The Issue The issues are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), by testing positive for marijuana; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating persons certified in Florida as law enforcement officers. On June 29, 2000, Petitioner certified Respondent as a law enforcement officer pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 192064. Petitioner had previously certified Respondent as an auxiliary law enforcement officer on November 3, 1998, pursuant to Law Enforcement Certificate number 183207. Respondent has worked continuously as an auxiliary law enforcement officer and as a law enforcement officer for the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) from November 3, 1998. Respondent performed her jobs well and had no disciplinary action prior to this proceeding. On January 30, 2002, a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for the Sheriff's Office collected a urine specimen from Respondent in a random procedure conducted pursuant to the Drug Free Workplace testing program. The LPN sealed the specimen in the presence of Respondent and stored the specimen in a refrigerator regularly used for that and other purposes. Staff for the Sheriff's Office forwarded the specimen to LabCorp at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that the LPN collected the specimen. The specimen arrived at LabCorp with the seals in tact. LabCorp would not have tested the specimen if the seals were broken. LabCorp staff observed two deficiencies in the chain of custody documents that accompanied the specimen. The collector signed as the collector but did not sign as the person who released the specimen. Nor did the chain of custody documents indicate the mode of shipment. LabCorp began testing the specimen and sent an affidavit to the LPN for her to sign. The LPN signed the affidavit, without understanding the content or purpose of the affidavit, and returned it to LabCorp. LabCorp would not have completed testing if the LPN had not returned the affidavit properly completed. LabCorp conducted an immunoassay. The specimen tested positive for propoxyphene. The reading for propoxyphene metabolite exceeded the minimum 300 required for a positive result. The specimen also tested positive for cannabinoids (marijuana). The reading for marijuana metabolite exceeded the minimum of 50 required for a positive result. LabCorp conducted a gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GCMS) to rule out a false-positive reading in the immunoassay. The specimen exceeded the minimums of 300 for propoxyphene and 15 nanograms per milliliter for marijuana. The specimen reading for marijuana was 32 nanograms per milliliter. LabCorp referred the test results to Dr. John Eustace, a certified medical review officer under contract with the Sheriff's Office to ensure the validity of test results for controlled substances. Dr. Eustace confirmed the test results and contacted Respondent. Respondent had a prescription for Darvocet. Darvocet contains propoxyphene. The Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with any violation based on propoxyphene. Respondent stated to Dr. Eustace that she was on other non-prescription pain medications. None of the pain medications would have caused a false-positive reading in the testing conducted by LabCorp. After concluding her conversation with Dr. Eustace, Respondent immediately submitted a second specimen for independent testing that was completed on February 14, 2002. The specimen did not test positive for any controlled substance. The independent test was conducted approximately 14 days after Respondent provided the original specimen. Tests may detect marijuana in chronic users for up to 14 days but generally cannot detect the drug in recreational users after three to five days. Respondent denies using marijuana and denies any willful or intentional ingestion of marijuana. The test conducted on the original specimen would have detected marijuana in Respondent's system if Respondent were to have ingested the drug unknowingly through food that she consumed or through second hand smoke. Respondent does not recall being around anyone smoking marijuana and has no knowledge of consuming food that contained marijuana. Respondent's only explanation for the positive test results is that someone tampered with the specimen tested by LabCorp. The refrigerator used to store the specimen is located in an area of the building that is not secure. Staff members of the Sheriff's Office as well as some inmates in the adjacent jail have access to the area where the refrigerator is located. Assuming arguendo that someone had access to the specimen, Respondent elicited no testimony from Petitioner's experts, and called no expert in her case, to show how those with access to the refrigerator could have added a substance to the specimen to cause it to test positive for marijuana. Nor did Respondent submit any evidence of how such tampering could have been accomplished without breaking the seal on the specimen tested by LabCorp.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4), and issuing a written reprimand in accordance with Subsection 943.1395(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Pine Scott Price, Esquire Bank of America Building 126 East Olympia Avenue Suite 405 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed certified nursing assistant, holding Florida license number 113243. On or about December 14, 2008, the Petitioner submitted to a drug screening urinalysis test at the request of an employer, Maxim Healthcare Services (Maxim). The sample was collected at a Maxim facility located at University Park, Florida. The Forensic Drug Testing Custody and Control Form and the urine sample collection container bear handwritten dates of December 13, 2008. At some point, the dates on the form and the container were overwritten to indicate that the sample was collected on December 14, 2008. According to the Respondent's Response to the Petitioner's Request for Admissions, the sample was collected on April 14, 2008. The Petitioner presented an expert witness who testified as to the testing procedures, including custody and storage of the urine samples to be tested. The expert witness' testimony regarding sample collection and transportation, calibration of equipment, sample storage and testing methodology, and reporting of test results, was persuasive and has been fully credited. According to the documentation presented by the Petitioner's expert witness, the sample collection container was received by the testing laboratory on December 15, 2008, with all transportation packaging and the sample container seal intact. According to the expert witness, the test for which Maxim paid, screened for ten drugs, including marijuana. According to the expert witness, the testing equipment was properly calibrated at the time the Respondent's urine sample was tested. The initial immunoassay test result indicated the presence of a recognized by-product of marijuana (delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid) in the Respondent's urine sample. Because the first result was positive, a second test was performed using a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry device, which confirmed the presence of delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid in the Respondent's urine sample. The Respondent denied using marijuana. The Respondent asserted that the test results were inaccurate. The Respondent testified that he had a prescription for, and was taking, hydrocodone at the time he provided the urine sample for the test at issue in this proceeding, but that the test results did not indicate the presence of hydrocodone. The Respondent asserted that the test result was either the result of lab error or that the sample was not his urine. The Petitioner's expert witness testified that the screening tests purchased by Maxim included limited testing for opiates and would not have indicated the presence of hydrocodone in the Respondent's urine. Although the Respondent testified that he had been told by Maxim personnel that the test results should have revealed the presence of hydrocodone, the Respondent's testimony in this regard was uncorroborated hearsay and was insufficient to support a finding of fact. Although the Respondent asserted that the sample tested was either not his urine or was otherwise tampered with, the evidence failed to support the assertion. There was no evidence that the sample was tampered with in any manner when the sample was obtained or during transportation to the testing laboratory. There was no evidence that the seal on the sample collection container was not intact at the time the sample was provided or transported. There was no evidence that the sample was stored improperly. There was no evidence that the testing equipment was not properly calibrated or that the tests were improperly performed. The Respondent testified, without contradiction, that over the course of 20 years in nursing work both before and after the tests at issue in this proceeding, his test results have never reported the presence of marijuana.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order assessing a fine of $250, requiring completion of an IPN evaluation, and imposing a 12-month period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Rick Garcia, MS, RN, CCM Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Patricia Dittman, Ph.D(C), RN, CDE Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Megan M. Blancho, Esquire Carla Schell, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael N. Heimur, C.N.A. 4901 South Salford Boulevard North Port, Florida 34287
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Andrew Pollock (also known as Antone Pollock), should be terminated from employment with the City of Clearwater (City) after testing positive for cocaine, while on duty, as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice (Notice) dated March 7, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Respondent began working for the City in August 2001. In November 2012 he was reclassified as a Stormwater Technician II. Pursuant to federal Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations, this position is considered a safety- sensitive position and requires that Respondent have a commercial driver's license (CDL) and that he submit to random drug testing. The City has a zero tolerance for drug and alcohol use while on the job. This is explained in the City's Drug/Alcohol Program Policy, also known as Policy No. 3401.2. See City Ex. 3, p. 5 ("Any employee covered by this policy who . . . fails an alcohol or drug test . . . will be immediately removed from active duty and subject to discipline, including termination."). Respondent signed documents acknowledging that he was given a copy of the policy and was responsible for complying with its terms and conditions. See City Ex. 1 and 2. Various rules, standards, and policies have been adopted by the City to govern the conduct of its employees. Specifically, the City has adopted a Performance and Behavior Management Program (PBMP) manual, which includes Personal Responsibility, Integrity, Excellence, and Citywide Standards. Pursuant to authority in the Code of Ordinances (Code), the Civil Service Board has adopted Rules and Regulations governing the conduct of all positions in the civil service. Relevant to this case is chapter 13, section 3, Rules and Regulations, which spells out grounds for suspending, demoting, or dismissing an employee. Also, as noted above, DOT safety regulations apply to employees such as Respondent who are performing safety-sensitive functions on the job. Finally, the City has adopted Policy 3401.2, which establishes guidelines and procedures regarding the use or abuse of illegal drugs by employees. Notably, these standards, rules, policy, and DOT regulations apply only to the use of drugs and alcohol by an employee while on duty. With certain exceptions not relevant here, there is no City prohibition against the use of drugs or alcohol while off-duty. But if an employee fails a drug test administered during regular working hours, it is presumed he is using, or under the influence of, drugs while on the job. In accordance with DOT regulations, on February 17, 2015, Respondent was selected for a random drug test and willingly submitted to the collection procedure that morning. See City Ex. 4, p. 5. Respondent acknowledges that he participated in the collection procedure on that date. The results of the test, conducted by Largo Medical Center, are shown on a copy of a barely legible Verification Report (Report) received in evidence as Exhibit 4. No individual from the testing facility testified, the Report is not signed by the medical review officer, and several significant sections in the Report are not completed or signed. Given these deficiencies, the City agrees that it does not have "admissible drug lab evidence." Tr., p. 77. Without objection the Report was offered only for the purpose of showing "what action [the City took] upon receipt of this document," and not to prove that Respondent failed the drug test. Tr., p. 18. On February 23, 2015, Respondent was notified that he tested positive for cocaine. While he disputes the laboratory results, he does not dispute the laboratory collection procedure. A recommendation was then made by his department head that he be terminated for violating City rules, policies, and standards, and DOT regulations. Civil Service Board regulations allow an employee to explain the circumstances which led to the positive test results and to provide mitigating facts. See ch. 13, § 8, Rules and Regs. An employee may request a disciplinary determination meeting with the Department of Human Resources; an adverse decision is then subject to review by a hearing officer (administrative law judge). Alternatively, an employee may file a grievance pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement. If the grievance is denied, the employee may have the matter heard by an arbitration panel, but the cost of arbitration is borne by the employee. Because of financial constraints, Respondent elected to have the matter reviewed by the Department of Human Resources. A disciplinary determination meeting was conducted on March 3, 2015. Respondent was represented at the meeting by a member of his union. After Respondent's explanation was not deemed to be plausible, on March 7, 2015, the City Manager formally notified Respondent that he was being terminated effective March 11, 2015. See City Ex. 6. Respondent then requested a hearing to contest that action. At hearing, Respondent essentially repeated the explanation he gave at the disciplinary determination meeting. He testified that while at a local bar with his brother on the evening of February 15, 2015, or two days before the random drug test and while off-duty, he asked a long-time friend, Eric "Red Rock" Gibson, for a "black and mild" (a cigar). After smoking the cigar, Respondent said that something seemed different about the cigar, his tongue was numb and tingling, and he was mumbling words. However, he attributed this to being drunk at the time and gave it no further thought. After receiving the results of the random drug test, and being told that he was terminated, Respondent spoke to Gibson and learned that Gibson always laced his cigars with cocaine, including the one given to Respondent. The City relies on this admission, and not the drug test, to prove the charges in the Notice. Thus, the sum of the case is that Respondent admitted that he unknowingly smoked a cigar laced with cocaine on February 15, 2015. There is, however, no competent evidence to support the charge that he flunked a drug test two days later, as charged in the Notice, or that cocaine was in his system when he reported to work that day. Respondent testified credibly that he does not use drugs and he unknowingly injested the cocaine. He pointed out that, except for this test, he has never failed a drug test while employed by the City. Shortly after the random testing, he paid for a follow-up drug test, which produced negative results. He desires to return to work in order to reinstate his health insurance benefits and to provide a source of income for his family. It is undisputed that Respondent has a blemish-free record working for the City over the last 14 years and, among other awards, he has received over 17 certifications for exceling in his work. His last evaluation in February 2015 was "Excellent." Policy 3401.2, the City's Administrative Policy and Procedure Manual, states that an employee in a safety-sensitive position who fails a drug test "may be demoted to a non-CDL or non-safety sensitive position in accordance with the procedures outlined in this document." City Ex. 3, p. 6. Even assuming arguendo that Respondent failed a drug test, which has not been proven here, Respondent testified that he is willing to accept a demotion to a non-CDL position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board enter an order dismissing all charges against Respondent and reinstating him, with back pay, to his position as a Stormwater Technician II. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated paragraph 2(G) of the December 14, 2010, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission ("EPC"), and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Commissioner of Education, is the head of the Florida Department of Education, the state agency charged with the ultimate responsibility to investigate and take disciplinary actions against persons who hold a Florida Educator's Certificate and are alleged to have violated specified statutes. The EPC is charged with imposing discipline for violations of sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate Number 519374 issued by the Department. Respondent's Employment History and Disciplinary History Respondent has been employed in the State of Florida public education system for thirty-one years, twenty-seven of which she has served as a full-time teacher. During the four years in which she was not a teacher, she served as an occupational specialist and career counselor, involved in helping at-risk students find employment and providing guidance regarding academic training for specific careers. She also served as a counselor for Project Hope, a drug rehabilitation program, and as a substitute teacher. She currently is employed as a classroom teacher by Broward County Public Schools. She has received positive job performance evaluations throughout her career. On or about May 14, 2010, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging violations of specified Florida Statutes and agency rules, and seeking to impose disciplinary sanctions against Respondent's Certificate. Following an informal hearing on the Administrative Complaint conducted pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(2), the EPC entered a Final Order dated December 14, 2010, placing Respondent on two employment years of probation, subject to specified conditions. The Final Order provides in pertinent part: "2. Upon employment in any public or private position requiring a Florida educator's certificate, Respondent shall be placed on 2 employment years of probation with the conditions that during that period, she shall: . . . G. [n]ot consume, inject or ingest any controlled substance unless prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes." To ensure compliance with paragraph 2(G)1 of the Final Order, Respondent is required to submit to random substance abuse testing, as directed by the Recovery Network Program for Educators ("RNP") or her employer.2 Pursuant to the Final Order, Respondent submitted to random substance abuse testing on January 28, 2011. Respondent was notified by letter from the RNP dated February 7, 2011, that she was in violation of the Final Order. The letter stated in pertinent part: "you failed to comply with Paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, to wit: You consumed, ingested, or injected a controlled substance that was not prescribed by a doctor as evidenced by your drug test on January 28, 2011, that was positive for Cocaine Metabolite." On February 17, 2011, the EPC issued a Notice to Show Cause, requiring Respondent to show cause why a penalty for violating the Final Order should not be imposed. A hearing on the Notice to Show Cause was convened before the EPC on April 8, 2011. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that she had not consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes. Respondent's Random Drug Test of January 28, 2011 On January 28, 2011, Respondent reported to Occupational Medicine Centers of America ("OMC"), in Miramar, Florida, to submit to a random drug test as required under the Final Order, paragraph 2(H). Because she had to work that day, Respondent reported to OMC in late afternoon, before 5:00 p.m. Respondent brought a chain of custody form, formally known as a Forensic Drug Testing Chain of Custody Form ("Form"), with her to OMC.3 The Form for Respondent's testing was provided by the RNP or Respondent's employer.4 The Form is multi-layered, with the pages (or "layers") designated for specific recipients ——i.e., the collection laboratory, the testing laboratory, the employer, the medical review officer ("MRO"),5 and the donor. The Form lists "8543245" as the "Specimen ID No." for Respondent's random drug test conducted on January 28, 2011. Because Respondent's employer or the RNP provided the Form for her drug testing, OMC could not, and did not, generate a chain of custody form that could be used in collecting Respondent's specimen. The Form is to be filled out by the person collecting the specimen in accordance with the specific steps set forth on the Form. Step 1 lists the employer's name, address, and identification number, and the MRO's name, address, phone number, and facsimile number. Step 1 requires the specimen collector to fill in the donor's name and social security number or employee identification number; verify the donor's identity; identify the reason for the drug test; identify the type of test to be performed; and provide the collection site name, address, phone number, facsimile number, and collection side code. Step 2 is completed by the collector once the donor has provided the specimen. The collector identifies the type of specimen provided (i.e., split, single, or none provided) on the Form, reads the temperature of the specimen within four minutes of collection, and verifies on the Form whether the temperature is between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit. Step 3 requires the collector to pour the specimen into a bottle, seal the bottle with a tamper-evident label or seal, have the donor initial the seal, and place the specimen bottle in a laboratory bag along with the testing laboratory's copy of the Form. Step 4 requires the collector to certify that "the specimen given to me by the donor identified in the certification section on Copy 2 of this form was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the Delivery System noted in accordance with applicable requirements." To complete Step 4, the collector must sign and date the form, fill in the time that the specimen was collected, and identify the courier service to which the specimen bottle is released. After the collector completes Steps 1 through 4 of the Form, the donor completes Step 5. Step 5 requires the donor to certify that he or she provided the specimen to the collector and did not adulterate the specimen, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper- evident seal in his or her presence, and that the information and numbers provided on the Form and label affixed to the bottle were correct. Upon arriving at OMC, Respondent was called into the portion of the facility where drug testing is conducted. She provided the Form to OMC's medical assistant, Jackie Scialabba, who was on duty at that time. Scialabba completed Step 1 of the Form, and instructed Respondent to place her belongings in a locker, wash her hands, and provide a urine specimen in the collection cup. While Respondent was in the restroom providing the specimen, Scialabba completed Step 4 of the Form. Specifically, she signed and dated the form, filled in the portion of the Form stating the "Time of Collection" as 4:25 p.m., and checked the box identifying the delivery service courier. Respondent emerged from the restroom and handed Scialabba the specimen to pour into a specimen bottle for sealing and delivery to the testing laboratory. At that time, Scialabba discovered that Respondent had not provided a specimen of sufficient quantity to be tested. Scialabba provided water to Respondent so that she would be able to produce a specimen of sufficient quantity for testing. Respondent waited in the lobby of the facility until she was able to provide another specimen. Scialabba's shift ended at 5:00 p.m. and she left for the day. By the time Respondent was able to provide another specimen, Scialabba was gone. Before she left, Scialabba informed Christin Visbal, also a medical assistant at OMC,6 that Respondent's drug test was incomplete and that Visbal needed to complete the test. Scialabba left the partially completed Form with Visbal. Scialabba testified that Respondent did not complete Step 5 of the Form in her presence. Once Respondent indicated she was able to provide another specimen, Visbal called Respondent back into the testing facility. Both Visbal and Respondent stated that they were the only people present in the testing facility at that time.7 Visbal had Respondent her wash her hands, gave her the specimen collection cup, and instructed her regarding providing the specimen. At that time, Respondent provided a urine specimen of sufficient quantity to meet the testing requirements. Visbal checked the temperature of the specimen as required on Step 2 of the Form, and completed the portion of Step 2 requiring verification that the specimen temperature was between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit.8 Visbal poured the urine into a specimen bottle, sealed the bottle with a tamper-evident seal, and had Respondent initial the seal. Respondent then completed Step 5 of the Form, which constituted her certification that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in her presence.9 Visbal placed the sealed urine specimen and the testing laboratory's copy of the Form in a bag, and sealed the bag. Visbal provided Respondent with the donor copy of the Form. Respondent collected her belongings from the locker and left the facility. Because Scialabba had prematurely completed Step 4 of the Form while attempting to collect Respondent's specimen before she left work for the day, Visbal was unable to complete Step 4. However, Visbal provided a sworn statement and testified at hearing regarding the substance of the certification in Step 4——specifically, that the urine specimen given to her by Respondent was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the delivery service10 in accordance with applicable requirements. The evidence establishes, and the undersigned determines, that Visbal correctly followed the established protocol in collecting, labeling, sealing, and releasing the specimen to the courier in accordance with the applicable chain of custody requirements. Accordingly, the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. Scialabba's paperwork error did not compromise the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen. On February 7, 2011, FirstLab provided a document titled "Participant Call Test Edit" to the RNP, showing a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. The document bears "Specimen ID No. 8543245"——the same specimen identification number as was listed on the Form that Respondent brought to OMC on January 28, 2011, for use in her drug test that day. Respondent does not dispute that the tested specimen yielded a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. She maintains that she did not produce the tested specimen. Respondent's Subsequent Random Drug Test Results Since January 28, 2011, Respondent has been randomly tested for drug use each month. Respondent's drug test results have been negative every time that she has been tested since the January 28, 2011 test——nine times as of the hearing date. Respondent served a subpoena duces tecum on FirstLab in August 2011, seeking to obtain all documents related to Respondent's random drug test results, including the negative test results. The subpoena provided the correct spelling of Respondent's full name but did not list her social security number, employee identification number, date of birth, address, or school system by which she is employed. Instead of producing Respondent's test results, FirstLab produced test results for another teacher having a similar name who is employed by Miami- Dade County Public Schools.11 Ultimate Facts Regarding Alleged Violation and Penalty For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned determines that the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. The evidence does not support an inference that Respondent's specimen was tampered with, tainted, or otherwise compromised in the collection, sealing, labeling, or delivery process. Therefore, either Respondent had cocaine metabolite in her system when she donated the urine specimen on January 28, 2011, or the testing laboratory or MRO made a mistake in testing or reporting the test results of her urine specimen. Respondent maintains it is the latter, but did not present any persuasive evidence to support her position. To that point, FirstLab's error in producing the wrong person's records in response to Respondent's subpoena does not provide a sufficient basis to infer that in this case, FirstLab reported another person's drug test result instead of Respondent's. It shows only that FirstLab makes mistakes when not provided sufficiently specific information about the person whose records are being subpoenaed. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent, in violation of paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for a legitimate medical purpose, as revealed by the random drug test to which Respondent submitted on January 28, 2011. However, there is no evidence in the record showing that Respondent's violation of the Final Order presented any danger, or caused physical or mental harm to any students or to the public. Nor is there any evidence that the violation caused any actual damage, physical or otherwise, or that Respondent benefited from the violation. To the contrary, the sole evidence shows that Respondent is a good teacher who has performed well as a public school employee for thirty-one years. There is no evidence that the violation has in any way impaired her performance of her duties as a classroom teacher. Moreover, the sole evidence regarding Respondent's subsequent random drug test results shows that Respondent is now complying with the Final Order, and apparently has complied ever since her January 28, 2011, test. This evidences Respondent's contrition and her recognition of the seriousness of this matter. At hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from Respondent regarding her criminal history, and an excerpt of the transcript of the EPC hearing, during which her criminal history was discussed, was admitted into evidence.12 However, her criminal history and alleged failure to report that history were the basis for the EPC's Final Order imposing penalties against Respondent, including the probation that she now is charged with violating. Respondent already has been penalized by the EPC on these bases, and they are not relevant to this proceeding. As justification for the penalty it seeks, Petitioner asserts that Respondent "never accepts responsibility for her own behavior, but blames others for her miscreant deeds." However, the evidence does not support this position. With respect to the hearing before the EPC that resulted in issuance of the Final Order, Respondent offered a plausible explanation for not having previously reported her criminal history on her Florida Educator's Certificate applications——specifically, that when she filled out the previous certification application forms, she did not realize that the form required the reporting of all prior criminal history, including offenses for which adjudication had been withheld. Indeed, when she filled out an updated version of the application form that apparently was clearer regarding criminal history disclosure requirements, she reported all prior offenses.13 Respondent acknowledged responsibility for her actions more than once during the EPC hearing. Moreover, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's testimony that she understood she was to be drug tested on a monthly basis as a condition of her probation.14 To the extent Respondent may have been incorrect regarding this detail, that mistake is more likely attributable to confusion (which is understandable under the circumstances) rather than lack of truthfulness on her part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order determining that Respondent violated the December 14, 2011, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission, and suspending Respondent's Florida Educator's Certificate for a period of six consecutive calendar months, followed by two years of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the School Board has cause to discharge Respondent, Arlene Murray, from her duties as a bus driver with the Board because of a positive result for cocaine obtained in a drug screening.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Petitioner, Pinellas County School Board, was the agency in Pinellas County responsible for the provision of public education and educational support services in the county. Respondent, Arlene Murray, was employed by the Petitioner as a school bus driver. The position of school bus driver is a sensitive position and subject to the additional requirements pertinent to employment in such a position. One of these requirements is to undergo random drug screening from time to time. There is a decided safety purpose inherent in this requirement. By letter issued in October, 1994, the Board notified all its school bus drivers, including the Respondent, that, consistent with federal law, all employees who were required to hold a commercial driver's license and who perform sensitive functions for the Board, would be subject to drug urinalysis testing and/or breath alcohol testing. Respondent operated a school bus which transported more than 15 persons and was, therefore, subject to this requirement. Sometime thereafter, in December, 1994, the Board adopted Section 6Gx52-5.27, "Drug-free and Alcohol-free Workplace", as a formal Board policy. One purpose of this policy was to comply with the federal requirement. Consistent with this action, the Board contracted with FirstLab, a medical testing organization, to conduct the drug screenings, and FirstLab contracted with Corning-Metpath Clinical Laboratories, (Corning Metpath), a certified clinical laboratory, to conduct the actual analyses of the specimens gathered from subject employees. School Board policy and the pertinent federal regulations require that drug testing be conducted un-announced on a random selection basis and must equal or exceed fifty percent of the total number of individuals in each subject class. Consistent with the policy and federal requirement, sometime prior to January 23, 1995, Max Loden, the Board's supervisor of support services and its project coordinator for drug testing, compiled a list of all subject employees which he thereafter furnished to FirstLab. FirstLab, in turn, through use of its computers, generated a random list of those subject employees who were to be drug tested in calendar year 1995. The list for the first quarter of calendar year 1995 was telefaxed by FirstLab to Mr. Loden on January 23, 1995. Respondent's name appeared on that list. Also, sometime during January 1995, the Board conducted one-hour workshops for all bus drivers to inform them of its policy regarding drug testing. At those training sessions, a handbook describing the program was furnished to each driver. Each driver who received such a handbook signed a receipt to that effect. On January 26, 1995, Ms. Murray signed a receipt indicating she had received the information handbook describing the Board's drug policy. As a part of its implementation of the testing program, some time before March 1995, the Board contracted with Doctors Walk-In Clinic, (Clinic), located on US 19 North in Clearwater, to be a drug testing site. A complete and detailed collection procedure was developed which, all available evidence indicates, is designed to preserve the confidentiality of the donor, and to ensure that the integrity of each sample is maintained to guarantee a match of sample with donor and against contamination by any outside source. This procedure was followed in Ms. Murray's case. On the morning of March 10, 1995, Respondent was notified by a Board representative that she was to report to Doctors Walk-In Clinic for a drug test before 9:35 AM that day. Ms. Murray reported to the proper location for testing as instructed, where the sample was collected according to the defined collection procedure, by Ashar Deshbande, a lab technician at the Clinic. Once the sample was collected, Ms. Deshbande completed the required portions of the federal drug testing custody and control form for shipment of the sample to Corning-Metpath for analysis. Portions of this form are completed by both the technician and the donor, and a detailed procedure is prescribed and followed for the securing, packaging and transmission of the sample from the collection site to the laboratory. This procedure, which was followed in this case, is designed to insure that the sample collected from the individual donor is properly identified, secured and transmitted to the lab without any reasonable possibility of contamination. Respondent's sample was received at Corning Metpath, a facility licensed to conduct this type of laboratory analysis by both the appropriate federal and Florida authorities, on March 14, 1995. When inspected at Corning Metpath, the sample was found to have all security seals intact and undisturbed. The identification number on the specimen was compared with the number on the requisition form submitted by the Clinic and found to be identical. It is found, therefore, that the sample collected from Respondent on March 10, 1995, immediately secured, identified and prepared shipment to Corning Metpath, and thereafter shipped by air to Corning Metpath, was the same sample as received by the laboratory on March 14, 1995 and it had not been contaminated by any outside source at time of receipt by the lab. A tracking number to be used for laboratory internal tracking was also assigned at that time. Several distinct tests were run at Corning Metpath on the instant specimen collected from Respondent. The first was a screening test, conducted on March 15, 1995. In this test, the sample is placed within a batch of control samples used to insure the instrumentation is properly functioning during the process of analysis. This screening process tests for five drug classes. These include amphetamines, phincyclatine, PCP, opiates and marijuana. In the course of the test, only a small portion of the sample is utilized. The remainder of the collected sample is placed in a locked cage for temporary storage. The sample to be used is then taken the preparation room to the screening room where instrumentation reads the identifying bar code on the containers, performs the analysis and produces a print out. Once the process is completed, this tested sample portion is discarded. In the instant case, the screening test indicated Respondent's specimen showed a numerical value of 370. This is more than twice the minimal indicator calibrated for indicating the presence of cocaine. When the specimen tested positive for cocaine, the sample was removed from the test batch and secured in a locked refrigerator for confirmation testing. The next day, March 16, 1995, the Respondent's positive sample was removed from the locked refrigerator and subjected to confirmation testing. Confirmation testing is accomplished by a staff team entirely different from those individuals who made up the screening test personnel. The confirmation testing is done on only one specimen at a time and no more than that sample under test is opened. In a confirmation test, the standards of which are even more stringent than those for the screening test, Respondent's sample again tested positive for cocaine. The test results indicating a positive result of the laboratory analysis were received from FirstLab by Mr. Loden at the Board on March 23, 1995. Mr. Loden immediately notified the Board's Office of Professional Standards that a positive result had been received on Ms. Murray's sample, and a decision was then made to suspend Ms. Murray, with pay, until dismissal action could be considered by the Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. Before the Board meeting could be held, Ms. Murray requested formal hearing. Ms. Murray denied under oath ever using cocaine and affirmatively stated she did not use drugs. She could not, however, give any explanation as to how cocaine metabolite could have been present in her urine. Ms. Murray has lived in Pinellas County for 32 years and has been employed by the Board as a bus driver for six years. Prior to the instance under consideration here, she claims, she has never been in any trouble with the Board and has never been convicted of a crime. When interviewed by Dr. O'Howell on the day the test results were received, she was advised of the results and that if she resigned, the incident would not appear in the papers. Because, she claims, she has not used drugs for at least one year prior to this incident, Ms. Murray declined to resign and was dismissed. She asserts that in briefings given to employees, they were told that if they were to come to their supervisor and indicate they needed help, they would not be fired. She knows of at least one other employee who tested positive for drugs and was not fired. That individual was not identified.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Arlene Murray, be terminated for cause from employment as a school bus driver with the Pinellas County Schools. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith B. Martin, Esquire Pinellas County Schools Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 34649-2942 Eduardo LaTour, Esquire Tarpon Tower, Suite 400 905 East Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive Tarpon Springs, Florida 34689-4815 Dr. J. Howard Hinesley Superintendent Pinellas County Schools Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 34649-2942 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Barbara J. Staros General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's corrections officer license is subject to suspension, revocation or other discipline.
Findings Of Fact On August 29, 1996, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent's corrections officer license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, which was indicative of the illegal ingestion of a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On September 5, 1996, Respondent filed an Election of Rights in which he disputed the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requested an administrative hearing. Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on June 23, 1999. The Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Volusia Correctional Institution (VCI) in early 1991. A corrections officer is a special risk employee in a safety sensitive position. At the time of licensure Respondent passed his drug screen. In 1996, the month of February had 29 days. In February 1996, Warden Bruce Scherer received allegations of possible drug abuse by Respondent from Connie Beach, Respondent's (then) wife. Respondent's wife was also a corrections officer. Ms. Beach had been in the Warden's office asking for a day off to retrieve her belongings from the marital home due to personal problems with Respondent. Upon inquiry of the Warden, the Warden learned that Ms. Beach's brother Carroll Bradshaw had smoked marijuana with Respondent. The Warden called the brother by telephone. The brother confirmed he had smoked marijuana with Respondent several occasions. In response, the Warden asked Respondent to submit to a drug test. Respondent was cooperative and agreed to submit to the drug test. Volusia Correctional Institution does not conduct random drug testing. At no time did Respondent question why he was being asked to submit to a drug test. Bolton accompanied Respondent to the Halifax Hospital facility to submit a urine specimen for drug testing. In testing specimens for marijuana, two tests are conducted; the first of these is an immunoassay screen, and the second is a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) test. The GCMS test is the more definitive test which specifically identifies THC, the major metabolite of marijuana. THC is also the part of marijuana which gives it its psycho-active properties. Cut-off levels are used in the testing process in order to exclude positive test results for persons who may have had accidental (or second-hand) exposure to marijuana. Respondent submitted his first urine sample for drug testing on February 28, 1996. On March 4, 1996, the results on the immunoassay screen came back positive for cannabinoid (marijuana). The sample first tested positive. It then tested about 300 nanograms of THC in the GCMS test. On March 19, 1996, a second test was conducted on Respondent's original urine sample. On March 20, 1996, the results of that test were received and reviewed by Dr. Hung Doan. The GCMS test showed 259 nanograms of THC. The result was confirmatory of the first as positive for marijuana. Dr. Hung Doan is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO). He is certified as to his knowledge of drugs, their medical usage and ingestion. Dr. Doan is an expert in the field. Dr. Doan was the MRO who reviewed and certified the results of Respondent's two positive drug tests in 1996. The high levels of marijuana detected in the two positive tests of Respondent's urine sample conclusively establish that the results could not have been caused by accidental or passive inhalation of marijuana. The results did not rule out ingestion of marijuana since the evidence showed that about two cigarette sized amounts of marijuana would produce results similar to those found on Respondent's tests. However, the evidence did not show that Respondent had eaten any marijuana. Only multiple "accidental" exposures to, in conjunction with "accidental" ingestion of marijuana could possibly have resulted in the nanogram levels detected in Respondent's urine without his knowledge. Respondent did not produce any evidence beyond speculation to suggest that this might have occurred in his case. Mr. Beach was notified of the first positive test on March 4, 1996, by Mary Yochum, Dr. Doan's assistant. Respondent's response to being told that he tested positive for marijuana was "okay." He was concerned with the result but could not go into detail over the phone because other officers were present. On March 6, 1996, Respondent submitted a separate urine sample for the purposes of having an independent drug test. The results of that test were negative for marijuana. However, this second test occurred seven days after the first urine sample was given. The test only shows Respondent's level of cannabinoid on the latter date had decreased or diluted sufficiently to fall below the cut-off point for such tests. Marijuana can clear the human body's system within days. However, a chronic user of marijuana may take up to 75 days before the drug clears the persons system. It depends on the persons individual metabolism. Carroll Bradshaw is the ex-brother-in-law of Respondent. Mr. Bradshaw is a known drug user and convicted felon. He was last released from incarceration in 1998 after serving time for a cocaine charge. He continues to use drugs to date. Mr. Bradshaw regularly socialized, and smoked marijuana with Respondent. However, he had not smoked marijuana for quite a while before receiving the telephone call from the Warden. Respondent admittedly was familiar with the smell and appearance of marijuana. Respondent would typically supply and prepare the marijuana which he and his brother-in-law smoked while socializing. Respondent kept his stash of marijuana on a "paraphernalia" tray underneath his couch in his home. Respondent's former mother-in-law, who was also familiar with the look and smell of marijuana because of her son's problems, witnessed Respondent smoking marijuana with her son and others. She confirmed the testimony of her son and her daughter as to Respondent's use of marijuana. Given these facts Petitioner has shown clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Chapter 943, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 John Stanton, Esquire 121 1/2 North Woodland Boulevard Suite 3 Deland, Florida 32720 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Respondent, Wade Ragland, when notified by his transportation dispatcher that he had been selected for a random drug substance test, did not immediately report for testing because he had scheduled a prior maintenance appointment at his home, constitutes a refusal to be tested in violation of School Board Policy, state law, or contractual agreement. If so, was his failure to report immediately for random drug testing just cause for termination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pinellas County School Board, is a political subdivision and an administrative agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all public schools and personnel in the Pinellas County School District. Dr. J. Howard Hinesley is the Superintendent of Public Schools for Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent, Wade Ragland, at all relevant times, was an employee of the Pinellas County School Board in its Transportation Department. Ragland was employed as a substitute school bus driver on July 20, 1998, and became a regular bus driver on August 17, 1998. On April 24, 2001, Ragland was acting as a school bus driver for the Board. He was tested for drugs in January 2001, and the test was performed after his first run, which was the Board's policy and standard procedure. Ragland's drug test result was negative. Pursuant to the Board's Policy 8.23 and Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as of January 1, 1995, all employees who are required to hold a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) as a condition of employment and who perform safety- sensitive functions, which include operating a vehicle designed to transport more than 15 persons, shall be subject to drug urinalysis testing and/or breath alcohol testing via sample collection, through random testing. The Federal Omnibus Transportation Act (The Federal Act) was at all times relevant, including April 24, 2001. Four times a year, once every three months, and on or before the 15th day of the month preceding the beginning of the quarter, a random list of drivers will be requested by a contract testing facility. The Federal Act does not require termination of a CDL employee who either fails or refuses to take a random drug test. The School Board Policy 8.23 is incorporated as Article 32 of the Agreement between the Pinellas County School Board and the School Employees Union, the exclusive collective bargaining representative for bus drivers. Under Section 8.23(3)(a) 3 of the Board's policy, random drug testing must be unannounced and shall be conducted during the selected driver's on-duty time. The Board's internal normal operating procedures for the selection of drivers to be tested in each quarter is accomplished in the following manner. Theresa Hooker, Personnel Technician and Drug Testing Program Manager since July 2, 2000, is responsible for drug testing of all personnel and maintenance of their confidential drug test records. FirstLab, the contract testing facility, is responsible for the selection of employees who will be tested during a given quarter from the list of names provided by the Board. Ms. Hooker is solely responsible for the determination of the date each of the selected employee will be tested. Upon receiving the quarterly list from FirstLab, Ms. Hooker sends the names of 20-25 selected bus drivers to Joyce Hefty, personnel technician in the Transportation Department. It is Ms. Hefty's responsibility to notify each driver, directly or through one of three dispatchers, of the selection for drug testing during a driver's first or second morning bus run. Once the selected driver reports to her office, she checks the driver's identification, provides the driver with the necessary testing paperwork and gives the location of a Board-approved testing facility. All dispatchers and bus drivers know that drivers who have been notified by dispatcher(s) that their names came up for testing are to report immediately, after completion of their first or second morning run, to Ms Hefty's office for identification check, completion of paper work, and instructions to report to a Board-approved test site for testing during their on-duty time for which they are paid. Equally known by dispatchers and drivers, is the meaning of on-duty time under School Board's Policy 8.23. On-duty time is the time required for a driver to complete his last morning run. Included is the time required for each driver to return to his/her assigned transportation compound. In those instances where a driver has permission to take the bus home, on-duty time is computed from check-out time of the first run to the time it would take a driver to return from the first or second morning run to the assigned compound. Each compound dispatcher maintains records and time sheets of assigned drivers. Should a driver selected for random drug testing not be tested, refuse to be tested, or experience the inability to provide a specimen and therefore has to wait hours to complete testing, Ms. Hefty is notified. She in turn notifies Ms. Hooker. Ms. Hooker notifies Mr. Gene Bessette, Administrator, Office of Personnel Standards. Mr. Bessette has discretionary decisional authority touching upon every facet of a particular situation. He is informed of each situation and determines whether an individual situation requires further action and, if so, what action should be taken. He determines the appropriate discipline based upon the totality of circumstances, disciplinary guidelines, and aggravating and mitigating factors, if any, and submits his final recommendations to the Superintendent of Pinellas Public Schools, Dr. Hinesley. Dr. Hinesley has authority to accept, reject or modify Mr. Bessette's recommendations. Dr. Hinesley's decision is presented to the Pinellas County School Board for final modification or approval. The chain of command would be for Ms. Hooker, upon receipt of information from Ms. Hefty, to contact Mr. Bessette. On April 24, 2001, at 9:34 a.m., Ms. Hooker received an e-mail from Ms. Hefty regarding Respondent, Wade Ragland. Ms. Hooker, however, was not in her office and did not speak with Ms. Hefty or Mr. Bessette on that day. On April 24, 2001, Ragland was acting as a school bus driver for the Board. The agreement between the Board and School Employees Union Local 1221, Firemen and Oilers, an affiliation of Service Employees International Union, which governs Ragland, provides, as does Board's Policy 8.23, that random drug testing "shall be during on-duty time." The Board's "normal random testing procedure," in effect since 1998, was to notify drivers during their first run in the morning that they are going to be sent for a random test after the completion of the first morning run. Dispatch would send a relief driver and bus to cover the second and third runs of the selected driver's route. Under the Board's normal procedure, notification to drivers would occur during a driver's first morning run. A driver's drug test, conducted at an approved testing site, would occur during the time the driver would normally be driving a second and third morning run. Under this procedure, selected drivers would not receive additional pay. Should, however, the actual drug test extend beyond a driver's normal scheduled time for morning runs, including compound check-in time, additional time would be added when computing the driver's total hours for that week. Under the operative terms of the Board's procedure, bus drivers are on non-paying "down-time" after completion of the final morning run. Down-time would continue until a driver began their evening run usually about 1:00 p.m. or later, depending on their selected bus route. "Down-time" is equal to "off-duty" time for which drivers receive no pay. The Board, at all times, was fully aware that drivers held other jobs during their down-time, a few cared for their elderly relatives, some, as did Ragland, scheduled personal appointments with service providers and others engaged in various other activities. Under the Board's procedure, "over-time," for over-time pay purposes, is the time drivers work beyond and over a predetermined time for each route. Drivers, at the beginning of each year, bid for a specific bus route. Each bus route has its own, per-week pay schedule based upon the number of morning/evening runs, the combined distance of the runs, plus any required over-time work in excess of their route time. The School Employees Union Agreement and the Board's policy mandate that drivers could be required to work over-time, when and if, the driver was requested by a dispatcher or supervisor to work over-time while the driver was on duty. For special trips, weekends, nights, etc., dispatchers or supervisors would first seek a volunteer driver. If no volunteer is found, a dispatcher would select a driver to work over-time who would receive over-time pay for the over-time work. Faced with a shortage of regular bus drivers for 2000- 2001 school year, the Board changed its herein above "normal random drug testing procedures" as described above. The intent of the Board was to comply with its Federal drug-testing requirements and to minimize expenditure of over-time pay for bus drivers. Accordingly, on August 31, 2000, Susan Detmold- Collins, Assistant Director, Transportation Department, issued a memo to "All School Bus Drivers" outlining a "Temporary Change To Random Drug/Alcohol Testing Procedure." In pertinent part the memo stated: To: ALL SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS Every year, at this time, we run into a bit of a problem with meeting our quotas for random drug/alcohol testing. As many of you know, we are required, by Federal Law, to randomly test 25 percent of our drivers each quarter. The current quarter started in July and will end in September. We always start out the school year somewhat behind in meeting our testing quotas, because many of our drivers do not work for summer school, and therefore can not be sent for testing during July and August. This year, because of our shortage of drivers, and the number of drivers we are required to send for testing, we decided to enact a temporary change to our usual procedures . . . First, I wanted to make sure all drivers were made aware of this temporary change we are making to our normal procedure and the reasons for it. Second, I wanted to reassure all drivers that we will pay them for any extra time they may end up working as a result of this change in procedure. (Since random drug/alcohol testing is usually conducted during a period of time when drivers would normally be doing their second and third runs, drivers do not usually receive any additional pay.) Third, I wanted to let drivers know we fully recognize that many of them have scheduled appointments and other things which they count on being able to do during the middle of the day, on what would normally be their "their down-time." If drivers let us know about these things, in advance, we will take steps to make sure they are not called to drug test when doing so would cause a scheduling conflict for the driver. Since a refusal to take a drug/alcohol test can have very severe consequences under Federal Law and School Board Policy, I wanted to reassure all drivers that we will work cooperatively with them and make every effort not to pull them for testing if they have made us aware that they have a doctor's appointment or other appointment or activity scheduled during their "down-time" on a particular day. Mr. Fleming and I greatly appreciate your cooperation and support during this period. . . . We are working hard with Supporting Services Personnel to recruit and train additional drivers as quickly as possible. We hope we'll have things back to "normal" by October at the latest, if not sooner. [emphasis added] By March 2001, the Transportation Department had hired sufficient bus drivers to cover the above-cited need. It is unclear, however, whether the Transportation Department made the administrative staff, dispatchers and bus drivers aware of the fact that a sufficient number of bus drivers had been hired. It is equally unclear, from the collective testimony of the Board's employees, whether the temporary change in the drug- testing procedure herein above outlined had been retracted, and if so, on what date. It is clear that as of April 24, 2001, the Transportation Department had not issued a written retraction of its August 31, 2000, temporary procedural change memoranda. From the testimony of a dispatcher, Masone, and the comments of a bus driver, Ragland, it is clear that neither Masone, nor Ragland, knew whether the normal drug-testing procedure or the temporary drug-testing procedure was in effect on April 24, 2001. It is therefore, a reasonable conclusion that some dispatchers, Masone for instance, assumed the temporary drug testing procedure was in effect wherein drivers would be required to undergo random drug-testing on down-time. Others, however, drivers like Ragland, assumed the normal drug- testing procedure was in effect and drivers could only be required to undergo random drug testing during on-duty time. This conflicting and confusing situation resulted in a misunderstanding of what was required of the drivers by dispatchers and what was required of dispatchers by drivers as it related to random drug testing procedures on April 24, 2001. It is certain, that bus drivers, dispatchers, the transportation personnel technician, the drug-testing program manager, and the professional standards office were not informed that the Board's temporary drug testing policy procedure was in effect on April 24, 2001, some six months past October 2000. On April 24, 2001, Ragland had driven to Palm Harbor University, then to Brooker Creek University and was driving to Safety Harbor Middle School, the third and last stop of his morning runs. Completion of the last morning run and the driving time required for Ragland to report back to the Tarpon Springs transportation compound checkpoint is considered on-the- clock time for pay purposes. The time of Ragland's arrival at the Tarpon Springs compound would begin his down-time. On that day, according to dispatcher Masone, Ragland's down-time began at 9:56 a.m. He would remain on down-time until his evening runs began at 1:00 p.m. later that same day. At 9:18 a.m. on April 24, 2001, Masone notified Ragland that he had been randomly selected for drug testing that morning. Ragland informed Masone that he had a prearranged service appointment at his home with an exterminator at 10:00 a.m. and he would go for testing "as soon as my appointment is over with." When asked by Masone why he did not tell his supervisor that morning when he checked in that he would not be available during his down-time, Ragland's reply was "I did not know I had to report" planned down-time activities. On this point Ragland is right. According to Gene Bessette, before the August 30, 2000, temporary change memo, there was never a written policy that required drivers to notify dispatchers or anyone else if they had a prearranged appointment during their down-time. Masone, not sure whether the temporary procedure or the normal procedure was in effect, informed Ragland that he "could" lose his job if he did not go for drug testing. Ragland replied he would go for testing after his appointment was finished, probably within the next one-half hour or approximately 10:30 a.m. At approximately 9:25-9:30 a.m. and after his conversation with Ragland, Masone called Joyce Hefty and informed her of his conversation with Ragland. Ms. Hefty asked Masone to call Ragland and have him call her. When Ragland arrived home, he called Ms. Hefty. At approximately 9:31 a.m. and after her conversation with Masone, Ms. Hefty e-mailed Susan Collins regarding Ragland's selection for random drug test at 9:18 a.m. and relayed the information as she received it from Masone regarding Ragland's position of his down-time status. Ms. Hefty does not recall if Masone told her Ragland said he would come for testing after his appointment was finished. Unable to reach Ms. Collins by telephone, Ms. Hefty called Mike Bessette regarding Ragland's situation. Bessette concluded the conversation by instructing Ms. Hefty to give Ragland another 40 minutes to cool off and see if he showed up at her office. As Masone had requested, Ragland called Ms. Hefty from his home between 9:32 a.m. and 9:44 a.m. Ms. Hefty asked if he was going for his drug test, Ragland replied that he could not come to her office at that time, but he would come as soon as his exterminator finished his work. The exterminator, Craig Schultheis, was in the house at the time of this telephone conversation and overheard Ragland's comments. Ragland's offer to Ms. Hefty to speak with his exterminator for verification was refused. Mr. Schultheis, the exterminator, arrived at Ragland's home approximately 9:40 a.m. completed his task and departed at approximately 10:05 a.m. While there, he overheard the telephone conversation and Ragland say, "When I'm done I can come in." He did not know at that time that Ragland was talking to Ms. Hefty. During the above telephone conversation, Ms. Hefty failed to inform Ragland that Mr. Bessette had given him an additional 40 minutes to report to her office. Had Ms. Hefty obeyed Mr. Bessette's instruction, Ragland would have had the option of immediately driving from his home to her office, should he chose to do so. Instead, at 9:44 a.m. Ms. Hefty, without further consultation with Mr. Bessette, her superior, concluded her conversation with Ragland by informing him that he was terminated. A few minutes later, she called the North County Dispatcher and requested that they send two drivers to pick up Ragland's bus and return it to the motor pool. Because Ragland drove from Safety Harbor Middle School directly to his home rather than driving directly to her office, Ms. Hefty testified it was too late for him to take the drug test. To her, his conduct constituted in part his refusal. This was Ms. Hefty's first occasion to encounter the situation where a driver who has been notified by a dispatcher of selection for random drug testing responded with, "No I can't; I have an (prearranged) appointment and will go when its finished." Ms. Hefty did not know whether Ragland was on "down- time" or "on-the-clock" status when he called her from his home. At the time she determined that Ragland's responses, "will go when my appointment is finished" or "not on my own time," coupled with his failure to immediately report to her office, was a refusal under her understanding of the rules. She did not know nor could she articulate the procedure or rule she relied on in reaching her conclusion. She testified she was merely doing what Polly Frush, who had the job before, had taught her. Ragland took a drug test at 1:00 p.m., on April 24, 2001, at Atlantis Clinic with a negative result. This drug test was not accepted by the Board as a substitute drug test. Under its policy, the Board accepts drug test results from only its approved and designated drug-testing facilities. Atlantis is not an approved facility. No Board employee, with whom Mr. Bessette spoke on April 24, 2001, informed him of Ragland's statement that he would be willing to go immediately to take the drug test after his appointment was concluded. If he had been made aware of Ragland's statement, he testified he would have taken that into consideration when determining whether or not Ragland's action was a refusal to take the random drug test. Assuming that Board staff had provided him with all the facts, and following the no exceptions policy (refusal equals automatic termination), Mr. Bessette made his recommendation of Ragland's termination to Dr. J. Hinesley, Superintendent of Public Schools, Pinellas County. This is a case of first impression for the Board's staff, wherein the Board issued two procedures for random drug testing, Policy 28.3 and the August 30, 2001, Memo to Bus Drivers; first impression where Board staff members and employees were not certain which one of the two procedures was in effect on April 24, 2001; and first impression where the conduct of the Board's administrative staff and the conduct of a bus driver employed the Board was reasonable given the circumstances on April 24, 2001. Petitioner's evidence in this case does not demonstrate insubordination by Ragland. The evidence does not prove that Ragland engaged in flaunting the Board's authority, repeatedly failed to heed the Board's instructions to take a drug test, openly refused to take the drug test, or failed to follow the Board's recently changed random drug testing procedure. Just the opposite is evident. On April 24, 2001, at approximately 1:00 p.m., during his normal on-duty time, Ragland took a drug test with a negative result. The facts here demonstrate, at most, Ragland's exercise of poor judgment based on the confusion created by a lack of clear directions from the Board. The confusion resulted from the Board's temporary random drug-testing procedure termination date and its normal random drug-testing procedure resumption date. Petitioner failed to produce evidence in any form to establish with reasonable certainty, which one of its two procedures was in effect on April 24, 2001. I find that on April 24, 2001, the Board's staff, at the very least, did not have a working knowledge of the applicable random drug testing procedure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Pinellas County School Board enter a final order finding Respondent, Wade Ragland, was not insubordinate and did not violate Board Policy 8.25(1)(u). Further finding that Respondent, Wade Ragland, did not violate School Board Policy 8.25(1)(x) by failing to comply with an existing School Board Policy. Further Recommended that Respondent, Wade Ragland be reinstated to his former position as a bus driver. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrew J. Salzman, Esquire Zimmet, Unice, Salzman & Feldman, P.A. Two Prestige Place 2650 McCormick Drive, Suite 100 Clearwater, Florida 33759 Jacqueline M. Spoto, Esquire School Board of Pinellas County 301 Fourth Street, Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Dr. J. Howard Hinesley, Superintendent School Board of Pinellas County 301 Fourth Street, Southwest Largo, Florida 33770-3536 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On March 14, 2001, the Board authorized the issuance of a request for proposals to solicit offers on a contract for drug screening services. Soon, Request for Proposals No. 149-AA10 (the “RFP”) was issued. The purpose of the RFP, as stated on the first page thereof, was [t]o obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services; and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (Attachment A). The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was April 10, 2001. Page 3 of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (the “Guide”) explained that applicants and employees are tested in the following circumstances: (1) upon application for full-time employment; (2) when "reasonable suspicion"1 exists to believe that an employee has impermissibly used drugs or alcohol; (3) as part of routine "fitness for duty" medical examinations2; and (4) as a "follow up" to an employee's completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Because the District employs persons performing safety- sensitive functions and persons who hold commercial driver licenses, the District must comply with a federal law known as the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“OTETA”). Employees covered by OTETA are subject to pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion testing, "return-to-duty" testing (after a positive test), follow-up testing, and annual testing. Guide, pp. 10-14. Unlike other employees, persons falling under OTETA are not subject to blood alcohol screening. Guide, p. 22. The type of drug test that the District most frequently requests involves urinalysis. For alcohol testing, breath analysis is the normal practice. Blood alcohol testing is used infrequently. The RFP did not explicitly disclose the District’s relative demand for these various types of tests. Section V of the RFP prescribed the technical requirements with which proposers needed to comply. Subsection C thereof stated, in pertinent part: The collection site is a place where individuals present themselves for the purpose of providing urine or blood specimens to be analyzed for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Page 15 of the Guide added that "[c]ollection sites shall have all of the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, facilities, and supervision to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping or transportation of urine specimens to a certified drug testing laboratory." Section V, subsection K set forth four “location parameters [as] examples of locations which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure [sic] convenience for applicants and employees.” These “location parameters” essentially divided the Miami-Dade County service area into quadrants. Section V, subsection L, provided in relevant part: “Mobile collection of specimens will be required at some of the Regional Transportation Centers[.]” The Guide, at page 15, further mandated that "[m]obile collection sites" be equipped and staffed "the same as" other collection sites. Section V, subsection M stated, in part: “A collection site is preferred in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33132, for the convenience of any potential employees who wish to provide specimen collection concurrent with a scheduled interview by the Office of Human Resources.” Section V, subsection N, stated: At least one site in the North end and [sic] of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Section VI of the RFP, which addressed the cost of proposed services, instructed that [p]roposals must include an itemization of charges for collection of specimens, initial and confirmatory tests. Such itemized charges will be used in the event a retest is necessary. Retests required as a result of defective equipment, incorrect analysis, or misinterpretation shall be done at the expense of the provider. Section VIII provided that proposals would be “evaluated by [a] selection committee . . . comprised of representatives of the school district, in order to ascertain which proposal best meets the needs of the School Board.” The selection committee (hereafter, “committee”) was to be composed of one administrator each from five separate offices, which were designated in section VIII. Section VIII also established the evaluation criteria to be used by the committee, stating: Evaluation considerations will include, but not be limited to, the following: Responsiveness of the proposal clearly stating an understanding of the work to be performed meeting all the technical guidelines in [the Guide]. Cost may not be the dominant factor, but will have some significance. It will be a particularly important factor when all other evaluation criteria are relatively equal. Documentation of current certification by DHHS; qualifications of laboratory staff members; past experience and record of performance; verification of references. Location of the laboratory and planned method of pick-up from designated collection sites and transportation of specimens according to chain of custody protocol to the drug testing laboratory; turnaround time relative to volume of expected need; accessibility relative to volume of expected need. Primary emphasis in the selection process will be placed on the independence, background, experience, and service of staff to be assigned to the project. Expertise in the areas addressed in the RFP, and the ability to respond in a timely, accurate manner to the district’s requirements is essential. Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collection/testing. The School District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals submitted and to waive irregularities. . . . . Relevant Details About the Proposals Two proposers, Global and RN, submitted timely responses to the RFP. The following is a look at certain terms in their respective proposals. Global’s Proposal Global was the incumbent provider pursuant to a contract that had been entered into on June 11, 1997. Even before the establishment of the expiring contractual relationship, from 1995 forward, Global had provided general drug testing services for the District. In addition to that, Global had performed fingerprint analyses for the District prior to 1995. Thus, Global had a history with the District. In a Fee Schedule included at page VIII-1 of its proposal, Global quoted the following prices for services: Federal Drug Testing for OTETA covered employees $30.00 * * * Breath Alcohol Testing $25.00 After hour Services Flat fee per donor/employee . $75.00 plus regular testing fee Monday — Friday: 5:00 p.m. — 8:30 a.m. Saturday and Sunday All Day Florida Drug Free Work Place for general employee drug testing $25.00 * * * At page V-1 of its proposal, Global listed ten collection facilities, providing their addresses and hours of operation. According to the proposal, only one of these facilities stays open until midnight. Five of them close each weekday at 4:00 p.m., and four at 5:00 p.m. None is open on weekends. Global offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered a site in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And Global offered at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County, satisfying the geographic requirements of subsection V.N. Global’s south-end site, however, closes at 5:00 p.m. and thus fails to satisfy the requirement, also prescribed in subsection V.N., that such facility remain open until midnight. In addition to these stationary facilities, Global offered the services of a mobile unit. Its proposal stated: ON-SITE COLLECTION After Hours Emergency24 hours Operating hours: Monday — Sunday Via Mobile Unit Global described its mobile unit, at page V-2, as a “self contained air conditioned motor coach equipped with 2 bathrooms, blood drawing chair, urine collection equipment, computerized breach alcohol analyzer with ample facilities for a physician to conduct physical exams on DOT (OTETA) employees and yearly re- certification.” Global, in fact, has three of these mobile units. The vans are available for use by all of Global’s clients. Two vehicles are maintained in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, and thus are in position to respond to service calls for the District. The third van is maintained in western Palm Beach County. Because after-hours tests generally are needed in post-accident and reasonable suspicion circumstances, which require a rapid response (within two hours of the incident), the Palm Beach County-based van would not, as a practical matter, likely be deployed for the District. Global does not maintain a mobile unit in Miami-Dade County. B. RN’s Proposal Included in RN’s proposal was the following schedule of costs: RN Expertise charges $27.80 for a 5 panel NIDA drug screen. This charge includes an adulterant panel, 5 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise charges $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. This charge will include an adulterant panel, 8 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. If the School Board does not elect to have an adulterant panel performed on general tests the charge will be $25.00. RN Expertise charges $25.00 for a breath alcohol test. This also includes on- site testing charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise will charge $30.00 for a blood alcohol test. RN Expertise will submit monthly invoices. These invoices will be submitted to the Office of Operation and Records and/or the Office of Professional Standards (OTETA) through a purchase order. The invoices shall reflect service provided to the Board in the prior month. Regarding collection sites and locations, RN’s proposal stated, at pages 12 through 13: Quest Diagnostics [the laboratory that RN proposed to use] has 14 collection sites in the Miami-Dade County area. Please see Appendix B for all maps of locations and zip code map with all locations that have been highlighted for your convenience. RN Expertise, Inc. will provide all on- site drug screen collections and breath alcohol tests. We have numerous certified collectors and breath alcohol technicians throughout the state who specialize in on site testing. All collectors and BATS have been certified by Christine Steele. Please see Appendix C. for certificates of RN Expertise, Inc. and insurance and licenses. Three Quest patient care centers are located very close to the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, 33232. The hours of operation are 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. RN Expertise has arranged three third party sites in the North end of Miami-Dade county and one site in the south end of Miami-Dade County that are available to perform reasonable suspicion and post- accident testing. The hours of operation are from 8:00 am to 12:00 midnight. These addresses are: Workers Compensation Medical Center 17601 N.W. 2nd Avenue Ste S Miami, Florida 33169 Workers Compensation Medical Center 6504 N.W. 77th Court Miami, Florida 33166 Homestead Hospital 160 NW 13th Street Homestead, FL 33030 If these sites are not convenient we can arrange additional sites or provide these tests on an on-site basis. RN offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered sites in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And RN offered at least two sites in the north end of Miami-Dade County and one in the south, all three of which were open from 8:00 a.m. until midnight, thereby satisfying both the geographic and hours of operation requirements of subsection V.N. The Evaluation Committee(s), Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart, and the Evaluations A. The Original Committee To evaluate the proposals, a five-person committee was appointed in accordance with the RFP. Its members were Nelson E. Diaz, Deputy Superintendent, Personnel Management and Services; Gwendolyn Jennings Kidney, Assistant Superintendent, Employee Support Programs; Jose Montes de Oca, Assistant Chief Auditor, Management and Compliance Audits; Michael Fox, Risk Analyst, Risk and Benefits Management; and Patricia Freeman, Director, Business Development and Assistance. This committee arranged to meet for the first time on April 11, 2001. Notice of the meeting was not published in advance; the committee would convene in private. The following staff persons were asked to be present at the April 11 meeting to provide technical expertise, if needed: Vera Hirsh, Administrative Director, Personnel; William Bevan, Executive Director, Personnel Operations and Records; Frederic F. Conde, Executive Director, Office of Professional Standards; and Barbara Jones, Director, Procurement. B. Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart Before the April 11, 2001, meeting, Ms. Hirsh asked Mr. Bevan, as a technical advisor to the committee, to prepare a comparison of the two proposals. At the time, Mr. Bevan was most knowledgeable about the District’s procedures for drug testing, because he had been directly involved in the general drug testing program. Also, through his work experiences, Mr. Bevan had acquired personal knowledge concerning Global. Indeed, Global had listed Mr. Bevan as a reference in its proposal. Mr. Bevan prepared a comparison chart that was distributed to all the members of the committee. The following table contains the substance of Mr. Bevan's comparison chart:3 Item No. GLOBAL RN EXPERTISE 1 TURNAROUND TIME IS NEXT BUSINESS DAY 5 DAYS ON POSITIVE 24 HOURS FOR NEGATIVES 48 HOURS FOR POSITIVES 2 LOCATION IS FORT LAUDERDALE ALTAMONTE SPRINGS 3 PLAN TO DELINEATE OTETA FROM GENERAL GOOD PLAN PLUS ICON BASED DRUG TEST FORM VERY WEAK PLAN VERY WEAK ANALYSIS 4 COST $30.00 DOT BLIND SAMPLES ARE INCLUDED COST $27.80 NO MENTION OF BLIND SAMPLES 5 POLICE $25.00 ALL ALCOHOL TESTS BOTH BREATH & BLOOD ARE $25.00 $26.00 8 PANEL TEST BREATH ALCOHOL $25.00 BLOOD ALCOHOL $30.00 6 COLLECTION SITES 10 TOTAL SITES 14 TOTAL SITES LESS 4 IN BROWARD, 6 FOR BLOOD DRAW ONLY = 4 NET SITES 7 MOBILE COLLECTION DONE BY MOBILE VAN "WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE COLLECTION" 8 EXPERIENCE 4 YEARS WITH M-DCPS NO SUCCESSFUL LEGITATION [sic] AGAINST M-DCPS US SUGAR ? 9 LABORATORY LAB CORP OF AMERICA LATE IN REPORTING RESULTS ONE TIME IN FOUR YEARS QUEST LABORATORIES QUESTIONABLE 10 ADULTERANT TESTING IS PERFORMED BY LAB CORP AT A STANDARD COURSE OF PROTOCOL WITH NO CHARGE FOR THIS PROCEDURE TESTSURE IS BROKEN OUT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY Because of his personal knowledge of and experience with the drug screening program, Mr. Bevan's opinions carried great weight with the committee members. As will become clear, moreover, Mr. Bevan operated as a de facto evaluator. Thus, for good reasons, his comparison chart drew RN’s close and critical attention. It will be examined in detail below. Item No. 1. This item is helpful as a contrast to the others, for here Mr. Bevan did exactly what a technical advisor should do: provide a concise, accurate, and objective summary of details contained in the proposals without making a subjective judgment as to which proposal is superior. Item No. 2. As Mr. Bevan admitted at hearing, the RFP did not include, as an evaluation criterion, the location of a proposer's base of operations. Testifying, he explained that, "in [his] mind, [a proposer's location] was not something that was in the RFP, but it was important to me." Hearing Transcript (“T.”) 59. Of course, it was not Mr. Bevan's place to make subjective judgments about what was valuable in the proposals—— that was for the evaluators. Further, even the evaluators could not properly take into account undisclosed evaluation criteria. Thus, this comparison was irrelevant and consideration thereof was contrary to the RFP and contrary to competition. Item No. 3. This comparison pertained to the evaluation criterion specified in section VIII, subsection F, which provided: Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collecting/testing. Mr. Bevan dubbed RN's proposal "very weak" and Global's "good" primarily because Global's prototype OTETA form had a transparent drawing of a school bus superimposed over the writing, and its sample form for use by school police officers had a simple, freehand outline of an officer drawn on its face, whereas RN's forms did not have such "icons." Mr. Bevan believed that the pictures of the school bus and police officer would prevent the less intelligent applicants and employees from using the wrong form.4 Although reasonable people might disagree with Mr. Bevan's analysis of the respective merits of the proposals on this criterion, his conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The problem, however, is that Mr. Bevan was not a member of the committee, and his qualitative judgment went well beyond an even-handed explanation of a technical term or process, or an objective summary of the proposals' details. In other words, as this item clearly shows, Mr. Bevan assumed the role of evaluator. Item No. 4. Mr. Bevan's comparison of "blind sample testing" is interesting because the purpose of focusing on this discrete point, among all others relating to the proposers' price quotes for OTETA testing, seems to have been to blunt the advantage that RN otherwise would enjoy for having offered the lower price. (The comparison effectively says, RN's OTETA test is cheaper, yes, but Global adds value by performing blind samples, whereas RN may not provide this service.) Mr. Bevan could have written, however, with equal accuracy, that RN's price for OTETA testing "includes an adulterant panel" while Global's proposal makes "no mention of adulterant panels," which would have made RN's price quote appear even more attractive as against Global's. RN, however, did not complain about this aspect of Mr. Bevan's analysis; consequently, the undersigned has paid little attention to, and based no ultimate factual determinations or legal conclusions on, this item. Item No. 5. According to the Guide, at page 21, school police officers are required to be tested for eight drugs or classes of drugs. This is called an "8 panel" test or screen. Other employees, in contrast, need only be tested for five drugs or drug classes, using a "5 panel" screen. In his comparison, Mr. Bevan balanced Global's supposed price of $25.00 for police tests against RN's quote of $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. Yet, in its Fee Schedule, Global did not specify a separate charge for police tests, 8 panel tests, or 5 panel tests.5 Rather, Global quoted a price of $25.00 for "general employee drug testing." Based on his previous experience with Global, however, Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's charge for police tests would be $25.00, the same as the cost of testing other non-OTETA employees. Mr. Bevan's assumption was dubious at best, even assuming that Global previously had been charging $25.00 for police tests.6 At worst, if Global's historical pricing were ignored (as it should have been, being a fact extrinsic to Global's proposal), Mr. Bevan's assumption was bereft of factual or logical support; it was simply arbitrary. At a minimum, though, Mr. Bevan should have stated, on the comparison chart he provided to the committee, that he was making an assumption in Global’s favor. Without such a qualification, the chart——which purported to compare "apples to apples"——unfairly depicted RN's as unequivocally the costlier proposal on this item, for RN was shown truthfully to have quoted $26.00 for an 8 panel test. Moreover, significantly, Mr. Bevan omitted the fact that RN also had offered a price of $25.00 for an 8 panel screen without an adulterant panel. Thus, not only had Mr. Bevan potentially compared "apples to oranges," he had compounded the problem by making RN's quote for police testing appear higher than it necessarily would need to be. Making the matter worse still, Mr. Bevan represented that Global's price for blood alcohol testing was $25.00 versus $30.00 for the same procedure with RN. Global, however, had not offered to perform blood alcohol tests for $25.00 apiece; it had not quoted any price for such testing. Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's price would be $25.00 based on his past experience with the company. The validity of Mr. Bevan's assumption, again, is questionable;7 at the very least, his assumption should have been disclosed to the committee on the comparison chart. As drafted, without disclosure of Mr. Bevan's Global-friendly assumption, the comparison chart was grossly inequitable to RN, creating the possibly false impression that RN's price for blood alcohol testing was 20% higher than Global's. Finally, in comparing the cost proposals, Mr. Bevan failed to note that Global had quoted a hefty $75.00 surcharge for all "after hour services," meaning tests performed on weekdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m., and anytime on Saturday or Sunday. RN, in contrast, did not similarly propose a 400% price increase for after-hours work, and thus would have been favored by the comparison Mr. Bevan chose not to make. Item No. 6. The issue of collection sites would become crucial. Mr. Bevan's ultimate opinion——that RN had proposed "4 net sites" as against the "10 total sites" offered by Global——was highly subjective and clearly erroneous. To begin, RN's proposal in fact described a total of 17 collection sites——not 14 as Mr. Bevan incorrectly represented. At pages 12 and 13 of its proposal, RN responded sequentially to RFP section V, subsections K (collection sites desired in four quadrants of Miami-Dade County), L (mobile collection required at some Regional Transportation Centers), M (preference for a site near 1500 Biscayne Boulevard), and N (requiring at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County). In response to subsection K, RN proposed to use 14 Quest patient care centers, the locations of which were further described in maps attached to RN's proposal as Appendix B. Three of the 14 Quest centers were represented to meet the preference expressed in subsection M. And RN offered three additional "third party sites" (plainly meaning, in context, sites that were not operated by Quest) to satisfy subsection N. There was and is nothing confusing about RN's response regarding collection sites. No reasonable, fair-minded person, upon reading pages 12 and 13 of RN's proposal, could reasonably conclude that RN was offering a total of only 14 collection sites. Next, four of the Quest sites proposed by RN are located in Broward County. Mr. Bevan decided that these Broward sites should be ignored. The RFP, however, did not prohibit a proposer from offering sites outside Miami-Dade County, and, significantly, RN's proposal satisfied the RFP's technical requirements concerning collection site locations without the Broward sites. Thus, an evaluator (as opposed to Mr. Bevan, who was not one) might have regarded RN's Broward sites either an added value that made RN's proposal more attractive or an unwanted option that neither added to, nor detracted from, RN's proposal. Either way, however, this qualitative decision was not properly Mr. Bevan's to make as a “technical advisor.” Mr. Bevan then subtracted six sites from RN's total because the proposal stated that the sites were available for blood draws only. (In fact, RN's proposal indicated that nine of RN's 17 total sites collected blood samples only; three of the nine are in Broward County and six in Miami-Dade.) Mr. Bevan's decision that "blood only" sites should not be counted was plainly contrary to the RFP, under which blood alcohol testing clearly was a required service. While the evidence showed that the District considers urine collection sites to be much more valuable than “blood only” collection sites, which it views as practically worthless, the RFP nevertheless did not disclose this preference or the relative weight of urine sites versus “blood only” sites. Simply put, the RFP did not allow the evaluators to ignore “blood only” collection sites. At bottom, a fair and balanced comparison (unlike Mr. Bevan's) would have shown that RN had proposed 17 total sites (four in Broward, 13 in Miami-Dade), of which nine (three in Broward, six in Miami-Dade) were "blood only" sites, leaving eight sites (one in Broward, seven in Miami-Dade) that were available for the collection of both urine and blood. An "apples to apples" comparison of Miami-Dade sites available for blood and urine testing would have been Global, ten versus RN, seven. Each evaluator, however, in weighing the relative merits of the two proposals, should have considered RN's ten additional sites——there was no warrant in the RFP for excluding them from the mix à la Mr. Bevan's analysis——and made an independent determination of the value added by those sites. Item No. 7. On this point, Mr. Bevan was unfair to RN——but only a bit. His comparison intentionally drew a distinction between Global's "mobile collection" (the term used in section V.L. of the RFP) and RN's "on-site collection," subtly implying that RN’s proposal might not be responsive, or as responsive as Global’s, to the RFP’s technical guidelines. In fact, however, in its proposal at pages II-2, V-1, V-2, and VIII-1, Global expressly had described the function of its mobile unit as being to provide "on-site" collections; even Global, in other words, considered mobile collection and on-site collection to be fungible concepts. Mr. Bevan's comparison chart thus somewhat unfairly gave Global a gentle semantic boost while concomitantly giving RN a little linguistic gig.8 Standing alone, this comparison would not be noteworthy. Viewed in the light of other, unfair contrasts, however, Mr. Bevan's mobile collection/on-site collection dichotomy takes on a slight hue of partiality.9 Item No. 8. Here, Mr. Bevan made a comparison that was highly unfavorable to RN. One the one side, he portrayed Global attractively as the incumbent vendor that, during a four- year tenure, has not exposed the District to an adverse litigation outcome, and which also provides services to U.S. Sugar (an agricultural concern in South Florida). On RN's side there was only a question mark——nothing more. The meaning was obvious: Global has good credentials, but RN's experience and litigation track record are questionable. This was terribly unfair. RN's proposal included two pages of references listing a number of current clients. Mr. Bevan's explanation at hearing for failing to acknowledge any of RN's references on his comparison chart was that RN's references "were much longer" and would not fit on the page, and that he had "put down what [he] could in the amount of time [he] had." 89. This explanation utterly fails to account for Mr. Bevan's misleading and prejudicial use of a question mark to describe RN's documented experience; it is not credible and is rejected.10 Regarding exposure to lawsuits, Mr. Bevan's comparison was gratuitous. The RFP did not ask for information concerning lawsuits; and the lack of adverse litigation outcomes, while perhaps interesting and even relevant, was not an evaluation criterion. Further, Mr. Bevan was aware of Global's litigation track record not because of information contained in Global's proposal (for such data was not included therein) but because he previously had monitored litigation against the District arising from OTETA testing. Despite relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal for this comparison, Mr. Bevan made no attempt to determine whether RN had exposed a client to an adverse litigation outcome and hence had no idea whether RN had or had not done so. Yet, despite the absence of any basis in logic or fact for such a conclusion, the question mark in RN's column (adjacent to the favorable comment about Global) strongly implied that RN either had omitted material information about litigation or disclosed something disturbing or questionable. The unavoidable net effect of this prejudicial and unfair comparison was to put an exclamation point on the fact that Global had served satisfactorily as the incumbent vendor (and thus was a safe choice)——while portraying RN as a pig in a poke (and hence a gamble). Item No. 9. Mr. Bevan shone a flattering light on Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA," the laboratory used by Global)——only one glitch in four years!——while labeling Quest Diagnostics ("Quest," used by RN) "questionable." This was problematic for several reasons. First, the RFP did not specify a preference for any particular laboratory. Second, Mr. Bevan's judgment was not based on the respective proposals but on his personal experiences. He had been pleased with LCA's services and preferred that the District continue to do business with that laboratory. But, as the comparison chart pointedly neglected to mention, Mr. Bevan's negative opinion of Quest was based on just one incident in which Quest had been slow in reporting the results of a retest that had been requested by an individual who had initially tested positive at LCA and requested that Quest perform the confirmatory test.11 Third, the judgment expressed on the relative merits of the proposers' laboratories was plainly qualitative; in other words, Mr. Bevan was evaluating the proposals, which was not properly his role, for he was not a de jure member of the committee. Item No. 10. Mr. Bevan's representation to the committee that LCA performed adulterant testing at no cost to the District was not based on Global's proposal, which neither mentioned adulterant testing nor quoted a price for such service, but on his experience with Global. (Incidentally, neither Mr. Bevan's testimony, nor any other evidence, persuasively established that Global or LCA had, in fact, been performing adulterant testing. Rather, the District’s employees assumed that such was the case——as it may, or may not, have been.) Aside from the impropriety of relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal, Mr. Bevan's contrast with RN's proposal ("TestSure is broken out as a separate entity") was both incorrect and incomplete, producing a false, "apples to oranges" comparison. First, as four pages of descriptive information included in RN's proposal made clear, TestSure is Quest's trademark for its adulterant testing protocol, which Quest considers a "breakthrough in technology for the industry." Contrary to Mr. Bevan's statement, TestSure is not a "separate entity." Thus, the apparently-intended implication that RN's price was higher because it was proposing to use a “separate entity” (in addition to Quest) for adulterant testing was untrue. Second, the information provided by RN concerning TestSure, rather than being a negative strike against RN's proposal, as Mr. Bevan's comparison suggested, was (or should have been) helpful in evaluating RN's proposal, a plus. While the committee certainly could have chosen to discount or ignore Quest's glowing review of its own product as puffery, the fact was that while Global's proposal said nothing about adulterant testing, RN had submitted some information on the subject. Finally, Mr. Bevan did not specify that his remark about Global's supposed offer to provide adulterant testing at "no charge" was merely an assumption that, for all that appears in Global's proposal, may or may not be true. This omission was especially unfair to RN because RN had stated explicitly in its cost proposal that an additional dollar would be charged for an adulterant panel——and that the District could save the dollar by electing not to have the panel performed on general tests. An impartial summary would have acknowledged RN's prices for general tests, both with and without an adulterant panel, and noted that Global's proposal was silent as to whether its quote of $25.00 for general testing included an adulterant panel. To state unqualifiedly that Global would provide adulterant testing for free, when its proposal said nothing of the sort, was patently inequitable. The First Evaluation and Recommendation After meeting for two hours on April 11, and having considered Mr. Bevan’s comparison chart, the committee voted to recommend that the contract be awarded to Global. In the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that [b]oth Proposals were evaluated according to the criteria outlined in the proposal. A comparison was made of services provided, locations for testing, cost, and other requirements. The committee recommended that Global MRO be awarded the contract. In addition to providing a reasonable fee schedule, the locations for drug testing, and the prior outstanding service provided by Global MRO, supports the committee’s decision. RN timely protested the intended award, the Board referred the matter to DOAH, and a final hearing was scheduled for July 30, 2001. Before the final hearing, however, the Board determined that the April 11, 2001, meeting might have occurred in violation of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the final hearing was postponed to enable the committee to reconvene in a public meeting for the purpose of reevaluating the proposals in compliance with the Sunshine Law. The Second Evaluation and Recommendation The committee met for a second time on September 4, 2001, pursuant to a prior written notice of proceedings. The September 4 meeting was open to the public. Although each of the original members of the committee was asked to return, two of them——Mr. Diaz and Ms. Freeman——were unable to attend the second meeting. In their places appeared subordinates as “representatives,” Pat Parham for Mr. Diaz and Enrique Sacasa for Ms. Freeman. Four members of this committee had no direct involvement in or experience with the drug screening services that were the subject of the contract for which proposals had been solicited. Of the five, only Ms. Kidney was knowledgeable about the program areas and service requirements for which contractual services were being sought. Once again, staff persons were present, ostensibly to answer technical questions. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Conde returned. With them this time were Barbara M. Moss, District Director, Office of Professional Standards; Brenda Miles, Executive Director, Professional and Technical Staffing; and Linda Cantin, Supervisor, Division of Procurement Management. Mr. Bevan did not distribute his comparison chart at the committee’s public meeting and made only a couple of comments there in response to questions. After conferring, the committee found both proposals to be responsive and voted unanimously to recommend that Global be awarded the contract. In the minutes of the September 4, 2001, meeting, it was reported that [t]he committee agreed that both proposals were good, and clearly stated an understanding of the work to be performed. There were concerns expressed, however, regarding [RN’s proposal] in reference to the location and convenience of collection sites. . . . . [Global] was selected because of the larger number of collection sites for urine that are available and the locations of these sites throughout various parts of the county, which would be of convenience to applicants and employees, and its experience. RN’s Protest By letter to the Board’s counsel dated September 6, 2001, RN amended its pending protest of the first recommendation to challenge the second proposed award with a newly-revised statement of grounds.12 As bases for relief, RN asserted that Global’s proposal was materially non-responsive for failure to comply with several of the RFP’s technical requirements; it also alleged that the committee’s evaluation had been flawed in several respects. Ultimate Factual Determinations Certain Ultimate findings of fact have been rendered below under the heading “Conclusions of Law.” This has been done for organizational convenience and for clarity of analysis. Accordingly, the findings announced in paragraphs 114, 120, 130, 134, 156, 159, 161-64, 167, and 169, infra, are hereby incorporated as Findings of Fact, as if fully set forth in the instant section of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the proposed award to Global. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.
The Issue Whether Respondent (“Desiree Seaton”) violated Petitioner, the School Board of Marion County’s (“the School Board”),1 drug-free workplace policy; 1 The School Board’s official name is “The School Board of Marion County.” § 1001.40, Fla. Stat. (2020)(providing that “[t]he governing body of each school district shall be a district school board. Each district school board is constituted a body corporate by the name of ‘The School Board of County, Florida.’”). The case style has been amended accordingly. and, if so, whether her employment with the School Board should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record of this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: The School Board maintains an alcohol and drug-free workplace. Section 6.33 of the School Board’s Human Resources Manual provides that: It is further the intent of the School Board of Marion County to comply with the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA), regulations of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) contained in 49 CFR Parts 40 and 382, et al, Section 2345.091, Florida Statutes, the provisions of the Drug-Free Workplace Act, and other applicable state and federal safety programs. This policy shall also affirm the Board’s position that an employee in a safety sensitive position may be considered impaired at any measurable level by the use of alcohol and/or controlled substances. Pursuant to OTETA and its implementing regulations, drug and alcohol testing is mandated for all safety sensitive identified employees who function in a safety sensitive position. Section 6.33 further specifies that prohibited substances include “marijuana, amphetamines, opiates, phencyclidine (PCP), and cocaine.” In 3 Ms. Seaton’s exhibits were misnumbered in that there was no Respondent’s Exhibit 10. addition, “[i]llegal use includes the use or possession of any illegal drug, and the misuse of legally prescribed or obtained prescription drugs.” Also, “when the use of a controlled substance is pursuant to the instructions of a physician, the employee shall immediately notify his/her supervisor.” Section 6.33 states that random drug testing “may take place at any time, with or without proximity to driving,” and that there will be random drug testing for “all identified safety sensitive positions.” A “safety sensitive position” is defined as “[a]ny function for which a commercial driver’s license is mandated and in which a driver operates a vehicle designed to carry sixteen (16) or more passengers, a vehicle which weighs 26,000 + 1 pounds, or a vehicle which carries a placard indicating hazardous cargo.” Furthermore, drug testing shall be conducted by “independent, certified laboratories utilizing recognized techniques.” While the School Board maintains a drug and alcohol-free workplace, it encourages employees with chemical dependency to seek treatment: The School Board of Marion County recognizes that chemical dependency is an illness that can be successfully treated. It is the policy of The School Board of Marion County to seek rehabilitation of employees with a self-admitted or medically determined drug problem. The School Board of Marion County will make every effort to assist those self-admitted and/or referred employees while being treated. Employees who are unwilling to participate in rehabilitation may be subject to appropriate action, pursuant to School Board policy, applicable Florida Statutes, State Board of Education rules, and applicable provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Substance Abuse Program – At any time prior to notification of a required test, an employee is encouraged to contact the Employee Assistance program. Such employees may be required to submit to testing as a part of a treatment program. The laboratory that conducts drug-testing for the School Board randomly selects individuals who will be tested during the upcoming quarter. The School Board then schedules those individuals for testing throughout the quarter so that a large number of drivers are not unavailable for work at the same time. During the next quarter, a different set of individuals are selected. Brent Carson is the School Board’s Director of Professional Practices. He becomes involved in employee disciplinary cases that rise above the level of a reprimand. Mr. Carson testified that the School Board has no ability to test employees other than the individuals the laboratory selects for testing: Q: To protect the integrity of the random testing, do you have the ability to vary from that random list provided by the outside lab? A: We have to test who they say – who they identify as the random employees. Q: So if you decided to pick and choose – if they pick someone and you said, no, I’m not going to bother with that person today, do you believe that could affect the randomness, if you will, if that’s the right word, of the test procedure, that it could affect the testing procedure and call into question if you start picking and choosing who’s not giving tests to people on the list? A: Yes, that would definitely, I think, impugn the efficacy of having random tests. If an employee has a positive drug test for a prescription medication, then the School Board’s Medical Review Officer (“MRO”) gives that employee three days to produce a valid prescription for that medication. If the employee produces a valid prescription, then the positive test is deemed to be a negative test. In addition, an employee can have a urine sample retested at his or her own expense. If there is no retest and no valid prescription is produced, then the School Board puts the employee on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. With regard to the consequences of a positive test, the Manual states that “[c]overed employees testing positive at any level for alcohol or controlled substances are in violation of district policy and will be immediately removed from their safety sensitive positions. A violation of federal, state, or District requirements shall be grounds for dismissal.” Mr. Carson testified that there is no progressive discipline for safety- sensitive positions. The first time an employee tests positive for an illegal substance or one for which that employee does not have a prescription, that employee is recommended for termination. Mr. Carson testified that the Superintendent has always recommended termination for violations of the School Board’s drug-free workplace policy: “Whether it’s random, whether it’s reasonable suspicion or whether it’s a drug test based off of injury, we have always recommended the termination of the employee.” Ms. Seaton Tests Positive for Opioids Ms. Seaton began working for the School Board as a bus driver in December of 2017. On February 5, 2018, Ms. Seaton signed a document acknowledging that bus drivers must “[s]ubmit to random, post accident and reasonable suspicion drug testing.”[4] Ms. Seaton has undergone surgeries in the past and testified that she has been prescribed hydrocodone “for years on and off depending on the 4 Prior to the positive drug test at issue in the instant case, Ms. Seaton had no disciplinary issues and had no other positive drug tests. surgery.”5 Ms. Seaton claims to be allergic to oxycodone, and it has been her habit to take hydrocodone only when she has excruciating pain.6 Ms. Seaton suffered a work-related injury on October 2, 2020, and described it as follows: I always help out where I can. So we have spare buses that we need to move from one compound to the other, and on this particular day I was taking one of the spare buses back over to another compound. As I was getting off the bus, I always grab with my right hand to the bar and my left hand on the dashboard. My hand slipped off the 5 Ms. Seaton had a double knee replacement surgery in August of 2019 and was prescribed hydrocodone. Respondent’s Exhibit 7 is a photograph of a pill bottle indicating that Ms. Seaton had been prescribed 60 hydrocodone pills. However, no date is visible from the photograph. 6 Respondent’s Exhibit 8 is a letter from a physician stating that Ms. Seaton has treated with him since December 21, 2018. The letter notes that Ms. Seaton is allergic to codeine and Premarin. There is no mention of Ms. Seaton being allergic to oxycodone. Also, hydrocodone was not among the medications this particular physician has prescribed for Ms. Seaton. dashboard and I went forward. And from there I suffered a rotator cuff tear and some other, like, bone spurs.[7] After the accident, Ms. Seaton took a drug test on October 2, 2020, and the test returned negative results for opiates, marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, propoxyphene, PCP, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines. Medical documentation from an October 5, 2020, evaluation by a workers’ compensation physician indicates Ms. Seaton had a contusion of the left elbow and shoulder, a left shoulder strain, a left elbow strain, and a neck strain. An MRI on January 5, 2021, revealed a posterior labrum tear along with a possible anterior dislocation of her left shoulder. Since her accident, Ms. Seaton had been driving her mother’s car because it is an automatic, and Ms. Seaton has a stick shift. Ms. Seaton flew out-of-town to visit her son in Baltimore on October 22, 2020. Because 7 Ms. Seaton has had a difficult recovery from her injury and is dissatisfied with the treatment she received through workers’ compensation. After receiving a second opinion from her primary care physician, Ms. Seaton had shoulder surgery on February 26, 2021. At the time of the final hearing, she did not know whether the surgery would ultimately prove to be a success: “I am still in ongoing treatment. It started October 2nd. I went through holy heck with our – the way that Concentra work[s] – which is the people they use for workmen’s comp – they make you go through physical therapy before you can actually get an MRI done, because they say that it’s required by the insurance company. They had given me ultrasound – not an ultrasound. X-rays when I first had the injuries. And from there they said I had to go through physical therapy, I went through that a month. And then from there I went for an MRI which determined that they saw something, but they couldn’t know exactly. So they, then again, another MRI, a contrast MRI. I want to say I had that done December 23rd where they finally saw that. And we still, let me still – I didn’t have my surgery until February 26th. So from October 2nd to February 26th, I did not have surgery. And I was in constant pain. At nighttime with the rotator cuff, it’s kind of – in the daytime it’s tolerable, but at nighttime it’s excruciating pain, something to do with the way the muscles go. I’m not a doctor, but – I mean, it would be online. But it’s when you’re laying down you’re in a lot of pain. I had pain from my neck all the way shooting to my arm. It would be like a shooting pain and [ ] constant. On December 23rd, when I actually had the MRI to determine that I did have a rotator cuff tear, at that point I got tired of the Concentra doctors because they weren’t doing anything for my pain, and I went to my primary care for a second opinion, [and] he sent me to a pain management doctor. As of December 30th I have been on pain management with him, which is, like, Lyrica and hydrocodone and tramadol. So between the two. I still have therapy like I go three times a week. And I’m expected – like six more weeks. I still can’t – they’re not feeling that I’m where I’m supposed to be at this point. I’m supposed to be able to lift my arm a certain way, and it’s not. So I still have another set of therapy that I have to go through. I’m praying that everything goes back to normal. But I still have neck pain and we’re waiting to see if that clears up, I might have to go back to a neck specialist next.” Ms. Seaton did not want to leave her mother without transportation, she drove her own manual-shift car to and from an airport in Orlando, 90 minutes each way. However, using her left arm for driving caused her a great deal of pain. Upon her return to Florida, Ms. Seaton took a hydrocodone during the night of Sunday, October 25, 2020, because the pain was preventing her from sleeping. The hydrocodone came from a prescription: A: I’ve had hydrocodone prescribed to me for years on and off, depending on the surgery, because I can’t take oxycodone, which is the one that they’re saying came up on my test. The one that I took for – on October 25th, I want to say, it was a Sunday, it was from my previous surgery that I had. ALJ: Hold on. We need to get this straight. It looks like your drug test was October 27th, according to Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. A: Correct. ALJ: Are you telling me you took something prior to – just prior to October 27th? A: Correct. ALJ: What did you take? A: Hydrocodone. ALJ: Did you have a prescription for hydrocodone? A: Yes. During her stay in Baltimore, Ms. Seaton ate two biscuits sprinkled with poppy seeds. On October 26, 2021, and on the morning of October 27, 2021, Ms. Seaton also ate bagels sprinkled with poppy seeds. Ms. Seaton was notified during the morning of October 27, 2020, that she had been selected for drug testing that day. At that point in time, she was on light duty due to her injury and assigned to the transportation help desk.8 On approximately November 4, 2020, the testing laboratory reported that Ms. Seaton’s urine sample had tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone.9 The School Board notified Ms. Seaton on November 5, 2020, that she had been placed on administrative leave, with pay, during the pendency of an internal investigation. Mr. Carson met with Ms. Seaton on December 2, 2020, to inform her of the Superintendent’s recommendation that she be terminated. Ms. Seaton told Mr. Carson that she did not know how she could have tested positive for oxycodone because she is allergic to that medication. Mr. Carson and Ms. Seaton disagree about other aspects of the meeting. Specifically, Ms. Seaton claims that she mentioned during the December 2, 2020, meeting that she took hydrocodone and had a prescription for that medication. Mr. Carson does not recall Ms. Seaton making that comment.10 8 Even though Ms. Seaton was on light duty status, Mr. Carson testified that she was still subject to random drug testing: “Employees that are subject to random drug tests based off of their status because they’re CDL holders and drivers, they’re expected to stay in the pool for random drug tests if they are on light duty. The only time they are removed from that list is if they’re in a no-work status.” 9 The laboratory report entered into evidence was not authenticated, either by a witness or by self-authentication as provided in section 90.902, Florida Statutes (2020). Furthermore, no witness was produced to testify that the laboratory report was a business record and thus subject to an exception to the hearsay rule. The laboratory report is, therefore, unreliable hearsay. 10 During questioning by Petitioner’s counsel, Ms. Seaton claimed that she told the School Board’s MRO about her hydrocodone prescription: Q: Now, the note on the drug test that says it was positive lists oxycodone. Correct? A: Yes. Mr. Carson and Ms. Seaton spoke again on January 8, 2021, and Ms. Seaton stated for the first time to Mr. Carson that she had taken a long trip during the weekend prior to the October 27, 2020,11 drug test. She relayed that she was experiencing a lot of pain after driving and took some pills to alleviate the pain. According to Mr. Carson, Ms. Seaton did not identify the pills she took, state that she had a prescription, or offer him evidence that she had a prescription for opioids.12 As described above in the Preliminary Statement, Ms. Seaton speculated in her December 11, 2020, response to the Superintendent’s allegations that the positive test result could have been caused by poppy seeds she ate in the days preceding the drug test. This was the first time that Q: Do you understand that oxycodone is a different drug than hydrocodone? A: Yes. After doing research, yes. Well, actually speaking with the MRO officer, because he called it Percocet and I said, well, that’s impossible because I can’t take Percocet because I’m allergic to it. And so I told him, I said, all the Percocets, all those things, every time I have a surgery the doctors try to give me that and I tell them, no, I can’t have that because I get really sick and break out with [a] rash and vomiting, so they don’t prescribe that. That’s why I get prescribed hydrocodone. Q: So you’re saying that you told the MRO you took hydrocodone? A: Correct, hydro. Q: And even after you told him that, he still reported a positive test. Correct? A: He said he had to go by what he has there. 11 October 27, 2020, was a Tuesday. 12 Ms. Seaton explained during the final hearing that she did not provide the School Board with a copy of her prescription because no one ever asked her to do so. Mr. Carson was aware of Ms. Seaton asserting that poppy seeds could have caused her positive test result.13 Ms. Seaton testified that she did not tell the School Board about her hydrocodone prescription because she was on desk duty following the accident and did not anticipate ever driving a school bus again: ALJ: I guess what I’m struggling with is given your accidents and the pain you were experiencing, it seems perfectly reasonable that you would be on some sort of opioid. I guess on the other hand, you know, if you tested positive, I guess it seems like a reasonable person would show the School Board a prescription for any kind of pain med, regardless [of] whether they tested positive, or not. I guess that’s what I’m struggling a little bit with. * * * So is it your testimony that – according to my notes, there were three – there have been three conversations or discussions between you and the School Board. The first one with Mr. Carson where he told you about the positive test. And let me just clarify. During that first conversation, did you mention the hydrocodone? A: Yes, I did. With Mr. Carson in the first conversation. ALJ: All right. So you disagree with his testimony that during the first conversation you said simply, I have no idea how that tested positive? 13 Mr. Carson testified that “[m]y brief understanding of it is that you would have to consume a great deal of poppy seeds for it to alter any type of drug test. I don’t know what that limit is. But that’s not something that we’re able to delineate in a drug test, whether it’s truly a substance or if it’s poppy seeds.” Mr. Carson disclosed that the basis for that aforementioned statement came from “the internet.” Because the School Board elicited no testimony indicating that Mr. Carson has any independent knowledge or expertise with drug testing or a related field, the undersigned does not credit his assertion that someone would have to “consume a great deal of poppy seeds” in order to affect a drug test. * * * A: Yes. And I did ask him because I wanted to remember that, I said to him, as much pain as I was in, if I had to do it again, I would. But the difference is I would tell my supervisor. Because I really didn’t – in the role that I was in, which was a desk job, I was not in any safety risk for anyone, I would never get on a bus, nor was I – I knew I wasn’t getting on a bus any time soon with the injury that I had. But I would never, ever put anybody at risk. I wouldn’t even get on a bus because my CDL, I figured my CDL was going to be taken. That’s another thing - - ALJ: Ms. Seaton, did you say, -- I may be mistaken. I thought I heard you testify that you’ve had a hydrocodone prescription for many years. Was that accurate or did I mishear? A: On different occasions for surgeries, correct. * * * ALJ: On the day that you injured your shoulder on the school bus and hurt your rotator cuff, the injury that we were talking about, at that time did you have any hydrocodone prescription? A: Yes. * * * ALJ: Were you taking hydrocodone at that time? A: No, sir.[14] During the final hearing, Ms. Seaton moved Respondent’s Exhibit 7 into evidence, and a portion thereof was a picture of a prescription bottle for 14 Ms. Seaton then testified that her trip to Baltimore resulted in her taking hydrocodone to alleviate pain in her left shoulder. 60 hydrocodone pills with Ms. Seaton’s name on the bottle. Ms. Seaton offered the following testimony in support of that Exhibit: ALJ: So, Ms. Seaton, this picture of the prescription bottle, can you give me some background on this? When was this prescribed to you? When do you fill it? Who prescribed it to you, and why? * * * A: The original prescription was prescribed to me in August, and it was for my double knee replacement by Dr. Raymond Weiand at the Orthopedic Institute. Petitioner’s Counsel: August, you said, prior to the injury, August of 2020? A: No, ‘19. * * * ALJ: I think you may have discussed this, but were you taking hydrocodone consistently or without a break from that date to the day of your accident and beyond? A: No, sir. I only took hydrocodone when I had excruciating pain. This is not something that I take on a regular, like – like if I have pain then I was taking it. That’s why I put Exhibit 1, it will state - - it wasn’t in my system. ALJ: But is your testimony that at some point after your accident which resulted in your injured shoulder, is it your testimony that you are taking hydrocodone to relieve the pain resulting from that accident? A: That is correct. The night when I returned from the trip, I was in so much – I kept waking up out of my sleep because the pain was so bad that I took the pill for it to go to sleep, to go back to sleep, because I did not want to miss work. ALJ: Okay. Mr. Levitt, do you have any cross on that issue regarding this exhibit? Petitioner’s Counsel: Let me think --- So you have August 2019 for a knee operation, and when was the last time you took it for the knee operation? Like back in 2019, or as the judge asked, were you continuing to take it? A: I took it around my birthday, July – July 28th of the 2020, I took some then. Petitioner’s Counsel: For what, for your knee? A: Yes. Petitioner’s Counsel: But this was never prescribed for your shoulder. Correct? A: No, sir. Ms. Seaton had left shoulder surgery on February 26, 2021. The post- operative diagnosis notes she had a rotator cuff tear and superior labral tearing. Ultimate Findings Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 is the only record evidence supporting the School Board’s allegation that Ms. Seaton “provided a urine sample and it was reported as a positive test for opioids.” Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 is a report from a laboratory indicating that the urine sample Ms. Seaton provided on October 27, 2020, tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone. Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 is hearsay in that it is an out-of-court statement being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, i.e., that Ms. Seaton’s urine sample from October 27, 2020, tested positive for opioids. The School Board did not present a records custodian from the testing laboratory or otherwise attempt to have Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 accepted into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. There is no record evidence supplementing or corroborating that Ms. Seaton’s urine sample was positive for opioids, the allegation specifically pled in the Administrative Complaint. Thus, there is no evidentiary support for the School Board’s allegation that Ms. Seaton committed “misconduct in office” or that there is “just cause for discipline.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dr. Diane Gullett, Superintendent Marion County Public Schools 512 Southeast 3rd Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Desiree M. Seaton 5 Hemlock Loop Lane Ocala, Florida 34472
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2015), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(d); and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the certification and the revocation of certification of law enforcement officers and instructors pursuant to section 943.12, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida. Petitioner issued Corrections Certification No. 332010 to Respondent on July 24, 2003. As part of her employment agreement with the Florida Department of Corrections (DC), Respondent agreed to submit to random drug testing. See also § 944.474, Fla. Stat. (providing DC with the authority to develop a program for random drug testing of all employees). On June 22, 2018, DC requested that Respondent submit to a random drug test and she provided a urine sample that same day. Prior to her submission of the urine sample, Respondent provided photo identification to the lab technician to verify her identity. Respondent did not notify DC of any reason why her urine sample might test positive for a controlled substance. After submitting her urine sample, Respondent signed a form that stated: I [the Respondent] certify that I provided my urine specimen to the collector; that I have not adulterated it in any manner, each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in my presence; and that the information provided on this form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle is correct. Respondent does not dispute the testing procedures, chain of custody, qualifications, or accreditation of the laboratory and its employees that analyzed her urine specimen. Respondent also does not dispute that this was a “drug test” as defined under section 112.0455(5)(j), Florida Statutes. Section 112.0455 is known as “the Drug-Free Workplace Act,” and authorizes random testing, establishes collection procedures to avoid sample contamination, requires accurate labeling, provides for chain of custody, and sets requirements for testing laboratories to conduct initial screening and confirmation testing. Petitioner did not introduce into evidence the actual results of Respondent’s June 22, 2018, drug test. Instead, it relied on the testimony of Dr. Widerspan, the medical review officer who analyzed Respondent’s drug test, and Dr. Schwimmer, the director of medical review services at Doctor’s Review Services, which employs Dr. Widerspan, to establish those results. Dr. Schwimmer testified as to the testing and evaluation procedures utilized generally at Doctor’s Review Services. He noted that his office does not conduct the drug test, but rather, a separate laboratory conducts it. Medical review officers within his office review the results of positive tests. With respect to marijuana, Dr. Schwimmer testified that the laboratory conducts a two-stage testing process. First, the laboratory conducts an immunoassay, or screening test, that he described as a reactive test. If that first test reveals presence of delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol/marijuana (delta-9 THC) for the marijuana metabolite at or above 15 ng/ml, the laboratory will then conduct a gas spectrometry test, which he described as more detailed and not reactive. If the gas spectrometry test confirms the concentration of delta-9 THC for the marijuana metabolite at or above 15 ng/ml, Dr. Schwimmer explained that the laboratory then refers the test to Doctor’s Review Services for review by a medical review officer. Dr. Schwimmer further testified that when a medical review officer receives the results of a test that reflects a concentration of marijuana in excess of 15 ng/ml, the medical review officer speaks with the subject of the test to determine if the subject has a valid medical explanation that the medical review officer can verify. According to Dr. Schwimmer, the only verifiable valid medical explanation for a positive marijuana test is if a subject presented a prescription for Dronabinol, also known as Marinol, and the subject ingested Dronabinol prior to the drug test. If a subject provides a verifiable, valid medical explanation for a positive marijuana test, a medical review officer may overturn the laboratory’s findings. Dr. Widerspan is a practicing physician and has been a certified medical review officer since 2015; she testified that she has evaluated over 50 urine specimens as a medical review officer. Dr. Widerspan was the medical review officer who reviewed the results of Respondent’s drug test. She testified that she saw the results of the marijuana metabolite concentration in Respondent’s drug test, which were transmitted electronically to her from the testing laboratory, and which she stated reflected a positive marijuana test. Again, Petitioner did not introduce into evidence the actual results of Respondent’s June 22, 2018, drug test. Dr. Widerspan testified that she contacted Respondent to determine if a valid medical explanation existed to justify the positive result of the drug test, and after that conversation, determined that Respondent did not present a valid medical explanation. Respondent, an approximately 16-year veteran of DC, testified and presented credible evidence that she suffered from multiple issues related to her back, starting in 2017. As a result, Respondent stated that she took over-the-counter cannabidiol oil (CBD) for back pain around the time of her drug test. Respondent testified that she explored, and ultimately decided to ingest the over-the-counter CBD oil as an alternative to other prescribed pain medication, so that she would not be “woozy” or “goofy” at work, and because, as a correctional officer, she needed to be “aware and alert.” Petitioner and Respondent both provided evidence that Respondent purchased an over-the-counter CBD oil product from a local pharmacy near the time of the drug test. However, Respondent did not provide evidence that a medical professional prescribed the use of CBD oil or any marijuana-related products for her back. Respondent denied ingesting illegal marijuana during her employment with DC, but admitted ingesting over-the-counter CBD oil around the time of her drug test. Dr. Schwimmer testified that the medical review officers at Doctor’s Review Services will not consider a subject’s claim that he or she ingested CBD oil to overturn a drug test that is positive for marijuana because “it is not verifiable.” He further explained: If they are taking a product that is sold legally in the State of Florida, we don’t believe that normal usage would be a valid medical explanation because the levels required are well beyond what you would expect to see from that normal usage. Dr. Schwimmer further testified that “normal” CBD oil should have no more than 0.3% THC, which is very low, and thus should not trigger a positive marijuana test, even if the subject ingests it regularly. Dr. Widerspan similarly testified: Because the THC content within a CBD oil product is a trace amount, which is not - - would not be expected to come up as a positive test. It is not expected to develop a concentration strong enough to show up as a confirmed positive test. Respondent testified that she spoke with Dr. Widerspan after receiving a phone call where Dr. Widerspan indicated that her drug test was positive for marijuana, and Respondent told Dr. Widerspan that she ingested over-the-counter CBD oil. Respondent further provided copies of the bottle of the CBD product, as well as receipts of purchase, to Doctor’s Review Services. Dr. Widerspan stated that she advised Respondent that Respondent failed to provide her with a valid medical explanation that would permit her to overturn the result because over-the- counter CBD oil is not an acceptable prescribed medication, such as Dronabinol. It bears repeating that Petitioner did not introduce into evidence the actual result of Respondent’s June 22, 2018, drug test. Instead, Petitioner apparently relies solely on the testimony of Dr. Schwimmer and Dr. Widerspan to establish that Respondent’s June 22, 2018, drug test resulted in a positive test for marijuana, and in turn, that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character. The only exhibit that Petitioner introduced was a receipt from the local pharmacy where Respondent stated she purchased the over-the-counter CBD product. Respondent introduced into evidence, among other things, a series of letters from current and past co-employees of DC, that attest to her professionalism, strong work ethic, and leadership abilities at DC, as mitigation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Terri D. Roberts. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Anthony Shackelford, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Terri D. Roberts (Address of Record-eServed) Dean Register, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jason Jones, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed)
