The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty, if any, should Petitioner impose on Respondent's teaching certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is authorized to teach English, the mentally handicapped, and psychology in Florida pursuant to Florida Educator's Certificate No. 435635. The certificate is valid through June 30, 2008. Respondent was an outstanding teacher for the Manatee County School District (the District) for approximately 21 years. The District employed Respondent as a language arts teacher at Manatee High School (Manatee) in 2000. On November 4, 2000, Respondent drove a white Dodge van approximately 30 miles an hour on the wrong side of U.S. Highway 41 (Highway 41) toward a deputy sheriff who was directing traffic during an annual festival. The deputy was off duty, but was in uniform and wore an orange vest. Highway 41 contains six lanes where the deputy was directing traffic. Three northbound and three southbound lanes are divided by a landscaped median with a turning ramp. Oncoming vehicles pulled off the road to avoid the van. The left front tire of the van was flat. The deputy attempted to stop Respondent by waiving his arms, jumping up and down, and yelling and screaming for Respondent to stop. Respondent drove past the deputy, and the deputy pushed off the front window of the vehicle. The deputy's vehicle was approximately 15 feet away with blue lights and strobe lights already operating. The deputy drove his vehicle after Respondent with the siren on. Respondent stopped the van approximately 1.4 miles from the location where she drove past the deputy. Respondent pulled into a parking lot of a chain restaurant. The deputy arrested Respondent for aggravated assault on a police officer and fleeing to elude a police officer. Respondent subsequently pled guilty to both charges. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced Respondent to six months of community control, 25 hours of community service, imposed fines and costs, and placed Respondent on probation for one year. Respondent satisfactorily completed her sentence, paid her fines, and completed her probation. On November 10, 2000, Respondent was under the influence of alcohol at Manatee as students were arriving for school. Administrators at Manatee gave Respondent a Breathalyzer test. The test disclosed a positive reading of .23. The legal limit is .07. The District suspended Respondent without pay on November 10, 2000. Respondent resigned from her teaching position with the District on November 16, 2000. The acts committed by Respondent on November 4 and 10, 2000, constitute neither gross immorality nor moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 1012.795(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). The acts were not base, depraved, dishonest, or unprincipled. They were related to alcohol addiction and a long-term illness of Respondent's mother. Respondent did not violate Section 1012.795(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent was not convicted of a criminal charge. The court withheld adjudication. Petitioner acknowledges in its PRO that Petitioner could find no authority to support a conclusion that the withholding of adjudication is a conviction for the purpose of this alleged violation. Respondent did not violate Section 1012.795(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003). The evidence is less than clear and convincing that the acts committed by Respondent seriously reduced her effectiveness as a teacher. The traffic incident occurred away from school. The second incident occurred before school began and did not harm students or their parents. Respondent was an outstanding teacher prior to her resignation. She resigned her position before her condition had any effect in the classroom. Respondent violated Section 1012.795(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2003), by committing acts prohibited by Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession. Respondent violated Section 1012.795(2), Florida Statutes (2003), by pleading guilty to the criminal charges against her. Three aggravating factors support a significant penalty against Respondent's teaching certificate. First, the offenses on November 4 and 10, 2000, were severe within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-11.007(3)(a). (References to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code on February 27, 1994.) Second, both offenses created a danger to the public within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-11.007(3)(b). Third, the offense on November 10, 2000, was a repetition of an alcohol- related problem. The District had previously transferred Respondent from another school to Manatee in an effort to help Respondent with problems associated with alcohol addiction. Numerous mitigating factors listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-11.007(3) justify a penalty less severe than the three-year revocation and probation that Petitioner proposes. The last offense occurred more than three years ago. Respondent practiced as an educator for over 21 years before the last incident, made significant contributions to students and the educational system in which she worked, and has no other disciplinary history. Fla. Admin. Code R. 6B-11.007(3)(d)-(f). Respondent caused no actual damage to any person or property. A penalty in this case has little, if any, deterrent effect and will have a significant adverse impact on Respondent's livelihood. Respondent voluntarily resigned her position and successfully rehabilitated herself from alcohol addiction. Respondent candidly admitted actual knowledge of her offenses and their severity. Respondent pled guilty to the charges against her and voluntarily resigned her teaching position. No pecuniary gain inured to Respondent, and Respondent did not harm any student or child. Respondent is rehabilitated from her previous alcohol addiction. Fla. Admin. Code R. 6B-11.007(3)(g)-(k), (m), and (q)-(s). The evidence does not support a period of probation. Respondent's alcohol addiction was related to external circumstances involving Respondent's mother who was ill and in need of constant attention in 2000. Those external circumstances no longer exist. Respondent is rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Subsections 1012.795(1)(c), (e), and (f), Florida Statutes (2003); guilty of violating Subsections 1012.795(1)(i) and (2), Florida Statutes; suspending Respondent's teaching certificate for one year beginning on November 10, 2000; and thereafter activating the certificate forthwith. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Nina Ashenafi, Esquire FEA/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 131 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-0131 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street 1244 Turlington Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Marian Lambeth, Program Specialist Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011, 1D-8.012, 11D-8.013, and 11D-8.014 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: FDLE is the state agency responsible for the regulation of blood analysts who conduct blood testing for purposes of the driving and boating under the influence and related provisions of Chapters 316, 322, and 327, Florida Statutes. § 316.1932(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Among FDLE's enumerated powers under the Alcohol Testing Program (the "program") are the authority to approve the "type" of blood test utilized and the authority to "specify techniques and methods" for blood testing utilized under the driving and boating under the influence and related provisions of Chapters 316, 322, and 327, Florida Statutes. § 316.1932(1)(a)2.n., and o., Fla. Stat. Petitioner, William Lane, has been charged with DUI manslaughter and is awaiting trial on that charge in the 18th Judicial Circuit, in and for Brevard County, Florida. Petitioner was subjected to a blood alcohol test that purported to be conducted in compliance with Sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes. FDLE has not contested the standing of Petitioner to initiate this proceeding. Petitioner has challenged Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011, 11D-8.012, 11D-8.013, and 11D-8.014 as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.1 Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.011 provides: 11D-8.011 Approval of Blood Alcohol Test Methods. The Department approves the following test methods for determining blood alcohol level: Alcohol Dehydrogenase (Enzymatic). Gas Chromatography. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10-31-93. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.012 provides: 11D-8.012 Blood Samples - Labeling and Collection. Before collecting a sample of blood, the skin puncture area must be cleansed with an antiseptic that does not contain alcohol. Blood samples must be collected in a glass evacuation tube that contains a preservative such as sodium fluoride and an anticoagulant such as potassium oxalate or EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid). Compliance with this section can be established by the stopper or label on the collection tube, documentation from the manufacturer or distributor, or other evidence. Immediately after collection, the tube must be inverted several times to mix the blood with the preservative and anticoagulant. Blood collection tubes must be labeled with the following information: name of person tested, date and time sample was collected, and initials of the person who collected the sample. Blood samples need not be refrigerated if submitted for analysis within seven (7) days of collection, or during transportation, examination or analysis. Blood samples must be otherwise refrigerated, except that refrigeration is not required subsequent to the initial analysis. Blood samples must be hand-delivered or mailed for initial analysis within thirty days of collection, and must be initially analyzed within sixty days of receipt by the facility conducting the analysis. Blood samples which are not hand-delivered must be sent by priority mail, overnight delivery service, or other equivalent delivery service. Notwithstanding any requirements in Chapter 11D-8, F.A.C., any blood analysis results obtained, if proved to be reliable, shall be acceptable as a valid blood alcohol level. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10-31-93, Amended 7-29-01. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013 provides: 11D-8.013 Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst. The application for a permit to determine the alcohol level of a blood sample shall be made on a form provided by the Department and shall include the following information: Name and address of applicant; A copy of state license if licensed, or college transcript; Name and address of employer and laboratory facility where applicant performs analyses; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, A complete description of proposed analytical procedure(s) to be used in determining blood alcohol level. Qualifications for blood analyst permit - To qualify, the applicant must meet all of the following requirements: Department approval of analytical procedure(s). All proposed analytical procedures will be reviewed and a determination of approval will be made by the Department; Satisfactory determination of blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Department using the proposed analytical procedure. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing, acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, Meet one of the following: Possess a clinical laboratory license in clinical chemistry as a technologist, supervisor or director, under Chapter 483, F.S.; or Be a licensed physician pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S.; or Complete a minimum of 60 semester credit hours or equivalent of college, at least 15 semester hours of which must be in college chemistry. The department shall approve gas chromatographic analytical procedures and enzymatic analytical procedures based on alcohol dehydrogenase which meet the following requirements: Includes the approved method used and a description of the method, and the equipment, reagents, standards, and controls used; Uses commercially-prepared standards and controls certified by the manufacturer, or laboratory-prepared standards and controls verified using gas chromatography against certified standards. For commercially-prepared standards and controls, the manufacturer, lot number and expiration date must be documented for each sample or group of samples being analyzed. For laboratory-prepared standards and controls, date, person preparing the solution, method of preparation and verification must be documented; A statement of the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range; Uses a new or existing calibration curve. The new calibration curve must be generated using at least three (3) standards: one at 0.05 g/100mL or less, one between 0.05 and 0.20 g/100mL (inclusive) and one at 0.20 g/100mL or higher, and must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher. The existing calibration curve must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher; Includes the analysis of an alcohol- free control, and the analysis of a whole blood or serum control. The whole blood or serum control may be used to satisfy the control requirement(s) in paragraph (d); A gas chromatographic analytical procedure must discriminate between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol and employ an internal standard technique; An enzymatic analytical procedure based on alcohol dehydrogenase must use the procedure recommended by the instrument manufacturer/test kit vendor for whole blood alcohol analysis, and the enzyme used must have sufficient selectivity to provide negligible cross-reactivity towards methanol, acetone and isopropanol. The permit shall be issued by the Department for a specific method and procedure. Any substantial change to the method, analytical procedure, or laboratory facility must receive prior approval by the Department before being used to determine the blood alcohol level of a sample submitted by an agency. The Department shall determine what constitutes a substantial change. An analyst shall only use a Department- approved procedure to determine the blood alcohol level of samples submitted by an agency. Approval of blood alcohol analysis methods and procedures shall be based on rule requirements in effect at the time they were submitted for approval. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3) 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b), (e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10- 31-93, Amended 4-1-94, 2-1-95, 1-1-97, 11-5- 02, 12-9-04. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.014 provides: 11D-8.014 Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst: Renewal. Permits to conduct blood alcohol analyses shall remain valid until otherwise suspended or revoked by the Department. In order to remain qualified for such permit, an analyst must satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of at least two (2) proficiency samples provided by the Department each annual quarter. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories. An analyst, who is in good standing, may elect to not participate in one proficiency test cycle each calendar year. The analyst must notify the Department in writing, of his/her election prior to the date the proficiency test results must be reported to the Department. Upon notification by the Department that an analyst has failed to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level on any set of proficiency samples, the analyst shall be required to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of a second set of five proficiency samples provided by the Department. Upon notification by the Department that an analyst has failed to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level on a second set of proficiency samples, the analyst shall not perform any duties authorized by the analyst’s permit until the analyst satisfactorily determines the blood alcohol level of a subsequent set of proficiency samples provided by the Department. This section shall not preclude the Department from taking further action in accordance with Rule 11D-8.015, F.A.C. Failure to satisfactorily determine the blood alcohol level of any six (6) sets of proficiency samples provided by the Department within a twelve (12) month period shall result in revocation of the blood analyst permit. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. History–New 10- 31-93, Amended 1-1-97, 11-5-02. Subsections 316.1932(1)(a)2. and (f)1., Florida Statutes, cited as specific authority for all four rules, provide: (2) The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is responsible for the regulation of the individuals who operate, inspect, and instruct on the breath test instruments utilized in the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is further responsible for the regulation of blood analysts who conduct blood testing to be utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program shall: Establish uniform criteria for the issuance of permits to breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to permit breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to discipline and suspend, revoke, or renew the permits of breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Establish uniform requirements for instruction and curricula for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Have the authority to specify one approved curriculum for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Establish a procedure for the approval of breath test operator and agency inspector classes. Have the authority to approve or disapprove breath test instruments and accompanying paraphernalia for use pursuant to the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. With the approval of the executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement, make and enter into contracts and agreements with other agencies, organizations, associations, corporations, individuals, or federal agencies as are necessary, expedient, or incidental to the performance of duties. Issue final orders which include findings of fact and conclusions of law and which constitute final agency action for the purpose of chapter 120. Enforce compliance with the provisions of this section through civil or administrative proceedings. Make recommendations concerning any matter within the purview of this section, this chapter, chapter 322, or chapter 327. Promulgate rules for the administration and implementation of this section, including definitions of terms. Consult and cooperate with other entities for the purpose of implementing the mandates of this section. Have the authority to approve the type of blood test utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. Have the authority to specify techniques and methods for breath alcohol testing and blood testing utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. Have the authority to approve repair facilities for the approved breath test instruments, including the authority to set criteria for approval. Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede provisions in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The specifications in this section are derived from the power and authority previously and currently possessed by the Department of Law Enforcement and are enumerated to conform with the mandates of chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida.[2] * * * (f)1. The tests determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or breath shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules of the Department of Law Enforcement. Such rules must specify precisely the test or tests that are approved by the Department of Law Enforcement for reliability of result and ease of administration, and must provide an approved method of administration which must be followed in all such tests given under this section. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood does not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes. Subsection 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes, cited as specific authority for Rule 11D-8.0133, provides: (b) A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose. The Department of Law Enforcement may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department. Any insubstantial differences between approved methods or techniques and actual testing procedures, or any insubstantial defects concerning the permit issued by the department, in any individual case, shall not render the test or test results invalid. Subsection 316.1934(3), Florida Statutes, is cited as specific authority for Rule 11D-8.013.4 Section 316.1934, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: 316.1934 Presumption of impairment; testing methods.— It is unlawful and punishable as provided in chapter 322 and in s. 316.193 for any person who is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired or to the extent that the person is deprived of full possession of normal faculties, to drive or be in actual physical control of any motor vehicle within this state. Such normal faculties include, but are not limited to, the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, judge distances, drive an automobile, make judgments, act in emergencies, and, in general, normally perform the many mental and physical acts of daily life. At the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving, or in actual physical control of, a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties were impaired or to the extent that he or she was deprived of full possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 and this section are admissible into evidence when otherwise admissible, and the amount of alcohol in the person's blood or breath at the time alleged, as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, or by chemical or physical test of the person's breath, gives rise to the following presumptions: If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.05 or less, it is presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, that fact does not give rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired but may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. If there was at that time a blood- alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher, that fact is prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. Moreover, such person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher is guilty of driving, or being in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle, with an unlawful blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level. The presumptions provided in this subsection do not limit the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired. A chemical analysis of a person's blood to determine alcoholic content or a chemical or physical test of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid under this section, must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose. Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques and actual testing procedures or any insubstantial defects concerning the permit issued by the department, in any individual case do not render the test or test results invalid. The Department of Law Enforcement may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to termination or revocation in accordance with rules adopted by the department. . . . For purposes of this proceeding, the remaining provisions cited as specific authority for or as laws implemented by the challenged rules are redundant to the provisions set forth above.5 11. Sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes, are collectively referred to as the implied consent law. See Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783, 789 n.4 (Fla. 1992). In Robertson, the Court, citing its earlier analysis in State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980), discussed the implied consent law and its relation to earlier common law evidentiary principles as to the admissibility of expert testimony in a DUI prosecution. The implied consent law "includes an exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of blood-test results taken contrary to its core policies." Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. However, "this exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of all evidence obtained contrary to the implied consent law, but only such evidence obtained in a manner that is contrary to the core policies of the statute: ensuring scientific reliability of the tests, and protecting the health of test subjects." Id. at 789 n.5. Prior to the adoption of the implied consent law, scientific tests for intoxication were admissible if a proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment, and (3) expert testimony was presented to explain the meaning of the test. Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. The Court explained the implications of this common law rule: This predicate had to be established in each and every case. If the state failed to do so, the evidence was not admissible. Moreover, when the state attempted to establish the necessary predicate, the defense enjoyed an opportunity to rebut all of this evidence. If the defense introduced sufficient evidence to rebut any one of the elements of the predicate, then once again the expert evidence was not admissible. Perhaps most significantly of all, the former procedure required the trial court to be the arbiter of what often was a dispute over arcane scientific principles. Id. (citation omitted). The implied consent law altered this practice by creating a presumption that the evidence is admissible, provided the state shows that the person conducting the test was properly licensed and has substantially complied with the governing regulations. "In other words, the state's burden of establishing a predicate is simplified in the sense that the state no longer has to guess what factors a particular trial judge will require the state to prove before admitting the test results; nor is the trial court required to wade into a morass of arcane scientific challenges and counterchallenges. If the state follows the HRS[6] 'checklist,' then the trial court's determination that the predicate has been established is clothed in a presumption of correctness." Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 789. In the instant case, Petitioner contends that the challenged rules do not provide a "checklist" in the area of blood alcohol testing sufficient to entitle the state to the presumption of correctness under the implied consent law. According to Petitioner, Robertson dictates that blood alcohol tests conducted under the challenged rules are not entitled to any presumption of correctness, and must be subjected to the three-step common law test for admissibility. Petitioner complains that the rules do not provide a checklist at all. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.011 simply approves alcohol dehydrogenase and gas chromatography as test methods for determining blood alcohol level, without setting forth a procedural checklist by which a judge could verify that the testing has been conducted in a scientifically reliable manner. In fact, the challenged rules do not prescribe a specific step-by-step procedure for the conduct of blood alcohol testing. Rather, blood alcohol permit applicants are required to propose analytical procedures that comport with the requirements set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3). If the application is approved by FDLE, then a permit is issued that allows the analyst to conduct testing only for the specific method and procedure described in the application, and only in the specific laboratory facility named in the application. Any substantial changes in the test method, analytical procedure, or in the laboratory facility itself must be approved by FDLE. Fla. Admin. Code R. 11D-8.013(4). Petitioner takes the position that in order to be consistent with the statutes as interpreted by Robertson, FDLE's rules must impose a uniform, step-by-step procedure for the administration of alcohol dehydrogenase and gas chromatography blood alcohol testing. FDLE takes the position that imposing such a procedure on every laboratory in the state would be absurdly expensive, scientifically unnecessary, and is not required by the governing statutes. Gas chromatography is the only test method currently used in Florida laboratories. "Headspace analysis" is the general procedure employed.7 Laura Barfield, the manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, explained that gas chromatography is a separation technique used to analyze blood samples for their alcohol (specifically, ethanol) content. Gas chromatography separates a compound into its individual components, using gas as the mode for separation. Petitioner's toxicology expert was Lawrence W. Masten, a former professor of toxicology at the University of Mississippi and currently a toxicology consultant. Dr. Masten explained the method in layman's terms. A small sample of blood is diluted with an internal standard, which is a chemical (usually a molecule similar to ethyl alcohol) of a known concentration. The diluted sample is placed into a vial, sealed, then heated to a constant temperature. The air sample in the head space above the heated liquid is analyzed in the gas chromatograph to derive findings as to the level of alcohol in the blood sample. Dr. Masten explained that the internal standard is included so that a ratio may be established between the molecules of alcohol in the blood sample and those in the standard. The inclusion of an internal standard also makes it less important to precisely measure the volume of the blood sample. Bruce Goldberger is a forensic toxicologist and is the director of toxicology at the University of Florida College of Medicine. In 1999-2000, Dr. Goldberger chaired a committee of scientific and legal experts who made recommendations to FDLE resulting in the current form of the challenged rules. Dr. Goldberger testified that the committee discussed the procedures needed to produce a reliable and accurate result from a gas chromatograph. He believed that the most important aspect of the rules is the requirement that the procedure be able to differentiate between ethanol and other volatiles in the specimen. Dr. Goldberger also cited the specific criteria for the calibration and control of the method as important factors in ensuring the reliability of tests performed pursuant to FDLE permits. Dr. Goldberger explained that, because there is the possibility of other alcohols in the blood specimen, the testing method must be able to differentiate between ethanol, which humans consume in alcoholic beverages, and acetone, isopropanol, methanol, and any other possible interferent. Dr. Goldberger agreed with Dr. Mastin on the importance of requiring the use of an internal standard. Dr. Goldberger testified that the use of an internal standard is always necessary in modern day quantitative analysis. While acknowledging the difficulties that these concepts pose to laymen, Dr. Goldberger stated that anyone trained in the area of quantitative analysis would understand the role of an internal standard. He explained that Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(f) does not prescribe one specific internal standard because there are two such standards that are commonly used throughout the world, and that either one, n-propanol or butanol, is accepted by scientists in the field of forensic toxicology. Dr. Goldberger testified that different laboratories may use different standards without affecting the accuracy and reliability of their tests, provided their testing methods are validated and provided the lab where the chemist is performing the test employs the calibrators and controls that are noted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013. Dr. Goldberger believes that it would be poor science to write rules that "get down to the nitty-gritty of a method." The rules should not prescribe the precise chemical composition of the internal standard, the temperature used to heat samples, or the column8 used. Different laboratories have different equipment, and the rules should provide some leeway to allow the analysts to perform their work in their own setting. As an example, Dr. Goldberger cited Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(c), which addresses the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range. Dr. Goldberger noted that the range varies between laboratories, and even from day to day within a single lab. In Dr. Goldberger's lab, the range may be linear from 0.01 to 0.5 one day, and from 0.01 to 0.4 the next day. This variability is why the lab runs calibrators to verify the range, and includes the current range on the worksheet along with the testing data. Dr. Goldberger concluded that the variations make it impossible for FDLE to require a specific number for the range. As another example, Dr. Goldberger cited Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(d), which discusses the constitution and use of a calibration curve. Calibration curves also vary from lab to lab, and the rule allows for that variation. Dr. Goldberger stated that it would be possible to specify an exact concentration, but it would not be good practice and could not be done without retooling the labs. Dr. Goldberger conceded that it would be possible to develop a detailed checklist in a rule, but asserted that to do so would not be good science. If the rules dictated every aspect of the equipment and procedures to be used in the lab, then nearly every lab in the state would have to retool and purchase new gas chromatographs. The expense would be prohibitive and unnecessary in scientific terms. Dr. Goldberger asserted that there is no need for a detailed checklist in the rules because the labs performing blood alcohol testing in Florida all use validated methods and are adequately calibrated and controlled. The data verifying the labs' methods, calibrations and controls is available for expert review. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.014 establishes a proficiency testing program, requiring every analyst to undergo quarterly testing to make sure their work is satisfactory. Dr. Goldberger testified that he has worked in several labs during his 25-year career. The methods employed in each lab were essentially the same. The instruments vary from lab to lab, but the technique is the same. Some technological improvements have been made in newer gas chromatographs, but have not altered the essential techniques of gas chromatography, which have not changed in 30 to 40 years. Dr. Goldberger stated that, while a layman might not be able to look at the rules and know all the steps necessary to perform a valid blood alcohol analysis, an analyst would. Further, persons reviewing the analyst's work in the lab would know the steps because each analyst is required to file with FDLE a "standard operating procedures" ("SOP") document that is several pages long and minutely details the procedures used by the analyst. Dr. Goldberger testified that "SOP" is a term of art in the industry. He acknowledged that the challenged rules do not employ that term, but testified that the language in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(2)(a) requiring FDLE approval of "analytical procedure(s)" is understood to mean that applicants must file their SOPs. The SOP is the "analytical procedure" to be approved by FDLE. The SOP contains all the analytical parameters necessary to perform gas chromatography, including the temperature, column, and column length. The SOP sets forth the steps employed by the analyst. Dr. Goldberger gave examples of the initial steps in a typical SOP: step one would call for removing the batch of specimens from the refrigerator, step two would be a review of the specimen identification information on the tubes, and step three would call for preparation of the dilution standard for that day's work. As the analysis goes forward, the analyst prepares a worksheet documenting each step in the process. The worksheet is used as part of the validation process for that batch and also for the calibration and control of that batch. An expert reviewing the analyst's work can combine the SOP, the worksheet and the raw data of the analysis to reconstruct exactly what occurred in the lab. Thus, Dr. Goldberger concluded that a "checklist" of sorts is provided under the challenged rules by way of each analyst's analytical procedure, which FDLE initially approves and periodically reviews. Dr. Goldberger concluded that the current standard of practice in forensic toxicology labs is to use head space gas chromatography for the analysis of blood alcohols. The standard of practice allows for differences in methodology from one lab to another, assuming the methodology is performed correctly. These variations do not prevent a qualified analyst from knowing what is required to conduct a gas chromatograph blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield, the manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, testified as to the program's duties. The program grants permits only to the analysts, not to laboratories. Approximately 66 analysts are currently permitted in Florida, and 11 Florida labs are used for this work. Some analysts hold two permits, because they use two different analytical procedures and a separate permit is required for each procedure. A potential applicant may obtain an application from the program's office or download it from the program's web page. The application requires the applicant to identify her employer, the lab facility to be used, and at least one agency for which the analyst will perform blood alcohol analysis. The applicant must identify the method to be used and must include a copy of her SOP. Once filed, the SOPs are maintained by the Alcohol Testing Program as a public record. The program releases permitting and proficiency test information upon request. Ms. Barfield stated that the "method" referenced by the rules is the type of test, i.e., gas chromatography or alcohol dehydrogenase. The "procedure" contemplated by the rule is the SOP, the actual set of steps that the blood sample will go through when that analyst performs a blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield testified that this "procedure" equates to the statutory term "method of administration" found at Subsection 316.1932(1)(f)1., Florida Statutes. The "method of administration" is spelled out at Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(3)(a)-(g). Ms. Barfield personally reviews the applications for blood alcohol analyst permits. When reviewing an application and its accompanying analytical procedures, Ms. Barfield uses Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013 as a checklist to ensure that all requirements have been met. She checks off each requirement of the rule that the application meets. If the proposed procedure discriminates between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol, she gives it a check. If it uses an internal standard, it gets a check. If it employs appropriate levels of standards and controls, it gets a check. The steps described in the analytical procedure become requirements of that analyst's permit and must be performed each time the analyst conducts a blood alcohol analysis. Ms. Barfield also gives proficiency tests pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.013(2)(b). In a proficiency test, the applicant must use the proposed procedure to correctly determine the blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Alcohol Testing Program. Ms. Barfield testified that the rules do not prescribe the specific steps to be used in the analytical procedure because there are many different laboratories and many different ways to achieve an accurate and reliable blood alcohol result. As an example, she described her own procedure in comparison to that of the lab at the University of Miami: I'm in the FDLE laboratory and I'm using a PerkinElmer gas chromatograph . . . and I'm going to prep my samples, meaning taking the blood vial that I receive, and I'm going to aliquot for a sample 50 microliters of that blood and put it in the correct container to be able, to be analyzing it. The head space gas chromatography has a special little container. You do not stick the blood vial on the autosampler. Anyway, you're aliquoting 50 microliters, and I'm going to do that twice because my procedure says I have to do it twice and the rule says I have to do it twice, and . . . I'm going to dilute it with n-propanol internal standard and I'm going to dilute it with a thousand milliliters of internal standard, and my n-propanol internal standard is at a .02 concentration. I put it on the gas chromatograph, and it's a head space autosampler, and I'm going to heat that bottle up to 60 degrees [Celsius] in order for equilibriation to occur between the alcohol in the blood and the alcohol in the head space above it, and I'm going to inject my needle into that. I'm going to leave the needle in there .02 seconds. I'm going to withdraw for .05 seconds. I'm going to put it on a transfer line that's 90 degrees C, and I'm going to run it through a gas chromatograph whose column on the inside is heated up to 55 C, and I'm going to detect it with a flame ionization detector. That's all great. That's the steps. That's the FDLE laboratory. We get a good result, a valid, reliable result. . . . The University of Miami, they use a Hewlett- Packard gas chromatograph. It has an autosampler on it, too, and to prep their samples, they don't have an automatic sampler to get the blood out where they can automatically sample 50 microliters and dilute it with 1,000 milliliters of internal standard. They're going to use pipettes. They're going to manually do it. Their sample size is 500 milliliters of blood. They automatically pipette their 500 milliliters of blood, put it in the special container for the autosampler. They're only diluting with 500 milliliters of internal standard, and their internal standard concentration is a .04. They seal off their bottle. They put it on the autosampler. They decide to equilibrate for 22 minutes at 50 C. The other lab was at 60. Their transfer line is-— they're going to inject for .05 seconds and withdraw for .05 seconds, and they're going to use their transfer line heated to 85 Celsius, and their gas chromatograph was heated to 50 Celsius, and they use a flame ionization detector, because most everybody does. Those are all little different parameters, right, but I just described two procedures, and the end result is they get the same answer. All the little minute things are laboratory-specific for the equipment that they have, everything from how they pipette the sample out of [the] blood tube to how they analyze it and the temperatures and the pressures and the operating parameters, transfer line temperatures, things like that, those are all individualized to a laboratory, and just because they're different doesn't make it wrong. To further go along with the description of their method and the overall requirements of the procedure that we're looking at, I proficiency test the analysts from the University of Miami. They're using different temperatures. They're doing things a little bit differently. Granted, everything's about-— generally, it's the same, but the temperatures are different and things like that. I proficiency test them before I even give them a permit, and both of their procedures provide accurate and reliable results, and that's why it's not detailed down to the minutia in that particular section [of the rule], because there are differences that can occur in the grand scheme that don't affect the overall end result. Ms. Barfield agreed that it would be possible to write a rule to encompass every detail for each of the labs, but stated that it is not scientifically necessary to enact such a rule. She further stated that such a rule would not be feasible because it would require every lab to have the same equipment and procedures, from pipetting the blood sample to the gas chromatograph to the autosampler to the same gases, operating at the same temperatures. Ms. Barfield testified that it would not be feasible to impose the same criteria for every procedural step in every lab without incurring an enormous outlay of money. She noted that a gas chromatograph alone costs around $50,000. Ms. Barfield acknowledged that Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.003(2) specifically approves two, and only two, instruments for the conduct of breath tests: the Intoxilyzer 8000 and the Intoxilyzer 5000. FDLE rules also call for the Alcohol Testing Program to register and conduct validation inspections of particular breath testing machines. Fla. Admin. Code R. 11D-8.004. When questioned as to why FDLE did not regulate gas chromatographs in the same manner, Ms. Barfield replied that any comparison between breath and blood testing is "apples to oranges." There is no need for the rules to identify "approved" gas chromatographs because all of the commercially available machines do the job for which they are designed. Breath testing is complicated by the fact that law enforcement personnel are operating scientific equipment; having a multitude of different testing instruments could jeopardize accuracy. It is preferable to train all breath test operators on the same equipment. In contrast, the gas chromatographs used in blood testing are being operated by professional analysts who have their own standards of practice. Thus, there is no need to standardize the equipment used in blood testing. Ms. Barfield failed to note that Subsection 316.1932(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, states: "The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments." (Emphasis added.) The statute charges the program with responsibility for the regulation of persons who operate, inspect and instruct on the breath test instruments, and for analysts who conduct blood testing, but nowhere does it specifically authorize the Alcohol Testing Program to regulate blood testing instruments. The apparent lack of statutory authority to regulate the gas chromatographs used by blood testing labs convincingly supplements Ms. Barfield's more practical reasons for the lack of a rule on this subject. Dr. Masten testified for Petitioner that it is possible to create a checklist for performing a gas chromatographic analysis of blood alcohol content. He also stated that a checklist such as those used by quality assurance auditors might be a desirable way to standardize operations and lessen the potential for error. However, Dr. Masten also conceded that alternate methods can achieve reliable, accurate results, and that proficiency testing can assure such results. Two analysts in different labs may use variations on the gas chromatography method, such as different temperatures and pressures during the testing. Dr. Masten knew of differences in instrumentation between FDLE's labs in Tallahassee and Orlando. However, if each analyst passes proficiency testing, then each analyst's processes are validated. Dr. Masten testified that there are a number of different manufacturers of gas chromatograph instruments, which vary in terms of their capacity but otherwise achieve reliable results in blood testing. Different gas chromatographs use different materials in their columns. There are also several internal standards that are acceptable. Dr. Masten defined a methodology as a set of specific conditions, some of which are columns, temperature, pressure of the gas flow or rate of the gas flow, and the type of machine. These are all different parameters that are normally addressed in the SOP. Reasonable scientists can disagree as to certain parameters, such as the amount of dilution. Dr. Masten stated that the prime criterion for any set of conditions is to prove they work. Because gas chromatography has so many variables, there is a large matrix of different conditions that potentially achieve correct results. These conditions vary from lab to lab, and to a lesser degree from analyst to analyst within a lab. If an analyst's method is validated, it can be used to reach an accurate and reliable test result. The greater weight of the expert testimony at the instant hearing established that a perfectly uniform manner of performing either gas chromatography or the alcohol dehydrogenase analysis would not be scientifically sound nor economically feasible. Dr. Goldberger reasonably opined that a defendant is provided with the equivalent of the "checklist" desired by Petitioner: the SOP, the analyst's worksheet, and the raw data of the analysis provide a reviewing expert with all the necessary information to contest the analyst's work. The fact that all SOPs are not perfectly uniform in accordance with the idealized rules envisioned by Petitioner is less important than the fact that all SOPs and analysts' test results are available as public records and may be reviewed for their accuracy and reliability. The evidence at hearing established that blood alcohol testing is dissimilar to breath testing. Specific instruments must be approved for breath testing because law enforcement personnel operate the instruments. Uniformity of equipment helps to simplify the permitting process and helps to ensure accuracy in testing. Also, Ms. Barfield at least suggested that there may be breath instruments on the market that are themselves unreliable. In contrast, the expert testimony at hearing established that all commercially available gas chromatographs perform their intended functions, and that blood alcohol analysts are trained professionals able to operate according to their labs' SOPs, without detailed, step-by-step instruction imposed by FDLE rules. The evidence established that Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.011 and 8.013 substantially comply with their statutory authorities. Test methods are established by Rule 11D-8.011. Methods of administration are found in the uniform permitting criteria set forth in Rule 11D-8.013(3)(a)-(g). Dr. Goldberger testified at length regarding the development of the rules, and Ms. Barfield described the application of the rules during the permitting process and in the laboratory. Both of these experts agreed that it would be poor science to require every analyst in the state to perform testing according to the standards of a single laboratory. The science of gas chromatography in blood alcohol testing simply does not require such rigidity.9 The challenged rules reasonably set forth permitting criteria and proficiency testing that insure the scientific reliability of the blood alcohol testing carried out by analysts operating under permits issued by the Alcohol Testing Program of FDLE. No evidence was offered by either party regarding the necessity to specify the types or amounts of preservatives and anticoagulants that must be contained in the glass evacuation tubes used to collect blood samples. No evidence was offered by either party as to the necessity to specify a range of temperatures for the refrigeration of blood samples collected pursuant to the implied consent law.
Findings Of Fact Bell holds license no. ME 0008297 issued by the State of Florida. His license was active from January 7, 1959, until December 31, 1991, at which time Bell's license became inactive because of his failure to pay the renewal fee. Bell is a board certified child and adult psychiatrist. In addition to his practice of psychiatry, Bell practiced general medicine for a year in 1979, worked as a contract physician in several emergency room in Georgia during 1986 and 1987, and worked as a parts warehouseman for an automobile dealership between February and September, 1989. Bell has a long history of alcohol related problems, beginning in August, 1982, when Bell was charged in South Carolina with driving under the influence of alcohol and was later convicted of reckless driving, which Bell acknowledges to have been alcohol related. In 1987, Bell called Roger A. Goetz, M.D., Director of the Florida Physicians Recovery Network (PRN), because he could not find employment in Georgia. He told Goetz that he was an alcoholic and agreed to enter the South Miami Hospital's addiction treatment program. This was not the first alcohol treatment program from which Bell had received treatment. Lynn A. Hankes, M.D., evaluated and observed Bell during his treatment at South Miami Hospital. Dr. Hankes also saw Bell in August, 1988, for a reevaluation. When Bell entered South Miami Hospital, he gave an extensive history of alcohol abuse and he acknowledged that he was an alcoholic. Alcoholism is a primary disease characterized by continuous or periodic impaired control, drinking to excess, preoccupation with the drug of alcohol, the use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and distortions in thinking, most notably, denial. The disease of alcoholism is progressive, causing multi- system impairment. The alcoholic is impaired and cannot predict or control when his drinking is going to be out of control. Denial is an integral part of the illness and a major obstacle to recovery. According to Dr. Hankes, at the time of his evaluations of Bell, Bell suffered from the disease of alcoholism. Despite the treatment and a period of abstinence after his release, Bell's attitude, awareness, and belief system, as manifested by his denial and lack of insight, indicated to Dr. Hankes that Bell would be unable to change his behavior, vis-a-vis alcohol. In his testimony, Dr. Hankes expressed an opinion that Bell is unable to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to his alcoholism and use of alcohol. However, Dr. Hankes' opinion was based only on his personal knowledge from 1988 and on his review of the reports of the other experts and the interviews with Bell. On August 23, 1988, Bell entered into a five-year contract with PRN in which he agreed to abstain from use of alcohol, to have Dr. Hankes as his monitoring physician, to attend AA three times per week, to attend aftercare, to notify PRN in case of a relapse, to contact PRN two times per month, to withdraw from practice on evaluation at the request of PRN, and to be reported to DPR by PRN if he failed to comply with the contract. Bell claims to have unilaterally "cancelled" his contract about two weeks after signing it, but he failed to advise PRN or anyone else about this cancellation. He cancelled the contract because Dr. Goetz did not find him a job which Bell believed Dr. Goetz had agreed to do if he went to treatment and signed a contract. PRN and Bell corresponded in 1989 and 1991 regarding the contract and Bell's alcohol usage. In August, 1991, Bell advised Dr. Goetz and PRN that he had no problem with alcohol. In May, 1991, Bell was arrested after an alcohol-related incident. The events leading up to this arrest involved a drinking binge Bell had with a lady friend who lived in a trailer next to him. Bell believed that the friend had stolen his carton of cigarettes and bottle of vodka while Bell was "asleep." He went to retrieve these items and entered the friend's trailer through the floor air duct. An altercation ensued involving a butcher knife. On August 22, 1991, Bell pled no contest to the charge of trespass in an occupied structure. At the time of the arrest, Bell's trailer was unkempt and strewn with empty liquor bottles. In December, 1991, at the request of DPR, Bell was examined by two physicians, John E. Perchalski, a family practitioner, and Ernest C. Miller, a psychiatrist and expert in addiction medicine. Bell reported to Dr. Perchalski and acknowledged at hearing that his average daily alcohol intake was 14.5 ounces and that his alcohol intake had remained at that level for many years. Dr. Perchalski assessed this information and determined that Bell had a history of chronic excessive alcohol intake. Additionally, Bell had a high corpuscular volume which can be indicative of excessive alcohol intake. According to Dr. Perchalski, while Bell has no physical disability that would prevent him from practicing medicine, his long history of maladaptive behavior and excessive, regular alcohol intake would make it very difficult for Bell to be able to perform in a completely rational and safe way in his care for his patients. Bell told Dr. Miller that he consumed an average of 14.5 ounces of alcohol per day and that he suffered from occasional blackouts and hangovers. Bell's further discussions with Dr. Miller supported Dr. Miller's opinion that Bell has no insight into his problem with dealing with, relating to, and controlling the use of alcohol and that treatment programs have thus far been unsuccessful. Bell's refusal to admit that he is an alcoholic is consistent with the level of Bell's denial regarding his problems with alcohol. The history given by Bell, the physical examination results, and the evaluation and assessment of Dr. Miller support Dr. Miller's diagnosis of chronic alcoholism, alcohol abuse, alcohol dependency, and gamma alcoholism. Dr. Miller's opinion is that in light of the progressive dysfunctional aspects of the disease, Bell will become incapable of sustaining an effective clinical role. As Bell drinks, which is inevitable without treatment, he will not function effectively and his functioning will become less effective as the disease asserts itself on the various aspects of Bell's being. While Dr. Miller acknowledges that Bell may be able to practice currently, the probability is that he will be or will become unable to practice safely until his disease of alcoholism and its disease process are successfully treated. Bell is not currently practicing so no immediate evidence of impaired practice exists. Additionally, Miller indicated that the ingestion of 14.5 ounces of alcohol would take 20 hours to dissipate from Bell's system and any work with patients before the alcohol dissipated would be affected. Bell maintains that he has no problem with alcohol and that at no time has there been any allegation that he treated any patient while under the influence of alcohol.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order and therein: Suspend the medical license of Robert E. Bell, Jr., M.D., for a period of one year or until he appears before the Board of Medicine and demonstrates that he is able to resume the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety. If or when the terms of the suspension have been satisfied, place Dr. Bell on probation for five (5) years with terms and conditions to be set by the Board to insure his continued ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. At a minimum, the demonstration of skill and safety should be supported by satisfactory mental and physical examinations by Board approved experts and by evidence of successful completion of an acceptable alcohol rehabilitation program. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2204 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 4(2); 5(3); 7(4); 8(12); 9(13); 10(16); 12(6); 13(5); 14(6 & 7); 15(7); 18(9 & 10); 20(15); 21(16); 22(18); 23(19); 24(19); 25(20); 26(21); and 27(23). Proposed findings of fact 2, 3, and 17 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 6, 11, and 16 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 19 is unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence in that Goetz's opinions were based on the evaluations and opinions of other experts and have insufficient support to stand alone. Proposed finding of fact 28 is irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Robert E. Bell, Jr., M.D. Proposed findings of fact 1a, 1b, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 2a, and 2b are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 1c, 1h, and 1i are irrelevant. Proposed finding of fact 2c is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry G. McPherson, Jr. Barbara W. Makant Attorneys at Law Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert E. Bell, Jr., M.D. Route 3, Box 503 Starke, FL 32091 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsection 466.028(1)(s), Florida Statutes (2000-2005), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state department charged with regulating the practice of dentistry pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 466, Florida Statutes (2006). Dr. Driggers is a licensed dentist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 5473. The Professional Resource Network (PRN) is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Dentistry, pursuant to Section 456.076, Florida Statutes (2006). PRN monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired healthcare professionals. Dr. Driggers has a long history of problems with alcohol. On January 15, 1987, he was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). He was adjudicated guilty of that offense. In 1990, Dr. Ken Thompson did an intervention on Dr. Driggers based on Dr. Driggers' alcohol abuse. As a result, Dr. Driggers was admitted to Glenbeigh Hospital of Tampa for a three-day evaluation of alcoholism and chemical dependency. Dr. Driggers was diagnosed with alcohol abuse and benzodiazepine abuse. Dr. Martin Zfaz, who evaluated Dr. Driggers, recommended that Dr. Driggers attend an outpatient treatment program with Dr. Ken Thompson five days a week, attend 90 Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings in 90 days, and obtain a sponsor. On December 17, 1990, Dr. Driggers entered into an Impaired Practitioner Program of Florida Physicians Recovery Network Advocacy Contract. The contract required that he "abstain completely from the use of any medications, alcohol, and other mood altering substances." He agreed to attend a self-help group meeting such as AA or NA three times per week, to participate in continuing care group therapy one time per week, and to attend a 12-step program of recovering professionals every other week. The contract was for five years, with renewal subject to review by PRN. Dr. Driggers did complete an outpatient treatment program with Dr. Thompson by February 1991. He did attend some meetings of recovering professionals. In January 1992, PRN referred Dr. Driggers to Anton M. Krone, M.D., for an evaluation of Dr. Driggers' status. Dr. Driggers told Dr. Krone that he had not completely abstained from consuming alcohol, but that his consumption had not caused a problem. He was not attending AA meetings and did not have a sponsorship. Dr. Driggers did not consider himself to be an alcoholic and was opposed to attending AA meetings and abstaining completely from drinking. Dr. Krone opined that "it would be very difficult to engage [Dr. Driggers] in a recovery process at this time which is abstinence based." Dr. Krone suggested that "PRN follow him on an informal basis and watch to be sure that he is not getting into future trouble and to be ready to intervene with him promptly if such trouble begins to appear." The contract between Dr. Driggers and PRN dated December 17, 1990, was voided as of February 1992. On October 6, 2000, Dr. Driggers was again arrested for DUI. He drove his car into the back of a car stopped at a red light. He was given a breathalyzer test, which showed a blood alcohol level of .23, which is almost three times the limit for a presumption of DUI in Florida.1 Dr. Driggers did not feel like he was intoxicated and blamed the accident on his leaning over to prevent carry-out food from falling to the floor. He was adjudicated guilty of DUI in October 2001. Dr. Driggers reactivated with PRN and agreed to an inpatient evaluation. On November 13, 2000, he went to Shands at Vista for the evaluation. Dr. Thompson evaluated Dr. Driggers and concluded that he was concerned about Dr. Driggers' ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. He made the following recommendation for the treatment of Dr. Driggers: "Return for inpatient detoxification with further assessment. I do not believe that in view of his denial, stress, shame, and anxiety level that he would likely be very successful in detoxing himself on an outpatient basis even with supervision." Dr. Driggers remained at Shands at Vista until he was discharged on March 9, 2001, with a diagnosis of alcohol dependence, sedative dependence, and anxiety disorder. On April 1, 2001, Dr. Driggers signed another five- year Impaired Practitioners Program of Florida Physician Recovery Network Advocacy Contract. As before, Dr. Driggers agreed to abstain completely from the use of any medications, alcohol, and other mood altering substances. He agreed to attend self-help meetings such as AA or NA three to four times per week. He agreed to attend a PRN monitored professional support group. Dr. Driggers agreed to participate in a random urine drug or blood screen program within 12 hours of notification. On June 23, 2004, Dr. Driggers tested positive for a metabolite of alcohol based on an ethyl glucuronide test, which detects metabolites of alcohol in urine. On July 12, 2004, Dr. Driggers again tested positive for a metabolite of alcohol based on an ethyl glucuronide test. His July score was higher than his June score. Dr. Driggers admits that he had not completely abstained from the use of alcohol and that he occasionally had a glass of wine with his new wife. Dr. Driggers rationalized his consumption of alcohol with the following comment: "I didn't think that the--that a glass of wine on a particular day would--would not only show in urine, but I didn't think that it was any major thing at the time. It was--it was something I did that I regret." On August 16, 2004, Dr. Driggers was referred by PRN to Martha E. Brown, M.D., for an evaluation. Dr. Driggers admitted to Dr. Brown that he had not abstained completely from alcohol. He told her that he went to PRN group meetings for a while, but quit going to the meetings. Dr. Brown concluded that she did "not feel Dr. Driggers can practice with reasonable skill and safety. He has been diagnosed with Alcohol Dependency in the past, yet has again resumed drinking. He appears to have much minimization of his alcohol use with rationalizations about it is okay that he has returned to drinking." Dr. Brown recommended that Dr. Driggers continue to participate in PRN, follow PRN recommendations, enter into a long-term residential treatment for chemical dependency, and abstain from all mood altering substances, including alcohol. In September 2004, Dr. Driggers sought a second opinion from Chowallur Dev Chacko, M.D., who is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry in general psychiatry, addiction psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry. Based on Dr. Driggers' long history of alcohol abuse and his continuing to drink while under a monitoring contract with PRN, Dr. Chacko opined that Dr. Driggers was not able to practice his profession with reasonable skill and safety and recommended that Dr. Driggers receive long-term residential treatment for his alcoholism. Dr. Driggers refused to follow the recommendations of either Dr. Brown or Dr. Chacko. On November 9, 2004, PRN sent notice to the Department advising that Dr. Driggers was not in compliance with his PRN monitoring contract. On June 17, 2005, Dr. Driggers returned to Dr. Brown for a new evaluation. Dr. Brown was still of the opinion that Dr. Driggers had a substance dependency problem and needed treatment. During her evaluation of Dr. Driggers, he told her that he would not be in PRN and would not follow PRN's recommendations. He was in severe denial concerning his chemical dependency. Dr. Brown recommended that Dr. Driggers should participate in PRN and follow the recommendations of PRN; that Dr. Driggers should minimally enter a partial hospitalization program with a step-down to an intensive out- patient program for his chemical dependency; that he should abstain from all mood altering substances, including alcohol; that he should attend 90 meetings of a self-help program in 90 days; and that he should turn in a signed list for attendance at 12-step meetings for six months to document his recovery. Dr. Driggers was evaluated by Jeffrey A. Danziger, M.D., on September 8, 2005, at the request of Dr. Driggers' attorney. Dr. Danziger opined that Dr. Driggers did not meet the criteria for alcohol dependence or active alcohol abuse at the time of the evaluation. Dr. Danziger diagnosed Dr. Driggers with posttraumatic stress disorder, in remission, and alcohol abuse, in sustained full remission. It was Dr. Danziger's "opinion that, from a psychiatric standpoint, Dr. Driggers did not have any substance abuse or psychiatric problems that would impair his ability to safely function as a dentist." Dr. Danziger explained that much of his evaluation was focused on whether Dr. Driggers posed an immediate danger that would justify an emergency suspension. Dr. Brown reviewed Dr. Danziger's evaluation report on Dr. Driggers and her prior evaluations of Dr. Driggers. On January 30, 2006, she opined as follows: I continue to believe that Dr. Driggers has a diagnosis of Alcohol Dependency as evidenced by having a BAL [blood alcohol level] of .2 at the time of one of his second DUI, indicating tolerance to the use of alcohol as "social" drinkers at a BAL of .2 would not have been able to get in their car to drive; he has been unsuccessful in his efforts to control his substance use while in PRN (he had continued to drink while in PRN) and again, if he was a social drinker, should have been able to completely abstain from substance use in PRN without any difficulty; and he has continued to use alcohol despite knowledge of having a persistent and recurrent problem with alcohol. Certainly of note is the fact that he has had not one but 2 DUIs in his past. He continues to have a great denial about the disease of chemical dependency and the need to abstain from all mood altering substances. This type of thinking poses an extreme risk to the public for him practicing without appropriate monitoring of his status by PRN. Alcohol Dependency is a permanent medical disease that does not go away once you develop it. A healthcare professional that has Alcohol Dependency must have long-term, appropriate treatment and monitoring to ensure they do well and can practice. In the most recent records you sent, numerous individuals gave affidavits that they have never seen him impaired while practicing. However, I would point out that simply not drinking at work, or not looking impaired, does not translate into whether one can practice their profession with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Brown continued to recommend abstention from alcohol and mood altering substances, outpatient treatment, and participation in PRN monitoring. If those recommendations were followed, she felt that he could practice with reasonable safety and skill. However, Dr. Driggers has continued to refuse to participate in any PRN monitoring. On September 27, 2006, Dr. Danziger again evaluated Dr. Driggers. He was still of the opinion that Dr. Driggers had a diagnosis of alcohol abuse rather than alcohol dependence. Once you have a diagnosis of alcohol abuse, you will always have alcohol abuse, but it can be in remission. He agrees with Dr. Brown that Dr. Driggers is in need of outpatient treatment and monitoring. Whether Dr. Driggers' drinking problem is labeled alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the consensus of the experts in addiction psychiatry who evaluated Dr. Driggers is that Dr. Driggers must have some type of treatment and must be monitored in order for him to be able to practice dentistry with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Driggers has been disciplined previously by the Board of Dentistry in 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Driggers has violated Subsection 466.028(1)(s), Florida Statutes (2004); giving Dr. Driggers a written reprimand; requiring Dr. Driggers to undergo a new evaluation by a PRN- approved evaluator; requiring Dr. Driggers to comply with PRN recommendations; and suspending his license until he undergoes further evaluation and begins compliance with PRN recommendations. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2007.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Clara Carr, was an inmate at the Florida Correctional Institution. The Respondent Commission is responsible for establishing Presumptive Parole Release Dates (PPRD's) for all inmates in the custody of the State of Florida who meet the requirements of Section 947.173, Florida Statutes. Petitioner met all of the requirements of that section and was entitled to a PPRD initial interview on November 25, 1985. In the establishment of a PPRD, the inmate is first interviewed in the field by an examiner who evaluates and scores the inmates on a form which is then sent to the full Commission which also scores the individual based on salient factors which may be aggravated or mitigated because of other permissible factors. If the Commission decides to assess an aggravating factor, the amount of time is discretionary within certain time limits. Initially, the Commission looks at the offense and its severity in setting a salient factor score and uses that as a beginning. Then the jail time prior to the admission to the Department of Corrections facility, if any, is removed and the pre and post sentencing reports, the interview, and other reports of public hearings and the like are evaluated as aggravating or mitigating factors. The aggravating factors are generally set out in the rule in question here but the list in question in the rule is not all inclusive. The Commission may consider anything which can be founded on a valid or reasonable connection to the action taken. Petitioner was interviewed by Commission staffers on November 25, 1985, for the purpose of setting her PPRD. By action of the Commission at a meeting held on January 8, 1986, the PPRD was established to be December 28, 1988. This date was arrived at by initially utilizing the maximum matrix of 32 months set for her offense and the conditions thereof aggravated by a history of alcohol abuse listed in the pre-sentence investigation; the psychological interview; and the admissions summary, for which the Commission added an additional 36 months. When that time was applied to the commencement of sentence, April 28, 1983, the PPRD was established as stated above. On January 30, 1986, through counsel, Petitioner requested a review of her PPRD alleging that the rule under which the Commission had aggravated her PPRD (Rule 23-21.10(4)(a)2b) is invalid. Petitioner claimed that alcoholism is a treatable illness and it is improper and illegal to aggravate on such grounds. Petitioner cited Article 1 Section 2 of the Florida Constitution; Section 396.022(1), Florida Statutes; 42 USC 4541(a)(8), and other authorities. A commission meeting was held on February 26, 1986, to consider Petitioner's request for review of her PPRD. The Commission did not change it holding that the rule in question was appropriate and provided for the aggravation of a PPRD for history of alcohol abuse. Consequently, the PPRD remained at December 28, 1988. In the pre-sentence investigation conducted by officials of Marion County, Florida, in August, 1983, which was presented to the Judge at the time Petitioner was sentenced and which was considered by the Commission at the time the PPRD was established, Petitioner is alleged to have indicated that she had been drinking very heavily for several hours the night of the incident and does not remember any of the circumstances surrounding it. She described herself as a "weekend drinker" of beer and liquor and denies the use of any drugs, but it is significant to note that her nickname in the community is "Boozie." Though Petitioner denied having a prior arrest record, the records of the Marion County Sheriff's Office and the Ocala Police Department indicate a series of arrests going back to January, 1975, five of six of which relate to aggravated battery or assault and battery, in some cases with a deadly weapon. During the admissions examination conducted at the time Petitioner entered FCI, she indicated that she did not drink, but also that she is a weekend alcoholic. The evaluator was of the opinion that her alcoholic involvement was more than just weekends involvement and in addition, she was diagnosed by the institutional psychiatrist as having an adjustment disorder. She was described as being very aggressive and one who would probably display aggressive behavior if placed under too much stress. The Commission is required, under the provisions of Sections 947.16 and 947.172, Florida Statutes, to provide the Petitioner with a PPRD and to compute that date according to objective parole guidelines outlined in Section 947.165, Florida Statutes. In determining the PPRD, the Commission may use aggravating or mitigating circumstances but these circumstances must not be duplicative of the severity of the offense behavior or the salient factor score arrived at pursuant to Sections 947.1651 and 947.1722, Florida Statutes. The Commission was delegated rulemaking power by Section 947.07, Florida Statutes. Consistent with the authority, the Commission developed parole guidelines outlined in Rule 23-21.10, Florida Administrative Code. The aggravation factor which is the subject of the instant challenge is contained in Rule 23-21.10(4)(a)2b, Florida Administrative Code. This Petitioner is a 28-year old female serving her first felony conviction from Marion County, Florida, for aggravated battery with a dangerous weapon having been sentenced to a term of 10 years (less 81 days jail time), on July 18, 1983. She was received at FCI on July 22, 1983, and presently has a maximum release date of April 25, 1993. Under the provisions of the rule cited above, the Commission may aggravate a Parole Release Date if the inmate has demonstrated a history of alcohol or drug abuse. The Petitioner's PPRD was aggravated for that reason because the history of her alcohol abuse relates to negative behavior on her part. This history of alcohol abuse alone would not be sufficient to cause the Commission to aggravate a PPRD. Here, however, there was a showing of increased risk on the part of Petitioner as a potential parolee. The Commission felt that she was a risk due to the interrelation of her history of bad behavior and alcohol consumption. Even though the rule in question does not specifically refer to aberrant behavior as related to the alcohol abuse as grounds for aggravation, it is nonetheless implied therein and a logical and reasonable extension and interpretation of the rule. The Commission does not specifically consider that the alcohol abuse may stem from a medical condition. It deals with results or behaviors regardless of the cause of the behavior. It is not the function of the Commission to deal with the cause of the problem, but to evaluate each inmate for parole on the basis of that inmate's specific situation. There is no formula for evaluation but instead, it is the best collective judgment of the risk factors in the individual case as arrived at by the members of the Commission. The matrix time ranges are limits of foundation times and the other factors are add-ons or subtractables. If this were not so; if there were to be no independence of thought and judgment by members of the Commission; there would be no need for people to make up the Commission and to make the decision. This function could be performed by a machine on the basis of factors fed into it. Petitioner contests the validity of the rule on the basis that it does not consider the fact that alcoholism is a sickness rather than a mental condition. At the time the rule complained of was drafted, the Commission hired Florida Research Center, Inc. as consultants to help come up with appropriate matrices and salient factors which included alcohol and drug abuse. In addition to this, a survey was conducted in 1978 of 10 individuals including the Commissioners as to how certain factors should be rated. Five of the ten parties questioned rated drug and alcohol abuse as number one. Two others rated those conditions as second in importance. Further, the Commission was provided with the professional literature considered by authorities at the time the preponderance of which supported these evaluations. It is clear that the legislative intent behind Chapter 947, Florida Statutes, was to have rules in effect for the Commission to use in establishing PPRD which call for the use of objective parole criteria within certain limits. Under the statute, the rule need not specify a number of months or a range of months for aggravation due to alcohol abuse. The Commission has not suggested to Petitioner that she seek treatment for her alcohol abuse nor has it offered to reduce her sentence if she should do so. It would be inappropriate for the Commission to do this as a part of a determination but it would not be inappropriate for the interview staff to suggest it as a matter of course. It is not the role of the Commission to suggest the course of an inmate's confinement or rehabilitation. That subject is within the purview of the Department of Corrections. The Commission's function is to assess the propriety of returning the inmate to society and the issue to be decided by the Commission at its hearing is whether the inmate constitutes a threat to the community or not. In fulfilling this function, the Commission uses the Department of Corrections to prepare mental and medical examinations of the inmate and to produce reports. If the evidence indicates there is a mental health problem, the Commission considers it. In early 1984, the Commission published two policy letters dealing with the Commission operations; Numbers 4.17 and 4.20, both of which relate to medical or mental health status reports regarding inmates. The first, dealing with the request for these reports indicates that if the Commission requires an up- to-date report in these areas it may request it and in those cases where a hearing examiner for the Commission feels that the Commission would need it, it is the responsibility of the examiner to request it so that it is available for the Commission to consider at the time the inmate's PPRD is considered. Number 20 deals primarily with the language to be used by the Commission in citing a mental health status report as a source of new information used to alter the PPRD. Neither of these policy letters are necessarily pertinent unless it is considered that alcohol abuse, the language used in the rule in question here, is equated to alcohol dependency and alcohol dependency is considered either a mental health or medical condition. It cannot be found here that alcohol abuse, which may be a single incident of improper consumption of alcohol, is tantamount to or equates to alcoholism or alcohol dependency which may be a mental or physical condition. The term, "aggravation", is defined in Rule 23-21.02(1) as: . . . to exceed the matrix times ranges upper month limit. Alcohol abuse is not defined in the rule or anywhere else for specific use by the Commission. It is basically left up to each Commissioner to apply his interpretation of the term to the facts before him or her and most Commissioners have a common understanding of what the term means. The Commission considers there is a medical difference between alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence for setting PPRDs. The determination of whether to use a history of alcohol abuse may be based on whether the abuse played a part in the current offense or not. If so, the Commission generally will utilize the incident in its deliberations. If not, then it may not, but the issue of whether to use it as either aggravation or mitigation is discretionary with the Commission. Once it is determined to use alcohol abuse as aggravation in establishing a PPRD, then the amount of aggravation and time to be added is also based on the individual judgment of each Commissioner based on his or her evaluation of the degree of risk involved to the general public by the inmate. In arriving at this additional time, the Commission has a range within which it may assess a period of months, but there is no formula. In substance, the Commission is making an assessment of the risk - not a medical diagnosis and the issue is whether, because of that demonstrated alcohol abuse, the inmate constitutes a greater risk to the public if paroled. If so, then additional months are added on. If not, they are not. In that connection, expert evidence tends to indicate that abusers of either alcohol or drugs have a lesser chance of success than those who do not abuse. Alcohol addiction does generally lead to poor behavior and it is often a condition of parole that the inmate not drink to excess. Consequently, if a demonstrated alcohol abuser does drink to excess, the likelihood of his behavior becoming inappropriate again is high, but in addition, he will most likely be in violation of the conditions of his probation. It is again a question of risk assessment by professional judgment on an individual basis. Some experts define alcohol abuse as "a voluntary excess or inappropriate use of alcohol", whereas alcoholism is "involuntary." An abuser is not necessarily an alcoholic and trained medical expertise differentiates between alcoholism and alcohol abuse. Because of the fact that alcohol abuse is voluntary, some experts believe there is no reason to extend a prison term on the basis of alcohol abuse if the extension does not result in treatment for the behavior. Petitioner introduces the Commission's action with regard to inmate Nicky Berkart, wherein the Commission declined to utilize that inmate's alcohol abuse to aggravate his PPRD as evidence of the inconsistency of treatment of this factor. Mr. Burkart's situation is not comparable, however, to the issue here. None of the documentation considered by the Commission here was prepared by a doctor or medical professional with the exception of the psychologist's interview, but there is no indication that it need be. If the Commission had decided that additional medical or professional evaluation was necessary and pertinent, it could have requested it. What must be recognized is that an inmate has no right to parole. The sentence imposed by the court generates an expiration of sentence date (EOS) at which time the inmate will be released unless he or she has committed additional offenses. Parole, which is a release prior to expiration of sentence, is a privilege and if no parole is granted, the inmate will still get out at the EOS less gain time. Consequently, since nothing extends the sentence, denial of parole does not increase the penalty. The Commission may and does make abstinence from alcohol, or the use of antabuse, a condition of parole. Neither, however, is a guarantee that the individual will refrain from using alcohol. The evidence presented by Respondent indicates that it is not at all unusual for a parolee to commit offenses while under the influence of alcohol. Forty to fifty percent of all revocations of parole result from some sort of substance abuse. Many of those parolees have a history of alcohol abuse. Therefore, a history of alcohol abuse would appear to be a negative indicant of parole success. The aggravating factor in this situation is not that the inmate has the medical problem of alcoholism, but that the history of alcohol abuse shows that the inmate is not a good parole risk. It is generally a safe statement that people in prison who abuse alcohol are not a risk to society. Those who are released form prison with a demonstrated propensity to abuse alcohol are. In making this evaluation, the Commission is not, as was indicated previously, bound by any strict formula. Whatever qualification is applied, however, it must be applied on an individual basis and not across the board. Each Commissioner tailors his recommendation on what he knows about the individual before him. Based on the information provided, plus whatever information is requested as appropriate, an individual conclusion is drawn by each member of the Commission. These then are evaluated and a Commission vote is taken which results in the establishment of the PPRD.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether the undisputed actions of Respondent constitute just cause to terminate his employment as an educational support employee, and, if not, what penalty is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Most of the material facts in this proceeding are undisputed. The parties dispute the reasonableness of the proposed termination of Respondent's employment. From December 3, 2001, through April 3, 2007, when Petitioner suspended Respondent without pay, Petitioner employed Respondent as an educational support employee, defined in Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Petitioner employed Respondent as an Electrician in Petitioner's Maintenance Services Department. The terms of employment are governed by the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (the CBA).2 Respondent is a recovering alcoholic, but his alcoholism has not previously affected his job performance. That changed on January 12, 2007. After receiving work assignments on the morning of January 12, 2007, Respondent became loud and agitated. Respondent's supervisor asked Respondent what was wrong, and Respondent indicated he was having problems at home. The supervisor asked if Respondent had been drinking alcohol. Respondent denied the implicit accusation. After the encounter with the supervisor, Respondent drove one of Petitioner's vans to his home and consumed vodka for most of the day. At about 3:00 p.m. that day, Respondent returned the van to the parking lot of the Maintenance Department and had difficulty parking, according to the observations of Respondent's supervisor. Respondent stopped the van and got out. He was unable to walk without staggering. His eyes were red and watery. He had difficulty standing, and his shirt was soiled with vomit. The supervisor asked Respondent again if Respondent was intoxicated, and Respondent voluntarily reported his alcohol- related problem. Respondent's supervisor and two zone service managers called for assistance from the Fort Myers Police Department (the police). The police first attempted to have Respondent admitted to the Detoxification Unit, but the Unit was full. The police drove Respondent to the hospital, and the hospital admitted Respondent. The incident on January 12, 2007, was not the first time Respondent had voluntarily reported his alcohol-related problem to a member of management. In November of the previous year, Respondent experienced some personal problems and resumed the compulsive consumption of alcohol. Respondent voluntarily reported the alcohol-related problem to his supervisor and to his department director and obtained a 30-day leave of absence to complete a 28-day residential alcohol treatment program. Respondent completed only 17 days of the 28-day program. Respondent exhausted his insurance benefits after 17 days and could not afford the daily rate of $833 to complete the remaining 11 days. Respondent returned to duty sometime between January 8 and 10, 2007. Respondent informed his supervisor that Respondent had not completed the residential treatment program because he had exhausted his insurance benefits. Petitioner did not refer Respondent to another treatment program. After the incident on January 12, 2007, Respondent voluntarily entered an outpatient treatment program with Southwest Florida Addiction Services. Respondent successfully completed the program on March 30, 2007. Petitioner paid for the outpatient program and Respondent kept Petitioner notified of his progress. Respondent has maintained after-care treatment with a physician who specializes in addiction disorders and has regularly attended Alcoholic Anonymous meetings. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. During the period of employment that began on December 3, 2001, Respondent received one probationary performance assessment and four annual performance assessments. Petitioner consistently evaluated Respondent at an "effective level of performance" in all areas targeted for assessment, with the exception that the assessment for the 2002-2003 school year scored two areas as "focus for development/feed back." The comment section in three annual assessments provides that Respondent "continues to do an excellent job." The department director recommended renewal of Respondent's contract for the five school years ending in 2007.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent from his employment without pay for four months from April 3, 2007, as a penalty for personal business on school time and driving a school vehicle for personal use, and requiring Respondent, as a condition of his continued employment, to maintain his current regimen of addiction treatment with a physician and regular intervention from Alcoholics Anonymous. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Hurner, currently holds Florida teaching certificate 447579, covering the area of Mental Retardation, from the Florida Department of Education (DOE). At all times material, the Respondent was licensed by DOE and employed as an ESE teacher at Paxson Junior High School, in the Duval County School District. On October 31, 1988, the Respondent was cleared to be issued a teaching certificate by Professional Practices Services after he acknowledged a 1984 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. On January 7, 1990, the Respondent was arrested and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. On March 19, 1990, the Respondent pled nolo contendere to the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol and was adjudicated guilty by the court. On March 19, 1990, the court sentenced the Respondent to three months' probation and ordered him to pay $926.50 in court costs and fines. In addition, the Respondent's driver's license was revoked for five years, and he was referred to the North Florida Safety Council. On June 15, 1993, the Respondent applied for a renewal of his teaching certificate. On his application, the Respondent acknowledged his 1990 conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Respondent has been a respected teacher with good evaluations from the Duval County School Board for seventeen years, despite his alcohol-related convictions. Neither of the arrests nor the underlying behaviors associated therewith occurred during school hours or in relation to any school sponsored events. No bodily harm or property damage was shown to be incident thereto. Respondent made no effort to hide his convictions from Petitioner agency and unrefuted testimony shows that his job performance and teaching reputation have not been affected thereby. The second event in 1990 occurred when Respondent was at a very low emotional ebb in his personal life. His mother was terminally ill. The North Florida Safety Council, in conjunction with the court and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, referred the Respondent to the Chemical Dependency Counselling Clinic. He successfully completed the requirements of all referring agencies. Although not required to do so, Respondent voluntarily increased his rehabilitation program with the Clinic to a full twelve weeks: five weeks awareness education and seven weeks of group and individual therapy. He did not use his personal problems as an excuse to fail, but was enthusiastic and made up any sessions he missed due to reasonable excused absences. On August 17, 1993, Respondent was discharged with such a good prognosis that no treatment recommendations were made by any of his three counsellors. Currently, he is diagnosed as "an alcoholic in recovery working on a lifestyle change." One of his former counsellors with the Chemical Dependency Counselling Clinic, Ms. Tibbett, testified on Respondent's behalf. She was trained by the U.S. Navy in the identification, treatment, prevention, and rehabilitation of drug and alcohol addiction. She has worked 16 years in the field and was certified by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles in 1985 and as a Certified Addiction Associate Professional (CAAP) by the Department of Professional Regulation in 1989. She currently is completing the successor agency's requirements for the higher ranking Certified Addiction Professional (CAP) certification. She now teaches other addictionologists and drug/alcohol treatment personnel in both the public and private sectors in addition to her own clinical work. She volunteers to the Duval County School Board on occasion. As evidence of Respondent's dedication to his recovery as well as of his recovery itself, Ms. Tibbett pointed to Respondent's record of never failing a random alcohol test while he was in the Chemical Dependency Counselling Clinic program, even on a holiday Saturday morning at 6:00 a.m. and even after his mother died after a long illness in May, 1993. Ms. Tibbett believes Respondent's sobriety record on those occasions is good reason to believe he will never relapse into alcoholism. She opined that he is no risk to the public in general nor specifically to any school children in his care. She further testified that she gladly would have her own seventeen year old son taught by him. Although she explained that no alcoholic is ever "cured," in her opinion Respondent is rehabilitated. Her well-reasoned professional opinion is accepted. Upon the unrefuted testimony of Respondent; of Mark S. Kager, a colleague and professional teacher for fifteen years; of Albert George Day, Respondent's housemate; of William Dale Tackett, a colleague and another professional teacher for seventeen years; and of Angela Hornbeck, Respondent's steady girlfriend for four years; it is found that Respondent voluntarily has imbibed no alcoholic beverages since April 2, 1990.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the agency enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 231.28(1)(e) F.S.; not guilty of violating Section 231.28(1)(c) F.S.; and ordering him to fulfill a one year probationary period including random drug and alcohol testing as prescribed by the Educational Practices Commission. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of November, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1994.
