Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having license ME 0036704. He is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He has had no prior complaints of any kind against him since he began practicing medicine in Florida in 1980, and he has a reputation for being a competent and caring physician. On the morning of August 1, 1988, while making rounds at Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, the Respondent was paged by one of his partners, Belur Sreenath, M.D. The Respondent returned the call and was asked to see a patient whom Sreenath had just accepted and admitted on a 23-hour basis at Morton Plant. Sreenath reported that the patient was a referral from the Morton Plant emergency room. The patient's regular physician was on vacation, and the regular physician's on-call cover had recommended to the emergency room physician that the patient be referred to the Respondent and Sreenath to treat the patient for diagnosed fecal impaction. It was reported to the Respondent, through Sreenath, that the patient had come into the emergency room at about five in the morning complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The emergency room physician, Jerry Julius Chase, M.D., had three X-rays done and had done his own "wet reads" of the X-rays before sending them to the radiology department for a definitive interpretation. According to Chase, the X-rays showed "much fecal matter, no obstruction." Chase did not mention any other significant findings. Chase's preliminary diagnosis was "fecal impaction." Sreenath also reported that he (Sreenath) had ordered enemas for the patient. Soon after the Respondent received the call from his partner, the Respondent called Chase, who was still in the emergency room and still had the X-rays. Chase confirmed what Sreenath had told the Respondent, again not mentioning any other significant findings. After talking to Chase, the Respondent visited the patient in his hospital room. By this time it was about 10:00 a.m. The Respondent took a history from the patient, examined the patient, and read the patient's chart. The chart included the results of lab work and the "ER sheet," which included the emergency room physician's diagnosis of abdominal pain and impaction and the results of his "wet-read" of the X-rays, but it did not yet include a report from the radiology department or the X-rays themselves. The Respondent did not contact the radiology department for a definitive interpretation of the X-rays or obtain the X-rays for his own review. By the time the Respondent saw the patient, the patient already had one enema and seemed to be responding to the treatment. Based on the information he had, the Respondent made a diagnosis of fecal impaction, confirmed his partner's orders for enemas for the patient, and added a stool softener. The nursing staff was ordered to monitor the patient's progress. The patient continued to respond satisfactorily to treatment during the day. Between ten and eleven in the evening of August 1, 1988, the patient complained of some abdominal pain or cramping (symptoms that are consistent with a diagnosis of fecal impaction and enema treatments) and the nurses on duty contacted the Respondent's partner, who was on call. Sreenath ordered a combination of demerol and vistaril as an analgesic. One small dose was enough to relieve the patient's pain, and the patient slept through most of the night. He ate 80% of his breakfast the next morning and was not complaining of pain or asking to see a doctor. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on August 2, 1988, a nurse telephoned the Respondent for a decision whether the patient was being discharged or was being admitted as an inpatient. The Respondent still had not seen the patient's X- rays, seen or had reported to him the radiology report on them, or spoken to the radiologist. On questioning, the nurse reported the patient's status to the Respondent. The nurse's report satisfied the Respondent that the patient was responding to the treatment for fecal impaction and could be discharged. The nurse was given orders to have arrangements made for the patient to see his regular physician within a week and to instruct the patient on symptoms to report if they occurred between discharge and seeing his regular physician. In accordance with the Respondent's telephone instructions, the patient was discharged at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 2, 1988. Although there were no clinical signs or symptoms of it during the patient's stay at Morton Plant, the patient had a large aortic aneurysm, approximately eight centimeters in diameter, in his abdomen just below the renal arteries. The aneurysm was readily apparent on the X-rays, yet Chase did not report it to either the Respondent or to his partner, Sreenath. The radiologist either did not contact Dr. Chase to point out to him that the report of Chases's "wet read" of the X-rays omitted the aneurysm or, if he did, Chase did not relay this information to the Respondent or his partner. The radiologist's written report, stating that the X-rays revealed the large aneurysm, was sent to Chase, not to the Respondent, and Chase did not relay the information in it to the Respondent or his partner. If the Respondent had known about the aneurysm, he would have considered the aneurysm to be the patient's most serious medical concern. He might not have accepted the patient or, if he did, he probably would have brought a vascular surgeon into the case and had the vascular surgeon, or perhaps a cardiologist, closely monitor the patient for possible leaking or dissecting or rupture of the aneurysm. The Respondent also would have had to give consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain. In addition to treating the aneurysm as the patient's most serious medical concern, giving consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain, the Respondent would have had to give consideration to altering his diagnosis for the patient had he reviewed the X-rays or the radiologist report, or had spoken with the radiologist. In addition to showing the existence of the aneurysm, the X-rays indicated that the patient technically may not have been impacted. (The gas pattern was non-specific.) With respect to this patient, the Respondent practiced medicine below that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physicians as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (below the standard of care) in that he did not either personally review the X-rays on the patient, read or have reported to him the contents of the radiologist's report, or talk to the radiologist. Instead, he relied totally on the emergency room physician's "wet read." As a result, the Respondent's diagnosis of "fecal impaction" may not have been correct, and he did not give proper consideration to the aneurysm. However, except for the failure regarding the X-rays, the DPR otherwise did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent, who was treating the patient for fecal impaction, to discharge the patient without seeing him on the morning of August 2, 1988, based on the nurse's report to the Respondent. Although it was below the standard of care for the Respondent not to either read the X-rays himself or obtain the radiologist's definitive interpretation, it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the emergency room physician would have told him, and noted in the "ER sheet," that the patient he was being referred had an aneurysm of the kind and size of the one the patient had in this case. Even if the emergency doctor had not initially communicated to the Respondent the existence of the aneurysm, either directly or through the "ER sheet," it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that, in the normal course, the radiologist reviewing the X-rays would have noted that, according to the "ER sheet," the ER doctor "missed" the aneurysm and would have contacted the ER physician to bring this to his attention, and that the ER doctor then would have contacted the Respondent to advise him of the omission. The patient did not experience abdominal pain after his discharge from Morton Plant, but he began to experience back and groin pain. The aneurysm was becoming symptomatic. The patient's symptoms markedly worsened in the early morning hours of August 4, 1988. The patient's wife had him taken to the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital at approximately half past midnight. The patient was confused, and was complaining of pain in the back and groin area. His blood sugars were three times normal. He was diagnosed preliminarily in the emergency room as having out-of-control diabetes and confusion and as being near sycope. No X-rays were taken in the emergency room at New Port Richey Hospital, and no information was obtained from Morton Plant Hospital. Because the patient and his wife did not know about the aneurysm, they were unable to report it when the emergency room physician took the patient's history. The patient was admitted to New Port Richey Hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1988. However, the admitting physician did not see the patient or order diagnostic medical imaging at that time. The admitting physician saw the patient at approximately 9:00 a.m., and ordered X-rays and a CAT scan. Before the X-rays or CT scan were taken, at approximately ten o'clock, the patient suffered an acute hypotensive event while in his hospital room. An emergency abdominal sonogram was ordered, and it was determined that the patient was suffering from the rupture of the abdominal aortic aneurysm (the same one that was evident on the X-rays taken at Morton Plant). Surgery was attempted to resect the ruptured aneurysm. The patient was a poor candidate for surgery of that kind due to his age and other health factors. The patient died on August 6, 1988. If the patient knew of the aneurysm, it is likely that his treatment on August 4, 1988, would have been far different. First, when the aneurysm became symptomatic, they probably would have contacted the vascular surgeon, who would have been on the case already, either immediately or on arrival at the emergency room. The aneurysm would have been closely monitored from the time of arrival at the hospital, and the vascular surgeon would have been prepared for surgery when indicated. 2/ At the very least, the patient and his wife probably would have reported the aneurysm during the taking of a history in the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital, and the emergency room surgeon could have immediately taken appropriate steps, such as contacting a vascular surgeon and immediately ordering appropriate diagnostic medical imaging. 3/ The Respondent did not dictate admission notes for the patient until August 17, 1988. The Respondent did not dictate discharge notes. The DPR did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent to delay the dictation of admission notes or for him not to prepare a discharge summary for a patient in the hospital on a 23-hour basis. The DPR also did not prove that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., guilty of one count of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), but dismissing the other count of the Administrative Complaint; reprimanding him; and (3) fining him $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1992.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Daniel Francis Sanchez was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners having been issued license number ME0038795. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was Regional Medical Director of IMC which operated HMO offices in Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency room at Metropolitan General Hospital. He was checked and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. The ambulance with EMS personnel arrived and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when taken to the emergency room and they refused to transport him again to the hospital. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to the place where Stroganow lived. She was let in by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not carry on a conversation to find out what condition he was in. She called for a Cares Unit to come and evaluate the client. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as a stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her determination on visual examination only. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit both members felt Stroganow needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady showed his income to be over the maximum for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold- Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement for Stroganow at the time because he was not ambulatory but felt he needed to be placed where he could be attended to and not left alone over the coming weekend. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, the Assistant Medical Director for IMC in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic and by EMS personnel. There were two and sometimes three doctors who treated patients at this clinic and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor, he was treated by the first doctor available. Stroganow had not specifically requested he be treated by Dr. Dayton. When the Cares team met with Dr. Dayton they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the night before but did not advise Dayton that the EMS team had refused to transport Stroganow to the hospital emergency room a second time the previous evening. Dayton telephoned the emergency room at Metropolitan General to ascertain the medical condition of Stroganow when brought in the evening before. With the information provided by the Cares team and the hospital, Dayton concluded that Stroganow should be given a medical evaluation and the quickest way for that to occur was to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency room for evaluation. When the Cares team arrived, Dayton was treating patients at the clinic. A doctor's office, or clinic, is not a desirable place to have an incontinent, incoherent, non- ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to do certain procedures frequently needed in diagnosing the illness and determining treatment needed for an acutely ill patient. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call to 911 for emergency medical assistance and it was necessary for someone to be with Stroganow with the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Dayton suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 for assistance in obtaining a medical evaluation of Stroganow. If called from the HMO office, the EMS squad would have arrived long before the Cares team could have gotten back to Stroganow. Dr. Dayton did not have admitting privileges at any hospital in Pinellas County at this time. Upon leaving the South Pasadena HMO clinic, the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute, they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus patients had an emergency situation. Respondent, Dr. Sanchez, called and advised that Dr. Dayton would take care of the problem. Later, around 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived, the Cares team called 911 from a telephone a block away from Stroganow's residence and arrived back just before the emergency squad. The EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room and this information was passed back to Sanchez who directed that Stroganow be taken to Lake Seminole Hospital. This was the first time either Dayton or Sanchez was aware that the EMS squad had refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room. Although Sanchez did not have admitting privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had a contractual agreement with Lake Seminole which provided that certain staff doctors at Lake Seminole would admit patients referred to Lake Seminole by IMC. Pursuant to this contractual arrangement, Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital where he was treated for his injuries and evaluated for his future medical needs.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly cited Petitioner for violating Section 400.0225(11), Florida Statutes, by taking a resident to the emergency room for a mental health evaluation without complying with the requirements outlined in Section 394.463, Florida Statutes, for an involuntary examination.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for licensing and regulating nursing home facilities under Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a nursing home facility in Baker County, Florida. Petitioner is located in the same building as Ed Fraser Memorial Hospital (Ed Fraser). The distance from Petitioner to Ed Fraser's emergency room is approximately 300 feet. Petitioner and Ed Fraser have separate licenses. However, they are operated by the same parent organization. At all times material here, Resident E. E. was one of Petitioner's residents. Resident E. E. had a history of psychological problems but did not require psychiatric inpatient care. Resident E. E. was well enough to be a resident at the nursing home under the care of her attending physician and Petitioner's Medical Director, Angelito Tecson, M.D. Resident E. E., at 72 years-of-age, suffered from Alzheimer's and chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. Her medications included Fosamax, eye drops, Seroquel, Zoloft, Risperdal, and Namenda. Resident E. E. received treatment from a consulting psychiatrist for her psychiatric condition. Her psychiatrist usually visited the nursing home once a month. The psychiatrist lived in Jacksonville. Dr. Tecson is a family practitioner who maintains an office in Baker County, Florida. Because he lives in Jacksonville, Florida, Dr. Tecson usually is not at his office after 5:00 p.m. Around the first of August 2006, Resident E. E. began to exhibit troublesome behaviors that did not respond to redirection or a change in medication. On August 14, 2006, after 5:00 p.m., Resident's E. E.'s escalating behaviors included the following: (a) trying to eat food out of the garbage can; (b) taking her clothes off; (c) taking soiled laundry out of the basket; (d) drinking coffee creamer; and (e) hitting Petitioner's Director of Nursing, Phyllis Rhoden, R.N., who was trying to redirect her. Ms. Rhoden knew Resident E. E. was being treated for a urinary tract infection (UTI) and was concerned that the medicine was not controlling the infection. Ms. Rhoden was aware that a UTI can do "really wicked things" to elderly people such as causing mental status changes. Petitioner usually tested for and treated UTIs in the nursing home. However, Ms. Rhoden did not initiate any procedure in the nursing home to determine whether Resident E. E. continued to suffer from a UTI. Instead, Ms. Rhoden directed one her nurses, Samantha Godwin, L.P.N., to call Dr. Tecson on the telephone. Ms. Godwin told Dr. Tecson that Resident E. E. was combative and creating concerns about her own safety and the safety of others. Dr. Tecson gave Ms. Godwin a verbal order to transfer Resident E. E. to Ed Fraser's emergency room for a mental evaluation. On August 14, 2006, at 5:30 p.m., Ms. Godwin wrote and initialed the following physician's order in Resident E. E.'s medical chart: "Send to ER for mental eval., V. O. Dr. Tecson." Dr. Tecson initialed the order on August 30, 2006. Petitioner had a part-time social worker, Rosa Williams, who happened to be at the nursing home. Ms. Williams witnessed Resident E. E.'s behavior. Ms. Rhoden and Ms. Williams walked Resident E. E. down the hall to the emergency room. Ms. Williams stayed with Resident E. E. and Ms. Rhoden returned to the nursing home. Petitioner's staff did not follow the procedure set forth in Section 394.463, Florida Statutes, before involuntarily transferring Resident E. E. to the emergency room for a mental evaluation. Petitioner's staff transferred Resident E. E. without a certificate from a designated professional, without an ex-parte order, and/or without law enforcement involvement. The emergency room medical records indicate that Resident E. E.'s major complaint was an "altered mental status." The diagnosis was "decompensated schizophrenia." The emergency room medical records do not refer to any other medical problem being evaluated and/or ruled out. The emergency room doctor called for an emergency screening assessment by an evaluator from the Northeast Florida State Hospital (NEFSH) Community Behavioral Healthcare Services. The evaluation resulted in a disposition plan that called for stabilization and admittance to the least restrictive facility. A deputy sheriff transported Resident E. E. from the emergency room to the NEFSH Receiving Facility on August 14, 2006, sometime after 8:30 p.m. She was subsequently admitted to that facility. On August 14, 2006, at 8:40 p.m., Dr. Tecson gave Ms. Godwin another verbal order over the telephone. The order was to transfer Resident E. E. to NEFSH. Dr. Tecson initialed the order in Resident E. E.'s medical chart on August 30, 2006. Resident E. E.'s medical record contains two nursing progress notes for August 14, 2006. The first one states that Resident E. E. was sent to the emergency room for a mental evaluation. The second one states that Resident E. E. was sent to NEFSH for treatment of mental status. Ms. Williams, the social worker, also made the following notation in Resident E. E.'s medical record on August 14, 2006: It was reported upon this S.W.'s arrival that resident's behavior is getting progressively worse by the day. On today she attempted to leave the facility and staff tried to re-direct her but she struck the person. She continues to come out of her room nude and when she is not totally nude, she pulls her dress up to show that there is no underwear. She also became aggressive (physically) with the ladies who deliver the [washed] clothes to the nursing home. She wanted to take all of the clothes and began hitting them when they refused to give them to her. She cursed them, which is totally out of character for her. At this point it was felt that resident now needs to be evaluated by the local mental health CSU. The resident has been evaluated by her attending psychiatrist on 8/8/06, but there has been very little improvement. In fact, there has been no improvement and resident's condition continues to get worse. Also, from reviewing her records, the resident appears to have been decompensating since May 2006. In addition to above stated inappropriate behaviors, the resident has been refusing her medication or was observed spitting them out. This S.W. called the local mental health office and requested assistance from the emergency service department by dialing two numbers. A response was not received, but in the message on voice mail it was stated that if someone needed their emergency services they should go to the jail or nearest ER (emergency room of a hospital). This resident was taken to ER at Fraser Hospital, evaluated by doctor on duty, an MH evaluator was called and later responded to the call. It was decided by the MH evaluator that residential treatment was needed. The resident was transported to Northeast Florida State Hospital by the Sheriff Dept. Upon arriving, she was accepted, bathed, and hopefully given something to eat. The resident should remain at NEFSH for at least 3 days for an evaluation. Hopefully, after being evaluated, she may be able to return back to the nursing home. If not stable in three days, NEFSH should consider long term treatment at their facility. It should be noted that this resident has a long psychiatric history. She resided at NEFSH for four years and G. Pierce Woods for almost eight years. Her first hospitalization occurred at the age of 14. This S.W. will continue to check on resident's status. In a memorandum dated August 15, 2006, Kevin D. Harris, Petitioner's Administrator, stated as follows: Approximately @ 1:50 p.m., I refused the readmission of [Resident E. E.]. This refusal was based on the recommendation of the Medical Director, Dr. Angelito Tecson, the Director of Nursing, Phyllis Rhoden, R.N., and Rosa Williams, Social Worker. [Resident E. E.] was transported here via Century ambulance without a 300B transfer sheet. Prior to this onsite refusal of readmission, the readmission was denied by Phyllis Rhoden, R.N., to NEFSH discharge personnel. The readmission was refused due to the fact that [Resident E. E.] had been Baker Acted on the evening of August 14, 2006, by Ed Fraser Memorial Hospital Emergency Room physician. Her ER visit was precipitated by a mental status change whereby [Resident E. E.] was combative and a danger [to] staff, residents and perhaps herself. Readmission would be reconsidered, after appropriate stabilization of [Resident E. E.] on a medication protocol that is appropriate for her needs and can be regulated in a nursing home environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Petitioner violated Section 394.463(2), Florida Statutes, and confirming the imposition of the class- three citation. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura Beth Faragasso, Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Box 14079 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Richard Joseph Saliba, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Thomas W. Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's medical license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0027368. Respondent is board certified in family practice; however, he is not board certified in emergency medicine. On May 30, 1994, Dr. Dulay was on call in the hospital emergency room at Madison County Memorial Hospital (MCMH) in Madison, Florida. On May 30, 1994, Patient T.H. an obese, forty-eight year-old male was found unconscious on the floor of the bathroom by his brother, Wallace. T.H. had an arteriovenous malformation (AVM) in his brain. An AVM is a weakened area of a blood vessel which can fill with blood, expand and/or burst. AVMs located in the brain are very dangerous since a ruptured AVM can damage the brains tissue. The amount of damage depends on the amount and rapidity of the bleeding. Under any circumstances, a ruptured AVM is an emergency medical condition where time is of the essence in diagnosing and treating usually with some neurosurgical intervention. On May 30, 1994, at approximately 4:56 a.m., Carol Wells a Madison County 911 Operator received an emergency call regarding T.H. The call was originally received as a fall. An Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulance was dispatched to T.H.'s location in Cherry Lake Garden Trailer Park. An ALS unit is intended to be a mobile critical care unit, able to render critical care and stabilization to a patient enroute to an appropriate hospital. An Advanced Life Support unit contains equipment needed for insertion of a chest tube, a lab, and an x-ray, as well as equipment and medications for cardiac emergencies. The equipment and medications needed for T.H.'s case were present. The ALS unit arrived at T.H.'s location at 5:19 a.m. Jimmy Kent was an EMT and driver of the ALS unit that responded to the 911 emergency call on T.H. Richard Kline was the paramedic on the ambulance. Mr. Kline was trained in ALS care and could administer certain drugs, including Procardia without a physician's order. Paramedic Kline found patient T.H. on the floor of the trailer. He observed T.H. to be comatose, unresponsive to painful stimuli, and exhibiting snoring-type respirations. His skin was hot and dry, and his face was red. T.H. scored a three on the Glasgow Coma Scale, the lowest possible score. T.H.'s vital signs were blood pressure estimated at 300 plus over 150, respiratory rate of 40, heart rate "tacking" at approximately 170, with raspy breathing. T.H. was considered in critical condition. At the scene, Paramedic Kline was having problems with his cardiac monitor, which became non-functional due to battery problems. However, patient T.H. could still be adequately monitored manually. Additionally, within twenty-five minutes of beginning the run, the cardiac monitor on the ALS unit was non- functional due to failure of the primary and back-up batteries. The lack of the units equipment did not significantly impact the paramedic's ability to monitor or treat T.H.'s condition. Paramedic Kline was informed by T.H.'s family that he had a history of Arterial Venous Malformation, paralysis on the right side, and strokes. T.H.'s sister was called and she advised that T.H. not be brought to Madison County Memorial Hospital (MCMH) because they usually don't have a doctor available. She wanted T.H. to go to South Georgia Medical Center (SGMC) in Valdosta, Georgia. The paramedic thought that they needed to take T.H. to MCMH because of the serious vital statistics that T.H. had. The paramedic felt T.H. could go into cardiac arrest. After being advised by the paramedic that T.H. needed immediate assistance at MCMH, T.H.'s sister agreed to have T.H. taken to MCMH. There are two hospital emergency facilities to choose from when transporting an emergency case in the Madison, Florida, area, MCMH and SGMC. In driving terms MCMH is slightly, but not significantly, closer to Cherry Lake Garden Trailer Park than SGMC. However, the facilities are very different in the services each can offer in an emergency situation. MCMH is not a trauma center. MCMH does not have any neurosurgical facilities, neurosurgical consults, diagnostic MRI's, diagnostic CT scans, or cerebral monitoring equipment available. MCMH cannot treat a cerebral vascular accident or bleeding in the brain. On the other hand, SGMC is a tertiary care facility. It has neurosurgical facilities, neurosurgical consults, diagnostic CT scans, and cerebral monitoring equipment available. SGMC can treat a cerebral vascular accident and is the closest facility which can provide such care. The ambulance was en route to MCMH when it contacted the hospital by radio; Joanie Cruce, R.N., spoke to the ambulance driver over the radio. Paramedic Kline informed Nurse Cruce of T.H.'s history, including the presence of T.H.'s AVM and vital signs. He also informed Nurse Cruce that he was bringing the T.H. to MCMH. Nurse Cruce relayed T.H.'s information to Joe Jaime, R.N. Nurse Jaimie was on the telephone to Dr. Dulay who was in another room at the hospital. Nurse Jaimie relayed over the telephone to Dr. Dulay the information Nurse Cruce gave her. At no time did Dr. Dulay speak directly with the paramedic. Dr. Dulay was informed that the patient had high blood pressure, was unconscious, and had a history that included an arterial venous malformation. Due to the patient being unconscious, he suspected a cerebral vascular accident/stroke (CVA). At approximately 5:40 a.m., while en route to MCMH, the paramedic asked for advice on whether to administer Procardia. Procardia is used to reduce blood pressure. Respondent advised that it was appropriate to administer 10mg of Procardia. There was some uncertainty in the testimony as to whether the administration of Procardia was requested by the paramedic and approved by Dr. Dulay, or ordered by Dr. Dulay. Either person could have authorized the use of the drug. In any event, 10mg of Procardia was the appropriate medication for the patient's condition and met or exceeded the appropriate standard of care for an emergency room physician under the circumstances. At some point, Dr. Dulay advised the ambulance to have T.H. taken to the nearest appropriate facility. The ALS unit was one to two miles from MCMH when Joanie Cruce, R.N., advised the ambulance driver to take T.H. to the nearest appropriate facility. Either Nurse Cruce misspoke and said Tallahassee or Richard Kline misunderstood her to say Tallahassee. Richard Kline questioned the direction to take T.H. to Tallahassee. He told nurse Cruce that the family wanted T.H. to go to the hospital in Valdosta. The information was passed to Dr. Dulay. He agreed that SGMC was an appropriate facility for T.H. and in fact SGMC was the closest appropriate facility for T.H.'s condition. Dr. Dulay never informed the nursing staff that T.H. could not be brought to MCMH and indeed the nurses thought that the ambulance was on its way even after the conversation about Valdosta. Patient T.H. was not in respiratory or cardiac arrest at the time the ambulance was turned around to go to Valdosta. After the change of direction, which is always within the discretion of the ambulance crew, there was no further contact with MCMH. Therefore Dr. Dulay was never informed of the results of the Procardia. Additionally, T.H. was never admitted to MCMH and never became a patient of Dr. Dulay or the hospital. Therefore, since T.H. was not a patient of the hospital no transfer from one facility to another facility occurred. While en route to SGMC, the ambulance contacted SGMC's emergency room. The staff advised the paramedic to give T.H. sodium nitroprusside. However, the ambulance did not carry sodium nitroprusside. Instead the paramedic was advised by SGMC staff to administer Lasix IV and nitroglycerine. Patient T.H. suffered respiratory arrest just outside the city limits of Valdosta. Efforts to intubate and revive him were unsuccessful. Patient T.H. arrived at SGMC in full arrest. The ambulance arrived at SGMC at 6:25 a.m. Attempts to revive the patient at the hospital were unsuccessful. T.H. was pronounced deceased shortly after his arrival at SGMC. T.H.'s cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest with an underlying cause of intracranial hemorrhage, probably due to an aneurysm. In short, all of T.H.'s symptoms were caused by a rapidly expanding and bleeding cerebral vascular incident from his AVM. T.H.'s condition was not due to a cardiac problem. The medical condition of T.H. at the time he was transported by Madison County ALS was indicative of an intracranial hemorrhage. Such a condition could only be evaluated for surgical treatment through the utilization of an MRI and CT scan, and required the immediate consultation of a neurosurgeon. None of which were available at MCMH. Moreover, it would generally be preferable to transport a patient with a score of three on the Glasgow Coma Scale to a trauma center. SGMC was the closet facility to Cherry Lake at which a neurosurgical consult was available, and which had the capability of treating an intracranial hemorrahage; therefore, patient T.H. was appropriately diverted to that facility. Dr. Dulay did not open a chart on T.H., and could not recall whether he made written notes during T.H.'s emergency. However, it is not customary practice that a medical chart be opened for an emergency case when consults are made via radio and the person is diverted or otherwise delivered to a separate facility. Generally, neither the hospital nor the doctor know the name of the person being transported. If the person does not arrive at the hospital, that facility has no information on which to open a patient record. Under such circumstances, the person's history, vital signs, and medication administration are recorded in the ALS run sheet, which accompanies the person to his or her ultimate destination. The radio communications are recorded by audiotape. In this case, the history, vital signs, and medication administration to T.H. were in fact recorded in the ALS run sheet. The run sheet appropriately accompanied T.H. to SGMC. The radio communications were recorded by audiotape. These documents are adequate records in emergency situations. Given these facts, there was no deviation by Dr. Aldolfo Dulay from the applicable standard of care for a physician under the circumstances presented in this case or that there was a failure to keep adequate written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Adolofo Dulay, M.D. did not practice below the accepted standard of care in his handling of the diversion of patient T.H. to a tertiary care facility, that there was no transfer of patient T.H. and that the records maintained were appropriate under the circumstances and that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John Terrell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Richard B. Collins, Esquire Ryan Garrett, Esquire Collins and Truett, P.A. 2804 Remington Green Circle, Suite 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 136 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (2003), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is charged with regulating the practice of licensed physicians pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2003). Dr. Dangl, whose address of record is 3900 Clark Road, Suite F-1, Sarasota, Florida 34233, was issued Florida license number ME 71286. On or before September 25, 2003, Dr. Dangl's office was approved to perform Level II Office surgical procedures by the Department. In a Level II Office surgery, "the patient is placed in a state which allows the patient to tolerate unpleasant procedures while maintaining adequate cardiorespiratory function and the ability to respond purposefully to verbal command and/or tactile stimulation." Fla. Admin. Code R. 648-9.009(4). Patient J.R., a 38-year-old female, presented to Dr. Dangl on September 25, 2003, for the removal of existing breast implants and the placement of larger saline implants. The surgery was scheduled to take place in Dr. Dangl's office. The surgical team consisted of Dr. Dangl; Amanda Fortner, R.N.; and Bruce Crow. Ms. Fortner assisted Dr. Dangl in administering anesthetic agents and other controlled substances, and monitored J.R. during the procedure. Her duties included documenting J.R.'s vital signs and the types and quantities of medications that were administered. A cardiac respiratory monitor, a pulse oximeter, and a blood pressure monitor were devices used to monitor J.R. during the surgery. A cardiac respiratory monitor records the heart rate, respirations, and the sinus rhythm of the heart. The oxygen saturation in the blood is measured by the pulse oximeter, which is placed on one of the patient's fingers. Blood pressure is monitored by the blood pressure machine. Bruce Crow was the surgical technician. During the surgical procedure, he made sure supplies and surgical instruments were ready, maintained the sterile field, and assisted Dr. Dangl with the procedure. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on September 25, 2003, Dr. Dangl started an IV in J.R.'s left hand and administered the following medications: one gram of Rocephin, 20 milligrams of Reglan, 50 milligrams of Demerol, ten milligrams of Valium, 25 milligrams of Ketamine and Versed. Dr. Dangl gave the initial medications, and Ms. Fortner administered additional drugs pursuant to Dr. Dangl's orders. J.R. was given an additional 200 milligrams of Demerol. The last dose of Demerol was administered by Ms. Fortner at 9:50 a.m. J.R. was a small person, and, for her weight and size, it took an unusual amount of Demerol to get J.R. sedated. Versed and Valium are sedative hypnotics, which sedate patients and cause them to become sleepy. Demerol is an analgesic, a pain medication. These medications can decrease respiration. Ketamine is a dissociate anesthetic, which does not cause respiratory depression. J.R. was also given a Propofol drip IV to help keep J.R. asleep. Propofol is a general anesthetic which depresses brain cells. The Propofol was mixed with a saline solution at a rate of one 55 cc vial per 100 cc's of saline. Ms. Fortner prepared the solution, which was initially administered by Dr. Dangl until he got it to the rate that he wanted. Once the surgery started, he would tell Ms. Fortner to speed-up or slow- down the drip as necessary. Three bottles of Propofol were used during the surgical procedure. J.R. was also given two liters of oxygen during the procedure. An oral airway was inserted into J.R.'s mouth during the early stages of the procedure. An oral airway is a long device that is inserted behind the tongue and goes deep into the patient's throat. In order to tolerate an oral airway, the patient would have to be in a deep level of sedation. J.R. was awake when the medications were started. She continued to talk through at least half of the time the medications were being administered. At one point during the surgery, J.R. "moaned a little bit, but then went right back to sleep." During the surgical procedure, Dr. Dangl sat J.R. up approximately three times to check the symmetry of the implants. J.R. continued to sleep through these checks. During the last time that J.R. was brought to a sitting position at approximately 11:55 a.m., the pulse oximeter alarmed. Thinking that the device may have fallen off J.R.'s finger, Ms. Fortner checked the device and also checked to make sure that the oximeter was not on the arm on which the blood pressure machine was placed. The pulse oximeter was on the correct finger. Ms. Fortner advised Dr. Dangl that something was wrong. She turned up the oxygen and placed an Ambu bag1 over the oral airway which had been placed in J.R.'s mouth at the beginning of the case. Ms. Fortner started Ambu bagging J.R. At Dr. Dangl's direction, Ms. Fortner turned off the Propofol drip. However, J.R.'s pulse oximeter reading did not improve. Not wanting to break the sterile field, Dr. Dangl yelled at Ms. Fortner, "Don't make me come back there and help your ass." When J.R. still did not improve, Dr. Dangl broke the sterile field, pushed Ms. Fortner aside, and began to Ambu bag J.R. Dr. Dangl checked J.R. for a pulse, but was unable to find one. Ms. Fortner checked for a pulse and thought that she may have found a faint pulse. Dr. Dangl, hearing the receptionist in the hallway, called to her to get Michelle Purdy, another employee of Dr. Dangl. The receptionist went to get Ms. Purdy and came back saying that Ms. Purdy was on the telephone. Dr. Dangl told the receptionist to get Ms. Purdy. Ms. Purdy, who is not a nurse, came into the operating area and tried to find a pulse for J.R. Unfortunately, Ms. Purdy tried to find a pulse using her thumbs. After being corrected by the surgical team, Ms. Purdy attempted to locate a pulse in the brachial, then the femoral, and then the pedal pulses, but she was unable to find a pulse. After being unable to locate a pulse, Dr. Dangl instructed one of his staff to call for emergency medical services (EMS). While Dr. Dangl and his employees were searching for a pulse, the surgical technician asked for leave to begin chest compressions. Mr. Crow told Dr. Dangl that the heart rate monitor was flat lining, meaning that it showed no basic heart rhythm for J.R. J.R.'s skin was gray and her fingers were turning blue. Dr. Dangl told Mr. Crow to wait. Dr. Dangl instructed Ms. Fortner to give J.R. three milligrams of Atropine two times. Ms. Fortner complied with his orders, but J.R. still had not started to breathe again. Mr. Crow continued to request Dr. Dangl to allow him to start chest compressions. After the administration of the Atropine failed to revive J.R., Dr. Dangl allowed Mr. Crow to begin chest compressions. From a minimum of two minutes to a maximum six minutes2 elapsed between the time Mr. Crow first asked to do chest compressions and when he began to do chest compressions. While chest compressions were being administered, Dr. Dangl ordered Ms. Fortner to administer Epinephrine to J.R. While Dr. Dangl continued to Ambu bag J.R., Mr. Crow administered three cycles of chest compressions. A cycle is 15 chest compressions to two Ambu breaths. J.R.'s heart rate returned and J.R. developed tachycardia, which means a high heart rate. About the time that J.R. revived and became stable, the paramedics arrived. J.R. was breathing, had a heart rate, and had a pulse oximeter reading of approximately 98. Neither the paramedics nor Dr. Dangl or any of his staff checked J.R.'s pupils. When the paramedics arrived, the surgery was not completed. The paramedics informed Dr. Dangl that another EMS team was on the way. Dr. Dangl and the paramedics agreed that Dr. Dangl could finish closing and suturing the wound, while waiting for the other EMS team to come and transport J.R. to the hospital. The paramedics stayed for a short time in the operating area monitoring J.R.'s vital signs and then left to make copies of J.R.'s chart, leaving Ms. Fortner to continue the monitoring of the vital signs. While Dr. Dangl was completing the procedure, J.R.'s vital signs were within normal range. Ms. Fortner periodically checked J.R.'s breathing by placing her hand over J.R.'s mouth. After Dr. Dangl completed suturing the wound, the second team of paramedics came into the operating area to transport J.R. The paramedics examined J.R.'s eyes, which were fixed and dilated. The paramedics immediately intubated J.R. and took her to the hospital. While at the hospital, Dr. Dangl admitted to J.R.'s fiancée that he had given J.R. "a lot of medication for her body size and weight," but that he thought J.R. was metabolizing the anesthetic very quickly. J.R. never regained consciousness after she was transported to the hospital. She died several months later from hypoxic encephalopathy, which means low oxygen brain damage. On September 26, 2003, Dr. Dangl dictated a report of operation. His documentation of J.R.'s "cardiorespiratory event" is as follows: Immediately prior to closure, the patient experienced a cardiorespiratory event that required CPR and resuscitative efforts. The EMS was activated and assumed care of the patient upon arrival. At this time the patient had responded to the resuscitative effort, vital signs were stable and permission was given by EMS to complete closure of the incisions prior to transport. The incisions were closed in a layered fashion with 3-0 PDS II and 5-0 nylon. A sterile dressing was placed over the incision sites. The patient was entubated [sic] by EMS prior to transport and left the O.R. via ambulance for Doctor's Hospital Emergency Room. Dr. Dangl signed a document entitled, "Operating Room Record." The record contained a section in which the medications that were administered should have been listed along with the time administered, the dosage, and the method of administration. That section of the record contained the following, "see anesthesia record," in lieu of listing the medications. The anesthesia record which was prepared by Ms. Fortner did not list all the medications that were administered to J.R. such as the Atropine and Epinephrine. She did not list the amount of Lidocaine or Propofol that was administered. It should have been obvious to Dr. Dangl when he reviewed the anesthesia report, that it was not correct. When Dr. Dangl prepared the Report of Operation and signed the Operating Room Record, he should have included the medications which he ordered and which were not included in the anesthesia report. Both Dr. Dangl and Ms. Fortner were certified in Advanced Cardiac Life Support at the time of the surgery. Ms. Fortner is not an anesthesiologist, a certified registered nurse anesthetist, or a physician assistant. Based on the testimony of Ms. Fortner that three 50 cc bottles of Propofol were used during the surgery, Dr. Joan Christie calculated that the dosage of Propofol that was administered was between 160 and 170 micrograms per kilo per minute. In a normal patient, who has received no other drugs, 100 micrograms per kilo per minute would be a lot of medication. J.R. received between 160 and 170 micrograms per kilo per minute on top of the other drugs that had been administered to her at the beginning of the procedure. The Propofol was administered in excessive amounts. Based on the evidence presented, it is clear that J.R. went from a Level II to a Level III office surgery during the surgical procedure. She tolerated an oral airway, which she could not do under a Level II or Level I. She was not responding purposefully to verbal commands or tactile stimulation. When J.R. was sat up to check the symmetry of her implants, she did not wake up or otherwise respond. Although she did moan at one time during the surgical procedure, that did not mean that she was either at Level I or Level II. Dr. Dangl has had no prior disciplinary actions taken against him by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Dangl violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (2003), and revoking his license to practice medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2005.
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Hunt is and has been at all times material, licensed by the Florida Board of Medicine. His license number is ME 001081. The Department of Health is charged with regulating the practice of medicine. The Department of Health may contract with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to provide investigative and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards, as appropriate. In this case, ACHA provided those services to the Department of Health. The Board of Medicine is an administrative body statutorily situated under the Division of Medical Quality Assurance. On the evening of June 28, 1999, Dr. Hunt was on duty in the emergency room of the Memorial Hospital-West Volusia. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia subsequently became known as Florida Hospital Deland (Hospital Deland). At 9:35 p.m., on June 28, 1999, Patient V.V., a 22-month-old female, was brought by her father to the emergency room of Hospital Deland with a complaint of fever and shortness of breath. It was reported to emergency room personnel that V.V. had experienced shortness of breath for many hours before she was brought to the emergency room. V.V. was born on August 29, 1997. V.V. had a history of multiple congenital deformities including panhypopituitarism and a severe cleft lip and palate, among other medical problems. V.V. had visited Hospital Deland at least 68 times previous to her visit of June 28, 1999. Panhypopituitarism means that the part of the brain that regulates all of the glands and hormones that the body requires to function, is not functioning. This gives rise to a host of problems, including hypothyroidism, retarded growth, and holoprosencephaly. This latter term means that the brain does not progress or develop much beyond the fetal stage. V.V. also experienced seizures and sodium imbalances which would range from very high to very low. V.V. was described by her Board-certified pediatrician, Dr. Susan Griffis, as being very difficult to manage medically. Dr. Griffis described V.V. as being basically in a vegetative state. She noted that V.V.'s deformities were not compatible with long-term existence. V.V.'s prognosis at birth was a life span of two years. By June 28, 1999, she had attained the age of 22 months. At 9:35 p.m., Nurse Hilbun noted a respiration of 60 and determined, through the use of a pulse oximeter, that V.V.'s concentration of oxygen was 60 percent. V.V. was placed on 100 percent oxygen along with an aerosol medicine through the application of a nonrebreather mask. V.V.'s skin was dry and pink which indicated that she was getting sufficient oxygen. Dr. Hunt, on June 28, 1999, first saw V.V. at 10:00 p.m. He conducted a physical examination which revealed, among other things, that the child had shortness of breath and a temperature of 101.8 degrees. The child was diagnosed with bilateral pneumonia. At 10:16 p.m., Dr. Hunt ordered diagnostic studies including a chest X-ray and laboratory studies, which include an RSV test for virus, and a complete blood count (CBC). The CBC could not be obtained because blood could not be drawn. Blood could not be drawn because V.V.'s veins were very small and because of scarring from numerous previous extractions of blood. Dr. Hunt attempted to contact Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician, for advice on a course of treatment but was unable to reach her. Dr. Hunt then contacted Dr. Reinertsen, the pediatrician on call who advised Dr. Hunt to intubate the patient and transfer her to Arnold Palmer Hospital in Orlando. It cannot be determined from the record exactly when this telephone call transpired. Dr. Reinertsen did not come to the emergency room. Arnold Palmer Hospital had an intensive care pediatrics unit. No intensive care pediatrics unit was available at Hospital Deland. Dr. Hunt did not transfer the child because he determined that V.V. was not stable to the point where she would survive the trip. He also did not follow Dr. Reinertsen's advice to immediately intubate the child, nor was he required to follow his advice. At 9:35 p.m., V.V.'s oxygen saturation was 60 percent and she had a heart rate of 160. At 9:45 p.m., she had an oxygen saturation of 85 percent. At 11:00 p.m., V.V's oxygen saturation was 98 percent and her temperature had improved to 100.6 degrees. At 11:40 p.m., respiration had improved to 52 and her heart rate was down to 140. At 1:40 a.m., June 29, 1999, respiration was 52, her heart rate was 142 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. At 2:30 a.m., respiration was 52 and her heart rate was 142. At 3:00 a.m., respiration was 60, her heart rate was 146 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. During this period, from 9:35 p.m. until immediately before 3:00 a.m. on June 29, 1999, V.V. was not sufficiently stable for transfer but her condition was not deteriorating. At approximately 4:00 a.m., V.V.'s condition took a dramatic turn for the worse. The child began to have difficulty breathing and was experiencing apnea. When the child's condition began to deteriorate, Dr. Hunt asked for and received permission from V.V.'s parents to intubate V.V. Although V.V. had been placed on oxygen shortly after arrival, an oxygen mask will only put oxygen into the lungs. It will not facilitate exhalation. Intubation, if successful, provides a clear passage to the lungs and facilitates both inhalation and exhalation. Dr. Hunt was unsuccessful in intubating V.V. An anesthesiologist was called in and eventually succeeded in intubating V.V. Nevertheless, V.V. continued to rapidly deteriorate, and suffered cardiac and respiratory arrest at approximately 5:00 a.m. Unsuccessful efforts were made to defillibrate V.V. with electric paddles at 5:12 a.m., 5:13 a.m., and 5:14 a.m., but the child could not be resuscitated. Intubating any baby is a difficult and dangerous task. Intubating a baby with the deformities that characterized V.V. is particularly dangerous because the tube could easily penetrate the brain instead of going down the back of the throat as it should. V.V. had been hospitalized at Shands Hospital for a repair of her cleft palate and cleft lip when she was approximately 18 months of age. Shands is a well-known research hospital with a superb reputation. Before the repair could be accomplished, it was necessary to intubate V.V. and the surgeons at Shands were unable to do it. Dr. Hunt was aware of this. Because of these factors, Dr. Hunt was reluctant to intubate V.V. The testimony of the State's Expert Mark Slepin, M.D., testified as an expert witness in the area of the delivery of emergency medical care. He is the chief operating officer and chief compliance officer for ECS Holdings. ECS Holdings is a company which provides quality assurance services, among other things, to hospitals throughout Florida and to hospitals in many other states. Dr. Slepin served a residency in emergency medicine at the University Hospital, Jacksonville. Dr. Slepin practiced emergency medicine for ten years at hospitals in the southeastern Virginia area. He practiced at St. Mary's and Good Samaritan Hospitals in West Palm Beach, and at hospitals in Milton and Sarasota, prior to joining ECS. He is Board-certified in emergency medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the practice of emergency medicine. Dr. Slepin reviewed V.V.'s hospital records and statements made by Dr. Hunt. He opined that Dr. Hunt, for the most part, practiced within the standard of care that is expected of a reasonably prudent emergency physician with regard to his evaluation of the patient, his work-up of the patient, and his initial management of the patient in the early stages of the patient's course in the emergency room. Dr. Slepin thereafter opined that the plan of care was not a plan that a reasonably prudent emergency physician would take. There was no written "do not resuscitate" order. He opined that under those circumstances Dr. Hunt should have either admitted V.V. into the hospital or transferred her to a hospital with appropriate resources. Moreover, Dr. Hunt failed to provide appropriate airway management, in his opinion. He opined that Dr. Hunt left the patient in limbo for five hours and, therefore, the patient eventually succumbed because there was no definitive airway intervention in a patient who needed airway intervention. Dr. Slepin opined that the medical records adequately documented the patient's response to therapy and progress, except that there should have been additional physician's notes regarding the patient's progress filed between the initial evaluation and the eventual demise. The testimony of the Respondent's Experts Donald Hilbun, Jr., is a registered nurse who has a bachelor of science degree in nursing from the University of South Alabama. He was a medic in the military for three years and practiced in the labor and delivery unit of a military medical facility in Alaska where he delivered health care to babies. He is certified by the American Heart Association in advanced cardiac life support. Nurse Hilbun had worked at the Hospital Deland for one year on June 28, 1999. He was accepted as an expert on the practice of nursing. Nurse Hilbun prepared nurses notes for V.V., which were part of the overall medical record of V.V.'s care. It is Nurse Hilbun's opinion that V.V. was never stable enough to permit a successful transfer to the Arnold Palmer Hospital. He does not believe Dr. Hunt withheld appropriate treatment. Jay Edelberg, M.D., is a Board-certified emergency room physician. He has a degree in dentistry and received his medical degree in 1975. He did a surgical internship for one year at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford, Connecticut, and did an emergency medicine residency from 1976 to 1978 at what is now called Shands of Jacksonville. He is currently in private practice. He also works in the emergency room of Flagler Hospital which is similar in size to Hospital Deland. Dr. Edelberg has had a contract with the AHCA for the last seven or eight years. The contract provides that he is to review cases relating to emergency room physicians. He gives written opinions, when asked, to the probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the field of emergency room medicine. Dr. Edelberg reviewed V.V.'s hospital records. He opined that when treating a patient who is having shortness of breath, intubation is done only as a last resort. He opined that Dr. Hunt's decision to intubate V.V. at the time he did was the correct decision and that it would have been a mistake to have done it earlier. Dr. Edelberg opined that the events of the evening of July 28, 1999, and the morning of July 29, 1999, were adequately documented by Dr. Hunt. Dr. Edelberg pointed out that Dr. Reinertsen was on-call for Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician. He was not on- call for the emergency room. He also pointed out that when someone like Dr. Reinertsen is consulted, unless that person comes in and takes over the case, it is the emergency room physician who must ultimately make all of the decisions with regard to care. Dr. Edelberg stated that it was his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the care provided to V.V. met the required standard of care. Conclusion On the whole, the expert testimony of Dr. Edelburg and Nurse Hilbun, was more persuasive than that of Dr. Slepin.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
Findings Of Fact On or about December 13, 1984, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a CON for an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). Respondent assigned CON number 3677 to Petitioner's application. Petitioner seeks to construct a two operating room, free standing ASC at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando, Orange County, Florida. The primary area to be served by this application is Orange County, and the facility as proposed is reasonably accessible to Orange County residents. Orange County is located within Respondent's District VII, which is also comprised of Osceola, Brevard and Seminole Counties. Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz are owners of Y and S Management and are partners in the application here at issue. Y and S Management will provide medical management services at this facility, as it provides at nine other facilities throughout the country which performed approximately 17,500 outpatient surgical procedures in 1985, primarily gynecological. Two of the facilities managed by Y and S Management are licensed as ASCs under the laws of the states in which they are located. The chief operating officer of Y and S Management, Susan Hill, prepared the CON application which is here at issue. Financing for this project will be provided from the personal funds of Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. No funds will be borrowed for this purpose. They have sufficient liquid personal funds to fully finance the project cost of $473,000, as well as operating costs. Petitioner will lease 6,500 square feet on the first floor of a professional building to be constructed at 1710 West Colonial Drive in Orlando from West Colonial Properties, Ltd., at $12 per square foot. This property is owned by Stuart and Joseph Yachnowitz. An abortion clinic known as Orlando Women's Health Center, which they also own, is located next door at 1700 West Colonial Drive. The facility as proposed can reasonably be expected to meet licensure requirements for an ASC. Ambulatory surgical procedures to be performed at Petitioner's facility will include, but not be limited to abortions, tubal ligations, hernia repairs, diagnostic laproscopies, eye surgery for cataracts, hand surgery, plastic surgery, tonsillectomies, and dilatation and curettage. Equipment cost estimates for this project of $161,158 are realistic and complete. Staffing requirement estimates of 11.54 F.T.E., and salary requirements of approximately $182,000 annually are also realistic and complete. Petitioner estimates that for 1987 and 1988, 20% of all cases will be paid by Medicaid, 5% by Medicare, and 75% will be insurance and private pay, with 4% of this figure ultimately being bad debt or indigent care. With total cases estimated for 1987 and 1988 to be 1700 and 2100, respectively, total net revenues for 1987 and 1988 are estimated to be $732,000 and $903,000, respectively. Providing services to Medicaid patients in 20% of its cases would be beneficial to the community since this is a high level of service to patients who are typically underserved. Assuming that 20% of the cases handled at Petitioner's facility have multiple procedures, the projected charge rates for 1987 are $326 per case for Medicare and Medicaid, and $489 per case for private pay and insurance. These are reasonable and competitive charges. The projected charge rate for private pay and insurance is simply 150% of the Medicare and Medicaid rate, which in turn is based on the projected case mix considering the various levels of reimbursement. Petitioner will pay Y and S Management a fee of $50 per case for management services. The financial pro forma prepared for Petitioner demonstrates that using a conservative approach that somewhat overestimates expenses, Petitioner will reach the break-even point at 1400 cases, after allowing for management fees, depreciation and amortization. Using a less conservative, but more typical approach to estimating expenses, Petitioner will break-even at 1100 cases. Need in the service area exceeds the conservative break-even point and Petitioner estimates it will handle 1700 cases in its first year of operation and 2100 in its second. These are reasonable estimates. Respondent has not promulgated a rule setting forth a methodology for determining need for an ASC. However, Respondent has utilized an evolving non-rule policy in evaluating the need for such facilities. Reid Jaffe, Respondent's expert in health care planning, explained the methodology used in this case which resulted in his determining that in July, 1987, there will be a need for additional ambulatory surgical facilities in Orange County sufficient to recommend approval of Petitioner's CON application. Specifically, Jaffe's methodology is as follows: Acquire data from the local health council regarding the number of inpatient and outpatient procedures performed by existing providers, as reported for the current calendar year (1985) by hospitals in the appropriate service district (District VII). Acquire data from the Governor's Office of the population estimate for the appropriate service area (Orange County) for the current and planning horizon years. Using this data, calculate the current overall surgical and outpatient surgical use rates per 1000 population for hospitals in the service area. Using the projected population for the planning horizon year (1987) and the current use rates calculated in (c) above, calculate the projection of overall surgical procedures in the planning horizon year. Multiply projected overall surgeries by 40% to establish total number of out-patient surgeries to be performed in the planning horizon year. Subtract from (e) all outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in hospitals, other ASCs in the service area, as well as the financial break-evens of all CON approved free-standing outpatient surgery centers in the service area. After performing these calculations and subtractions, the number of outpatient surgical procedures remaining are compared to the break-even of the CON applicant at issue. If the remaining number is larger than the applicant's break even, a quantitative need is demonstrated. Applying Jaffe's methodology to this case and applying data he obtained from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida, as reported to it by hospitals in District VII for calendar year 1985, as well as population data for Orange County he obtained from the Governor's Office, it appears that a total of 83,054 surgical procedures were performed in District VII in 1985, with 21,084 of these being outpatient procedures performed in a hospital. Using a July, 1985, population estimate for Orange County of 556,384, the overall surgical use rate for Orange County is 83,054 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 149.27 surgical procedures per 1000 population; the use rate for outpatient procedures performed in hospitals is 21,084 divided by 556,384 over 1000, or 37.89 outpatient procedures performed in hospitals per 1000 population. Multiplying the overall surgical use rate of 149.27 by 574,599 (projected Orange County population for July 1987) over 1000 and applying a factor of 40% yields a projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987. The use rate of 37.89 for outpatient services performed in a hospital is then multiplied by 574,599 over 1000 to obtain 21,722 which is the projected number of outpatient procedures which will be performed in a hospital in 1987. By subtracting this number (21,722) from the projection of total outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987 (34,308) you identify 12,536 procedures which could be performed in ASCs in 1987. The reported number of outpatient procedures being performed in existing ASCs and the break-evens of CON approved facilities are calculated to be 5,488 (Surgical Services 2,693; MediVision 903; AMI Single Day Surgery 1,832; Surgical Associates 60) which is then subtracted from 12,536 to leave a need of 7,048 outpatient procedures which could be performed in ASCs which are not now approved for this service area. Since Petitioner has a conservative break-even point of 1400 cases, and a more typical break-even point of 1100 cases, a quantitative need has been identified which far exceeds Petitioner's break-even point. Jaffe testified that in his experience this is the largest margin between break-even and available procedures he has seen in reviewing CON applications. A need analysis conducted by Howard E. Fagin, Ph.D., who was accepted as an expert in health care planning, facility planning and operations analysis, also confirms that there is a quantitative need for the ASC proposed by Petitioner. The methodology used by Dr. Fagin starts by calculating a target utilization for ambulatory surgical operating rooms. Assuming that a facility operates 250 days/year, 6 hours/day, it takes 1.25 hours/case and that there are 1.2 procedures/case with a utilization rate of 75%, a target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year for an ambulatory surgical room is thereby determined. In 1985 there were 10 approved hospital "dedicated" ambulatory surgical rooms in Orange County, and 9 approved rooms in free-standing ASCs (Surgical Services-5, AMI Single Day Surgery-2, MediVision-2) not counting the 2 rooms approved in CON 3313 for Surgical Associates which are used for no more than 60 cases per year. Multiplying these 19 rooms by the target utilization of 1,080 procedures/year results in a calculation of 20,520 total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms. Data from the Local Health Council of East Central Florida for 1985 indicates that 11,413 outpatient procedures were performed in hospital, non-dedicated, operating rooms. Therefore if we take Jaffe's projection of 34,308 outpatient surgical procedures to be performed in 1987, and subtract 20,520 (total utilization in available dedicated and free-standing ASC rooms) and also subtract 11,413 (outpatient procedures performed in hospital, non-dedicated, rooms), we arrive at a need of 2,375 procedures in 1987 and 3,770 procedures in 1989. Since Petitioner's break-even is conservatively 1400 cases, and again assuming 1.2 procedures per case, Petitioner's conservative break-even is 1680 procedures, which is within the need which will exist in 1987, and well within the need in 1989. The need methodology and opinion of Intervenor's expert, Dr. Deborah Kolb, is rejected because she incorrectly: (a) considered Orange and Seminole Counties as comprising a two county service area; (b) included all existing inpatient hospital based operating rooms, regardless of whether they are dedicated to outpatient surgery, in arriving at her conclusion that there is excess capacity; and (c) assumed all hospital operating rooms are available for outpatient surgery without modification. Ambulatory surgery is typically performed in three types of facilities: hospitals which utilize their operating rooms for both inpatient and outpatient surgery; hospitals which maintain separate "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, sometimes even in separate facilities adjacent to the main hospital; and free-standing ASCs which are not associated with a hospital. There are definite disadvantages to serving outpatients in hospitals without "dedicated" outpatient operating rooms, including the "bumping" of outpatients in emergencies and increased costs to the patient for services. On the other hand there are advantages and disadvantages to the other two modes of delivering ambulatory surgical services. Hospital based "dedicated" rooms are obviously closer to a hospital in case an emergency develops, and some patients may prefer this proximity to additional equipment and emergency medical staff. On the other hand, costs at a free-standing ASC are generally lower, and some patients prefer to avoid a hospital atmosphere altogether. Surgical procedures performed at ASCs have grown from 10% of all procedures in the early 1970s to 40% currently, and are projected to grow to 50% in the near future. This growth is somewhat the result of a change in Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement policies which now pay 80% for procedures performed in a hospital and require a 20% co-payment by the patient, but which pay 100% for procedures performed in an ASC and require no patient co-payment. The decision to have outpatient surgery performed at one or the other of these types of facilities is primarily the result of patient preference. However, it is clear that the increasing utilization of ASCs is a market force that is driving the cost of hospital outpatient services down. Respondent issued its original notice of intent to deny Petitioner's application on or about May 17, 1985, and on June 14, 1985, Petitioner filed its Petition for Formal Hearing. Thereafter, Respondent reconsidered its position and on March 6, 1986, notified the parties that it intended to grant Petitioner's application. The reason for this reconsideration was that when the initial denial was made, Respondent's projections of procedures were premised on the use of a 30% outpatient surgical factor. Subsequently, the Respondent began using 40% in its projection of the total volume of surgical procedures which might be performed on an outpatient basis. Given the fact that the reason Petitioner was initially denied was due to insufficient procedures, and utilization of the new projection of outpatient volume indicated there would be sufficient volume to support the facility, Respondent determined to support Petitioner's application. The notice of change of position was prepared by Reid Jaffe, who based his testimony at hearing on the 40% factor, and was approved by Robert E. Maryanski, Administrator of Community Medical Facilities, and Marta V. Hardy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning and Development. Since Respondent has not adopted a need methodology rule for ambulatory surgical centers, the increase in the factor used to calculate outpatient surgeries from overall surgeries performed was not accomplished through rule-making proceedings. In 1985 Respondent used a factor of 30%, but in early 1986 increased this to the 40% applied in this case.. Intervenor provides services similar to those which Petitioner will perform, and has four free-standing, "dedicated" operating rooms which are used for ambulatory surgery. It also has 17 operating rooms that are used for both in and out-patient surgery. The Intervenor opposes Petitioner's application. In 1985, Intervenor made a profit of $10.9 million on total revenues collected of $184 million; it had an actual total of $37.4 million in uncompensated care which includes partial or no payments, charity, bad debt, and contractual patients. For 1986, it projects an $18.9 million profit on collected revenues of $211 million, with projections of actual uncompensated care of approximately $52 million. In 1985, 2% of Intervenor's costs were for providing indigent care, and this totaled approximately $6 million. Petitioner projects net revenues of approximately $900,000, and it has not been established if this will have any impact on Intervenor's revenues. According to Billie June, Assistant Director of Operating Rooms at Florida Hospital who was accepted as an expert in surgical nursing, and the management and operation of surgical units from a nursing standpoint, Intervenor has had considerable difficulty attracting qualified nursing staff for its operating rooms, and has had to develop its own qualified staff through an internship program. However, Petitioner's facility will not contribute to this difficulty or result in higher salaries. Susan Hill testified based on her experience since 1973 of managing and hiring staff in the Orlando area of the type needed to operate an ASC, that she has had no difficulty obtaining the cooperation of physicians in the area and in attracting fully qualified staff. Based on Hill's experience with other ASCs managed by Y and S Management throughout the country as well as her experience in Orange County, it is found that the staffing needs of Petitioner's proposed facility can be met with nursing and medical staff available in the area. It is found as a matter of fact that there is a need in Orange County for the two operating room ASC proposed by Petitioner, that Petitioner has the ability and will provide quality care, the project is financially feasible, Petitioner will work with and help to meet the needs of health maintenance organizations and will promote cost effectiveness in Orange County. Petitioner's proposal is consistent with the goals, objectives and recommended actions in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan and the local health plan. The State Plan encourages the existence of ASCs and the removal of obstacles to the use of outpatient surgery; the local plan provides that applicants for an ASC must demonstrate a willingness to provide services to underserved patient groups and considers the provision of ambulatory surgery to the underserved population to be a desirable objective. In this case Petitioner intends to provide 20% of its cases to Medicaid patients, and another 4% to indigents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for CON number 3677. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chris H. Bentley, Esquire Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esquire Jeffrey Boone, Esquire Gregory Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. 2,3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 14. 12,13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 15 but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. 23-25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12-14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 31-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 36,37. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 39,40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 41. Rejected as a Finding of Fact since this is a request for further ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Limine which was granted at hearing. Petitioner filed a Motion in Limine on June 11, 1986 to exclude depositions taken of John Hutchens on April 23, 1986 and June 5, 1986. This is the motion dealt with at the prehearing conference on June 23, 1986. The only deposition of John Hutchens offered by Intervenor and admitted was one taken on June 20, 1986 (I-2). Therefore, Petitioner's motion and the prior ruling is moot since the depositions to which the motion was directed were not offered at hearing. 42-45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rulings on Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, as set forth beginning on page 3: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 2-16. Rejected in Finding of Fact 15, and otherwise irrelevant and cumulative. 17,18. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-14, 22. 19-26. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 27,28. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 12, 13, but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 29. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12-15 and otherwise as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. 30-34. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 16 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 19, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14. 37,38. Rejected as irrelevant. 39,40. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 2, 3 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 43,44. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22. 45-47. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected in Findings of Fact 3, 5, 7 and 22. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 3. Rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. 53,54. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 22 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 57-59. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony, irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 13, 14 and 16 but otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. 62,63. Rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 7. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Findings of Fact 11, 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 22 and otherwise irrelevant and contrary to competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 20, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16; rejected in Finding of Fact 21 and otherwise rejected as contrary to competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 4, 5 and otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 72-75. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 19-21, but otherwise rejected in Findings of Fact 21, 22 and as irrelevant. 76-79. Rejected as irrelevant, cumulative argument which does not provide citations to the record contrary to Rule 221-6.31(3), Florida Administrative Code.
