The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004(27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS-sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staffperson Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004(27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision- making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parenti in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida , Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections 120.56 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. The two cases consolidated above present two separate issues which must be addressed in separate orders, as one issue (the validity of Rule 10E- 16.004(27), Florida Administrative Code) is determined by the Hearing Officer, and the other issue (whether SAFE violated the rule) is determined by the agency upon a recommended order by the Hearing Officer. Notwithstanding the parties' earnest desire to obtain a resolution of the issue of when a program like SAFE can use physical restraint to prevent withdrawal, the Hearing Officer has no authority to issue a "declaratory statement." That function, addressed in Section 120.565, Florida Statutes, is reserved to the agency. Rule 10E-16.004(6)(a), [Florida Administrative Code], provides that "[t]he department shall impose a penalty of no more than $100 per day against a licensed program that commits a [significant violation pertaining to the health and safety of the clients.] ..." [emphasis added] Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (27) Aggression Control Techniques. Programs which use verbal, psychological and physical intervention methods for managing client behavior shall be required to implement the procedures established under HRS Regulation Number 205-1 regarding the use of Aggression Control Techniques (ACT), or other techniques, as approved by the department. (a) Justification and Documentation of Use. In the event that physical intervention is used to restrict a client's movement, clinical justification shall be documented in the client record, and a complete, detailed report of the incident shall be maintained as part of the program's administrative records and reported to the department's district administrator. Physical intervention techniques shall be employed by trained adult staff to prevent a client from injuring himself or others, or to prevent serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. HRS contends that SAFE violated Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code, when the program restrained its minor client, S. B., from attempting to bolt without going through the "chain of command" described in SAFE's voluntary withdrawal procedures. HRS has the burden of proving the alleged violation. Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) HRS does not claim that the techniques used on S. B. were by other than trained adult staff or that the required reports were not made to the agency and properly maintained by the program. Rather, HRS claims that a program such as SAFE cannot detain a child against his or her will. The rule cited by HRS simply does not include that prohibition. It states in the affirmative two circumstances in which a program shall use appropriate physical intervention: to prevent injury to the client or others, or to prevent serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. SAVE contends that permitting a child to leave at will, without following established withdrawal procedures would cause a serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. SAFE presented some competent credible testimony by its director to support its contention. HRS presented no evidence on that subject. HRS, moreover, has failed to justify its policy determination and interpretation of the rule in this case. It argues, for example, that parents do have a right to admit their children to a secure facility and to obtain a court order or alternative involuntary assessment. SAFE is not classified as a secure facility. The procedures and statutes referenced in HRS' proposed recommended order, however, were not in effect at the time of the incident at issue. Chapter 397, Florida Statutes, was substantially revised in 1993 and the revisions became effective October 1, 1993, after the incident at issue. See, Chapter 93-39, Section 51, Laws of Florida. The arguments made by HRS were specifically rejected by the court in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Straight, Inc., 497 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), a case decided prior to the 1993 amendments and therefore more relevant to the instant case. The determination that HRS has failed to meet its burden of proof in this case does not resolve for the parties their more global issue of whether a non-secure program such as SAFE can detain a child involuntarily placed by his or her parents or guardian. That issue is not resolved in Straight, supra, decided under a different statute; or by HRS' rule Chapter 10E-16.004, Florida Administrative Code, in its current form. Nor, contrary to SAFE's assertions, is the issue resolved in the stipulated judgement entered in the Palm Beach case referenced in paragraph 14, above, affecting a program which is not described in any competent evidence in this record. The conclusion in this case is properly limited to the facts and circumstances presented, and to consideration of a rule and statute in existence at the time of the incident at issue. The conclusion is merely that HRS failed to meet its burden of proving that by detaining S. B. on August 27, 1993, SAFE violated Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter its final order dismissing the January 12, 1994 amended complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Newnum, Esquire TURNBULL, ABNER, DANIELS and ROOKS 147 West Lyman Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0100 James A. Sawyer, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Sandy Coulter, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
Findings Of Fact Answers on the Application Amer Alanbari, M.D., applied to the Board of Medicine for licensure as a physician by endorsement on February 19, 1992. The application form he filled out and submitted asks two questions on page 4 under no. 8: "Are you now or have you ever been emotionally/mentally ill?" and "Have you ever received psychotherapy?" To both questions, Dr. Alanbari answered "No." Under "POSTGRADUATE TRAINING," Dr. Alanbari listed "[f]rom 7/1/88 to 6/30/89: No training." The application form also asked, "Have you ever had to discontinue practice for any reason for a period of one month or longer?" To this question, Dr. Alanbari answered "No." Events Prior to the Application Amer Alanbari, M.D., naturalized in Newark, New Jersey, as a citizen of the United States on August 29, 1989, was born in Damascus, Syria in 1958. He received his medical degree in the same city on September 7, 1982, from the University of Damascus. Within a month he began specialty training in pulmonary diseases at the University of Nancy, Centre Hospitalier Regional de Nancy, in Nancy, France. His attendance in the program in France was from October 1, 1982 until July 30, 1984, From August 1984 until November 1986 he resided in Prospect Park, New Jersey, where he has family, a time during which he received no medical training. For the next year and one-half, approximately, from December 1, 1986, until June 30, 1988, Dr. Alanbari enjoyed an Internship in Internal Medicine at The University of Toronto, The Toronto Western Hospital in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He completed training in Core Internal Medicine on June 30, 1988, and left the program in good standing. Sometime shortly before completing the training in Internal Medicine in Toronto, Dr. Alanbari suffered a crisis brought on by serious family and financial problems following the death of his father. The chief resident at The Toronto Western Hospital arranged for Dr. Alanbari to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Dr. Alanbari's condition was "depression"; an anti-depressant medication was prescribed. Dr. Alanbari took the medication for three weeks. After the three weeks, not convinced that he was suffering from depression and having received some training in psychiatry, himself, Dr. Alanbari ceased the medication. He has not seen a psychiatrist since. Upon leaving Toronto, Dr. Alanbari returned to Prospect Park, New Jersey. On November 18, 1989, Dr. Alanbari entered the Internal Medicine Program at the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He entered the program as a first year medical resident even though he had completed a first year residency earlier because, for whatever reason, he was unable to obtain a second year residency. Dr. Alanbari was not given an official letter from the VA facility informing him of the status of his training because it was an unusual time of the year to begin training. He was told by the VA Medical Center that he could remain until June and then his status would be determined. Dr. Alanbari, however, did not remain at the facility until June. He left the Medical Center on April 18, 1989, under the affectation that his ulcer had begun bleeding. Although Dr. Alanbari had an ulcer at the time, it was, in fact, not bleeding. In truth, Dr. Alanbari left the program because of difficulties in an engagement to be married. Dr. Alanbari did not reveal the true nature of the basis of his departure from the Wilkes-Barre VA facility because the issue of difficulties in his personal relationship with his fiancee was sensitive to him at least, in part, because of the Syrian culture in which he was raised. Moreover, he did not want to suffer a suggestion from supervisory medical personnel at the VA facility, as had been made earlier at the Toronto facility, that he see a psychiatrist again. He resisted such a suggestion because he felt he was capable of solving the problem himself. Dr. Alanbari's fiancee, a Syrian woman residing in New York, wanted to return to Syria while Dr. Alanbari was intent on conducting the practice of medicine in the United States. Forced to choose between his fiancee and his career, a decision with at least the potential for affecting the remainder of his life, Dr. Alanbari returned to Prospect Park, New Jersey, in order to make a decision free of the pressures of residency and the practice of medicine. For several months, Dr. Alanbari lived with family in New Jersey. In July of 1989, less than three months after leaving the Wilkes-Barre VA facility, Dr. Alanbari moved to New York and entered a first-year residency for the third time, again in Internal Medicine, but this time at the Methodist Hospital at 506 Sixth Street in Brooklyn, New York. At the time Dr. Alanbari submitted his application in February of 1992, he had completed the first two years of his residency at the Methodist Hospital in Brooklyn and was in the second half of his third year of residency in internal medicine. Events after the application's submission During the processing of Dr. Alanbari's application, the Board received a profile from the American Medical Association revealing the training Petitioner received at the Wilkes-Barre VA hospital. The contradiction between the profile and Dr. Alanbari's application led the Board to inquire further. On May 24, 1992, two months after the filing of the application, Dr. Alanbari appeared in the office of the Board to discuss problems with his application. The visit was followed by letters from Dr. Alanbari to the Board less than one month later. Although copies of the letters were stricken from the record, Dr. Alanbari testified at hearing that he informed the board by letter of the crisis he had suffered following his father's death shortly before leaving Toronto, the single visit to a psychiatrist at the suggestion of the Chief Resident, the psychiatrist's diagnosis of depression and the prescription of the anti-depressant. Dr. Alanbari answered "No," to the question on the application as to whether he had ever been emotionally or mentally ill because he was not convinced that he suffered from depression, was hesitant to reveal matters that were private and was not sure he could obtain a report from the psychiatrist because of his limited treatment. Dr. Alanbari also related to the Board in the same letter that he had started training at the Wilkes-Barre VA facility in December of 1988 but left in April of 1989 because of serious problems in his marital engagement. In November of 1992, Dr. Alanbari appeared before the Board's Credentials Committee. The meeting's minutes relate: After receiving testimony, it was determined that Dr. Alanbari has been less than truthful not only during the application process, but during his medical training and the independent psychiatric evaluation which was arranged through PRN. Dr. Alanbari stated that he was very hesitant to give details about his personal problems because he feels it is a matter of privacy. The minutes go on to reflect that Dr. Goetz of the Physicians Recovery Network recommended that Dr. Alanbari undergo a five-day inpatient evaluation through the Physicians Recovery Network. After a discussion with Dr. Goetz outside the Committee's meeting room, the minutes report, "Dr. Alanbari stated that he is agreeable to undergoing the five-day evaluation through PRN as suggested by Dr. Goetz." Motion was made, seconded and carried unanimously to retain jurisdiction until no later than the March, 1993, meeting to allow Dr. Alanbari to undergo evaluation through PRN and to complete a new, complete and accurate application. The Credentials Committee reconvened on March 19, 1993. Minutes of this second meeting show that, On March 10, 1993, a letter was received from Dr. Alanbari stating that he could not afford the cost of the PRN evaluation. Motion was made, seconded and carried unanimously to recommend denial of application based on his testimony at the November, 1992 Committee meeting, attempting to obtain a license by fraud and misrepresentation, failure to comply with the Board's request that he undergo five-day inpatient evaluation through PRN and failure to submit a new, complete and accurate application. The minutes also show, apparently, that an inde- pendent evaluation, an evaluation other than the five-day inpatient evaluation the board had requested Dr. Alanbari to undergo, had been conducted of Dr. Alanbari. Dr. Goetz of the Physicians Recovery Network opined to the board that "he felt Dr. Alanbari had not been forthright during the independent evaluation . . ." Dr. Goetz did not testify at the hearing. There was, therefore, no foundation laid for the opinion; nor, was it elaborated upon or explained by Dr. Goetz. No evidence was introduced as to who conducted the evaluation, of what it consisted or anything else about it. On November 4, 1993 the Order of the Board denying Dr. Alanbari's application was rendered. There is nothing of record to indicate what, if anything, relevant to this case transpired during the eight month period between the March meeting of the Credentials Committee and the Board's order. In the order's statement of grounds for the denial is the following, "Your mental condition interferes with your ability to practice medicine with skill and safety." Although nothing was produced by the Board at hearing to show what happened between March of 1993 and November of 1993, the minutes of the Credentials Committee contain the grounds found by the committee in support of a recommendation to the Board that the application be denied. Dr. Alanbari's "mental condition" as "interference with his ability to practice medicine" was not among the Credential Committee's grounds supporting the recommendation to the Board formulated in March of 1993. The hearing. Following Dr. Alanbari's explanation at hearing of the reasons for filling out his application as he had, the Board presented no witnesses to support its action in entering the denial order. The remainder of the Board's case was comprised of four exhibits: (1) Dr. Alanbari's application; (2) A letter from Robert A. Bear, M.D., stating that Dr. Alanbari left the program at the University of Toronto "in good standing. He did not break a contract. He was not offered a contract to continue training"; (3) the Credential Committee's minutes from its November 1992 meeting, and; (4) the Credential Committee's minutes from its March 1993 meeting. Aside from the four exhibits, the Board's case for denial rests on the "admission" under oath by Dr. Alanbari that his replies on the application were false, an "admission" made by an unrepresented applicant under withering cross- examination by substitute counsel for the board: Q . . . First of all, I want to establish, is it not true that you stated on your application to the Board of Medicine that you have never had any mental illness or been treated with any psychotherapy? A Yes, it was true, and that's why -- Q Doctor, however, isn't it also true that, in fact, you were seen by a psychiatrist and given medication? A Only once and I gave all the details, that's why I made my trip from New Jersey to meet with higher authorities to explain that special situation. It's my privacey [sic]. Q Doctor, that was after you said no, isn't that correct? A Yes. Q You keep talking about privacy here. Do you believe that you have a right to give a false answer on your application because you believe it to be a private matter. A It was delicate situation, I tried to deal with it with honesty, that's why I made my trip to Florida. I wanted to speak to someone. Q Doctor, was your answer on the application honest? A Yes. Q When you said no on the application, was that an honest answer? A If you asked me if any question on the application was honest, yes. Q No, I asked you if your answer on the application was honest, your answer to the question about psychotherapy and you said no. A The honest question, I don't know. Not yes, not no. Q But you answered no, didn't you, Doctor? A It was a very delicate situation and I presented the events as they happened and I left it to you to appreciate -- Q Doctor, did you submit such an explanation with your application when you said no? A No. Q You didn't, did you? A No. Q Now, did you honestly answer that question as to whether or not you had psychotherapy? A Initially, I said no, but -- Q Is that an honest answer, Doctor? A No, its not. Q Thank you. Do you believe, Doctor, that you have a right to tell a lie about something just because you consider it to be private? A I don't believe in telling lies. Q But you did, Doctor, didn't you? A I initially wrote down this, but again, the issue was very delicate, there was no good answer to this. Not a yes, not a no. Q Doctor, the truthful answer to that question was yes, wasn't it? A No. Q Doctor, did you receive psychotherapy? A No, sir. (Tr. 40-43, emphasis supplied). At hearing, Dr. Alanbari was also asked in light of the fact that he had discontinued the practice of medicine for more than a month on several questions why he had answered "no," to the question on the application, "Have you ever had to discontinue practice for any reason for a period of one month or longer?" (emphasis supplied). From his testimony, it was apparent that Dr. Alanbari believed "no" to be a correct answer because although he had ceased to practice medicine for more than a month on several occasions after graduation, he had never been forced by a licensing authority or anyone else to cease practicing medicine. Whenever he had lapses in practice of more than a month they were always by choice. He, therefore, had never had to discontinue practice, the precise question posed by the application. Dr. Alanbari's testimony on this subject squares with the remainder of his application from which it is obvious that he informed the board from the moment he first applied that he had not practiced for several periods of more than one month's duration subsequent to his graduation from medical school. This included a period from August of 1984 until November of 1986 and the time that he did not practice between July of 1988 and June of 1989 that preceded and followed his practice at the VA Medical Center.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That Dr. Alanbari be requested to submit additional information to the Board; and, That Dr. Alanbari's application be denied if he does not submit such additional information within 30 days of the request. If the Board does not choose to request additional information to clarify Dr. Alanbari's application then Dr. Alanbari should be certified by the Board to the Department for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner did not submit a proposed recommended order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, it was the Board which framed the issues of the hearing in its denial order. Dr. Alanbari adopted those issues. In all other respects the finding is accepted. With respect to Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, Petitioner's representation was not fraudulent. With respect to Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 9, the representation was not fraudulent. With respect to Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 10, the first sentence of the finding is accepted. The remainder of the finding is rejected. Although counsel stated at hearing that correspondence had been sent to Petitioner inquiring about the Wilkes-Barre program, there was no evidence presented of such correspondence. Nor was there evidence that Petitioner's participation in the program was anything other than temporary. His assertion, therefore, was not false. With respect to Respondent's finding of fact No. 11, the finding is accepted. The finding is relevant only to Petitioner's credibility. As explained in the body of the Recommended Order, under Petitioner's legitimate interpretation of the question, his answer was not false. COPIES FURNISHED: Amer Alanbari, M.D. 51 Layton Road Sussex, NJ 07461 Gregory A. Chaires, Esquire Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact On February 4, 1980, the Office of Medicaid Quality Control advised Respondent that a review of his Medicaid claims revealed that he billed the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services and further advised him that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program for such services. The letter further requested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a copy of his Board certification. (Although the letter admitted in evidence bears the date of February 4, 1979, it is obvious that the date contains a typographical error, since the letter pertains to services previously rendered in April of 1979, and refers to a rule which became effective January 1, 1980.) By letter dated February 8, 1980, Respondent replied, by advising Petitioner that he was neither Board-certified nor Board-eligible. Respondent included in his letter a recitation of his extensive experience and qualifications as a psychiatrist. In spite of Petitioner's failure to reply to his letter or to authorize him to do so, Respondent continued to bill Petitioner for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner determined that ineligible psychiatrists were billing the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients. In order to ascertain those qualified to bill the Program, form letters were sent to all providers of psychiatric services requesting documentation of Board eligibility or Board certification and further advising that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program. On August 5, 1981, that form letter was sent to Respondent. On August 11, 1981, Respondent replied to the August 5 form letter by again advising Petitioner that he was not Board-certified or Board-eligible and his extensive background and qualifications as a psychiatrist. Although no reply was made to his August 1981 letter to Petitioner, Respondent continued to bill the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. Respondent is not presently, and has never been, a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification. During the period from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982, Respondent billed for and was paid $38,252.75 by the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner never advised Respondent that he was entitled to bill the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients notwithstanding the fact that he was not a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered directing Respondent to reimburse to Petitioner the sum of $38,252.75 for payments received by him for psychiatric services rendered from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Medicaid Program Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce M. Boiko, Esquire 1000 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 212 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1997) (hereinafter, "Florida Statues"), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 59S- 8.005(1)(e)1 and 2, by diverting morphine during his care and treatment of two patients and failing to keep accurate nurse's notes. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of nursing. Respondent is licensed as a nurse pursuant to license number RN 2185632. Respondent admitted under oath at the hearing that he committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent did not overdose any patient, endanger, or neglect any patient. Respondent diverted morphine during his care and treatment of patients J.G. and R.B. at West Volusia Memorial Hospital on March 24 and 26, 1997. Respondent was addicted to morphine and diverted morphine from the two patients for self- administration. Respondent is guilty of negligent administration of morphine. Respondent self-administrated morphine that was not medically necessary. Respondent failed to keep accurate nurse's notes for patient J.G. Respondent inaccurately recorded the amount of morphine administered to patients J.G. and R.B. Respondent has voluntarily sought aggressive care and treatment for his drug addiction. Respondent is in three rehabilitation programs in Georgia. Respondent is in an intervention program for nurses ("IPN") approved by the State of Georgia pursuant to a prosecution conducted by the appropriate state agency in Georgia. He is also in a nurses anonymous program and a follow-up hospital program. Respondent is also under the regular care of a psychiatrist.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 464.018(1)(h) and Rules 59S-8.005(1)(e)1 and 2, suspending Respondent's license for two years from the date of this Recommended Order, and placing Respondent on probation for two years from the end of the suspension period. The terms of probation shall include a requirement that Respondent successfully complete the IPN program in Georgia and hospital follow-up program. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marilyn Bloss, Executive Director Department of Health Board of Nursing 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 136 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1580 Waldo Palmer Lane Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-4229 Joseph Webb, pro se 2169 Turner Church Road McDonough, Georgia 30252
Findings Of Fact Alexander G. Toth graduated from medical school in 1943 and migrated to Miami in 1948. He took his three-year residency in general surgery at the V. A. Hospital in Miami starting in 1951 and thereafter practiced general surgery until 1976 when he had a serious accident. This accident plus additional health problems caused him to give up surgery and he has practiced family medicine since 1976. His office hours have been limited from 9 until 12 each week day since 1976. Approximately 10 patients per day were seen by Respondent during the period involved in these charges. At all times here relevant Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a physician. Richard Hatcher was a patient of Respondent in 1975 at which time he complained of headaches and low back pain. Respondent prescribed Percodan, Doriden, Dilaudid and Placidyl during a one-year period Hatcher was a regular patient. At this time Hatcher had a suit pending to recover damages for injuries received in an automobile collision. Hatcher did not see Respondent with any regularity again until 1978. Respondent's patient records of Hatcher (Exhibit 5) show he treated Hatcher on 11-20-78 on complaint of can't sleep, low back pain and spasm of lower back, by prescribing 100 Valium and 100 Percodan. Exhibit 6, which is a copy of prescriptions written by Respondent for Hatcher, shows the following prescriptions were written for Hatcher on dates indicated: 6/2/78 - 30 Valium 10 mg; 8/8/78 - 50 Seconal and 30 Fastin 30 mg; 10/11/78 60 Tuinal 3 grs, 60 Fastin 30 mg, 50 Valium 10 mg and 100 Percodan; and 11/20/78 - Valium 10 mg, 30 Fastin 30 mg and 100 Percodan. Exhibit 5 shows in 1975 Hatcher was 6 feet and 180 pounds. The entry dated 12/18/78 opposite Fastin is (Wt 205). During the period 12/18/78 to 2/27/79 Respondent prescribed for Hatcher on numerous prescriptions the following: 300 Percodan, 250 Valium, 230 Tuinal 3 gr, 60 Fastin, 60 Demerol 100 mg, one 30 cc vial Demerol 100 mg per cc, and 30 syringes (Exhibit 6) . Exhibit 5 contains an entry dated 3/2/79 "(Wants Demerol) Refused - refer to JMH", and a final entry (3-19) Deceased." Hatcher voiced the same or similar complaints of pain on each visit to Respondent. Richard Hatcher was found dead in his apartment on or about 21 March 1979 some 24 to 36 hours after he died. Cause of death was acute intravenous narcotism. The syringe with which the fatal narcotic was injected was still in his arm when his body was found. Due to the rapid clearing of many drugs from the blood the autopsy failed to reveal which of the opiate drugs caused Hatcher's death. About one week later Mrs. Hatcher, the mother of Richard, received from her ex-husband and father of Richard a page from a notebook found in Richard's apartment after his death signed by Richard which indicates some concern by Hatcher that he might overdose on drugs given him by Dr. Toth, the Respondent (Exhibit 12). Richard Hatcher became seriously involved with drugs in 1967 when he was 21 years old. By 1975 his mother noted a personality change where he would quickly go from normal to extremely agitated. In the fall of 1978 Hatcher committed himself to Village South, a drug rehabilitation program in Dade County, for some 4 or 5 months. After release from Village South Hatcher continued to take drugs. To his mother's knowledge he overdosed several times before his death. Three times she found him unconscious on the floor of her apartment and on numerous other occasions he was "spaced out". Respondent testified that Hatcher showed no indication he had abused or misused the medications Respondent prescribed. If so, it is evident that Respondent did not closely observe Hatcher or do more than hear his litany of pain. On the other hand, Exhibit 5 shows that some 2-1/2 weeks before Hatcher's death Respondent refused to prescribe the Demerol wanted by Hatcher. Unless Respondent recognized the seriousness of Hatcher's addiction it is not conceivable that he would suddenly refuse drugs so freely prescribed in the past. Michael Kavney was a patient of Respondent from June 1979 until his death from an overdose of Placidyl on 14 or 15 January 1980. On June 11 1979 Kavney complained of pain in his shoulder and Respondent prescribed 50 Tylenol. Kavney was 6 feet tall, weighed 189 pounds, and told Respondent he wanted to lose weight. Respondent on June 11, 1979 also prescribed 50 Fastin. On 8-16-79 Respondent, at Kavney's request, called in a prescription for 50 Valium. On 9/7/79 he called in a prescription for 50 Tylenol. Both of these prescriptions resulted from a phone call to Respondent. On October 29, 1979 Kavney visited Respondent, told him the shoulder pain persists and he would like some more weight reducers. By this time Kavney's weight was down to 185 pounds from 189 four months earlier. Respondent prescribed 50 Tylenol, 50 Valium (Exhibit 4) and 30 Fastin (Exhibit 3). By script dated 11/21/79 Respondent prescribed 50 Fastin for Kavney and by script dated 11/26/79 he prescribed 50 Tylenol (Exhibit 4). No record of these is contained in Exhibit 3. By entry on Exhibit 3 dated December 17, 1979 Respondent recorded "pain left shoulder, using heat at home, can't take codeine, Percodan 50". The Tylenol, which had been prescribed on four previous occasions, contains 1 grain of codeine per tablet. On January 14, 1980 Kavney visited Respondent, told him of disturbed sleep patterns, that he had taken Placidyl on prior occasions with good results and Respondent prescribed 60 Placidyl (750). Kavney was found dead in his automobile with an empty bottle with Placidyl label on the floor. An autopsy done on January 15, 1980 shows Kavney died from an overdose of Placidyl. Terry McGarey grew up in Miami and played in bands with Kavney as early as high school days. He had also known Hatcher since 1963. McGarey first visited Respondent in 1970 with an arm injury. He next saw Respondent near the end of 1976 and he complained of headache and leg pains from an earlier motorcycle accident. McGarey received a prescription for Percodan. McGarey, who appeared as a witness, testified that he had visited Respondent every three or four weeks in 1976 complaining of headache and during these visits he also received Placidyl, Demerol, Parest and Valium. These visits continued in 1977 with the same frequency and results. Respondent's patient records for Terrance McGarey (Exhibit 1) commence 3/28/78. The first entry is not dated but states "cc severe headaches - nausea - at JMH March `78. Neuological dept. - treated for organic brain syndrome - at JMH 1976 migraine - no allergies - only relief Demerol. Rx demerol 100 mg #5 fiorinal tabs." Thereafter Exhibit 1 shows entries 7-31-78, 8-7-78, 8-28, 9-1, 9-6, 9-11, 9-27, 10-9, 10-20, 10-29, 10-31, 11-16, 11-22, 12-18, 12-22, 12-29, 1-3, 1-8, 3-21 and 4-19-79. Most of these entries resulted from office visits but some entries recorded prescriptions as a result of phone calls. During this period prescriptions were issued to McGarey for Percodan, Emperin, Doriden Parest, Tuinal, Demerol, Placidyl, Dalmane, Darvon, Seconal and Valium (Exhibit 2) On May 7, 1979 McGarey called the Cardella Pharmacy saying he was Dr. Toth, gave the correct DEA number and authorized the delivery of 18 Placidyl 50 mg to patient Jerry McGaret. The pharmacist called the doctor's office, which was closed, and then issued the drugs to McGarey. A subsequent try was unsuccessful when the pharmacist was told by Respondent's office that this man was no longer a patient of Respondent. Respondent testified that he treated McGarey for migraine headaches, insomnia, nervousness, and low back pain. He found no evidence of abnormal conditions in his examination of McGarey. Through mid-October Respondent had no indication McGarey was in a methadone program or addicted and the drugs were continued with each visit or phone call. On December 29 Respondent learned from McGarey that he had been admitted to JMH for seizures and the resident recommended Seconal. On this basis Respondent prescribed Seconal but did not learn the cause of the seizures. On January 8, 1979 McGarey's mother called Respondent to advise that her son was a drug abuser and had been on a methadone program for 18 months. Following this entry is the notation "No more Rx's - back to JMH". Respondent's next entry on Exhibit 1 is "Called records at JMH patient admitted 2-9-79 - overdosed - discharged 2-14 Signed out - mother took him home." Although Respondent testified it never entered his mind that McGarey might be a drug abuser he also testified that the symptoms of narcotic addiction are agitation, nervousness, slurred speech and poor equilibrium. On the witness stand McGarey exhibited traits of nervousness and agitation. He appeared hyperactive rather than calm and sedate. His movements were jerky rather than fluid and he did not give the impression of a normally relaxed person under tension because he was testifying. On 11 January 1980 Kirk Kratz, a 29-year-old male, visited Respondent's office as a patient. He had a cast on his right upper arm and stated it was fractured some two weeks earlier. Also he had received a gunshot wound in the abdomen before Christmas and a laparotomy had been performed. He complained of pain in the right arm. He was given a prescription for 100 Percodan for pain and 60 Tuinal 3 gr for sleep. Kratz returned 12 February with same complaints and was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan, 60 Tuinal and 30 Valium. On 2/29 Kraft appeared without the cast, told Respondent the police had broken the cast, held him in jail for 3 days and confiscated his medication. He was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan and 60 Tuinal. On 4/8/80 Kratz still complained of "pain in the shoulder and arm and can't sleep." Prescriptions for 100 Percodan, 60 Tuinal and 100 Valium were given him. Finally on 6/13, with complaint of pain in hand and shoulder, Kratz was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan and 30 Doriden (Exhibit 9). Hatcher and McGarey were drug addicts before and during the time they were being treated by Respondent. At one time or another both of them had been enrolled in the methadone program at Jackson Memorial Hospital and/or other withdrawal programs for addicts. In addition to getting drugs from Respondent, they were also obtaining drug prescriptions from other doctors. Also from the quantity of drugs prescribed for Kavney and Kratz it is evident that both of these individuals were also addicts. During the period between 1 January 1980 and 14 June 1980 Respondent, with an active practice of some 700 patients prescribed approximately 28,000 Percodan and 2,000 Percocet tablets to various patients. Exhibit 16 shows a breakdown of the 130 patients treated by Respondent during this period. While Exhibit 16 shows Kirk Kratz received 100 Percodan only on 2/29/80, Exhibit 8 indicates he received 500 Percodan between 1 January and 14 June 1980. Assuming all other entries on Exhibit 16 to be accurate, a spot check shows the following patients were given Percodan or Percocet during the period 1 January - 14 June in the following quantities: Steven Arnold - 300; Cathy Blauk - 450; Bill Davis - 500; Kirk Decker - 300; George Fernandez - 300; Sidney Ford - 600; Ron Jangie - 300; Jerome Johnson - 300; Patty La Fortuna - 310; Vincent La Fortuna - 200; William Leonard - 350; Mary Leslie - 300; Gus Melquezo - 400; Michael Pravioski - 225; Debbie Saey - 250; Robert Sandifer - 400; James Setters - 300; Alvin Terrell - 300; Mike Thill - 300; Mark Wolfson - 200; Joe Worth - 300; and Harvey Zemaster - 200. Exhibit 16 also shows that most of these prescriptions were written for quantities of 100. It also lists almost 18,000 Percodan issued to 130 patients during this period, or an average of 140 per patient. Percodan, Tuinal, Parest, Demerol and Seconal are Class II drugs. One hundred Percodan taken in a one-month period will cause addiction in the taker. After 48 hours taking Percodan every 4 to 6 hours the patient will have withdrawal symptoms. Although Placidyl, Valium, Doriden, Empirin and Dalmane are not Class II drugs, they are dangerous and therefore controlled. Fifteen Placidyls taken at one time can be fatal. Many of the drugs prescribed by Respondent, when taken in combination, create a synergistic effect which makes the combination greater than the sum of its parts. Similarly a synergistic effect is created when some of these drugs are taken in conjunction with alcohol. Fastin is used for weight control. Neither Hatcher nor Kavney at 6 feet and 180 - 185 pounds should have been a candidate for weight loss. Further, prescriptions for Fastin and Seconal (for sleep) at the same time are incompatible as one is an upper, the other a downer. Tuinal in combination with Valium will increase depression. When Fastin is added, a pharmacological jungle can result. Respondent acknowledged that he relied more on the statements of his patients than upon an examination to determine when to prescribe medications. If the patient said he hurt, Respondent would prescribe a pain killer. A two- week-old fracture properly set and in a cast should cause little pain. If pain persists two weeks after casting something is wrong that will not likely heal itself. Therefore, painkillers to mask the symptoms are contraindicated. Similarly, a persistent pain in the shoulder is likely to be caused by inflammation and an anti-flammatory agent is indicated. Neither Tylenol nor Percodan are anti-inflammatory agents. Dr. John V. Handwerker, M.D. was accepted as an expert in family practice medicine. After reviewing Respondent's records of Hatcher, Kavney, Kratz and McGarey he expressed the strong opinion that the complaints of the patients did not justify the narcotics prescribed; that much larger quantities of each drug were prescribed at one time than was medically indicated or prudent; that drugs were prescribed in dangerous combinations due to the synergistic effect if taken together, plus some of these drugs such as Fastin and Valium are mutually exclusive; that issuing a prescription to take these drugs "as needed" was improper and dangerous; and that narcotics were frequently prescribed for alleged ailments for which more effective non-narcotic drugs were available. This witness was particularly critical of the prescription for liquid Demerol, as this should be prescribed only when the patient can't take the drug orally. After reviewing Exhibit 7 Dr. Handwerker expressed the opinion that prescribing 28,000 Percodan tablets during a 5-1/2 month period could only be justified with a large practice limited to trauma patients and that the records and prescription schedules show a practice harmful to the public. This opinion was based partially on Dr. Handwerker's practice in which, during the same period, he saw 2,081 patients and wrote 73 prescriptions for 1,996 Percodan tablets. Exhibit 7 contains 291 prescriptions issued by Respondent during this period, and recovered by Petitioner's investigator from pharmacies in the vicinity of Respondent's office. These coupled with Respondent's patient records show some 28,000 Percodan and 2000 Percocet tablets were prescribed. Valium is the most commonly prescribed drug in the United States and one of the most abused drugs. If a patient is emotionally stable 60 Valium is too many to prescribe for a patient at one time. If a patient is emotionally disturbed there is even greater reason for not prescribing 60 Valium. Dr. Roderick Palmer, M.D., testified as an expert in clinical pharmacology. He opined that prescribing 100 Percodan for a patient at one time was not appropriate because if the pain results from a traumatic injury, such injury will normally cease being painful in 4 or 5 days, and 100 Percodan is enough to commit suicide or become addicted. Dr. Palmer described Percodan and Placidyl as widely abused drugs. Sixty Placidyl in one prescription is too many because of suicide potential. Further, if one Placidyl is taken every day for 60 days the patient would probably become addicted. Taking more than one Placidyl per day could impair coordination enough to result in an industrial or automobile accident or other injury. With respect to Exhibit 7, Dr. Palmer cited instructions for Percodan or Percocet that the physician should not prescribe enough to result in addiction (not more than 30) nor prescribe enough for patient to commit suicide. It is necessary for patients to return to the physician before the patient can become addicted to the drugs prescribed. In this way the doctor will not lose control over the patient which could result in the patient becoming addicted. With respect to the 28,000 Percodan prescribed in a 5-1/2 months period Dr. Palmer viewed that quantity as more than he would prescribe in a lifetime. Dr. Murray Sims, M.D., is a Board certified surgeon who testified on behalf of Respondent. He found the prescriptions issued to Hatcher, Kavney, McGarey and Kratz to be proper for the complaints of the patients. Sims has known Respondent for many years, and has worked, studied, and taken examinations with Respondent. Dr. Sims prescribes Percodan in quantities of 100 and even 200. He does not believe 100 Percodan taken in a 30-day period is addictive. He has one 93-year old patient to whom he mails prescriptions for 100 Percodan per month (40 to 60 days) because, as she told him, "It makes my day start off right." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 102). When asked if Percodan and Tuinal taken together would have a synergistic effect Dr. Sims said no (Tr. Vol. II, p. 67) but on p. 119 he testified "I guess it would, you get a relief of both, yes. Don't hold me too much about pharmacy." Dr. Sims practice is 99 percent devoted to surgery patients and if he has a patient with a non-surgical related disorder he usually refers the patient to another doctor. This witness's testimony regarding the various drugs prescribed by Respondent and the appropriateness thereof was not deemed as credible as was the testimony of Drs. Hardwerker and Palmer. This was so because the latter had more expertise in this area of medicine and demonstrated greater credibility on the witness stand.
