Findings Of Fact The following facts are based upon the stipulation of the parties (Exhibit 1): Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Massachusetts in 1979. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Connecticut in 1980. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was an apprenticed optician with various licensed opticians in the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the past four to five years. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, on or about May, 1980, while living and employed in Connecticut, made a telephone call to the Board of Opticians in the State of Florida, with reference to her eligibility in taking the examination for a dispensing opticians license. After Petitioner detailed her formal training and work experience, she was advised that she was qualified to take the Florida Opticians Examination as the result of her having been licensed in both the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut and having five years apprentice experience. The Board of Opticians then mailed her an application form which she filled out and returned to them with a seventy five dollar ($75.00) money order for the examination and twenty dollars ($20.00) to register with the State of Florida. As a direct result of this telephone conversation with a representative of the Board of Opticians of the Department of Professional Regulations of the State of Florida, the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, quit her job in Connecticut and moved to Florida anticipating taking the aforesaid examination. After she had moved to Florida in reliance of the representations made to her by the Board of Opticians, she was notified that she was not qualified to take the said examination. Petitioner's application was considered by the Board of Opticianry on July 10, 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida and it was found that the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, did not meet the statutory requirements of s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), although at the time she contacted the Board, she did meet the requirements of s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), which was the prior licensing statute for the Board of Opticianry and was no longer in effect at the time. The Board further held that they did not have the authority to admit Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, into the examination .for licensure as an optician in the State of Florida since she did not qualify under the current statute, s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), even if they felt she had relied on the Board's prior representations that she would be allowed to take the examination to her detriment. The sole issue for consideration at this hearing is whether the Board of Opticianry has the authority to allow the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, to sit for the next examination for a license to be a dispensing optician in the State of Florida on the basis that the Board of Opticianry is estopped for asserting the new statute as a denial of her right to sit for the next exam since she has detrimentally relied on their representation that her qualifications under the old statute, s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), qualified her to sit immediately for said examination." The following are additional Findings of Fact based upon testimony adduced at the hearing: When Petitioner made her telephone call to the Board of Opticians in May, 1980, she asked to speak to one of the Board members, but was assured by a woman who answered the phone that she could answer any questions Petitioner might have concerning her qualifications. At this time, Petitioner informed the person taking the call that she planned to move to Florida if she was qualified to take the examination for a dispensing optician license. Petitioner thereafter moved to Florida and is now employed by Sheppard Optical at Delray Beach, Florida where she is earning $200.00 a week. She was making approximately $300.00 a week when she left Connecticut and anticipated a higher income when she commenced practicing under her opticians license in Connecticut. (Testimony of Petitioner) Prior to the consolidation of the various state licensing boards into the Department of Professional Regulation in 1979, the practice of the Board of Opticianry, under the apprentice requirements of Section 484.03, Florida Statutes, (1977) was to permit individuals who had apprenticed in another state, but not in Florida, for the specified time of not less than three years, to register with the Board, and then make application for and take the examination for licensure. This was frequently done by means of telephone calls authorizing the individual to make application. In some cases, letters were sent which contained a similar authorization. Subsequent to Petitioner's telephone call to the Board in May, 1980, the new Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry, Herbert F. Varn, changed this practice to conform to the applicable statute which requires individuals to register as an apprentice with the Board and not admit such individuals to examination until after they had thereafter completed the requisite three year period of apprenticeship. In some isolated cases, the Board had permitted individuals who had previously received a letter authorizing them to take the examination, even though they had not been registered in Florida for the requisite three year period, to take the examination. However, after reorganization, the Board did not permit individuals to take the examination based solely upon any oral assurances received from persons in the prior Executive Director's office. (Testimony of Varn) The order of the Board of Opticianry, dated September 2, 1981, denying Petitioner's application stated that she had not met the statutory requirements for licensure by examination pursuant to Section 484.067(1), Florida Statutes, because she had not completed the requisite two school year course of study in a recognized school of opticianry, had not actively practiced as a licensed optician in another state for more than three years preceding the application, and had not registered as an apprentice with the Department and served not less than a three year apprenticeship under appropriate supervision. The present Executive Director of the Board is of the opinion that there would be no detriment to the public if Petitioner was allowed to sit for the examination based on her prior training and experience, but acknowledges that this is a matter for Board determination. (Testimony of Varn, pleadings)
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Elizabeth Nicolitz who has been actively licensed in Florida as an optician since May 1, 1985. The Respondents are the Board of Opticianry and the Department of Professional Regulation. The Petitioner sought her attorney's fees and costs from an administrative proceeding, DOAH Case No. 92-1477, which was initiated by the filing of an administrative complaint on October 23, 1991, seeking disciplinary action against the Petitioner. The First District Court of Appeal summarized the facts and law leading up to this attorney's fees and costs case in Nicolitz v. Board of Opticianry and Department of Professional Regulation, 609 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), as: Nicolitz was previously placed on probation and ordered to file quarterly reports. When two of those reports were late filed, an administrative complaint was filed against her. Through counsel she executed an "election of rights" form and disputed the allegations of fact and sought a formal hearing before a Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) hearing officer in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was referred to DOAH, where counsel for the Depart- ment of Professional Regulation (Department) and counsel for Nicolitz entered into a prehearing stipulation. The Department construed this stipula- tion as demonstrating an absence of disputed issues of material fact and, in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 22I-6.033, moved the hearing officer to relinquish jurisdiction. The DOAH hearing officer considered Nicolitz's response in opposition to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction, heard oral argument, and denied the motion. Several weeks later, and one day before the scheduled formal hearing, counsel for the Department filed an "notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice." This pleading essentially tracked the earlier motion to relinquish jurisdiction in concluding that no material issues of fact were in dispute, and sought dismissal without prejudice to the Department's right to proceed before the Board of Opticianry (Board) in an informal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. The hearing officer entered an order which "ratified" the voluntary dismissal and purported to dismiss the administrative complaint. See F.A.C. Rule 22I-6.037. When an informal hearing was scheduled before the Board, Nicolitz petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition and we issued an order to show cause. We have considered the petition, the responses of the Department and the Board, and petitioner's reply, and grant relief. . . . [The opposition] is based in part on an argument that [Ms. Nicolitz] has failed to acknowledge and comprehend the relationship between the Department and the Board in disciplinary proceedings. While we agree that relationship is key to proper resolution of this dispute, we find it is respondents [Department and Board] who miss the mark. The disciplinary proceeding essentially evolves in three stages, the first being an investigation by the Department and its report to the Board as to the existence of probable cause. See SS. 455.225(1), (2), and (3), Fla. Stat. (1991). The Board then may direct the Department to file an formal complaint and the Department shall "prosecute that complaint pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120." S. 455.225(4), Fla. Stat. The prosecution, second stage of the disciplinary proceeding, may or may not result in a referral to DOAH, but if it does, the relationship of the Board and the Department is altered. In the first stage, and during the third stage when jurisdiction returns to the Board and it enters a final order in accordance with section 455.225(6), the Board is a quasi-judicial body and the Department acts as an investigative and prosecuting authority. While jurisdiction lies with DOAH, however, that tribunal has jurisdiction and the Board is a party to the proceedings. S.120.57(1)(b)(3). During the DOAH proceedings, the Department acts as counsel of record for the Board and, we conclude, the Board must be bound by its counsel's actions. Those actions include voluntary dismissal of a complaint. Petitioner filed her attorney's fees and costs petition pursuant to Section 57.111 F.S. with the Division of Administrative Hearings on February 26, 1993, less than sixty days after the District Court's mandate issued. That is the case sub judice. She seeks attorney's fees and costs starting from October 29, 1991. The disciplinary litigation and administrative background between Ms. Nicolitz and Respondents could be described as a long and dreary "mini war," fought in sequential encounters. An abbreviated chronology of this epic struggle is essential to reach the material issues at bar, and illustrates that most of the time the right hand of the bureaucracy had no idea what its left hand was doing, even when the right hand directed the left hand to act. Ms. Nicolitz was licensed in Florida as a Dispensing Optician Lic. No. DO 0002492, and owned an optical establishment in Jacksonville known as "Specs and Company, Inc." During the summer of 1986, Ms. Nicolitz became the sponsor of an apprentice optician named Douglas H. Stewart. Chapter 484 F.S. permits licensed opticians to sponsor an apprentice optician for training purposes and allows the apprentice to perform a limited number of opticianry tasks, subject to the regulations contained in Rules 21P-16.001 through 21P-16.011 F.A.C. On June 30, 1986, while Ms. Nicolitz was away from the establishment, apprentice Stewart measured a patient's pupillary distance and segment height for assembling and fitting a pair of glasses in apparent violation of Rule 21P- 16.003 F.A.C. On December 12, 1986, the Department initiated disciplinary action against Ms. Nicolitz's license through the filing of a formal complaint styled DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0072717. The case was subsequently resolved by stipulation of the parties, and Ms. Nicolitz signed the stipulation on March 23, 1987. The stipulation was then presented to the Board of Opticianry on April 10, 1987. A final order was filed May 12, 1987, ordering Ms. Nicolitz to pay an administrative fine of $250.00 within 30 days. Additionally, she would be placed on probation for one year and as a condition of probation, she was required to file quarterly reports, commencing the first of the month three months from the date of the filing of the final order. On May 12, 1987, Ms. Patricia B. Guilford, Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry wrote Ms. Nicolitz pointing out that the final order had been officially filed and as such, the terms of the March 23, 1987 stipulation must now be fulfilled. Ms. Guilford also pointed out that the administrative fine of $250.00 was due on or before June 12, 1987 and that Ms. Nicolitz's probation had begun, effective May 12, 1987, and would end June 12, 1988. The letter further specified that there were "specific terms and conditions" of probation that had to be met. As part of the letter, she included a copy of the filed final order. This package was sent by U.S. Certified Mail to Ms. Nicolitz and was signed for by her agent. Ms. Nicolitz paid the $250 fine on June 1, 1987. However, she did not thereafter file her quarterly reports with the Board in satisfaction of the other terms of her stipulation. On October 6, 1990, the Board of Opticianry filed a new administrative complaint, styled DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0106310, alleging that Ms. Nicolitz had violated the previous final order by failing to submit the required quarterly reports in a timely fashion. Ms. Nicolitz responded to the Department by asserting that she had never received the final order, especially in reference to the probation requirement. On the advice of counsel, Ms. Nicolitz suggested that a new stipulation agreement be entered between her and the Department calling for new starting dates for her probation and quarterly reports. As agreed to, the new stipulation required Ms. Nicolitz to file quarterly reports on March 31, 1990, June 30, 1990, September 30, 1990, and December 31, 1990. In entering into the new stipulation agreement, the Department took into consideration allegations made by Ms. Nicolitz and her counsel that the final order may not have been properly served upon her, and agreed to dismiss pending complaint DPR v. Elizabeth Nicolitz, Case No. 0106310, filed October 6, 1990. That case was presented to the November 18, 1989 Probable Cause Panel for closure. The Panel heard the arguments and agreed to closure. During all of this period, agency personnel had harbored suspicions of Ms. Nicolitz because they felt she should have known what to do and when to do it because she had signed the stipulation and because of the agent's signature on the receipt for the final order. There were misinterpretations of the earlier closing order and attorneys for both parties fired off accusatory, and eventually explanatory and apologetic, letters. In any case, it was abundantly clear as of November 18, 1989 at the latest, that Ms. Nicolitz knew she must file her quarterly reports on March 31, 1990, June 30, 1990, September 30, 1990, and December 31, 1990. As per her agreement, Ms. Nicolitz submitted her first and second quarterly report on March 22, 1990 and June 1, 1990, respectively. However, she failed to submit the third quarterly report which was due September 30, 1990. The Board sent her a letter notifying her that she was delinquent. She then submitted the third report on October 16, 1990. She was again late with the filing of her last quarterly report due December 31, 1990. The Board once again notified her of the delinquency, and she submitted the last quarterly report on February 11, 1991. On October 23, 1991, a formal administrative complaint was filed. It charged Ms. Nicolitz with a violation of Section 484.014(1)(i) F.S., which provides for discipline of a licensee for: Violation of a lawful order of the board or department previously entered in a disciplinary hearing or failing to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena of the department. That administrative complaint became the underlying DOAH Case No. 92-1477, the procedural history of which is set out in Findings of Fact 3-4 supra. A more detailed factual history behind how the administrative complaint came to be filed is set out infra. There has never been any dispute that Ms. Nicolitz filed her first two of four required probation reports on time or that they were properly mailed directly to the Department of Professional Regulation instead of the Board. Since it was due on September 30, 1990, Ms. Nicolitz's third report, dated October 16, 1990, was 16 days late when she wrote it. Administrative Assistant Leah R. Hickel is an employee of the Board of Opticianry, whose paycheck is issued by the Department. In a letter dated October 17, 1990 Ms. Hickel advised Ms. Nicolitz that her quarterly report due September 30 had not been timely received and that she had thirty days from the date of Ms. Hickel's October 17, 1990 letter (i.e. November 16, 1990) to file the third quarterly report and comply with the terms of the final order. Ms. Nicolitz's October 16, 1990 report was stamped in as received by the Board on October 23, 1990. Ms. Hickel's letter and Ms. Nicolitz's third report must have crossed in the mail, but the third report was clearly timely received by the Board within the terms of Ms. Hickel's letter, and it may be reasonably inferred to have been received even earlier by the Department. Ms. Hickel sent a similar letter to Ms. Nicolitz on February 6, 1991 to the effect that Ms. Nicolitz's December 31, 1990 final quarterly report had not yet been received and that she must submit it within 30 days (i.e. March 8, 1991). The fourth report was filed with both Respondents within the time-frame provided in that letter. Contrary to the testimony of Susan J. Foster, the current Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry, and Manty Morse, a member of the Board and one of the members of the Probable Cause Panel which arrived at the new administrative complaint on September 16, 1991, the overwhelming record evidence is to the effect that Leah Hickel had apparent authority to extend the time for Ms. Nicolitz to file her third and fourth reports. Also, on the issue of whether or not Ms. Hickel had actual authority to extend probationers' time for reporting, it is found that she did. The Board had adopted a policy of extending by 30 days the time for filing probation reports as reflected by the minutes of an open meeting held November 3, 1989, stating: "The Board directed Ms. Hickel to send a 30-day letter any time a person is found not in compliance with a Final Order and to refer to complaints if they do not respond." (Emphasis supplied). Board Member Dale Wenal, the Board attorney, Theresa Bender, and the Department prosecutor, Renee Alsobrook, were present at the February 9, 1990 Board meeting when the November 3, 1989 Board meeting minutes were discussed and adopted. Board members, including Ms. Wenal, voted for adoption of the minutes, and both sets of minutes were preserved as a standard business record of the Board. This method of doing regular Board business, i.e. the instruction of its support service personnel, was common practice of this particular collegiate body. Under these circumstances, it is immaterial that a formal motion and vote to "create" such a policy did not occur at either meeting. It is also immaterial that Ms. Wenal and Ms. Morse were not present at the November 3, 1989 meeting and that Ms. Morse was not present at the February 9, 1990 meeting. No one for either the Board or the Department notified Ms. Nicolitz that she was in violation upon her late-filing of the third or fourth probation reports, filed within the extensions granted by Ms. Hickel on October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991. However, on February 12, 1991, Ms. Hickel sent a memorandum to Denise Love, Senior Complaint Analyst, to the effect that she now wanted to initiate a complaint for violating the prior final order. Ms. Love advised Ms. Nicolitz via a February 26, 1991 letter of a preliminary investigation. Ms. Love already had signed the Department's internal uniform complaint form on February 21, 1991. To further obfuscate what the agency(ies) were doing, while the Department was initiating the investigation preparatory to an administrative complaint for late filed reports, Ms. Hickel notified Ms. Nicolitz by letter dated March 1, 1991 that: This will acknowledge receipt of your last quarterly report, received in this office on February 15, 1991. Please be advised we are notifying the office of licensure to remove your license from pro- bationary status, this date. The effect of the foregoing letter was to remove Ms. Nicolitz's license from probationary status as of March 1, 1991. By letter of March 28, 1991, Ms. Love invited a response to her February 26, 1991 letter from Ms. Nicolitz. Ms. Nicolitz, now thoroughly confused and frustrated, responded that she had sent all her reports and Ms. Hickel had acknowledged receipt thereof. On April 30, 1991, Ms. Love sent a similar letter to Ms. Nicolitz stating that no response from Ms. Nicolitz had been received. Ms. Nicolitz's attorney then entered the fray and wrote Ms. Love on May 21, 1991 advising her of the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter removing Ms. Nicolitz from probation. Ms. Love had already prepared an investigative synopsis to the file dated May 8, 1991. It was not altered thereafter by her. It reads: SECTION I - ALLEGED VIOLATION Failure to comply with terms of Final Order previously entered in a disciplinary hearing; violation of a rule. STATUTE/RULE NUMBER Rule 21P-8.020(2)(i), FAC; Section 484.014(1)(g), Fla. Stat. SECTION II - SYNOPSIS This investigation is predicated on the receipt of a complaint on 2/14/91 from the Board of Opticianry, alleging that Subject has failed to comply with the terms of the Final Order issued in DPR case #0072717. Subject was placed on probation and required to submit quarterly reports to the Board, but has not done so; Subject was notified of the complaint by letter to inquire dated 2/26/91 and again on 4/30/91. Response from Subject was received 4/24/91. Subject states that she has now complied with the terms of the Final Order and has submitted all of her quarterly reports. She says that Leah Hickel of the Board of Opticianry will confirm this. (Emphasis supplied). The Probable Cause Panel (Ms. Manty Morse and Ms. Dale Wenal) had at least the following items before them when considering Ms. Nicolitz's case on September 16, 1991: a uniform complaint form, a proposed closing order and a recommendation for a letter of guidance, an administrative complaint, a previously issued final order and attached affidavit of service, a memorandum of finding of probable cause, the four letters from Ms. Nicolitz to the Board purporting to be her quarterly reports, findings made by the Department, the two "extension" letters from Leah Hickel dated October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991, the investigative synopsis, and the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter removing Ms. Nicolitz from probation. The materials had been received and reviewed by panel members earlier. Ms. Marcel Flannigan of the Department, Renee Alsobrook and Lucy Sneider, attorneys for the Department, and Theresa Bender, Counsel for the Board of Opticianry, were also present for the meeting. The direct evidence at formal hearing by Manty Morse was that she was unaware as of the September 16, 1991 Probable Cause Panel meeting of the Board's prior delegation of authority to Ms. Hickel and that she had not interpreted the Hickel letters as granting an extension for Ms. Nicolitz's third and fourth reports. With the advice of counsel, the panel had viewed each day which the probation reports were late as a separate violation of the prior final order which had never been formally modified. The exchange at the Probable Cause Panel Meeting went as follows: A VOICE: She's saying she filed her reports on April 17th of 1991. MS. ALSOBROOK: After Lea wrote. A VOICE: After. In other words, had she not written to her we'd still be waiting for her. MS. ALSOBROOK: And we also wrote her on September 30th of 1990 and she sent her report for that quarter in on October 23rd. So you may want to file an AC. It's up to you. A VOICE: An AC, air conditioning? MS. ALSOBROOK: An administrative complaint. What would you all like? You have probable cause; you can do either one. It's up to you. A VOICE: Well I would find probable cause, okay, and do file an Administrative Complaint. MS. BENDER: Okay. So you previously had found probable cause and -- A VOICE: Letter of Guidance. MS. BENDER: -- wanted to close it with a letter of guidance. A VOICE: But I would like to change that and have an Administrative Complaint. I don't feel good about this the other way. THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. MS. ALSOBROOK: What section, 484.014(i), failure to comply with Final Orders? THE CHAIRPERSON: You don't want to send a letter to -- you want a response. A VOICE: I can't imagine that they would have attorneys -- MS. ALSOBROOK: Ready for the next one? (Whereupon, the above matter was concluded) Ms. Morse's formal hearing testimony essentially corroborated the statements made by the panel members at the September 16, 1991, Probable Cause Panel meeting. Her comments reflect the following, in part: Q With regard to the Nicolitz case, do you remember being provided with the entire investigative file? A Yes. Q When you reviewed this file to find probable cause, can you explain briefly why probable cause was found? A Probable cause was found because she didn't file her reports on time. Q Did the panel consider that each day that the reports were beyond the cutoff date for the quarter to be a violation? A Yes, we did. And we were upset that it had taken this long for her compliance and still she had not done it in a timely manner. Q Did you consider her to be, in essence, ignoring the Board? [objection] Q How did you interpret Ms. Nicolitz's actions as far as the late filing? A Well, the way the panel saw them, myself and Mrs. Wenal, was that she really didn't care, you know, and that's why we were both upset. So, she was just disregarding all the orders that were given to her previously and now, even though we had extended for her to file her reports, you know, two years, three years later. Q Do you recall if the prosecutor had recommended that you find probable cause? A Yes. Q Do you recall if the prosecutor had indicated a recommended penalty or action after you found probable cause? A I remember that they wanted a letter of guidance at that time. Q What is a letter of guidance? A It's to explain to her that there was probable cause found and for her to, you know, tell what went wrong and to guide her so she would not do it again, I guess. Q Did the panel decide to issue a letter of guidance? A At first we thought that was the proper thing to do. But then when we got into discussion, that we saw how far the case went and we saw all this inconsistency, you know, and she still filed late, that's when we decided not to go with the recommendation of the attorney. Q And what was the direction of the probable cause panel to the prosecutor? A It was to find probable cause, that we had found, and to file an administrative complaint. (Emphasis supplied) It is accepted that at the time of the Probable Cause Panel meeting, Ms. Morse did not have actual knowledge of the actual authority reposed in Ms. Hickel by the Board's actions of November 3, 1989 and February 9, 1990, but Ms. Morse's lack of actual knowledge of the Board's directive to Ms. Hickel is not controlling as to whether or not the panel's decision to file a new administrative complaint was substantially justified. Board members have a duty to advise themselves concerning the Board directives which have been previously issued to staff. Nor is it indicative of substantial justification whether or not Ms. Nicolitz knew of the content of the prior Board minutes. It is material whether the Probable Cause Panel knew or should have known on September 16, 1991, when it determined there was probable cause Petitioner had committed a violation, rejected the Department's recommendation for closing, and instructed the Department to file an administrative complaint, that the prior Board directive permitting extensions had been issued and what the panel did, knowing that the extensions had been granted. From her presence and vote on February 9, 1990, it may be inferred that on September 16, 1991 Ms. Wenel had actual knowledge of Ms. Hickel's actual authority to grant extensions and ignored it. It also is clear that on September 16, 1991, both Ms. Wenal and Ms. Morse also ignored the apparent authority of Ms. Hickel's October 17, 1990 and February 6, 1991 letters, which were physically before them, and knew of and also ignored Ms. Nicolitz's ultimate compliance with those letters, which were also before them, and that both Panel members did so because the Hickel letters were contrary to the members' subjective perception that Ms. Nicolitz had been ignoring them and their prior final orders. They also ignored the apparent ratification of Ms. Nicolitz's probation compliance contained in the March 1, 1991 Hickel letter. Their deliberations indicate no adequate basis for a probable cause determination since they had Ms. Nicolitz's quarterly reports and Ms. Hickel's extension letters before them and could not have been misled by the Department's report to the effect that Ms. Nicolitz only "states that she has now complied." (Emphasis supplied) The Department report also told them that Ms. Nicolitz requested that they ask Ms. Hickel to confirm all her assertions. Leah Hickel worked for the Board. Had the Panel consulted Leah Hickel, any doubts concerning her authority to grant extensions could have been cleared up. Therefore, the Panel ignored all exculpatory evidence pointed out by the accused. The Panel did not have a basis in law or fact for the administrative complaint actually filed. The Panel also deviated from proper legal and standard procedure by not conducting a clear vote on a finding of probable cause. 1/ Ms. Nicolitz's first report (March 22, 1990) stated that as of December 1989, she had closed Specs and Company Inc.'s optical business and that for the first quarter she had not practiced opticianry. The second report (June 1, 1990) stated she had not practiced opticianry in the second quarter. The third report (October 16, 1990) stated she had done nothing optical at all during the third quarter, other than going to a few optical meetings. The fourth report (February 11, 1991) reported that nothing had changed, Petitioner was not working for anyone as an optician and she had not done so for the last quarter of 1990. Ms. Nicolitz's four reports to the Board under the terms of her probation were that she had "closed Spec's and Company's Optical Business;" was home "out of all business settings;" "had not practiced opticianry," "was not operating a business and had not done anything optical at all," and "was not working optically or for anyone as an optician," throughout the whole of 1990. Despite a great deal of backpedalling on the foregoing representations as contained in pleadings and papers filed immediately prior to formal hearing with the intent to defuse Respondents' motion for summary final order of dismissal, Ms. Nicolitz's oral testimony at formal hearing does not appear to materially alter the representations contained in her four reports for the year 1990. To the extent that she has made any inconsistent statements in any form concerning the year 1990, those statements are found not to be credible. It is therefore found that Ms. Nicolitz was not operating as a "small business party" during the whole of 1990. With regard to her situation in 1991-1992, the only years relevant to the attorney's fees and costs incurred in the underlying case, Ms. Nicolitz testified that she operated Specs and Company, Inc. as an optical shop only until December 1989, when she closed it and moved into her two residential garages the portion of optical equipment which she was unable to sell. She did this, because, as she put it, "a question of conflict of interest arose" with her opthalmologist husband's work at Baptist Eye Institute. Specs and Company, Inc. was not administratively dissolved until October 9, 1992, but it was clearly no more than a de facto corporation at all times material. Ms. Nicolitz appeared in her individual capacity in the underlying case, and Specs and Company, Inc. was not a party. Prior to her licensure, Ms. Nicolitz was apparently only an appentice employee of the corporation. It is unclear if that status of "employee" altered after she was licensed in 1985. From 1982 until Ms. Nicolitz ceased to compete with her husband due to alleged "conflict of interest" in 1989, her corporation had all the indicia of doing business including maintaining a location open to the public during normal business hours; providing opticianry services to customers; having optical equipment, a lease agreement, secretarial staff, office equipment, finishing lab, city occupational license, business stationery, advertising, income, bank accounts; filing returns and paying sales and corporate taxes; and filing W-2 forms for employees. After 1989, any equipment which had not been sold sat in residential garages, and Ms. Nicolitz maintained no occupational license or any other indicia of a business. She specifically did not operate a business for profit out of any location labelled "Specs and Company, Inc." or "Elizabeth Nicolitz, O.D." at any time after December, 1989. Ms. Nicolitz's testimony and her answers to discovery were inconsistent or vacillated with regard to whether or not she considered what she personally did during 1991-1992 to constitute "practicing opticianry." Putting the best light on it, Ms. Nicolitz was clear that she did not think anything she did for family or friends during 1991-1992 constituted practicing opticianry "until I thought about it," immediately before a hearing on the motion for summary final order in this fees case. Her position at formal hearing was that merely maintaining an active individual professional opticianry license was sufficient to constitute "practicing opticianry." She gave as an example of what she was capable of doing as, "[A]t any time if I wanted to practice opticianry that I could. If someone was absent at, let's say Lens Crafters and they needed me to come in, I would bring my license in with me and practice under Lens Crafters with my new license for them." Admittedly, however, she never was actually employed anywhere by any other optician during this period of time. Rather, she listed herself for income tax purposes in both 1991 and 1992 as a "consultant" employee of her husband's business, "Ernest Nicolitz, M.D. P.A." She testified that this term meant "design consultant." Her husband is a medical physician, an opthalmologist. The total of the practice of opticianry now recollected by Ms. Nicolitz for 1991-1992 is that over some unspecified period of time, on sporadic occasions, she pushed lenses back into glasses frames for children whose names she did not know and with whom she had no ongoing relationship when their tumbling activities at a gym she belongs to resulted in the lenses popping out; in March or April of 1991, she replaced stripped screws in a neighbor's damaged glasses frames and heated the frames in hot water to mold them back in shape for the neighbor's face; later, she sold the same neighbor some glasses frames with nonprescription display lenses for the neighbor's mother, apparently without ever seeing the mother, and definitely without reporting the $50 sale as professional or any other type of income, and without paying any sales or other tax thereon. Ms. Nicolitz derived no pay as an optician for any of these activities and had no prescription for the tumblers, the neighbor, or the neighbor's mother. She had her professional license but no occupational license in her own name. Also, at a time no more definite than "in the fall" of 1991, Ms. Nicolitz was involved in fitting hunting glasses for her husband and son, one pair each. At her home, upon written prescriptions from her opthalmologist husband, Ms. Nicolitz fitted frames to her husband's face and her son's face, took the offset of the pupillary distance due to the scope on a gun and then "we figured out the density of the lenses we would be using and we figured out, what, you know, color tones we wanted to use in the lens. And then we ordered the lenses and had them ground at a lab to my specifications." Although she testified that her husband did not know how to offset the optical center for the hunting glasses and could not physically measure himself, her overall description shows Ms. Nicolitz was working under the direction, not of a customer, but of her husband, the opthalmologist, for whom she worked as a "consultant." She charged no separate opticianry fees and had no occupational license in her own name. Clearly, she was intentionally not in competition individually in her own right or as "Specs and Company, Inc." with her husband for "conflict of interest" purposes. Ms. Nicolitz and her C.P.A., Mr. Shelton, whose expert testimony came by way of deposition, estimated her personal net worth as between $400,000 and $450,000 for 1991-1992, but given that Ms. Nicolitz's C.P.A. made his estimates purely for family financial planning purposes 2/ and Ms. Nicolitz eschewed any concrete knowledge of her own financial affairs, their evidence does not establish Petitioner's net worth. The Department's C.P.A. expert witness estimated the combined worth of Ms. Nicolitz and her husband as $2,190,000, based upon tax returns and Mr. Shelton's deposition. No evidence categorized Petitioner's personal net worth as derived in any significant part as related to her practice of opticianry, or established the net worth of Specs and Company, Inc. or broke out with reasonable clarity Ms. Nicolitz's "personal net worth from personal and business investments." The testimony of the three attorneys who testified as to fees and costs has been thoughtfully considered and weighed. It is found that Petitioner was obligated to her attorney for fees and costs for 15.30 hours and no allowable costs as of the date of voluntary dismissal of the underlying case, for 40.30 hours and $279.70 in allowable costs as of the date the initial petition for fees and costs was filed February 26, 1993, for 40.30 hours and $279.70 in allowable costs as of the date of filing of the amended fees and costs petition herein; and for 126.30 attorney hours and $368.05 costs as of the commencement of formal hearing on fees and costs herein. The rate of $200.00 dollars per hour charged by Petitioner's counsel is a reasonable hourly rate, given the unique circumstances of this case. At that rate, Petitioner's counsel established sufficient hours to reach the $15,000 statutory cap prior to the commencement of formal hearing on the attorney's fees and costs issues. 3/
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a passing score on the clinical examination of the July 2002 optometry licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner earned a bachelor of science degree in mathematics from Baylor University in 1978 and a doctor of optometry degree from the University of Houston in 1982. He subsequently became licensed to practice optometry in West Virginia and Texas. After practicing for years in West Virginia, Petitioner practiced for 13 years in Texas before moving to Florida in June 1999. In July 2002, Petitioner took the clinical examination portion of the optometry licensure examination. To obtain a license, a candidate must pass this portion of the examination, as well as the portions pertaining to pharmacology and ocular disease and Florida laws and rules. Petitioner has already passed these other portions, so the clinical examination is what he must pass to earn a Florida license. The clinical examination is a practical examination in which a candidate must demonstrate specific procedures. Respondent selects the procedures to be demonstrated on the basis of their importance to the practice of optometry. Respondent scores the clinical examination by averaging the scores of two examiners, who score the candidate's work independent of each other. The clinical examination is divided into two sections, and a different pair of examiners score each section. An examiner must be a Florida-licensed optometrist for at least three years prior to the examination. The examiner may not be under investigation or have been found to have violated Chapter 456 or 463, Florida Statutes. Prior to performing their duties, examiners must attend a standardization program, at which they are trained in identifying the skills to be examined and the standards to be applied. All of the examiners for a specific examination date attend the same standardization program, at which Respondent's coordinators present several hundred slides showing correct and incorrect procedures and answer any questions that examiners may have. In general, Petitioner challenges the work of one of Respondent's staff in rescoring his examination and calculating his score as 74.10. Although still not a passing grade, 74.10 is one point closer to passing than was his originally reported score of 73.10. However, this staffperson rechecked her work and later confirmed that 73.10 was the correct score. At the hearing, Petitioner specifically challenged Questions 33(b), 33(c), 35(b), 37(a), and 38(b). These questions are all from the same section of the examination, so the same two examiners scored each of them. In Questions 33(b) and (c), the candidate must perform tonometry on a nondilated eye and demonstrate the proper mires width and correct mire alignment, respectively. For Question 33(b), Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires width was "too thin," and Examiner 242 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires width was "too thin" and there was "not enough flourescein." For Question 33(c), Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the mires were "no [sic] aligned," and Examiner 242 gave Petitioner no credit, noting that the "mires [were] off." Petitioner has failed to prove error in either score. For Question 33(b), both examiners found the same condition. The candidate, not the examiner, as Petitioner claimed, is responsible for adding flourescein. Insufficient flourescein would leave the mires too thin. Examiner 242's additional note explains the source of Petitioner's error in Question 33(b). Petitioner's argument that he could still obtain a proper ultimate reading despite insufficient flourescein and thin mires lines misses the point of the question, which is to determine if candidates can take the conventional steps toward the ultimate objective of estimating intraocular pressure. For Question 33(c), both examiners drew similar pictures showing that Petitioner's mires lines were misaligned. Petitioner produced no evidence to the contrary. His argument that he could not have answered Question 34 correctly without solving Question 33(c) misses the point of Question 34, which is merely to determine if a candidate can accurately read a dial. For Question 35(b), the candidate must demonstrate proper illumination of an inferior angle of the eye. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "poor lighting." It is entirely possible that Examiner 242, who was first to examine the demonstrated angle, found adequate lighting, but, due perhaps to patient movement with no readjustment, Examiner 143 found inadequate lighting. In this procedure, only one examiner can check the angle at a time. For Question 37(a), the candidate must determine the presence of iris processes by showing the correct response and clear focus. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, noting that Petitioner "repositioned [patient] and got focus of angle and answered correctly," but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "no view or focus." As noted by Examiner 242, Petitioner had to reposition the patient and did so to earn credit for this item. Evidently, Petitioner failed to do so for Examiner 143. For Question 38(b), the candidate must demonstrate the specified angle of the eye with proper illumination. Examiner 242 gave Petitioner credit, but Examiner 143 gave Petitioner no credit, noting "no view of angle." Again, the most likely reason for the loss of a view was patient movement without an accompanying readjustment of the focus. Petitioner has failed to prove that he is entitled to any additional points for the clinical examination portion of the optometry licensing examination that he took in July 2002.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Optometry enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the clinical examination portion of the July 2002 optometry licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C07 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 A. S. Weekley, Jr. Holland & Knight LLP Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cassandra Pasley Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue Whether Dunlop violated Rules 21P-1.012 and 21P-6.07, Florida Administrative Code, by permitting an unlicensed person to use his license for the purpose of dispensing optics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida State Board of Dispensing Opticians take no action against the license of Francis (Frank) Dunlop. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Wiser, Esquire Post Office Box 1752 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Thomas F. Lang, Esquire Suite 302 801 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF DISPENSING OPTICIANS In the Matter of the Suspension or revocation of the License to Practice the Trade or Occupation of Dispensing Optician in this State of FRANCIS NELSON DUNLAP DOAH CASE NO. 77-2291 As a duly licensed dispensing optician authorized to supervise the preparing, fitting and adjusting of optical devices at Vent-Air Contact Lens Service, Florida National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida /
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent materially failed to follow applicable ruling making procedures required by Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation of proposed Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, relating toqualifications of sponsors for apprentice opticians; whether the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated authority by Respondent; and whether Petitioners are parties substantially affected by the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulation of an apprenticeship program for candidates desiring licensure as opticians in the State of Florida. The apprenticeship program provides an alternate route to qualification to take the examination for licensure as an optician. Candidates may also qualify for examination by receipt of an associate degree in opticianry from an accredited educational institution or previous practice and licensure in other jurisdictions. Candidates electing to pursue licensure examination through the apprenticeship program as currently established must comply with provisions of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code. The current version of Rule 21P-16.002, Florida Administrative Code, states: 21P-16.002 Qualifications for Apprentices and Sponsors. Apprentices and sponsors for apprenticeship programs must meet the following qualifications: An apprentice must be at least 17 years old at the date of application; must submit a complete application for apprenticeship along with proof of having obtained a qualified sponsor; and must submit the registration fee required in Rule 21P-11.013. A sponsor must be an optician, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 21P-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. Proposed Rule 21P-16.002, makes no changes to the existing sponsorship requirements found in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the present rule, but adds a new paragraph (3) which specifies the following: (3) No optician, physician or optometrist may serve as a sponsor unless he actually dispenses eyewear and maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works. For example, an optician, physician or optometrist whose premises and equipment are distinct from the intended apprentice's work area cannot serve as a sponsor, even though the optician's, physician's or optometrist's premises are within the same office area or building. The proposed rule seeks to implement Section 484.007(1)(d)4., Florida Statutes, which provides an applicant may qualify to take the state opticianry licensure examination following completion of a three year apprenticeship "under the supervision of an optician, a physician, or an optometrist licensed under the laws of this state." Through promulgation of the new rule, Respondent seeks to correct a perceived deficiency in the degree of supervision provided by some sponsors to their apprentice opticians. The new proposed rule seeks to correct such deficiency through the prohibition of separate or "distinct" work areas for sponsor and apprentice; the requirement that the sponsor "dispense eyewear"; and the requirement for the sponsor to "maintain the equipment" used by the apprentice on the premises where both apprentice and sponsor work. Petitioners are corporate entities licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Petitioners operate various retail optical establishments engaged in providing opticianry services. While not licensed to perform opticianry services, Petitioners employ opticians and apprentice opticians for that purpose. Petitioners also have contractual relationships with licensed optometrists for the provision of optometric services at Petitioners' retail establishments. The employed opticians and contracted optometrists often act as sponsors for apprentice opticians employed in Petitioners' retail establishments. Generally, Petitioners' retail establishments haveseparated areas for optometry services, dispensing of eye wear and a laboratory for the preparation of lenses. In the various establishments, these areas are separated from each other by a permanent wall constructed of either glass or other solid, opaque substance. Two to four licensed opticians are employed in each of Petitioners' retail establishments. Each of these individual opticians, or a licensed optometrist under contract, may sponsor an apprentice optician employed by Petitioners. Often the sponsoring professional is otherwise occupied in these establishments and the apprentice, who is also generally an employee, may be required to perform certain functions without direct supervision by the sponsor. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor actually "dispense eyewear" results from Respondent's position that a sponsor should actually be performing that task in order to properly train an apprentice in the performance of that procedure. The proposed rule's requirement that a sponsor "maintains the required equipment on the same premises where the apprentice works" dictates that a sponsor must own the equipment used by the apprentice or otherwise be responsible for the provision of that equipment. Such a requirement may effectively prohibit opticians and optometrists employed by Petitioner from serving as sponsors where those employees do not own and are not otherwise responsible for providing, generally, the "required equipment" on the premises of Petitioners' various establishments. Petitioners argue that such de facto denial of sponsorship opportunities to opticians, optomertrists and physicians employed by them contravenes the statutory provision of Section 484.007(1)(d)4, Florida Statutes, that an apprenticeship be completed under the supervision of "an optician, a physician, or optomertrist licensed under the laws of this state." Such an argument is not credited in the absence of expressed legislative intent to grant sponsorship status to any of the licensed professionals denominated in the statute. Specifically, it is found that the referenced statutory provision sets a minimum requirement for sponsorship, as opposed to a limitation to establishment of further qualifications. Respondent's economic impact statement was prepared by counsel. Respondent's position, as expressed through testimony of its executive director, is that the proposed rule has no discernible direct adverse economic impact, although testimony presented by Petitioners supports the finding that the proposed rule change shall require at least some alteration of the physical arrangement at some of Petitioners' retail establishments in the event that Petitioners desire to continue present apprentice programs in their businesses.
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioners, Albert F. Williams and Stitch Enterprises, d/b/a Skycrest Pharmacy, are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act," and if so, what amount would be reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of pharmacy pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, Chapter 456 (formerly 455), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 465, Florida Statutes. Prior to July 1, 2002, the Department of Health, pursuant to the authority of Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, contracted with the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter "AHCA") to provide consumer complaint, investigative, and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards, as appropriate. Petitioner, Albert F. Williams (hereinafter "Williams"), is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pharmacist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PS 0008425. Petitioner, Stitch Enterprises, d/b/a Skycrest Pharmacy (hereinafter "Skycrest"), is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pharmacy in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PH 0012143. Before the initial final hearing, Skycrest was administratively dissolved by the Florida Secretary of State. On March 31, 1998, Respondent received a complaint from AHCA investigator William H. Herbert, Investigation Specialist II (hereinafter "Herbert"), alleging that a March 26, 1998, pharmacy inspection of Skycrest by Herbert, revealed that Williams and Skycrest were in violation of multiple pharmacy regulations. Pursuant to Subsection 455.621(1), Florida Statutes, Respondent conducted an investigation into the alleged conduct of Williams and Skycrest. On April 10, 1998, as a part of the investigation, Herbert notified Williams and Skycrest of the investigation. Herbert's letters, written on AHCA letterhead, one addressed to Williams and the other letter addressed to Skycrest in care of Williams, invited Williams and Skycrest to submit separate written responses to the pending investigations. On May 8, 1998, Williams and Skycrest both filed three- page responses to the pending investigations with AHCA. Both responses were written and signed by B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire (hereinafter "Johnson"), the attorney for both Williams and Skycrest. During the investigations, Herbert took pictures of various medications that were misbranded or repackaged and took possession of various medications indicated on the survey forms that were completed and filed. During the investigations, Herbert spoke at length with Johnson regarding the violations that were discovered at the time of the inspection of Skycrest. On July 31, 1998, Respondent's investigations of Williams and Skycrest were completed. The completed investigative reports regarding Williams and Skycrest were forwarded to Respondent's legal department and received on August 3, 1998. The AHCA attorney, after reviewing Herbert's entire investigative reports and files, drafted two proposed administrative complaints and made recommendations to the Probable Cause Panel for their consideration. Copies of the entire investigative file, including the proposed administrative complaints, were made available for each member of the Probable Cause Panel. Respondent called John Taylor, R.Ph., as an expert in pharmacy law, and he testified that based on the information available to the Probable Cause Panel, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Williams and Skycrest had both violated the provisions cited in the Administrative Complaints filed by Respondent. Mr. Taylor's testimony was uncontested by Williams. On April 15, 1999, Respondent presented the investigative reports and files to the Probable Cause Panel and recommended that probable cause existed that Williams and Skycrest violated multiple provisions of Chapter 465, Florida Statutes (the Pharmacy Act). On April 15, 1999, after review of the entire investigative files, discussions with staff counsel and discussions with the Department of Health's expert in pharmacy law, amendments to the proposed administrative complaints were suggested by the Probable Cause Panel, and they subsequently found probable cause that: Williams had violated Section 465.016(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by violating 465.018, Florida Statutes, by violating Section 499.005(1), Florida Statutes, by repackaging, holding or offering for sale any drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded or has otherwise been rendered unfit for human or animal use. and Skycrest had violated Section 465.023(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by violating Section 499.005(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by repackaging, holding or offering for sale any drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded or has otherwise been rendered unfit for human or animal use. The Probable Cause Panel directed the Agency to file an Administrative Complaint against Williams and file an Administrative Complaint against Skycrest. The findings of the Probable Cause Panel were confirmed in writing by the chairperson of the Probable Cause Panel. On June 23, 1999, pursuant to the Probable Cause Panel's findings of probable cause, Administrative Complaints (DOAH Case Nos. 00-0220 and 00-0315) were filed against Williams and Skycrest. Both Williams and Skycrest requested formal hearings before the Division of Administrative Hearings. On November 17, 2000, a formal hearing on DOAH Case Nos. 02-0220 and 02-0315 was held in Clearwater, Florida, before the undersigned. At the November 17, 2000, final hearing, Skycrest stipulated it would, within 30 days, voluntarily relinquish and surrender its license. Respondent accepted Skycrest's stipulation and in return agreed to not prosecute charges against Skycrest, but to prosecute charges only against Williams. The undersigned accepted the stipulation of the parties, and the parties are bound thereby in the case at bar. Skycrest, by virtue of this stipulation and Respondent's subsequent dismissal of the Administrative Complaint against Skycrest, was not a prevailing small business party as defined by statute in that proceeding. On August 17, 2001, counsel for Williams and Skycrest filed the Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and the Affidavit as to Reasonable and Necessary Attorney Fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, now at bar. At the hearing on the case at bar, counsel for Williams and Skycrest elected not to present testimony nor evidence when given the opportunity to establish entitlement to attorney's fees and costs. Counsel elected to rely exclusively on the documents filed: (1) Affidavit as to Reasonable and Necessary Attorney's Fees and (2) the Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, reserving the right to call rebuttal witnesses after the presentation of evidence by Respondent. Respondent defended the Probable Cause Panel's action of finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Complaints against Williams and Skycrest as substantially justified. Respondent presented testimony of two witnesses, both of whom addressed the process undertaken by the Probable Cause Panel that concluded in findings of probable cause against both Williams and Skycrest. At the conclusion of Respondent's substantial justification defense, counsel for Williams and Skycrest called a Stetson University law professor as Petitioners' rebuttal witness. When requested to provide a proffer of the rebuttal testimony, counsel stated that the witness would testify regarding corporate law in Florida, its application to the administratively dissolved Skycrest Pharmacy, and Williams' use of Skycrest pharmacy as a "small business." Respondent objected to Williams' rebuttal witness' proffered testimony as beyond the scope of Respondent's defense of "substantial justification" for the Probable Cause Panel's filing of the Administrative Complaints. After hearing arguments of counsel and considering the parties' binding stipulation that Skycrest was administratively resolved and would voluntarily surrender its license in return for Respondent's not prosecuting the charges against Skycrest, Respondent's objection to the proffered rebuttal testimony was granted. Counsel for Williams and Skycrest was afforded an opportunity to place the proffered testimony on the record for appellate purposes after the close of this hearing, but chose not to do so. Counsel for Williams and Skycrest, introduced no evidence in support of his Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and has accordingly not met its burden of proof demonstrating entitlement to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether alleged statements attributed to the Board of Optometry were made by the Board, and if so, whether the statements constitute unpromulgated rules prohibited by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated as a matter of fact that: The FOA is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose membership is comprised of optometrists licensed under Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, to practice optometry in Florida. All FOA members are subject to and regulated by the Board of Optometry and its rules. The FOA has approximately 1,022 members. The Board of Optometry is the agency responsible for regulating the optometric practice of all FOA members. Board rules and agency statements of general applicability regulate the optometric practice of all FOA members. Individual members of the FOA, being subject to and regulated by the rules and policy of the Board of optometry, are persons whose substantial interests will be affected by the alleged agency statements and are thus substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.56(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1966). As all members of the FOA are subject to and regulated by Board rules and statements of general applicability, a substantial number of the FOA’s members would be substantially affected by the alleged statements. The objective of the FOA is to promote and protect the interests of the general public and licensed optometrists in ensuring the availability of high quality eye care at an affordable price. The FOA represents its members through the provision of education and training, and by participation in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation. Petitioner, Brian Lloyd Weber, O.D., is an optometrist licensed and practicing in Florida. Petitioner, 29/49 Optical Inc., (29/49), is a corporation which operates optical establishments in Florida. The Board of Optometry is the state agency in Florida which licenses optometrists and regulates the practice of optometry in this state. On January 29, 1992, the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Optometry determined there was probable cause to discipline the license of Dr. Weber because of an alleged violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statutes, involving the corporate practice of optometry. Thereafter, on February 2, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed with the Board which alleged that Dr. Weber had violated the cited statute by engaging in the practice of optometry with a corporation not composed of other health care providers; by entering into a corporate arrangement which permitted an unlicensed person to practice optometry through Dr. Weber, in violation of Rule 21Q-3.008, (now Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code); and by holding himself out to the public as available to render professional services in a manner which implies he is professionally associated with an entity which is not a licensed practitioner, also in violation of the Rule. The investigation conducted by the then Department of Professional Regulation, which led up to the action of the panel and the filing of the Administrative Complaint indicated that Dr. Weber owned 250 shares of stock in 29/49, along with an optician, Anthony Record, not licensed to provide optometry services, who also owns stock in the corporation. Allegedly, the corporation operated at five different locations, at one or more of which eye examinations were performed. It was also alleged that 29/49 had publicly advertised itself as an entity which provided complete eye examinations, and that Dr. Weber performed the eye examinations described in the advertisements. In fact, Dr. Weber is a director and officer of 29/49. He holds a 75% ownership share in the corporation. Both Dr. Weber and Mr. Record control the corporation and share the duties and profits of the operation. The firm provides optitianry services, as defined in Sections 484.002(3) and (7), Florida Statutes. Dr. Weber asserts that the operations of 29/49 are separate from the operations of his optometric practice, and claims that the Board’s direction to him to change the corporate structure of 29/49 so as to dissolve his partnership with a lay person is a continuation of what he claims is a long-standing policy of prohibiting the joint ownership of an optitianry between and optometrist and a lay person. Before a hearing was held on the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Weber and counsel for the Board entered into a stipulation which, if accepted by the Board, would have resolved the pending disciplinary action. The stipulation was presented to the Board at its July 8, 1993 meeting, at which time the Board voted to reject it and to propose a counter-stipulation. At that meeting, the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue here nor did it take a position as to what Dr. Weber must do to rectify the practice situation to its satisfaction. Nonetheless, by Order dated September 9, 1993, the Board formally rejected the proposed stipulation and proposed its own stipulation. On September 12, 1996, Dr. Weber and the Agency’s counsel presented a second stipulation to the Board for settlement of the disciplinary matter, but again the Board voted to reject the stipulation and to offer its own second counter- stipulation. This counter-proposal called for Dr. Weber to change his corporate structure so that he no longer violated the statutory prohibition against practicing optometry with non- licensed individuals, and that he no longer practice with a lay person. This second counter-proposal by the Board did not enunciate any of the alleged agency statements at issue herein. This second counter-proposal was promulgated in an Order of the Board issued on October 15, 1996. Sections 463.014(1)(a)&(b), Florida Statutes, provide: No corporation, lay body, organization, or individual other than a licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry through the means of engaging the services, upon a salary, commission, or other means or inducement, of any person licensed to practice optometry in this state. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the association of a licensed practitioner with a multidisciplinary group of licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of which is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. No licensed practitioner shall engage in the practice of optometry with any corporation, organization, group or lay individual. This provision shall not prohibit licensed practitioners from employing, or from forming partnership or professional associations with, licensed practitioners licensed in this state or with other licensed health care professionals, the primary objective of whom is the diagnosis and treatment of the human body. Consistent therewith, the Board of Optometry has promulgated Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, which implements the provisions of the statute. Rule 59V-3.008, Florida Administrative Code, restates the intent of the legislature regarding the need for licensure of practitioners of optometry, defines a “licensed practitioner”, and thereafter outlines with particularity those actions which may and those which may not be carried on by licensed optometrists in Florida. The rule is quite clear in its definitions and leaves little room for misunderstanding regarding what constitutes the practice of optometry and optometric services; those individuals who must be licensed; what professional activities a licensed practitioner may perform and what activities constitute a violation of Section 463.014,Florida Statutes. Of specific relevance to the issues herein are: (15)(b) Entering into any agreement (whether written or oral) which allows, permits or facilitates an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner to practice optometry, to offer optometric services to the public, or to control through any means whatever any aspect of the practice of optometry. Allowing, permitting, encouraging, forbearing, or condoning any advertisement including those placed in a newspaper, magazine, brochure, flier, telephone directory, or on television or radio, which implies or suggests that the licensed practitioner is professionally associated or affiliated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. Occupying or otherwise using professional office space in any manner which does not clearly and sufficiently indicate to the public that his/her practice of optometry is independent of and not associated with an entity which itself is not a licensed practitioner. , (I), and(j), [which all refer with specificity to some action which relates to the practice of optometry by a licensed practitioner with an entity which itself is not a licensed licensed practitioner.] This rule has been challenged in the courts and determined to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner claims that pronouncements by the Board of Optometry since the passage of the relevant statute and the promulgation of the relevant rule, including a Declaratory Statement by the Board in response to a Petition therefore by Phillip R. Sidran, O.D. in 1991, found at 13 FALR 4804; and in discussion of members at various meetings of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel; all indicate that the Board has formulated a policy regarding the instant issue which is neither a statute nor a properly promulgated rule. In 1991, Dr. Sidran, a licensed optometrist, sought a declaratory statement from the Board regarding the propriety of having a licensed optician share the revenues and responsibilities deriving from the optical portion of his practice. In its Declaratory Statement, issued on October 9, 1991, the Board specifically referred to and quoted the controlling portions of the statute and the rule which it then interpreted as indicating such an arrangement was prohibited. At no time did the Board promulgate new guidelines or expand the strictures imposed by the existing statute and rule. It applied an existing statute and rule to the factual situation posed by Dr. Sidran and concluded that under the facts of that case, the existing statute and rule prohibited the proposed relationship. The subsequent discussion of that opinion at the meeting of the Board’s Probable Cause Panel, convened on January 29, 1992, to consider proposed disciplinary action against Dr. Weber for the situation described here with 20/49, again interpreted existing statute and rule but did not formulate policy. Petitioner further refers to two additional meetings of the Board of Optometry at its meetings on July 8, 1993 and September 12, 1996, at both of which the members present discussed the situation regarding Dr. Weber’s business relationship in 29/49. He claims that in both situations, the Board members made policy statements which should have been formalized through the promulgation of a rule amendment or supplement. Review of the transcripts of those meeting does not support Dr. Weber’s position, however. It is clear that in each case the Board members examined the facts presented to them, applied the existing statutory and rule provisions to those facts, and concluded that the Petitioner’s actions constituted a violation of existing law. The Board’s position vis a vis Dr. Weber’s business arrangement was made a part of the Board’s counter-proposal to the stipulation of settlement initially agreed to by Dr. Weber and the Department’s counsel. In it’s counter-stipulation, which came out of the September 12, 1996 Board meeting, the Board required Dr. Weber to “... change his corporate structure so he is no longer in violation of Section 463.014(1)(b), Florida Statues, and that [his] practice be changed so that he is no longer practicing with a lay person.”
Findings Of Fact Case History On April 10, 1987, Petitioners filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and for Administrative Determination of Invalidity of a Rule as described in the Issues statement to this Order. On April 20, 1987, Intervenors requested intervention. On April 20, 1987, Respondent Board moved to dismiss the petition filed by the Petitioners and to stay the proceedings. On April 27, 1987, oral argument was held on the petition to intervene, the motion to dismiss, and the request to stay proceedings. On April 29, 1987, an order was entered which granted the intervention, and denied the motions to dismiss and to stay. The case was originally scheduled to be heard on May 5 and 6, 1987. Upon stipulation and agreement of the parties to waive the requirement set forth in Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, calling for the conduct of the final hearing within 30 days of assignment of this matter to a Hearing Officer, the case was rescheduled for hearing to be held on June 11 and 12, 1987. The First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Professional Regulation, et al. v. William J. Broussard, M.D., et al., Case Nos. 87-238/87-260, issued an order staying the conduct of the hearing to be held on June 11 and 12, 1987. The stay was eventually dissolved as a result of an order entered by the First District Court of Appeal on July 23, 1987, in the aforementioned appellate court cases. The administrative case was then returned to an active status before the Division of Administrative Hearings and scheduled for hearing on dates including October 5 and 6, 1987, the eventual dates for hearing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Intervenors sought action on a motion to dismiss the Florida Medical Association as a petitioner. That motion was denied. Another preliminary matter related to the September 2, 1987, request for production of documents from the physician petitioners. On October 2, 1987, Petitioners had objected to that request for production. On October 5, 1987, Intervenors had filed a motion to compel physician petitioners to produce certain economic information and financial records related to allegations of standing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing on October 5, 1987, and in the face of remarks by counsel for the Petitioners, it was determined that the physician petitioners did not intend to advance a claim of economic injury in the sense of a change in economic circumstances in their practices with the advent of the licensure of certified optometrists. As a consequence, the requested production became a moot question and the motion to compel was denied. Enabling Legislation In 1986, the Florida Legislature reenacted the Optometry Practices Act, as Chapter 86-289, Laws of Florida. Section 6 of that Act set forth the opportunity for practitioners licensed as certified optometrists to administer and prescribe topical ocular pharmaceutical agents for the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions of the human eye and its appendages. The specific provisions which establish the requirements for certification are announced in Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.) as: The board shall issue certification for the administration and prescription of topical ocular pharmaceutical agents in the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions to licensed practitioners who have completed the appropriate forms as required by the board and who have submitted proof of fulfilling all of the following requirements: Successful completion of at least 110 hours of approved transcript-quality coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology, as determined by the board. However, no course in pharmacology shall be approved by the board unless the course is conducted by an institution which has facilities for both the didactic and clinical instructions in pharmacology and which is accredited by a regional or professional accrediting organization that is recognized and approved by the Council on Post-secondary Accreditation or the United States Department of Education. Completion of at least 1 year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders as part of the optometric training or in a clinical setting as part of optometric experience. Successful completion of an examination approved by the board which tests knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology with particular emphasis on the topical applica- tion of pharmaceutical agents for the eye and the side effects of such pharmaceutical agents. A related provision at Section 463.002(9), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), describes "transcript-quality" as follows: (9) "Transcript-quality" means a course which is in conjunction with or sponsored by a school or college of optometry or equivalent educational entity, which course is approved by the board and requires a test and passing grade. Section 463.0055(3), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), pertains to the payment of fees associated with becoming a certified optometrist. It states: (3) The board shall establish by rule an application fee, not to exceed $250, and an examination fee, not to exceed $250, for certification pursuant to this section. Section 463.0055(4), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), establishes a formulary committee which will assist DPR in identifying those topical ocular pharmaceutical agents that may be utilized by the certified optometrist in his or her practice. The decision to enact legislation providing for certification of optometrists to use topical ocular pharmaceutical agents for the diagnosis and treatment of ocular conditions in the human eye was passed in a setting in which optometrists within Florida had historically been involved with the administration and prescription of diagnostic and therapeutic drugs. The overall facts of this case demonstrate that this legislation was designed to specifically set forth the framework for allowing the employment of those pharmaceutical agents or drugs in the future. Adoption of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, etc. In an attempt to effectuate the purposes of Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), the Board adopted Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code. The rule was first noticed for adoption in Vol. 12, No. 38 of the Florida Administrative Weekly, published September 19, 1986. The rule was adopted by the Board and filed with the Secretary of State on October 31, 1986. The effective date of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, is November 20, 1986. In the issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly described in the previous paragraph, the Board published amendments to the rule pertaining to fees which is Rule 21Q-6.001, Florida Administrative Code. Those amendments were filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on October 31, 1986. They became effective on November 20, 1986. Within that set of amendments on fees, the Board created a $100 application fee "for certification as a certified optometrist" and a $250 examination fee "for certification as a certified optometrist." The text of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, states: 21Q-10.001 Application for Certification. To be certified to administer and prescribe topical ocular pharmaceutical agents a licensed practitioner must submit a completed application form provided by the Board, remit the application fee for certification speci- fied in Rule 21Q-6.001(9), and demonstrate compliance with the following requirements: Successful completion of at least 110 hours of Board approved transcript quality coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology conducted by an accredited institution which has facilities for both didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology. The institution must document the applicant's successful completion. The Board will accept coursework and clinical training in general and ocular pharmacology received by the applicant during his basic optometric curriculum or at postgraduate courses if this coursework and training was provided by a Board approved school of optometry or equivalent educational entity; Completion of at least one (1) year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders. The one year of supervised experience shall be received either during optometric training or in a clinical setting as part of optometric experience. The requisite one year of supervised experience in a clinical setting may be obtained in an academic or non- academic environment. For the purpose of this rule, one year of supervised experience in an academic setting is understood to mean three (3) quarters or two (2) semesters and one (1) year of supervised experience in a non-academic setting is understood to mean a twelve month period; Successful completion of a Board approved examination testing knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology with particular emphasis on the topical application of pharmaceutical agents. In order to be approved by the Board, the examination must have been administered in a Board approved school of optometry or at the conclusion of a post- graduate course conducted by a Board approved school of optometry, and the examination must be approved by the Board. Board Activities in Certifying Optometrists In preparation for implementing the statute, in July 1986 Board Chairman Edward K. Walker, O.D., appointed Jon S. Jacobs, O.D., as an ad hoc committee of one to begin gathering information from the schools and colleges of optometry. Dr. Jacobs' mission was to gather information from the schools and colleges to present to the Board so that it could determine whether the level and quality of the education, curriculum, examinations and supervised clinical experience in differential diagnoses received by optometry graduates of the various schools satisfied the criteria contained in Section 463.0055(2), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Licensed practitioners of optometry in Florida have been educated at eighteen different schools and colleges of optometry. Dr. Jacobs contacted either the president or dean of each of these institutions in order to obtain information for the Board's consideration. On August 1, 1986, Dr. Jacobs wrote each of the schools and colleges. In his letter Jacobs cited the language of the statute and asked the schools to respond to the different sections of the law by providing the Board with information concerning whether and when graduates of their institution satisfied the statutory criteria. He requested specific information from the schools concerning how many clock hours of coursework in general and ocular pharmacology they required and in what years they required them. He inquired whether or not students had to pass the pharmacology courses in order to graduate. He asked that the schools provide the Board with the pharmacology examinations given to their graduates. Dr. Jacobs also requested that the schools provide the Board with the information which would establish the beginning year in which the institution required of their graduates one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders. In addition to requesting information concerning the school's basic curricula leading to the O.D. degree, Dr. Jacobs also requested information on postgraduate and continuing education coursework offered by the institutions. The Board interprets the 110-hour requirement as referring to "clock hours" and not to "credit hours." The Board has determined that the accreditation of a school is evidence of its having facilities for both the didactic and clinical instructions in pharmacology. The optometric schools in question are accredited. All of the schools responded with information from which the Board could determine if and when the school met the 110 clock hour requirement and the requirement of one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis. All of the schools provided information to the Board which indicated that their students were required to pass the pharmacology courses in order to graduate and therefore satisfied the "successful completion of at least 110 hours" criterion. Follow-up correspondence and telephone conversations with the presidents or deans were necessary to clarify the Board's request and verify the school's response. Many of the schools and colleges expressed concern about the confidentiality of the examinations which the Board had requested. The Board assured the schools that it would not be reviewing the exams for any purpose other than complying with its statutory responsibilities. The information was submitted to the Board in various forms by the schools and colleges and included catalogs, lists of pharmacology courses, and narrative or individual curriculum descriptions of pharmacology courses offered by the institutions. All of the schools and colleges submitted examinations to the Board, but not all examinations given in the relevant courses. Some of the schools submitted as many as eight examinations. The exams submitted were administered by the schools at various times. Many of the schools submitted information which indicated that they maintain computerized banks of examination questions from which they draw randomly in constructing examinations. In some instances, the Board received representative examinations because all of the exams the school had ever administered were not available. With the assistance of the Board's executive director, Dr. Jacobs compiled the information he had gathered from the various schools in chart form and presented it to the Board for its consideration. The ad hoc committee of one composed of Dr. Jacobs evolved into a three member certification committee. In August of 1986, Peter Liane, O.D., became chairman of the Board and appointed Dr. Jacobs as chairman of the Board's Certification Committee. Dr. Liane also appointed himself and Dr. Walker to the committee. The mission of the certification committee was to determine the minimum requirements of the statute, further organize the information Jacobs had gathered, and recommend to the Board those who were to be certified or not based upon documentation and evidence of what they deemed to be compliance with the statute. In reviewing the information it had gathered, the Board viewed the statutory criteria as requiring it to answer three questions: (1) Have applicants for certification received the requisite quantity and quality of coursework?; (2) Have applicants obtained the requisite differential diagnosis experience?; and (3) Are applicants safe to prescribe and administer topical ocular pharmaceutical agents based on passage of a Board approved examination which tested their knowledge of pharmacology and the side effects related to topically applied pharmaceutical agents? The Board reviewed the curriculum and the catalogs and information it received from the schools of optometry. The Board was satisfied about the accuracy of the information it received from the schools and colleges based upon the Board's knowledge of the programs in the schools, including experiences of four members of the Board who sit on the boards of trustees of various colleges of optometry. The Board relied upon the information, statements, and representations they received from the deans and colleges concerning when their graduates complied with certain statutory criteria. The Board determined that it would accept education, training, and examinations from the schools and colleges of optometry and other equivalent entities in order to satisfy statutory criteria for certification. When asked to describe in general terms what the Board was looking for in reviewing the exams to determine if the coursework in pharmacology was in compliance with Section 463.0055(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), Board members identified that they reviewed examinations to determine whether the course content, as set forth in the exam instrument, was at least 75 percent related to general and ocular pharmacology. The 75 percent standard was chosen by the Board as an arbitrary number which represented "a substantial portion of the test." A number of courses and their exams were not recommended for approval on the basis that the examinations lacked enough questions related to pharmacology to meet this requirement established by the Board. Although the deans and colleges assured the Board that their school's coursework satisfied the pharmacology criterion, it was the Board's understanding that the Legislature intended for the Board to "approve" the coursework by looking at it to determine the quality and level of that coursework. The Board was of the view that, even though an applicant took a course for the requisite number of hours, unless the Board specifically approved the course and determined that it was of sufficient quality, the course would not satisfy the first statutory criterion. Therefore, the Board reviewed the material each institution submitted on an individual basis, and approved portions of that material as satisfying the criterion for coursework. The Board believed that the best way to evaluate the quality of a course was to look at the examination which was required in that course. The Board reviewed each of the examinations which they received from the schools or colleges. Although the Board did not review each and every exam administered by all schools, it did review exams from all schools. Each Board member received copies of the exams. The exams were reviewed and discussed question by question at public meetings. The Board conducted its review based on the expertise of its members who are practicing optometrists with a knowledge of optometric education and professional practice. The statutory term "successful completion" was determined by the Board to mean successful passage of an examination for the course. The deans of the schools certified to the Board that their graduates were required to have taken 110 hours of coursework in pharmacology and had passed an exam in such coursework. With regard to the "110 hours," the Board determined that even if an applicant indicated that he or she had received that quantity of coursework, at least 75 percent of the 110 hours (83 hours) would need to be satisfied in a core course. None of the exams which the Board reviewed for the 83 hour core courses were "take home" exams. Some examinations for which partial credit was given were of that type. In satisfying the statutory criterion of "transcript-quality coursework," the Board determined whether the coursework was given by a school or college of optometry or equivalent entity, and whether the student had taken and passed an examination on the coursework. The Board also determined that the coursework which was submitted in satisfaction of the 110 hour requirement, in fact, included "clinical training." The Board made this determination by observing that information in the curriculum presented by the various schools and colleges. As to the specific clinical training criterion for certification, Dr. Jacobs assumed that the schools "automatically would have their clinical training in their curriculum." Also, Dr. Jacobs indicated that, because the schools were accredited, "we could then assume that these were the quality schools and, therefore, would be administering quality coursework and quality testing." The courses which were approved by the Board as having satisfied the 110 hours of "pharmacology" criterion were courses which dealt with the properties, chemistry, actions and uses of drugs. The courses approved also dealt with the effects of drugs on the body and on the eye, the diagnostic use of drugs, the therapeutic use of drugs, and the side effects of drugs. The Board also determined that the pharmacology coursework was "conducted by an institution which has facilities for both the didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology." The Board did not approve courses taught by individuals, but only recognized courses conducted by colleges of optometry with both the physical facilities and faculty expertise in teaching and research necessary to provide didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology. The Board also determined that each approved course was conducted by an institution accredited by the Council on Post-secondary Accreditation. This information was readily accessible to the Board because of the Board's continuing responsibility to review the accreditation status of various optometry schools in order to enforce the Board's existing requirement that applicants for licensure in Florida be graduates of accredited schools. Accreditation, however, did not mean a school's coursework was automatically accepted as satisfying the statutory criterion. Of the eighteen accredited schools of optometry recognized for licensure purposes in Florida, coursework from only sixteen were approved for certification purposes. Two accredited schools, the University of Montreal and Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, were disqualified because they did not meet the statutory requirements for certification. However, the Board believes that the statutory and rule requirement that approved coursework must be "conducted by" an accredited institution which has facilities for both didactic and clinical instruction in pharmacology does not require that such courses be taken at that institution or at a location that, in fact, has didactic and clinical instruction facilities. The Board also reviewed and approved continuing education courses and postgraduate courses which could be used in partial satisfaction of statutory criterion number one. The Board went through the same process with regard to reviewing and approving the examinations for the continuing and postgraduate courses. However, unlike the groups of representative exams which the Board was sent by schools and colleges, the Board reviewed each and every one of the continuing education and postgraduate examinations. Although the Board had previously reviewed and approved the continuing education course exams when the courses were approved for continuing education credit, the Board reviewed the exams a second time to determine if they satisfied the certification criterion concerning appropriate coursework. The Board has approved approximately forty continuing education, seminar, extension and postgraduate courses. The Pennsylvania College of Optometry continuing education course referred to as "PCO 701" is an example of this type of course approved by the Board. The "PCO 701" course was designed for practicing optometrists. The instructors for the course were Ph.D.s in pharmacology and ophthalmologists from the Jefferson Medical School in Philadelphia. The instructors flew in to several areas of Florida every weekend to conduct the three month continuing education course. As to the requirement of one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis, the Board has determined that this may be obtained in either an academic or a non-academic environment. In order to determine compliance with the "one year of supervised experience" criterion, the Board requested the schools and colleges to provide it with the year in which the institution required at least one year of clinically supervised training in differential diagnosis of their graduates. The catalogs and curricula submitted by the schools to the Board also indicated that clinical training was provided as part of pharmacology coursework. The third criterion requires an examination approved by the Board. The Board did not prepare or administer an examination in order to determine an applicant's compliance with this criterion. Concerning the requirement of successful completion of an examination which tests knowledge of general and ocular pharmacology, the rule implements the Board's policy decision to not prepare and administer a separate pharmacology exam for certification purposes. The Board has determined that examinations administered in optometry school or in postgraduate courses suffice. In order to determine whether applicants satisfied the third criterion, the Board reviewed and approved the examinations which applicants had been required to pass either at the end of their coursework in optometric school or at the end of their postgraduate education. Since 1972, the Board has tested for the side effects of pharmaceutical agents as required by criterion three on the pharmacology portion in its general licensing examination, to become a "licensed practitioner." The pharmacology portion of the Board's exam is a prerequisite to obtaining licensure in Florida. Part I of the examination tests ocular pathology and pharmacology. Applicants must obtain a score of 70 percent or better in each subject in Part I of the exam in order to obtain a passing grade. Part II of the exam consists of the clinical portion and a pharmacology/ocular disease portion. An applicant must obtain a score of 80 points or better in order to secure a passing grade on the clinical portion of the practical exam. The National Board of Examiners in Optometry Education also tests ocular pathology, ocular pharmacology, and treatment and management of ocular disease. The NBEO exam tests: Clinical science which measures a candidate's application of the fundamental knowledge base to the prevention, diagnosis, management, and treatment of clinical conditions within the scope of optometric practice and consists of the following subject areas: systemic conditions; ocular disease/trauma. The International Association of Boards of Examiners in Optometry examination on the treatment and management of ocular disease (IAB examination) is an examination which must also be passed by Florida applicants in order to obtain general licensure. The IAB examination is designed to assess the cognitive skills deemed essential in utilizing pharmacologic agents for therapeutic purposes. A passing score is 75. The subject areas tested on the IAB examination include selection of the therapeutic regime; dosage and/or duration; contraindications/side effects; and the follow-up prognosis. The Board of Optometry approves the Florida examinations for general licensure. This function includes reviewing all of the examinations, working with DPR staff in the design of those examinations, actual selection of examination questions, and determination of the scope of the exam. The Board has approved all of the general licensure examinations which have been administered subsequent to 1972. Although Board members have been aware that since 1972 applicants for general licensure have been required to pass the Board approved examination in pharmacology which tests for side effects, the Board has never specifically stated or adopted a policy that this examination satisfies the third criterion to become a certified optometrist. While the Board seems satisfied that the post-1972 licensure exam would be sufficient to satisfy that criterion, the Board relied on and approved the exam which the applicant took either in school or at the end of their postgraduate training as the exam which satisfied the third criterion. Eight hundred seventy three (873) optometrists had been certified in Florida at the point of final hearing. Each of the 873 optometrists who have been certified were existing licensed practitioners in Florida at the time they were certified. Paradoxically, though the Board did not rely on the general optometric examinations for certification, it did rely on the 1972 and forward examination results in classifying the successful candidates for certification. The Board related that 570 of the 873 certified optometrists took the Florida licensure exam in 1972 or thereafter. Three hundred three (303) took the Florida licensure exam prior to 1972. Two hundred sixty three (263) of the 303 took and passed the PCO 701 course for which the Board reviewed each examination and determined that it satisfied the third criterion because it tested for the use of topical application of pharmaceutical agents and side effects. Of the remainder of the applicants who were examined for general licensure prior to 1972, 37 took the PCO 750-B course which was another course in pharmacology for which the Board had reviewed exams and found that they satisfy the third criterion. Of the remaining three applicants, one took the New England diagnostic pharmacology course and one took the Indiana DBF course in ocular pharmacology. The Board reviewed and approved each of these exams as having satisfied the third criterion. The lone applicant remaining of the 873 was a 1971 graduate from the University of Houston. The Board did not review the actual exam which the University of Houston applicant took, although the Board reviewed a number of representative exams which were sent by the University of Houston. Based on its review of the representative exams provided by the University of Houston, the Board determined that the one applicant for certification who had taken an examination which tested for side effects, but which actual exam was not approved by the Board, was sufficiently qualified to demonstrate compliance with the third criterion. The Chairman of the Board personally knows the single candidate from the University of Houston and has a personal knowledge of his practice abilities and competence. The Application/Certification Form The application form, which is challenged as an unpromulgated rule, sets out an activity section for the benefit of the Board which would indicate if a candidate has been approved for certification, the assigned certification number if approved, and other items related to this review. The application form contains a place where the applicant sets forth his or her name and the mailing address. The application form identifies the fact that $100 fee for application is required. The form asks that the candidate name the school or college of optometry which he or she attended and the year of graduation, and to provide and 8 1/2 X 11 inch photocopy of the diploma received from that school. The application form provides for the applicant's signature which is to be notarized. The application form in its second page gives further instruction and cites the text of Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code, and Rule 21Q-10.002, Florida Administrative Code. The latter rule deals with the administration and prescription of topical pharmaceutical agents. The application form in its substance, set out in Sections 1 through 4 of the first page, establishes the exact formula for obtaining certification to practice optometry, beyond the payment of fees and other preliminary matters which have been addressed in these factual findings. In effect, there are four alternatives by which a candidate may obtain certification. This has formed the basis for examining the credentials of candidates since the inception of the certified optometrist program within the State of Florida. The only changes that have been made concern the fact that the application form has been expanded upon through the recognition of additional postgraduate courses which could count toward the obtainment of 110 hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology. The form does not contemplate the idea of independent testing to address the third statutory criterion. The details of the four alternatives are as set forth below: 1. I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on graduation from an approved school or college of optometry which his certified to the Board that graduates received 110 hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology, including clinical training, and passed a Board approved examination (463.0055(1)(a)(c)). At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders was included as part of the optometric training for graduation (463.0055(1)(b)). Optometrists who graduated from the following schools in the year listed below, or in subsequent years, have been approved by the Board as meeting all of the requirements of 463.0055(1)(a)(b)(c) F.S. PLEASE CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX, IF THIS IS YOUR CATEGORY. Univ. of Alabama 1973 Univ. of Houston 1975 U. of CA at Berkley 1977 Illinois College 1976 Southern California 1979 Indiana Univ. 1976 Ferris State College 1979 Univ. of Missouri 1984 Pennsylvania College 1976 Southern College 1976 Waterloo, Canada 1976 New England College 1977 Northeastern State 1983 Ohio State 1972 Pacific University 1977 State Univ., New York 1975 I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on graduation from an approved school or college of optometry which has certified to the Board that graduates received 88 or more hours of approved coursework in general and ocular pharmacology, including clinical training, and passed a Board approved examination. At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye disease or disorders which included as part of the optometric training for graduation. I graduated from the school checked below and have attended the following approved courses, as indicated, to meet the 110 hour requirement for certification. SCHOOLS Univ. of Houston 1966-74 90 hours Illinois College 1974-75 102 hours Waterloo, Canada 1972-76 84 hours COURSES (attach verification of passing the exam) FOA/Univ. of AL-2/7-8/87 10 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/83 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/86 6 hours FOA/PA College-5/78 6 hours FOA/PA College-10/84 6 hours I am applying to become a certified optometrist based on 88 or more hours of approved transcript quality courses in general and ocular pharmacology, which included clinical training and passing a Board-approved examination. At least one year of supervised experience in differential diagnosis of eye diseases or disorders was included as part of my optometric training for graduation. The following courses have been approved by the Board as meeting the criteria above: (Check any courses you attended and attach proof of passing the exam.) PA College Course 750B 110 hours Illinois College Courses 1986-87 85 hours PA College Course 701 98 hours PA College Course 701 105 hours Florida Optometric Assoc/ PA College 1/31/87 110 hours If applicable to meet the 110 hours, the following approved courses may be included in your documentation for certification: FOA/Univ. of AL-2/7-8/87 10 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/PA College-5/78 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/85 6 hours FOA/PA College-10/84 6 hours FOA/Univ. of AL-10/86 6 hours I do not fit into any of the above categories. However, my educational coursework and clinical training meet all three (3) requirements of 463.055(2)(a)(b) and (c). I have attached a detailed report and all required documentation as necessary. Sections 1-4 within the application form are based upon the information gathered by Dr. Jacobs from the schools of optometry and concerning postgraduate coursework. The Certification Committee reviewed the information which Dr. Jacobs had gathered, and made a recommendation to the Board pertaining to how the information should be used. Dr. Jacobs presented a suggested format for the application form to the Board's office based upon the charts he prepared which summarized the information he had gathered. The Board's office modified Dr. Jacobs' suggested format and sent it to the Board members for their approval. After the Board approved both the use of the information gathered and the format of the application, the Board office prepared the application form for printing and distribution. By including the information concerning the school and year attended by the applicant, the Board was able to avoid having to search through existing Board licensure files which already contain this information and also enabled the Board to refer to the data which the Board had already gathered and analyzed, without the necessity to do it for each applicant. The Board did not accept the form alone in its decision-making process. The associated documentation was reviewed by the Board prior too approval for certification. Applicants were disqualified if they did not provide proper documentation. The Certification Committee reviewed all individual applications and made recommendations to the Board. Each application was reviewed individually by two different committee members. If the two committee members disagreed on certifying the applicant, the third member of the committee reviewed the application and cast the deciding vote concerning whether to recommend certification or not to the Board. The Board then voted on the application and decided whether or not to certify the applicant. The form was designed to act as a facilitator. Nonetheless, it is the substantive standard for review in all instances. The application form implements the Board's previous decision to accept the substantive information which it had been provided. Within the form, Section 1 applicants are those optometrists relying solely on their graduation from one of sixteen optometry schools in the United States and Canada on or after the year designated on the form for that school. Section 2 applicants are those optometrists relying on graduation from the University of Houston (1966-1974), Illinois College of Optometry (1974-1975), or University of Waterloo (1972-1976), in conjunction with completion of courses sponsored by the Florida Optometric Association. Section 3 applicants are those optometrists seeking certification based on completion of one post-graduation "core course" of 83 hours or more, and additional continuing education courses necessary to achieve the 110-hour total. Section 4 was created for applicants who may not fit in any of the three previously-described sections, but who may be able to establish their qualification for certification through other means. An example of use of the form is that when an applicant checked Section 1 on the form indicating the school and year of graduation, the Board reviewed the diploma to determine whether the graduation date on it coincided with the date of graduation, and the school checked in Section 1. Having previously determined that graduates of that institution subsequent to the year indicated on the form satisfied the statutory criteria, the Board used the form to confirm the applicant's credentials in the request for certification. The determination as to whether or not to certify the applicant was made after the Board examined the application form and verified that the applicant had graduated from that particular school by checking the diploma, signature, and notary certificate. Section 3 of the form shows eleven courses. As mentioned before, there are other courses that since have been determined by the Board to be acceptable towards the 110 hour total. These courses were not listed on the form because the Board was unaware of them at the time the form was printed. An applicant under Section 3 who wanted to claim credit for courses which were not listed, could write in those courses and send documentation from the school in the form of a letter or transcript which indicated that the applicant had been tested on the course and had passed the exam. The Board would then confirm that the course was given and would review the exam for course quality. With respect to applicant who checked Section 3, the Board also determined satisfaction of the one year of supervised clinical experience requirement by referring back to the information which had been provided previously by the optometry schools. For Sections 2 and 3 applicants, the continuing education courses relied on to supplement optometric school coursework or post-graduation "core courses" were all sponsored by the Florida Optometric Association in conjunction with optometric schools. Section 4 of the application form afforded applicants who did not fit categories 1, 2 or 3 an opportunity to demonstrate that they satisfied the statutory criteria. For instance, one applicant who applied under this category was a pharmacist before he was an optometrist. He did not fit into any of the other categories because his coursework was obtained in pharmacy school, and he wished to rely on that training to satisfy requirements for certification. A review of the minutes of the Board meetings from the amendment of Chapter 463 in June, 1986, through August, 1987, indicates that the certification form was not adopted as a Board rule. Dr. Walker, Board member, in his testimony confirmed that the application form was not adopted as a Board rule. The certification form-was first used by the Board at the first meeting at which it certified optometrists, April 11, 1987. It certified 455 optometrists at that first meeting; 200 more at its May 9, 1987 meeting; 174 more at its July 6, 1987 meeting; and 45 more at its August 28, 1987 meeting. Of the continuing education courses for which information is available, the "smaller courses" of 10 hours or less were offered in a "seminar" setting, with faculty from optometry schools, most notably UAB, Pennsylvania, Southern College, New England, Indiana, and Houston. In addition to the Florida Optometric Association, other non-school entities such as the Southern Council of Optometrists, the American Academy of Optometry, the Southwest Florida Optometric Association, the Northeast Florida Optometric Society, and the Bay Point Anterior Segment Symposium, Inc., sponsored some of these continuing education courses. Some of the approved continuing education courses described in the form were given at resorts, hotels, or meeting centers. Legislative Intent Petitioners' Composite Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7 were offered in an attempt to describe legislative intent related to Senate Bill 3-B, which forms the basis of the amendments to Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, which took place in 1986. This included Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Having considered those exhibits and the proposed facts of the parties, the intent which the Legislature had in the passage of Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.) cannot be gleaned. Therefore, conclusions about the meaning of that legislation must be made based upon a literal reading of its text, together with other provisions within Chapter 463, Florida Statutes. In a related vein, the Board of Optometry and the Intervenors have suggested facts concerning an April 15, 1987, Senate Committee on Economic, Community and Consumer Affairs request for information from the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, on the topic of the Board of Optometry's implementation of the certification process. In particular, reference is made to that committee's request concerning which schools and coursework satisfied the 110 hour and one year of supervised clinical experience requirements contained within the statute. The committee also wanted documentation of the procedures and standards used in approving examinations which satisfied the requirement for examination set forth in the third criterion. The Secretary of DPR requested the Board of Optometry to prepare the report and it was prepared and delivered to the Senate Committee. That report generally describes the activities of the Board of Optometry in its efforts at certification, as announced in the fact findings herein. Because the Senate Committee did not respond to the report made by the Department of Professional Regulation, the Intervenors and the Board urge that the silence by the Senate Committee somehow recognizes the acceptability of the procedures employed by the Board of Optometry in its certification process. Likewise, the Intervenors and the Board of Optometry seem to take some comfort in the fact that no further legislation was passed in 1987 pertaining to Section 463.0055(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), which dealt with the need to have the Board prepare an independent examination document as opposed to the technique which has been employed of using other examination instruments to satisfy the terms of that statutory reference. The exact position of the Senate Committee concerning this dispute and the need for independent testing to address the third criterion is not described in this record, nor can its silence or that of the full Legislature in its 1987 Session be seen as creating any inference about the proper construction to be given the language within Section 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), and especially Section 463.0055(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Standing Ophthalmologists and optometrists who practice their professions in Florida are to a significant extent offering similar health care. In particular, the opportunities provided the certified optometrist for practice coincide with part of the practice available to ophthalmologists. Petitioner, Florida Society of Ophthalmology, is an organization concerned with, among other things, the educational interests of ophthalmologists and the quality of eye and health care delivered to the patients of ophthalmologists. It is also concerned on behalf of its members about the quality of eye care and health care of Floridians treated with medication by optometrists. Petitioner Florida Medical Association has the same concerns, responsibilities and purposes. Petitioner, Tully C. Patrowicz, M.D., is a physician and ophthalmologist practicing in Mount Dora, Florida, since 1972. Dr. Patrowicz is a Board-certified ophthalmologist since 1974, and is also a past officer and president of Petitioner Florida Society of Ophthalmology. He is currently a member of both Florida Society of Ophthalmology and Florida Medical Association. Petitioner, William J. Broussard, M.D., is a physician and ophthalmologist who has practiced in Melbourne, Florida, since 1967. He is a Board-certified ophthalmologist since 1966. Dr. Broussard is also a member and former office of Petitioner Florida Society of Ophthalmology. Florida Optometric Association is a not-for-profit organization with membership comprised of licensed optometrists in Florida. The purpose of Florida Optometric Association is to promote and protect the general public in ensuring the availability of high quality optometric services at affordable prices. Approximately 850 of the 1,100 practicing optometrists in Florida are members of Florida Optometric Association. Approximately 650 certified optometrists are members of Florida Optometric Association. Florida Optometric Association participates in administrative proceedings, legislative activities, and court litigation on behalf of optometry. The president of Florida Optometric Association has authorized retention of counsel for those purposes with the permission of the Executive Board and a vote of the membership. Florida Optometric Association members who are certified optometrists are subject to Rule 21Q-10.001, Florida Administrative Code. Florida Optometric Association participated in the legislative activities which resulted in the Optometric Practice Act of 1986. Dr. Howard J. Braverman, O.D., is President of the Florida Optometric Association and is a certified optometrist engaged in the active practice of optometry in Florida. If the certified optometry rule is invalidated, it will have a significant impact on the practice of certified optometry by Dr. Braverman and by the members of the Florida Optometric Association who are certified optometrists. It would also significantly affect their patients. Petitioner Baxter H. Byerly, M.D., and Intervenor Frank A. Broome, O.D., did not appear at the hearing and no indication was given concerning the exact nature of their claims as petitioner and intervenor, respectively. Respondent State of Florida, Board of Optometry, is an agency of the State of Florida within the Department of Professional Regulation with authority to regulate the practice of optometry. Sections 463.001, 463.003, 463.005, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Activities subject to the Board's regulatory and rulemaking authority include standards of practice of optometry, the administration and prescription of topical ocular pharmaceutical agents, and the certification of optometrists to administer and prescribe such drugs in their practice. See Sections 463.005(1)(a) and (g), and 463.0055, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Respondent State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, is an agency of the State of Florida that generally assists the various professional regulatory Boards, such as the Respondent Board of Optometry, in the examination and licensure of professionals. See Section 455.217, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a passing grade on the clinical portion of the August 2000 optometry licensure examination.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner took the optometry licensure examination in August of 2000. He received passing scores on three of the four parts of the licensure examination. He received a failing score on the clinical portion of the examination. The Petitioner's score on the clinical portion of the subject examination was 70.50. The minimum passing score is 75.00. The Petitioner contested the scores awarded to him for his performance of procedures itemized on the examination as 2A, 7B, 10A, 22A, 33C, 9A, 18B, and 14B.3 During the course of the hearing, two of the challenged items were resolved without the need for evidence. The Petitioner withdrew his challenge to item 10A. The Respondent stipulated that the Petitioner's performance on item 2A had been incorrectly graded, and agreed that 1.5 points should be added to the Petitioner's grade on the subject examination. On five of the items challenged by the Petitioner, one of the examiners gave the Petitioner credit for successful completion of the procedure and the other examiner did not.4 With regard to these five items, the Petitioner's primary contention is that, if one examiner gave him credit, he should also have received credit from the other examiner. However, given the nature of the manner in which the clinical examination is conducted, different scores by examiners evaluating a candidate's performance are not unusual, and, standing alone, different scores are not indicative of any irregularity in the manner in which the examination was conducted. On the clinical portion of the optometry licensure examination, each candidate is evaluated by two examiners, each of whom grades the candidate's performance of a procedure independently of the other examiner. Further, the examiners are not permitted to confer with each other regarding a candidate's scores. Specific written grading standards have been prepared for each of the procedures candidates are required to perform as part of the clinical portion of the subject examination. These written grading standards are provided to all examiners prior to each examination so that the examiners can review the standards and be prepared to apply them in a fair and even-handed manner. Before serving as an examiner, each proposed examiner goes through a training session. During the training session, each proposed examiner practices scoring the performance of various optometry procedures. Following the practice sessions, the work of each examiner is evaluated to determine whether the examiner is correctly applying the grading standards. If a potential examiner is unable to demonstrate the ability to apply the grading standards, then that examiner is assigned to other duties and is not assigned to grade candidates on the licensure exam. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination all successfully completed the training process and were determined to be acceptable by the Department. The examiners assigned to grade the Petitioner on the clinical portion of the subject examination were all experienced examiners and a statistical analysis of their scoring of all candidates on the subject examination demonstrates that they reliably applied the grading standards. With regard to the procedure required by item 14B, the Petitioner asserts that his ability to demonstrate the required procedure was impaired by the fact that the patient was photophobic. The greater weight of the evidence is otherwise. While the subject examination was in progress, two optometrists examined the patient and determined that the patient was not photophobic. There is no competent substantial evidence of any misconduct by any of the examiners who graded the Petitioner's performance during the subject examination. Similarly, there is no competent substantial evidence that the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or that it abused its discretion. There is no competent substantial evidence that the scoring of the Petitioner's examination performance was flawed, other than the additional 1.5 points that the Department agreed should be given for item 2A.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner is not entitled to a passing grade on the clinical section of the optometry licensure examination and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2001.
The Issue This cause arose as an action pursuant to Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes, challenging the validity of the amendment to Rule 59U-16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, proposed and published by the Board of Opticianry on February 14, 1997. The issues are: Do Petitioners have standing to bring this rule challenge? Is the following proposed amendment of Rule 59U- 16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to Sections 120.52(8)(c) and (8)(e), Florida Statutes? A sponsor must be an optician who is licensed under Chapter 484, F.S., for no less than one (1) year, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 59U-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. (Amended language underlined) Are Petitioners entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact All persons seeking to be licensed as opticians in Florida must first pass a minimal qualifications licensure examination. Before being qualified to sit for this examination, one of the following courses of preparation provided in Section 484.007, Florida Statutes, must be met. In relevant part, this section provides that one must have (1) received an associate degree, or its equivalent, in Opticianry from an accredited educational institution; (2) be an individual who is licensed to practice the profession of Opticianry in another state, territory, or jurisdiction, who has actively practiced for more than three years; or (3) come from a state or jurisdiction which is not licensed and have actively practiced in that state, territory, or jurisdiction for more than five years immediately preceding application; or (4) be an individual who has completed an apprentice program consisting of 6,240 hours of training under the supervision of an optician, a physician, or an optometrist licensed under the law of this state. Respondent Board of Opticianry published on February 14, 1997 a proposed change to Rule 59U-16.002(2), Florida Administrative Code, as set out below. The underlined language is the only substantive change: 59U-16.002 Qualifications for Apprentices and Sponsors. Apprentices and sponsors for apprenticeship programs must meet the following qualifications: No change. A sponsor must be an optician who is licensed under Chapter 484, F.S., for no less than one (1) year, a physician or an optometrist licensed in this state, whose license is not subject to any current disciplinary action; must be actively engaged in the practice of the qualifying profession; and must provide the equipment set forth in Rule 59U-10.007 on the premises of any establishment in which apprentices are trained. Specific Authority - 484.005 F.S. Law Implemented - 484.007(1)(d)4. F.S. The parties' Amended Prehearing Stipulation agreed that, Petitioners did not request a public hearing pursuant to the Florida Administrative Weekly notice. A Notice of Additional Public Hearing scheduled for May 16, 1997, was published on April 18, 1997, Volume 23, No. 16, Florida Administrative Weekly. At that hearing, the Board of Opticianry discussed and approved an amendment to proposed amendment to Rule 59U- 16.002. At formal hearing, counsel for the Board represented that the Board had voted to amend the challenged proposed rule so that it would not restrict persons who had completed more than one year of opticianry practice out of state prior to passing the Florida Opticianry licensure examination from acting as sponsors of apprentices within their first year of Florida practice; however, the Board would not withdraw the challenged rule as published and would not publish/file a Notice of Change until a Final Order is entered on the instant challenge. The Board's position was that this vote did not constitute a stipulation of invalidity, arbitrariness, capriciousness, or overreaching its statutory authority. According to the Board, this representation was made only because the Board would not be putting on evidence to support certain portions of the rule language, as published. Nonetheless, Sam Jones, licensed optician and Board member, testified, on behalf of the Board, that new Florida licensees from out of state could not properly sponsor apprentices for at least one year because they "need a little more exposure" to Florida laws and rules before teaching others and because some other states have no licensure criteria at all and no continuing education requirements. The Petition challenges the ability of the Board to require that opticians be licensed for at least one year prior to serving as apprentice sponsors, alleging that the Board lacks statutory authority to promulgate such a rule and that the proposed change is arbitrary and capricious and not based on appropriate factual or legal justification. Petitioner Lenscrafters, Inc. is a corporation that does business in the State of Florida, offering optical services and goods to the public. Lenscrafters hires employees to work as opticians, as well as hiring other unlicensed store employees. Petitioner Sanjiv Matta is Lenscrafters' Regional Trainer of Operations and apparently Lenscrafters' primary Florida employment recruiter. He also locates coaches for Lenscrafters' training programs. He has been a licensed optician in Florida for more than one year. He does not currently sponsor an apprentice. Lenscrafters and Mr. Matta allege that they will be substantially affected because the proposed rule amendment will reduce the number of available sponsors, which will in turn reduce the number of apprentices, which will in turn reduce the number of available employees now and the number of available licensed opticians in the future. As a subset of this alleged chain of unavailability of sponsors, apprentices, and employees generally, Petitioners claim great difficulty will arise in attempting to coordinate apprentice work hours with sponsor work hours. Lenscrafters has 64 stores in Florida. Each store is staffed by opticians, but there is often an independent optometrist next door. Lenscrafters employs approximately 200 opticians in Florida, with an average of three opticians working in each of its stores. Approximately 25 of the 200 opticians employed by Lenscrafters in Florida have been licensed for less than one year. These 25 were among the 60 new employees hired by Lenscrafters last year. Some of the licensed opticians Lenscrafters hires unilaterally elect to serve as sponsors to other employees who would like to obtain their opticianry license by completing an apprenticeship program. However, according to Mr. Matta, it would not be "integrity based" for Lenscrafters to urge or encourage optician employees to take on sponsorship. Lenscrafters provides the optometric equipment used by sponsors and apprentices in its employ. Although Lenscrafters provides programs to help all its employees, including apprentices, achieve expertise in fitting and adjusting eyeglasses and provides situational training, equipment training, training tests, performance tests, and lending libraries, it has no specific apprenticeship program, as such, in place. Some of Lenscrafters' programs assist apprentices in attaining credit hours towards licensure. Some supplement the apprentice program requirements. The primary purpose of Lenscrafters' programs is to educate and train its employees for servicing its customers. The ultimate testimony of Mr. Matta that there currently are three opticians employed by Lenscrafters who have been licensed in Florida for less than one year and who are also currently serving as sponsors was anecdotal at best and at worst was speculative and self-contradictory of prior testimony. Lenscrafters currently has 66 apprentices in its employ in Florida. Pursuant to Board rules, each sponsor may oversee two apprentices and any apprentice may have both a primary and a secondary sponsor. Credit hours in the apprentice program are only earned when the apprentice works under a sponsor's supervision. Board rules would permit Lenscrafters' 200 opticians to sponsor 400 apprentices if each licensee had two apprentices. The proposed change in the rule would allow 175 Lenscrafters' opticians to sponsor 350 apprentices. Simple mathematics shows that Lenscrafters has between 33 and 66 optician employees who serve as apprentice sponsors, primary or secondary. Clearly, Lenscrafters currently employs many more non-sponsors than sponsors. Section 484.011, Florida Statutes, allows any employee of an optician to perform any of the functions an optician performs, as long as the acts are performed under the direct supervision of the optician. Lenscrafters allows apprentices to perform more tasks than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters considers apprentices to have greater expertise, employee commitment, and career commitment than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters pays apprentices more than other unlicensed employees. Lenscrafters and Mr. Matta believe that apprentices who have worked in Lenscrafters' stores and trained on Lenscrafters' equipment will eventually provide a pool of trained opticians for hire or promotion. However, Lenscrafters submitted no statistical data to confirm this "belief" expressed by Mr. Matta, and based on the ratio of available sponsors to apprentices which was developed at formal hearing, this "belief" constitutes pure speculation. It could be just as beneficial for Lenscrafters to train non-apprentices at a lower salary. Intervenor Odette Gayoso has been involved in opticianry for 15 years. She has an Associate of Arts (AA) degree in Optical Science and has been licensed as an optician in Puerto Rico since 1991. Ms. Gayoso is employed as an optician by Lenscrafters. She has been a licensed optician in Florida since December 1996. Therefore, at the time of formal hearing, she had been Florida- licensed for less than one year. Under the proposed rule amendment, she would be unable to act as a sponsor for five more months. Ms. Gayoso does not sponsor an apprentice currently, although the current rule permits her to do so. She has never applied to be a sponsor. No apprentice currently wants her as a sponsor. In the past, two Lenscrafters employees needed sponsors, but both left Lenscrafters' employ before any agreements concerning sponsorship were reached. Ms. Gayoso feels she is qualified to sponsor an apprentice and that she would derive satisfaction from teaching one. The parties' Amended Prehearing Stipulation stipulated that POF had standing to intervene. POF put on no evidence of standing. Mr. Matta and Ms. Gayoso testified that they recruit for Lenscrafters. Ms. Gayoso is an assistant retail manager in a single store. Mr. Matta recruits state-wide. Only Mr. Matta testified that, in his experience, there is a shortage of qualified opticians available to be hired. Only Mr. Matta testified that due to the Board's rule requirement of direct supervision it was difficult for him to match apprentices' work hours with those of their sponsors. Ms. Gayoso did not corroborate Mr. Matta's perception that it is difficult to match apprentices' work hours with those of their sponsors. Although she could see how that could be, it apparently was not a problem in her store where the optician/manager sponsored two apprentices and where another optician who had been employed less than 90 days was prohibited by Lenscrafters from acting as a sponsor. The fact that Lenscrafters prohibits some of its licensed opticians from sponsoring apprentices undermines Lenscrafters' position that the proposed rule change alone would undermine apprentices locating willing sponsors. Mr. Sam Jones perceived no shortage of licensed opticians, only a shortage of licensed opticians he would care to hire in his establishment. The Board office receives approximately 86 calls about the apprenticeship program each month. The Board has never received a call concerning a prospective apprentice's inability to find a sponsor. There are currently approximately 2,500 actively licensed opticians in Florida. Of these 2,500 licensees, 174 were licensed last year. This number of annual new licensees has stayed relatively stable for many years. Of 544 current apprentices in Florida, only 27 currently have sponsors of less than one year licensure. The statistics show that many more potential sponsors are available both state-wide and within Lenscrafters' Florida operation than there are those who want to be apprentices. Under the current rule, only those licensees who are currently under disciplinary action are precluded from being sponsors. Under the proposed rule, and excluding any disciplinary concerns, only the 174 new admittees could not be sponsors for one year. A year later, those 174 could become sponsors. So in effect, the only licensees who could not be sponsors each year are the newest licensees, while each year the total number of potential sponsors grows respectively. Of course, the number of eligible physicians and optometrists who could also serve as sponsors would not fall below the current number and would continue to grow respectively year by year. Florida has two junior colleges with an Opticianry AA degree program. These colleges graduate approximately 60 opticians per year. Approximately half of the successful opticianry licensure examinees come from the AA program, and half come from the apprentice program. There is a 90 percent first time pass rate on the examination. The number of apprentice program examinees who fail on both the initial examination and "retake" examinations is higher than for AA degree holders. Since 1991, the Board has been concerned that the apprenticeship route has not been adequately educating future opticians and ensuring the safety of their public practice after licensure even if they were being adequately prepared to pass the standardized minimal qualifications examination. The Board consulted no empirical data for formulating its rule as published, but it held between nine and 12 Board meetings which included discussions on upgrading the apprenticeship program. Board members reported information from nationally recognized professional associations and reviewed a national trend whereby more states are requiring licensure and more states are phasing out apprenticeship programs. Some Board members took the minimum qualifications licensure examination so that they could understand what was involved and how the examination could be improved and report back to the Board. Board members heard reports from staff and investigators on reasons more disciplinary cases were not prosecuted. These Board meetings were open to the public and solicited public input. Some were referred to as "workshops," although they might not meet the generally understood Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, definition of "workshop." In 1996, a bill to amend Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, so as to require optician licensees to have three years of licensure before becoming sponsors did not pass into law. The Board viewed the one-year rule amendment as a more conservative step than requiring three years of licensure for sponsorship. All witnesses agreed that an experienced optician knows more about the practice of opticianry than a newly licensed optician. Lenscrafters' witnesses contended that newly licensed opticians were more enthusiastic sponsors and more able to teach what would be required on the licensure examination. Sam Jones was one of the Board members who retook and passed the current licensure examination. On behalf of the Board, he stated that the teaching of how to pass the licensure examination did not equate with teaching the practice of opticianry. In drafting the rule challenged herein to apply to all new optician licensees regardless of which of the four alternative routes they had taken to licensure, the Board viewed the new one-year requirement as constituting an internship akin to the internship required of other health care professionals. The new rule does not require physicians and optometrists to be licensed for one year before acting as a sponsor. In not applying the one-year requirement to physicians and optometrists, but only to opticians, the Board considered that licensed physicians and optometrists already had clinical experience in excess of licensed opticians. The parties stipulated that the Board is authorized to make such rules as are necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public as it relates to the practice of opticianry and is authorized, "to establish administrative processing fees sufficient to cover the cost of administering apprentice rules as promulgated by the Board."
