Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, was the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents and the regulation of the insurance business in Florida. Respondent, Richard M. Rinker, was licensed by the Petitioner as a health insurance agent engaged in the business of soliciting, selling and servicing health insurance policies for National States Insurance Company. Levon H. and Joan D. Sprague, husband and wife, moved to Florida from New York in August, 1991. Prior to moving to Florida, the Spragues operated a restaurant in New York and purchased health insurance from Blue Cross/Blue Shield for themselves and some of their employees. They also owned a H.I.P. policy which was similar to a health maintenance organization, but both that coverage and the Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage were dropped when they moved to Florida. Because both Mr. and Mrs. Sprague were getting older, and because both had indications of possible future health problems based on experience and family history, upon the recommendation of Mrs. Sprague's father, who had purchased coverage from Respondent and was satisfied with the service received, they contacted Respondent and met with him about purchasing health insurance. The first meeting was on January 6, 1992. At that time, the Sprague's made Respondent aware of the fact that they had no health insurance coverage at that time and that they wanted to purchase coverage which would give them 100 percent reimbursement of all bills for medical care rendered. After some discussion, they agreed to accept less coverage for doctors' bills and other professional services, but were quite adamant in reiterating they wanted a policy that would cover 100 percent of the cost of hospitalization. They emphasized this because of Mr. Sprague's family's history of heart problems and they wanted to be sure the hospital expense would be covered in full. They felt the doctors could wait a while for payment of the full amount of their bills. During the course of his presentation, Respondent utilized a document called a National States Limited Medical-Surgical Hospital Confinement Plan which purportedly outlined the specifics of policy coverage. Under that portion entitled "Specific Benefits", the form read, "This policy pays percent of usual and customary expenses of the following type:". Under the blank space, in smaller type, were the numbers "10, 20, 30, 40". In the blank area, Respondent, by hand, inserted 80 percent. Above, and to the right of that insertion, he also placed the numbers, "100 percent" and "40 percent." Respondent explains this as being his attempt to provide answers to questions asked of him by Mrs. Sprague. He noted that his company does not offer a major medical policy such as desired by the Spragues, and that the only way he could provide coverage close to that which they wanted was to combine policies. Using a yellow highlighter, he also highlighted the words, "Doctor's charges", "doctor's office", "clinic", "hospital", "home", and "surgical or medical center." He also highlighted the terms "annual mammography screening" because Mrs. Sprague had specifically inquired about coverage of that procedure. On that visit, Respondent sold the Spragues two policies each. These were "MSH-1" and "MSH-2" policies which, the Spragues recall, Respondent indicated would provide the total coverage they wanted. Initially, the premium was to be $3,600.00 for the year, but when the Spragues indicated they could not afford that much, after calling his office, Respondent was able to offer them 6 months coverage for one half the price. They were satisfied with this and accepted the policies. Mr. Rinker received as his commission 45 percent of the premium paid in by the Spragues for the first year of the policy. When he departed the Spragues' home, he left with them the policy outline he utilized in his presentation, a large manila envelope containing information regarding his office hours and phone number, and a MSP form required by law. The coverage was not heavily used at first. When, during the first six month period, claims were initially denied because of the waiting period, the Spragues accepted that. After the expiration of the waiting period, all claims submitted for doctors' visits and mammography were covered to at least 80 percent of the amount expected by the Spragues. This was, however, because of the combined benefits paid by the two policies. Neither policy, alone, paid 100 percent percent of the claim. The Spragues were satisfied with this because it was not hospitalization. Later on, however, it became apparent that Mr. Sprague would have to enter the hospital for coronary bypass surgery, and he was admitted on an emergency basis. Before the surgery was done, however, the Spragues wanted to be sure the hospital bills would be paid in full, and they had their daughter- in-law, who had extensive experience in the insurance business prior to that time, to examine the policies. Her review of the policies generated some questions in her mind as to whether they provided 100 percent coverage of all hospital costs. To satisfy herself and her in-laws, utilizing the telephone number for Respondent on the materials left by him with the Spragues, she contacted him and asked, specifically, whether the policies he had sold to the Spragues, provided the 100 percent coverage they desired. His answer was somewhat evasive and non- responsive to her inquiry. He said, "Don't worry. She'll [Ms. Sprague] be able to sleep at night. She has a good policy." This did not satisfy either Ms. Sprague or her mother-in-law, and so she called Respondent again. During this second conversation he admitted that for at least a part of the cost, there was a 40 percent coinsurance provision. Respondent claims that during these calls, Ms. Sprague did not tell him that her father-in-law was to have surgery but only told him about tests. The tests were covered and the bills therefor paid by National States. By the time of these calls, however, Mr. Sprague was already in the hospital and facing the surgery the following morning. There was little that could be done. Mr. Sprague wanted to cancel the surgery but his wife would not allow this and the operation was accomplished. The hospital bills received by the Spragues amounted to approximately $140,000. Of this, the insurance company paid approximately $18,000. Ultimately, the Spragues and the hospital were able to reach an agreement for settlement of the obligation for $40,000. In order to satisfy this, Mr. Sprague was required to liquidate all his investments. He still owes the doctors a substantial sum but is making periodic payments to liquidate those obligations. The policies which Respondent sold to the Spragues were limited medical and surgical expense policies which pay only a limited percentage of incurred medical expenses over a limited period of time. Neither policy pays 100 percent of any medical or surgical expense. Respondent did not clearly communicate this fact to the Spragues. They suffered from the misconception that the policies sold to them by the Respondent paid 100 percent coverage for hospital expense, 80 percent for doctor fees, and 40 percent for medication. Petitioner presented no evidence that what Respondent did was below the standards accepted of sales agents within the health insurance industry. On the other hand, James Quinn, an insurance agent since 1975, who has taught life and health insurance and the legal responsibility of agents in the health insurance area with the approval of the Department since 1985, testified on behalf of Respondent. Mr. Quinn noted that there are three types of medical policies in use, including basic medical expense, major medical, and comprehensive major medical. The first of these, basic medical expense, permits liberal underwriting and pays policy limits. In Mr. Quinn's opinion, based on the age and preexisting conditions that the Sprague's have, major medical coverage, like they wanted, would cost between seven and ten thousand dollars annually, excluding deductibles. Health insurance coverage outlines, such as used by Respondent in his presentation to the Spragues are, according to Mr. Quinn, reasonably self-explanatory and are left with the insured either when the policy is applied for or is delivered. In the former case, the client is able to read the outline and cancel the policy before delivery, if he so desires. In the latter case, the insured has a set number of days to read the policy after delivery and cancel if he so desires. These outlines do not substitute for the policy, however, and generally, the agent prefers to deliver the policy personally so he can go over it again with the insured. According to Mr. Quinn, it is difficult to explain coverage to prospective insureds because of their unfamiliarity with the terminology and the available benefits. He concluded that the action of the Respondent, in issue here, whereby he used the coverage outline to explain the coverages to the Spragues, was consistent with proper agent conduct and was within industry standards. He also concluded that based on what Respondent had available to sell to the Spragues, he sold them the best package he could, at the time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this matter finding Respondent, Richard Michael Rinker, guilty of a violation of Sections 626.611(5), (7), (9), and (13); 626.621(2) and (6); 626.9521, and 626.9541(1)(a)(1), (1)(e)(1), and (1)(k)(1), Florida statutes, and suspending his license as a health insurance agent for nine months. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-0089 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted as to finding Mr. Quinn is an expert regarding insurance standards and business practices, but rejected as insinuating those opinions are binding on the Hearing Officer. Rejected notwithstanding the opinions of Mr. Quinn. Accepted, as there is no evidence to the contrary. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as contra to the evidence. Second sentence accepted as to the furnishing, but the quality of the information was less than clear. Balance accepted. & 8. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") properly disallowed Petitioners' expense for liability insurance and accrued contingent liability costs contained in AHCA's audit of Petitioners' Medicaid cost reports.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners operate licensed nursing homes that participate in the Florida Medicaid program as institutional providers. The 14 Palm Gardens facilities are limited liability companies operating as subsidiaries of New Rochelle Administrators, LLC, which also provides the facilities with management services under a management contract. AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. One of AHCA's duties is to audit Medicaid cost reports submitted by providers participating in the Medicaid program. During the audit period, Petitioners provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreements that they entered into with AHCA. The Provider Agreements contained the following relevant provision: (3) Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002)1, provided in relevant part: Reimbursement of Medicaid providers.-- Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. These methodologies may include fee schedules, reimbursement methods based on cost reporting, negotiated fees, competitive bidding pursuant to s. 287.057, and other mechanisms the agency considers efficient and effective for purchasing services or goods on behalf of recipients. . . . * * * (2)(a)1. Reimbursement to nursing homes licensed under part II of chapter 400 . . . must be made prospectively. . . . * * * (b) Subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, the agency shall establish and implement a Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Medicaid) for nursing home care in order to provide care and services in conformance with the applicable state and federal laws, rules, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to ensure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable geographic access to such care. . . . AHCA has adopted the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the "Plan") by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. The Plan incorporates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") Publication 15-1, also called the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual" or "PRM"), which provides "guidelines and policies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of l965, as amended." CMS Pub. 15-1, Foreword, p. I. The audit period in these cases spans two versions of the Plan: version XXIII, effective July 1, 2002, and version XXIV, effective January 1, 2003. It is unnecessary to distinguish between the two versions of the Plan because their language is identical as to the provisions relevant to these cases. Section I of the Plan, "Cost Finding and Cost Reporting," provides as follows, in relevant part: The cost report shall be prepared by a Certified Public Accountant in accordance with chapter 409.908, Florida Statutes, on the form prescribed in section I.A. [AHCA form 5100-000, Rev. 7-1-90], and on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as incorporated by reference in Rule 61H1-20.007, F.A.C., the methods of reimbursement in accordance with Medicare (Title XVIII) Principles of Reimbursement, the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB. 15-1)(1993) incorporated herein by reference except as modified by the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan and State of Florida Administrative Rules. . . . Section III of the Plan, "Allowable Costs," provides as follows, in relevant part: Implicit in any definition of allowable costs is that those costs shall not exceed what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer pays for a given service or item. If costs are determined by AHCA, utilizing the Title XVIII Principles of Reimbursement, CMS-PUB. 15-1 (1993) and this plan, to exceed the level that a prudent buyer would incur, then the excess costs shall not be reimbursable under the plan. The Plan is a cost based prospective reimbursement plan. The Plan uses historical data from cost reports to establish provider reimbursement rates. The "prospective" feature is an upward adjustment to historical costs to establish reimbursement rates for subsequent rate semesters.2 The Plan establishes limits on reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement ceilings and targets. AHCA establishes reimbursement ceilings for nursing homes based on the size and location of the facilities. The ceilings are determined prospectively, on a semiannual basis. "Targets" limit the inflationary increase in reimbursement rates from one semester to the next and limit a provider's allowable costs for reimbursement purposes. If a provider's costs exceed the target, then those costs are not factored into the reimbursement rate and must be absorbed by the provider. A nursing home is required to file cost reports. The costs identified in the cost reports are converted into per diem rates in four components: the operating component; the direct care component; the indirect care component; and the property component. GL/PL insurance costs fall under the operating component. Once the per diem rate is established for each component, the nursing home's reimbursement rate is set at the lowest of four limitations: the facility's costs; the facility's target; the statewide cost ceiling based on the size of the facility and its region; or the statewide target, also based on the size and location of the facility. The facility's target is based on the initial cost report submitted by that facility. The initial per diem established pursuant to the initial cost report becomes the "base rate." Once the base rate is established, AHCA sets the target by inflating the base rate forward to subsequent six- month rate semesters according to a pre-established inflation factor. Reimbursement for cost increases experienced in subsequent rate semesters is limited by the target drawn from the base rate. Thus, the facility's reimbursement for costs in future rate semesters is affected by the target limits established in the initial period cost report. Expenses that are disallowed during the establishment of the base rate cannot be reclaimed in later reimbursement periods. Petitioners entered the Medicaid program on June 29, 2002. They filed cost reports for the nine- month period from their entry into the program through February 28, 2003. These reports included all costs claimed by Petitioners under the accrual basis of accounting in rendering services to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. In preparing their cost reports, Petitioners used the standard Medicaid Cost Report "Chart of Accounts and Description," which contains the account numbers to be used for each ledger entry, and explains the meaning of each account number. Under the general category of "Administration" are set forth several subcategories of account numbers, including "Insurance Expense." Insurance Expense is broken into five account numbers, including number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party," which is described as "[c]osts of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or a non-profit service corporation."3 Petitioners' cost report stated the following expenses under account number 730810: Facility Amount Palm Garden of Clearwater $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Gainesville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Jacksonville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Largo $171,188.00 Palm Garden of North Miami $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Ocala $217,712.00 Palm Garden of Orlando $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Pinellas $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Port St. Lucie $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Sun City $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Tampa $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Vero Beach $217,712.00 Palm Garden of West Palm Beach $231,151.00 Palm Garden of Winter Haven $145,042.00 AHCA requires that the cost reports of first-year providers undergo an audit. AHCA's contract auditing firm, Smiley & Smiley, conducted an examination4 of the cost reports of the 14 Palm Gardens nursing homes to determine whether the included costs were allowable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has promulgated a series of "attestation standards" to provide guidance and establish a framework for the attestation services provided by the accounting profession in various contexts. Attestation Standards 101 and 601 set out the standard an accountant relies upon in examining for governmental compliance. Smiley & Smiley examined the Palm Gardens cost reports pursuant to these standards. During the course of the audit, Smiley & Smiley made numerous requests for documentation and other information pursuant to the Medicaid provider agreement and the Plan. Petitioners provided the auditors with their general ledger, invoices, audited financial statements, bank statements, and other documentation in support of their cost reports. The examinations were finalized during the period between September 28, 2006, and October 4, 2006. The audit report issued by AHCA contained more than 2,000 individual adjustments to Petitioners' costs, which the parties to these consolidated proceedings have negotiated and narrowed to two adjustments per Palm Gardens facility.5 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the first adjustment at issue is AHCA's disallowance of Palm Gardens' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of GL/PL insurance, where Palm Gardens could not document that it had purchased GL/PL insurance. The second adjustment at issue is ACHA's disallowance of a portion of the premium paid by Palm Gardens for the Mature Care Policies. The total amount of the adjustment at issue for each facility is set forth in the Preliminary Statement above. Of that total for each facility, $18,849.00 constituted the disallowance for the Mature Care Policies. The remainder constituted the disallowance for the accrual of GL/PL related contingent liabilities. Janette Smiley, senior partner at Smiley & Smiley and expert in Medicaid auditing, testified that Petitioners provided no documentation other than the Mature Care Policies to support the GL/PL entry in the cost reports. Ms. Smiley testified that, during much of the examination process, she understood Petitioners to be self-insured. Ms. Smiley's understanding was based in part on statements contained in Petitioners' audited financial statements. In the audited financial statement covering the period from June 28, 2002, through December 31, 2002, Note six explains Petitioners' operating leases and states as follows, in relevant part: The lease agreement requires that the Company maintain general and professional liability in specified minimum amounts. As an alternative to maintaining these levels of insurance, the lease agreement allows the Company to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount. The Company chose to self-insure, and has recorded litigation reserves of approximately $1,735,000 that are included in other accrued expenses (see Note 9). As of December 31, 2002, these reserves have not been funded by the Company. . . . The referenced Note nine, titled "Commitments and Contingencies," provides as follows in relevant part: Due to the current legal environment, providers of long-term care services are experiencing significant increases in liability insurance premiums or cancellations of liability insurance coverage. Most, if not all, insurance carriers in Florida have ceased offering liability coverage altogether. The Company's Florida facilities have minimal levels of insurance coverage and are essentially self-insured. The Company has established reserves (see Note 6) that estimate its exposure to uninsured claims. Management is not currently aware of any claims that could exceed these reserves. However, the ultimate outcome of these uninsured claims cannot be determined with certainty, and could therefore have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company. The relevant notes in Petitioner's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2003, are identical to those quoted above, except that the recorded litigation reserves were increased to $4 million. The notes provide that, as of December 31, 2003, these reserves had not been funded by Petitioners. Ms. Smiley observed that the quoted notes, while referencing "self-insurance" and the recording of litigation reserves, stated that the litigation reserves had not been funded. By e-mail dated April 21, 2005, Ms. Smiley corresponded with Stanley Swindling, the shareholder in the accounting firm Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A., who had primary responsibility for preparing Petitioners' cost reports. Ms. Smiley noted that Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the company "chose to self-insure" and "recorded litigation reserves," then wrote (verbatim): By definition from PRM CMS Pub 15-1 Sections 2162.5 and 2162.7 the Company does in fact have self-insurance as there is no shifting of risk. You will have to support your positioning a letter addressing the regs for self-insurance. As clearly the financial statement auditors believe this is self- insurance and have disclosed such to the financial statement users. If you cannot support the funding as required by the regs, the provider will have to support expense as "pay as you go" in accordance with [2162.6] for PL/GL. * * * Please review 2161 and 2162 and provide support based on the required compliance. If support is not complete within the regulations, amounts for IBNR [incurred but not reported] will be disallowed and we will need to have the claims paid reports from the TPA [third party administrator] (assuming there is a TPA handling the claims processing), in order to allow any expense. Section 2160 of the Manual establishes the basic insurance requirement: A. General.-- A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider's financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self-insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. . . . . . . If a provider is unable to obtain malpractice coverage, it must select one of the self-insurance alternatives in §2162 to protect itself against such risks. If one of these alternatives is not selected and the provider incurs losses, the cost of such losses and related expenses are not allowable. Section 2161.A of the Manual sets forth the general rule as to the reimbursement of insurance costs. It provides that the reasonable costs of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or nonprofit service corporation are allowable to the extent they are "consistent with sound management practice." Reimbursement for insurance premiums is limited to the "amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Section 2162 of the Manual provides as follows, in relevant part: PROVIDER COSTS FOR MALPRACTICE AND COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE General.-- Where provider costs incurred for protection against malpractice and comprehensive general liability . . . do not meet the requirements of §2161.A, costs incurred for that protection under other arrangements will be allowable under the conditions stated below. . . . * * * The following illustrates alternatives to full insurance coverage from commercial sources which providers, acting individually or as part of a group or a pool, can adopt to obtain malpractice, and comprehensive general liability, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and employee health care insurance protection: Insurance purchased from a commercial insurance company which provides coverage after a deductible or coinsurance provision has been met; Insurance purchased from a limited purpose insurance company (captive); Total self-insurance; or A combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. . . . part: Section 2162.3 of the Manual provides: Self-Insurance.-- You may believe that it is more prudent to maintain a total self- insurance program (i.e., the assumption by you of the risk of loss) independently or as part of a group or pool rather than to obtain protection through purchased insurance coverage. If such a program meets the conditions specified in §2162.7, payments into such funds are allowable costs. Section 2162.7 of the Manual provides, in relevant Conditions Applicable to Self-Insurance.-- Definition of Self-Insurance.-- Self- insurance is a means whereby a provider(s), whether proprietary or nonproprietary, undertakes the risk to protect itself against anticipated liabilities by providing funds in an amount equivalent to liquidate those liabilities. . . . * * * Self-Insurance Fund.-- The provider or pool establishes a fund with a recognized independent fiduciary such as a bank, a trust company, or a private benefit administrator. In the case of a State or local governmental provider or pool, the State in which the provider or pool is located may act as a fiduciary. The provider or pool and fiduciary must enter into a written agreement which includes all of the following elements: General Legal Responsibility.-- The fiduciary agreement must include the appropriate legal responsibilities and obligations required by State laws. Control of Fund.-- The fiduciary must have legal title to the fund and be responsible for proper administration and control. The fiduciary cannot be related to the provider either through ownership or control as defined in Chapter 10, except where a State acts as a fiduciary for a State or local governmental provider or pool. Thus, the home office of a chain organization or a religious order of which the provider is an affiliate cannot be the fiduciary. In addition, investments which may be made by the fiduciary from the fund are limited to those approved under State law governing the use of such fund; notwithstanding this, loans by the fiduciary from the fund to the provider or persons related to the provider are not permitted. Where the State acts as fiduciary for itself or local governments, the fund cannot make loans to the State or local governments. . . . The quoted Manual provisions clarify that Ms. Smiley's message to Mr. Swindling was that Petitioners had yet to submit documentation to bring their "self-insurance" expenses within the reimbursable ambit of Sections 2161 and 2162 of the Manual. There was no indication that Petitioners had established a fund in an amount sufficient to liquidate its anticipated liabilities, or that any such funds had been placed under the control of a fiduciary. Petitioners had simply booked the reserved expenses without setting aside any cash to cover the expenses. AHCA provided extensive testimony regarding the correspondence that continued among Ms. Smiley, Mr. Swindling, and AHCA employees regarding this "self-insurance" issue. It is not necessary to set forth detailed findings as to these matters, because Petitioners ultimately conceded to Ms. Smiley that, aside from the Mutual Care policies, they did not purchase commercial insurance as described in Section 2161.A, nor did they avail themselves of the alternatives to commercial insurance described in Section 2162.A. Petitioners did not purchase commercial insurance with a deductible, did not self- insure, did not purchase insurance from a limited purpose or "captive" insurance company, or employ a combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. Ms. Smiley eventually concluded that Petitioners had no coverage for general and professional liability losses in excess of the $25,000 value of the Mutual Care Policies. Under the cited provisions of the Manual, Petitioners' unfunded self- insurance expense was not considered allowable under the principles of reimbursement. Petitioners were uninsured, which led Ms. Smiley to further conclude that Section 2162.13 of the Manual would apply: Absence of Coverage.-- Where a provider, other than a governmental (Federal, State, or local) provider, has no insurance protection against malpractice or comprehensive general liability in conjunction with malpractice, either in the form of a limited purpose or commercial insurance policy or a self-insurance fund as described in §2162.7, any losses and related expenses incurred are not allowable. In response to this disallowance pursuant to the strict terms of the Manual, Petitioners contend that AHCA should not have limited its examination of the claimed costs to the availability of documentation that would support those costs as allowable under the Manual. Under the unique circumstances presented by their situation, Petitioners assert that AHCA should have examined the state of the nursing home industry in Florida, particularly the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, and further examined whether Petitioners had the ability to meet the insurance requirements set forth in the Manual. Petitioners assert that, in light of such an examination, AHCA should have concluded that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may properly be invoked to render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Keith Parnell is an expert in insurance for the long- term care industry. He is a licensed insurance broker working for Hamilton Insurance Agency, which provides insurance and risk management services to about 40 percent of the Florida nursing home market. Mr. Parnell testified that during the audit period, it was impossible for nursing homes to obtain insurance in Florida. In his opinion, Petitioners could not have purchased commercial insurance during the audit period. To support this testimony, Petitioners offered a study conducted by the Florida Department of Insurance ("DOI") in 2000 that attempted to determine the status of the Florida long-term care liability insurance market for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and continuing care retirement communities. Of the 79 companies that responded to DOI's data call, 23 reported that they had provided GL/PL coverage during the previous three years but were no longer writing policies, and only 17 reported that they were currently writing GL/PL policies. Six of the 17 reported writing no policies in 2000, and five of the 17 reported writing only one policy. The responding insurers reported writing a total of 43 policies for the year 2000, though there were approximately 677 skilled nursing facilities in Florida. On March 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature's Joint Select Committee on Nursing Homes issued a report on its study of "issues regarding the continuing liability insurance and lawsuit crisis facing Florida's long-term care facilities and to assess the impact of the reforms contained in CS/CS/CS/SB 1202 (2001)."6 The study employed data compiled from 1999 through 2003. Among the Joint Select Committee's findings was the following: In order to find out about current availability of long-term care liability insurance in Florida, the Committee solicited information from [the Office of Insurance Regulation, or] OIR within the Department of Financial Services, which is responsible for regulating insurance in Florida. At the Committee's request, OIR re-evaluated the liability insurance market and reported that there has been no appreciable change in the availability of private liability insurance over the past year. Twenty-one admitted insurance entities that once offered, or now offer, professional liability coverage for nursing homes were surveyed by OIR. Six of those entities currently offer coverage. Nine surplus lines carriers have provided 54 professional liability policies in the past year. Representatives of insurance carriers that stopped providing coverage in Florida told OIR that they are waiting until there are more reliable indicators of risk nationwide to re-enter the market. Among the Joint Select Committee's conclusions was the following: In the testimony the Committee received, there was general agreement that the quality of care in Florida nursing homes is improving, in large part due to the minimum staffing standards the Legislature adopted in SB 1202 during the 2001 Session. There was not, however, general agreement about whether or not lawsuits are abating due to the tort system changes contained in SB 1202. There was general agreement that the long-term care liability insurance market has not yet improved. After hearing the testimony, there is general agreement among the members of the Joint Select Committee that: * * * General and professional liability insurance, with actual transfer-of-risk, is virtually unavailable in Florida. "Bare- bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory insurance requirement are available; however, the cost often exceeds the face value of the coverage offered in the policy. This situation is a crisis which threatens the continued existence of long-term care facilities in Florida. To further support Mr. Parnell's testimony, Petitioners offered actuarial analyses of general and professional liability in long-term care performed by AON Risk Consultants, Inc. (AON) on behalf of the American Health Care Association. The AON studies analyzed nationwide trends in GL/PL for long-term care, and also examined state-specific issues for eight states identified as leading the trends in claim activity, including Florida. They provided an historical perspective of GL/PL claims in Florida during the audit period. The 2002 AON study for Florida was based on participation by entities representing 52 percent of all Florida nursing home beds. The study provided a "Loss Cost per Occupied Bed" showing GL/PL liability claims losses on a per bed basis. The 2002 study placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $10,800 per bed for the year 2001. The 2003 AON study, based on participation by entities representing 54 percent of Florida nursing home beds, placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $11,810 per bed for the year 2002. The studies showed that the cost per bed of GL/PL losses is materially higher in Florida than the rest of the United States. The nationwide loss per bed was $2,360 for the year 2001 and $2,880 for the year 2002. The GL/PL loss costs for Texas were the second-highest in the country, yet were far lower than the per bed loss for Florida ($5,460 for the year 2001 and $6,310 for the year 2002). Finally, Petitioners point to the Mature Care Policies as evidence of the crisis in GL/PL insurance availability. The aforementioned SB 1202 instituted a requirement that nursing homes maintain liability insurance coverage as a condition of licensure. See Section 22, Chapter 2001-45, Laws of Florida, codified at Subsection 400.141(20), Florida Statutes. To satisfy this requirement, Petitioners entered the commercial insurance market and purchased insurance policies for each of the 14 Palm Gardens facilities from a carrier named Mature Care Insurance Company. The policies carried a $25,000 policy limit, with a policy premium of $34,000. These were the kind of "bare bones" policies referenced by the Joint Select Committee's 2004 report. The fact that the policies cost more than they could ever pay out led Mr. Swindling, Petitioners' health care accounting and Medicaid reimbursement expert, to opine that a prudent nursing home operator in Florida at that time would not have purchased insurance, but for the statutory requirement.7 The Mature Care Policies were "bare bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory liability insurance coverage requirement. The policies cost Petitioners more than $37,000 in premium payments, taxes, and fees, in exchange for policy limits of $25,000. In its examination, AHCA disallowed the difference between the cost of the policy and the policy limits, then prorated the allowable costs because the audit period was nine months long and the premium paid for the Mature Care Policies was for 12 months. AHCA based its disallowance on Section 2161.A of the Manual, particularly the language which states: "Insurance premiums reimbursement is limited to the amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Petitioners responded that they did not enter the market and voluntarily pay a premium in excess of the policy limits. They were statutorily required to purchase this minimal amount of insurance; they were required to purchase a 12-month policy; they paid the market price8; and they should not be penalized for complying with the statute. Petitioners contend they should be reimbursed the full amount of the premiums for the Mature Care Policies, as their cost of statutory compliance. Returning to the issue of the contingent liabilities, Petitioners contend that, in light of the state of the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, AHCA should have gone beyond the strictures of the Manual to conclude that GAAP principles render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Under GAAP, a contingent loss is a loss that is probable and can be reasonably estimated. An estimated loss from a loss contingency may be accrued by a charge to income. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS No. 5"), Accounting for Contingencies, provides several examples of loss contingencies, including "pending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and assessments." Petitioners assert that the contingent losses reported in their cost reports were actual costs incurred by Petitioners. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, provides: The ultimate costs of malpractice claims, which include costs associated with litigating or settling claims, are accrued when the incidents that give rise to the claims occur. Estimated losses from asserted and unasserted claims are accrued either individually or on a group basis, based on the best estimates of the ultimate costs of the claims and the relationship of past reported incidents to eventual claims payments. All relevant information, including industry experience, the entity's own historical experience, the entity's existing asserted claims, and reported incidents, is used in estimating the expected amount of claims. The accrual includes an estimate of the losses that will result from unreported incidents, which are probable of having occurred before the end of the reporting period. Section 8.10 of AICPA Guide provides: Accrued unpaid claims and expenses that are expected to be paid during the normal operating cycle (generally within one year of the date of the financial statements) are classified as current liabilities. All other accrued unpaid claims and expenses are classified as non-current liabilities. As noted above, Petitioners' audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, showed that the accrual was incurred and recorded by Petitioners during the audit period. Mr. Swindling prepared Petitioners' cost reports, based on information provided by Petitioners, including trial balances reflecting their costs, statistics on patient days, cost data related to square footage, and revenue information. Mr. Swindling advised Petitioners to include the accrued losses. He believed that the loss contingency was probable and could be reasonably estimated. The losses were probable because it was "a given in the state of Florida at that time period that nursing homes are going to get sued." Mr. Swindling testified that the accrual reflected a per bed loss amount of $1,750, which he believed to be a reasonable estimate of the contingent liabilities faced by Petitioners during the audit period. This amount was much less than the per bed loss indicated by the AON studies for Florida. Mr. Swindling used the criteria set forth in Section 8.05 of the AICPA Guide to establish the estimate. He determined that the lesser amount was adequate based on his discussions with Petitioners' management, who indicated that they had a substantial risk management program. Management also disclosed to Mr. Swindling that Petitioners' leases required $1,750 per bed in liability coverage. See Finding of Fact 22, supra. Mr. Swindling believed that the estimated loss per bed was reasonable based on the AON studies and his knowledge and experience of the state of the industry in Florida during the audit period, as further reflected in the DOI and Joint Committee on Nursing Homes materials discussed above. Mr. Swindling's opinion was that the provisions of the Manual relating to GL/PL insurance costs do not apply under these circumstances. The costs at issue in this proceeding are not general and professional liability insurance costs subject to CMS Pub. 15-1; rather, they are loss contingencies related to general and professional liability, including defense costs, litigation costs, and settlement costs. Mr. Swindling placed the loss contingency under number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party" because, in the finite chart of accounts provided by Medicaid, that was the most appropriate place to record the cost.9 Despite the initial confusion it caused the agency's auditors, the placement of the loss contingency under number 730810 was not intended to deceive the auditors. Mr. Swindling opined that, under these circumstances, Sections 2160 through 2162 are in conflict with other provisions in the Manual relating to the "prudent buyer" concept, and further conflict with the Plan to the extent that the cited regulations "relate to a retrospective system as opposed to prospective target rate-based system." Mr. Swindling agreed that the application of Sections 2160 through 2162 to the situation presented by Petitioners would result in the disallowance of the loss contingencies. Mr. Swindling observed, however, that Sections 2160 through 2162 are Medicare regulations. Mr. Swindling testified that Medicare reimbursements are made on a retrospective basis.10 Were this situation to occur in Medicare -- in which the provider did not obtain commercial insurance, self-insurance, or establish a captive insurer -- the provider would be deemed to be operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though its costs might be disallowed in the current period, the provider would receive reimbursements in subsequent periods when it could prove actual payment for its losses. Mr. Swindling found a conflict in attempting to apply these Medicare rules to the prospective payment system employed by Florida Medicaid, at least under the circumstances presented by Petitioners' case. Under the prospective system, once the contingent loss is disallowed for the base period, there is no way for Petitioners ever to recover that loss in a subsequent period, even when the contingency is liquidated. During his cross-examination, Mr. Swindling explained his position as follows: . . . Medicare allows for that payment in a subsequent period. Medicaid rules would not allow that payment in the subsequent period; therefore you have conflict in the rules. When you have conflict in the rules, you revert to generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles are what we did. Q. Where did you find that if there's a conflict in the rules, which I disagree with, but if there is a conflict in the rules, that you follow GAAP? Where did you get that from? I mean, we've talked about it and it's clear on the record that if there is no provision that GAAP applies, but where did you get that if there's a conflict? Just point it out, that would be the easiest way to do it. A. The hierarchy, if you will, requires providers to file costs on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If there's no rules, in absence of rules -- and I forget what the other terms were, we read it into the record before, against public policy, those kind of things -- or in my professional opinion, if there is a conflict within the rules where the provider can't follow two separate rules at the same time, they're in conflict, then [GAAP] rules what should be recorded and what should be reimbursed. * * * Q. [T]he company accrued a liability of $2 million for the cost reporting period of 2002-2003, is that correct? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you have any documentation supporting claims paid, actually paid, in 2002-2003 beyond the mature care policy for which that $2 million reserve was set up? A. No. Q. So what did Medicaid pay for? A. Medicaid paid the cost of contingent liabilities that were incurred by the providers and were estimated at $1,750 per bed. Generally accepted accounting principles will adjust that going forward every cost reporting period. If that liability in total goes up or down, the differential under [GAAP] goes through the income statement, and expenses either go up or they go down. It's self-correcting, which is similar to what Medicare is doing, only they're doing it on a cash basis. Mr. Swindling explained the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. The highest governing law is the Federal statutory law, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Subsection. 1396-1396v. Below the statute come the federal regulations for implementing Title XIX, 42 C.F.R. parts 400-426. Then follow in order Florida statutory law, the relevant Florida Administrative Code provisions, the Plan, the Manual, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, GAAP. Mr. Swindling testified that in reality, a cost report is not prepared from the top of the hierarchy down; rather, GAAP is the starting point for the preparation of any cost report. The statutes, rules, the Plan and the Manual are then consulted to exclude specific cost items otherwise allowable under GAAP. In the absence of an applicable rule, or in a situation in which there is a conflict between rules in the hierarchy such that the provider is unable to comply with both rules, the provider should fall back on GAAP principles as to recording of costs and reimbursement. John A. Owens, currently a consultant in health care finance specializing in Medicaid, worked for AHCA for several years up to 2002, in positions including administrator of the audit services section and bureau chief of the Office of Medicaid Program Analysis. Mr. Owens is a CPA and expert in health care accounting and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that AHCA's disallowance of the accrued costs for GL/PL liability was improper. Mr. Owens noted that Section 2160 of the Manual requires providers to purchase commercial insurance. If commercial insurance is unavailable, then the Manual gives the provider two choices: self-insure, or establish a captive program. Mr. Owens testified that insurers were fleeing the state during the period in question, and providers were operating without insurance coverage. Based on the state of the market, Petitioners' only options would have been to self-insure or establish a captive. As to self-insurance, Petitioners' problem was that they had taken over the leases on their facilities from a bankrupt predecessor, Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). Petitioners were not in privity with their predecessor. Petitioners had no access to the facilities' loss histories, without which they could not perform an actuarial study or engage a fiduciary to set up a self-insurance plan.11 Similarly, setting up a captive would require finding an administrator and understanding the risk exposure. Mr. Owens testified that a provider would not be allowed to set up a captive without determining actuarial soundness, which was not possible at the time Petitioners took over the 14 IHS facilities. Thus, Petitioners were simply unable to meet the standards established by the Manual. The options provided by the Manual did not contemplate the unique market situation existing in Florida during the audit period, and certainly did not contemplate that situation compounded by the problems faced by a new provider taking over 14 nursing homes from a bankrupt predecessor. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that, under these circumstances, where the requirements of the Manual could not be met, Petitioners were entitled to seek relief under GAAP, FAS No. 5 in particular. In situations where a loss is probable and can be measured, then an accounting entry may be performed to accrue and report that cost. Mr. Owens concluded that Petitioners' accrual was an allowable cost for Medicaid purposes, and explained his rationale as follows: My opinion is, in essence, that since they could not meet -- technically, they just could not meet those requirements laid out by [the Manual], they had to look somewhere to determine some rational basis for developing a cost to put into the cost report, because if they had chosen to do nothing and just moved forward, those rates would be set and there would be nothing in their base year which then establishes their target moving forward. So by at least looking at a rational methodology to accrue the cost, they were able to build something into their base year and have it worked into their target system as they move forward. Steve Diaczyk, an audit evaluation and review analyst for AHCA, testified for the agency as an expert in accounting, auditing, and Medicaid policy. Mr. Diaczyk was the AHCA auditor who reviewed the work of Smiley & Smiley for compliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, and to verify the accuracy of the independent CPA's determinations. Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Mr. Swindling's description of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Mr. Diaczyk affirmed that Petitioners employed GAAP rather than Medicaid regulations in preparing their cost reports. Mr. Diaczyk testified regarding the Notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements, set forth at Findings of Fact 22-24, supra, which left AHCA's auditors with the understanding that Petitioners were self-insuring. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that Section 2162.7 of the Manual requires a self- insurer to contract with an independent fiduciary to maintain a self-insurance fund, and that the fund must contain monies sufficient to cover anticipated losses. The fiduciary takes title to the funds, the amount of which is determined actuarially. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, in reimbursing a provider for self-insurance, Medicaid wants to make sure that the provider has actually put money into the fund, and has not just set up a fund on its books and called it "self-insurance" for reimbursement purposes. AHCA's position is that it would be a windfall for a provider to obtain reimbursement for an accrued liability when it has not actually set the money aside and funded the risk. Medicaid wants the risk transferred off of the provider's books and on to the self-insurance fund. Mr. Diaczyk testified as to the differing objectives of Medicaid and GAAP. Medicaid is concerned with reimbursing costs, and is therefore especially sensitive regarding the overstatement of costs. Medicaid wants to reimburse a provider for only those costs that have actually been paid. GAAP, on the other hand, is about report presentation for a business entity and is concerned chiefly with avoiding the understatement of expenses and overstatement of revenue. Under GAAP, an entity may accrue a cost and not pay it for years. In the case of a contingent liability, the entity may book the cost and never actually pay it. Mr. Diaczyk described the self-insurance and liquidation provisions of 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100, "Special treatment of certain accrued costs." The federal rule essentially allows accrued costs to be claimed for reimbursement, but only if they are "liquidated timely." Subsection (c)(2)(viii) of the rule provides that accrued liability related to contributions to a self-insurance program must be liquidated within 75 days after the close of the cost reporting period. To obtain reimbursement, Petitioners would have had to liquidate their accrued liability for GL/PL insurance within 75 days of the end of the audit period. Mr. Diaczyk also noted that, even if the 75-day requirement were not applicable, the general requirement of Section 2305.2 of the Manual would apply. Section 2305.2 requires that all short-term liabilities must be liquidated within one year after the end of the cost reporting period in which the liability is incurred, with some exceptions not applicable in this case. Petitioners' accrued liability for general and professional liability insurance was not funded or liquidated for more than one year after the cost reporting period. It was a contingent liability that might never be paid. Therefore, Mr. Diaczyk stated, reimbursement was not in keeping with Medicaid's goal to reimburse providers for actual paid costs, not for potential costs that may never be paid. Petitioners responded that their accrued liabilities constituted non-current liabilities, items that under normal circumstances will not be liquidated within one year. Mr. Parnell testified that there is great variation in how long it takes for a general and professional liability claim against a nursing home to mature to the point of payment to the claimant. He testified that a "short" timeline would be from two to four years, and that some claims may take from eight to eleven years to mature. From these facts, Petitioners urge that 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100 and Section 2305.2 of the Manual are inapplicable to their situation. As to Section 2305.2 in particular, Petitioners point to Section 2305.A, the general liquidation of liabilities provision to which Section 2305.2 provides the exceptions discussed above. The last sentence of Section 2305.A provides that, where the liability is not liquidated within one year, or does not qualify under the exceptions set forth in Sections 2305.1 and 2305.2, then "the cost incurred for the related goods and services is not allowable in the cost reporting period when the liability is incurred, but is allowable in the cost reporting period when the liquidation of the liability occurs." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners argue that the underscored language supports the Medicare/Medicaid distinction urged by Mr. Swindling. In its usual Medicare retroactive reimbursement context, Section 2305.2 would operate merely to postpone reimbursement until the cost period in which the liability is liquidated. Applied to this Medicaid prospective reimbursement situation, Section 2305.2 would unfairly deny Petitioners any reimbursement at all by excluding the liability from the base rate. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, where the Medicaid rules address a category of costs, the allowable costs in a provider's cost report are limited to those defined as allowable by the applicable rules. He stated that if there is a policy in the Manual that addresses an item of cost, the provider must use the Manual provision; the provider cannot use GAAP to determine that cost item. In this case, Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Ms. Smiley as to the applicable rules and the disallowance of Petitioners' contingent liability costs. According to Mr. Diaczyk, GAAP may be used only if no provisions farther up the chain of the "hierarchy" are applicable. In this case, the Medicaid rules specifically addressed the categories of cost in question, meaning that GAAP did not apply. Under cross-examination, Mr. Diaczyk testified that the accrual made by Petitioners in their cost reports would be considered actual costs under GAAP, "[a]ssuming that they had an actuarial study done to come up with the $1.7 million that they accrued." Mr. Diaczyk acknowledged that AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, does not limit the provider to an actuarial study in estimating losses from asserted and unasserted claims. See Finding of Fact 49, supra, for text of Section 8.05. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that the problem in this case was that Petitioners gave AHCA no documentation to support their estimate of the accrual, despite the auditor's request that Petitioners provide documentation to support their costs. Mr. Diaczyk's testimony raised a parallel issue to Mr. Swindling's concern that Medicaid's prospective targeting system permanently excludes any item of cost not included in the base rate. Mr. Swindling solved the apparent contradiction in employing Medicare rules in the Medicaid scenario by applying GAAP principles. Responding to the criticism that GAAP could provide a windfall to Petitioners by reimbursing them for accrued costs that might never actually result in payment, Mr. Swindling responded that GAAP principles would adjust the cost for contingent liabilities going forward, "truing up" the financial statements in subsequent reporting periods. This truing up process would have the added advantage of obviating the agency's requirement for firm documentation of the initial accrual. Mr. Swindling's "truing up" scenario under GAAP would undoubtedly correct Petitioners' financial statements. However, Mr. Swindling did not explain how the truing up of the financial statements would translate into a correction of Petitioners' reimbursement rate.12 If costs excluded from the base rate cannot be added to future rate adjustments, then costs incorrectly included in the base rate would also presumably remain in the facility's rate going forward.13 Thus, Mr. Swindling's point regarding the self-correcting nature of the GAAP reporting procedures did not really respond to AHCA's concerns about Petitioners' receiving a windfall in their base rate by including the accrual for contingent liabilities. On April 19, 2005, Petitioners entered into a captive insurance program. Petitioners' captive is a claims-made GL/PL policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $3 million in the aggregate. Under the terms of the policy, "claims-made" refers to a claim made by Petitioners to the insurance company, not a claim made by a nursing home resident alleging damages. The effective date of the policy is from April 21, 2005, through April 21, 2006, with a retroactive feature that covers any claims for incidents back to June 29, 2002, a date that corresponds to Petitioners' first day of operation and participation in the Medicaid program. The Petitioners' paid $3,376,906 for this policy on April 22, 2005. Mr. Parnell testified that April 2005 was the earliest time that the 14 Palm Gardens facilities could have established this form of insurance program. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the contingent liabilities established that Petitioners took over the 14 Palm Gardens facilities after the bankruptcy of the previous owner. Petitioners were faced with the virtual certainty of substantial GL/PL expenses in operating the facilities, and also faced with a Florida nursing home environment market in which commercial professional liability insurance was virtually unavailable. Lacking loss history information from their bankrupt predecessor, Petitioners were unable to self-insure or establish a captive program until 2005. Petitioners understood that if they did not include their GL/PL expenses in their initial cost report, those expenses would be excluded from the base rate and could never be recovered. Petitioners' leases for the facilities required them to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount of $1,750. Based on the AON studies and the general state of the industry at the time, Petitioners' accountant concluded that, under GAAP principles, $1,750 per bed was a reasonable, conservative estimate of Petitioners' GL/PL loss contingency exposure for the audit period.14 Based on all the evidence, it is found that Petitioners' cost estimate was reasonable and should be accepted by the agency. Petitioners included their GL/PL loss contingency expenses in their initial Medicaid cost report, placing those expenses under a heading indicating the purchase of insurance from a third party. The notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the facilities were "essentially self- insured." These factors led AHCA to request documentation of Petitioners' self-insurance. Petitioners conceded that they were not self-insured and carried no liability insurance aside from the Mature Care policies. The parties had little dispute as to the facts summarized above. The parties also agreed as to the applicability of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Their disagreement rests solely on the manner in which the principles of the hierarchy should be applied to the unique situation presented by Petitioners in these cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order that allows Petitioners' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of general and professional liability ("GL/PL") insurance, and that disallows the Mature Care policy premium amounts in excess of the policy limits, prorated for a nine- month period. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the State of Florida's group health insurance plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Judy Stahl began her employment with the State of Florida as a public assistance specialist with the Department of Children and Families on October 4, 1991. She began participating in the State's group health insurance program on December 1, 1991. Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment by the State on November 28, 2002, for personal reasons. In her letter of resignation she stated that it was her intention to again seek employment with the State after the personal situation which caused her to resign was concluded. Premiums for the State's group health insurance are paid one month in advance. Therefore, Petitioner's coverage under the State's group health insurance program continued through the end of December 2002. In January 2003, the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner of her right to elect continuation coverage under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) and the federal Public Health Services Act (PHSA). Petitioner so elected and continued her participation in the State's group health insurance under COBRA for the maximum period of 18 months that was available to her. Her continuation coverage expired June 30, 2004. In May 2004 the State's Division of State Group Insurance notified Petitioner that her continuation coverage would soon expire and further advised her of her right to convert her insurance coverage to a private, individual policy. Petitioner exercised her option to convert to a private policy, effective July 1, 2004. In March 2005 the Florida Division of Retirement sent Petitioner an Estimate of Retirement Benefits. The Estimate contained the comment that: "As a result of a review of accounts for terminated members, it was determined that you are eligible for retirement benefits." The Estimate form was accompanied by a pamphlet explaining the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan. It was also accompanied by information on the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) health plan. The retirement pamphlet included the information that health insurance was available to retirees; however, the health insurance information advised that health insurance was only available to certain retirees. Petitioner concluded that if she retired, she could obtain cheaper health insurance from the State than from her private provider. This was the first time that Petitioner considered the possibility of retirement. Petitioner thereafter made many telephone calls to the Department of Children and Families, to the Division of Retirement, to the Division of State Group Insurance, and to People First, inquiring about retirement and insurance. These telephone inquiries were the first time she mentioned to any State employee or representative that she was interested in retiring. At the end of March 2005 she made the decision to retire and submitted her application for retirement benefits. Her effective retirement date was April 1, 2005. At the time Petitioner filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in the State's group health insurance program. At the time she filed her application for retirement, she was no longer participating in continuation coverage pursuant to COBRA. She was insured under a private policy. At the time of her initial enrollment in the State group health insurance program, Petitioner signed a new enrollee form that, inter alia, advised her that eligibility and enrollment were governed by the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 22K-l. During her employment she also enrolled in supplemental dental insurance. That enrollment application form notified Petitioner that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the federal Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. Throughout her employment and at the time that she terminated her employment, she completed Annual Benefits Open Enrollment forms, which also notified her that any changes in enrollment or coverage are governed by the Internal Revenue Code and the Florida Administrative Code. While employed by the Department of Children and Families, Petitioner was provided with copies of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document. Those booklets describe eligibility for participation to include employees, certain retirees, and COBRA participants. They also describe termination of coverage due to termination of employment and describe continuation coverage and conversion coverage. At the time Petitioner retired, she was not a State employee; she was a former State employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner is not eligible to participate in the State's group health insurance program. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Berkowitz, Esquire Mark J. Berkowitz, P.A. 524 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 200N Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sonja P. Matthews, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Tom Lewis, Jr., Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue This case involves a dispute as to whether the Petitioner underpaid the premiums due on his health insurance coverage and, if so, what action should be taken by the Department of Administration as a result of any premium underpayments. By notice dated March 18, 1988, the Department of Administration notified the Petitioner that the Department records "show a total underpayment of $1,117.81 for the coverage periods 9/86 through 9/87." At the formal hearing, over the objection of the Petitioner, the Department was permitted to offer evidence regarding the Petitioner's premium history (both the amounts due and the amounts actually paid) for the entire period of the Petitioner's employment with the State of Florida, a period which runs from May 1978 until October 1988. At the formal hearing the Department of Administration presented the testimony of one witness and offered several exhibits, all of which were received. The Petitioner did not present any evidence, but did present oral argument on his own behalf. The parties were allowed 10 days from November 3, 1988, within which to file their post-hearing submissions with the Hearing Officer. The Department of Administration timely filed Proposed Findings Of Fact. Those findings are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order. The Petitioner did not file any post-hearing submission.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the formal hearing, I make the following findings of fact. From May 1, 1978, until August 1, 1978, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-insurance Plan. From November 1, 1978, until November 1, 1985, the Petitioner requested and received individual coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From November 1, 1985, until the date of the hearing, the Petitioner requested and received family coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan. From May 1, 198, until July 1, 1984, the Petitioner was a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .25 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .25 full-time equivalent position. From July 1, 1984, until at least the date of the hearing, the Petitioner has been a part-time employee of the State of Florida, working .20 of a full-time equivalent position. Accordingly, his premiums for health insurance coverage under the State Group Self-Insurance Plan during this period should have been paid on the basis of employment in a .20 full-time equivalent position. During the period beginning May 1, 1988, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals S1,116.36. 1/ During the period beginning March 1, 1986, and continuing through October of 1988, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $861.74. During the thirteen-month period beginning with September 1986 and ending with (but including) September 1987, the amount by which the Petitioner underpaid his health insurance coverage premiums totals $258.36.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order to the following effect: Finding the Petitioner to be in debt to the State of Florida in the amount of $258.36 by reason of underpayment of premiums during the period of September 1986 through September 1987. Providing that the Petitioner's health insurance coverage under the State Group Health Self-Insurance Plan will be cancelled unless within thirty (30) days following the entry of the final order the Petitioner either pays the full amount of $258.36 or enters into an installment payment program consistent with Rule 22K-1.049(1)(a)2., Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1988.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue Whether the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, which is the subject of Case Number 01-2295, reflect statements of agency policy which should have been adopted as rules pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties United is a foreign insurer, domiciled in the State of Wisconsin holding a certificate of authority from the Department to transact the business of insurance in this state. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Medical Securities Group, Inc. The Department, through its agency head, the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, has regulatory jurisdiction over United in connection with certain matters set forth in the Complaint. The regulatory scheme for out-of-state health insurance companies Health insurance companies operating pursuant to in-state regulatory schemes are subject to oversight regulation of the corporate entity including financial solvency and market conduct. Rates are required to be filed and approved prior to being used in the state. The review process involves a review of the rates to determine if they are reasonable in relation to the benefits provided. In regard to this, the Department has rules which it has adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, which it uses to determine the standards and formulae for making that determination. Certain out-of-state health insurers, such as United, are not subject to such stringent regulation. No review of premium rates is conducted by the Department in the case of these insurers, but it would be incorrect to state that they are not subject to regulation by the Department at all. Approximately 40 percent of the health insurance market in Florida is written through out-of-state group arrangements that do not provide policyholders consumer protections afforded to policyholders holding in-state policies regulated by the Department. United is required by Florida law to provide certain types of coverage. United must also ensure that certificates of coverage provided to residents of Florida contain the following language: The benefits of the policy providing your coverage are governed primarily by the law of a state other than Florida. Indent Background At all times pertinent, American Medical Security, Inc. (AMS), was a Florida-licensed administrator authorized to market and administer United's out-of-state group health insurance plans in Florida. AMS, like United, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Medical Securities Group, Inc. In May 1993, United, through AMS, filed for approval with the Department pursuant to Section 627.5515(2), Florida Statutes (1993), as an out-of-state group health insurer who would provide policies to be offered through an Alabama entity called the Prescription For Good Health Trust, which was formed primarily for the purpose of providing group insurance. The Department approved this filing. On March 2, 1995, the Department participated by conference call in a Regulatory Task Force of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The mission of the task force was to attempt to address a number of problems facing the insurance market. One of the problems discussed was rate protection for consumers when faced with "tier rating" or "tier blocking." The two terms are synonymous and mean, as to group health insurance, reclassifying insureds subsequent to having been initially placed in a class. This practice will be discussed in more detail below. In 1996, United made a filing for the Prescription For Good Health Trust which proposed tier rating. Sometime during 1996, after the Department objected to the filing, United withdrew it. The Department had never seen such a filing previously. United is the only health insurer to assert before the Department that reclassification by movement between classes would be permissible under the Florida Insurance Code. Section 627.6515(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a group health insurance policy issued or delivered outside this state under which a resident of Florida is provided coverage, shall comply with the provisions of Part VII, of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, in the same manner as health policies issued within the state. Part VII of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, provides for a comprehensive regulatory scheme for group health insurance. Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, however, sets forth a number of exemptions. Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, provides an exemption for an insurer like United, which provides health insurance through an association formed for a purpose other than that of offering insurance, which provides the language referred to in paragraph 5, supra, on the face of the certificate, and which offers the bundle of coverages provided in Subsection (c). This exemption applied to the Prescription For Good Health Trust. The Department concedes that it has no authority to set premium rates for out-of-state insurers like United. In November 1996, United through AMS, filed with the Department, pursuant to Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes, a request for approval of an out-of-state group health insurance policy termed the "MedOne Choice" plan. This plan was to be offered through an Ohio association called the Taxpayers' Network, Inc. (TNI). The association was formed primarily for purposes other than providing insurance. In January, 1997, the filing was accepted by the Department as meeting the requirements of Section 627.6515(2), Florida Statutes. Chapter 96-223, Laws of Florida, created Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, effective May 25, 1996. When created, the section only addressed the renewability of individual coverage. Chapter 97-179, Laws of Florida, substantially amended Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, effective May 30, 1997. Subsequent to the amendment, the section addressed certificates of coverage offered to individuals in the state as part of a group policy. This statute, along with Sections 627.6571 and 627.6487, Florida Statutes, implemented the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The basic theory of the HIPAA legislation is that an insurance company cannot simply cancel a health insurance policy without providing other options. On or about September 25, 1998, United, through AMS, notified all Prescription For Good Health Trust certificate holders that the policy forms through which their coverage had been provided were being discontinued, effective as of each certificate holder's 1999 renewal date. Upon discontinuance of the Prescription For Good Health Trust Plans, the only United health insurance plans available in Florida were the MedOne Choice plans offered through TNI. Membership in TNI was available to anyone upon submitting an application form and paying the membership fee. Membership in TNI was a prerequisite to continuance of a persons' health insurance coverage under United's MedOne Choice plan. United guaranteed each certificate holder, upon joining TNI, that upon request, they would be issued coverage under the Classic Benefit Plan (one of the TNI MedOne Choice plans) without regard to their health status. However, there was no guarantee that premiums would not rise. Certificate holders were also advised that if they desired coverage under a MedOne Choice plan other than the guaranteed issue Classic Benefit plan, they could apply for any of the other TNI plans. Only if the applicant met the underwriting guidelines for the plan for which they applied, would they be issued coverage under another MedOne Choice plan. Between October 1998 and early January 1999, United responded to questions and concerns raised by the Department about the decision to discontinue the Prescription For Good Health Trust plan, and whether the plan of discontinuance was in compliance with Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes. Specifically, discussions were had concerning the movement of insureds from the class in which they were originally assigned to another class at the time of renewal. United entered an agreement with the Department on January 14, 1999, whereby United would offer to certificate holders an additional guaranteed issue TNI plan and would cap the rate for the guaranteed issue plans at no more than twice the premium then currently being paid for the discontinued Prescription For Good Health Trust plan. In accordance with this agreement, United notified certificate holders of the additional guaranteed issue option available to them. Later in 1999, United discontinued the trust plan in accordance with their agreement with the Department. During the process of discontinuance, no certificate holder requested conversion coverage under Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes. Section 627.6675, Florida Statutes, provides that an insured may assert his or her right to a "converted policy," which provides for certain health insurance continuation rights. The Department determined that United's rate for the conversion policy, pursuant to the agreement, was within 200 percent of the standard risk rate and that the notice of the conversion privilege was contained in the certificate of coverage issued to Florida residents. Thus, the Department concluded that United was in compliance with the agreement of January 14, 1999. On May 19, 1999, a Department letter informed a consumer that the discontinuance of her coverage by United did not mean she was being discriminated against because the policy had been terminated for all members. The letter further recited that the Department did not have the ability to regulate United because it was not domiciled in Florida and her insurance was being provided to a group, referring to TNI, that was not registered in Florida. On July 27, 1999, a Department letter informed a consumer that United had an obligation to offer a replacement policy but that United had the right to underwrite the policy and charge additional premium. This statement also referred to TNI. Section 627.6425(1), Florida Statutes, provides that "except as otherwise provided in this section, an insurer that provides individual health insurance coverage to an individual shall renew or continue in force such coverage at the option of the individual." For the purpose of the aforementioned Section, the term "individual health insurance" means health insurance coverage, as described in Section 627.6561(5)(a)2, Florida Statutes, offered to an individual in the state, "including certificates of coverage offered to individuals in the state as part of a group policy issued to an association outside this state. " As noted earlier, Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, is one of the statutes enacted in Florida which implemented HIPAA. HIPAA provides for continuation of health insurance of an insureds health policy but does not limit the premiums which an insurer can charge for coverage. Although Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, does not have the words "guaranteed renewable" contained within the statute, the gist of the statute is that if a person has a health policy, the person has the right to continued coverage. The Department contends that the statute also means that there can be no reclassification or movement between classes at the time of renewal. On March 30, 2000, the Department notified United that it believed the discontinuance of Prescription For Good Health Trust plan, in accordance with the January 1999 agreement, may have violated Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes. A Department publication dated January 4, 2001, entitled, "The Florida Health Insurance Market, Issues and Possible Market Reform Measures," noted that there are "an increasing number of carriers attempting to establish HIPAA eligible individuals as a separate rating class with premium charges ranging from 300 to 500 percent of standard rates. While the Department has found such a rating practice to be in violation of the Florida Insurance Code, many carriers have continued to protest this interpretation. Carriers contend the surcharge practice is both actuarially sound and interpreted as a HIPAA permissible practice by other states." In the 2001 legislative session, the Department sought additional regulatory authority concerning out-of-state group insurers, such as United, along with numerous other changes to the Florida Insurance Code which are unrelated to the issues addressed in this Order. The Florida Legislature failed to approve the requested legislation. Tier rating When a group health policy is underwritten, the members of the group may be divided into classes. The classes are based on risk, which is a function of the probability of claims and the cost of claims. Classes may be denominated, for example, as preferred, manual, and substandard. Very healthy persons are put in the preferred class and pay lower premiums relative to other classes. Average persons are put in the manual class because the likelihood and cost of claims may be average. Persons who for actuarial reasons are determined to have an above-average likelihood of claims and whose claims are apt to be costly, are placed in the substandard class. It, perhaps, goes without saying that the individuals in the substandard class must pay higher premiums for the same coverage as others in the group. If the group health policy is guaranteed renewable, certificate holders may continue their coverage. However, premiums within a class can be increased. It is general industry practice to increase the premiums by class when the time for renewal occurs, if the loss experience is such that there is a requirement to increase premiums. As earlier noted, the Department asserts that only by raising premiums for an entire class may premiums be raised. The Department insists that this requirement is part of the definition of "guaranteed renewable." It became United's practice to move insureds between classes. Therefore, for instance, if a person in the group who had been a member of the preferred class experienced the need for costly medical services, then that person might be moved to the manual or substandard class. This would inevitably result in that person paying an increased premium. On the other hand, a person in the substandard class, who was subsequently determined to be a good risk, might be moved to the preferred or manual class and experience reduced premiums as a result. When a substandard class becomes populated with persons who cause the payment of costly claims, premiums increase within that class. Premiums may increase to the point where persons egress the plan, which leaves the class with fewer and sicker members. Eventually, under such a plan, there will be no members, because the premiums will inflate to the point that the benefits, in relation to the amount of the premium, will render the plan uneconomical. This sequence of events is often referred to as the health insurance "death spiral." One of the asserted evils which the Department seeks to combat in the Complaint is the "death spiral." HIPAA eligibles In 1996, when HIPAA became law and Florida enacted laws to implement it, a practice sometimes referred to as "rating up" occurred among some carriers in the industry. As noted earlier, HIPAA and the state statutes implementing it, guarantee that an individual, who through no fault of his own, loses his or her group health insurance coverage has the opportunity to obtain substitute health insurance. A person in this category is referred to as HIPAA eligible. Companies providing insurance under these laws are cognizant of the fact that persons in good health generally decline to purchase this type of insurance but that persons who are in bad health, and who will, therefore, likely have costly claims, will purchase it if they can afford it. This results in a desire on the part of insurers, to charge higher premiums for HIPAA eligible persons than they might charge persons in a comparable, non-HIPAA plan. It is a permissible underwriting practice to take into consideration age, health, and a myriad of other actuarial considerations when developing premium rates for HIPAA eligibles. If an insurer factors in the knowledge that unhealthy persons are more likely than healthy persons to obtain a policy based on HIPAA and charge higher premiums as a result, then "rating up" occurs. The Department contends in its Complaint that "rating up" is discriminatory and, therefore, forbidden by the Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act (UITPA), Section 626.951, et seq., Florida Statutes. United allegedly arrives at rates for HIPAA eligibles solely based on the fact that the individuals are HIPAA eligible which if true, would be "rating up." Immediately prior to April 30, 1998, the Department received a memorandum from the federal Health Care Financing Administration addressing three general problems with insurance practices regarding HIPAA eligibles. One of the three problems addressed in the memorandum was the practice of "rating up." In response, the Department issued Informational Memorandum 98-103M on April 30, 1998, addressing the three problems. The Department announced that it had concerns similar to that of the Health Care Financing Administration, and would address them in administrative rules implementing HIPAA and Chapter 97-179, Laws of Florida. However, no rules addressing these concerns have been adopted. Insurance carriers disagree with the Department as to whether "rating up" is unfairly discriminatory and therefore a violation of the UITPA. The Department is addressing these differences on a case-by-case basis in the course of market conduct examinations. The evidence adduced at the hearing did not elucidate exactly what "addressing these differences on a case-by-case basis in the course of market conduct examinations" means. Count Three in the Complaint represents the first time an administrative action has been brought against an insurer addressing this practice. The definition of guaranteed renewable Chapter 4-149, Florida Administrative Code, is entitled "Filing of Forms and Rates for Life and Health Insurance." Rule 4-149.006(4)(o)3, Florida Administrative Code, provides for a definition of "guaranteed renewable." However, Chapter 4-149, Florida Administrative Code, does not address out-of-state group health insurers, such as United, because the Department has no authority to require the filing of forms and rates in the case of out-of-state health insurers like United. A life and health insurance treatise written by Black and Skipper states that the definitions of the categories of renewable health insurance policies are not uniform among the states. It is the Department's position that Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, applies to out-of-state trusts, such as United's Prescription For Good Health Trust, even though the word "trust" is not used in the statute. It is apparent that if there is no limit on the amount of premium a health insurer can charge at the time of renewal, a guarantee of renewal can be meaningless. This fact is ameliorated by rate-setting in the case of highly regulated health insurers such as domestic insurers. In the context of this case, it is not the renewability of a policy that is the gist of the problem. Rather, it is whether rates can be increased on persons through the movement of insureds from one class to another. The allegations of the Complaint In order to determine which statements are alleged to be unadopted rules, it is necessary to refer to Counts Two through Seven of the Complaint. These counts will be summarized, in seriatim. Count Two alleges that persons who continued their participation in TNI were unlawfully and unfairly discriminated against because some members were reclassified based on their health status present at that time (1999), rather than being retained in the class in which they resided when the policy was initially issued. The Petition alleges, inter alia, that this practice violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, which is a section in the UITPA. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Three alleges that all of those individuals formerly covered through the Prescription For Good Health Trust who were at the time of their discontinuance HIPAA eligible, were, arbitrarily and without regard to health status, assigned a premium rate of either three or five times the base rate for TNI as a whole. Count Three alleges that this assignment unfairly discriminated against the HIPAA eligible individuals who were of the same actuarially supportable class and essentially the same hazard. Count Three further alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Four alleges that the enactment of Section 627.6425, Florida Statutes, in 1996, as amended in 1997, statutorily determined that the Prescription For Good Health Trust plan was "guaranteed renewable" as that term is used and understood in the insurance industry. It further alleged that the term "guaranteed renewable” means that once an insurer classifies an individual as a member of an actuarially supportable class for rate and premium applicable to the specified coverage, that individual may not thereafter be charged a premium which is different from any other member of the same class and cannot be moved to another class. The complaint states that United unlawfully moved insureds from one class to another. Count Four additionally alleged that when United discontinued the Prescription For Good Health Trust, the prerequisite for individuals to obtain renewed health insurance coverage was reclassification of some of those individuals to different actuarially supportable classes based on their health status then pertinent to those individuals. It was further alleged that higher premiums were charged to approximately 70 percent of those who renewed or continued, and that premium increases of 200 percent to 300 percent were experienced. Count Four asserted that Section 627.6425(3), Florida Statutes, prohibits such reclassification. Count Four also alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because such reclassification was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Five alleges that on the one year anniversary of renewal with TNI, United unlawfully reclassified additional individuals which resulted in a premium increases of up to 60 percent. Count Five alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because this action was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Six alleges that within the tier blocks described in Count Two, United unlawfully established numerous sub- classifications based on health related factors pertinent to each individual within that class. It is alleged in the Complaint that these sub-classifications resulted in individuals within the same class being charged a different premium than are other members of the class. Count Six alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, because this action was discriminatory. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. Count Seven alleges that United used a point debit system where an arithmetic number of points are assigned to a corresponding health hazard. The higher the cumulative debit score, the higher the premium. United will decline to insure at all if the cumulative debit score gets sufficiently high. Count Seven alleges that the assignment of points with no criteria for decision-making results in arbitrary and discriminatory point scores. Count Seven alleges, inter alia, that this violated Section 626.9541(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes. This statement is alleged in the Petition to be a statement of general applicability. In summary, the three statements alleged to be rules are: Practicing tier rating is discriminatory and violates the UITPA. Placing HIPAA-eligible individuals in a premium classification solely on the basis of their HIPAA eligible status is discriminatory and violates the UITPA. The term "guaranteed renewable" prohibits the classification of individuals in a health insurance group at a time other than at the inception of coverage.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an upgrade in her insurance coverage from individual to family status should be granted with a retro-active effective date of October 13, 1994; the date of birth of Respondent's son.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Petitioner was initially employed and covered under the State Employees' State Group Health Self Insurance Plan on July 1, 1993. Petitioner selected individual coverage and completed the appropriate forms indicating such coverage. Effective January 1, 1994, Petitioner's coverage for the 1994 Plan Year continued with individual coverage. Petitioner became pregnant in April, 1994, with an estimated due date of December 6, 1994. However, she went into premature labor on October 12, 1994, at 32 weeks gestation. Attempts to stop her labor were unsuccessful and she delivered a son, Gavon K. Brown, by caesarean delivery on October 13, 1994. On October 22, 1994, Petitioner completed the required forms to change from individual coverage to family coverage. Respondent changed Petitioner's coverage to family coverage effective December 1, 1994. Other Facts Petitioner did not inform the personnel office at her place of state employment, Columbia Correctional Facility in Lake City, Florida of her pregnancy. Petitioner saw a private physician in Gainesville, Florida. The physician was concerned about Petitioner's excessive weight and referred her to the Park Avenue Women's Center in Gainesville sometime near the end of April, 1994. The Park Avenue Women's Center, associated with the University of Florida College of Medicine, treats women with at risk pregnancies. Petitioner was seen there by Dr. Kenneth Kelner, also a professor of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the University of Florida College of Medicine. As a registered nurse, Petitioner was aware that she was at an increased general risk for difficulty with her pregnancy as a result of her excessive weight. On August 5, 1994, as a result of problems with getting a medical bill paid by the State Employees' State Group Health Self Insurance Plan, Petitioner called offices of the administrator of the Plan, Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) in Jacksonville, Florida. In the course of her telephone conversation, Petitioner maintains that she was told she could switch to family coverage in order to cover expenses of her unborn child as late as 30 days prior to the birth, estimated and expected to occur on December 6, 1994. Petitioner had previously received The Benefit Payment Schedule on July 13, 1994, which contained a warning to pregnant women policyholders that single or individual coverage did not include coverage for a child following its birth and that family coverage would need to be in effect prior to the month of the child's birth to afford coverage for the child. During the August 5, 1994 telephone conversation with the representative of BCBS in Jacksonville, Petitioner inquired regarding the amount of the monthly premium for family coverage. Petitioner was referred to the Division of State Employees' Insurance (DSEI) and provided with that telephone number in order to acquire coverage for her unborn child and get further detailed information. Petitioner did not call DSEI. On October 12, 1994, in the course of a routine check-up, it was determined that Petitioner's cervix was dilated. Subsequently, Petitioner gave birth to her son at 1 a.m. on October 13, 1994. On October 13, 1994, Petitioner called the personnel office at her place of employment with the Department of Corrections and informed that office of the birth of her son. Although Petitioner maintains that she was told at that time by someone in the personnel office that her son would immediately be afforded insurance coverage, Petitioner presented no direct admissible evidence in corroboration of this allegation and her testimony in this respect is not credited. On October 22, 1994, while sitting in the hospital lobby waiting to visit her son, who remained in hospital care following his premature birth, Petitioner signed the required papers and forms to change from individual to family coverage. The forms, bearing an effective date for coverage change of December 1, 1994, were returned to Petitioner's personnel office without an accompanying check or other payment for any employee premium co-payment which would have permitted a construction that an earlier coverage effective date should have been assigned the policy change. Based upon the timing of the election made by Petitioner, expenses attributable solely to medical services received by the child prior to December 1, 1994, were not covered by the State Employees' State Group Health Self Insurance Plan.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing Susie Simone Brown's petition in this matter. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 6th day of September, 1995. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-24. Adopted, not verbatim. 25.-28. Rejected, unnecessary. 29.-40. Adopted by reference. 41.-42. Rejected, unnecessary. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of one paragraph requesting that Respondent provide coverage for Petitioner's son effective on the date of his birth, October 13, 1994. The proposed finding is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Chief Department of Management Services Division of State Employees' Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Rd., B-12 Tallahassee, FL 32301-4876 Susie Simone Brown 2931 Bay Rd. Orange Park, FL 32065 William H. Linder Secretary Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Dr., Ste. 307 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell General Counsel Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Dr., Ste. 312 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent in the State of Florida licensed to sell health insurance. At all times material hereto, Respondent was not formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. However, Cleveland Insurance Agency often referred clients to Respondent for health and Medicare supplement policies because Cleveland Insurance Agency did not handle those type policies. Prior to November 1987, Respondent, working in conjunction with Cleveland Insurance Company, sold to Irene Goldberg a health insurance policy issued through Provider's Fidelity Insurance Company (Provider's Fidelity). On November 29, 1987, Ms. Goldberg paid $1,504.56 as the annual renewal premium for this health insurance policy which extended her coverage through December 4, 1988. In March of 1988, Ms. Goldberg contacted Cleveland Insurance Agency and requested that someone review her health insurance coverage. Cleveland Insurance Agency referred Ms. Goldberg's request to Respondent. Respondent was familiar with the terms and conditions of the health insurance coverage Ms. Goldberg had in place and he knew that she had paid the premium for this policy through December 1988. Upon visiting with Irene Goldberg on or about March 10, 1988, Respondent presented Ms. Goldberg with a business card that intentionally misrepresented his status with Cleveland Insurance Company. Because Ms. Goldberg had placed most of her insurance needs through Cleveland Insurance Agency during the past few years, Respondent intentionally misled Ms. Goldberg into thinking that he was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. During that visit, Respondent recommended to Ms. Goldberg that she purchase a policy of insurance issued by First National Life Insurance Company (First National) to replace her Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg specifically discussed with Respondent a preexisting medical condition which required periodic medical treatment and the need for the treatment required by this condition to be covered by the new policy. Respondent assured Ms. Goldberg that the preexisting condition would be covered by the new policy. Respondent also told Ms. Goldberg that he would cancel the Provider's Fidelity policy and that he would secure on her behalf a pro rated refund of the premium she had paid to Provider's Fidelity. Based on Respondent's representations, Ms. Goldberg agreed to purchase the First National policy. On March 30, 1988, Ms. Goldberg gave to Respondent a check made payable to First National Life Insurance Company in the amount of $1,892.00, the amount Respondent had quoted as the full annual premium. A few days later, Respondent contacted Ms. Goldberg and advised her that there would be an additional premium in the amount of $1,360.00, which Ms. Goldberg paid on April 4, 1988. This additional premium was, according to Respondent, for skilled nursing care coverage which First National had added as a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg had purchased. The skilled nursing care coverage was, in fact, a separate policy which was not a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg thought she was purchasing from First National. Respondent misled Ms. Goldberg as to the terms of the policies he had sold her and as to the number of policies he had sold her. Respondent represented that the premiums he had collected on behalf of First National were in payment of a single health insurance policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg four separate policies, and he collected a commission for each of the policies. When Ms. Goldberg received her insurance documents from First National, she learned for the first time that Respondent had sold her four separate policies of insurance, including a cancer policy that she and Respondent had never discussed. In addition to the health and cancer policies, Respondent sold Ms. Goldberg a home convalescent care policy and a separate skilled nursing care policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg policies of insurance that Ms. Goldberg had not requested and that she did not know she was buying. Upon reading the health policy, Ms. Goldberg discovered that her new First National Life policy excluded her preexisting condition. Ms. Goldberg contacted Respondent who told her that he had not cancelled the Provider's Fidelity policy as he had agreed to do and that he had not tried to get the pro rated refund of the Provider's Fidelity premium. Respondent told her that any claim she might have for the preexisting condition should be filed under the Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg then complained to First National which, after an investigation, refunded to Ms. Goldberg the premiums she had paid for the three policies. Respondent had received a commission on the policies of insurance he had sold to Ms. Goldberg. As of the time of the hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed First National for the commission he had received based on the premiums that were subsequently refunded to Ms. Goldberg. In February 1988, Respondent met with Helen Krafft to discuss her health insurance needs. During the course of the meeting, Respondent presented to Ms. Krafft a business card which intentionally misrepresented his affiliation with Cleveland Insurance Agency. This business card misled Ms. Krafft into believing that Respondent was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. On February 18, 1988, Respondent sold to Ms. Krafft a health insurance policy through First National and a health insurance policy issued through American Sun Life, at which time he collected a premiums in the total amount of $519.80 for six months of coverage from each of the two policies. In July 1988, Respondent visited with Ms. Krafft at her place of work and told her that she should pay her renewal premiums for the health insurance policies on or before August 1, 1988, to avoid a premium increases. Respondent knew, or should have known, that there were no premium increases scheduled for those policies and that there were no discounts for early payment of the premiums The renewal premiums Respondent quoted Ms. Krafft for the two policies totaled $485.40. At Respondent's instructions Ms. Krafft delivered to Respondent her signed check dated July 18, 1988, in the amount of $485.40 with the payee's name left blank. Respondent accepted these trust funds from Ms. Krafft in a fiduciary capacity. Instead of using these funds to pay the premiums as he had agreed to do, Respondent filled his name in on Ms. Krafft's check and cashed it. Ms. Krafft learned that Respondent had not used the funds she had given him to renew her two policies when she started getting late payment notices from the two insurance companies with accompanying threats of cancellation if the premiums were not paid. In late September 1988, Respondent paid to Ms. Krafft the sum of $485.40 in cash. In June of 1988, Steven R. and Marilyn Hill applied, through Respondent, for a health policy with First National. The Hills paid the initial premium of $304.37 by check made payable to First National on June 26, 1988. Because of underwriting considerations, First National informed Respondent that the Hills would have to pay a higher premium to obtain the insurance they wanted. The Hills were not willing to pay the higher premium and requested a refund of the amount they had paid. First National made the refund check payable to Steven Hill and mailed the check to Respondent. There was no competent, substantial evidence as to what happened to the check other than First National Life stopped payment on the check and it never cleared banking channels. A second refund check was later delivered to Steven Hill. First National contended at the hearing that Respondent had accrued a debit balance in the amount of $2,692.45 as a result of his dealings as an agent of the company. Respondent contended that he is entitled to certain offsets against the amount First National claims it is owed based on commissions he contends that he had earned but had not been paid. First National had not, prior to the hearing, submitted to Respondent any type of accounting of sums due, nor had it explicitly demanded any specific sum from Respondent. Instead, First National had made a blanket demand that Respondent return all materials belonging to First National and advised that future commission checks would be held in escrow. From the evidence presented it could not be determined that Respondent was indebted to First National.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the multiple violations of the Florida Insurance Code as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and which further revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer to Respondent, John Richard Klee. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3269 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected in part as being a conclusion of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. 10 are adopted in material part 11 are adopted in material part 12 are adopted in material part 13 are adopted in material part 14 are adopted in material part 15 are adopted in material part 16 are adopted in material part 17 are adopted in material part 18 are adopted in material part 19 are adopted in material part 20 are adopted in material part 21 are adopted in material part 22 are adopted in material part 23 are adopted in material part 24 are adopted in material part 25 are rejected as being The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 2 and 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 27 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 28 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 29 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 30 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy H. Schmidt, Esquire Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee Florida 32399-0300 Greg Ross, Esquire 400 Southeast Eighth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
