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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs LIBBY INVESTIGATIONS, AND MARVIN W. LIBBY, 95-001564 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 31, 1995 Number: 95-001564 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1996

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed violations of provision of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, sufficient to justify the imposition of disciplinary action against Respondent's Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License; his Class "C" Private Investigator License; his Class "D" Security Officer License; his Class "G" Statewide Firearm License; and his Class "M" Private Investigative/Security Agency Manager License.

Findings Of Fact The Department of State hereby adopts and incorporates herein by reference the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order. WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Respondent's Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, Number A93-00352, effective October 11, 1993; his Class "C" Private Investigator License, Number C93-00189, effective March 8, 1993; his Class "D" Security Officer License, Number D93- 10584, effective July 15, 1993; his Class "G" Statewide Firearm License, Number G93-01 133; effective May 24,1993, and his Class "M" Private Investigative/Security Agency Manager License, Number M93-00074, effective July 15, 1993, are hereby REVOKED. It is further ORDERED based on a complete review of the record and in accordance with the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law Number 27 and the Hearing Officer's finding of aggravating circumstances pursuant to Rule 1 C-3. 113(5), Florida Administrative Code, that as to Count III of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent be and is hereby FINED $700.00 pursuant to Rule 1C-3.113(2)(q), Florida Administrative Code. Payment of the administrative fine shall be by cashier's check or money order payable to the Department of Stated Division of Licensing within thirty (30) days.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of allegations contained in Counts I, II and III of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and it is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such final order revoke Respondent's Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, Number A93-00352, effective October 11, 1993; his Class "C" Private Investigator License, Number C93-00189, effective March 8, 1993; his Class "D" Security Officer License, Number D93-10584, effective July 15, 1993; his Class "G" Statewide Firearm License, Number G93- 01133; and his Class "M" Private Investigative/Security Agency Manager License, Number M93-00074, effective July 15, 1993. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-12. Accepted in substance, though not verbatim. 13. Incorporated by reference. 14.-17. Accepted in substance. 18.-19. Incorporated by reference. 20.-23. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 24.-38. Accepted in substance, though not verbatim. 39. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 40.-42. Incorporated by reference. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. Accepted in substance. 2.-4. Rejected, argument. 5. Rejected, Class C license was effective in March. 6.-10. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. 11. Incorporated by reference. 12.-15. Unnecessary to result, rejected. Rejected, hearsay. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted. 20.-26. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 27. Rejected, credibility. 28.-29. Accepted. 30.-31. Rejected, credibility, not supported by weight of the evidence. 32.-38. Rejected, relevance. 39. Accepted in substance. 40.-41. Rejected, credibility. 42. Accepted in substance. 43.-46. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 47.-48. Accepted in substance. Rejected, subordinate, credibility. Rejected, credibility. 51.-52. Rejected, subordinate. 53.-54. Rejected, relevance, credibility. Rejected, subordinate, credibility. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Rejected, subordinate, relevance, credibility. 58.-59. Rejected, credibility, weight of the evidence. 60.-62. Rejected, relevance, subordinate to HO findings. Rejected, credibility. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Incorporated by reference. 66.-68. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 70.-77. Rejected, subordinate, argumentative, legal conclusions. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Cobb, Cole and Bell 131 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68493.6118
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ALEX MARRERO vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 81-001437 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001437 Latest Update: Nov. 17, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Alex Marrero, age 27, has never been convicted of a crime. He became a Dade County police officer in 1975. During his work as a police officer he received numerous commendations and citations from the Kiwanis Club and his supervisors for outstanding service. One year he was Officer of the Month once, and runner-up for Officer of the Year. During the course of his employment as a police officer, however, the Petitioner became one of the subjects of an investigation by the Internal Security Bureau of the Dade County Public Safety Department, which related to the arrest and beating of Arthur McDuffie on the night of December 17, 1979. As a result of this investigation, the Petitioner was discharged as a police officer on February 1, 1980, by the Director of Public Safety. The Petitioner's termination from employment was reviewed by a hearing examiner for Dade County at hearings held on April 29 and May 15, 1981, which resulted in the issuance of a recommendation dated June 19, 1981, that the discharge of the Petitioner be upheld. Thereupon, on July 16, 1981, the County notified the Petitioner that his dismissal from service was confirmed. The Petitioner admitted the fact that the recommendation of the hearing examiner was based upon findings that he used unnecessary force in the arrest of Arthur McDuffie which contributed to his death. He also admitted that the hearing officer found that he had tampered with evidence to make the death of McDuffie appear to have been accidental. No administrative or judicial review of the Petitioner's discharge as a police officer has been undertaken. Previously, in 1979, the Petitioner was charged with second degree murder and manslaughter and brought to trial in Circuit Court. The Petitioner pleaded self-defense, and he was found not guilty on all counts by a jury. There have been no other incidents in his life questioning his honesty or good moral character, according to the Petitioner. Prior to his employment as a police officer the Petitioner worked for Preventative Security Service and Investigation, Inc. Since his termination as a police officer he has resumed investigative work with this employer, and he has also worked for a jewelry company in Miami as a security consultant. The Petitioner contends that the same facts were before both the jury and the hearing officer relative to the arrest and beating of Arthur McDuffie, and that his acquittal by the jury after a trial wherein over ten witnesses were heard, is entitled to more weight than an administrative proceeding where only two witnesses testified. However, the jury verdict of not guilty after a self- defense plea, without more, is not subject to only a single interpretation. There is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that the death of Arthur McDuffie was justifiable or excusable. The only import of the jury's acquittal of the Petitioner is that he is not guilty of the crimes charged. Acts which might not be criminal offenses, or which may not have been proven sufficiently so as to warrant a conviction, may nevertheless be the basis for administrative proceedings and receive different treatment. Further, the Petitioner presented no evidence to corroborate his own assertions relative to his character, past record, etc. In view of the circumstances surrounding the termination of the Petitioner's employment as a police officer by Dade County, there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Petitioner meets the good character requirement for a private investigative agency license.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Alex Marrero for a Class A Private Investigative Agency license, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 17th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward J. O'Donnell, Esquire Suite 300 1125 N.E. 125th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 James V. Antista, Esquire Room 106, R.A. Gray Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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HERSHELL LEE JOHNSTON vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 90-005938 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 20, 1990 Number: 90-005938 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 1991

Findings Of Fact On April 18, 1990, Hershell Lee Johnston filed an application with the Department of State, Division of Licensing, for licensure as a Class "C" Private Investigator and as a class "E" Repossessor. On July 11, 1990, Respondent, through Marilyn D. Thompson, denied the application based on the provisions of Section 493.319, Florida Statutes. The denial was based on Mr. Johnston's failure to list on his application certain aliases that he had allegedly used and on his failure to reflect that he had been charged and convicted of the crime of theft by taking in the State of Georgia in 1984. No appearance was made at the formal hearing by Mr. Johnston or by anyone on his behalf, and no evidence in support of his application was presented at the formal hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which denies the subject application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991. Copies furnished: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Hershell Lee Johnston Post Office Box 061479 Fort Myers, Florida 33906

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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FENEL ANTOINE vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 94-000086 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 06, 1994 Number: 94-000086 Latest Update: May 02, 1994

The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for a Class "C" private investigator license should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for a Class "C" private investigator license. The Department denied that application by letter dated November 24, 1993, for the reason that Petitioner had not shown that he had the two years of full-time experience or training required for licensure. As evidence of his two years of full-time experience or training, Petitioner had submitted to the Department an affidavit from attorney Mark M. Spatz of the law firm Simons and Spatz and an affidavit from attorney Lawrence S. Ben of the law firm Chikovsky and Ben. Both of those affidavits had been altered. Although Petitioner did perform some services for attorney Spatz' law firm by assisting in the investigation and preparation of some cases for trial from September of 1990 to June of 1992, he did so as an independent contractor and not as an employee. That law firm provided Petitioner with no training or equipment and exercised no control over him. Petitioner was simply given an assignment and told to complete it for a flat rate. Petitioner was not held out by the law firm to be an employee, he was not carried on any of the firm's insurance policies, no taxes were withheld from his pay check when he carried out an assignment, and Petitioner did not receive a weekly paycheck. Petitioner's contacts with that law firm were minimal and numbered less than ten. Petitioner worked as an employee at the law firm of Chikovsky and Ben. He performed both janitorial work and investigative work. The amount of his time spent working as a janitor versus the time spent working as an investigator while employed by that law firm is unknown as is the length of time he was employed there.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class "C" private investigator. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 94-0086S Petitioner's proposed findings of fact delineated by letters A-I have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5-10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Fenel Antoine 1019 Northwest 5th Avenue, #2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (4) 120.57493.6102493.6201493.6203
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GARY J. MCDANIEL vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 78-000725 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000725 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1978

Findings Of Fact The only issue raised as to whether the Petitioner's application for a private investigative agency license should be granted, is whether or not he has the experience required by law. The Petitioner has received an Associate of Arts degree from Palm Beach Community College. His primary area of study was law enforcement, including courses in search and seizure and investigations. In 1974 the Petitioner received a Bachelor's degree in Criminology from the Florida State University. At Florida State he took courses in criminal investigations, constitutional law, government, psychology, and sociology. While the Petitioner's course work does not constitute experience in the area of private investigations, it is relevant to his qualifications to serve in that capacity. Prior to his attending college, and during the time that he attended college, the Petitioner worked as a security officer for several department stores. He worked approximately four months for Fountain's Department Store in Palm Beach County, and approximately twelve months at Gayfer's Department Store in Tallahassee, Florida, At Gayfer's his employment was part-time, however, he worked thirty to forty hours per week. After graduation from college the Petitioner worked approximately five months at a Sears Department Store in Palm Beach County on a full-time basis. Four months of that experience was as a security officer. As a security officer at the department stores, the Petitioner was present at the stores and observed customers. He apprehended shoplifters, took statements from them, and testified against them in court. He also investigated cash register shortages and other indications of employee dishonesty. An investigator for the Division of Licensing testified that in his opinion the department store experience would not constitute experience in the area of investigations, but rather should be considered security work. The agent did testify, however, that a policeman who worked on a "beat" would be considered to have investigative experience. The work that the Petitioner performed at the department stores is directly analogous to the work that a policeman would perform, and his experience is directly related to the field of private investigations, and should be included in his experience. From March, 1976 through February, 1977 the Petitioner was employed by the Wackenhut Corporation. Since March, 1977 the Petitioner has been employed by Damron Investigative Agency. The work that the Petitioner has performed with these two employers is directly related to the field of investigations. At the time of the hearing the Petitioner had a total of 26 months of experience working for these two employers.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ROBERT FILECCI vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 90-007171 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 09, 1990 Number: 90-007171 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1991

Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1987, the Division received Petitioner's application for a Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern License. The Division issued Petitioner's "CC" Intern's License on March 19, 1987. On October 12, 1987, the Division received Petitioner's application for an upgrade to a Class "C" Private Investigator's License. Included with the application was a Completion of Sponsorship Letter reflecting a total internship of twenty-three months, and a letter from Troopers International Security Corp. reflecting investigative and bodyguard experience from May 1976 to June 1979. The Division issued the Class "C" license on December 14, 1987. On February 13, 1989, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Petitioner's Class "C" license based on two violations of Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), conviction of crimes directly related to the business for which the license is held. On April 13, 1989, prior to final disposition of the Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Petitioner's Class "C" license, he applied for a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License. A Final Order revoking Petitioner's Class "C" license for the criminal violations was entered on June 29, 1989. On July 10, 1989, eleven days after revocation of the Class "C" license, the Division issued Petitioner's Class "A" agency license. Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal of the Final Order revoking his Class "C" license. On February 27, 1990, the parties entered into a Stipulation and Agreement wherein Petitioner would withdraw his appeal and be allowed to apply for a Class "C" Private Investigator's License. The Division stipulated that it would not take disciplinary action against Petitioner's Class "A" agency license based solely upon the criminal convictions, and Petitioner would be placed on probation for a period of one year. The parties stipulated that Petitioner would also be allowed to apply for a Class "G" Statewide Gun Permit on September 1, 1990. The agreement also provided that the Division would not deny Petitioner's Class "C" license application based solely upon his 1988 misdemeanor convictions. On April 3, 1990, Petitioner applied for a Class "C" Private Investigator License. The Division of Licensing investigated Petitioner's experience background and concluded that Petitioner did not have the required experience. By letter dated July 13, 1990, the Division informed Petitioner he did not have the required two years experience and gave him thirty days to respond with additional information. Petitioner did not respond in writing within the thirty day period. By letter dated August 30, 1990, the Division informed Petitioner his Class "C" application was denied based on his failure to respond to the letter of July 13, 1990, and because he did not have two years of verifiable experience as required by Section 493.306(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner obtained the Class "A" license mentioned above in order to be better able to pursue a full time career as a private investigator. Petitioner also abandoned his furniture refinishing business in order to operate the private investigation agency. The abandonment of the furniture refinishing business was sometime prior to the revocation of Petitioner's Class "C" license in 1989. Much of the same experience that was listed on Petitioner's 1987 application was also listed on his 1990 application. The July 13, 1990, letter from the Division of Licensing proposing to deny Petitioner's application states that the basis for denial is Petitioner's failure to demonstrate the required experience. The denial letter also states that much of the experience listed by Petitioner cannot be credited as qualifying experience because it was obtained under circumstances which required the Petitioner to have certain licenses that he did not have.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Licensing issue a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's application for a Class "C" license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of March 1991. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March 1991.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs JACKSONVILLE DETECTIVE AGENCY AND CLARENCE D. ENGLAND, 94-006949 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 14, 1994 Number: 94-006949 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent held a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, Number A00-01205, and a Class "C" Private Investigator Licence, Number C00-01229. Respondent has been licensed as a private investigator since 1962. During that time, there has been no disciplinary action against his licenses. On or about May 26, 1994, Leslie Dillingham hired Respondent to obtain proof of her husband's homosexuality for use in a divorce and custody proceeding. During the initial meeting between Respondent and Ms. Dillingham, she requested that Respondent conduct a surveillance of her husband, Mr. Dillingham, and his alleged boyfriend. She also requested that Respondent send someone who could pass as being gay to attend a meeting of an alleged support organization for homosexual men at a branch of the public library on May 28, 1994. Ms. Dillingham wanted to find out the names and addresses of the gay men who were members of the support group. Respondent represented to Ms. Dillingham that he would conduct the surveillance and that he had employees that could assist him in performing these services. He told Ms. Dillingham that he had an employee who could pass as being gay and infiltrate the organization of gay men. However, that employee was out of town. Respondent said he would contact this employee and have him attend the meeting at the library. During the initial meeting between Respondent and Ms. Dillingham, she expressly informed Respondent of the time constraints involved in the investigation. She needed all available information before June 7, 1994, which was the trial date for her divorce and child custody proceeding. Ms. Dillingham specifically requested an oral daily report, an itemized statement of the work done, and a written report of the outcome of Respondent's investigation. Respondent was to make his daily reports by telephone to Ms. Dillingham's home or office. Ms. Dillingham gave Respondent some pictures of her husband and his alleged boyfriend along with the tag numbers for their automobiles. She also gave Respondent a retainer in the amount of $1,500. She agreed to pay Respondent and/or his employees $40 per hour. Respondent immediately began his surveillance of Mr. Dillingham's residence on May 26, 1994. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent worked alone and did not engage any employee or other investigator to assist him with the investigation. On May 27, 1994, Respondent continued his surveillance of Mr. Dillingham's apartment and made spot checks at the home of the alleged boyfriend who lived in a different part of town. The surveillance revealed no contact between the two subjects. Respondent did not attempt to make his daily report to Ms. Dillingham. On May 28, 1994, Respondent conducted surveillance of the subjects' residences, first one and then the other, until 4:00 p.m. At that time, Respondent went to the library branch where the support group was scheduled to meet. He had been unable to arrange for his employee to infiltrate the meeting. Instead, Respondent sat outside the door of the meeting where he could hear the group planning a Memorial Day picnic. He was able to record the tag numbers of some of the men attending the meeting. Neither of the subjects attended the support group meeting. After the meeting, Respondent resumed his surveillance at the residences of Mr. Dillingham and the alleged boyfriend. They did not have any contact with each other. Again, Respondent did not attempt to contact his client to make his daily report. The next day was Sunday, May 29, 1994. Once again Respondent's surveillance of the subjects' residences was not fruitful. Respondent contacted his client, Ms. Dillingham, who directed him not to begin surveillance of the husband until after noon the next day. Ms. Dillingham did not want Respondent to conduct surveillance on the morning of May 30, 1994, because her husband would have visitation with their son during that time. Monday, May 30, 1994, was Memorial Day. Respondent's surveillance from 1:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. did not reveal any contact between the subjects. However, Respondent made his daily report to his client. Ms. Dillingham informed Respondent that she was attempting to serve her husband's male friends with subpoenas for deposition. She told Respondent that once "the cat was out of the bag," continued surveillance probably would not be useful. On May 31, 1994, Respondent was unable to locate the vehicle of the client's husband at home or at work. Spot checks throughout the day revealed no activity between the subjects. When Respondent made his daily report, Ms. Dillingham told him that depositions of her husband's friends would take place on June 2, 1994, and mediation on June 3, 1994. After this conversation, Respondent understood that the surveillance part of the investigation was complete. Ms. Dillingham's husband had visitation with their son on Wednesday evening, June 2, 1994, and on the weekend from Friday, June 3, 1994, through Sunday, June 5, 1994. Ms. Dillingham did not want surveillance conducted during visitation periods. Ms. Dillingham and her sister, Karlene Goller, tried to reach Respondent by phone several times everyday from June 1, 1994, through June 4, 1994. They were not successful. On Sunday, June 5, 1994, Respondent returned one of Ms. Dillingham's calls and agreed to meet her at her office. During the meeting, Respondent returned the photographs of Ms. Dillingham's husband and his alleged boyfriend. He also gave her the tag numbers of some of the men who attended the support group meeting at the public library. Ms. Dillingham was dissatisfied with the results of Respondent's investigation because it had not produced any evidence of her husband's homosexuality. Respondent informed Ms. Dillingham that he had worked for 60 hours on the case. Ms. Dillingham was so upset that Respondent agreed to continue the investigation without charging her for his time in excess of the $1,500 retainer. Respondent said he would visit some gay bars to determine whether anyone knew Mr. Dillingham. Respondent told Ms. Dillingham that he might have to pay someone at the gay bars to contact him if they saw Mr. Dillingham at a bar. On Monday, June 6, 1994, Respondent went to some gay bars. At a bar known as the Metro, Respondent made contact with a bartender/security man, Bruce Long, who knew most of the gay men in town. However, Mr. Long did not know Mr. Dillingham by name and verbal description. Respondent gave $50 dollars to Mr. Long and promised to furnish him with a photograph of Mr. Dillingham. In exchange for the money, Mr. Long agreed to call Respondent if he saw Mr. Dillingham. Around 11:00 p.m. on June 6, 1994, Respondent met with Ms. Dillingham and her sister at a Waffle House on Roosevelt Boulevard. She gave a photograph of Mr. Dillingham to Respondent to show to Mr. Long at the Metro. Later that night, Respondent returned to the Metro. He gave the photograph of Mr. Dillingham to Mr. Long who agreed to show it around to friends and bartenders at other gay clubs. June 7, 1994, was the date of the final hearing in Ms. Dillingham's divorce and custody proceeding. After checking with Mr. Long to find out if any of his gay friends knew Mr. Dillingham, Respondent beeped Ms. Dillingham indicating that he had no new information. Ms. Dillingham never saw Respondent's investigative report marked as Petitioner's Exhibit One (1) until an investigator from Petitioner's office showed it to her. She never received an itemized statement or bill indicating how Respondent spent her retainer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order reprimanding Respondent, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250 and placing the licensee on probation for a period of time and subject to such conditions as the department may specify. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of February 1996. SUZANNE HOOD, HEARING OFFICER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in Findings of Fact 1. Accepted in Findings of Fact 2. Accepted in Findings of Fact 3 except for last sentence in 3(a) of the Proposed Facts which is rejected. No persuasive evidence that Respondent and his client discussed the need to make inquiries at gay bars during the initial meeting. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5. Accepted in Findings of Fact 7. Rejected as contrary to greater weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to greater weight of evidence. Accepted in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. Accepted in Findings of Fact 16. Accepted as restated in Findings of Fact 10 and 16-17. Accept in Findings of Fact 17 that Respondent agreed to visit some gay bars but reject that Respondent offered to buy testimony. Accepted in Findings of Fact 18. Accepted in Findings of Fact 18-20. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted but subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry H. Wells Attorney at Law 8015 Tara Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Florida Laws (3) 120.57493.6118493.6121
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE, INC., AND CARL J. CLAUSEN, 94-000853 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Chattahoochee, Florida Feb. 18, 1994 Number: 94-000853 Latest Update: Feb. 03, 1995

Findings Of Fact In 1993, Respondent Carl Clausen, along with some acquaintences, was interested in opening a private investigative business or becoming associated with a private investigative agency. Mr. Clausen had an extensive background in police investigative and security work and was well qualified to be licensed as a private investigator. In pursuit of getting into the business of private investigations, Mr. Clausen attended a business recruiting meeting held by a private investigative company on March 19, 1993. Ms. Bronson, owner of Prosearch International, then the holder of a valid Class A Private Investigative Agency license, also attended the meeting where she met Respondent. After the meeting, Ms. Bronson and Respondent discussed various ways he might became associated with her investigative agency in order to expand the services Prosearch could offer potential clients. These discussions included buying part or all of Prosearch. At some point after the recruiting meeting, Ms. Gentry, a local attorney in Tallahassee, Florida, was appointed to represent a man accused of murder in Quincy, Gadsden County, Florida. Ms. Gentry felt the defense team needed an experienced investigator who could effectively work within a predominately minority community in Quincy. Ms. Gentry contacted Ed Rawls about possibly working the case. However, Mr. Rawls was a reserve Gadsden County Sheriff's Deputy, and had an obvious conflict in investigating the case for Ms. Gentry. Mr. Rawls recommended Mr. Clausen as a potential investigator. Ms. Gentry called Mr. Clausen on March 24, 1993, and requested that he come the next day for an interview. On March 25, 1993, Mr. Clausen asked Ms. Bronson to meet him for lunch to discuss her employing him as an intern private investigator. An intern private investigator holds a Class "CC" license once the sponsorship becomes effective. Eventually, the intern can obtain a Class "C" investigative license. Mr. Clausen and Ms. Bronson met for lunch and Ms. Bronson agreed to sponsor Mr. Clausen. Mr. Clausen also told Ms. Bronson about his scheduled meeting with Ms. Gentry. Soon after the meeting, Ms. Bronson left town to take care of some personal matters. After lunch, Mr. Clausen went directly to Ms. Gentry's office for the meeting she had scheduled. Ms. Gentry interviewed Respondent to determine whether he had the experience and ability to perform the investigation she felt was necessary to prepare for her client's murder trial. Ms. Gentry discussed some general details of the case with Respondent in order to more fully assess Respondent's abilities to investigate her case should the Respondent become licensed as an investigator. Respondent did not receive the case file from Ms. Gentry, nor did Respondent receive information such as addresses which would have enabled him to begin an investigation. Ms. Gentry felt that Mr. Clausen was very well qualified. At the initial meeting Respondent made it very clear to Ms. Gentry that he would not begin any investigation until he was properly licensed or could conduct the investigation under one of the exemption categories in Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, such as an employee for an attorney. Mr. Clausen also told Ms. Gentry he was not at present in business as a private investigator, but that he wanted to be and was working on the prospect. However, Ms. Gentry did not want to deal with the paperwork or potential liability of an employment relationship with Mr. Clausen. Therefore, Mr. Clausen needed to become licensed as quickly as possible so that the investigation could begin. Respondent and Ms. Gentry met again on March 30, 1993. However, the meeting contered on the quickest way Respondent could become licensed as an investigator. Mr. Clausen also told Ms. Gentry that his license would most likely be in order April 2, 1993, when Ms. Bronson, through Prosearch, would return to formalize his application at the Department of State for the internship. In short, Mr. Clausen would have a Class "CC" license. Prior to licensure as a Class "C" or "CC" licensee, Respondent did not advertise or solicit any investigative business on his behalf. Respondent only participated in an employment interview for future employment after he was licensed and discussed various methods of becoming legally able to pursue Ms. Gentry's case. Likewise no investigation was begun prior to his licensure. On April 2, 1993, Ms. Bronson filed Respondent's sponsorship papers and Respondent filed an application for a Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern license issued under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Because of the sponsorship, Respondent was employed by Prosearch International, a Class "A" private investigative agency, under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Ms. Bronson furnished Mr. Clausen with letters of introduction and appointment as her investigator. These letters were given to Ms. Gentry and a contract for services was entered into. On April 6, 1993, Ms. Gentry met with Mr. Clausen at her office where he was furnished with names, addresses, physical evidence and access to Ms. Gentry's case file. The case file contained police reports and probable cause affidavits on the case. Ms. Gentry requested Mr. Clausen to proceed immediately with the investigation. Mr. Clausen began the investigation on the morning of April 7, 1993, by interviewing the defendant in jail. Around April 21, 1993, Prosearch presented its first invoice for services to Ms. Gentry. The invoice contained charges for Mr. Clausen's meetings on March 25 and 30, 1993. However, the charges were not for investigative services. Ms. Gentry felt it was appropriate for Prosearch to bill for those hours even though she was aware no investigative work had begun and she had no contract with Respondent or Prosearch until April 6, 1993. Thereafter, Gadsden County paid the first invoice to ProSearch. Aroung May 7, 1993, ProSearch submitted a second invoice to Ms. Gentry. The investigation and report were completed and delivered by Ms. Bronson to Ms. Gentry's office around June 22, 1993. Both Ms. Gentry and Ms. Bronson praised Mr. Clausen's investigation and report as excellent. From March 25, 1993, to July 3 or 4, 1993, discussions between Mr. Clausen and Ms. Bronson regarding the future organization and market strategy for ProSearch or another business occurred almost daily. At the July meeting it became clear that Ms. Bronson had decided to associate with two others and gave Mr. Clausen a ProSearch check for his commission on the first invoice. On July 6, 1993, Ms. Bronson sent letters firing Mr. Clausen and notifying the Division that she would no longer sponsor Mr. Clausen. However, there was still billable time for investigative services outstanding for the investigation for Ms. Gentry. Additionally, Mr. Clausen was due his commission for those hours. Ms. Bronson said she had no money to pay wages or workman's compensation and therefore did not have funds to pay Mr. Clausen's his commission or expenses. Anxious to resolve the situation and not having contact with Ms. Bronson, Mr. Clausen submitted a final invoice on Specialty Security Services, Inc., letterhead to Gadsden County. The invoice referenced the first and second ProSearch invoices, showing the first invoice as paid and the second invoice as unpaid. The Gadsden County Commission approved and paid the invoice. Mr. Clausen used Special Security Services, Inc., letterhead because his word processor is programmed to always include the "Special Security Services, Inc." (SSS) letterhead. Otherwise, Special Security Services, had no role in this matter and should be dismissed as a party. Further, none of Mr. Clausen's activities violates Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the administrative complaint against Respondent should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not violated Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 1C-3.122(2), Florida Administrative Code, and that the petition be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 94-0853 The facts contained in paragraphs 4 and 6 of Petitioner's Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The statements contained in paragraphs 1, 5 and 7 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were subordinate. The statement contained in paragraph 3, of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraphs 3, and 4 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are either introductory or conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 John Wardlow Attorney at Law Post Office Box 84 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68493.6101493.6106493.6116493.6118493.6201
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PHILLIP J. STODDARD vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, 00-004199RU (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 10, 2000 Number: 00-004199RU Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2000

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's rule challenge petition should be dismissed for failure to present issues that meet the requirements of Sections 120.56(1), 120.56(3), and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, and if so, whether Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Sections 120.569(2)(e), 120.595(3), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for a Class "C" private investigator license on or about May 15, 2000. By letter dated September 5, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application for a Class "C" license as a private investigator was denied. The letter stated as follows in relevant part: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6203, Florida Statutes. You have not demonstrated the necessary lawfully gained, verifiable, full-time experience or appropriate training. Your application is therefore being denied. Petitioner filed a request for an administrative hearing with Respondent on or about September 13, 2000. He filed an amended request for hearing with Respondent on or about September 15, 2000. On September 27, 2000, Respondent issued an Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend. This order referenced Rule 28-106.201(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that Petitioner's hearing request was substantially deficient because it did not contain the following: An explanation of how the petitioner's substantial interest will be affected by the agency determination; A statement of disputed issues of material fact. The Petitioner has not disputed the material facts at issue in this case; which is whether the Petitioner provided the Division with information which the Division could then verify. Verification is achieved by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work. Petitioner provided information concerning former employers in the Affidavit of Experience section of the application. After submitting the application, Petitioner submitted an affidavit from an investigator, however that investigator was not Petitioner's employer and therefore not in the position to verify Petitioner's experience. For the first time, in Petitioner's requests for a hearing, Petitioner submits information concerning a former career in executive recruiting consisting of an affidavit, notarized in Maryland, of a former co- worker. This information was never provided to the Division and is not listed anywhere on the application submitted by Petitioner nor is there any way to verify any of the information in that affidavit as the affiant's address and telephone number are not provided. In his petitions for hearing Petitioner has raised only legal issues which are not legally the forum of a formal administrative hearing. Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes . . . . A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; A statement of the specific rules or statutes the petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action . . . . (Emphasis added) Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend also determined that: (a) Petitioner's hearing requests improperly mixed rule validity challenge arguments for Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, proceedings with disputed material fact arguments for proceedings under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes; (b) Petitioner's argument that his Juris Doctorate training and related legal work experience met the statutory requirements of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes, was a statutory construction/legal argument presented in the guise of factual issues; (c) The Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity arguments in a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding; and (d) Petitioner's argument that he is entitled to licensure by default due to the failure of the agency to meet the 90-day time requirement of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, is a legal issue in light of the tolling provision of Section 493.6108, Florida Statutes. In a footnote to the Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, Respondent referred to two documents that Respondent attached as a courtesy to Petitioner. The first document was Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50. This letter responded to a specific inquiry, determining that an attorney, who was not a member of the Florida Bar and who wanted to perform sub-contract investigative work for a licensed private investigation agency, was not exempt under Section 493.6102(6), Florida Statutes, from having to separately qualify for "C" licensure requirements. The second document was Respondent's internal memorandum, identified herein as Opinion No. 92-4. This memorandum determined that legal training and work experience of attorneys do not automatically qualify them for a Class "C" license. Instead, each application should be considered on a case-by-case basis. On October 10, 2000, Petitioner filed his Request for Formal Administrative Hearing, citing Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, as authority to challenge certain of Respondent's rules and statements defined as rules. Petitioner claims that Respondent routinely applies heightened scrutiny to applications submitted by attorneys, persons who are qualified to be attorneys, or others who have research and investigative skills but no actual police or criminal justice experience. Petitioner's hearing request first argues that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, together with its attachments, all of which are referenced above, set forth policies having the effect of rules. In Petitioner's "First Rule Challenge," he argues that Respondent's interpretation of the time limitations for processing license applications in Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, together with Respondent's interpretation of the tolling provisions of Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, constitute a rule. Petitioner concludes that Respondent is without delegated legislative authority to extend the 90-day application processing time of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, unless Respondent does not receive the fingerprint investigation report required by Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, prior to the expiration of the 90-day processing period. Petitioner's "Second Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4, a memorandum dated January 23, 1992, constitutes a rule because: (a) Respondent uses the opinion to define the "practice of law"; and (b) Respondent relies on the opinion in refusing to recognize experience gained by lawyers in the practice of their profession unless the lawyer was engaged in "full-time investigative work." However, Respondent concludes by acknowledging that the opinion recommends a case-by-case analysis of each attorney's application to determine whether the attorney has the experience and training required by Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's "Third Rule Challenge" also argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4 constitutes a rule. According to Petitioner, Respondent relies on the opinion to find that an attorney, even if a member of the Florida Bar, lacks creditable "college coursework related to criminal justice, criminology, or law enforcement administration." See Section 493.6203(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner concludes that Respondent does not have authority to interpret the meaning of the statutory term, "related to," so narrowly. Petitioner's hearing request did not include a "Fourth Rule Challenge." Petitioner's "Fifth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50, dated October 20, 1992, is an unpromulgated rule. Petitioner claims that Respondent relies on this opinion to set broad policy concerning the agency's treatment of the experience and educational qualification of unlicensed attorneys. Petitioner states that the opinion infringes on the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Bar. Petitioner asserts that he is substantially affected because he is an unlicensed attorney. Petitioner's "Sixth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend is an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioner claims Respondent created a rule by refusing to credit applicants with work experience that is not "verifiable by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work." According to Petitioner, Respondent has no authority to establish such an agency specific meaning of the common term, "verifiable experience." Petitioner's "Seventh Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent has adopted a special meaning for the term "private investigation" which contravenes the statute. Petitioner takes issue with Respondent's interpretation of "private investigation" as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner also challenges Respondent's interpretation of the experience requirement of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has withdrawn his "Eighth Rule challenge" regarding the validity of Rule 1C-3.100(3)(a), Florida Administrative.

Florida Laws (16) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.573120.574120.595120.60120.68493.6101493.6102493.6105493.6108493.6109493.6203 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.201
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