Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Joyce Chandler, prior to February 2, 1982, was a real estate salesman employed by Frank Ambrose, a real estate broker. On February 2, 1982, Chandler became licensed as a real estate broker with the State of Florida, and holds license number 0348072. On February 8, 1982, the Respondent drafted an offer to purchase for herself property located at 811 Perrine Avenue in Miami, which belonged to Dr. Harry Moskowitz. The purchase price of the offer was $140,000. The Respondent took the offer to Carol Rebhan, the listing salesman of the property who was employed by Tauber-Manon Red Carpet Realty. The offer provided that an earnest money deposit of $100 would be placed in the escrow account of Roberta Fox, the Respondent's attorney, with an additional $5,000 to be deposited in Roberta Fox's escrow account within three working days of acceptance of the offer. The contract also called for a ten percent brokerage fee to be divided equally between the Respondent and Tauber-non Red Carpet Realty. Carol Rebhan and the Respondent presented the offer to Eugene Lemlich, attorney for the seller Dr. Harry Moskowitz. After contacting Dr. Moskowitz in Texas, Lemlich accepted the offer on his behalf. Three working days after the offer was accepted, Carol Rebhan called Roberta Fox's office repeatedly to determine whether the additional $5,000 deposit had been placed in escrow. Fox's office advised Rebhan that they did not have the $5,000 deposit. Rebhan confronted the Respondent with this information, and the Respondent stated that she was going to deposit the monies with Frank Ambrose at Landmark Title. The next day, Rebhan contacted Landmark Title and was informed that they did not have the deposit in escrow. On or about the 14th of February, 1982, Rebhan contacted Frank Ambrose personally and inquired about the $5,000 deposit. Ambrose told Rebhan that Landmark Title was in possession of the deposit. This was not true. Rebhan requested that Ambrose send her an escrow letter acknowledging possession of the $5,000 deposit. By letter dated February 18, 1982, Ambrose informed Rebhan that Landmark Title was in possession of the $5,000 deposit. On February 18, 1982, the Respondent gave Ambrose a $5,000 check payable to Landmark Title Company. The check was for the additional deposit on the Moskowitz property and was post-dated to February 28, 1982. The check was deposited on February 19, 1982. On February 25, 1982, Ambrose was informed that there were insufficient funds in the Respondent's account to pay the check. Ambrose notified the Respondent that the check had been returned unpaid. She advised him that she was expecting some funds, and would make the check good within a few days. Ambrose took no action to notify the parties at this time. In the first week of March, 1982, when Ambrose had still not received funds from the Respondent to cover the check, he contacted Carol Rebhan and informed her of the series of events which had occurred with regard to the deposit check. When Rebhan subsequently contacted the Respondent and told her that her $5,000 check had bounced, the Respondent seemed shocked at the news. The Respondent has not made good the check returned to Landmark Title Company, nor has she placed the $5,000 deposit in escrow in accordance with the terms of the contract with Dr. Moskowitz. Throughout the entire transaction, the Respondent misled the parties involved with regard to the location and existence of the earnest money deposit, she represented that she would replace the dishonored check or make it-good but has not done so, and she has thereby breached her contract to purchase the subject property from Dr. Moskowitz. The Respondent contends that she informed all parties that the $5,000 check would be post-dated, but there is not sufficient evidence to support this assertion. Nevertheless, the post-dated check given by the Respondent has never been made good, so the Respondent's contention that she advised the parties at the outset that the $5,000 check would be post-dated, is irrelevant.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the license of the Respondent, Joyce A. Chandler, be suspended for a period of one year. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Joyce A. Chandler 11231 S.W. 201st Street Miami, Florida 33189 William M. Furlow, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate, in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(e) and 475.25(1)(e); committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) (two counts); failing to account for or deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1; failing to maintain trust funds in a real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement is authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k); failing to provide a written agency disclosure, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(q); being found guilty for a second time of any misconduct that warrants suspension or of a course of conduct or practices that show such incompetence, negligence, dishonesty, or untruthfulness as to indicate that Respondent may not be entrusted with the property, money, transactions, and rights of investors or others with whom Respondent may maintain a confidential relation, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o); and failing to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failing to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions together with such additional data as good accounting practice requires, in violation of Rule 61J-14.012(4) and Section 475.25(1)(e).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license numbers 0489551 and 3000384. Respondent is the qualifying broker for Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc., of which Respondent was a principal. Respondent has been disciplined once previously. On December 8, 1994, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order, pursuant to a stipulation, ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $500 and complete 30 hours of professional education. In late 1993, Respondent, Armand Houle, and Svein Dynge formed DSA Development, Inc. (DSA). Respondent, Houle, and Dynge were directors of the corporation. On December 1, 1993, Respondent, Houle, and Dynge formed Gulf Southwest Developers, Ltd. (GSD). DSA served as the sole general partner of GSD, whose original limited partners included Houle and several foreign investors represented by Dynge, but not Respondent or Houle. The investors formed GSD to assemble a vast tract of land in Collier County, through numerous purchases, for purposes of mining, development, and speculation. The initial investors contributed or agreed to contribute over $4 million to GSD. Respondent's role was to find suitable parcels of land and negotiate their purchase by GSD or its agent. GSD agreed to pay Respondent $1000 weekly for these services. GSD also authorized Respondent to take a broker's commission of 10 percent of the sales price for each fully executed contract presented to the closing agent. This is the customary broker's commission in the area for transactions of this type. Respondent's claim that he was entitled to a commission of 20 percent is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. There is some dispute as to whether the seller or the buyer was to pay the commission. The contracts provide that the commission was to be deducted from the seller's proceeds. However, regardless of the source of the commission, Respondent was entitled only to 10 percent, not 20 percent. Respondent knew that he was not entitled to 20 percent when he took the additional sum from GSD funds. Thus, the act of taking the funds constituted no less than concealment (due to his failure to disclose his withdrawals), dishonest dealing, culpable negligence and breach of trust, if not actual fraud. There is some evidence that Respondent took substantial sums from GSD without authorization. Without doubt, part of these sums represented the additional ten percent commission described in the preceding paragraph. Petitioner has attempted to prove that Respondent took sums in excess of the extra ten percent commission without authorization. However, as to such sums in excess of the additional ten percent commission, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either that Respondent took such additional sums or, if he did so, that these withdrawals were not authorized or at least ratified. As agent for GSD, Houle entered into numerous contracts in the second half of 1994 and first half of 1995. In each of these contracts, Respondent signed the contract below printed language stating that he, as broker, and Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. had received the initial escrow deposit under the conditions set forth in the contract. At no time did Respondent or Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. hold the escrowed funds in an escrow account under the name of Respondent or Buyers Realty. Respondent maintains that he transferred the funds to the title company to hold in escrow. The record does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not do so, although there is some evidence indicating that the title company did not hold such funds. However, it is sufficient that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that neither Respondent nor Buyers Realty held these escrow funds, despite clear misrepresentations by Respondent in each contract that he or his company held these escrowed funds. Respondent's misrepresentations constitute fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, and breach of trust. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not make the required agency disclosures in a timely fashion or that Respondent did not make available to Petitioner's investigator the books and records that he is required to maintain. Likewise, Petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to complete the education required by the prior final order or participated in the fraudulent endorsement of Houle's signature on checks by a secretary, who later obtained Houle's consent to the act.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 James H. Gillis James H. Gillis & Associates, P.A. Law Offices of Gillis & Wilsen 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801-2169 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate brokers and holds license No. 0002997. On May 7, 1979, Respondent acted in the capacity of a real estate broker in the transaction of the sale of a parcel of real property located in Polk County, Florida. The purchaser in that transaction was Margaret Rhoden, and the seller was June Davis, who was represented in the transaction by a relative, Henry Goodwin. On May 7, 1979, Margaret Rhoden entered into a Contract for Sale of Rea1 Estate for the purchase of a piece of property Frostproof, Florida, from June Davis. The full purchase price of the property was $3,500, which Ms. Rhoden paid to Respondent in cash on May 7, 1979, and obtained a receipt from Respondent for that amount. At the time the contract was entered into, Ms. Rhoden was advised that a deed should be forthcoming from the seller within two to four weeks. A date of June 20, 1979, was established to close the transaction, subject to a 120-day curative period should any cloud on the title be discovered. The contract between the parties provided that should any such cloud appear of record, the seller would have a period of 120 days after receipt of written notice prior to the date set for closing in which to attempt to cure the defect. The contract further provided that if title defects were not cleared within the l20-day period, the deposit would be returned to the buyer, or, at the buyer's option, the transaction should be closed in the same manner as if no defect had been found. A warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from the seller to the buyer was executed on June 7, 1979, and a title binder was issued on that same date. The title binder indicated an outstanding mortgage on a larger piece of property of which the parcel purchased by Ms. Rhoden was only a part. When efforts to clear this cloud on the title took longer than expected, Ms. Rhoden asked, and was granted, permission by the seller's agent to commence construction on the improvements on the property notwithstanding the fact that she knew that a cloud remained on the title to the lot, and the transaction had not been closed. Construction was not completed on the improvements because Ms. Rhoden ran out of cash during the course of construction. She moved into the dwelling while it was still in a partially completed condition and, on September 8, 1979, with the permission of the seller's agent, received a loan of $3,000 from the $3,500 deposit she had placed with Respondent, Ms. Rhoden executed a promissory note dated September 8, 1979, in which she agreed to repay the $3,000 loan when clear title to the property was issued. Ms. Rhoden used the proceeds of this loan to make additional improvements on the property. On October 26, 1979, Respondent received both the warranty deed dated June 7, 1979, and the title binder issued on that date from the attorney for the seller. When approached by Ms. Rhoden, Respondent agreed to lend her the deed and title binder to attempt to obtain additional financing to complete construction on her home. The clear inference from the record in this proceeding is that there was never any understanding between Respondent and Ms. Rhoden that this deed could be recorded at this or any other juncture in this transaction. In fact, the contract entered into between the buyer and seller clearly called for the payment of the full purchase price of the property at closing, and the note subsequently executed by Ms. Rhoden conditioned the issuance of a warranty deed to her on the payment of the $3,000 face value of the note. Ms. Rhoden was unsuccessful in obtaining additional financing to complete construction on her home, probably due to the fact that when she sought that financing the outstanding mortgage on the property had still not been satisfied. When Respondent advised the seller's attorney that he had loaned the warranty deed to Ms. Rhoden for the purposes outlined above, he was advised that there was nothing to keep Ms. Rhoden from recording the deed, at which point Respondent apparently determined that it would be prudent for him to retrieve the deed from Ms. Rhoden's possession. Ms. Rhoden had her mother return the deed to Respondent in February of 1980. According to the testimony of both Ms. Rhoden and her mother, they felt the purpose for the returning of the deed was to have it recorded. Respondent denies any such understanding. In resolving this conflict in testimony, the clear inference from the circumstances involved in this transaction, including the wording of the contract of sale and the note executed by Ms. Rhoden, supports a finding that all of the parties to this transaction either knew, or should have known, that the recording of the deed at this juncture in the transaction would have been improper. Although the outstanding mortgage had been satisfied in January of 1980, Ms. Rhoden had not Performed her obligation under the contract of sale by paying the full purchase price. When Respondent had recovered the deed from Ms. Rhoden, he was advised by the attorney for the seller not to record the deed until he had received payment from Ms. Rhoden in accordance with the contract and the promissory note. As indicated above, the outstanding mortgage on the property was satisfied in January of 1980. On February 6, 1980, Respondent Prepared a closing statement reflecting the purchase price of the property as $3,500. From this amount he deducted a total of $478 for state documentary stamps, title insurance, Preparing the deed, and amount of real estate commission leaving a the apparently forwarded the note from Ms. Rhoden for $3,000, together with the $22.00 cash balance remaining from her initial $3,500 deposit to the seller along with the deed which the seller had earlier executed. Ms. Rhoden apparently never made or tendered payment of the $3,000 note, the transaction never closed, and at the time of final hearing in this cause an eviction action was apparently pending between the seller and Ms. Rhoden. Paragraph seven of the contract of sale executed between the seller and Ms. Rhoden Provides as follows: If Buyer fails to perform this contract, the deposit this day paid by Buyer as aforesaid shall be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages.
The Issue Whether James F. Robertson signed a false affidavit in violation of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation In making a recommendation in this matter, the Hearing Officer considers the following factors relating to James F. Robertson's fitness to be a registrant of the Florida Real Estate Commission. Robertson admitted that he realizes that he executed a false affidavit. Robertson did not falsify the affidavit with the intent to defraud anyone because he intended to pay all the subcontractors and materialmen and thought that he had the ability to pay them. Robertson pledged his personal assets to the payment of the L & M account print to the lien which indicates his intent to make good the account. Robertson is apparently concerned about the Smith's problem but has not been able to settle the account with L & M. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and facts in mitigation, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the registration as real estate broker of James F. Robertson be suspended two years; and further, that this suspension be suspended as long as Robertson makes regular payments on the debt to L & M Builder Supplies, Inc., such that the debt will be liquidated at the end of the two year period and the lien against the Smith's home satisfied. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Robertson c/o Gernada Realty, Inc. 2007 Parsons Avenue, North Seffner, Florida 33584
The Issue The Florida Real Estate Commission, herein sometimes called the Plaintiff or the Commission, seeks to revoke or suspend the license of the Defendant, Alan Leavitt, a registered broker, based on allegations that he violated Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in its administrative complaint filed on December 9, 1976. As is set forth more particularly in its two count administrative complaint, the Commission alleges that the Defendant, while employed as an active broker for Special Realty Corp., acted in his own behalf by advertising and selling several unimproved lots located in Walton County, Florida. It is further alleged that the Defendant made statements in an effort to sell said lots indicating that the lot sizes were 50 feet wide and 150 feet deep, whereas in actuality the lots were only 25 feet wide and 105 feet deep. The complaint alleges that the purchaser consummated the sale for the above referred lots based on the representations made respecting the lot sizes and upon subsequent examination found that the lot sizes were substantially less whereupon the purchaser demanded a refund from Defendant, to no avail. Based thereon, it is alleged that the Defendant is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, etc., in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes. In count two it is alleged that the Defendant, while registered as an active real estate broker, permitted Isaac Shelomith and Barry Shelomith, registered real estate salesmen, to unlawfully operate as real estate salesmen out of his offices and encouraged them to engage in the sale of lots in Walton County, Florida by means of unscrupulous and unlawful methods involving fraud, and other breaches of trust in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(a), and (b), Florida Statutes. For all of the foregoing reasons, the complaint alleges that the Defendant is guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show that he is so dishonest and untruthful that the money, property, transactions and rights of investors or those with whom he may sustain a confidential relation, may not safely be entrusted to him, in violation of Subsection 475.25(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, the pleadings and the admissions contained therein including the arguments of counsel, I make the following: The Defendant, who holds license number 0051095, was a registered real estate broker during times material to the allegations contained in the administrative complaint filed herein. During early October, 1975, Defendant placed in the classified section of the Miami Southside Newspaper, an ad relative to real property located in Walton County, near DeFuniak Springs. On October 14, 1975, Mr. Lionel G. Rush, an unemployed marketing executive, responded to the aforesaid ad to inquire about the advertised lots. He later purchased four lots from the Defendant for the sum of $1,500. The four lots were described in a warranty deed dated October 17, 1975, from Defendant to Lionel G. Rush and Susie M. Rush, his wife. (See Commission's Exhibit #4). Mr. Rush stated that the Defendant advised him that each individual lot was 50 feet in width and 150 feet in depth and it was based on these representations that he purchased the four lots described in the above referenced warranty deed. Mr. Rush, after purchasing the lots, investigated the lot sizes, approximately three weeks later by calling the county clerk for Walton County who advised that the lot sizes were approximately 25 by 105 feet each. He thereafter contacted the Defendant who checked to determine the accuracy of the lot sizes and was able to determine that the lot sizes were 25 by 105 feet as Mr. Rush had informed. Mr. Rush indicated that but for the inaccurate lot sizes, he was pleased with the property purchased from the Defendant. Mr. Rush testified that he advised the Defendant that there were in his opinion, several options available to satisfy or otherwise cure his purchase problems. He first suggested that the Defendant refund a portion of his purchase money to reflect the actual lot sizes conveyed or alternatively Defendant deed over to him another four lots to compensate for the alleged inadequacy of the lot sizes. Alan Leavitt, the Defendant herein, acknowledged that he sold four lots to Mr. Lionel Rush and his wife in Country Club Heights in Ft. Walton Beach. He denied that the lot sizes were recorded by him or upon his direction as the description is now reflected on the warranty deed entered herein. (See Exhibit 4). Defendant testified that after selling the lots to the Rushes, he received a phone call approximately three weeks later from Mr. Rush complaining about the lot sizes. Mr. Rush expressed his desire to get a refund of the purchase money paid or to seek some other restitution. Defendant checked into the matter and was able to determine that the lot sizes were in fact 105 feet by 100 feet. When Defendant was unable to resolve the matter with the Rushes, he offered to return their money back and in fact purchased a money order for the full amount of the purchase price and agreed to absorb all incidental costs connected with the purchase of the property. He stated that the refund offer was made after Mr. Rush tried to bargain over price and in his opinion was trying to get the lots for what was in his opinion, a "ridiculously low price." He testified that when he discerned this, he had no further dealings with Mr. Rush and was only interested in refunding the purchase money price once the Rushes executed a proper deed returning the property to him. He (Defendant) denied ever misrepresenting the lot sizes. Isaac Shelomith, a registered real estate salesman during times material, was called and denied having any employment relationship with the Defendant in any manner during times material to the allegations contained in the administrative complaint filed herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the administrative complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David B. Javits, Esquire 3628 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33137 Alan Leavitt 7100 Fairway Drive Miami Lakes, Florida 33014 Bruce I Kamelhair, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the exhibits received into evidence, I make the following: The Defendant is a real estate salesman registered with the Commission and currently holds registration certificate number 0151729 (non-active). Defendant applied for registration as a real estate salesman by execution of a sworn application with the Commission on March 4, 1975 and was issued an initial registration certificate as such effective September 29, 1975. In response to the question as to whether or not she had ever been arrested for the commission of any offense against the laws of this state, she responded that "in 26years of living, I could honestly say I had (sic) never been arrested, either justly or unjustly." (See Commission's Exhibit #1). Exhibits introduced and received during the course of the hearing clearly reveal that the Defendant was arrested on January 21, 1975 and charged with engaging in the unlawful practice of massage for a fee or gratuity without a certificate or registration in violation of Section 480.02(1), Florida Statutes; and for the unlawful receipt of a fee for touching or offering to touch the sexual parts of another for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. Officer White, a police officer for Broward County was called and credibly testified that the Defendant, Sharon Lee (Blackburn) Jarvis is the same Sharon Lee Blackburn that was arrested on January 21, 1975, and stated that the charges were nolle prosequi because of the Defendant's cooperation with the police on other related charges. Michael H. White, a police officer with the City of Ft. Lauderdale, was called and testified that he arrested the Defendant on June 13, 1975 and charged her (Defendant) for the offense of "indecent assault upon a child". On June 2, 1976 the Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to the above offense and was placed on probation for a period of six years. (See Commission's Composite Exhibit #5) Although Defendant complained that she was not served with copies of the administrative complaint and notice of hearing, evidence reveals that such was mailed to her at her last known address. It was noted that the complaint and notice of hearing which was mailed by the Commission was returned as "undeliverable". These documents were mailed to Defendant at her last known address. A registrant is required to immediately notify the Commission of address changes. (Chapter 475.23, Florida Statutes, and Rule 21V-9.01, F.A.C.) This the Defendant failed to do. As an aside, evidence reveals that Defendant received a copy of the notice of hearing sent by the undersigned. Accordingly, Defendant lacks standing to now complain that she did not receive notice of the proceedings herein. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, I make the following:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: 1. That the Defendant's registration with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondents failed to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account in a federally- insured financial institution, in violation of section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes (2013).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Office of Financial Regulation, is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing chapter 560, Florida Statutes, including part III of that statute, related to money services businesses. Respondent, Moctezuma Envios, Inc. ("Moctezuma Envios"), is a Florida corporation operating as a money services business, cashing checks and acting as a money transmitter, as authorized by License No. FT30800203 issued by Petitioner. Its address of record is 19784 Southwest 177th Street, Miami, Florida 33187. Respondent Liliana Carrascal has a 100 percent controlling interest in, and is the sole officer of, Moctezuma Envios.3/ The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Respondents have been in the money services business, and Moctezuma Envios has been licensed to conduct this business, since 2001. Respondents were doing business with Intermex Wire Transfer LLC ("Intermex"), a money transfer services business, before the events giving rise to this proceeding. Sometime prior to January 2013, Carrascal was approached by representatives of Intermex about opening an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank.4/ Intermex representatives told Carrascal that the account could be used for depositing the checks that Moctezuma Envios cashed and also for paying Intermex for money transfers. According to Carrascal, this offer was attractive to Respondents because U.S. Bank accepted third-party checks, and opening a check-cashing account that accepts such checks is difficult. Additionally, having the account would streamline the process by which Moctezuma Envios paid Intermex to serve as its money transmitting agent, and would enable Carrascal to avoid driving across town carrying large sums of money to deposit cash into Intermex's account. Carrascal testified, credibly, that Intermex representatives told her she would be the owner of the account, that she could deposit payment instruments into and withdraw funds from the account, and that the account would be compliant with the law. On the basis of these representations, Carrascal authorized Intermex representatives to open an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank. The account number was XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that Account No. XX3503 was established as an agent account, with Moctezuma Envios acting as a money transmitter agent for Intermex. As such, Moctezuma Envios was authorized to deposit funds and payment instruments into the account. Robert Lisy and Darryl J. Ebbert, both employees of Intermex, were signatories on Account No. XX3503, and, as such, were the owners of the account. They were authorized to deposit funds into, withdraw funds from the account, and otherwise control the account. The persuasive evidence further shows that Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX3503.5/ Accordingly, they were not authorized to withdraw funds from the account. During the period spanning from January 2013 to late 2014, Respondents deposited payment instruments received through their check-cashing business into Account No. XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that once Respondents deposited the payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of those funds. This is because, as noted above, only Intermex representatives were authorized signatories on the account. When Respondents deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, those funds were thereafter "swept" into Account No. XX7788, which was Intermex's main operating account at U.S. Bank. This means that the funds were removed from Account No. XX3503 and deposited in Account No. XX7788. Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX7788, so did not have access to the funds in that account. As a result of Respondents not being signatories on either Account No. XX3503 or Account No. XX7788, once they deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of the funds paid under those payment instruments. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents deposited approximately ten percent of the payment instruments that they received from their check cashing business into Account No. XX3503 during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding. The other payment instruments were deposited into other accounts that Respondents held at other banks. Carrascal credibly testified that when Intermex first approached her about opening an account at U.S. Bank, she was concerned because she knew that the law required payment instruments to be deposited into the business's own commercial account. Thus, she declined to open such account. When Intermex representatives approached her a second time, they told her that the account would be in the name of Moctezuma Envios and assured her that Moctezuma Envios would be in compliance with the law. She believed them, so authorized them to open Account No. XX3503. Carrascal further testified, credibly and persuasively, that as soon as she received notice that Petitioner believed that Account No. XX3503 did not comply with the law, she closed the account and ceased doing business with Intermex and U.S. Bank. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents did not attempt to conceal any information or mislead Petitioner regarding Account No. XX3503. Carrascal credibly and persuasively testified that she had intended to fully comply with the law. She had received training in order to serve as Moctezuma Envios' compliance officer, and Moctezuma Envios has a legal compliance manual in place to help ensure that it complies with applicable laws. The evidence establishes that Moctezuma Envios has been disciplined twice for previous violations of applicable laws. Specifically, some time prior to December 2008, Moctezuma Envios failed to file currency transaction reports concerning cash received from another chapter 560 licensee and failed to timely file at least two quarterly reports, as required by statute and rule. In 2011, Moctezuma Envios failed to timely file a required quarterly report. Both violations were resolved pursuant to Stipulation and Consent Agreement between Petitioner and Moctezuma Envios, under which Moctezuma Envios paid fines and agreed to comply with the law in the future. Carrascal acknowledged that the violations had occurred, but testified, credibly, that in both instances, Respondents had not intended to violate the law, and that Respondents had cooperated with Petitioner to rectify the circumstances that had resulted in noncompliance. Petitioner has adopted rule 69V-560.1000, which codifies a penalty matrix that authorizes and enables Petitioner to impose a fine for a specific statutory or rule violation, based on the level of fine adopted in rule 69V-560.1000(150) and the number of times a licensee has violated that particular statute or rule. Rule 69V-560.1000(150) establishes a range of $1,000 to $3,500 for a Level A fine; $3,500 to $7,500 for a Level B fine; and $7,500 to $10,000 for a Level C fine. Here, Respondents are charged with having violated section 560.309(3) for the first time. Pursuant to rule 69V-560.1000(85), Respondents are subject to a Level B fine, which ranges from $3,500 to $7,500. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) sets forth the factors, which Petitioner characterizes as "aggravating" or "mitigating," that must be considered in determining the specific amount of the fine within the ranges established in rule 69V-560.1000(150). 29. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) states: In accordance with Sections 560.1141(2) and (3), F.S., the Office shall consider the following circumstances in determining an appropriate penalty within the range of penalties prescribed in this rule for each violation as based upon the citation number. The Office also shall consider these circumstances in determining a penalty that deviates from the range of penalties prescribed for each violation and citation number as a result of such circumstances: Whether the violation rate is less than 5% when compared to the overall sample size reviewed; The degree of harm to the customers or the public; The disciplinary history of the licensee; Whether the licensee detected and voluntarily instituted corrective responses or measures to avoid the recurrence of a violation prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee’s violation was the result of willful misconduct or recklessness; Whether at the time of the violation, the licensee had developed and implemented reasonable supervisory, operational or technical procedures, or controls to avoid the violation; Where the violation is attributable to an individual officer, director, responsible person, or authorized vendor, whether the licensee removed or otherwise disciplined the individual prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee attempted to conceal the violation or mislead or deceive the Office; The length of time over which the licensee engaged in the violations; Whether the licensee engaged in numerous violations or a pattern of misconduct; The number, size and character of the transactions in question; Whether the licensee provided substantial assistance to the Office in its examination or investigation of the underlying misconduct; Other relevant, case-specific circumstances. Andrew Grosmaire, Chief for Petitioner's Bureau of Enforcement, testified that Petitioner proposes to impose a $7,500 fine on Respondents, and explained the basis for that amount. Grosmaire testified that Petitioner did not have any information regarding several of the factors listed in rule 69V-560.1000, so did not "use" those factors in determining the fine to be imposed on Moctezuma Envios.6/ Specifically, Petitioner did not use the factors in subsections (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (l), and (m) in determining the fine. Petitioner did consider subsection (c), regarding the licensee's disciplinary history, in determining the fine. As discussed above, Petitioner presented evidence showing that Moctezuma Envios had been disciplined twice for violations of provisions of chapter 560 and implementing rules, albeit not for the same violation that is the subject of this proceeding.7/ Grosmaire noted that it was "unusual" for a licensee to have two previous violations. Petitioner thus considered Moctezuma Envios' disciplinary history an aggravating factor in determining the applicable fine. Petitioner also considered subsection (k), which addresses the number, size, and character of the transactions in question. According to Grosmaire, "100 percent of the checks were deposited into this account during the period in question," so Petitioner considered this an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate fine. As noted above, pursuant to rules 69V-560.1000(85), (147), and (148), Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Alleged Violation Florida case law holds that the determination of whether alleged conduct violates a statute or rule is a question of ultimate fact. Gross v. Dep't of Health, 819. So. 2d 997, 2002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st SCA 1995). For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondents did not own Account No. XX3503, into which payment instruments from Moctezuma Envios' check-cashing business were deposited. Although Respondents were able to deposit payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they were not signatories on the account so could not withdraw funds from that account. Further, Respondents were not signatories to, and therefore did not have access to funds in, Account No. XX7788, into which Intermex swept the funds from the deposited instruments in Account No. XX3503 on a routine basis. On this basis, it is determined that Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Moctezuma Envios and Liliana Carrascal, by virtue of being an affiliated party pursuant to section 560.103(1), violated section 560.309(3) by failing to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account at a federally- insured financial institution. As discussed above, Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500, the maximum amount that can be imposed for a Level B fine. Petitioner reached this amount taking into account the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(c) and (k), which it considered to be aggravating factors that militated imposition of a higher fine within the Level B range. As discussed above, Carrascal presented evidence regarding several of the factors in rule 69V-560.1000(148) considered in determining the appropriate fine. Specifically, Carrascal testified, persuasively, that no harm to her customers or the public resulted from Respondents' violation of section 560.309(3); that Respondents' violation of the statute was inadvertent and was the result of misrepresentation by Intermex, so that the violation was not the result of Respondents' willful conduct or recklessness; that Moctezuma Envios has in place a professionally-prepared compliance manual to help Respondents avoid future violations, including the type of violation at issue in this proceeding; that once Carrascal became aware that Petitioner believed Account No. XX3503 was noncompliant with section 560.309(3), she cooperated fully with Petitioner's investigation and did not attempt to conceal, mislead, or deceive Petitioner; that as soon as Carrascal became aware of the noncompliance issues with Account No. XX3503, she closed the account and Respondents terminated all business dealings with U.S. Bank and Intermex, the latter with which Respondents had a business relationship that predated the matters giving rise to this proceeding; and that the deposits into Account No. XX3503 constituted only approximately ten percent of the total deposits Respondents made during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding, with the other 90 percent being deposited in other accounts at other financial institutions. As discussed above, the undersigned found Respondents' evidence of mitigation regarding the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(b), (e), (f), (h), (k), and (l) credible and persuasive. Further, the undersigned considers relevant that in this case, Respondents affirmatively were misled into violating the law by Intermex.8/ Petitioners did not present persuasive countervailing evidence rebutting the evidence of mitigation presented by Respondents with respect to the amount of the fine. As noted above, Grosmaire testified that Petitioner considered subsections (c) and (k) as aggravating factors in determining that Respondents should be fined $7,500. Rule 69V- 560.1000(148) does not specifically address how much weight each factor should be assigned in determining the specific fine within the authorized range, and Grosmaire did not explain how the factors Petitioner "used" were weighed in arriving at the $7,500 fine. Considering the "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors on which the parties presented evidence, the undersigned determines that a $4,500 fine should be imposed on Respondents in this proceeding.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding that Respondents, Moctezuma Envios, Inc., and Liliana Carrascal, violated section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $4,250. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Jeralne C. Burt is registered with the Florida Board of Real Estate as a salesperson and was so registered at all times here involved. In the fall of 1977, Barbara Rogers came to Respondent's home seeking to purchase residential real estate and was shown several houses by Respondent. One of these houses she agreed to purchase. When asked how she wanted the contract made out, Barbara Rogers said make the contract in the name of Louise Rogers, her sister. The contract to purchase was prepared and given to Barbara Rogers to have executed. When this contract (Exhibit 1) was returned to Respondent it was signed Louise Rogers as the buyer, but the signature was not witnessed. After being assured that Louise had signed the contract to purchase, Respondent signed as a witness to the previously unwitnessed signature of Louise Rogers. At the time this offer was executed by the buyer, Respondent understood that Barbara Rogers was putting up the money for the cash required over the mortgage. Thereafter, Louise Rogers proceeded to the bank where the necessary documents were executed to qualify for an FHA morgage on the property. At the designated closing date Respondent drove to Barbara Rogers' house where Barbara was picked up and they went to the place Louise worked to pick her up. Louise came out to the car and told Respondent that she couldn't get off work and that Barbara could sign the papers for her. When Respondent said she thought Louise should come to the closing to sign, Louise replied that she and her sister signed each other's names all the time and that it was all riht for Barbara to execute the papers. Respondent and Barbara Rogers proceeded to the closing. No one inquired if Barbara Rogers was Louise Rogers, nor was she ever introduced as Louise Rogers. At the closing Barbara Rogers signed Louise Rogers' name on the various documents presented for signature. Due to the house requiring some repairs the closing was kept in escrow for approximately one week to ten days. During this escrow period the mortgage processor at the Barnett Bank, who had processed the application of Louise Rogers, received a phone call from a woman identifying herself as Louise Rogers inquiring when the closing on the house was to take place. When Louise Rogers said she had not executed any papers for the closing the bank officials quickly re-assembled the parties and this time all documents were executed by the real Louise Rogers. Although Respondent realized Louise Rogers should have signed the documents at closing, because of Louise's insistence that Barbara could sign for her and Respondent's previous experience of signing her grandmother's name for her the past two years of her grandmother's life, Respondent assumed the authorization for Barbara to sign Louise's name had been given.
Findings Of Fact During December of 1979, Fred H. Greene and his wife Marie L. Greene, decided to sell their residence located in St. Augustine, Florida. They listed the property with Respondent for a selling price of $55,000. Ms. Farrell holds a real estate salesman's license issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. At all times pertinent to this case she has been so licensed. In January 1980, Ms. Farrell presented an offer to purchase the Greene's home for $50,000. They agreed to the offer and entered into a Contract for Purchase and Sale on January 15, 1980. In the course of discussing how to structure the financing of the sale, Ms. Farrell suggested that the Greenes take back a $6,000 second mortgage from the purchasers, Harry and Margaret Carlyle. Mr. Greene wanted to know from Ms. Farrell how much in proceeds he would receive when the parties closed the sale. She made the following calculations: $50,000.00 Purchase Price -$31,000.00 Greene's First Mortgage held by McCaughn $19,000.00 $19,000.00 -$ 3,562.00 ----------- $15,438.00 Commission and Closing Costs tary Stamps, Abstract Cost) (Documen- $15,438.00 +$ 8,490.00 (Six Thousand Dollars Second Mortgage ----------- and Interest thereon at 10 percent) $23,928.00 These computations are incorrect. At closing the $6,000 second mortgage was not to be part of the cash distribution to the Greenes, but, was a debit against the cash proceeds. The above incorrect calculation is the only error made by Respondent in discussing the sales transaction with the Greenes. At all times relevant the Greenes were properly apprised of all the other details concerning the sale of their house. The miscalculation was an honest mistake on the part of Ms. Farrell. There is no evidence that it was made with the intent of misrepresenting anything to the Greenes. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the miscalculation was made negligently. Neither Ms. Farrell nor the Greenes knew she had made a mistake until the closing which was held on March 24, 1980. During the closing Ms. Judy White who was the closing agent for St. Johns Title and Abstract Company began to explain to the Greenes their closing statement. Mr. Greene pushed the statement away and said, "That's not what I expected to get." The statement showed that his cash proceeds were $9,144.46. The statement properly reflected the $6,000 second mortgage as a sellers' debit. Ms. White explained the statement to Mr. Greene several times, but he still did not understand why the cash proceeds did not equal the amount computed for him by Ms. Farrell during their early discussion. Mr. Greene was visibly upset and directed several angry questions towards Ms. Farrell concerning the discrepancy. Because she felt a need to control the closing proceedings, Ms. White vigorously intervened and attempted to answer Mr. Greene's questions. Both of the buyers who were also present at the closing urged the Greenes not to sign the closing documents if they had any questions or doubts about the sale. During the closing Ms. Farrell was not aware of her original mistake in miscalculating the closing proceeds. Neither the Carlyles, Ms. Farrell or Ms. White did anything to influence Mr. Greene to execute the closing documents. During his heated discussion of the figures with Ms. White, Mr. Greene's wife repeatedly urged him to be quiet and execute the documents. At one point she said, "Oh sign it, you son-of-a-bitch." Finally Mr. Greene relented and executed all of the closing documents which were then recorded. The proceeds of the sale were then disbursed. Prior to executing the closing documents the Greenes were fully apprised of all significant financial facts concerning the sale of their home to Harry and Margaret Carlyle. During the foregoing transaction Ms. Farrell represented the Greenes as their real estate salesperson. She did not become aware of the mistake in her calculation of the closing proceeds, until she discussed the matter with her real estate sales manager after the closing. Ms. Farrell has an excellent reputation for competency in the real estate profession, both in St. Johns County where the above transaction took place and in Broward County where she is now employed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent, Mary P. Farrell be DISMISSED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 18th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October,1982
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, whether any disciplinary action against his licensure status is warranted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material herein, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 00335420. The last license issued was as a salesman, c/o Ancla Realty, Inc., 292 Aragon, Coral Gables, Florida 33134. Respondent, on or about January 24, 1983, in Dade County, Florida, did unlawfully obtain or use, or did endeavor to obtain or use the property of another, Steffi Downs or Joann Downs, being a lamp, with the intent to deprive that person of the right to the property or of a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto, in violation of Subsection 812.014 (1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes. As a result thereof, an information alleging petit theft was filed against the Respondent on March 1, 1983. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the information and by order of April 22, 1983, Respondent was found guilty of petit theft, adjudication was withheld, Respondent was placed on six months probation and was assessed $100.00 court costs.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is Recommended that a Final Order be entered which would: Dismiss Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Find the Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint; and Revoke the Respondent's license, without prejudice to his reapplication for licensure upon a showing of rehabilitation. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Eddie Garcia 1260 N. W. 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33167 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando Florida 32801
