The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On November 30, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new, 1994 Mercedes Benz SL600, bearing vehicle identification number WDBFA76EORF093081. The selling dealer was Regency Autohaus, Inc. in Naples, Florida, which is where delivery to Petitioner took place. Petitioner experienced numerous mechanical problems with the vehicle starting shortly after taking delivery. Problems during the first year of ownership included air conditioning that would not work and a transmission problem that would not permit use of gears other than third. On February 22, 1995, Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Petitioner continued to experience problems with the car and, on May 9, 1996, sent Mercedes Benz a second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. Despite repeated attempts by Mercedes Benz to repair largely recurring problems with the car, Petitioner was unable to obtain satisfactory repairs. Twice, the Mercedes Benz dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, where Petitioner lives part of the year, towed the car to the shop to repair a failure of the car to start. Keeping the car 11 days the first time and six days the second time, the Louisville dealer could not determine the source of the problem. Later, in September 1996, the Louisville dealer kept the car for 13 days trying to fix several problems. At this time, the car had 23,692 miles on it. The issue in this case is whether Petitioner made a timely demand for arbitration under the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Motor Vehicle Defect Notifications that Petitioner sent to Mercedes Benz are not demands for arbitration. The forms state that, under the Florida Lemon Law, the purchaser is “requesting that [the manufacturer] make a final attempt to correct the continuing substantial defect(s) or condition(s).” In the spring of 1996, Petitioner spoke with several representatives of Mercedes Benz and Respondent about arbitration and procedures under the Florida Lemon Law. By letter to a national Mercedes Benz representative dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner complained about the car and the discourteous treatment he had received from another Mercedes Benz employee. The letter explains why Petitioner does “not want to keep this vehicle” and warns that, if Petitioner did not hear from someone at Mercedes Benz within five days, he would “have no alternative but take further action.” By letter dated May 9, 1996, Petitioner sent the Office of the Attorney General a letter with a copy of the second Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The letter notes that the car was in the shop for repairs for more than 15 days prior to the expiration of 18 months and thus appears to be covered by the Florida Lemon Law. The letter concludes: “I have requested that the purchase price be refunded or that the vehicle be repaired.” By letter dated May 23, 1996, Petitioner informed a Mercedes Benz representative in St. Petersburg, Florida, that Petitioner had researched his rights under the Florida Lemon Law. Petitioner stated that Mercedes Benz had to replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price. Petitioner added, “If your company fails to do this, then the only alternative would be to arbitrate the matter . . ..” The letter concludes: “It would seem to me that your company should be willing to go ahead and do this rather than go through the arbitration and be ordered to do something that you could voluntarily do. Please advise your thoughts on the matter.” On July 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Immediately above Petitioner’s signature, which is dated June 28, 1996, the form warns that persons making false statements with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duty are guilty of misdemeanor violations of cited Florida Statutes. The form adds: I hereby request arbitration of my case with the Florida New Motor Vehicle Board. I certify that all statements made in connection with this request are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. I understand that this document and its attachments are public records. The letters of April 29 and May 9 and 23 are not demands for arbitration. They are demands for the remedies that are available under the Florida Lemon Law, but they are not demands for arbitration. Nowhere in these three letters does Petitioner, who is an attorney, make a definitive demand of Mercedes Benz or Respondent for arbitration. The letters mention Mercedes Benz’s liability under the Florida Lemon Law and the remedies available under the law. The letters implicitly warn of arbitration, but continue to reflect Petitioner’s strategy during this period to try to work out this matter without the necessity of legal proceedings. Mercedes Benz does not maintain a certified procedure for the resolution of disputes of the type involved in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of January, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Bertram Post Office Box 25 Jamestown, Kentucky 42629-0025 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner timely filed her request for arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the governmental agency responsible under Chapter 681 for receiving and evaluating consumer complaints and requests for arbitration that are filed against automobile manufacturers and dealers doing business in the state. Respondent is required to determine if a consumer's request for arbitration should be referred to the Attorney General for arbitration. Petitioner is a consumer within the meaning of Section 681.102(4). Petitioner purchased a motor vehicle for personal use and took delivery of the motor vehicle on September 15, 1992 (the "motor vehicle"). 2/ Petitioner filed two requests for arbitration for her motor vehicle. Petitioner filed her first request for arbitration on February 22, 1995. She filed her second request for arbitration on May 16, 1995. By letter dated March 7, 1995, Respondent notified Petitioner that her first request for arbitration lacked certain required information and returned the request for arbitration to Petitioner. Petitioner voluntarily withdrew her first request for arbitration on April 12, 1995. Respondent closed its file regarding the first request for arbitration. On May 16, 1995, Petitioner filed her second request for arbitration. Pursuant to a letter dated May 19, 1995, Respondent denied Petitioner's second request for arbitration on the grounds that it was not timely filed. Petitioner is generally required under Chapter 681 to file her request for arbitration within the time defined in Section 681.102(9) as the "Lemon Law rights period" (the "initial rights period"). The initial rights period expires on the earlier occurrence of two dates. The first date is 18 months from the date of delivery. The second date is the date that the motor vehicle accumulates 24,000 miles. The dealer delivered the motor vehicle to Petitioner on September 15, 1992. Eighteen months from the date of delivery was March 15, 1994. The motor vehicle accumulated 24,000 miles on September 16, 1993. The initial rights period expired on September 16, 1993, because that date occurred earlier than March 15, 1994. The initial rights period is extended, pursuant to Section 681.104(3)(b), for six months if there are any uncured nonconformities (the "extension period"). Petitioner experienced uncured nonconformities in the gear shift mechanism of the motor vehicle. The gear shift arm buzzes when the motor vehicle is driven in a forward gear. The gear shift arm jumps out of gear when the motor vehicle is being driven in reverse. 3/ Petitioner took the motor vehicle in for repair four times for the problem with the gear shift mechanism. The dealer attempted to repair the problem on: August 6, 1992, when the vehicle had accumulated 3,987 miles; September 16, 1993, when the vehicle had accumulated 24,000 miles; 4/ January 9, 1995, when the vehicle had accumulated 38,568 miles; and January 30, 1995, when the vehicle had accumulated 39,087 miles. The dealer never repaired the problem with the gear shift mechanism. The motor vehicle accumulated 24,000 miles on September 16, 1993. The extension period extended the time in which Petitioner was entitled to file her request for arbitration from September 16, 1993, until March 16, 1994. Respondent added 51 days to the time in which Petitioner was allowed to file a request for arbitration to reflect the period of time from the date Petitioner filed her first request for arbitration, on February 22, 1995, until she voluntarily withdrew her first request for arbitration on April 12, 1995. Fifty-one days from the last date of the extension period, March 16, 1994, expired on May 7, 1994. Petitioner filed her second request for arbitration on May 16, 1995, approximately one year after May 7, 1994. Petitioner did not file her second request for arbitration in a timely manner. 5/ Petitioner's second request for arbitration was not filed in a timely manner under the alternative deadline for filing a request for arbitration. Even if it is assumed that the motor vehicle did not accumulate 24,000 miles until 18 months after the date of delivery of the vehicle, Petitioner did not file her second request for arbitration in a timely manner. 6/ The dealer delivered the motor vehicle on September 15, 1992. The initial period of 18 months expired on March 15, 1994. The extension period expired on September 15, 1994. Fifty-one days from the expiration of the extension period was November 5, 1994. Petitioner did not file her request for arbitration until May 16, 1995.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration as not timely filed. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1995.
The Issue Whether the Petitioners' Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 681.109, Florida Statutes, Respondent's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate consumer requests for arbitration pursuant to Chapter 681, which is officially known as the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, but which is more commonly referred to as the "Lemon Law". As part of its responsibilities, the Division of Consumer Services determines whether complaints it receives from consumer against manufacturers pursuant to the "Lemon Law" qualify for referral to the Department of Legal Affairs for further proceedings before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. 1/ On March 29, 1995, Respondent received and filed Petitioners' Request for Arbitration under the provisions of the Lemon Law. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as being ". . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever first occurs." The automobile that is the subject of Petitioners' complaint is a Toyota Camry. The Petitioners took delivery of this vehicle on July 25, 1992, the date they leased the vehicle from a Toyota dealer. Eighteen months from July 25, 1992, is January 25, 1994. It was not until September 1, 1994, that Petitioners put 24,000 miles on the vehicle. The initial Lemon Law period, as defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, expired for the subject vehicle on January 25, 1994. Petitioners made complaints to the dealer prior to January 25, 1994, that remained uncured after January 25, 1994. Because of those complaints, the Respondent assumed that the Lemon Law period was extended for an additional six month period pursuant to Section 681.104(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Petitioners, the Respondent determined that the extended Lemon Law period expired July 25, 1994. It is found that the extended Lemon Law period for the subject vehicle expired on or before July 25, 1994. Pertinent to this proceeding, Section 681.109(4), Florida Statutes, provides that a consumer must request arbitration before the Arbitration Board within six months after the expiration of the extended Lemon Law rights period. Because of that provision, the Petitioners had until January 25, 1995, to file its request for relief under the Lemon Law. The request for relief under the Lemon Law, first filed by Petitioners on March 29, 1995, was not timely.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that denies the Petitioners' Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board on the grounds that the request was not timely. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1995.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner’s request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Department of Agriculture And Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services. Respondent administers the “Motor Vehicle Enforcement Warranty” set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, inclusive of the Florida New Vehicle Arbitration Board. Petitioner is a consumer who took delivery of the then new motor vehicle at issue on December 8, 1995. He received no information from the dealership where he purchased the vehicle concerning his rights to access to Respondent’s arbitration program. On June 1, 1998, Respondent received Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Petitioner’s vehicle had 24,000 miles on it at that time. Petitioner’s arbitration request disclosed vehicle problems requiring at least three repair attempts. Petitioner’s request failed to provide a copy of any written defect notification, or other written notification to the manufacturer of the vehicle. In his arbitration application and later at the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that he had provided the manufacturer with such written notification. However, despite Respondent’s repeated request of Petitioner to provide Respondent with copies of that notification, Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation. The fourth notice by Respondent to Petitioner informed him that a copy of such notification must be received by Respondent no later than August 3, 1998. Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with a copy of the manufacturer notification by the deadline of August 3, 1998. Thereafter, by letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent notified Petitioner that his request for arbitration was denied as ineligible. At the final hearing, the testimony of Respondent’s spokesman, James D. Morrison, established that Petitioner’s failure to provide Respondent with a copy of the Motor Vehicle Defect Information form sent to the manufacturer by Petitioner was the sole reason that Petitioner’s application for arbitration was denied. As further established by Morrison’s testimony, the rationale of Respondent for the requirement of the copy of Petitioner’s notification to the manufacturer, and copy of receipt of acceptance by the manufacturer, is to ascertain that Petitioner has complied with Section 681.104, Florida Statutes, requiring that all applicants for arbitration first notify the vehicle manufacturer by registered or express mail of such application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard C. Holtzendorf, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Arthur H. Baredian 275 Ravine Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board should be denied as untimely.
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive and evaluate requests for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (Board), submitted by purchasers of new motor vehicles in this state. If a request qualifies for arbitration and is timely filed, the matter is referred to the Florida Attorney General for further processing and action. On September 10, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new Ford Escort automobile from Ken Marks Ford in Clearwater, Florida. The mileage reflected on the odometer at the time of delivery was 26 miles. Petitioner claims that at the time he took delivery of the vehicle, he was not furnished with a copy of the Attorney General's brochure entitled Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law, nor was he given any other information, either in person or in writing, from the dealer or from anyone else, regarding the operation of the Lemon Law program. However, at hearing he indicated that he had a copy of the pamphlet as early as October 13, 1995, when he signed the Defect Notification form which is included within the pamphlet. The pamphlet clearly outlines the benefits, requirements and time limits pertinent to the program. From the very beginning of his ownership, Petitioner experienced difficulty with the vehicle. His first problem, requiring the replacement of the right head lamp assembly, took place on September 13, 1993, only three days after delivery and continued until December, 1995. He experienced problems with several systems at least three times each. These included squealing brakes, the right seat belt, the alarm light, the tachometer, the gas pedal and the idle. By the time he took the vehicle in for the third time for the most recent problem, the odometer registered 30,710 miles. He claims to have notified the manufacturer in writing of this problem on October 18, 1995. Mr. Maxwell accumulated 24,000 miles on his vehicle on or before January 4, 1995. It was on that date, when he brought the vehicle to the dealer for the third time for the squeaking brakes, the alarm light and the seat belt problems, that the odometer showed 24,035 miles. Even though the initial Lemon law period expired at 24,000 miles, Petitioner was potentially eligible for a six month extension of the original rights period because several complaints registered with the dealer during the initial period remained uncorrected at that time. The six months extension expired on or before July 4, 1995. Under the Florida Lemon Law, consumers are entitled to file for relief under the statute for a period of up to six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, because of the six month extension, the filing deadline of six months expired no later than January 4, 1996. In October 1995, Petitioner contacted Ford's Customer Assistance Center and requested information regarding correction of his problems. In response he received a customer satisfaction questionnaire but no assistance with his difficulties. Thereafter, he contacted the Department to request the form for filing the Request for Arbitration on November 11, 1995. Subsequent to the receipt of the Request for Arbitration from the Division, Mr. Maxwell engaged in several telephone negotiations with representatives of Ford Motor Company and received oral settlement offers from the company, including either a replacement automobile or a total refund. When Mr. Maxwell elected to receive a refund, he was told that the Ford representative would get back to him but no one from either Ford Motor Company or Ken Marks Ford ever did. Petitioner believes he was misled by both so that he would thereafter become ineligible for participation in the arbitration program. Ford Motor Company has no state- certified settlement procedure. Petitioner's Request for Arbitration reflects January 6, 1996 as the date of execution. It was received in the Division of Consumer Services on January 10, 1996. It was subsequently reviewed and rejected as untimely by the Division on January 16, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Maxwell 775 Lantana Avenue Clearwater Beach, Florida 34630 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner has leased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1992 Merdedes-Benz 300SE (hereinafter referred to as the "subject vehicle"), from Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., an automobile dealership located in Coral Gables, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"), since October 30, 1991, when he took delivery of the vehicle. At the time of delivery, the subject vehicle was new. Thereafter, various problems developed with the subject vehicle. Petitioner reported these problems to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to completely rectify them within 18 months of the date of delivery. Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles during this 18-month period. Some of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of his possession of the vehicle still persist today. On or about April 23, 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." The manufacturer responded by sending the following letter, dated April 27, 1993, to Petitioner: This will acknowledge the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form you completed, which was received by this office today. This letter shall serve as a written request to provide Mercedes-Benz of North America ("MBNA") with an opportunity to inspect, verify and if necessary, repair your vehicle. As you are aware, Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., located in Coral Gables, Fl., is a reasonably accessible repair facility. Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, will contact you to make an appointment to meet with you. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to call me at (904)443-2150. In or about December of 1993, Petitioner retained Joseph Portuondo, Esquire, who sent, on Petitioner's behalf, the following letter, dated December 13, 1993, to the manufacturer: As you know, Mr. Palaez has experienced such difficulty with his automobile that it led to his filing of a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification with you on April 23, 1993. Thereafter, on April 27, 1993, you directed Mr. Palaez to Bill Ussery [Motors], Inc. of Coral Gables, Florida, to attempt the last chance repairs to his automobile. Mr. Palaez complied with your instructions. However, the defects in the automobile remain unresolved and out of service days are well in excess of those required under the Lemon Laws of this state. Simply put, Mr. Palaez has a lemon for which we demand a remedy. As such, we hereby demand that Mr. Palaez be immediately refunded the full purchase price of the vehicle. In the event that you do not immediately provide a refund, we hereby demand that this matter be referred to the appropriate state-certified settlement program. Needless to say, if we are unsatisfied with this matter, we will proceed for relief to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board of the Office of the Attorney General. We trust that our position in this matter is clear. It is truly unfortunate that Mercedes-Benz and its dealer have chosen to treat Mr. Palaez so poorly as a customer that he has had to resort to judicial relief. In response to Portuondo's letter, the manufacturer sent him the following letter, dated December 21, 1993: We are writing in response to the correspondence received by this office today, regarding your client's vehicle. Mercedes-Benz of North America is concerned in this matter and as a result, your concerns have been assigned to Mr. Eric Moore, Field Service Manager, a member of our staff for handling. You will, if not already, be contacted by him in the near future. Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. On or about December 29, 1993, Portuondo sent Petitioner a copy of the manufacturer's December 21, 1993, letter, along with the following cover letter: Enclosed herein please find a letter recently received [with respect to the above-referenced] subject matter. I will let you know if there is any progress. Petitioner waited until August 12, 1994, to file with the Department his Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. He did not file a request sooner because, from April of 1993, the manufacturer and Dealership had repeatedly made representations to him, upon which he relied, that they would either make the necessary repairs to the subject vehicle or otherwise resolve the matter to his satisfaction so that there would be no need for him to resort to arbitration or litigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner's request for arbitration is not time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of March, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1995.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board concerning his purchase of a 1995 Saturn automobile.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, was the state agency responsible for the administration of matters regarding the implementation of the Lemon Law for motor vehicles in this state. Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, deals with motor vehicle sales warranties, and incorporates Florida’s Lemon Law as it is pertinent to this matter. Petitioner, Marshall E. Pitts, III, a resident of Groveland, Florida, purchased a 1995 Saturn SLI automobile on or about March 14, 1995, from Saturn of Orlando. The purchase order/contract for sale bears a date of March 14, 1995. The purchase price of the vehicle was $13,750. Petitioner had a trade-in valued at $8,400, which left a difference of $5,350 to be paid. In his request for arbitration, Petitioner indicated the purchase date as March 16, 1995, and the Department, giving him the benefit of the doubt in calculating the allowable time for filing under the Lemon Law, considered the March 16, 1995, date as the date of purchase/delivery which initiates the running of the time for filing a request for arbitration. The Lemon Law calls for filing for arbitration within 18 months or 24,000 miles of delivery. Therefore, the initial filing deadline was September 16, 1996. The vehicle reached 24,000 miles on the odometer sometime in November 1996. The Lemon Law statute allows an extension of six months for filing if a nonconformity has been reported but not cured by the manufacturer or its representative by the expiration of the Lemon Law period. Petitioner took the vehicle in for repairs to the safety belt three times starting sometime in October 1995. Exact dates are not shown. He also took it in for repairs to the transaxle three times, on March 21, 1996, September 19, 1996, and on January 31, 1997. The trouble with the transaxle was not corrected within the Lemon Law rights period. Because of this, a six-month extension for triple reports of difficulty was implemented. This extended the filing deadline to March 16, 1997. Petitioner was afforded an additional six-months extension because of the wording of the statute which grants an individual six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law Rights period to request arbitration. Application of this additional six months extended the filing deadline to September 16, 1997. Petitioner submitted his request for arbitration on October 29, 1997, and it was received in the Department on November 5, 1997. At the time of filing the request, there were 77,000 miles on the vehicle’s odometer. Petitioner claims he did not receive any notification of his rights under the Lemon Law from the dealer at the time he took delivery of the vehicle. He claims it was only when talking with an attorney late in the process that he learned of the existence of the arbitration procedure. A dealer of new cars is required by law to provide the purchaser of a new vehicle with a copy of the Department’s brochure which outlines the Lemon Law program. Petitioner also recites a litany of complaints regarding the vehicle and the treatment he received from both the selling dealer and the manufacturer. Unfortunately, traumatic as these problems must have been to him, they have no relevance to the issues here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall E. Pitts, III 3831 Soto Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
