dentists worked on Cedar at this office. However, most of the work appears to have been done by Rickles and Stang. After the work on Cedar had been completed, he complained of pain from the partial dentures which had been prepared for him and was referred to Respondent, who first saw Cedar on June 28, 1979 when he adjusted the partial plates. Exhibit 14 indicates Respondent again saw Cedar on July 3, 19, 24, 25 and August 7 for adjustments. Cedar testified he told Respondent about a sore spot near the partial denture on the upper left side of his mouth but Respondent only told him it was not caused by the dentures. Respondent's version was that he X-rayed the lower right side of Cedars' mouth where the partial had been fitted and found an abscess which could cause the pain described by Cedar, and that Cedar never complained of soreness in the upper left area of his mouth. On August 15 or 16, 1979 Cedar went to the dental clinic at Mount Sinai Medical Center complaining of a soreness in the upper left area of his mouth. He was examined by several dentists because the affected area looked suspicious, and a biopsy was done. This showed the lesion to be squalus cell carcinoma, which was subsequently excised. The lesion removed from Cedar's mouth was well-differentiated in mid- August when he was seen at Mt. Sinai. It is unlikely that a well-differentiated lesion will develop in a week to ten days, but could develop in a period of two or more weeks. A competent dentist should recognize a well-differentiated lesion and refer the patient to an oral surgeon. Failure to do so constitutes practice below minimum accepted community standards. Respondent has referred other patients to oral surgeons when suspicious conditions were observed in patients' mouths. (Exhibit 18). Hilda Hirschman first visited Dade Dental in December 1978 and was referred to Respondent. She had several teeth extracted by Respondent, partial dentures made and two crowns installed. Mrs. Hirschman testified that Schiller escorted her into Respondent's office on her first visit and wrote down and quoted to her prices for work as he and Grebin talked. She thought Schiller was the head dentist. She also testified that one time Schiller ground down one of her teeth. When told periodontal treatment was indicated, Mrs. Hirschman told Respondent she did not want root canals done. After her teeth had been extracted and partials made, the partials were inserted by Respondent, but neither of the partials fit. The upper was adjusted to fit and a second impression was taken for the lower. Mrs. Hirschman was later examined by Dr. Leonard Sakris at the request of the Dental Board. From his study of the X-rays taken in November 1978 and August 1979 and his examination of the patient, Dr. Sakris opined that the teeth extracted by Respondent could have been saved if root canal therapy had been used and crowns installed. This examination also revealed the condition of Mrs. Hirschman's mouth to be bad, with two ill-fitting partial dentures and restoration placed over decay. The conclusion this decay existed when Respondent treated Mrs. Hirschman was reached from the X-rays. On cross- examination, Dr. Sakris acknowledged that decay was not always discernible on X- rays and could be misdiagnosed absent a visual examination and probe by the dentist. Dr. Sakris' examination did not confirm Mrs. Hirschman's testimony that Schiller had ground down her tooth. He found no evidence of grinding, except possibly on Lower Left Canine 3. This is also the tooth with decay found on Sakris' examination. The crown on Lower Right 5 placed by Respondent had a bad margin and decay when Mrs. Hirschman was examined by Sakris. Unless margin of crown makes solid contact with tooth, decay can occur. It is below acceptable minimum standards to leave open margins between crown and tooth. Respondent's testimony that he suggested Mrs. Hirschman go to a periodontist for root canal treatment and she refused is corroborated by Mrs. Hirschman's testimony that she didn't want the expense of root canals. Without periodontal treatment for Mrs. Hirschman's dental condition, extraction is the standard practice. Respondent's testimony that both he and Stang worked on Mrs. Hirschman is supported by Exhibit 13 and lends credence to his testimony that he did not prepare the crowns he installed on this patient. Further, Exhibit 13 contains the notation that Mrs. Hirschman "refuses pero" (presumably periodontal treatment) and confirms Respondent's testimony that the patient's refusal to have root canals left him no choice but extraction. The parties stipulated that the advertising which forms the basis for Counts XVI II through XXI was ordered and paid for by Stang, although it continued for some two months after Respondent took over the operation of the dental clinic before it was stopped. Respondent's testimony that he neither ordered nor paid for the advertising which appeared after July 1, 1979 was not disputed. No evidence was presented regarding the character of this advertising, other than the examples thereof shown in Exhibit 8.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Jennifer Lee Brown, D.M.D., should receive a passing grade on the December 1997 Florida dental licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jennifer Lee Brown, D.M.D., is a graduate from the University of Florida College of Dentistry. Respondent, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is responsible for the licensure of dentists in the State of Florida. In December 1997 the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on behalf of the Department, administered the Florida dental licensure examination which persons wishing to practice dentistry in the State were required to pass. Dr. Brown took the December 1997 dental examination (hereinafter referred to as the "Examination"). The Examination consisted of clinical, Florida laws and rules, and oral diagnosis parts. The clinical portion of the Examination consisted of 8 procedures: procedures 1-3 and 5-9. Each procedure was graded by three separate examiners. The scores awarded by the three examiners on each procedure were averaged, resulting in a truer score. Each procedure had standardized "comments" concerning a candidate's performance on the procedure which examiners could note. Examiners were selected from individuals recommended by existing examiners or members of the Board of Dentistry (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"). Prospective examiners could not have any complaints against their license and they were required to have actively practiced dentistry and to be licensed as a dentist in Florida for a minimum of five years. Prospective examiners were required to file an application with the Board's examination committee. Prior to the Examination, a "standardization" session was conducted for the examiners selected. During the session, examiners were trained how to grade the Examination using the same internal criteria. The standardization session was conducted by assistant examiner supervisors appointed by the Board. After completion of the standardization session, and before the Examination, examiners were required to grade five mannequin models in order to evaluate the examiners' understanding of the grading criteria. Each examiner's performance was evaluated to determine whether the examiner should be used during the Examination. The examiners who graded Dr. Brown's clinical part of the Examination were designated as Examiners 168, 176, 195, 207, 264, 290, 298, and 299. All of these examiners completed the standardization session and the post-standardization evaluation. During the clinical part of the Examination, the examiners were required to grade each procedure independently, without conferring with each other. The clinical part of the Examination was "double blind" graded. Examiners did not see the candidates they were grading or watch their work. The test procedures were performed in a clinic in the presence of a licensed dentist. After the procedure was completed, the patient or tooth was taken to another clinic where the examiners reviewed the work performed on the patient and graded the procedure. The examiners had no direct contact with any candidate. Candidates were permitted to use "monitor-to-examiner" notes to convey information to the examiners that a candidate wanted the examiners to take into consideration when grading a procedure. Any such notes were read by the examiners and initialed "SMN" (saw monitor note) before they actually looked at the patient or tooth. For the clinical part of the Examination the following grading system was used: Zero: complete failure; One: unacceptable; Two: below minimally acceptable. Three: minimally acceptable. Four: better than minimally acceptable. Five: outstanding. After the Examination was graded, all examiners underwent a post-examination evaluation. Grades awarded by each examiner were compared to other examiners for consistency. All of the examiners who graded Dr. Brown's clinical part of the Examination were found to have performed acceptably. Dr. Brown was subsequently informed that she had failed to obtain the minimum passing grade of 3.00 for the clinical part of the Examination. Dr. Brown was informed that she had been awarded a score of 2.67. Dr. Brown was also informed that she passed the other two parts of the Examination. Dr. Brown challenged the scores she had been awarded on the clinical part of the Examination for procedures 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The procedures challenged were graded by examiners 176 (graded all the challenged procedures), 195 (graded procedures 5- 9), 207 (graded procedure 2), 298 (graded procedure 2), and 299 (graded procedures 5-9). The Department conceded that the scores awarded Dr. Brown on procedures 7 and 8 were incorrect. As a result, the Department agreed that Dr. Brown's overall score for the clinical part of the Examination should be raised to 2.82. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brown should have received a higher score on procedures 7 and 8. Procedure 2 consisted of an amalgam (filling)n preparation on a human patient. Dr. Brown was required to select a tooth and, after the selected tooth was checked by an examiner, complete preparation for the amalgam. Dr. Brown wrote three monitor-to-examiner notes during procedure 2. All three examiners wrote "SMN" on all three notes. Dr. Brown received an average score on procedure 2 of 3.66. Dr. Brown was awarded the following individual scores for her performance on procedure 2: Examiner Score 176 4 207 4 298 3 Examiners 176 and 298 noted the following comment concerning Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 2: "Depth Prep." Examiner 298 also noted the following comment: "Marginal Finish." Examiner 207 noted the following comment: "Retention Form." Dr. Brown admitted that her performance on procedure 2 was not ideal, but expressed concern that she was graded down for matters dealt with in the monitor-to-examiner notes. Dr. Shields opined that it was possible for the examiners to have reduced the score awarded to Dr. Brown on procedure for depth preparation, marginal finish, and retention form and not have graded her down for the monitor-to-examiner notes. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Shields' opinion was not reasonable or accurate. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brown should have received a higher score for procedure 2 of the clinical part of the Examination. Dr. Brown received a fairly consistent score from all three graders. Procedure 5 was a "class IV composite restoration." This procedure involved the selection of a tooth by Dr. Brown which she was then required to make a slice cut on to replicate a fracture. Dr. Brown was then required to restore the simulated fractured tooth to its normal contour and function. The procedure was performed on a mannequin. Dr. Brown received an average score of 1.66 on procedure 5. Dr. Brown was awarded the following individual scores for her performance on procedure 5: Examiner Score 176 3 195 0 299 2 Examiners 176 and 195 noted the following comment concerning Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 5: "Proximal Contour." Examiners 176 and 299 noted the following comment concerning Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 5: "Margin." Finally, the following additional comments were noted by the examiners: Examiner Comment: 195 Functional Anatomy Mutilation of Adjacent Teeth 289 Gingival Overhang Dr. Brown's challenge to her score for procedure 5 was essentially that Examiner 199 had given her such a low score on this procedure and procedures 7 through 9 when compared to the scores awarded by Examiners 176 and 298. Dr. Shields opined that Dr. Brown should not have received a higher score for her performance on procedure 5. Dr. Shields' opinion was based generally upon his 21 years of experience as a dentist. More specifically, Dr. Shields based his opinion upon his examination of the actual tooth that Dr. Brown performed procedure 5 on. Dr. Shields found excess material left at the gingival or gum portion of the tooth. Dr. Shields also found that Dr. Brown attempted to polish the material off and had flattened some of the surface of the tooth. Apparently, based upon Examiner 195's comment notes, Examiner 195 was the only examiner to catch these deficiencies in Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 5. Dr. Shields also found slight damage on the mesial, the approximating surface of the lateral incisor, the tooth next to the tooth that was restored. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Shields' opinions concerning Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 5 were not reasonable and accurate. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brown should have received a higher score for procedure 5 of the clinical part of the Examination. Procedure 6 required that Dr. Brown perform an Endodontic Evaluation of the Maxillary First Premolar. Dr. Brown was required to select an extracted tooth, a maxillary tricuspid, examine x-rays of the tooth, and then perform a root canal on the tooth. The tooth had two roots. The root canal involved creating an opening in the tooth and removing the pulpal tissue from the two nerve canals of the tooth (a debridement). The canals were to be shaped for an obturation or the filling of the canal. A final x-ray of the tooth was taken after the procedure was completed. Dr. Brown received an average score on procedure 6 of 1.00. Dr. Brown was awarded the following individual scores for her performance on procedure 6: Examiner Score 176 3 195 0 299 0 All three examiners noted the following comment for Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 6: "Proper Filling of Canal Spaces with Gutta Percha." Gutta Percha is the material that was used by Dr. Brown to fill the canal of the roots after she completed the debridement. Examiner 195 noted the following additional comment for Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 6: "Access Preparation." Examiner 299 noted the following additional comment: "Shaping of Canals." Dr. Brown's challenge to her score for procedure 6 was based in part on her concern that Examiners 199 and 299 had given her a score of 0 on this procedure while Examiner 176 had given her a score of 3. Dr. Brown admitted that she had caused the gutta percha to extrude through the apex of the canals. She argued, however, that gutta percha is reabsorbed by the patient. Therefore, Dr. Brown suggested that her performance was "clinically acceptable." Dr. Brown questioned how one examiner, Examiner 176, could conclude that her performance was in fact clinically acceptable, while the other two examiners concluded it was not. The difficulty with Dr. Brown's position with regard to procedure 6 is that she assumes that the only deficiency with her performance was the extrusion of gutta percha and that it was not a significant deficiency. The evidence failed to support this position. Dr. Shields opined that Dr. Brown should not have received a higher score for her performance on procedure 6. His opinion was based upon the fact that the extrusion of gutta percha was very significant on one of the canals: it extended a millimeter and a half. On the other canal it was a half of a millimeter. Filling the canal one half millimeter to a millimeter is considered ideal. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Shields' opinion was not reasonable or accurate. During the standardization session, examiners were told that extrusion of gutta percha more than a half millimeter through the apex was to be considered an error of major consequence. Candidates who extruded guttal percha more than a half millimeter were not to receive a grade higher than one. In light of the instructions during the standardization session, it was more likely that Examiner 176 gave Dr. Brown too high of a score on procedure 6. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brown should have received a higher score for procedure 6 of the clinical part of the Examination. Procedure 9 was a pin amalgam final restoration. Although this procedure involved, in a lay person's terms, a filling, what exactly was involved in this procedure was not explained during the formal hearing. Dr. Brown received an average score on procedure 9 of 1.66. Dr. Brown was awarded the following individual scores for her performance on procedure 9: Examiner Score 176 4 195 0 299 1 All three examiners noted the following comment concerning Dr. Brown's performance on procedure 9: "Functional Anatomy." Examiners 195 and 299, who both graded Dr. Brown below minimal acceptability, also noted the following comments: "Proximal Contour," "Contract," and "Margin." Dr. Brown failed to present any evidence to support her claim that she should have received a higher score for procedure Dr. Brown simply questioned the fact that Examiner 195 had graded her low on all the clinical procedures. Dr. Shields opined that Dr. Brown should not receive a higher score on procedure 9. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Shields' opinion was not reasonable or accurate. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Brown should have received a higher score for procedure 9 of the clinical part of the Examination. Dr. Brown's challenge in this case was based largely on the fact that Examiner 195 had graded her performance on procedures 5, 6, and 9 as a zero, procedure 7 as a one, and procedure 8 as a two. Other than the fact that Examiner 195's scores were consistently low, the evidence failed to prove that Examiner 195 improperly graded Dr. Brown except as conceded by the Department on procedures 7 and 8. Comparing the scores awarded by Examiner 195 to Examiner 176 does raise some question as to why there was such a discrepancy in the two examiners' scores. When the scores on procedures 5, 6, and 9 of all three examiners are compared, however, Examiners 195 and 298 generally were consistently below acceptable, while Examiner 176's scores were generally higher on these three procedures: Examiner Procedure 5 Score Procedure 6 Score Procedure 9 Score 176 3 3 4 195 0 0 0 299 2 0 1 This simple mathematical comparison, however, is not sufficient to conclude that Examiner 195 scored too low or that Examiner 176 scored too high. Other than a simple comparison of the scores of the three examiners, the only evidence concerning whether Examiner 195 graded too low based upon the scores alone was presented by Ms. Carnes, an expert in psychometrics. Ms. Carnes opined that Examiner 195's performance was acceptable, except with regard to procedures 7 and 8. The evidence failed to refute Ms. Canres' opinion. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Dr. Brown's score for the clinical portion of the Examination, as adjusted by the Department during the final hearing of this case, was reasonable and accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health, Board of Dentistry, dismissing Dr. Brown's challenge to the amended grade awarded for the clinical part of the December 1997 Dental Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Brown Post Office Box 39 Starke, Florida 32091-0039 Anna Marie Williamson, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 William Buckhalt, Executive Director Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 466.028(1)(m) and 466.028(1)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is charged with regulating the practice of dentistry pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456, 466, and 120, Florida Statutes (2003). At all material times to this proceeding, Dr. Nguyen was a licensed dentist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number DN0014768. On April 17, 2002, Patient J.N. presented to Dr. Nguyen complaining with pain from a broken tooth. She brought a full set of x-rays taken by another dentist approximately a year before her visit to Dr. Nguyen. J.N. filled out a form entitled "Health Questions." J.N. indicated on the form that her teeth were sensitive to cold. He examined J.N.'s teeth and saw that tooth 30 was fractured to the gum line. J.N. complained that the broken area of the tooth was sharp and was rubbing against her tongue causing irritation. His examination further revealed that she had some slight gum disease in the upper right side. J.N. was not experiencing a throbbing pain from tooth 30, and tooth 31 was not giving her any discomfort. Her discomfort was due to the inflammation of her gums and her tongue. Dr. Nguyen did a percussion test, i.e. tapping on the tooth, and probed in her mouth, measuring the tooth. Dr. Nguyen did not do any vitality testing and did not perform any periodontal charting of the teeth. J.N. did not want Dr. Nguyen to take any additional x-rays since she had brought a full set of x-rays with her. Dr. Nguyen felt that the set of x-rays that J.N. provided was sufficient for him to be able to treat J.N. for her fractured tooth. The x-rays did not show the fracture, but fractures may not necessarily show up on an x-ray. Dr. Nguyen told J.N. that she may or may not need a root canal. Dr. Nguyen discussed treatment options with J.N., and she decided to have a three-quarter crown on one tooth and an overlay on the other tooth. He removed all of the fracture of tooth 30 and made impressions for the three-quarter crown and inlay, which were sent to the laboratory for the fabrication of the crown and inlay. She left the office with temporary teeth on teeth 30 and 31. Dr. Nguyen made the following progress note concerning his treatment of J.N. on April 17, 2002: pt came in w/ fmx from another DDS. Dr. Richardt in Bonita. Both 30 & 31 have very large old fractured decay amalgam. Both lingual cusps #30 fractured to gingival line. Complaint of "uncomfortable." #30 prep for crown / 3/4 crown. #31 prep for MOB onlay. Composite provisional. A few days later, J.N. called Dr. Nguyen's office complaining of a lot of pain. J.N. was given a prescription for penicillin and Tylenol No. 3. On April 26, 2002, J.N. returned to Dr. Nguyen's office complaining of pain. She had taken the prescribed pain medication prior to her visit so that it was difficult for Dr. Nguyen to assess the pain. Dr. Nguyen made an adjustment to her bite and told her that if the pain continued that he would refer her to an endodontist. Dr. Nguyen asked J.N. to stop taking the pain medication and return to his office after 5 p.m. that day so that he could accurately assess her pain without having the pain medication masking the pain. She did not return to his office. On May 1, 2002, J.N. went to see another dentist, who referred J.N. to Juan Pablo Rodriguez, D.D.S. (Dr. Rodriquez), who specializes in root canals. J.N. complained to Dr. Rodriguez that she was having pain in tooth 30 and it was waking her up at night. Tooth 31 did not respond to cold. Dr. Rodriguez diagnosed J.N. with irreversible pulpitis for tooth 30, which means that the nerve of the tooth had inflammation, and that the nerve would not get better, but would die. He determined that tooth 31 was non- vital or necrotic. On May 8, 2002, J.N. called Dr. Nguyen's office and stated that she wanted to have her tooth extracted rather than have to pay for a root canal. She indicated she wanted her money back. The next day, J.N. came to Dr. Nguyen's office demanding her money back and wanting her x-rays. Dr. Nguyen kept the original x-rays and provided J.N. a copy of the x-rays which she had furnished him on her initial visit. J.N. had paid Dr. Nguyen a portion of his fees by credit card, and a portion of his fees had been paid by J.N.'s dental insurance plan. Dr. Nguyen refunded all fees paid to him. Melvin A. Platt, D.D.S., testified as an expert witness for the Department. It is Dr. Platt's opinion that Dr. Nguyen, in relation to his treatment of J.N., did not practice dentistry within the minimum standards of performance in diagnosis and treatment when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. His opinion is based on Dr. Nguyen's failure to determine the need for a root canal prior to preparing the teeth for restoration. According to Dr. Platt, Dr. Nguyen should haven taken an x-ray of teeth 30 and 31, performed vitality testing, and done periodontal charting. Dr. Platt was also of the opinion that the dental records maintained by Dr. Nguyen regarding his care of J.N. failed to justify his course of treatment. According to Dr. Platt there was nothing in the progress notes to justify going ahead with the restorations without any prior testing of any kind. Dr. Nguyen's license has previously been disciplined by the Department for failing to include in an advertisement the statement required by Section 456.062, Florida Statutes (1999). Department of Health v. Luyen Nguyen, D.D.S., Case No. 2000- 01848 (Dept. of Health 2002).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Luyen Nguyen, D.D.S., did not violate Subsection 466.028(1)(m), Florida Statutes, but did violate Subsection 466.028(1)(x), Florida Statutes; imposing a $1,000 administrative fine; and issuing a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004.
