The Issue The issues in this case are the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Petitioners pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2007);1 whether Petitioners are entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Subsections 57.105(5), 120.569(2)(e), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes; and, if so, what amount should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact Each of the 14 Petitioners filed separate rule challenges, challenging the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031 and challenging eight statements of policy of the Board of Pharmacy, which statements had not been adopted as rules. Prior to the filing of his or her rule challenge, each Petitioner had graduated from a pharmacy school located outside the United States and had taken and passed the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Equivalency Examination, the Test of Spoken English, and the Test of English as a Foreign Language. Petitioners had been issued Intern Registrations by the Board of Pharmacy. All but two of the Petitioners had submitted an application to be admitted to the professional licensure examination. Those applications had been denied. All Petitioners, including the two Petitioners who had not submitted an application, had applied to the Board of Pharmacy for a variance or waiver to allow them to sit for the professional licensure examination. The Board of Pharmacy denied each Petitioner’s application for a variance or waiver. Each Petitioner had been represented by The Health Law Firm in their applications for a variance or waiver and wanted The Health Law Firm to continue to represent them in the rule challenge. When asked why the Petitioners had contacted The Health Law Firm to represent them, an attorney for The Health Law Firm stated: I think they have a network where word just gets around. And they-–I believe they even had some sort of list serve or Web site where they had all noted that they were being treated unfairly, and so they knew each other. And maybe our name got out on that or something. But they-–they all seemed to know each other-–seemed to know each other. Additionally, The Health Law Firm had sent out letters soliciting the foreign pharmacy graduates to join the rule challenge. An attorney for The Health Law Firm was not sure whether the letter had been posted on the web site for the foreign pharmacy graduates. In several of the invoices submitted by The Health Law Firm, there was a charge of $20.00 for a “[t]elephone conference with client’s colleagues who are in the same situation and interested in filing petitions for waivers and joining the rule challenge.”2 Thus, the circumstances surrounding the representation of Petitioners by The Health Law Firm do not demonstrate that it was a coincidence that Petitioners just happened to pick The Health Law Firm to represent them in the rule challenges. The Health Law Firm decided to file 14 separate petitions instead of one petition with 14 petitioners. The reason for the filing of the separate petitions was to increase the amount of attorney’s fees which could be awarded. Given the inexperience of attorneys at The Health Law Firm with rule challenges and the difficulty in understanding the speech of Petitioners, who received their pharmacy training in countries other than the United States, The Health Law Firm felt that it was not economically feasible to pursue the rule challenge for $15,000.00. Petitioners had a common goal, i.e. to be allowed to sit for the professional licensure examination. The wording of each of the petitions was essentially the same except for the names of the individual Petitioners. Because the issues were the same for all the rule challenges, the rule challenges were consolidated for final hearing. No final hearing was held in the consolidated cases. The parties agreed that, based on the parties’ Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, there were no disputed issues of material fact and agreed to file proposed final orders addressing each party’s position regarding the application of the law to the stipulated facts. The Board of Pharmacy conceded that Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031 was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and Petitioners were determined to prevail on the issue of the invalidity of the existing rule. On the challenge to the Board of Pharmacy’s policy statements, four statements were determined to meet the definition of a rule. The Board of Pharmacy conceded in the parties’ pre-hearing stipulation that the instructions in the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Application for Licensure by Examination, directing applicants not to apply prior to obtaining all the required internship hours, constituted a non-rule policy. On August 1, 2008, in response to its concession that some of the statements or policies at issue were invalid non-rule policies, the Board of Pharmacy had published, in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly, a Notice of Rule Development for Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031. On August 21, 2008, the Board of Pharmacy approved changes to Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16- 26.2031, eliminating the Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Examination Committee (FPGEC) requirement, incorporating by reference the Foreign Graduate Examination Application, and stating the time frames for the application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B16-26.2031. Pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(e), Florida Statutes, the portion of the petitions dealing with the statements on which the Board of Pharmacy did not prevail was abated pending the rulemaking process. Petitioners did not prevail on four of the policy statements they challenged. These were the policy statements which the Board of Pharmacy contested. Based on the invoices submitted, the parties attempted to settle the case. Essentially, the Board of Pharmacy had started rule development which eliminated the requirement in the existing rule which caused it to be invalid and which dealt with the unpromulgated rule issues that the Board of Pharmacy had conceded in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Petitioners wanted to be able to sit for the National Association of Pharmacy Licensure Examination (NAPLEX) and the Multistate Pharmacy Jurisprudence Examination (MPJE). All Petitioners who had a Foreign Pharmacy Graduate Application for Licensure by Examination pending on August 21, 2008, were approved by the Board of Pharmacy to sit for the NAPLEX and the Florida version of the MPJE. Thus, by August 21, 2008, those Petitioners had reached their goal. The impediment to settling the cases was the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded to Petitioners. There was no undue delay by the Board of Pharmacy or anything which could be attributed to the Board of Pharmacy as needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. The Board of Pharmacy correctly contended that the amount of fees requested by Petitioners was unreasonable. The Partial Final Order entered in the underlying rule challenges held that Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. The Board of Pharmacy was not substantially justified in promulgating the challenged rule in the underlying case and did not demonstrate that special circumstances existed to warrant the promulgation of the challenged rule. The Board of Pharmacy did not demonstrate that the statements which constituted unpromulgated rules are required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition to receipt of federal funds. Each Petitioner entered into a contingency fee contract3 with The Health Law Firm to represent him or her in a rule challenge. The parties have agreed that the hourly rate of $350.00 per hour for the services of George F. Indest, III, Esquire, is reasonable and fair under the circumstances. The parties have agreed that some of the hourly rates being claimed for the other attorneys and employees of The Health Law Firm are reasonable and fair under the circumstances. Those fees are $200.00 and $150.00 per hour for the associate attorneys, $80.00 per hour for the paralegals, and $70.00 per hour for the legal assistants. There were a few entries in the invoices made by senior attorneys for whom the rate charged is $300.00 per hour. Based on the rates charged for the senior partner and the associate attorneys, an hourly rate of $300.00 for a senior attorney is reasonable. The names of the attorneys and staff and the respective hourly rate amount for each are listed below. In discussing the reasonableness of the fees claimed in the various invoices, the attorneys and staff will be referred to by their initials as listed in the invoices. Initials Name Hourly Rate GFI George F. Indest, III, Senior Partner $350.00 MLS Michael L. Smith, Senior Attorney $300.00 JK Joanne Kenna, Senior Attorney $300.00 TJJ Teresa J. James, Attorney $200.00 MRG Matthew R. Gross, Attorney $150.00 JP Justin Patrou, Law Clerk $100.00 GJ Gail Joshua, Senior Paralegal $80.00 PD Pamela Dumas, Litigation Clerk $80.00 SF Sandra Faiella, Paralegal $80.00 RS Rebecca Simmons, Paralegal $80.00 AE Alexa Eastwood, Legal Assistant $70.00 SE Shelly Estes, Legal Assistant $70.00 The amount of fees claimed by each Petitioner for representation by The Health Law Firm for the rule challenge is listed below. These amounts are based on the individual invoices and the first consolidated invoice:4 Name Amount Vipul Patel $15,212.36 Miriam Hernandez $15,683.36 Mirley Aleman-Alejo $11,469.36 Valliammai Natarajan $5,074.36 John H. Neamatalla $11,215.36 Samad Mridha $13,650.36 Se Young Yoon $12,292.36 Saurin Modi $10,093.36 Deepakkumar Shah, M.Ph. $11,764.36 Mijeong Chang $12,528.36 Nabil Khalil $10,272.36 Hadya Alameddine $5,313.36 Balaji Lakshminarayanan $4,585.36 Anand Narayanan $4,218.36 Total $143,372.04 Sandra Ambrose testified as an expert witness on behalf of Petitioners. Her opinion is that the amounts claimed are based on a reasonable number of hours expended in the litigation of the rule challenge. However, Ms. Ambrose has never represented a client in a rule challenge. It was Ms. Ambrose’s opinion that the difficulty in the cases was a result of the number of Petitioners not the issues to be litigated. Having reviewed all the invoices submitted in these cases, the undersigned cannot credit Ms. Ambrose’s testimony that the fees are reasonable. The Board of Pharmacy argues that the amount of fees and costs should be limited to the amount expended in the petition brought by the first Petitioner, Vipul Patel. The expert who testified for the Board of Pharmacy did not give a definite amount that he considered to be a reasonable fee in these cases. Prior to the final consolidation of all 14 rule challenges, The Health Law Firm invoiced for its services and costs by individual Petitioner. After all 14 rule challenges were consolidated, The Health Law Firm invoiced for its time and costs via a consolidated invoice. The undersigned has painstakingly reviewed all the invoices that were submitted to support Petitioners’ claims for fees and costs in the rule challenges and finds the fees requested are not reasonable. On May 15, 2008, the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2733RX contained the following entry for MRG. “Review/analyze final order. Strategize regarding final order.” The final order appears to be related to a petition5 for a waiver or variance before the Board of Pharmacy, and the entry is deleted. This conclusion is supported by the entry in the invoice dated May 29, 2008, relating to a telephone conference with the client relating to a re-petition for waiver. In Case No. 08-2730RX, there is an entry on May 27, 2008, for .10 hours for MRG, but no service is listed. That entry is deleted. On June 6, 2008, MRG entered .50 hours each in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX. The entry stated: “Continue preparing rule challenge and waiver.” The Health Law Firm represented the Petitioners in four of these cases before the Board of Pharmacy on June 10, 2008, on their petitions for a wavier or variance. The invoice does not delineate the amount of time that was spent on the rule challenge and the amount of time that was spent on the waiver cases. Therefore, the time is divided equally and .25 hours in each case is charged toward the rule challenge. 23. On June 9, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2729RX, and 08-2732RX, the senior partner of The Health Law Firm entered .30 hours for each case, which stated: “Prepare letter to Division of Administrative Hearings forwarding Petition for Rule Challenge to be filed.” The letter which accompanied the petitions in these cases stated: Dear Clerk: Attached for filing, please find a separate Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Agency Rule and the Invalidity of Agency Policy and Statements defined as Rules, for each of the individuals listed below: Miriam L. Hernandez Mirley Aleman-Alejo Se Young Yoon John H. Neamatalla Valliammai Natarajan Md. A. Samad Mridha Thank you for your assistance in this matter. For this letter, Petitioners are claiming 1.8 hours or $630.00. This is not reasonable. On the same date, GFI prepared a similar transmittal letter in Case No. 08-2728RX and listed .3 hours, which is a reasonable amount for the preparation of such a letter. Thus, the preparation of the transmittal letter on June 9th for Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2729RX, and 08-2732RX is reduced to .3 hours, which is prorated to .05 hours for those cases. The senior partner in The Health Law Firm claims 23.6 hours during June 3 through 5, 2008, for the following service which was entered on the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2730RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2731RX, 08-2823RX, 08-3298RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2733RX, and 08-2824RX. Conduct legal research, review statutes, cases (approximately 28 cases reviewed and analyzed) and two (2) different Florida Administrative Law legal treatises regarding rule challenges and challenging agency statements not adopted as rules, in order to properly prepare Petition for Formal Rule Challenge in case. Research legal issues including administrative agency rules exceeding authority granted in statutes, retroactive applications of agency rules, adding requirements to licensure requirements through administrative rules when those requirements are not contained in the statute. Review Rules of Procedure and Chapter 120 to determine contents of Rule Challenge Petition. Begin reviewing and revising draft for Rule Challenge in case. (Note: Only pro-rata portion of this time charged to each case.) The total amount of fees claimed for this research is $8,260.00. GFI testified that he had never done a rule challenge prior to filing the petitions in the instant cases. His fees for research due to his lack of knowledge of the basics of a rule challenge should not be assessed against the Board of Pharmacy. A reasonable amount of time for his research is four hours. Thus, the amount for this legal research prorated among the ten cases for which it was listed is .4 hours. On July 19, 2008, the senior partner of The Health Law Firm entered .60 hours in ten of the rule challenges for reviewing the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings for February 8 and April 5, 2008, and preparing a notice of filing the Transcripts with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Six hours to review the Transcripts and prepare a notice of filing is not reasonable. Three hours is determined to be a reasonable amount of time for this task, and that amount is prorated among the ten cases in which the charge was made. On June 10, 2008, members of The Health Law Firm attended a Board of Pharmacy meeting at which they represented foreign pharmacy graduates who had petitioned the Board of Pharmacy for a waiver or variance. In Case Nos. 08-2821RX, 08-3298RX, and 08-2733RX, the senior partner listed .90 hours for each case for preparation for the June 10th Board of Pharmacy meeting. The preparation related to the petitions for variances or waivers and should not be assessed for the instant cases. For June 10, 2008, JP listed .70 hours each in Case Nos. 08-2823RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2821RX, and 08-2733RX for attendance at the Board of Pharmacy meeting. For June 10, 2008, GFI entered 1.4 hours for attendance at the Board of Pharmacy meeting. The entries for attending the Board of Pharmacy meeting related to the petitions for waivers and should not be assessed in the instant cases. For June 19, 2008, the senior partner made the following entry in the invoices for Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, and 08-2824RX: Travel to Boca Raton to meet with other health care lawyers and discuss issues in common on these cases and others. Discuss legal strategies that worked in the past and legal strategies to be avoided. Return from Boca Raton. Each entry was for one hour, for a total of eight hours claimed for a trip to Boca Raton, which equates to $2,880.00. Based on the entry, it seems that the trip included discussions of other cases that The Health Law Firm was handling or that other attorneys were handling. Additionally, there was no rationale for having to travel to Boca Raton to discuss the issues, and fees for such travel should not be awarded. A reasonable amount of time for discussion of the case with other attorneys by telephone would be .80 hours. The prorated amount of time for each case listed is .10 hours. On May 27, 2008, SF made a .30-hour entry in Case No. 08-2824RX for reviewing the agenda of the June 10th Board of Pharmacy meeting as it related to the client in Case No. 08-2824RX. The entry related to the client’s petition for a waiver, which was heard at the June 10th meeting and should be deleted. On May 30, 2008, in Case No. 08-2824RX, SF made a .40-hour entry for drafting a letter to client with retainer agreement. The entry is clerical and should be deleted. On June 18, 2008, an entry was made in the invoice in Case No. 08-2731RX, which stated: “Telephone call from husband of our client indicating that they want us to close this matter and that they do not wish to pursue it any further; follow-up memorandum to Mr. Indest regarding this.” Charges continued to be made to the client through July 16, 2008. Based on the entry to the invoice on June 18, 2008, no further charges should have been made to the client except for the filing of a voluntary dismissal of the rule challenge for the client. However, no voluntary dismissal was filed. Based on the absence of any further charges to the client after July 18, 2008, it is concluded that the client did wish not to proceed with her rule challenge. Any charges by The Health Law Firm after June 18, 2008, in Case No. 08-2731RX will not be assessed against the Board of Pharmacy as it relates to the rule challenge. On June 19, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in ten of the cases: “Review June 10, 2008, Board of Pharmacy Agenda. Telephone conference with Court Reporter, Ms. Green, ordering transcript of the June 10, 2008, meeting.” An hour for reviewing an agenda and ordering a transcript is not reasonable. A reasonable amount of time is .40 hours, and such time is prorated to the ten cases in which it is charged. 33. On June 20, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2823RX and 08-2824RX, TJJ made a .80-hour entry which stated: “Prepare draft motion for consolidation.” No motion was ever filed and would not have been necessary since the parties had agreed at the pre-hearing conference that the rule challenges would be consolidated. The time for this service should be deleted. 34. On July 10, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in several of the cases: “Review prehearing instruction orders and amended orders to determine respondent’s deadline to serve discovery responses.” The entry is duplicative of services provided by MRG on July 8, 2008, and should be deleted. 35. On July 15, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2729RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX, TJJ had .40 hours for a total of 4.00 hours for the following entry: Prepare Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Discovery and assemble and copy documents to be attached to Motion. Prepare facsimile coversheets and transmit the Motion to the attorney for the Board of Pharmacy, Ms. Loucks, and to the clerk for the Division of Administrative Hearings. The copying, preparing facsimile coversheets, and transmitting the motion are clerical tasks. The entries are reduced to .20 hours due to the clerical nature of the tasks, which leaves a total of two hours for preparing a simple motion to compel. The time for the preparation of the motion to compel is not reasonable and is reduced to .10-hour for each entry. On July 22, 2008, the last Order consolidating all the cases was filed. The Order consisted of four paragraphs. On July 29, 2008, TJJ entered .10 hours in Case Nos. 08-2733RX, 08- 2730RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2824RX, 08-3510RX, 08-3488RX, 08-3347RX, 08-2823RX, 08-3298RX, and 08- 2821RX, and each entry stated: “Review order of consolidation filed on July 22, 2008, for common information needed for all cases.” Thus, Petitioners are claiming a total of 1.3 hours or $260.00 to review a four-paragraph Order of Consolidation. This claim is not reasonable. A reasonable amount of time to review the Order was .10 hours, and the time shall be prorated among the cases for which it was claimed at .08 hours each. On July 24, 2008, TJJ made an entry of .10 hours in ten of the cases which stated: Telephone conference with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal, First District to find out the start time of oral arguments on Custom Mobility (rule challenge case). Request information from clerk regarding how to listen to oral arguments online. Observing this oral argument will allow us to better prepare our case for possible appeal. First, a one-hour telephone conversation with the Clerk of District Court of Appeal to ascertain the time for an oral argument and to learn how to listen to oral arguments online is not reasonable. Second, it is not reasonable to charge the Board of Pharmacy with a call to the District Court of Appeal in the instant cases, even if the amount of time for the call had been reasonable. The one-hour charge for $200.00 for a telephone call is deleted. On July 30, 2008, TJJ made an entry of .10 hours in 13 of the rule challenges. The entry stated: “Listen to oral arguments presented before District Court of Appeals, First District, in Custom Mobility case (rule challenge case).” The oral argument was not related to the instant rule challenges and should not be charged to the Board of Pharmacy. The 1.3 hours or $260.00 claim for listening to an oral argument is deleted. On August 4, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: “Review Joint Motion for Abeyance and Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance. Calendar deadlines regarding same.” The time of 1.3 hours for reviewing the simple motion and Order is not reasonable. Calendaring is a clerical task. The time for this service is reduced to .01 hours for each entry. On August 5, 2008, TJJ made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: “Review Respondent’s Objections and Responses to Petitioners’ Second Set of Interrogatories and Respondent’s Objections to Petitioners’ Second Set of Requests for Admissions.” The objections were that the interrogatories and requests for admissions exceeded 30. The time of 1.3 hours for reviewing the pleadings is not reasonable. The time for this service is reduced to .04 for each entry. Petitioners had scheduled the depositions of Rebecca Poston and Daisy King for July 18, 2008. On July 17, 2008, Petitioners filed notices canceling the depositions. On July 17, 2008, PD entered .10 hours in ten of the rule challenges for the following entry: Telephone conference with Accurate Stenotype Reporters regarding cancellation of depositions of Daisy King and Rebecca Poston on July 18, 2008 and delay transcription of depositions of Erika Lilja and Elizabeth Ranne due to potential settlement. It is not reasonable to charge an hour to cancel depositions with the court reporter. A reasonable amount of time would be .10 hours, which is prorated to the ten cases to which it is charged. PD prepared the notice of the canceling of the deposition of Ms. Poston and the notice of the canceling of the deposition of Ms. King. Entries were made in ten of the cases for time for preparing the notices. The total time for preparing the two notices by PD was 1.45 hours. The time is not reasonable. A reasonable time to prepare two notices of canceling depositions would be .40 hours, which is prorated among the ten cases in which it was charged. One of the issues on which Petitioners did not prevail in the rule challenges was the issue of retroactive application of the rule. There are entries totaling 3.4 hours for JP for preparation of a memorandum dealing with the retroactive application of a rule issue. GFI entered .30 hours for the same issue. The time relating to the retroactive application issue is deleted. On April 19, 2008, MRG entered .20 hours each in several cases, which related to the rule challenge and retroactive application issue. That time is reduced by half. On May 6, 2008, MRG made .60-hour entries in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2729RX, 08-2730RX, 08-2732RX, 08-2733RX, 08-2734RX, 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, 08-2824RX, and 08-3298RX, which showed the preparation of three sections of the petition. One of the sections dealt with the retroactive application issue, and the entries are reduced by .20 hours for that issue. The invoices demonstrated that a considerable amount of time was charged for legal assistants and paralegals. Much of this time was for clerical tasks. SE is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a legal assistant. The majority of the entries by SE dealt with the photocopying, labeling, organizing, indexing, and filing documents. These services performed by SE are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. RS is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal/legal assistant. The majority of the entries in the invoices for RS deal with receiving, reviewing, labeling, indexing, scanning, summarizing, and calendaring pleadings and orders that were received in the cases. These services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. Petitioners in Case Nos. 08-2728RX, 08-2732RX, and 08-2733RX each claimed .30 hours for RS for the following service on April 30, 2008: Received and reviewed letter from Department of Health regarding our Public Records Request dated April 28, 2008 relating to client’s case. Index document for filing and scanning for use of attorneys at hearing. However, .90 hours for reviewing and indexing a letter is not reasonable and is clerical in nature. On June 17, 2008, in Case No. 08-2730RX, RS entered .60 hours for preparing, copying, and sending a letter to the client forwarding a copy of the Order of Assignment. That entry is reduced to .30 hours, since at least half of the time appeared to be for clerical tasks. AE, who is identified as a legal assistant in Petitioners’ exhibits, has numerous entries in the invoices for receiving, indexing, filing, calendaring, and providing pleadings and orders to clients. Those services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. In Case No. 08-2728RX, PD, identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal, made entries on June 16 and June 25, 2008, for .30 hours each. These entries were to update the litigation schedule with the hearing date. The entry is clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. SF, who is identified in Petitioners’ exhibits as a paralegal/legal assistant, made an entry for .30 hours in Case No. 08-2728RX on June 26, 2008, and in Case No. 08-2732RX on June 11, 2008, for forwarding orders to the client. An entry was made on July 10, 2008, in Case No. 08-2728RX and on June 18, 2008, in Case No. 08-2730RX for .30 hours for processing the retainer package. Additionally, SF had entries for organizing and filing transcripts and orders. Such services are clerical and, as such, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees. In Case No. 08-3488RX, SF made a .30-hour entry on June 30, 2008, for updating the parties list and document file and a .50-hour entry on June 26, 2008, for completing opening procedures. In the same case, SF made two entries on July 7, 2008, for a total of 1.5 hours for preparing a retainer package and sending it to the client. These tasks are clerical. On June 24, 2008, SF made the following .30-hour entry in 11 of the cases: “Finalize and forward Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing to client in this matter.” These entries are deleted; as they represent clerical tasks and an unreasonable amount of time to finalize a motion for continuance for which GFI had charged 1.1 hours for preparing the motion. In several cases JP, identified as a law clerk, made entries on July 15, 2008, for .30-hour for creating, numbering, and copying exhibits. Such service is clerical. On July 30, 2008, PD made the following .20-hour entry in 13 of the cases: Prepare Petitioners’ Notice of Service of Second Set of Interrogatories and Certificate of Filing and Service. Prepare correspondence to Debra Loucks, attorney for Board of Pharmacy regarding filing and Service of Petitioners’ Fourth Set of Request to Produce and Second Set of Interrogatories. However, 2.6 hours is not a reasonable amount of time to prepare a notice of service of discovery and a transmittal letter to opposing counsel. A reasonable amount of time to prepare such documents is .50 hours, and the time is prorated among the 13 cases. On July 28, 2008, PD made the following .10-hour entry in 13 of the cases: Prepare Notice of Filing Videotaped Depositions of Elizabeth Ranne and Erika Lilja. Prepare draft of Notice of Filing Deposition Transcript of Elizabeth Ranne. However, 1.3 hours is an unreasonable amount of time to prepare two notices of filing depositions. A reasonable amount of time is .40 hours, and that amount is prorated among the 13 cases. On June 17, 2008, PD made the following .20-hour entry in each of the 11 cases: Prepare Petitioners’ Notice of Service of First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent and Certificate of Filing and Service. Prepare correspondence to Debra Loucks, attorney for Board of Pharmacy, regarding filing and service of Petitioners’ First Set of Request to Produce, Petitioners’ First Set of Request for Admissions and Petitioners’ First Set of Interrogatories. However, 2.2 hours is an unreasonable amount of time to prepare a notice of service of discovery and a transmittal letter to opposing counsel. A reasonable amount of time is .50, which is prorated among the 11 cases. 58. On June 21, 2008, in Case Nos. 08-2821RX, 08-2823RX, and 08-2824RX, there is a .30-hour entry for SF for finalizing and forwarding a petition for formal hearing to the Department of Health for filing. This entry does not appear to be related to the rule challenges and is deleted. In Case No. 08-3298RX, MRG made an entry of .50 hours for a telephone conference regarding the date of rule challenge and petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing dealt with the client’s petition for waiver and should not be included. Thus, the entry is reduced to .25 hours. After all the cases were consolidated The Health Law Firm began to make entries for all cases in the first consolidated invoice. On July 28, 2008, GFI made an entry of 2.8 hours, which related exclusively to the issue of retroactive application of the rule. This entry is deleted. RS made entries in the first consolidated invoice for August 12, 14, 28, and 29, 2008, and September 2, 5, 10, and 18, 2008, relating to filing, indexing, copying, and forwarding documents. There are similar entries for SF on August 26, 2008, and September 4 and 9, 2008, and for AE on September 8, 2008. Those entries are for clerical tasks. PD had entries for reviewing, organizing, and indexing documents on September 4, 8, 11, and 17, 2008, and October 8, 2008. Those entries are for clerical tasks. There were numerous entries in August 2008 relating to a Board of Pharmacy meeting on August 21, 2008, in which the Board of Pharmacy heard motions for reconsideration of orders denying Petitioners’ petitions for waivers. Those entries are related to the petitions for waiver and not to the rule challenges. Although, The Health Law Firm makes reference to a settlement agreement in which the Board of Pharmacy agreed to grant the waivers, there was no settlement agreement of the rule challenges because the parties proceeded to litigate the issues by summary disposition. Thus, the references to attending and preparing for the August 21, 2008, Board of Pharmacy meeting as well as advising the clients of the outcome of the meeting on August 20 and 21, 2008, are deleted. Additionally, an entry by MRG on August 20, 2008, which included reviewing the August 21st agenda is reduced to .75 hours. On August 25, 2008, MRG made an entry which included a telephone conference with Mr. Bui and a telephone conference with Ms. Ranne regarding Mr. Bui. Mr. Bui is not a Petitioner, and the entry is reduced to .55 hours. Based on the invoices, it appears that Mr. Bui and Ms. Ranne were also foreign pharmacy graduates seeking waivers from the Board of Pharmacy. On August 29, 2008, MRG made another entry which included the preparation of an e-mail to Mr. Bui. The entry is reduced to two hours. On August 6, 2008, MRG made a 1.80-hour entry which included preparing e-mail to Mr. Bui and a telephone conference with Mr. Sokkan regarding the rule challenge and settlement negotiations. Neither of these persons is a Petitioner; thus, the entry is reduced to .60 hours. On August 28, 2008, TJJ made a 3.60-hour entry for researching and preparing Petitioners’ second motion to compel discovery. No such motion was filed. Thus, the entry is deleted. Another entry was made on September 2, 2008, which included, among other things, the revision of the motion to compel. That entry is reduced to .80 hours. On August 8, 2008, MRG made a 1.00-hour entry which included a telephone conference with Ms. Alameddine regarding her passing the MPJE and being licensed in Michigan. Those issues relate to the petition for reconsideration of the waiver. The entry is reduced to .50 hours. On September 4, 2008, TJJ made a .80-hour entry for preparing a letter to Mr. Modi regarding his approval to take the examination, a 1.00-hour entry dealing with Mr. Lakshminarary’s application, a .90-hour entry dealing with Petitioner Narayanan’s application, a .70-hour entry dealing with Mr. Shah’s application, and a .60-hour entry dealing with Ms. Hernandez’s application. The entries deal with the petitions for a waiver and are deleted. On September 4, 2008, MRG made an entry which included, among other tasks, time for determining if the Board of Pharmacy had sufficient funds to pay Petitioners’ attorney’s fees. This entry is reduced to two hours. On October 10, 2008, MRG made a 1.20-hour entry which included, among other things, analyzing pleadings to determine if persons who were not Petitioners should file petitions for attorney’s fees. The entry is reduced to .60 hours. On July 16, 2008, MRG and JP made entries in ten of the cases for traveling to Tallahassee and attending the depositions of Elizabeth Ranne and Erika Lilja. The total hours for MRG was 16.9 hours and for JP the total was 17 hours. These total hours are reduced by ten hours each for travel time. On August 12 and 13, 2008, MRG made entries which included travel time to attend Board of Pharmacy meetings.6 Those entries are reduced each by one hour to account for travel time. The following is a listing of the amount of hours and dollar amount for fees, which are considered to be reasonable for the rule challenges. Individual and First Consolidated Invoice Hours Rate Amount GFI 146.10 $350.00 $51,135.00 MLS 3.70 $300.00 $1,110.00 JK 1.40 $300.00 $420.00 TJJ 80.13 $200.00 $16,026.00 MRG 210.16 $150.00 $31,824.00 JP 37.80 $100.00 $3,780.00 PD 39.053 $80.00 $3,124.24 SF 16.80 $80.00 $1,344.00 GJ .40 $80.00 $32.00 RS 1.3 $80.00 $104.00 $108,899.24 The Partial Final Order found that Petitioners were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Thus, the issue of entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, was not an issue that was litigated in the instant fee cases. The issue of whether Petitioners were entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Subsections 57.105(5), 120.569(2)(e), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes, were entitlement issues which were litigated in the instant fee cases.7 Most of the charges dealing with the petitions for fees and costs are related to the amount of fees that are to be awarded and not to the entitlement to fees. In Petitioners’ second consolidated invoice (Petitioners’ Exhibit 4), there is a two-hour entry by MLS on November 3, 2008, for research of entitlement to fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. This entry is deleted since the issue of entitlement to fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, had already been determined. The following entries in the second consolidated invoice relate to the litigation of the amount of fees to be awarded and are deleted: 11-5-08 GFI 6.90 hours 11-6-08 SF 7.00 hours 11-6-08 GFI 7.40 hours 11-7-08 SF 7.00 hours 11-7-08 MLS 1.00 hour 11-7-08 JCP 7.00 hours 11-8-08 JCP 1.00 hours 11-8-08 GFI 7.10 hours 1-26-09 GFI 1.00 hour 2-9-09 GFI .60 hours 2-10-09 GFI .30 hours 2-12-09 GFI .60 hours 2-17-09 GFI .30 hours 2-17-09 GFI .60 hours 2-19-09 GFI .60 hours The following entries were made in the second consolidated invoice for clerical tasks performed by paralegals and legal assistants: 11-3-08 RAS .30 hours 2-9-09 RAS .30 hours 2-10-09 RAS .30 hours 2-12-09 ACE .40 hours The issue of entitlement to fees pursuant to statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, was a small portion of the litigation relating to attorney’s fees and costs. The major areas of litigation dealt with the amount of fees and costs that should be awarded. The invoices do not specifically set forth the amount of time that was spent on the issue of entitlement to fees on statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Based on a review of the pleadings in these fee cases and a review of the invoices submitted for litigation of attorney’s fees and costs, it is concluded that ten percent of the time should be allocated to the issue of entitlement to fees. The percentage is applied to the fees after the fees listed in paragraphs 76, 77, and 78, above, have been deleted. Thus, the following entries in the second consolidated invoice are reduced to the following amount of hours: 11-1-08 JCP .26 hours 11-3-08 MLS .10 hours 11-4-08 MLS .40 hours 11-8-08 JCP .32 hours 12-22-08 GFI .04 hours 12-30-08 MLS .03 hours 1-7-09 GFI .02 hours 1-14-09 GFI .04 hours 1-15-09 GFI .07 hours In the third consolidated invoice (Petitioners’ Exhibit 5), the following entries relate to the amount of fees to be awarded and are deleted: 3-4-09 SME 4.80 hours 3-4-09 GFI 1.20 hours 4-3-09 GFI 3.20 hours 4-7-09 GFI .50 hours 4-7-09 GFI .60 hours 4-7-09 GFI .30 hours 4-8-09 GFI 4.20 hours 4-8-09 GFI 1.00 hour 4-9-09 MRG 1.50 hours 4-9-09 GFI 3.20 hours 4-11-09 GFI .60 hours 4-15-09 GFI 4.40 hours On April 14, 2009, GFI made an entry which included time for travel to the expert witness’ office. The entry is reduced by .75 hours for travel time. Ten percent of the time not excluded or reduced above related to the issue of entitlement of fees pursuant to statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. The following entries are reduced to that percentage: 3-31-09 GFI .05 hours 4-1-09 GFI .20 hours 4-6-09 GFI .19 hours 4-6-09 GFI .03 hours 4-7-09 MRG .05 hours 4-7-09 GFI .07 hours 4-7-09 GFI .19 hours 4-7-09 GFI .27 hours 4-9-09 GFI .10 hours 4-13-09 GFI .50 hours 4-14-09 GFI .48 hours 4-14-09 GFI .275 hours The following is a list of the fees in the second and third consolidated invoices which are related to entitlement of fees pursuant to Florida Statutes other than Subsection 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Second and Third Consolidated Invoice Hours Rate Amount GFI 2.525 $350.00 $883.75 MLS .43 $300.00 $129.00 MRG .05 $150.00 $7.50 JCP .32 $100.00 $32.00 $1,052.25 With the exception of the costs related to the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings of April 8 and 9, 2008, and June 10, 2008, Respondent, as stipulated in the parties’ Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, does not dispute that the amounts of costs set forth in the invoices submitted by Petitioners are fair and reasonable.8 The cost of the Transcripts of the Board of Pharmacy meetings on April 8 and 9, 2008, was $1,476.00. The cost of the Transcript of the Board of Pharmacy meeting on June 10, 2008, was $524.00. At the final hearing, the Board of Pharmacy’s objection appeared to be based on the timing of the payment of the court reporter’s fees related to the transcribing of those meetings. The Transcripts were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings prior to the issuance of the Partial Final Order. Thus, the costs of the transcribing of the Board of Pharmacy meetings are properly included in the amount of costs to be awarded to Petitioners. The amounts of the costs claimed for the rule challenges in the individual and first consolidated invoice are reasonable. The costs incurred by Petitioners for the rule challenges as set forth in the individual and first consolidated invoices are listed below: Name Amount Vipul Patel $1,773.62 Miriam Hernandez $1,801.41 Mirley Aleman-Alejo $1,213.80 Valliammai Natarajan $321.17[9] John H. Neamatalla $1,118.72 Samad Mridha $975.12 Se Young Yoon $1,097.07 Saurin Modi $1,168.75 Deepakkumar Shah, M.Ph. $1,119.24 Mijeong Chang $1,213.16 Nabil Khalil $961.32 Hadya Alameddine $464.60 Balaji Lakshminarayanan $509.71 Anand Narayanan $461.87 The total amount of costs to be awarded for the challenge to the existing rule and to the policy statements is $14,199.56. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the costs contained in the second consolidated invoice. The second consolidated invoice lists the total costs as $2,096.12. Therefore, the costs for the second consolidated invoice are reduced to $209.61,10 which represents the amount attributable to litigation of entitlement of fees, ten percent of the total costs. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the costs contained in the third consolidated invoice. The third consolidated invoice lists the total costs as $580.62. Therefore, the costs for the third consolidated invoice are reduced to $58.06,11 which represents the amount attributable to litigating the entitlement of fees, ten percent of the total costs. Petitioners incurred costs in the litigation of the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Petitioners retained an expert witness, Sandra Ambrose, Esquire. Ms. Ambrose’s fee relating to the issue of attorney’s fees is $5,200.00. Her fee is reasonable; however, Ms. Ambrose’s testimony was related to the amount of the fees not to the entitlement to fees and are, therefore, not awarded as part of the costs. The total costs to be awarded for the litigation of the fees is $267.67.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent applied the following policy to Petitioner and, if so, whether the policy constitutes an unpromulgated "rule" as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. If during its review of a rate change filing, DOI determines an insurer is not in compliance with the annual rate filing requirements of section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, and if the filing involves a Medicare Supplement form, section 627.6745, Florida Statutes, then DOI will only approve an "annual portion" as a percentage of the rate change requested based on the elapsed time period since the last approved rate filing.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Central States Health and Life Company of Omaha (hereinafter referred to as "Central States"), is a corporation domiciled in Nebraska. Central States holds a certificate of authority issued by the Department which allows it to sell life and health insurance, including individual and group standardized Medicare supplement policies, in Florida. Respondent, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the review and approval of health insurance policy forms used in Florida. General Requirements for Medicare Supplement Policy Forms in Florida. No "basic insurance policy" may be delivered in Florida unless the "form" has first been approved by the Department. Section 627.410(1), Florida Statutes. Section 627.410(6), Florida Statutes, additionally requires that a copy of the applicable rating manual or rating schedule included as part of a insurance policy form must be filed with the Department for approval before any "health insurance policy form" is delivered in Florida. Pursuant to Section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, insurers required to file rating manuals or rating schedules pursuant to Section 627.410(6), Florida Statutes, must make an "annual filing" with the department. The rating manual and rating schedule requirements of Section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, may be satisfied by: A "rate filing prepared by an actuary which contains documentation demonstrating the reasonableness of benefits in relation to premiums charged in accordance with the applicable rating laws and rules promulgated by the department." Section 627.410(7)(b)1, Florida Statutes; or "If no rate change is proposed, a filing which consists of a certification by an actuary that benefits are reasonable in relation to premiums currently charged in accordance with applicable laws and rules promulgated by the department." Section 627.410(7)(b)2, Florida Statutes. The filing requirements of Section 627.410(6) and (7), Florida Statutes, apply to Medicare supplement forms. Section 627.6745, Florida Statutes, limits the manner in which entities providing Medicare supplement policies may meet the annual filing requirement of Section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes. Section 627.6745, Florida Statutes, eliminates the use of the certification procedure described in Finding of Fact 7.b., supra, by Medicare supplement policy providers. Section 627.6745(2), Florida Statutes, requires that all providers of Medicare supplement policy forms: . . . file annually its rates, rating schedules, and supporting documentation demonstrating that it is in compliance with the applicable loss ratio standards of this code. The filing of rates and rating schedules shall demonstrate that the actual and expected losses in relations to premiums comply with the requirements of this section. Rule 4-156.012(3), Florida Administrative Code, requires that issuers of Medicare supplement policies and certificates must file their rates annually "for approval by the Department in accordance with Section 627.410, Florida Statutes." Section 627.6745, Florida Statutes, also provides limitations on the rates which may be charged for Medicare supplement policies: Medicare supplement policies shall return the following to policyholders in the form of aggregate benefits under the policy, with respect to the lifetime of the policy, on the basis of earned premiums and on the basis of incurred claims experience . . . and in accordance with accepted actuarial principles and practices: At least 75 percent of the aggregate amount of premiums earned in the case of group policies. . . . for individual policies issued on or after July 1, 1989, at least 65 percent of the aggregate amount of premiums earned. . . . Stated very simply, this provision requires that for every dollar of premiums earned, a minimum of 75 cents must be paid in claims for group policies and a minimum of 65 cents must be paid in claims for individual policies. The grounds for disapproval of "any form filed under s. 627.410" are provided in Section 627.411, Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, Section 627.411(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a "form" may be disapproved if the form: (e) Is for health insurance, and provides benefits which are unreasonable in relation to the premium charged, contains provisions which are unfair or inequitable or contrary to the public policy of this state or which encourage misrepresentation or which apply rating practices which result in premium escalations that are not viable for the policyholder market or result in unfair discrimination in sales practices. The Department has adopted rules establishing rate filing procedures. Rule 4-149.003, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 4-149.006, Florida Administrative Code, sets out the information an actuary must provide and the manner in which an actuary is to provide that information. The Department has also adopted rules providing the manner in which the reasonableness of benefits in relation to premiums will be determined. Rule 4-149.005, Florida Administrative Code. Central States' 1998 Rate Increase Filings and the Department's Denial Thereof. On or about January 20, 1998, Central States filed two requests for rate increase with the Department. One request sought a 39% increase for Individual Medicare supplement policy forms (hereinafter referred to as "Individual Medicare Forms") sold in Florida and the other sought a 39% increase for Group Medicare supplement policy forms (hereinafter referred to as "Group Medicare Forms") sold in Florida. For purposes of this Final Order all Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law apply equally to each type of rate increase request unless otherwise noted. Both rate increase requests were accompanied by an actuarial memorandum certified by Dawn Helwig, an actuary retained by Central States. The rate increase requests were reviewed by Linda Ziegler, an actuary employed by the Department. Following her review, Ms. Ziegler asked for additional information or explanation concerning several issues by letters dated February 10, 1998. By letter dated February 18, 1998, Central States responded to Ms. Ziegler's letters. Each of the issues raised by Ms. Ziegler was addressed in the February 18, 1998, letter. After review of Central States' rate increase requests, the Department informed Central States that the 39% rate increases it had requested were disapproved. Central States was informed of the denial by letter dated March 6, 1998. The Department also informed Central States in the March 6, 1998, denial letter that rate increases of 9.6% were "APPROVED." Central States was requested to "provide revised rate pages reflecting the approved rate increase by March 20, 1998." The Department denied the 39% rate increase requests for three reasons: The Department determined that the rate increases sought by Central States did not provide benefits which were reasonable in relation to the premium to be charged. Therefore, the Department denied the rate increase requests pursuant to Section 627.411(1)(e), Florida Statutes. This determination was based upon a finding that Central States' projected Anticipated Loss Ratio did not meet or exceed the weighted average of the Anticipated Loss Ratio *N (hereinafter referred to as the "*N Test"). "Anticipated Loss Ratio" is defined in Rule 4- 149.006(3)(b)20, Florida Administrative Code, as essentially the present value of future benefits (claims) divided by the present value of future premiums. The conclusion that Central States' projected Anticipated Loss Ratio did not meet or exceed the *N Test was based essentially upon four areas of disagreement with Ms. Helwig's calculations in her actuarial memoranda; The Department determined that Central States' "forms" were in violation of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department denied the rate increase requests pursuant to Section 627.411(1)(a), Florida Statutes. This determination was based upon the Department's conclusion that Central States had failed to make annual rate filings as required by Section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4-156.011, Florida Administrative Code; and The Department determined that Central States' requested rates were not "viable." Therefore, the Department denied the rate increase requests pursuant to Section 627.411(1)(e), Florida Statutes. This determination was based upon the Department's conclusion that because Central States had failed to obtain annual approval of its Individual and Group Medicare Forms for several years the amount of the increases sought by Central States was not "viable." The four areas of disagreement with Ms. Helwig's calculations are: What Individual Medicare Forms should be considered to have been issued to individual customers after "6/1/94" for purposes of Rule 4-149.005(2), Florida Administrative Code. (This issue only impacted Central States' Individual Medicare Forms request); Whether Central States should pool its experience with its Individual and Group Medicare Forms; Whether Central States should use its actual nationwide experience instead of its actual nationwide experience "adjusted to the Florida Rate basis"; and Whether it was appropriate for Central States to assume that its premiums would be received and its claims incurred at the beginning of the year. The Department concluded that 32.7% increases would meet the *N Test if the four areas of disagreement with Ms. Helwig were corrected by Central States. The four areas of disagreement are the subject of Case Numbers 98-1562 and 98-1563. The Department also concluded, however, that even if Central States met the *N Test it would only be entitled to a one-year adjustment which it calculated to be 9.6%. It is this determination that Central States has alleged constitutes the application of an unpromulgated rule. The Challenged Unpromulgated "Rule." The specific statement or statement description challenged by Central States as an unpromulgated rule is as follows: If during its review of a rate change filing, DOI determines an insurer is not in compliance with the annual rate filing requirements of section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, and if the filing involves a Medicare Supplement form, section 627.6745, Florida Statutes, then DOI will only approve an "annual portion" as a percentage of the rate change requested based on the elapsed time period since the last approved rate filing. (The foregoing statement of policy will be referred to as the Challenged Policy"). Central States has alleged that the Department applied the Challenged Policy to it in denying its rate increase requests. Central States has also alleged that the Challenged Policy had not been adopted or proposed as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, at the time of its application by the Department. The Department's Application of the Challenged Policy. The Challenged Policy is actually more than one policy. First, the Challenged Policy includes a policy of the Department that it will not allow a rate increase for Individual or Group Medicare supplement forms attributable to more than a one-year period if an insurer fails to comply with the annual filing requirement of Section 627.410(7)(b), Florida Statutes. This policy is based upon the Department's conclusion that the failure to obtain annual approval means that any future "form" filed by an insurer is in violation of Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, and its conclusion that any future rate increase will not be viable. Secondly, the Challenged Policy includes a policy of the Department that, if the annual filing requirement has not been met, it will only approve an "annual portion" as a percentage of the rate change requested based on the elapsed time period since the last approved rate filing. The evidence in this case proved that the first part of the Challenged Policy formed a large part of the basis for the Department's denial of Central States' applications for rate increases. The evidence also proved that the second part of the Challenged Policy was relied upon by the Department in determining that increases of 9.6% would be acceptable. The Challenged Policy was a statement of general applicability implementing and interpreting Section 627.411(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and prescribing policy of the Department concerning the procedures the Department intended to follow in determining a viable rate of increase for Medicare supplement forms where an insurer has not made the annual filings required by Section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes. The Department has not disputed this finding. The Challenged Policy, as alleged by Central States, constitutes a "rule" as that term is defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. The Challenged Policy had not been adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, at the time of its application to Central States. Throughout this proceeding, the Department has conceded that the Challenged Policy is a "rule" and that the Challenged Policy has not been adopted by rulemaking. Feasibility of Rulemaking. The Challenged Policy was proposed for adoption as a rule by the Department prior to the filing of the petition in this case. On November 7, 1997, the Department caused notice of its intent to adopt proposed rules to be published. Volume 23, Number 45, Pages 6045-6068 of the Florida Administrative Weekly (November 7, 1997). Pursuant to this notice the Department indicated its intent to repeal Chapter 4-149, Florida Administrative Code, and replace it with a new Chapter 4-149. Included in the newly proposed rule chapter, the Department included newly proposed rule 4-149.108(14): (14) If an insurer has not made an annual rate filing or certification stating the reasonableness of benefits in relation to the premiums charged as required by section 627.410(7), Florida Statutes, other than when the department approved a lower increase than what was requested, the current rate increase request shall be limited to the current year's increase. The current year's increase is defined as the maximum level average annual increase permitted by this part, determined assuming that the insurer had implemented level annual rate increase for the period where no filing or certification had been made. (Hereinafter referred to as the "First Proposed Policy"). Volume 23, Number 45, Pages 6045-6068 of the Florida Administrative Weekly (November 7, 1997)(hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rules"). Neither party disputes the fact that the Challenged Policy is included in the First Proposed Policy. Nor do the parties dispute that the Department applied the policies of the First Proposed Policy to Central States in March 1998 in denying its requested rate increases and approving a 9.6% rate increase. Therefore, the evidence failed to prove that rulemaking was not feasible and practicable under Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing is whether Petitioner should be granted interim rate adjustments.
Findings Of Fact Sunrise Community, Inc. (Petitioner) is a charitable organization which serves individuals with developmental disabilities. Petitioner is a licensed Medicaid provider which owns, and/or operates Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded and Developmentally Disabled (ICF/MR-DD). The Agency for Health Care Administration (Respondent) is the state agency responsible for the administration and implementation of the Florida Medicaid Program. In August 1995, Petitioner submitted interim rate requests, i.e., requests for interim changes in its Medicaid reimbursement rate, for costs incurred associated with several of its facilities. The costs were incurred to comply with existing state and federal regulations. Petitioner submitted requests for the following Intermediate Care Facilities (ICFs): Sunrise Main Facility Number 285013, St. Petersburg Cluster Number 280186-01, Greentree Court Cluster Number 280283-01, McCauley Cluster Number 280208-1, Mahan Cluster Number 280291-01, Bayshore Cluster Number 280313- 01, Dorchester Cluster Number 280496-01, Cape Coral Cluster Number 285331-01, 26th Terrace (Number 12) Number 285528, County Meadows (Number 13) Number 285536, 138th Court Number 285480-00, 62nd Place Number 285471-00, 55th Court Number 285609-00, 53rd Court Number 285595-00, Wentworth Number 285617-00, Oakmont Number 285587-00, and 148th Court Number 285579-00. Reimbursement to participating ICF/MR-DD for services provided must be in accordance with Florida Title XIX ICF/MR-DD Reimbursement Plan, Version VI, dated November 15, 1994 (Reimbursement Plan). Respondent timely denied Petitioner's interim rate requests. 2/ Section III.G.7 of the Reimbursement Plan provides: After June 30, 1984, additional costs incurred after enrollment in the program that are due to capital additions or expansions must have prior approval by the HRS Office of Developmental Services if such costs exceed 1 percent of the provider's current total reimbursement rate, with the exception of the addition of new beds which are approved through the state's Certificate of Need process. Costs for specific expansion or additions that exceed the 1 percent limit shall not be reimbursable if not previously approved. Further, financing costs for approved expansions or additions shall be limited by the prudent buyer limits established in Section III.G.4. above. Section IV.G of the Reimbursement Plan provides in pertinent part: Requests for rate adjustments for increases in property-related costs due to capital additions, expansion, replacements or repairs shall not be considered in the interim between cost report submissions, except for the addition of new beds or if the cost of the specific expansion, addition, repair, or replacement would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider's total per diem reimbursement rate. Requests for interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of resident care or administration changes or capital replace- ment other than that specified in (1) above shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing state or federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1.0 percent or more in the provider's current total per diem rate. The provider must submit documentation showing that the changes made were necessary to meet existing state or federal requirements. Around February or March 1993, Petitioner's representatives discussed with the then Assistant Secretary of Development Services (DS) its plans for the ICFs, including the day centers, six-bed facilities, and office building. No costs were discussed because only the approximate costs, not the actual costs, for the projects were known at that time. The then Assistant Secretary verbally gave Petitioner's representatives approval to proceed with their plans. Following numerous public hearings, Petitioner executed leases for properties from Regional Properties, Inc., which acquired the properties through its tax exempt bond issue in October 1993. Regional Properties is a not-for- profit corporation, exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Subsequently, a new Assistant Secretary took the helm of DS. Around March 1994, Petitioner representatives met with the new Assistant Secretary and discussed the ICF projects with him. He advised Petitioner's representatives to continue with the projects. Respondent required that the costs be incurred before requesting reimbursement. Petitioner submitted interim rate adjustment requests for the costs associated with the ICF projects. Medicaid had received approval from DS for the property items in the interim rate requests. Since the requests involved items which were required as part of the ICF/MR-DD program, DS took the position that it could not disapprove the requests. The Assistant Secretaries of DS did not give Petitioner written prior approval for the costs associated with the projects. However, although not written, the new Assistant Secretary did give prior approval for the costs. This finding is consistent with the approval of all of Petitioner's requests for interim rate adjustments (for reimbursement) of the costs associated with the projects submitted during the tenure of the new Assistant Secretary. In 1995, the new Assistant Secretary of DS was replaced by the present Acting Assistant Secretary. The present 1995 interim rate adjustment requests are a continuation of costs associated with the ICF projects which have already been approved. The identification of costs, as for capital additions or expansions, by a provider is accepted and not questioned or challenged by DS. The costs in the 1995 interim rate requests were accepted by DS. The costs in the 1995 interim rate change requests were considered by DS to be a continuation of costs for the ICF projects previously approved. As a result, the Acting Assistant Secretary of DS took the position that DS could not disapprove the requests. Written prior approval was not required by DS prior to Petitioner's 1995 interim rate change requests. Petitioner was entitled to rely upon the terms of the Reimbursement Plan and the past practice of Medicaid, DS, and Respondent regarding prior approval. In reliance on the past practice, Petitioner proceeded and continued with the ICF projects and incurred costs associated with the projects. Petitioner leases properties from Regional Properties, Inc. The Phineas Corporation controls both Petitioner and Regional Properties. Petitioner leases the properties from a "related" party or organization. The lease payments are not costs for capital additions or expansions under the Reimbursement Plan. Repairs and replacements are not capital additions or expansions under the Reimbursement Plan. Each facility must be evaluated separately regarding capital additions or expansions in terms of the 1 percent requirement of Section III.G.7 of the Reimbursement Plan. In the 1995 interim rate adjustment requests, there are no capital additions or expansions beyond those identified by Petitioner in its requests. The 1 percent requirement of Section III.G.7 does not apply to any of Petitioner's 1995 interim rate adjustment requests. The costs submitted by Petitioner in the 1995 interim rate adjustment requests are reasonable and necessary and are, therefore, allowable subject to audit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order granting Petitioner's interim rate adjustment requests submitted in August 1995, subject to auditing. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Greynolds Park Manor, Inc. (Greynolds), operates a skilled nursing home facility at 17400 West Dixie Highway, North Miami Beach, Florida. The facility was constructed in 1968 and has been certified in the Medicaid Program since 1971. It is licensed by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to operate 324 beds. However, its average patient census in 1979 through 1981 was between 220 and 225 patients. It is the largest nursing home in Dade and Broward Counties. HRS is the state agency designated to administer Florida's Medical Assistance (Medicaid) Program pursuant to Section 409.266, et seq., Fla. Stat. HRS and Greynolds have entered into a written agreement, "Agreement for Participation in Florida's Medical Assistance Program," for each fiscal year that Greynolds has participated in the program. Greynolds' fiscal year runs from June 1 through May 31. Effective October 1, 1977, HRS adopted the "Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan" (Plan). The Plan is a prospective reimbursement plan, designed to aid the State in containing health care costs for Medicaid recipients. The prospective reimbursement rate for a provider is based on the actual allowable costs of a provider for the previous fiscal year, to which an inflationary factor is added. The mechanics utilized to establish the prospective reimbursement rate under the Plan are clear. The provider is required to submit a uniform cost report within 90 days after the conclusion of its fiscal year. HRS audits the uniform cost report, determines allowable costs, adds an inflationary factor, and thereby sets the provider's prospective reimbursement rate. This rate is effective the first day of the month following receipt of the uniform cost report by HRS, and remains in effect until a new cost report is filed by the provider. Under the provisions of the Plan, all cost reports are desk reviewed within six months after their submission to HRS. HRS, under the terms of the Plan, may perform an audit on the cost report. An on-site audit is a more extensive review of the cost report than desk review. During an on-site audit the financial and statistical records of the provider are examined to ensure that only allowable costs were included in the cost report. The audit findings prevail over those made at desk review. Greynolds submitted its cost report for fiscal year 1979 on September 27, 1979. Previously, by letter dated September 10, 1979, Greynolds had been advised by HRS that an on-site audit was to be done of its ficsal year 1979 cost report, and that Greynolds' Medicare cost report would be a subject of inquiry. The cost report Greynolds submitted to HRS on September 27, 1979, did not make a Medicare cost adjustment, and none was made at desk review. 1/ A rather anomalous situation existed in 1979 through 1980 which lent itself to potential abuse. The Medicare cost adjustment was never made at desk review. It was only made if there was an audit. Yet only one in three providers were designated for audit each year, and even if designated the audit could be terminated at any time. Consequently, if no audit were made, or if terminated prematurely, the provider would not be required to make a Medicare adjustment and would reap a substantial windfall. Greynolds was fully aware of HRS' practice. In 1981 HRS altered its practice and began to make the Medicare adjustment at desk review. The audit of Greynolds' cost report for fiscal year 1979 was actually begun in October 1979 by the Fort Lauderdale Office of HRS. At the same time, the desk review of the cost report was undertaken by HRS' Jacksonville Office and was ultimately finalized on February 29, 1980. The desk review findings contained adjustments to expenditures totaling $46,592, but made no Medicare adjustment, consistent with HRS policy at that time. Based upon these adjustments, HRS' desk review established prospective reimbursement rates effective October 1, 1979. However, HRS advised Greynolds that these rates were "subject to change by any on-site audit." Greynolds used these rates for the period October 1, 1979 through August 31, 1980. In June 1980, HRS' Supervisor of Audit Services requested additional information before the field audit of the 1979 cost report could be completed. Greynolds presumably furnished this information because the field work was completed in September 1980. On June 24, 1981, Greynolds was notified by letter that the audit had been completed and was pending final review. The letter further advised Greynolds that "since this audit will supersede the desk review, the adjustments we made in our desk review letter of February 29, 1980, must stand until the on- site audit results are released." On June 9, 1982, HRS' Fort Lauderdale Office advised Greynolds that its on-site audit of the 1979 cost report had been completed. The audit adjustments to the cost report had been increased from $46,592 to $803,592. Most of this was due to a Medicare adjustment in the amount of $654,282. An exit conference was held by HRS' field representatives and Greynolds on June 21, 1982. None of the adjustments were changed as a result of this meeting. At that time, Greynolds first requested that it be allowed to file an interim rate change. Greynolds was advised, however, that the Office of Audit Services had no authority to approve such a request. On September 23, 1982, the final audit report of Greynolds' 1979 cost report was issued. The audit concluded that the reported allowable expenses of Greynolds would be reduced by $725,953, resulting in an overpayment of $288,024. Most of this was, again, the result of the Medicare adjustment of $654,282. The report further advised Greynolds of the right to request that any audit adjustment in dispute be addressed in a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Fla. Stat. Greynolds duly petitioned for a Section 120.57 hearing on the audit adjustments of September 23, 1982. This matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and docketed as Case No. 82-3208. At the outset of the hearing in that case, Greynolds withdrew its challenge to the Medicare adjustment of $654,282. Following receipt of the final audit report of September 23, 1982, Greynolds requested, by letter dated November 2, 1982, an interim rate change for its fiscal year 1980, "in accordance with the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan IVA-10." The reasons assigned by Greynolds for making the request were: A substantial decrease in Medicare patient days in the fiscal year ended May 31, 1980 and the corresponding decrease in the Medicare adjustment; and A change in the percentage of skilled and intermediate Medicaid patients. The request was denied by HRS on January 12, 1983, on the ground that "interim rates will not be granted for a closed cost reporting period." HRS' denial failed, however, to inform Greynolds of its right to request a hearing. On June 7, 1983, Greynolds renewed its request for an interim rate change for its fiscal year ended May 31, 1980. This request was denied October 12, 1983, on the ground that: To grant an interim rate for a closed cost reporting period would be the same as making a retroactive payment to a nursing home whose costs exceed annual payment. Retroactive payments such as this are specifically prohibited by Section 10C-7.48(6)(1), Florida Administrative Code, which was in effect during the cost reporting period in question. Greynolds filed a timely request for a Section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., hearing. The circumstances relied on by Greynolds to justify an interim rate request were primarily the result of a substantial decline in its Medicare patient census resulting from a staphytococcus bacterial infection among its patients. The bacterial infection arose in February 1979 and continued through May 31, 1980 (the end of Greynolds' 1980 fiscal year). Greynolds is a dual provider facility, treating both Medicare and Medicaid eligible patients. The bacterial infection, which was contained within the Medicare section of the facility, resulted in a 45 percent decline in Medicare admissions during the period. Under the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement systems, a provider is required to first request payment from Medicare if the patient is Medicare eligible. Medicare reimburses at a higher rate than does Medicaid. Consequently, a substantial decrease in the number of Medicare patient days would result in a substantial decrease in the revenue received by the provider. Greynolds was fully aware of the change in the patient mix, as it occurred, during fiscal year 1980. Greynolds opined that it did not apply for an interim rate request at that time because the prospective reimbursement rate which had been set October 1, 1980, based on its cost report for fiscal year 1979, was "adequate" until the Medicare adjustment was finally made. The facts, however, reveal a different motivation. Under the Plan, whether on desk review or on audit, a Medicare adjustment is made to a provider's uniform cost report when developing a prospective reimbursement rate. The Medicare adjustment is made by excluding the Medicare patient days and Medicare costs from the provider's cost report, since these items are reimbursed by Medicare. The reimbursement rate is then established by adding an inflationary factor to the remaining patient days and costs. This reimbursement rate remains in effect until the provider files its next cost report. If the provider maintains its costs under the reimbursement rate, it may retain the difference; if the provider's costs exceed the reimbursement rate, it will not be reimbursed for its inefficiency. The Plan is predicated on a cost containment methodology. It is designed to encourage efficient administration by nursing home providers when providing services to Medicaid recipients. The Plan does, however, permit an adjustment to a provider's prospective reimbursement rate ("an interim rate") when unforeseen events during that fiscal year occur which were not contemplated in setting the provider's prospective reimbursement rate predicated on the previous year's costs. Greynolds was aware of the change, as it occurred, in its 1980 patient mix. Therefore, it could have applied for an interim rate adjustment at that time. To have done so, however, would have required it to make the Medicare cost adjustment to its 1979 cost report since its justification for an increase was the substantial decrease in Medicare patients and the corresponding decrease in the Medicare adjustment it was currently experiencing. To raise the Medicare adjustment issue was not, however, to its financial advantage. If it "escaped" the Medicare adjustment to its 1979 cost report, it would profit by the amount of that adjustment ($288,024). Greynolds' request for an increase in its reimbursement rate for 1980, after the 1980 cost reporting period was closed, also raises the disquieting specter that Greynolds will be reimbursed for the same costs twice. Since each year's reimbursement rate is based on the previous year's cost report, to retrospectively pick one reimbursement period from the series of years is disruptive of all the rates which were subsequently established. Under the Plan, if a provider experiences a substantial decrease in Medicare patient days and costs for a cost reporting period, the Medicaid reimbursement rate for the next period, based on that cost report, would substantially increase. Accordingly, Greynolds' 1981 reimbursement rate would be reflective of the loss of Medicare patient days in 1980. To now ignore the effect 1980 costs had in establishing 1981 reimbursement rates, and to reimburse Greynolds for 1980 without regard to the reimbursement rate for the subsequent year, ignores reality. Greynolds has on one other occasion availed itself of an interim rate request. On June 17, 1981, Greynolds applied for an interim rate for its fiscal year 1981. Greynolds' request was based on the fact that it had negotiated a union contract effective April 1, 1981, which resulted in a substantial increase in salaries for its employees. Since this factor was not reflected in its cost report for fiscal year 1980, upon which its current reimbursement rate was predicated, HRS, by letter dated July 29, 1981, granted Greynolds' request. Greynolds asserts that the granting of its 1981 interim rate request occurred after the close of its 1981 cost reporting period and is, therefore, evidence that the denial by HRS of its interim rate request in this case is inconsistent and improper. HRS asserts that the granting of Greynolds' interim rate request in 1981 was proper, and that it was not granted outside a closed cost reporting period. HRS interprets "cost reporting period" to be that period within which the provider must file its cost report for the previous fiscal year ("the cost report period"). Rule 10C-7.48(5)(c), F.A.C., in effect at the time, provided A cost report will be submitted as prescribed by the Department to cover the facility's fiscal year, along with the facility's usual and customary charges to private patients receiving comparable medicaid service, within 90 days after the end of the cost report period. According to HRS, the "cost reporting period" would be closed when the provider submits its cost report, which could be as much as 90 days after the "cost report period" had ended. HRS' interpretation is certainly reasonable, within the range of possible interpretations, and is therefore adopted. The interim rate request, granted Greynolds in 1981, was not granted after a closed cost reporting period. The reimbursement rate in effect on June 17, 1981, had commenced September 1, 1980. This rate remained in effect until the interim rate was granted, which interim rate remained in effect until Greynolds submitted its cost report for fiscal year 1981. Greynolds' 1981 cost report was submitted August 31, 1981, and its new reimbursement rate was therefore effective September 1, 1981. Accordingly, the grant of Greynolds' 1981 interim rate request was not inconsistent with the position it has adopted in this case. Had Greynolds "timely filed" its interim rate request in this case, HRS concedes the circumstances which gave rise to the request would have entitled the request to consideration under the provisions of Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan, paragraph IVA-10. However, since HRS rejected Greynolds' interim rate request as untimely, it never addressed, by review or audit, the accuracy or prospective impact of Greynolds' request.
Findings Of Fact Provider received the correspondence giving notice of Provider’s right to an administrative hearing regarding the improper Medicaid reimbursement. Provider filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing, and then caused that petition to be withdrawn and the administrative hearing case to be closed. Provider chose not to dispute the facts set forth in the letter dated August 1, 2011. The facts alleged in the letter are hereby deemed admitted, including the total improper reimbursement amount of twelve thousand, one hundred sixty-four dollars ($12,164.00). The Agency hereby adopts the facts as set forth in the letter, including the improper reimbursement amount of twelve thousand, one hundred sixty-four dollars ($12,164.00). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The Agency incorporates and adopts each and every relevant statement and conclusion of law set forth in the August 1, 2011, letter. The admitted facts support the legal conclusion that the improper reimbursement in the amount of twelve thousand, one hundred sixty-four dollars ($12,164.00) was appropriate. As partial payment has previously been made, five thousand, eight hundred sixty-four dollars ($5,864.00) is now due and owing from Provider to the Agency. Based on the foregoing it is ORDERD AND ADJUDGED that Provider remit, forthwith, the amount of five thousand, eight hundred sixty-four dollars ($5,864). Provider’s request for an administrative hearing is hereby dismissed. DONE and ORDERED on this the We day of fojtimla__. 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. and Mf SECRETARY Agency for Health Care Administration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Rachic’ Wilson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Roberto E. Moran, Esq. Rasco, Klock, Reininger, et al 283 Catalonia Avenue Second Floor Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (U.S. Mail) June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Mike Blackburn, Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity Finance and Accounting HOA Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Facility) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail on this the Ainot Sek W12. = —az, Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before me for issuance of a Final Order on an August 1, 2011, letter from the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) to Bay Point Schools, Inc. (“Provider”) notifying Provider that it had been improperly reimbursed twelve thousand, one hundred sixty-four dollars ($12,264.00) by Medicaid. The August 1, 2011, letter indicated that partial payment had already been remitted by Provider and that five thousand, eight hundred sixty-four dollars ($5,864.00) remained due and owing from Provider to the Agency. The August 1, 2011, letter provided full disclosure and notice to Provider of procedures for requesting an administrative hearing to contest the allegations made in the letter. Provider filed a petition with the Agency requesting a formal administrative hearing on September 6, 2011. The Agency forwarded Provider’s hearing request to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) for a formal administrative hearing. On March 9, 2012, Provider filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Formal Hearing. DOAH issued an Order Filed September 6, 2012 1:46 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction on March 12, 2012, closing the above-styled cause and relinquishing jurisdiction back to the Agency.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology that Respondent uses to determine the amounts payable to pharmacies for prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that the methodology in question, which is incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250, enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program in which Florida participates in partnership with the national government. Medicaid provides medically necessary health care—— including, relevantly, prescription drugs——to lower income persons. In addition to shouldering administrative and regulatory responsibilities, Florida partially funds the Florida Medicaid Program, contributing about 42 percent of the money budgeted for the program's operation in this state. Federal funds make up the balance. Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration (the "Agency") is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. (At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, known collectively as "CMS," is the agency authorized to administer Medicaid.) Among other things, the Agency is responsible for reimbursing Medicaid providers in accordance with state and federal law, subject to specific appropriations. In this connection, the Agency is authorized and required to prescribe, by rule, reimbursement methodologies. The Agency is permitted to publish such methodologies in policy manuals and handbooks, provided the latter are incorporated by reference in duly promulgated rules. Petitioner, The Florida Retail Federation, Inc. (the "Federation"), is a trade association whose members include all or most of the major drugstore chains doing business in Florida. These drugstore chains, which include Walgreen's, CVS, Eckerd's, Albertson's, Publix, Winn-Dixie, Target, and Wal-Mart, participate in the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council, which is the only organization in this state representing the interests of drugstore chains. Members of the Federation's Chain Drugstore Council operate more than 2,500 separate pharmacies, each of which is an enrolled Medicaid provider of prescription drugs. Given that there are approximately 4,000 pharmacy-providers participating in the Florida Medicaid Program, the Federation represents a significant percentage of the enrolled pharmacies. The Federation advocates on behalf of its members before the Florida Legislature and the state regulatory agencies. Medicaid funding is one of the organization's top priorities. The Federation brought the instant proceeding because it believes that the Medicaid Program has been under- reimbursing its members based on a methodology that contravenes the applicable Florida statutes. The Disputed Rule The Medicaid reimbursement methodology for prescribed drugs is set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drugs Services Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook, July 2001 (the "Handbook), which Handbook was incorporated by reference in, and hence adopted via Section 120.54(1)(i)1., Florida Statutes, as, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G- 4.250. The methodology, which will be referred to hereafter as the "Reimbursement Rule," limits the amount that the Medicaid Program will pay for prescription drugs, as follows: Reimbursement for covered drugs dispensed by a licensed pharmacy that has been approved to be an eligible provider, or a physician filling his own prescriptions if there is no licensed pharmacy within a ten mile radius of his office, shall not exceed the lowest of: Average Wholesale Price (AWP) minus 13.25 per cent of the drug, (also known as the Estimated Acquisition Cost or EAC) plus the dispensing fee; Wholesaler Acquisition Cost (WAC) plus 7 per cent plus the dispensing fee; Federal Upper Limit (FUL) price plus the dispensing fee; The State Maximum Allowable Cost (SMAC) plus a dispensing fee established by the state on certain categories of drugs not reviewed by CMS (formerly HCFA); or Amount billed by the pharmacy, which cannot exceed the pharmacy’s average charge to the public (non-Medicaid) in any calendar quarter, for the same drug, quality, and strength. This average is known as the pharmacy’s usual and customary charge for the prescription. By its plain terms, the Reimbursement Rule (a) requires that five separate methods for determining reimbursement be applied with respect to each prescription and (b) mandates that the maximum allowable payment for each prescription be the lowest dollar amount resulting from the application of these five methods to the claim at hand.1 For ease of reference, the five separate methods enumerated in the Reimbursement Rule will be referred to collectively as the "Limits." Individually, the Limits will be called the "First Limit," "Second Limit," etc., with the numerical adjective corresponding to the order in which the Reimbursement Rule lists the respective Limits. (Thus, for example, the First Limit is the one based on average wholesale price; the Fourth Limit references the state maximum allowable cost.)2 The Reimbursement Rule was promulgated to implement two statutes in particular. One of these was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, which provided in pertinent part as follows: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. § 409.908(14), Fla. Stat. (2003). The other was Section 409.912, Florida Statute, which directed, in relevant part, that "[r]eimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." § 409.912(40)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2003). The Challenge The Federation filed its Petition for Invalidity of Rule ("Petition") on May 19, 2004, initiating the instant proceeding. The Petition describes a straightforward objection to the Reimbursement Rule, namely that the prescribed Limits include methods for determining reimbursement in addition to "average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent," which latter, according to the Petition, constitutes the exclusive method for reimbursing pharmacies, pursuant to Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003). Thus, the Federation alleged, only the First Limit is permissible; the rest are unauthorized, and the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Section 409.912(40)(a)2. for using them, making the Reimbursement Rule an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. As this proceeding progressed, the Federation's position became a bit more complicated. Forced to deal with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), which was not mentioned in the Petition, the Federation effectively conceded (assuming it ever disputed) that "amount billed" and "usual and customary charge" are statutorily authorized methods for calculating reimbursement, in addition to discounted average wholesale price. Unable as a result to argue that the Fifth Limit should be rejected in toto, the Federation claimed instead that the Reimbursement Rule's definition of "usual and customary charge" enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the use of that term in Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003). On this point, the Federation presented expert testimony at hearing that "usual and customary charge" is a term of art used in the industry to mean the amount a pharmacy charges cash paying customers who have no insurance coverage for the prescription in question. The Reimbursement Rule's definition, in contrast, does not restrict the scope of "usual and customary charge" to uninsured customers, but rather requires that charges to all non-Medicaid customers be taken into account in determining the average charge that equals "usual and customary charge." Because private insurers and HMOs typically negotiate discounts not available to uninsured consumers, the inclusion of amounts charged to insured customers in the equation for calculating "usual and customary charge," à la the Reimbursement Rule, is likely to produce, in most instances, a lower "usual and customary charge" than would obtain were charges to insured customers excluded from the calculation. The Federation argues that the legislature intended "usual and customary charge" to have the more generous technical meaning that the industry ascribes to it, and therefore that the Reimbursement Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific law implemented by giving the term a different, more parsimonious meaning. Confronting Section 409.908(14) also compelled the Federation to argue that, while the section imposes (and hence enables the Agency to implement) limits on reimbursement in addition to discounted average wholesale price, the reference therein to "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" as an alternative reimbursement limit nevertheless cannot be construed as authority for the adoption of a methodology that would result in reimbursement at less than the least of (a) the amount billed by the provider, (b) the provider's "usual and customary charge" (as the Federation would define that term), or (c) average wholesale cost less 13.25 percent. In this regard, the Federation asserts that Section 409.908(14) and Section 409.912(40)(a)2.——which might at first blush appear to be inconsistent with one another——can easily be harmonized by construing "Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency" to mean "average wholesale price less 13.25 percent." The Agency's Defense of Reimbursement Rule The Agency's arguments in support of the Reimbursement Rule can be reduced to two principal propositions. First, the Agency insists that if it were to reimburse pharmacies for all prescribed drugs at average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, the resulting payments, in the aggregate, would exceed federal limits on reimbursement, for reasons that need not detain us here. Exceeding federal limits, the Agency asserts, could cause CMS to take adverse action against the Florida Medicaid Program, perhaps putting at risk Florida's continued receipt of federal matching funds. Second, the Agency contends that Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), which requires that reimbursement be set at the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent, does not establish a floor (as the Federation maintains) but rather, when read in conjunction with Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2003), prescribes another potential ceiling in addition to the pharmacy's actual charge, "usual and customary charge," and "the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency," which are the other potential ceilings pursuant to Section 409.908(14). Under this interpretation of the statutes, application of the Reimbursement Rule always produces the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the Agency——a statutorily authorized limit——and if that fee happens in a given situation to be less than the discounted average wholesale price, so be it. The New Statutory Methodology The 2004 Legislature amended Sections 409.908(14) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2003), enacting a bill (House Bill No. 1843) that was signed by the governor while this case was pending, on May 28, 2004. See Laws of Florida, Ch. 2004-270, §§ 12 and 17. The relevant statutory amendments took effect on July 1, 2004, id. at § 25, which was shortly after the final hearing in this case——and prior to the date of this Final Order. As amended, Section 409.908(14), Florida Statutes (2004), reads in relevant part as follows, with the recently added language underlined: A provider of prescribed drugs shall be reimbursed the least of the amount billed by the provider, the provider's usual and customary charge, or the Medicaid maximum allowable fee established by the agency, plus a dispensing fee. The Medicaid maximum allowable fee for ingredient cost will be based upon the lower of: average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider. As amended, Section 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), provides in pertinent part as follows, with the newly added language underlined and recently deleted language stricken through: Reimbursement to pharmacies for Medicaid prescribed drugs shall be set at the lesser of: the average wholesale price (AWP) minus 15.4 percent, the wholesaler acquisition cost (WAC) plus 5.75 percent, the federal upper limit (FUL), the state maximum allowable cost (SMAC), or the usual and customary (UAC) charge billed by the provider the average wholesale price less 13.25 percent. Collectively, Sections 409.908(4) and 409.912(40)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004), will be referred to hereafter as the "New Statutory Methodology."
