The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application No. 8614, filed by Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., meets, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration relied upon an unpromulgated and invalid rule in preliminarily denying CON Application No. 8614.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospital South, Inc. (Vencor), is the applicant for certificate of need (CON) No. 8614 to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the state agency authorized to administer the CON program in Florida, preliminarily denied Vencor's CON application. On January 10, 1997, AHCA issued its decision in the form of a State Agency Action Report (SAAR) indicating, as it also did in its Proposed Recommended Order, that the Vencor application was denied primarily due to a lack of need for a long term care hospital in District 8, which includes Lee County. Vencor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Vencor, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, founded in 1985 by a respiratory/physical therapist to provide care to catastrophically ill, ventilator-dependent patients. Initially, the corporation served patients in acute care hospitals, but subsequently purchased and converted free-standing facilities. In 1995, Vencor merged with Hillhaven, which operated 311 nursing homes. Currently, Vencor, its parent, and related corporations operate 60 long term care hospitals, 311 nursing homes, and 40 assisted living facilities in approximately 46 states. In Florida, Vencor operates five long term care hospitals, located in Tampa, St. Petersburg, North Florida (Green Cove Springs), Coral Gables, and Fort Lauderdale. Pursuant to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed on October 2, 1997, the parties agreed that: On August 26, 1996, Vencor submitted to AHCA a letter of intent to file a Certificate of Need Application seeking approval for the construction of a 60-bed long term care hospital to be located in Fort Myers, AHCA Health Planning District 8; Vencor's letter of intent and board resolution meet requirements of Sections 408.037(4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008(1), Florida Administrative Code, and were timely filed with both AHCA and the local health council, and notice was properly published; Vencor submitted to AHCA its initial Certificate of Need Application (CON Action No. 8614) for the proposed project on September 25, 1996, and submitted its Omissions Response on November 11, 1996; Vencor's Certificate of Need Application contains all of the minimum content items required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes; Both Vencor's initial CON Application and its Omissions Response were timely filed with AHCA and the local health council. During the hearing, the parties also stipulated that Vencor's Schedule 2 is complete and accurate. In 1994, AHCA adopted rules defining long term care and long term care hospitals. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code, provides that: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part 1, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, Subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Other rules distinguishing long term care include those related to conversions of beds and facilities from one type of health care to another. AHCA, the parties stipulated, has no rule establishing a uniform numeric need methodology for long term care beds and, therefore, no fixed need pool applicable to the review of Vencor's CON application. Numeric Need In the absence of any AHCA methodology or need publication, Vencor is required to devise its own methodology to demonstrate need. Rule 59C-1.008(e) provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Vencor used a numeric need analysis which is identical to that prepared by the same health planner, in 1995, for St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg). The St. Petersburg project proposed that Vencor would manage the facility. Unlike the current proposal for new construction, St. Petersburg was a conversion of an existing but closed facility. AHCA accepted that analysis and issued CON 8213 to St. Petersburg. The methodology constitutes a use rate analysis, which calculates the use rate of a health service among the general population and applies that to the projected future population of the district. The use rate analysis is the methodology adopted in most of AHCA's numeric need rules. W. Eugene Nelson, the consultant health planner for Vencor, derived a historic utilization rate from the four districts in Florida in which Vencor operates long term care hospitals. That rate, 19.7 patient days per 1000 population, when applied to the projected population of District 8 in the year 2000, yields an average daily census of 64 patients. Mr. Nelson also compared the demographics of the seven counties of District 8 to the rest of the state, noting in particular the sizable, coastal population centers and the significant concentration of elderly, the population group which is disproportionately served in long term care hospitals. The proposed service area is all of District 8. By demonstrating the numeric need for 64 beds and the absence of any existing long term care beds in District 8, Vencor established the numeric need for its proposed 60-bed long term care hospital. See Final Order in DOAH Case No. 97-4419RU. Statutory Review Criteria Additional criteria for evaluating CON applications are listed in Subsections 408.035(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and the rules which implement that statute. (1)(a) need in relation to state and district health plans. The 1993 State Health Plan, which predates the establishment of long term care rules, contains no specific preferences for evaluating CON applications for long term care hospitals. The applicable local plan is the District 8 1996-1997 Certificate of Need Allocation Factors Report, approved on September 9, 1996. The District 8 plan, like the State Health Plan, contains no mention of long term care hospitals. In the SAAR, AHCA applied the District 8 and state health plan criteria for acute care hospital beds to the review of Vencor's application for long term care beds, although agency rules define the two as different. The acute care hospital criteria are inapplicable to the review of this application for CON 8614 and, therefore, there are no applicable state or district health plan criteria for long term care. (1)(b) availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing services in the district; and (1)(d) availability and adequacy of alternative health care facilities in the district. Currently, there are no long term care hospitals in District 8. The closest long term care hospitals are in Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale, all over 100 miles from Fort Myers. In the SAAR, approving the St. Petersburg facility, two long term care hospitals in Tampa were discussed as alternatives. By contract, the SAAR preliminarily denying Vencor's application lists as alternatives CMR facilities, nursing homes which accept Medicare patients, and hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA examined the quantity of beds available in other health care categories in reliance on certain findings in the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, a report submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Levin-VHI, Inc. ("the Lewin Report"). The Lewin Report notes the similarities between the type of care provided in long term care, CMR and acute care hospitals, and in hospital-based subacute care units, and subacute care beds in community nursing homes. The Lewin Report also acknowledges that "subacute care" is not well-defined. AHCA has not adopted the Lewin Report by rule, nor has it repealed its rules defining long term care as a separate and district health care category. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order, AHCA may not rely on the Lewin Report to create a presumption that other categories are "like and existing" alternatives to long term care, or to consider services outside District 8 as available alternatives. Additionally, Vencor presented substantial evidence to distinguish its patients from those served in other types of beds. The narrow range of diagnostic related groups or DRGs served at Vencor includes patients with more medically complex multiple system failures than those in CMR beds. With an average length of stay of 60 beds, Vencor's patients are typically too sick to withstand three hours of therapy a day, which AHCA acknowledged as the federal criteria for CMR admissions. Vencor also distinguished its patients, who require 7 1/2 to 8 hours of nursing care a day, as compared to 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day in nursing homes. Similarly, the average length of stay in nursing home subacute units is less than 41 days. The DRG classifications which account for 80 percent of Vencor's admissions represent only 7 percent of admissions to hospital based skilled nursing units, and 10 to 11 percent of admissions to nursing home subacute care units. Vencor also presented the uncontroverted testimony of Katherine Nixon, a clinical case manager whose duties include discharge planning for open heart surgery for patients at Columbia-Southwest Regional Medical Center (Columbia-Southwest), an acute care hospital in Fort Myers. Ms. Nixon's experience is that 80 percent of open heart surgery patients are discharged home, while 20 percent require additional inpatient care. Although Columbia-Southwest has a twenty-bed skilled nursing unit with two beds for ventilator-dependent patients, those beds are limited to patients expected to be weaned within a week. Finally, Vencor presented results which are preliminary and subject to peer review from its APACHE (Acute Physiology, Age, and Chronic Health Evaluation) Study. Ultimately, Vencor expects the study to more clearly distinguish its patient population. In summary, Vencor demonstrated that a substantial majority of patients it proposes to serve are not served in alternative facilities, including CMR hospitals, hospital-based skilled nursing units, or subacute units in community nursing homes. Expert medical testimony established the inappropriateness of keeping patients who require long term care in intensive or other acute care beds, although that occurs in District 8 when patients refuse to agree to admissions too distant from their homes. (1)(c) ability and record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Vencor's application complies with the requirement of Subsection 408.035(1)(c). (1)(e) probable economics of joint or shared resources; (1)(g) need for research and educational facilities; and (1)(j) needs of health maintenance organizations. The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (j) are not at issue. (f) need in the district for special equipment and services not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Based on the experiences of Katherine Nixon, it is not reasonable for long term care patients to access services outside District 8. Ms. Nixon also testified that patients are financially at a disadvantage if placed in a hospital skilled nursing unit rather than a long term care hospital. If a patient is not weaned as quickly as expected, Medicare reimbursement after twenty days decreases to 80 percent. In addition, the days in the hospital skilled nursing unit are included in the 100 day Medicare limit for post-acute hospitalization rehabilitation. By contrast, long term care hospitalization preserves the patient's ability under Medicare to have further rehabilitation services if needed after a subsequent transfer to a nursing home. (h) resources and funds, including personnel to accomplish project. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated that Vencor has sufficient funds to accomplish the project, and properly documented its source of funds in Schedule 3 of the CON application. Vencor has a commitment for $10 million to fund this project of approximately $8.5 million. At the hearing, AHCA also agreed with Vencor that the staffing and salary schedule, Schedule 6, is reasonable. (i) immediate and long term financial feasibility of the proposal. Vencor has the resources to establish the project and to fund short term operating losses. Vencor also reasonably projected that revenues will exceed expenses in the second year of operation. Therefore, Vencor demonstrated the short and long term financial feasibility of its proposal. needs of entities serving residents outside the district. Vencor is not proposing that any substantial portion of it services will benefit anyone outside District 8. probable impact on costs of providing health services; effects of competition. There is no evidence of an adverse impact on health care costs. There is preliminary data from the APACHE study which tends to indicate the long term care costs are lower than acute care costs. No adverse effects of competition are shown and AHCA did not dispute the fact that Vencor's proposal is supported by acute care hospitals in District 8. costs and methods of proposed construction; and (2)((a)-(c) less costly alternatives to proposed capital expenditure. The prehearing stipulation includes agreement that the design is reasonable, and that proposed construction costs are below the median in that area. past and proposed service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Vencor has a history of providing Medicaid and indigent care in the absence of any legal requirements to do so. The conditions proposed of 3 percent of total patient days Medicaid and 2 percent for indigent/charity patients proposed by Vencor are identical to those AHCA accepted in issuing CON 8213 to St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. Vencor's proposed commitment is reasonable and appropriate, considering AHCA's past acceptance and the fact that the vast majority of long term care patients are older and covered by Medicare. services which promote a continuum of care in a multilevel health care system. While Vencor's services are needed due to a gap in the continuum of care which exists in the district, it has not shown that it will be a part of a multilevel system in District 8. (2)(d) that patients will experience serious problems obtaining the inpatient care proposed. Patients experience and will continue to experience serious problems in obtaining long term care in District 8 in the absence of the project proposed by Vencor. Based on the overwhelming evidence of need, and the ability of the applicant to establish and operate a high quality program with no adverse impacts on other health care providers, Vencor meets the criteria for issuance of CON 8614.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue CON 8614 to Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., to construct a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, District 8. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Daniel Francis Sanchez was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners having been issued license number ME0038795. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was Regional Medical Director of IMC which operated HMO offices in Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency room at Metropolitan General Hospital. He was checked and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. The ambulance with EMS personnel arrived and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when taken to the emergency room and they refused to transport him again to the hospital. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to the place where Stroganow lived. She was let in by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not carry on a conversation to find out what condition he was in. She called for a Cares Unit to come and evaluate the client. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as a stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her determination on visual examination only. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit both members felt Stroganow needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady showed his income to be over the maximum for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold- Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement for Stroganow at the time because he was not ambulatory but felt he needed to be placed where he could be attended to and not left alone over the coming weekend. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, the Assistant Medical Director for IMC in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic and by EMS personnel. There were two and sometimes three doctors who treated patients at this clinic and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor, he was treated by the first doctor available. Stroganow had not specifically requested he be treated by Dr. Dayton. When the Cares team met with Dr. Dayton they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the night before but did not advise Dayton that the EMS team had refused to transport Stroganow to the hospital emergency room a second time the previous evening. Dayton telephoned the emergency room at Metropolitan General to ascertain the medical condition of Stroganow when brought in the evening before. With the information provided by the Cares team and the hospital, Dayton concluded that Stroganow should be given a medical evaluation and the quickest way for that to occur was to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency room for evaluation. When the Cares team arrived, Dayton was treating patients at the clinic. A doctor's office, or clinic, is not a desirable place to have an incontinent, incoherent, non- ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to do certain procedures frequently needed in diagnosing the illness and determining treatment needed for an acutely ill patient. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call to 911 for emergency medical assistance and it was necessary for someone to be with Stroganow with the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Dayton suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 for assistance in obtaining a medical evaluation of Stroganow. If called from the HMO office, the EMS squad would have arrived long before the Cares team could have gotten back to Stroganow. Dr. Dayton did not have admitting privileges at any hospital in Pinellas County at this time. Upon leaving the South Pasadena HMO clinic, the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute, they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus patients had an emergency situation. Respondent, Dr. Sanchez, called and advised that Dr. Dayton would take care of the problem. Later, around 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived, the Cares team called 911 from a telephone a block away from Stroganow's residence and arrived back just before the emergency squad. The EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room and this information was passed back to Sanchez who directed that Stroganow be taken to Lake Seminole Hospital. This was the first time either Dayton or Sanchez was aware that the EMS squad had refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room. Although Sanchez did not have admitting privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had a contractual agreement with Lake Seminole which provided that certain staff doctors at Lake Seminole would admit patients referred to Lake Seminole by IMC. Pursuant to this contractual arrangement, Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital where he was treated for his injuries and evaluated for his future medical needs.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0040318. Respondent completed a residency in internal medicine and later was a nephrology fellow at Mayo Clinic. He was recruited to Florida in 1952 by Humana. In 1984 he became associated with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in an administrative position but took over treating patients when the owner became ill. This HMO was affiliated with IMC who assimilated it when the HMO had financial difficulties. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was a salaried employee of IMC and served as Assistant Medical DIRECTOR in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency Room at a nearby hospital. He was examined and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. When the ambulance with EMS personnel arrived they examined Stroganow, and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when he was transported to the emergency Room, and refused to again take Stroganow to the emergency Room. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to check on Stroganow. Upon arrival, she was admitted by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, and apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not engage in conversation to determine his condition. She called for a Cares Unit team to come and evaluate Stroganow. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her evaluation on visual examination. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit, and, after examining Stroganow, both members of the team agreed he needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady revealed his income to be above that for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold-Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, Respondent, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement because Stroganow was not ambulatory, but felt he needed to be placed in a hospital or nursing home and not left alone with the weekend approaching. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, who was in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic, and, they thought, was Stroganow's doctor. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic as well as by EMS personnel. There were always two, and occasionally three, doctors on duty at South Pasadena Clinic between 8:00 and 5:00 daily and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor he was treated by the first available doctor. Stroganow had not specifically requested to be treated by Respondent. When the Cares unit met with Respondent they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the previous evening but did not advise Respondent that the EMS squad had refused to return Stroganow to the emergency Room when they were recalled for Stroganow the same evening. Respondent telephoned the Metropolitan General Emergency Room and had the emergency Room medical report on Stroganow read to him. With the information provided by the Cares unit and the hospital report, Respondent concluded that Stroganow needed emergency medical treatment and the quickest way to obtain such treatment would be to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency Room for evaluation. When the Cares unit arrived, Respondent was treating patients at the clinic. A clinic, or doctors office, is not a desirable or practical place to have an incontinent, incoherent, and non-ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to perform certain procedures that may be required for emergency evaluation of an ill patient. At a hospital emergency Room such equipment is available. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call being placed to 911 for emergency medical treatment and it was necessary that someone be with Stroganow when the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Respondent suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 to transport Stroganow to an emergency Room for an evaluation. Upon leaving the South Pasadena clinic the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem with Stroganow. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC Tampa Office to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus HMO patients had an emergency situation which was not being property handled. Respondent left the South Pasadena Clinic around noon and went to IMC's Tampa Office where he was available for the balance of the afternoon. There he spoke with Dr. Sanchez, the INC Regional Medical Director, but Stroganow was not deemed to be a continuing problem. By 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived the Cares Unit called 911 for EMS to take Stroganow to an emergency Room. Upon arrival shortly thereafter the EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow. The Cares team communicated this to their supervisor who contacted IMC Regional Office to so advise. At this time Dr. Sanchez authorized the transportation of Stroganow to Lake Seminole Hospital for admission. Although neither Respondent nor Sanchez had privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had contracted with Lake Seminole Hospital to have IMC patients admitted by a staff doctor at Lake Seminole Hospital. Subsequent to his meeting with the Cares team Respondent received no further information regarding Stroganow until well after Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital. No entry was made on Stroganow's medical record at IMC of the meeting between Respondent and the Cares Unit. Respondent was a salaried employee whose compensation was not affected by whether or not he admitted an IMC Gold-Plus patient to a hospital.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, Petitioner is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the defense of a disciplinary proceeding.
Findings Of Fact On September 2, 1988, an 83-year-old female was admitted to West Orange Memorial Hospital with recurrent rectal bleeding and complaints of pain in the low back and left hip. The patient also reported pain while sitting or lying due to a subcutaneous nodule in the left buttock. As noted in the patient's history dictated by Petitioner on September 12, 1988, the patient had numerous admissions to the hospital for rectal bleeding and previously had been diagnosed as suffering from angiodysplasia. These notes also reflect that the patient had recently undergone a colonoscopy and upper endoscopy, which were negative. The notes of N. Alar, M.D., which were dictated on September 3, 1988, indicate that he had seen the patient in consultation for evaluation of lower gastrointestinal bleeding. The notes disclose that the patient had complained of bloody bowel movements. The notes record a history of diverticulosis and angiodysplasia of the colon. Following a colonoscopy and polypectomy, Petitioner excised the nodule on September 11. The procedure took place at the hospital bed of the patient where her left buttock was prepped and draped in sterile fashion prior to the making of a two-inch incision. Following the removal of the nodule, the area was cleaned, the wound was closed, and sterile dressing was applied. There was no break in technique during the procedureand sterility was maintained. The nodule was later determined to be an area of fat necrosis that had undergone dystrophic calcification. The following day, the patient developed severe respiratory distress and expired. Her final principal diagnoses were anemia secondary to gastrointestinal bleeding, arteriosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, and clostridium with septicemia. A Serious Incident Report was filed on November 29, 1988, and Respondent commenced an investigation on January 11, 1989, to determine if Petitioner's practice was below applicable standards. The first time that Petitioner's case appeared at a Probable Cause Panel Meeting of the Board of Medicine was on May 11, 1990. The following Panel members were present: Chair Robert Katims, M.D.; Marilyn Wells, M.D., and Gilbert Rodriguez. Also present were Assistant Attorney General M. Catherine Lannon and Respondent's attorneys, Carlos Ramos and Stephanie Daniel. At the commencement of the meeting, Ms. Lannon explained the respective roles of herself and Respondent's attorneys. In general, she was present to advise the Panel as to its legal duties under applicable statutes and rules. Respondent's attorneys were available to respond to questions involving specific investigations. In response to a question posed by Ms. Lannon, each Panel member indicated that he or she had received the written materials concerning matters to be considered at the meeting insufficient time to review them. Mr. Ramos identified the materials that had been provided to each Panel member prior to the meeting. The materials included the entire investigative file and Respondent's recommendation in the form of a draft administrative complaint or closing order, as appropriate. When Petitioner's case was announced, Mr. Ramos stated that Respondent recommended the Panel find probable cause and direct the filing of an Administrative Complaint. Mr. Ramos explained that the proposed Administrative Complaint alleged that Petitioner practiced medicine below the acceptable level of care when he excised a nodule from a patient's left buttock while the patient was lying on a hospital bed. Also, Mr. Ramos stated, medical records failed to reflect a rectal examination upon admission. Terming it a "terrible case," Panel member Wells moved to find probable cause and issue the Administrative Complaint. Mr. Ramos stated that Petitioner "wasn't sterile." Transcript of May 11 meeting, page 5. Chair Katims asked if Petitioner had surgical privileges. Ms. Lannon responded by restating Dr. Katims' question whether Petitioner may have performed the procedure in a hospital bed because he lacked surgical privileges. Dr. Wells expressed interest in this point. The motion was then passed without further discussion. The materials available to the Probable Cause Panel on May 11, 1990, included a letter dated March 15, 1989,from Joseph R. Goggin, M.D., who is a board certified surgeon. Retained by Respondent to opine as to the standard of care, Dr. Goggin reviewed the file materials and stated in part: I find it hard to believe that the patient's hospital bed in a usual hospital room would be considered sterile. [Petitioner's] statements throughout both the Discharge Summary and in the chart itself state that the wound infection clostridium perfringens and staph coagulase negative was self-inflicted by the patient following the surgical procedure. I cannot believe that this is true. Clostridium perfringens is not a normal flora found in the human colon. Neither is staph coagulase negative. I would suspect that if the patient had contaminated the wound with her own stool, we would have seen mixed cultures with numerous other bacteria involved. One must assume that because of the pure cultures of clostridium perfringens and staph coagulase negative that a break in sterile technique occurred. I think this occurred because the patient underwent the procedure in her hospital bed and not in a sterile operating environment. Dr. Goggin's letter concludes that the hospital changed its policy so that all procedures involving excision be performed in a "completely sterile environment." The letter adds: If this policy was not in place prior to the procedure, I don't believe that the licensee violated the standard of care as it applied to this hospital. However, most of us would believe that any invasive procedure of this nature should probably be performed in a sterile environment. The letter from Dr. Goggin also faults Petitioner for his failure to obtain a rectal examination upon admission of the patient, even though she had been complaining of rectalbleeding. In terms of the timeliness of Petitioner's diagnosis of clostridium, Dr. Goggin concedes, "I don't think that an earlier diagnosis would have changed this patient's final outcome." The records available to the Probable Cause Panel on May 11, 1990, also included a letter from Respondent to Petitioner advising him that he is the subject of a complaint and inviting him to provide a written explanation. In response, and included in the records available on May 11, were a letter dated April 25, 1989, from Petitioner; a statement dated April 25, 1989, from the attending nurse corroborating that sterility was maintained during the excision of the nodule; and a letter dated July 3, 1989, from James J. McClelland, M.D., whose letterhead indicates that he is a member of a group of infectious disease control consultants. Petitioner's letter states that invasive procedures, such as subclavian insertions, chest tube placements, and lumbar punctures for spinal taps, are commonly performed in the hospital bed. The letter restates the procedures followed to maintain sterility and asserts that the contamination had to take place subsequent to the dressing of the wound, such as by the patient inadvertently loosening the dressing through normal movement in the bed. Dr. McClelland's letter states that, following review of the medical records, he finds that Petitioner "followed the normal standard of care in performing this procedure . . .." The letter explains: [C]lostridial infections in sepsis are well reported in the literature to have occurred after many sterile procedures, using standard medical care and that the presence of the clostridial infection does not imply substandard care. It should be noted that clostridial organisms can colonize the skin, often times in higher numbers below the waist, and that this organism entered the wound in the postoperative period. The record showed that [Petitioner] followed the standard care to prevent contamination of the wound by his prep and subsequent dressing of the wound. In regard to the question con- cerning a break in sterile technique and the findings of pure cultures of Clostridium perfringens and staph coagulase negative, it could also [be] assumed that a break in sterile technique would result in multiple other organisms being present in the wound. It should also be noted that the Clostridium perfringens organism can colonize the gastrointestinal tract, as well as the skin, and in itself does not exclude this as a potential pathophysiologic mechanism for her subsequent sepsis. The potential for the woman to have developed this overwhelming infection, whether the surgical procedure was performed in the office, a hospital bed, or the operating room, all exist and cases have been reported associated with all settings. There is no evidence I can see that [Petitioner] deviated from what would be considered normal procedure in removing this nodule from the patient's buttocks. As a result of the deliberations of the Probable Cause Panel on May 11, 1990, Chair Katims executed a Memorandum of Finding of Probable Cause. In the memorandum, the Panel finds that probable cause was found of a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t) and (m). By Administrative Complaint filed August 24, 1990, commencing DOAH Case No. 90-5298, Respondent alleged that thesurgical wound on the left buttock developed pure cultures of clostridium perfringens and staph coagulase negative, "indicating a break in sterile technique." The Administrative Complaint alleges that the patient was admitted with rectal bleeding, but the records fail to disclose that a rectal examination was performed upon admission. The Administrative Complaint alleges that the hospital involved has since changed its policy to require all procedures involving excision to be performed in a "completely sterile environment." Based on the foregoing allegations, Count One of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Petitioner violated Section 458.331(1)(t) by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician when Petitioner excised the nodule in the "environment of [the] patient's hospital bed, which is not a sterile operating environment." Count Two alleges that Petitioner violated Section 458.331(1)(m) by failing to keep medical records--namely a rectal examination upon admission-- justifying the course of treatment of the patient. On September 26, 1990, Respondent filed a motion to amend the Administrative Complaint to delete the allegation about the change in the hospital procedure as irrelevant. The motion was granted. On October 9, 1990, Respondent also filed responses to interrogatories. In support of the assertion that the hospital bed is not a sterile operating environment,Respondent stated that it would rely upon the following witnesses: Petitioner, the attending nurse, Dr. Goggin, and the medical records custodian. In their entirety, the responses disclose that Respondent had not obtained expert advice other than that set forth above. In response to a letter dated December 28, 1990, requesting an opinion and providing all file materials, Respondent's attorney Randolph Collette received a seven-page letter dated January 3, 1991, from E. Rawson Griffin, III, M.D. Dr. Griffin is Board-certified in family practice. After an extensive recitation of the patient history taken by Petitioner, Dr. Griffin traces the subsequent actions of Petitioner, noting that pathological examination of the biopsied tissue detected "no particular serious abnormalities." Dr. Griffin opines: . . . my first opinion is that overall I find that [Petitioner] followed the basic standard of care in doing a history and physical examination, writing progress notes which justified the treatment, provided a surgical procedure in which he documented proper sterilization, surgical technique and postoperative wound care and that he obtained proper informed consent and signed this informed consent. Based on this review, I feel that the standard of care which is outlined in DeGowan and DeGowan's as well as what any reasonable physician would follow, was pretty much followed. The only criticism that I can find is again that there are no progress notes which may have been made by the covering physician. I also found that it was interesting that [Petitioner] did do progress notes on days that other physicians did not and I felt that this indicated that he was following the patient properly. It should also be emphasized that he did a three page dictation which was a discharge summary which basically outlined the facts of the case and I found this discharge summary to adequately summarize the events as they had occurred. In answering specific questions posed to him by Respondent, Dr. Griffin responds affirmatively to the question whether Petitioner met the applicable standard of care in his examination, diagnosis, and treatment of the patient. Dr. Griffin opines that the bedside location of the procedure did not violate the applicable standard of care. In this regard, Dr. Griffin notes the cost-effectiveness of method of treatment, as well as the documentation of proper anaesthesia, preparation of tissue, proper technique, and proper sterile dressings. As to Petitioner's failure to perform a rectal examination, Dr. Griffin notes that a colonoscopy polypectomy was performed. Again referring to the DeGowan and DeGowan treatise, Dr. Griffin observes that, in some cases, a routine or basic examination is inappropriate. One of the primary purposes of a rectal examination is to detect rectal bleeding, but the patient presented with obvious signs of rectal bleeding. Dr. Griffin concludes that a rectal examination by Petitioner might not have produced any more information, so the trauma associated with repeated rectal examinations was unnecessary. Under the circumstances, Dr. Griffin opines that the records justify Petitioner's failure to perform a rectal examination upon admission of the patient. Dr. Griffin also discredits the findings of a Dr.Khouzan who, based upon what he described as a "very careful review of the chart," found "very severe purulent material." Dr. Griffin notes that this finding was contradictory to multiple other chart entries and concludes that Dr. Khouzan did not in fact examine the patient. Respondent's attorney Randolph Collette received a four-page letter dated January 8, 1991, from Stephen J. Nelson, M.A., M.D., whom Respondent had also retained for an opinion by letter dated December 28, 1990. Dr. Nelson is an Assistant Clinical Professor of Pathology at the University of Miami. He is also an Associate Medical Examiner for Broward County and Attending Neuropathologist. Acknowledging the receipt of relevant file materials, Dr. Nelson states: [The patient's] terminal hospital course is an example of anaerobic Clostridium perfrin- gens cellulitis, and probable myonecrosis, following surgery. The onset is sudden, dramatic, and often fatal with an incubation period of 6-72 hours. There are five types of Clostridium perfringens, A-E, separated according to their production of four major lethal exotoxins. The most important exotoxin is . . . (alpha) toxin, or lecithinase-C, because of its lethal, dermonecrotic, and hemolytic activity. Such wounds classically display no pus because the enzyme lecithinase attacks cell membranes and literally dissolves any and all cells (including inflammatory cells) that are in its path. Other Clostridial exotoxins include collagenase, protease, deoxyribonuclease, hyaluronidase, and a hemolysin. Bacteremia is present in about 15 percent of cases. [The patient's] wound is described in multiple places throughout her medical recordas having a serosanguinous drainage. A "thin blood-stained exudate" is the usual classic textbook description. I'm not sure what Dr. N. Khouzan was referring to . . . when he says that his "careful review of the chart revealed a very severe purulent material . . .." His review couldn't have been that awfully careful as there is no mention of "a very severe purulent material," and he incorrectly identified the species of Clostridium he was hoping to treat as being Clostridium tetany (sic) which causes tetanus, rather than Clostridium perfringens which was one of the organisms cultured from [the patient's] excisional wound (along with coagulase-negative Staphylococcal spp.). I can only hope that Dr. Khouzan is not an infectious disease specialist. . . . Dr. Nelson opines that the presence of Clostridium perfringens was not necessarily evidence of substandard care. To the contrary, Dr. Nelson finds that Petitioner, trained as an orthopedic surgeon, "adequately assessed and documented [the patient's] signs and symptoms." Additionally, Dr. Nelson states that Petitioner properly performed the excisional biopsy himself; although devoting his practice to family/general medicine, Petitioner was trained as a surgeon in orthopedics. The bedside site of the excisional procedure did not bother Dr. Nelson, who states that the operating room is "justifiably reserved for more complex procedures." Dr. Nelson questions whether the procedure was performed at bedside or in a nearby "procedure room," where it was scheduled to be performed according to one of the records provided to Dr. Nelson. Dr. Nelson explains that the procedure rooms can easily be prepared for sterile procedures like excisional biopsies. Dr. Nelson's letter concludes: Clostridial spp. are ubiquitous to the human body. They most often become disease-producing and self-perpetuating when the oxygen tension in tissues is lowered, as with an abscess, decubital ulcers, or other cause of tissue necrosis and/or devitaliza- tion. Debilitated patients are at a higher risk of developing Clostridial infections. Intestinal disorders, most commonly malig- nancies, permit Clostridium perfringens invasion and replication, resulting in severe local or, rarely, septicemic Clostridial disease. The most likely source of Clostridium perfringens in [the patient's] excisional biopsy wound is local fecal contamination, though systemic invasion cannot be absolutely ruled out. [The patient] could have developed the infection from an iatrogenic injury during the colonoscopy on 9/4/88 . . . from which the adenomatous polyp was snared. Or from [the patient's] long-standing diverticulosis with the infection spreading from the abdomen to the wound. These are unlikely scenario, given her medical history and hospital course, but it would have been an easy task to have ruled these out by the performance of an autopsy. On January 11, 1991, Respondent requested that the final hearing set for January 29, 1991, be cancelled and the case abated to allow Respondent to return the case to the Probable Cause Panel for reconsideration. In the absence of objection from Petitioner, the motion was granted and the case was abated until March 10, 1991. At the Probable Cause Panel Meeting of the Board of Medicine conducted on February 22, 1991, the following members of the Panel were present: Chair George P. Vitale; Fuad Ashkar, M.D.; and Margaret Skinner, M.D. Ms. Lannon was present, aswere Mr. Ramos, and Respondent's attorneys Larry McPherson, and Susan Londgard. In response to a question posed by Ms. Lannon, each Panel member indicated that he or she had received the written materials concerning matters to be considered at the meeting in sufficient time to review them. Ms. Lannon then invited the Panel members to ask questions or request material if they encountered a case for which they had not read the materials or were otherwise unfamiliar with. Mr. Ramos identified the materials that had been provided to each Panel member prior to the meeting. The materials included the entire investigative file. When Petitioner's case was announced, Mr. Ramos stated that the case was before the Panel for reconsideration after a previous Panel finding of probable cause and the subsequent filing of an administrative complaint. Mr. Ramos explained: We have brought this case back for your consideration, because discovery revealed that two expert opinions state that the Respondent's excision of the nodule in the bedside of the patient was not below the acceptable standard of care. Furthermore, the information related by the patients--by our expert as to the source of the patient's infection is contradicted by recognized medical treatises and the opinion of an infections disease control specialist, and that has been included in the packet. That came after discovery. And, therefore, the Department has recommended that we close this case without further prosecu- tion. Transcript of February 22 meeting, page 7. Panel member Skinner then indicated that she had noticed that the two expert opinions were from a Broward County assistant medical examiner and a family practitioner. She said that she would like to see an opinion from someone who is "Board certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty of infectious diseases, and I would like to see that . . . before we move to do away with this case. This case is heinous . . .." Id. at page 8. Panel member Skinner complained that the experts did not have any medical records and that her records were incomplete. For instance, she said that she did not know the size of the incision or if a nurse documented erythema or "crud" in the wound. She thus moved that the case be brought back with the medical records with an opinion specifically from somebody Board-certified in internal medicine with a sub-specialty in infectious diseases and be brought back to the Panel, because one of the things that is not in the [Administrative Complaint] is failure to recognize [Clostridium perfringens]. Id. at pages 8-9. Ms. Lannon responded that the standard of care would be a reasonably prudent similar physician, "so unless [Petitioner] was Board-certified in infectious diseases, he wouldn't be held to that standard of care. He would be held to the standard of care of a similar physician." Id. at page 9. Panel member Skinner answered that Petitioner is an "orthopedist practicing family practice." Id. Dr. Skinner then asked if Petitioner had surgical privileges at the hospital at which the incident took place. She suggested that the status of Petitioner's surgical privileges could be an "attributing cause." Id. Panel member Ashkar stated that he agreed with Dr. Skinner. Dr. Ashkar noted that one of the materials in the file indicated that the hospital had since changed its policies, or possibly had done so, in terms of excision procedures being performed in a completely sterile environment. In response to a question posed by Ms. Lannon, Panel members Skinner and Ashkar stated that they would proceed with an administrative complaint if they find "it's a standard-of-care violation." Id. at page 11. Dr. Ashkar added that a previous probable cause panel had good cause when it caused the filing of the Administrative Complaint, and the new panel should proceed with it. Dr. Skinner requested that the Administrative Complaint be expanded to include an allegation that Petitioner failed to recognize the presence or possible presence of a staph infection. Dr. Skinner conceded that she did not have the medical records, so she did not know if Petitioner did a wound culture. She also did not have the nurses' notes, so she did not know if they made if obvious that something was wrong with the wound. At this point, Mr. McPherson reminded the Panel that the case had been before a probable cause panel previously. He added that three expert opinions determined that there was "no standard-of-care violation." Id. at page 12. Ms. Lannon disagreed with Mr. McPherson, and Panel members Skinner and Ashkar agreed with Ms. Lannon. Dr. Ashkar stated that Dr. Goggin opined that there was a standard-of-care violation and that the incident forced the hospital to change their policies. Ms. Lannon cautioned that a change in policy would not establish a violation in the first place. Dr. Ashkar responded by referring to the standard-of-care issue and quoting Dr. Goggin as follows: ". . . the patient probably should have had the surgical procedure performed in a sterile environment under the usual conditions found in an operating room suite where there are sterile instruments, and that the wound infection here is probably due to doing it outside that kind of a setting." Id. at page 13. Ms. Lannon asked the Panel what they thought about Dr. Nelson's opinion that Petitioner could be regarded as overutilizing the operating room by performing the excision procedure there. Dr. Skinner admitted that the Panel's problem was that they did not know the size of the excision. She added that the experts differed as to the appearance of the wound, which went toward the failure to recognize a serious problem. Mr. Ramos suggested that the Panel table the case so that Respondent could provide the Panel with the medical records, which everyone agreed had not been included in thepackage supplied to the Board members prior to the meeting. Concluding their discussion of the case at the February 22 meeting, Panel member Ashkar rejected Dr. Nelson's opinion because, absent an emergency, Dr. Ashkar had "never heard of [performing the subject excision procedure in a hospital bed] recently ywayay." Id. at page 16. Dr. Skinner restated her concern about Petitioner's failure to recognize the complication. Ms. Lannon suggested that an orthopedic specialist who had examined the specialist possibly could provide needed information as to the size and nature of the nodule on the patient's hip. The motion was clarified to include consideration of amending the Administrative Complaint to include an allegation that Petitioner failed to recognize timely the patient's clostridium infection and to investigate whether Petitioner had surgical privileges. The Panel voted unanimously in favor of the motion and tabled the case. By Status Report filed March 5, 1991, Respondent advised that the Probable Cause Panel had tabled the case at its February, 1991, meeting in order to obtain additional information. At the Probable Cause Panel Meeting of the Board of Medicine conducted on May 4, 1991, Panel members present were Chair Vitale, Dr. Skinner, and Dr. Ashkar. Mr. Ramos and two of Respondent's investigators were present, as was Assistant Attorney General Edwin Bayo substituting for Ms. Lannon. Each of the Panel members indicated that he or she had read the file materials. When Petitioner's case came up, Mr. Ramos noted that the case had been in front of the Panel "a couple of times," most recently February 22, 1991. Transcript of May 4 meeting, page 4. Mr. Ramos added that one of Respondent's attorneys had pursued all the issues identified by the Panel at the last meeting. Mr. Ramos stated: Discovery reveals that the [Respondent's] expert's opinion was incorrect. That was the initial expert on which we depended on to file an Administrative Complaint. Dr. Nelson and Dr. Griffin have opined since then that the procedure performed in this case does not constitute the practice of medicine below the acceptable level of care. And at our last meeting, the Panel was informed on the foregoing, and it requested that an expert on infectious disease be obtained, and to obtain information as to the respondent's hospital privileges. There's two letters that are part of your packet from the hospital that says the subject did have hospital privileges. And as to the infectious disease person, the only person we have is the one on record, which is on the subject side of this case and [Respondent's attorney] tried to find someone. If you guys know someone for future reference, we need to know about it, because . . . Id. at pages 4-5. Panel members Ashkar and Skinner offered to provide Mr. Ramos with some names. Then Dr. Skinner confessed that she was still troubled about several things involving the case. She again raised the question why Petitioner failed to recognize the serious infection, clostridium perfringens. Sherestated the other issue concerning whether Petitioner was wrong to remove the cyst in the hospital bed. Addressing the first issue, Mr. Ramos said that Respondent could not obtain an expert opinion on whether Petitioner was culpable in his failure to recognize the infection. Dr. Skinner again offered to give Respondent the names of possible experts. Mr. Ramos responded that the process would take time, and, in the meantime, "we have this doctor in this position." Id. at page 6. Dr. Ashkar offered to contact the proposed expert and expedite the process, so the Panel could accept the expert's credentials at the next Board meeting at the end of May. Mr. Ramos said they could move fast on the case, so Dr. Skinner moved to table the case again. Dr. Skinner noted that they needed to consider the issue whether Petitioner improperly incised the abscess at the hospital bed. She asked that Respondent's attorneys pose to the expert two questions: was it below the standard of care to incise the abscess in the bed and was there a failure to recognize a potential danger. Dr. Ashkar distinguished between the removal of a nodule that is a simple ganglion, an ingrown hair, or a sebaceous cyst, on the one hand, and the draining of an abscess with a "very deadly bacteria in it in a general ward," on the other hand. Id. at page 8. Mr. Ramos answered that the case would depend entirely on the expert. The first expert was dated andcontradicted by treatises. Dr. Ashkar responded that it would have been more acceptable if a surgeon without access to an operating room performed the excision in a sterile setting other than an operating room. In any event, it was, in Dr. Ashkar's opinion, improper to perform the procedure in a general ward where infectious diseases are a recurring problem. Id. at pages 8-9. Dr. Skinner agreed that the situation was worse because Petitioner had operating privileges. Dr. Skinner then moved to table the case pending acquisition of expert witness, and again, . . . I would ask him all the ques- tions you asked the other expert witness. Noting that he did have operating room privileges. The second corner of the question that wasn't asked, is, is if it was failure to recognize an additional problem with this wound below the standard of care. Id. at page 10. The Panel then voted unanimously to table the case. Respondent filed a second Status Report on May 20, 1991, and advised that the Probable Cause Panel again tabled the case at its April, 1991, meeting in order to obtain an additional expert opinion. Petitioner objected to further abatement and requested that the case be dismissed. At the same time, Petitioner requested attorneys' fees and costs. By Order Setting Case for Hearing entered June 12, 1991, the request to dismiss was denied, the request for attorneys' fees and costs was denied, and the final hearing resetfor July 15, 1991. By Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed June 18, 1991, Respondent dismissed the DOAH Case No. 90-5298 and the Division closed its file by Order entered the following day. On July 10, 1991, Respondent received the opinion of another expert, Stephen M. Kreitzer, M.D., who had been retained by letter dated June 26, 1991. In relevant part, Dr. Kreitzer's letter states: The bacteria [to which the patient succumbed] are present in the skin and certainly the elderly with diminished circulation to the skin are more prone to these types of infec- tions. These types of infections can certainly occur under the sterile conditions surgery or they can occur with any break of the skin on their own. It certainly is within the standard of care to remove the type of nodule removed by [Petitioner] in an outpatient center, hospital in-patient bedside, or in a physician's office. There is no evidence to suggest [Petitioner] violated Surgical Infectious Disease Guidelines. . . . Sepsis was recognized by the Emergency Room physician and the care of the septic patient was begun by the Emergency Room physician. [Petitioner] continued that care in the Intensive Care Unit. Appropriate cultures and the broadened spectrum antibiotics were prescribed. In my opinion, the patient contracted the Clostridium and Staph bacteria from unfortu- nate skin entry. Skin entry can occur from an intravenous site, or wound such as that involved with the nodule removal, joint injection by an Orthopedist which occurred during this hospitalization and finally, colonoscopy and polypectomy with mucosal contamination and septicemia. Bacteria induced septicemia have been documented in all of the above instances and is well recognized. . . . Because of the timing of this patient's sepsis, it is unlikely that the trigger point injection or colonoscopy had anything to do with the patient's subse- quent septicemia and demise. Regardless, there is no evidence in the chart that the patient contracted the infection because of the procedure or treatment falling below the standard of care. [Emphasis added.] The applicable standard of care comes into question with this case because of both record keeping and the admitting orders. The patient did not have a history and physical dictated at the time of admission, but rather that was delayed until the 12th of September. Although rectal exam was not included, since the admitting orders included the consultation with the Gastroenterologist who obviously would per- form the rectal exam and colonoscopy, the patient need not have undergone a rectal exami- nation necessarily upon admission. . . . Petitioner subsequently commenced the present case by filing a Petition for Costs and Attorneys Fees on July 29, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation (Charter) which proposes to construct and operate a freestanding, 60 bed, 24- hour-a-day, Intensive Residential Treatment Program for children between the ages of 6 and 18 in Palm Beach County within HRS District IX, pursuant to Rule 10-28.152(8), F.A.C. and Chapter 395, F.S. Although FRTC represents it will construct its proposed facility with or without CON licensure, which it is entitled to do, given the peculiarities of this type of health care entity, it is clear that a prime motivator in FRTC's CON application is that with CON licensure, FRTC potentially will have greater access to insurance reimbursement because it may then call itself a "hospital." FRTC will seek JCAH accreditation. HRS is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications, pursuant to Chapter 10-5.011, F.A.C. and Sections 381.701-381.715, F.S. (1987). HRS preliminarily approved FRTC's application, and supported it through formal hearing and post-hearing proposals. RTCPB is an existing 40 bed residential treatment center for adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18, located in Palm Beach County, on the campus of Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches. It provides services similar or identical to those services proposed to be offered by FRTC. It is JCAH accredited through an extension of Lake Hospital's accreditation and is close to JCAH accreditation in its own right. RTCPB is a subsidiary of Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. (PIA) . PIA operates two residential treatment centers in Florida. RTCPB is not CON licensed as an IRTP, under Chapters 381 and 395, F.S., but is licensed as a child care facility under Chapter 395, F.S., as a provider of services to HRS under Chapters 10M-9 and 10E-10, F.A.C. RTCPB accepts substance abusers in residency. RTCPB has also applied for CON licensure as an IRTP in a batching cycle subsequent to the present one. That application has been preliminarily denied by HRS and RTCPB is awaiting a Section 120.57(1), F.S., formal administrative hearing thereon. RTCPB now estimates its current patients' average length of stay (ALOS) as 106 days but projects a 315 day (10 1/2 months) ALOS in its subsequent CON application. RTCPB is charging $185 per day or HRS patients and $255 with $23-26 ancillaries [sic] per day for private pay patients. Like FRTC, it uses a "levels" system of behavior modification and patient control. Humana is a 250 bed JCAH accredited hospital located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Of Humana's 250 beds, 162 are traditional acute care beds and 88 are psychiatric beds. The 88 psychiatric beds are administratively divided into different units, one of which is a 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit; this unit opened January 20, 1987, and has an average length of stay of nine months. Humana's existing CONs are for short-term adult psychiatric beds and do not authorize an adolescent unit with an average length of stay of over 30 days. Ninety days is the demarcation, by rule, between short- and long-term psychiatric beds. Humana recently applied for a CON for more psychiatric beds and also applied for an IRTP CON in a subsequent batch to the present one. Humana's present 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit provides grossly similar services to those proposed to be offered by FRTC, but its emphasis is more medical-psychiatric than emotional-behavioral. Like FRTC, Humana does not accept in residency adolescents with a primary diagnosis of substance abuse. Like FRTC and RTCPB, Humana uses a "levels" system. Eighty percent of Humana's patient mix are commercial pay, and the unit is running at a 15 to 20 percent profit margin. Humana usually charges $325 per day on their adolescent unit plus ancillaries [sic] amounting to 10 percent of the patient's bill, but HRS contract patients pay only $225 per day. Humana has lost a number of adolescent unit referrals to RTCPB since RTCPB opened June 1, 1987, but the unit continues to be almost fully occupied. Humana's main referral asset, as well as the source of the confusion of referring entities, appears to be the reputation of its director, Dr. Kelly. Dr. Kelly previously directed a program at Lake Hospital which was identical to the program that he now directs at Humana. Lake Hospital currently has RTCPB operating under its auspices, but not Dr. Kelly. Nature of the FRTC Program FRTC's proposed program is designed to serve those persons in the designated age group who have psychiatric diagnoses of a severity requiring a long-term approach in a multidisciplinary structured living setting to facilitate recovery. It will not, however, treat adolescents with an active diagnosis of chemical dependency or substance abuse. It also only commits to 1.5 percent indigent care. The proposed FRTC program differs from an acute care setting in significant quantitative and qualitative ways, the most visible of which is that acute care psychiatric settings (either long- or short-term) are geared toward dealing with patients actively dangerous to property, themselves, or others, but patients whom it is reasonably assumed will respond primarily to physiologically-oriented physicians and registered nurses administering daily medication, treatment, and monitoring, as opposed to a long-term living arrangement emphasizing behaviorally-oriented group interaction as an alternative to parental care at home. FRTC will, however, accept patients with psychiatric diagnoses of effective disorders, depression, schizophrenia and impulse disorders and those who may be potentially harmful to themselves, others, or property for whom no other less intensive or less restrictive form of treatment would be predictably helpful. FRTC would fall on the continuum of care below an acute psychiatric facility such as Humana. Assessment of such a target group on a patient by patient basis is obviously subject to a wide variation of interpretation by qualified health care professionals, but FRTC anticipates both verifying referral diagnoses and assuring quality of care by insuring that each new patient is seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee. FRTC also plans to complete appropriate patient assessments and develop and update individual, integrated treatment programs. FRTC will provide, where appropriate, for continuity of care from previous acute care institutions through the FRTC program and out into more normal individual or family living arrangements. Parents will have to consent to their child's placement at FRTC. FRTC's program proposes an average length of stay of 365 days (one year) with a range of six months to two years. Based upon all the credible record evidence as a whole, including, but not limited to, the protestants' respective ALOS, this is a reasonable forecast despite contrary evidence as to Charter's experience at its "template" Virginia institution, Charter Colonial. FRTC's program components will include individual therapy, recreational therapy, occupational therapy, and general education. The general education component in FRTC's proposed program is more general and more open than that offered in acute care settings, such as Humana. FRTC's overall program will utilize a "levels" system of behavioral management based upon patients earning privileges, which levels system has a good patient rehabilitation and functional administrative track record in many different kinds of psychiatric health care facilities, including Humana and RTCPB. FRTC intends that each patient's program will be individualized according to age and program component directed to his/her diagnosis and each patient will receive individual, resident group, and family therapies. As to assessment, types of therapy, continuity of care, and general education provisions, FRTC's proposal is grossly consistent with that of its "template." To the extent there is evidence of inconsistencies between the two programs in the record, the FRTC proposal represents either improvements over, or refinements of, its template program which have been developed as Charter/FRTC has learned more about what actually "works" for the IRTP form of health care, or it represents changes to accommodate Florida's perception of what less restrictive but still intensive residential treatment should be, or it anticipates local community needs. Quality of Care The applicant's parent corporation is an experienced provider of many types of accredited psychiatric facilities. The type of quality assurance program proposed and the staff mix provide reasonable quality care assurances. Design, Construction, and Personnel Refinements to FRTC's original schematic take into consideration the influence that physical structure has on an Intensive Residential Treatment Program. Those refinements include modification of a multipurpose room into a half-court gymnasium, addition of a classroom, addition of a mechanical room, modification of the nursing station to decrease the amount of space, and the deletion of one seclusion room and addition of a four to six bed assessment unit. The modifications resulted in the addition of approximately 1,000 square feet to the original design. A minimum of four to six acres would be necessary to accommodate the modified design which totals approximately 32,000 square feet. Public areas, such as administration and support services, dining room, and housekeeping areas, are to the front; private areas, such as the nursing units, are to the back. The facility's middle area houses gym, classrooms, and occupational therapy areas. The location encourages residential community involvement. Each of three, 20-bed units is made up of a group of two consultation rooms, a galley, a laundry, a day room and core living space located directly across from the nursing station for maximum observation and efficiency. Each unit comprises a separate wing. Six handicapped accessible patient beds are contemplated; the building will be handicapped-accessible. The staffing projections have increased and the pattern has been minimally altered in the updates. The updated pro forma also modified the initial financial projections so as to increase salary expense and employee benefits based on this change in staffing. An increase in the total project cost impacted on depreciation, and interest expense changed with time. All these changes are reasonable and insubstantial. FRTC's design is adequate for providing a suitable environment for intensive residential treatment for children and adolescents even though it is not identical to Charter's "template" for residential treatment and even though Charter's extensive experience with acute care facilities has focused these changes in its residential treatment concepts. The parties stipulated to the adequacy of FRTC's proposed equipment list and costs. Total construction cost was demonstrated to be reasonably estimated at $2,078,000. The square footage costs of $64.86 per square foot represet an increase from the square footage costs contained in the original CON application. The original budget was updated based upon a three percent inflation factor and the addition of the approximately 1,000 square feet. The additional space is not a significant construction change. The total project costs of $4,728,000 are reasonable. The testimony of HRS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, who testified by deposition, (RTCPB's Exhibit 8, pp. 21-22) revealed no firm policy on what the agency, within its expertise, views as substantial and impermissible amendments to a CON application; HRS did not move at hearing to remand for further review; and the undersigned concludes that the changes in facility design, costs, and staffing do not represent significant changes which would be excludable as evidence and that they do represent permissible minor modifications and refinements of the original FRTC application. Site Availability No party contended that FRTC's application was a "site specific" application, that a residential treatment program is otherwise required to be "site specific," or that an IRTP CON is governed by a "site specific" rule or by "site specific" statutory criteria. Therefore, it was only necessary for FRTC in this noncomparative proceeding to establish that several suitable sites were available within the required geographic parameters at the financial amount allotted in FRTC's projections. FRTC did establish financially and geographically available and suitable sites through the testimony of Robert H. Ellzey, a qualified expert in commercial real estate values. The Non-Rule Need Policy There are no hospital licensed Intensive Residential Treatment Programs in Palm Beach County or in District IX. IRTPs are in a separate licensure category by law from psychiatric beds, acute care beds, and rehabilitation beds. There is a separate need methodology for long-term psychiatric beds and there are no CON licensed long-term psychiatric programs for children and adolescents in District IX, unless one considers Humana which is treating adolescents well beyond 30 or 90 days residency. HRS has no promulgated rule predicting need for IRTPs seeking specialty hospital licensure under Chapter 395, F.S. Subsequent to advice of its counsel that a CON must be obtained as a condition of IRTP licensure pursuant to Chapter 395, F.S., HRS elected to evaluate all IRTP CON applications in the context of the statutory criteria of Chapter 381, F.S., and in the context of HRS' non-rule policy establishing a rebuttable presumption of need for one "reasonably sized" IRTP in each HRS planning district. The May 5, 1988 Final Order in Florida Psychiatric Centers v. HRS, et al., DOAH Case No. 88- 0008R, held this non-rule policy invalid as a rule due to HRS' failure to promulgate it pursuant to Section 120.54, F.S., but that order also held the policy not to be invalid as contrary to Chapter 381, F.S. That Final Order intervened between the close of final hearing in the instant case and entry of the instant Recommended Order, however, it does not alter the need for the agency to explicate and demonstrate the reasonableness of its non-rule policy on a case by case basis. HRS was unable to do so in the formal hearing in the instant case. Notwithstanding the oral testimony of Robert May and Elizabeth Dudek, and the deposition testimony of John Griffin, it appears that the non- rule policy is not based upon generally recognized health planning considerations, but solely on the agency's statutory interpretation of recent amendments to Chapter 395 and some vague perception, after internal agency discussions, that the policy is consistent with certain promulgated need rules and with certain other non-rule policies for other types of health care entities, which other non-rule policies were never fully enunciated or proved up in this formal hearing. The HRS non-rule policy was also not affirmatively demonstrated to be rational because it does not take into account the reasonableness of a proposed facility's average length of stay, referral sources, geographic access, or other factors common to duly promulgated CON rules. Numerical Need and Conformity to Applicable Health Plans FRTC sought to support HRS' non-rule policy on numerical need for, and definition of, a "reasonably sized" IRTP through the testimony of Dr. Ronald Luke, who was qualified as an expert in health planning, development of need methodologies, health economies, survey research, and development of mental health programs. In the absence of a finding of a rational non-rule policy on numerical need, Dr. Luke's evidence forms the cornerstone of FRTC's demonstration of numerical need. Through the report and testimony of Dr. Luke, and despite contrary expert health planning testimony, FRTC established the numerical need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District IX with projected 60 percent occupancy in the first year and 50 percent in the second year of operation using two bed need methodologies. Dr. Luke ultimately relied on a utilization methodology based upon 1991 population projections. Dr. Luke used a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58. This is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, regardless of the fact that the types of residential treatment considered by the NIMH data base employed by Dr. Luke greatly vary in concept and despite HRS having not yet clearly defined the nature of the programs and services it expects to be offered by a Florida specialty hospital licensed IRTP. Therefrom, Dr. Luke derived an average daily census of 52 in 1991. That figure yields a bed sizing of between 58 and 61 beds, depending on whether an 85 percent or 90 percent occupancy factor is plugged in. Either 58 or 61 beds is within the range of ratios calculated by Dr. Luke's other methodology for currently licensed Florida IRTPs in other districts. Assuming a target occupancy rate of 85 percent and an ALOS of one year, Dr. Luke considered the gross District IX IRTP bed need to be 60. In the absence of any like program to assess occupancy for and in the presence of similar programs such as Humana operating at nearly full occupancy now and RTCPB forecasting its occupancy at 88 percent in 1990 if it were IRTP-licensed, it is found that 60 beds are justified. Since there are no IRTP beds licensed as specialty hospitals in the current district bed inventory, no adjustment of this figure must be made to account for existing licensed IRTP beds. Simply stated, this is a CON application for an IRTP, nothing more and nothing less, and the subtrahend to be subtracted from gross district bed need is zero when there is a zero specialty hospital licensed IRTP bed inventory. Luke's calculated gross need of 60 bed is also his net need and is accepted. Fifty beds is generally the minimum size HRS will approve to be feasible for any free standing facility to be eonomically efficient and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. This 50 bed concept is within the wide range of bed ratios that HRS implicitly has found reasonable in, previously- licensed IRTP CON approvals. Conformity With Applicable Health Plans Section 38l.705(1)(a), F.S., requires HRS to consider CON applications against criteria contained in the applicable State and District Health Plans. In this regard, neither the applicable State Health Plan nor the applicable District IX Local Health Plan make any reference to a need for intensive residential treatment facilities. The District IX Health Plan addresses the need for psychiatric and substance abuse services to be available to all individuals in District IX. FRTC's project addresses this goal only in part. The District Health Plan states that priority should be given to CON applicants who make a commitment to providing indigent care. FRTC proposes only 1.5 percent indigent care which works out to only 1/2 of the ALOS of one patient at the proposed facility and is hardly optimum, but in a noncomparative hearing, it stands alone as advancing the given accessibility goal within the plan. Objective 1.3 of the State Health Plan provides: Through 1987, additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy for all existing and approved long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the HRS District is at least 80 percent. FRTC's project is neutral as to this goal. The District Plan also contains a goal for a complete range of health care services for the population of the district. FRTC advances this goal. The State Health Plan further provides: Goal 10: DEVELOP A COMPLETE RANGE OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN EACH HRS DISTRICT OBJECTIVE 10.1: Develop a range of essential mental health services in each HRS district by 1989. OBJECTIVE 10.3: Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1990. RECOMMENDED ACTION: 1.03A: Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving ing treatment in out-of-state facilities by 1990. The FRTC project advances these goals in part. To the extent SED patients placed outside the state for residential treatment services are HRS patients whom FRTC as yet has not contracted to treat, the FRTC project does not advance this goal. However, increased insurance reimbursement will advance accessibility for those SED children and adolescents in need of this type of care whose families have insurance coverage. The State Plan also emphasizes a goal for a continuum of care. The FRTC plan advances this goal. Financial Feasibility William S. Love, Senior Director of Hospital Operations for Charter, was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Mr. Love prepared the pro forma financial statement contained in the original CON application and the update of the pro forma in response to HRS' completeness questions. Mr. Love also had input into the updated financial information which increased salary and benefit expense. (See FOF No. 11). The revised pro forma utilized an assumption of gross patient revenues of $300 per day and a 365 day ALOS, both of which are reasonable and both of which support the rest of FRTC's assumptions (See FOF No. 9). Routine revenues are based on the types of routine services patients normally receive on a daily basis. Ancillary revenues are support revenues such as pharmacy charges, X-rays, lab charges, and other charges not generally utilized on a routine basis. The only charges to patients at the proposed FRTC facility are the routine and ancillary charges. The assumptions with regard to contractual adjustments are that there will be no Medicare utilization since the facility is projected for children and adolescents and no Medicaid since freestanding facilities in Florida are not eligible for Medicaid. Two percent of gross patient revenues are estimated to be contractual adjustments which relate to HMOs and PPOs. FRTC addresses indigent care by 1.5 percent of gross revenues which will be dedicated to Charter Care which is free care. The assumptions with regard to bad debt are that 8 percent of gross revenue will be the allowance for bad debt. An assumption of 20 percent of salaries was used for employee benefits which include the FICA tax, health insurance, dental insurance, retirement plans, and other benefits. Supplies and expenses were calculated as a function of patient day with a $90 per day estimate. Included in supplies and expenses are supplies utilized in the delivery of health care services as well as medical professional fees such as the half-time medical director and purchased services such as laundry, linen, speech and hearing services, utilities, telephone, malpractice insurance, repairs and maintenance. The depreciation assumptions are that the building would be depreciated over 40 years, fixed equipment over 20 years and major movable equipment over 10 years. Pre-opening expenses for the first 45 days of operation have been capitalized over 60 months with low amortization costs over 15 years. There is no income tax assumed in the first year but the assumption in subsequent years is that the tax rate will be 38 percent. The failure to assume a hospital tax is inconsequential. The assumptions for the second fiscal year are basically the same. Although staffing remained the same, the FTEs per occupied bed increased, and a 7 percent inflation factor was added. The project will be financially feasible even though the facility is pessimistically projecting a loss of $102,000 for the first year because a facility can suffer a loss in its first year of operation and remain financially feasible. The facility projects a $286,000 profit in its second year of operation. With regard to utilization by class of pay, FRTC has assumed that the insurance category represents 65.5 percent of total revenues projected and includes such things as commercial insurance, Blue Cross and any third party carrier other than Medicare and Medicaid. Assumptions with regard to the private pay are that 25 percent of the total revenues will be generated by private pay patients and would include the self pay portions of an insurance payor's bill, such as deductible and co-insurance. Bad debt was assumed to be 8 percent, and Charter Care or free care, 1.5 percent. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable and is supported by the protestants' current experience with commercial insurance utilization and reimbursement and the predicted recoveries if RTCPB were IRTP-licensed. In the second year of operation, the assumptions with regard to utilization by class of pay demonstrated an increase in the insurance category from 65.5 to 66.5 percent with everything else remaining the same except for a decrease in bad debt to 7 percent. The assumption with regard to a decrease in bad debt is based upon the establishment of referral patterns from acute psychiatric facilities, outpatient programs, mental health therapists, and miscellaneous programs. The assumption is that 65 percent of the patients would be covered by insurance, not that 65 percent of each bill would be paid by insurance. Charter's experience has been that a good portion of the deductible and co-insurance payments are collectible. FRTC did not assume payment from any governmental contracts or HRS reimbursement. FRTC's projected self pay percentages assumption reasonably contemplates the percentage of households in the district which can afford its projections for self pay. For purposes of evaluating the financial feasibility of this proposal, a management fee was not included because in looking at the financial feasibility of a facility the expenses of a corporate home office are incurred whether or not the facility is built. It was not appropriate to allocate a management fee to the hospital because it showed a loss in its first year of operation and a profit in its second. When the facility becomes profitable, FRTC anticipates passing the profit through to the corporation to help reduce the corporate overhead. If a management fee had been allocated to this facility, allocations would have had to have been made to the other Charter facilities to show where their management expense had decreased and their profitability increased. It would have been inappropriate to take these fixed expenses and allocate a portion of them to the proposed FRTC facility. In addition to the fact that the failure to include a management fee in the pro forma should not affect the feasibility of the project, Charter has good cause not to apply a $44 per patient day management fee in its IRTP. FRTC's categories of payor class are generally reasonable based in part on the results of a survey performed in Florida. FRTC's assumptions and calculations are reasonable, based upon the testimony of William S. Love and Dr. Ronald Luke, notwithstanding the testimony of Dan Sullivan, Donald Wilson, and Christopher Knepper, also qualified as experts. Specifically, it is found that Dr. Luke's assessment that the designation of a facility as a licensed specialty hospital has a beneficial effect on its ability to obtain insurance reimbursement for services, that reimbursement impacts to increase ALOS, and that the breakdown of sources of payment that FRTC has used is reasonable, is a credible assessment, supported elsewhere in the record. It is also found that Mr. Knepper's assessment for bad debt is inadequately supported and inconsistent with other evidence, and therefore not credible. Mr. Sullivan's testimony is not persuasive. Staffing and Recruitment Dr. Brett, a Charter regional director for hospital operations, was accepted as an expert in staffing psychiatric facilities including residential treatment centers. His distinctions between the acute care and residential types of facilities are corroborated and explained by other witnesses and evidence. Mr. Joyner was accepted as Charter's expert recruiter. Although the depth of Mr. Joyner's hands-on involvement in active recruitment is not extensive, the Charter network of manpower referrals and "head hunting" will obviously support this project. Upon the combined testimony of Dr. Brett, Mr. Joyner, and Paul Bodner, Charter's senior director of physician relations, there is sufficient evidence that FRTC can recruit a suitable staffing pattern to ensure quality of care (see FOF Nos. 9 and 10) in its proposed program, even if it has to hire from out of state and pay somewhat higher salaries due to some qualified manpower shortages in certain categories in Palm Beach County. In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the testimony of Donald Wilson concerning certain institution-specific recruiting problems of his principal, RTCPB, and the "step down" status of residential treatment as testified by Mary Certo, of Humana. Impact on Costs and Competition The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to attract patients with insurance coverage who would otherwise go to existing facilities for care, however, in light of the relatively consistent occupancy rates at Humana and RTCPB despite both their geographical proximity and the unique confusion of referrals arising over the relocation of Dr. Kelly, this impact is not altogether clear. Dr. Kelly's reputation will not be impacted by granting of a CON to FRTC. It is also not possible upon the basis of the record created in this hearing to factor out reimbursement differences inherent in Humana's current CON classification and RTCPB's circumstance as an unlicensed intensive residential treatment center. In any case, the negative impact upon Humana must be measured against the health planning goals expressed by several witnesses that it is desirable to substitute more suitable, less restrictive facilities for institutionalization of the severely emotionally disturbed child and adolescent whenever possible and that it is also desirable to encourage residential treatment upon a continuum of care basis after acute psychiatric care. The FRTC project will obviously increase the accessibility to this type of treatment for young people who have the appropriate insurance coverage. These goals are in conformity with the applicable health plans. The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to initially increase some costs of health services throughout the district because it will inflate some salary costs due to competition, but the negative impact will probably be short term.
Recommendation Upon a balanced consideration of all relevant criteria it is RECOMMENDED that HRS enter a Final Order approving FRTC's CON application for an IRTP, as updated, for licensure as a specialty hospital. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2037 & 87-2050 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., with regard to the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) of FRTC: Covered in "issue" and FOF 1. Covered in FOF 1 and 2. 3-7. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 8. Accepted in FOF 12. 9-12. Except as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative, accepted in FOF 7-9. 13. Accepted in FOF 10. 14-17. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 7-11, 30. Although portions of the underlying data referred to in proposal 16 and by Mr. Joyner in his testimony was excluded from evidence, he was qualified as a recruitment expert and for the reasons set forth in FOF 30, his opinion is accepted. 18-19. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 23. Accepted in FOF 24. Accepted in FOF 25 and 29. Accepted in FOF 26 and 29. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, covered in FOF 27. Except as mere argument or statement of position, accepted in FOF 26-27, and 29. 27-29. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 26-29. 30-31. Accepted in FOF 28. 32-40. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 9, 11, 21, 26-29. 41-44. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 29-32. 45-47. Rejected, as recital or summation of testimony and as part of preliminary agency review not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 48. Covered in FOF 7, 18-20, 22, and 26. 49-52. dejected as set out in "organic law and legislative background," "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15. See also COL. 53. Accepted in FOF 16. 54-58. Rejected in part and accepted in part as set out in FOF 14-15. Rejected where not supported in full by the record as a whole, where subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found and where mere recital of testimony. 59. Accepted in principle and modified to conform to the record in FOF 18-20, 31. 60-61. Accepted in part and rejected in part as stated in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and in FOF 14-16 and the COL. Accepted in FOF 15 and COL. Accepted in FOF 18-20, 31. 64-68. Rejected as unnecessary to the facts as found in FOF 1, 7, 13-15 and 29, also in part as not supported by the record as a whole, and as primarily legal argument and recitation of testimony. Accepted in FOF 3-4 and 30. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 3-4, 7, 26, and 29. 71-74. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9 and 30-32. HRS' Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): 1-3. Accepted in "organic law and legislative background." 4. (Two paragraphs) Accepted FOF 3-4. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. Accepted, FOF 29-32. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted, FOF 1. 10-18 & 20. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5, 6, 15, 26, 31. 19. Rejected as irrelevant. 21-28. Accepted in part as modified to conform to the record as a whole in FOF 6-9, 30-31. The irrelevant, unnecessary or subordinate material has also been rejected. 29-31. Accepted in FOF 4, 9, 21, 26, 29-31. 32-35. Accepted in FOF 7-9. 36-41. Accepted in FOF 7-9 as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application, in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 42-45. Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 9-11, 21, 23, 30 and 32. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 22, 26. 49-52. Accepted in FOF 3, 4, 21-29. Assuming, based on the transcript reference, that this proposal refers to FRTC's pro forma, this proposal is accepted but unnecessary for the reasons set forth in rulings on HRS' PFOF 36-45. See FOF 11 and 21-29. Accepted in FOF 13-15. 55-58. Rejected as unnecessary. 59. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 13-15. 60-62. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-14, as mere recital of testimony and statements of position. 63. Accepted in FOF 29. 64-65. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Accepted in FOF 7-9. Accepted that HRS made this assumption but it fails to explicate the non-rule policy. See FOF 13-14. Accepted in FOF 16. Rejected as a statement of position or COL. Peripherally, see COL. Accepted in FOF 13-14 but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. Rejected in FOF 13-14. 72-74. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 75-76. Accepted in FOF 17-20. This is a subordinate definition and not a FOF. See FOF 30-31 and COL. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 17-20, 31. Accepted in FOF 10. Accepted in FOF 13-15. Accepted as stated in the "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15 and in the COL. 82-85. Covered in FOF 3-6, 13-15. 86. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 87-88. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary. 89. Accepted in FOF 29. 90-96. Accepted as modified to conform to the record evidence as a whole and FOF 15-16 and to reject subordinate and unnecessary material. Accepted without any connotations of the word "therefore" in FOF 4, 7-9, 21 and 29. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Accepted in "organic and legislative background" and FOF 13-15. Rejected as not established upon the record as a whole; unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of position only. Joint Proposed Findings of Fact of RTCPB and Humana 1-2 Accepted in FOF 1. 3-4. Accepted in FOF 2. 5-6. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. 7. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 5-6. 8-13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as set out under "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 3-6, 13-15, and the COL. 14-18. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 1, 7-9, 11, 21-29. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant preliminary action to this de novo proceeding. 28-36. Rejected in part and accepted in part upon the compelling competent, substantial evidence in the record as a whole as set forth in FOF 13-14. Also as to 33 see FOF 15. 37-52. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-16 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence of record as a whole. Irrelevant, unnecessary and subordinate material has been rejected, as has mere argument of counsel. Accepted in FOF 17. Rejected in FOF 20, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 20, 31. Excepting the mere rhetoric, accepted in FOF 18, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 7, 18-20, 26, 31. 58-59. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 17-20, 26, Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as recital of testimony and argument 62-63. Rejected as unnecessary. 64-67. Accepted in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The first sentence is rejected as cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. Rejected in FOF 4, 21. Accepted in FOF 4 and 21, 29. Rejected as unnecessary Accepted in FOF 26. Rejected in FOF 15-20, 31. Rejected as unnecessary in a noncomparitive hearing. 75-87. Except as irrelevant, unnecessary, or subordinate, accepted in FOF 5-9, 30, 31. Rejected in part as unnecessary and in part as not comporting with the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 7-10 and 30. Accepted in FOF 1, 5-9. 90-92. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Rejected in FOF 5-6. Rejected as subordinate. 95-98. Accepted in FOF 5-9. 99-102. Rejected as unnecessary. 103. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9. 104-118. Except as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, these proposals are covered in FOF 5-9, 30-31. Except as Subordinate, covered in FOF 6 and 31. Accepted in part in FOF 5-9, 21-29, otherwise rejected as misleading. Except as subordinate, accepted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 21-29. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 21-29. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary in part and not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in 21-29. 127-128. These proposals primarily recite testimony by Mr. Grono, an administrator of a psychiatric hospital for very severely disturbed persons (Grant Center). This evidence by itself is not persuasive in light of Dr. Luke's study and other admissions of the parties referenced in FOF 21-29. Upon the greater weight of contrary evidence, it is rejected. 129. Rejected as subordinate except partly accepted in FOF 29. 130-133. Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 9, 11 and 21-29. 134, 139. Rejected as legal argument without citation. 135-138. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 140-144. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence and as partly mere legal argument. See FOF 9, 21-29. 145. The first sentence is rejected upon the reference to PFOF 140-144 for the same reasons given above and the remainder is rejected as subordinate. 146. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 147. Rejected as mere legal argument without citation. 148-149. Rejected in FOF 21-29, particularly 27 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. The mere legal argument is also rejected. 150-157. Rejected as set out in FOF 28 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Uncited argument and statements of position have likewise bean rejected. 158, 160. Rejected as mere argument without citation. 159. Rejected as subordinate and not dispositive of any material issue at bar in FOF 23. 161. Rejected as mere argument. 162-167. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in FOF 30-32. Also 167 is rejected as mere argument without citation. 168. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 30-32. 169. Accepted but subordinate. 170. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 31. 171-180. Covered in FOF 30-32. 181-185. Rejected as contrary to the evidence in part and in part unnecessary and cumulative to the ruling in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 7, 10-11, 21, 23, 30-32. 186-188. Rejected in FOF 7, 10 and 30 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. 189. Rejected as unnecessary 190. Rejected in FOF 30. 191-392. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 30-32. 193. Rejected in FOF 30-32. 194-195. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, rejected in the several references to future establishment of referral networks. See FOF 21, 27. 196-197 & 199. Rejected as unnecessary 198. Rejected as irrelevant in part and immaterial in part upon the rulings in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 200. Rejected as unnecessary 201-202. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 26-27 and 31, but cumulative. 203. Covered in the COL. Rejected in FOF 21-22. 204. Rejected as mere argument without citation. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire BONNER & O'CONNEL 900 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 James C. Hauser, Esquire Joy Heath Thomas, Esquire MESSER, VICKERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN 215 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred W Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LaFACE & RICHARD 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Stipulation and Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached stipulation and agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the 1i f- day of CJcfi>bA,y- , 2009, in Tallahassee, Florida. Filed October 12, 2009 11:38 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DOAH Cases No. 09-0355MPI and 09-0359RU AHCA v. HEARTLAND and HEARTLAND v. AHCA Final Order w-JL H?LLY BENSON, sbARY Agency for Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Debora E. Fridie, Esq. Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) William M. Furlow, III, Esquire Metzger, Grossman, Furlow & Bayo, LLC 1408 North Piedmont Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (U.S. Mail) The Honorable Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (U.S. Mail) Kenneth Yon, Bureau Chief, MPI Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Peter H. Williams, Inspector General Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Finance and Accounting Agency for Health Care Administration Page 2 of3 DOAH Cases No. 09-0355MPI and 09-0359RU AHCA v. HEARTLAND and HEARTLAND v. AHCA Final Order CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail and/or Interoffice Mail on this the / y of Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Page 3 of3 7 /i 7 /2009 1::.a PH Fl\OM: 863-J8f,-8t44 Heartland Int •·n;,l Med TO: 1- ;.o-:,ss-1953 PAGE: 002 OF 011 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION PF ADMfN!STRATIVE 1-mARfNGS
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Proposed Rule 10- 5.005(2), Florida Administrative Code, as promulgated by DHRS constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Based upon the following findings of fact, conclusions and analysis, proposed Rule 10-5.005(2)(a) and (b) is invalid.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. DHRS' Office of Health Planning and Development is divided into two separate divisions: The Office of Community Medical Facilities, which administers the State Certificate of Need Program and has responsibility for making recommendations regarding CON applications, and (2) the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning, which has primary responsibility for development of rules pertaining to Certificate of Need policy. Mr. Robert Maryanski, Administrator of the Office of Community Medical Facilities, believes his office made no formal comments (perhaps informal comments,) concerning the proposed rule. Mr. Maryanski considered that the proposed rule was objectionable based on his understanding of the statutes. (TR 33, 54). Elfie Stamm is employed by the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning and has primary responsibility for development of Proposed Rule 10-5.005. The text of the proposed rule is as follows: 10-5.005 Exemptions. * * * (2)(a) Physician offices or physician group practices which do not exist for the primary purpose of providing elective surgical care are exempt from certificate of need requirements for ambulatory surgical centers as specified in 10-5.011(30). This certificate of need exemption applies to offices and associated surgical suites maintained by one or more private physicians or a physician group which is used only by the physician or the physicians of the group practice, and in which 50 percent or more of the patients treated annually are non-surgical patients. (b) Physician offices, or physician group practices applying for designation as an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and who meet the requirements for exemption from certificate of need review under the provisions delineated under paragraph (2), shall submit a request for exemption from certificate of need to the Department. The physician office or physician group practice shall provide the Department with at least 30 day's written notice of the proposed exemption from the certificate of need requirements for ambulatory surgical centers. Within 30 days of receipt of such written notice, the Department shall determine if the physician office or physician group practice is exempt and advise the applicant of its determination in writing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). The proposed rule exempts physician offices and physician group practices from CON requirements for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) when at least 50 percent of the patients treated annually in these facilities are non- surgical patients. The proposed rule purportedly implements the Federal Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) policy allowing physician offices which are exempt from State CON and licensure requirements to apply directly (to HCFA) to receive ASC designation for medical facility reimbursement purposes without first obtaining a CON. Currently, "Ambulatory Surgical Center" means a facility, the primary purpose of which is to provide elective surgical care and in which the patient is admitted to and discharged from such facility within the same working day and which is not part of a hospital. However, a facility existing for the primary purpose of performing therapeutic abortions, an office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine, or an office maintained for the practice of dentistry shall not be construed to be an ASC. Section 395.002(2), Florida Statutes (1985). DHRS is trying to implement what it believes to be a statutory CON exemption for doctor's offices through the proposed rule. In so doing, HRS considers physicians' offices to be indistinguishable from physician group practices. In this regard, the relevant statutes do not reference physician group practices. Historically, HRS would not certify physician offices as medicare providers (in its role as surveyor for HCFA) because such certification entails the requirement that a physician's office comply with the State ASC Law. In short, a physician's office wishing to become an ASC had to satisfy both CON and State licensure requirements in order to be certified as a medicare providing ASC. Prior to promulgation of the proposed rule, DHRS never had a policy that group practices or physicians with operating suites are excluded from the statutory definition of an ASC. DHRS has no exemptions or exclusions for physicians' groups with surgical suites so that they could become ASCs for medicare certification. (Testimony of Tom Porter, previous supervisor for DHRS' Certificate of Need Program). DHRS took the position that it was without authority to grant an exemption to physician group practices and the related offices as an associated surgical suite without such facility having first obtained a CON as an ASC prior to offering such services. DHRS also took the position that a physician wishing to do minor surgical procedures as a sub-part of his office practice would not be required to obtain a CON as an ASC. These services could be done as an ancillary part of the physician's office. (Testimony of Gene Nelson, former Administrator, Office of Comprehensive Health Planning and Administrator of the Office of Community Medical Facilities prior to Mr. Maryanski's tenure with DHRS). Section 381.495, Florida Statutes, provides for several defined exemptions from CON review. As stated above, the proposed rule purports to grant an exemption to physician offices or to physician group practices from State CON requirements. Section 381.493 (3)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), states, in relevant part, that an office maintained by a physician for the practice of medicine is excluded from the definition of an ASC. The referenced statute does not grant an exemption from the ASC regulation nor has DHRS previously exempted a person or entity from CON review under such circumstances. DHRS has historically distinguished between a physician performing minor surgical procedures as an ancillary part of his office versus a full service ASC. HCFA clarified in Memorandum FQA-731, Ambulatory Surgical Center regulations relating to compliance with state licensure requirements and the application of state CON provisions as a prerequisite for medicare certification. (Pet. Exh. 8) In states where ASC licensure laws are in effect, facilities seeking to participate in medicare must meet such licensure requirements. Thus, 42 CFR Section 416.40 states, in pertinent part, that the ASC must comply with state licensure requirements. CON provisions must be met as a prerequisite for medicare licensure certification for an entity to operate legally within a state and CON approval is required before the decision to award a license is made. In instances where licensure is not required either by virtue of the absence of an ASC Licensure Law or the exemption of certain entities from the licensure law, compliance with CON provisions is not necessary for medicare eligibility as an ASC. It is through a series of correspondence between Mr. Robert Streimer of HCFA and Mr. Marshall Kelley, DHRS' Assistant Secretary for Program Planning that affords the proffered "basis" for the proposed rule. (TR 87). The Streimer letter provides that ASC services performed in a physician's office which is not required by state law to be licensed as an ASC and which meets all medicare ASC requirements would be covered and reimbursed by medicare at the ASC rate. As noted, DHRS historically took a different position. Nowhere in Mr. Kelley's letter to Mr. Streimer did HRS identify the specific criteria that would relate to an exemption request in Florida as currently stated in the proposed rule. DHRS, based on the proposed rule, now takes the position that any physician having a operating room and furnishing surgical procedures for less than 50 percent of his or her patients would be entitled to an exemption from CON requirements and in turn be entitled to apply for certification from HCFA as an ASC for ASC reimbursement (facility fee). The proposed rule allows for surgery currently performed in a physician's office to qualify for higher reimbursement from medicare (i.e., a facility fee). DHRS uses as authority for the proposed rule, Section 381.493(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Prior to receipt of Streimer's letter, DHRS considered HCFA's policy to be that if a facility did not have a CON and was not licensed as an ASC, there would be no medicare certification forthcoming from HCFA. The Streimer letter purportedly clarifies HCFA's policy although it does not represent a change in that policy. (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). The proposed rule defines "primary as 50 percent or more of the patients treated annually as being non-surgical patients. However, according to the 1982 federal regulations, an entity seeking application and certification as a medicare ASC must be dedicated exclusively to the provision of Ambulatory Surgical Services (42 CFR Section 416.2). Federal Rules provide that the requirement for ASC's to be certified in order to receive medicare payments was expected to exclude physicians offices. There appears to be no federal regulation dealing with reimbursement for the surgical procedures which are to be done in physicians' offices. To satisfy HCFA's certification requirements, an applicant must satisfy the relevant state licensure requirements if any, and meet federal certification requirements. As presently codified, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy the proposed rule and the federal ASC definition contained in 42 CFR Section 416.02. Thus, an entity could not "exclusively" provide ASC services and at the same time not exist for the "primary" purpose of providing elective surgical care on an outpatient basis. They are mutually exclusive since the two definitions are inconsistent. The Streimer letter initiated HRS's evaluation of current statutes and the proposed rule is, according to HRS, designed to implement current statutes. HCFA's policy is that if a facility legally provides or is allowed to provide elective surgical procedures in Florida, without having to be licensed as an ASC or having gone through the CON process, it is inappropriate to require the facility to obtain a CON and be licensed as an ASC as a condition of that facility being approved for medicare reimbursement at the ASC rate. Prior to HCFA's correspondence, HCFA required an applicant for medicare ASC certification to meet State Law and also meet its certification requirements. This is still the case and the HCFA's correspondence to DHRS did not change that requirement. The purpose of the Health Facility and Health Services Planning Act, more commonly known as the CON law, (sometimes called the Act) is to protect the public health, safety and welfare of Floridians. These protections are further defined as a necessary increase in health care, minimizing duplication in health services, and minimizing situations where there is an underutilization of existing health care resources. The proposed rule does not relate to or otherwise address any "need" issue or capacity issue and contrary thereto, allows for uncontrolled growth of surgery suites as long as the physician group practice has 50 percent or more of total patients treated as non-surgical patients. It can be expected that there will be a proliferation of physicians, solo or group practices, with physician surgical practices developing in addition to hospital out-patient surgery. Additionally, there is no physical constraint on the location of the physician and a physician's group practice. Adoption of the proposed rule will also increase the cost of the total health care system in Florida as follows: The average cost per procedure increases when procedures are spread out over a greater number of fixed facilities and because of incentives that would be inherent in this additional capacity for additional unnecessary utilization. Physicians would receive a facility fee in addition to a professional fee. Physicians would thereby receive more money for doing the same procedures they are currently doing in their offices without the facility fee. The effect of the introduction of surgery centers where there is already excess capacity in hospitals and in freestanding surgery centers is to increase the cost of health care to the community. With the addition of new facilities, there are added fixed costs placed into the system that would remain until the facility becomes outmoded. With the addition of fewer procedures spread over more fixed costs, the average cost per procedure likewise increases even though the cost to an individual patient might appear to be lower in an alternative setting. Excess capacity leads to underutilization with the resultant increase in the rates for surgery. Without a capacity constraint, there will be more elective surgery performed. With the approval of the proposed rule, a doctor's office will be eligible for medicare reimbursement for a facility fee. Medicare reimbursement for a facility fee is unique to ASCs and does not apply to surgical procedures performed in a doctor's office. The purpose behind reimbursing for facility fees is that there is considerable overhead associated with performing relatively complex surgical procedures which require an operating room. If procedures are so simple as to be safely performed in a doctor's office, the intent of the rule is to distinguish between these two settings. It is desirable for procedures to be done in a doctor's office that are simple because it is the lower cost setting. Procedures performed in a physician's office will not qualify for the facility fee reimbursement and overhead payment because of the simplistic nature of the procedures and the lack of need for sophisticated equipment which is currently being used in ASCs. The federal regulations were intended to remove hospital surgery to ASCs, if appropriate, and to remove minor surgery to doctors' offices in order to avoid reimbursement for procedures which can be done in a less sophisticated setting. If more procedures are shifted to medicare certified ASCs, there would be an additional facility fee and physicians would be eligible for this reimbursement. An example of the operational effect of the proposed rule is the scenario surrounding Doctor Stephen S. Spector and the Presidential Eye Surgery Center in Palm Beach County. Doctor Spector was denied a CON for an ASC based on a lack of need for additional operating suites in Palm Beach County. After DHRS made its initial decision denying Dr. Spector's CON, he petitioned for a formal administrative hearing. A Recommended Order was entered denying Dr. Spector a CON and HRS then issued a Final Order denying a CON to Dr. Spector. Dr. Spector has since simply requested an exemption for a freestanding ASC pursuant to the proposed rule. DHRS will entertain this request and if granted, Dr. Spector will be entitled to medicare certification and a facility fee for surgical procedures performed in his office. The proposed rule will encourage the massive proliferation of outpatient surgery facilities and outpatient surgery suites. 3/ Evidence adduced at final hearing indicates that CON approved and licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers are currently underutilized and not operating at optimal capacity. The result will be increased hospital and ASC costs per unit because fixed costs must then be spread over a smaller patient base. It is likely that there will be underutilization of existing facilities. The proposed rule does not foster the purposes of Florida's CON law and it will not restrain increases in health care costs. The proposed rule will enhance or maximize unnecessary duplication and promote underutilization of existing resources. Pursuant to Section 120.54(2), Florida Statutes (1985), the Department is required to prepare an economic impact statement of the proposed rule. For the proposed rule, HRS states, in part, in its economic impact statement as follows: The proposed amendment is expected to have an economic impact on hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgical centers licensed by the State. It is expected that some Medicare patients who previously have been referred to hospital outpatient departments or a freestanding ambulatory surgical center licensed by the State may have their elective surgeries performed in the physician's group practice. In addition, the proposed rule may encourage the development of physician group practices with surgical suites since they are exempted from the certificate of need process and State licensure requirements. The fiscal impact on hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers cannot be estimated since the Department has no data regarding the number of potential applicants under this Rule, the location of those applicants, the volume of surgeries which may be performed by these entities, or the number of surgeries which would have been performed in hospital outpatient departments or State licensed ambulatory surgical centers in the absence of these new entities. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). The economic impact statement for the proposed rule does not provide any data or method used in making the required economic impact estimates. The statement does not include any data to analyze whether the rule will impact ASCs having less than one million dollars net worth and less than 25 employees or whether the proposed rule will have an economic impact on hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. Although HRS has indicated that the exact amount of the fiscal impact is impossible to estimate due to the unknowns respecting the number of physician offices or group practices that will qualify for the exemptions and therefore no analysis was undertaken or developed, studies could have been made to determine the effect any level of participation would have on hospital costs and utilization of existing facilities. Although the task of compiling such data would, no doubt, be arduous, evidence adduced at final hearing indicates that DHRS could have, with effort, compiled a data base with a stratified sample which would have been reliable and could forecast the likely effect of the proposed rule within an acceptable margin of error. DHRS did not compile data which would provide an estimate as to the number of patients who would choose the physician's office over other facilities that perform Ambulatory Surgery. DHRS never requested input from hospitals or outpatient surgery centers with respect to pay or patient mix. DHRS conducted no surveys with respect to the number of potential applicants under the proposed rule. DHRS considered it not relevant to examine the capacity of existing freestanding surgery centers or hospitals having outpatient surgery facilities. DHRS conducted no studies to determine the accessibility of existing ASCs and hospital ASCs. No studies were done to examine the impact, as to the cost to patients, that the proposed rule is likely to have on existing providers. No studies were done to assess the impact the proposed rule will have on the medicare trust fund. No studies were done to determine the impact, if any, on Florida small and minority businesses. It is true that a great deal of the needed data was not readily available to HRS whereas, on the other hand, it made no attempt to gather such data. DHRS has the ability to assess the number of surgeries that could be performed in hospital outpatient departments and ASC's since DHRS does such compilations on a day to day basis when it projects the need for new ASCs. DHRS could have commissioned studies to determine the effect any level of participation would have on hospital costs and utilization. Development of an adequate data base and a meaningful economic impact of the proposed rule is paramount in view of the legislative mandate (to DHRS) to contain health care costs. Rules are promulgated to further the purpose and objective of the statutes they implement. To accomplish this, they must be consistent with the statute. Here, the purpose of the statute is cost containment. Evidence adduced at final hearing reveals, without contradiction, that the proposed rule will increase health care costs, contrary to the major purpose for its existence. Finally, DHRS compiled no data as to the impact on the ability of hospitals to provide indigent care under the proposed rule. As example, Florida Hospital projects that it will provide $48,000,000 in uncompensated care for fiscal year 1986. If the hospital were to lose revenue as result of this proposed rule, the level of indigent care will also correspondingly be reduced in order to offset the loss of revenue. Other parties herein provide services to indigent persons. The proposed rule does not require these exempt facilities to provide indigent care. In addition to the above economic impact which will be brought about by the proposed rule on the Health Care system as a whole, the proposed rule will have an economic impact on the existing hospitals and ASC's. (TR 276-277; 438-440). As example, one Petitioner herein advises that if one surgery suite were added by an existing physician group or formed near the hospital, the hospital will lose approximately $481,000 per annum. By letter dated August 29, 1986, DHRS forwarded a copy of the purposed rule to the statewide and local health councils requesting comments by September 12, 1986. The public hearing on the proposed rule was scheduled for October 20, 1986. Neither health council (state or local) participated in the public hearing for the proposed rule nor has either council submitted comments respecting the proposed rule. The notice provided to the local and statewide health councils for comments on the proposed rule was adequate and afforded the various councils an opportunity to voice any concerns or provide input about the proposed rule. Dr. Montgomery, an Intervenor herein, will receive additional medicare reimbursements of $500.00 per patient for a facility fee under the proposed rule. Dr. Montgomery approximated that he performed 320 cataract surgeries per year of which approximately 300 patients are paying patients. Approximately 85 percent of those patients are over 65. Therefore, Dr. Montgomery will receive medicare reimbursement for 255 patients or approximately $127,500.00 in additional fees if his office is certified as exempt under the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Based upon an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, and a later addendum, petitioner received Certificate of Need Number 1460 in February of 1981 granting the petitioner the authority to construct 126 additional general medical/surgical beds but to only license and operate 72 of such beds. The instant proceeding involves petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to license and operate the remaining 54 beds which have been previously constructed under Certificate of Need Number 1460. St. Joseph's Hospital is a 649-bed full service major referral hospital in Hillsborough County owned and operated by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny. Its services include a comprehensive community mental health center, a comprehensive pediatric unit with 88 beds, a radiation therapy center, a 60- bed community cancer center, cardiac catheterization, cardiac surgery and a large and active emergency room. It serves a considerable number of indigent patients and participates in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Petitioner is now requesting permission to license the regaining 54 beds which were authorized to be constructed pursuant to Certificate of Need Number 1460. The project involves no additional construction or renovation inasmuch as all 126 beds previously authorized have been completed. No capital expenditure will be required in order to place the 54 beds into operation. If the Certificate of Need is granted, petitioner intends to create two specialty medical/surgical units: a 32-bed cardiac surgical unit to accommodate patients from the open heart surgical program and a 22-bed medical unit for psychiatric patients requiring medical treatment. There currently are no other beds available in the hospital to convert for use for the psychiatric patient or for the cardiac surgical unit. Petitioner has been operating, on occasion, at occupancy levels in excess of 90 percent. At times, it has been necessary to place non-emergency patients in the emergency room and have them remain there until beds become available. There are sometimes up to 40 patients on the waiting list for elective surgery. Due to the shortage of empty beds, petitioner cannot now admit new members to its medical staff. Steady operation of the hospital at occupancy levels exceeding 90 percent can have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the nursing staff and the quality of care offered to patients. Because the bulk of projected growth in Hillsborough County is expected to occur in the center and northwestern area of the county, it is anticipated that the pattern of utilization of petitioner's facility will continue. While the licensing of the 54 additional beds involves no capital expenditure on petitioner's part, it is estimated that, if petitioner is not permitted to license these beds, a total yearly loss of over $3.8 million will be experienced. This figure is the sum of lost net revenues from the beds in the amount of $87,339 and lost net ancillary revenues in the amount of $2.36 million, as well as the absorption of $232,750 in yearly depreciation costs and $1.14 million in committed indirect costs. Petitioner anticipates a loss per patient day, calculated at 100 percent occupancy, of $16.82 if the licensing of the beds is not approved. This would result in an increase of current patient charges by 9.1 percent in order to maintain petitioner's budgeted profit margin. Petitioner is located in HRS District VI which, at the time of the hearing, was composed of Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. Some 81 percent of all beds in the District are located in Hillsborough County. As of the time of the hearing, the District had 3,899 licensed acute care beds, with 606 additional beds having been approved but not yet operational. The generally accepted optimum utilization rate for acute care beds is 80 to 85 percent. For District VI, the overall utilization rate is below the optimum level. In Manatee County, utilization of acute care beds is at 78.3 percent. In Hillsborough County, the utilization level is at 77.4 percent, with the major referral hospitals experiencing a higher level of utilization than the smaller community hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, contains the governing methodology for determining acute care bed needs of the various Districts. Applications for new or additional acute care hospital beds in a District will not normally be approved if approval would cause the number of beds in that District to exceed the number of beds calculated to be needed. Application of the Rule's formula to District VI results in a total acute care bed need of 3,622 projected for the year 1988. Given the 4,505 existing and approved beds in the District, there are 883 excess beds in District VI under the Rule's formula methodology for projecting need. The 1982 Health Systems Plan adopted by the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency makes no bed need projections for other specialty medical/surgical beds," but shows no need for medical/surgical beds. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, provides that other criteria may result in a demonstration of bed need even when the formula approach illustrates no need for beds. When additional beds are approved pursuant to other criteria, those beds are counted in the inventory of existing and approved beds in the area when applying the bed need formula to review future projects. The formula methodology does account for the inflow and outflow of patients in a specific area. While Rule 10-5.11(23) permits the Local Health Councils to adopt subdistrict bed allocations by type of service, the Council for District VI had not adopted its local health plan as of the date of the hearing in this matter. The Rule itself simply addresses the need for general acute care bed needs in the future.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to license 54 acute care medical/surgical beds be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire David Pingree Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein Secretary One Houston Center Department of Health and Suite 1600 Rehabilitative Services Houston, Texas 77010 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner Naples Community Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to add a total of 35 beds to Naples Community Hospital and North Collier Community Hospital should be approved based on peak seasonal demand for acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict.
Findings Of Fact Naples Community Hospital, Inc., ("NCH") holds the license for and operates Naples Community Hospital ("Naples"), a 331 bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, and North Collier Community Hospital ("North Collier"), a 50 bed acute care hospital. NCH also operates a 22 bed comprehensive rehabilitation facility and a 23 bed psychiatric facility. NCH is owned by Community Health Care, Inc., "(CHC"). Both Naples and North Collier are located within Agency for Health Care Administration ("ACHA") district 8 and are the only hospitals within subdistrict 2 of the district. Naples is located in central Collier County. North Collier is (as the name implies) located in northern Collier County approximately 2-3 miles from the county line. NCH's primary service area is Collier County from which approximately 85-90 percent of its patients come, with a secondary service area extending north into Lee County. Neither Naples nor North Collier are teaching hospitals as defined by Section 407.002(27), Florida Statutes (1991). NCH is not proposing a joint venture in this CON application. NCH has a record of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. NCH proposes to provide health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Neither Naples nor North Collier are currently designated by the Office of Medicaid as disproportionate share providers. NCH has the funds for capital and initial operating expenditures for the project. NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. The costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable. The Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency charged with responsibility for administering the Certificate of Need program. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center ("Southwest") is a 400 bed for-profit acute care hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County. Lee County is adjacent to and north of Collier County. Southwest is owned by Columbia Hospital Corporation ("Columbia"), which also owns Gulf Coast Hospital in Fort Myers, and two additional hospitals in AHCA District 8. Southwest's primary service area is Lee County. Although Southwest asserts that it would be negatively impacted by the addition of acute care beds at NCH, the greater weight of the credible evidence fails to support the assertion. The primary market services areas of NCH and Southwest are essentially distinct. However, the facilities are located in such proximity as to indicate that secondary service areas overlap and that, at least during peak winter season periods, approval of the NCH application could potentially impact Southwest's operations. Southwest has standing to participate in this proceeding. Southwest offered evidence to establish that it would be substantially affected by approval of the NCH application. The NCH length-of-stay identified in the Southwest documents is inaccurate and under-reports actual length-of-stay statistics. The documentation also includes demographic information from a zip code (33912) which contributes an insignificant portion of NCH patients, and relies on only two years of data in support of the assertion that utilization in the NCH service area is declining. Southwest's chief operating officer testified that he considers Gulf Coast Hospital, another Columbia-owned facility, to offer more competition to Southwest that does NCH. Further, a physician must have admitting privileges at a hospital before she can admit patients to the facility. Of the physicians holding admitting privileges at Southwest, only two, both cardiologists, also have admitting privileges at NCH. Contrary to Southwest, NCH does not have an open heart surgery program. Accordingly, at least as to physician-admitted patients, approval of the NCH application would likely have little impact. On August 26, 1991, NCH submitted to AHCA a letter of intent indicating that NCH would file a Certificate of Need ("CON") application in the September 26, 1991 batching cycle for the addition of 35 acute care beds to the Naples and North Collier facilities. The letter of intent did not specify how the additional beds would be divided between the two facilities. The determination of the number of beds for which NCH would apply was solely based on the fact that the applicant had 35 observation beds which could be readily converted to acute care beds. The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH and are currently staffed. The costs involved in such conversion are minimal and relatively insignificant. Included with the letter of intent was a certified corporate resolution which states that on July 24, 1991, the NCH Board of Trustees authorized the filing of an application for the additional beds, authorized NCH to incur related expenses, stated that NCH would accomplish the proposed project within time and budget allowances set forth in the application, and that NCH would license and operate the facility. By certification executed August 7, 1991, the NCH secretary certified that the resolution was enacted at the July 24, 1991 board meeting and that the resolution did not contravene the NCH articles of incorporation or bylaws. Article X, Sections 10.1 and 10.1.3 of the NCH bylaws provides that no CON application shall be legally effective without the written approval of CHC. On September 26, 1991, NCH filed an application for CON No. 6797 proposing to add 31 acute care beds to Naples and 4 acute care beds to North Collier. The CON application included a copy of the NCH board resolution and certification which had been previously submitted with the letter of intent as well as the appropriate filing fee. NCH published appropriate public notice of the application's filing. As of the date of the CON application's filing, CHC had not issued written approval of the CON application prior to the action of the NCH Board of Directors and the filing of the letter of intent or the application. On October 2, 1992, four days prior to the administrative hearing in this case, the board of CHC ratified the actions of NCH as to the application for CON at issue in this case. The CHC board has previously ratified actions of the NCH in such fashion. There is uncontroverted testimony that the CHC board was aware of the NCH application and that no reservation was expressed by any CHC board member regarding the CON application. Although NCH's filing of the CON application without appropriate authorization from its parent company appears to be in violation of the NCH bylaws, such does not violate the rules of the AHCA. There is no evidence that the AHCA requested written authorization from the CHC board. After review of the application, the AHCA identified certain deficiencies in the application and notified NCH, which apparently rectified the deficiencies. The AHCA deemed the application complete on November 8, 1991. As required by statute, NCH included a list of capital projects as part of the CON application. The list of capital projects attached to the application was incomplete. The capital projects list failed to identify approximate expenditures of $370,000 to construct a patio enclosure, $750,000 to install an interim sprinkler system, $110,000 to construct emergency room triage space, and $125,000 to complete electrical system renovations. At hearing, witnesses for NCH attempted to clarify the omissions from the capital projects list. The witnesses claimed that such omitted projects were actually included within projects which were identified on the list. When identifying the listed projects within which the omitted projects were supposedly included, the witnesses testified inconsistently. For example, one witness testified that the patio project was included in the emergency room expansion project listed in the application. Another witness claimed that the patio enclosure was included in an equipment purchase category. Based on the testimony, it is more likely that the patio enclosure was neither a part of an emergency room expansion nor equipment purchase, but was a separate construction project which was omitted from the CON application. Similarly inconsistent explanations were offered for the other projects which were omitted from the capital projects list. The testimony was not credible. The capital projects omitted from the list do not affect the ability of NCH to implement the CON sought in this proceeding. The parties stipulated to the fact the NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. As part of the CON application, NCH was required to submit a pro forma income statement for the time period during which the bed additions would take place. The application failed to include a pro forma statement for the appropriate time period. Based on the stipulation of the parties that the costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable, and that NCH has adequate resources to fund the project, the failure to include the relevant pro forma is immaterial. Pursuant to applicable methodology, the AHCA calculates numeric acute care bed need projections for each subdistrict's specific planning period. Accordingly, the AHCA calculated the need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2 for the July, 1996 planning horizon. The results of the calculation are published by the agency. The unchallenged, published fixed need pool for the planning horizon at issue in this proceeding indicated that there was no numeric need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2, Collier County, Florida, pursuant to the numeric need methodology under Rule 59C-1.038 Florida Administrative Code. The CON application filed by NCH is based on the peak seasonal demand experienced by hospitals in the area during the winter months, due to part-time residents. NCH asserts that the utilization of acute care beds during the winter months (January through April) results in occupancy levels in excess of 75 percent and justifies the addition of acute care beds, notwithstanding the numerical need determination. Approval of the CON application is not justified by the facts in this case. The AHCA's acute care bed need methodology accounts for high seasonal demand in certain subdistricts in a manner which provides that facilities have bed space adequate to accommodate peak demand. The calculation which requires that the average annual occupancy level exceed 75 percent reflects AHCA consideration of occupancy levels which rise and fall with seasonal population shifts. The applicant has not challenged the methodology employed by the AHCA in projecting need. Peak seasonal acute care bed demand may justify approval of a CON application seeking additional beds if the lack of available beds poses a credible threat of potentially negative impact on patient outcomes. The peak seasonal demand experienced by NCH has not adversely affected patient care and there is insufficient evidence to establish that, at this time, such peak demand poses a credible threat of potential negative impact on patient outcomes in the foreseeable future. There is no dispute regarding the existing quality of care at Naples, North Collier, Southwest or any other acute care hospital in district 8. The parties stipulated that NCH has the ability to provide quality of care and a record of providing quality of care. In this case, the applicant is seeking to convert existing beds from a classification of "observation" to "acute care". The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH. Approval of the CON application would result in no net increase in the number of licensed beds. NCH offered anecdotal evidence suggesting that delays in transferring patients from the Naples emergency room to acute care beds (a "logjam") was caused by peak seasonal occupancy rates. There was no evidence offered as to the situation at the North Collier emergency room. The anecdotal evidence is insufficient to establish that "logjams" (if they occur at all) are related to an inadequate number of beds identified as "acute care" at NCH facilities. There are other factors which can result in delays in moving patients from emergency rooms to acute care beds, including facility discharge patterns, delays in obtaining medical test results and staffing practices. NCH asserted at hearing that physicians who refer patients to NCH facilities will not refer such patients to other facilities. The evidence fails to establish that such physician practice is reasonable or provides justification for approval of CON applications under "not normal" circumstances and further fails to establish that conditions at NCH are such as to result in physicians attempting to locate other facilities in which to admit patients. The rule governing approval of acute care beds provides that, prior to such approval, the annual occupancy rate for acute care beds in the subdistrict or for the specific provider, must exceed 75 percent. This requirement has not been met. Applicable statutes require that, in considering applications for CON's, the AHCA consider accessibility of existing providers. The AHCA- established standard provides that acute care bed accessibility requirements are met when at least 90 percent of the residents in an urban subdistrict are within a 30 minute automobile trip to such facilities. At least 90 percent of Naples residents are presently within a 30 minute travel time to NCH acute care beds. The number of acute care beds in the subdistrict substantially exceed the demand for such beds. Additional beds would result in inefficient utilization of existing beds, would further increase the current oversupply of beds, would delay the time at which need for additional beds may be determined and, as such, would prevent competing facilities from applying for and receiving approval for such beds. The financial feasibility projections set forth in the CON application rely on assumptions as to need and utilization projections which are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence and are not credited. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that the addition of 35 acute care beds to NCH facilities is financially feasible in the long term or that the income projections set forth in the CON application are reasonable. As to projections related to staffing requirements and costs, the beds are existing and are currently staffed on a daily, shift-by-shift basis, based on patient census and acuity of illness. There is reason to believe that the staffing patterns will remain fairly constant and accordingly the projections, based on historical data, are reasonable. Generally stated, where there is no numeric or "not normal" need for the proposed addition of 35 acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict, it could be predicted that the addition of acute care beds would exacerbate the oversupply of available beds and could cause a slight reduction in the occupancy levels experienced by other providers. In this case, the market service areas are sufficiently distinct as to suggest that such would not necessarily be the result. However, based on the lack of need justifying approval of the CON application under any existing circumstances, it is unnecessary to address in detail the impact on existing providers. The state and district health plans identify a number of preferences which should be considered in determining whether a CON application should be approved. The plans suggest that such preferences are to be considered when competing CON applications are reviewed. In this case there is no competing application and the applicability of the preferences is unclear. However, in any event, application of the preferences to this proposal fail to support approval of the application.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered DENYING the application of Naples Community Hospital, Inc., for Certificate of Need 6797. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of March, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1510 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3-4, 6-8, 16-20, 29-36, 38, 41, 44, 47, 49-61, 80, 88, 95-96, 100, 104, 108, 117-119, 122-125, 127, 134-138. Rejected as unnecessary. 15. Rejected as irrelevant. Peak seasonal demand is accounted for by the numeric need determination methodology. There is no credible evidence which supports a calculation of three years of four month winter occupancy to reach a 12 month average occupancy rate. 21-27, 37, 42-43, 62-64, 66, 97, 99, 101-103, 105-107, 109, 120-121, 126. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 28. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence and contrary to the stipulation filed by the parties. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the transfer of patients from emergency room to acute care beds is delayed due to numerical availability of beds. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the alleged lack of acute care beds is based on insufficient number of total beds as opposed to other factors which affect bed availability. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence which fails to establish reasonableness of considering only a four month period under "not normal" circumstances where the period and the peak seasonal demand are included within the averages utilized to project bed need. 86. Rejected as cumulative. 114. Rejected as unsupported hearsay. Respondent/Intervenor The Respondent and Intervenor filed a joint proposed recommended order. The proposed order's findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 6, 45, 51, 53, 59-67, 69-70, 94-113. Rejected as unnecessary. 16. Rejected as to use of term "false", conclusion of law. 58. Rejected as not clearly supported by credible evidence. 71-93, 114-124. Rejected as cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 W. David Watkins, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez, & Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Edward G. Labrador, Esquire Thomas Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D.C. Newton, II, Esquire Aurell, Radey, Hinkle, Thomas & Beranek Monroe Park Tower, Suite 1000 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
