The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be granted a consumer’s certificate of exemption pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Revenue (Respondent) is the state agency charged with enforcement of Chapter 212, Florida Statues, and the issuance of certificates of exemption. Unto Others, Inc. (Petitioner) is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a non-profit corporation. Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, Article II, states Petitioner’s purpose as follows: The purposes for which the Corporation [Petitioner] is organized are exclusively religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue law. Petitioner made application to the Respondent for a certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(o)2.b, Florida Statutes. Petitioner did not make application for an exemption as a scientific, religious, or educational institution, but it may in the future apply under these criteria. By Notice of Intent to Deny (Notice) dated January 30, 1998, the Respondent notified Petitioner that its application was being denied. The grounds stated in the Notice for the denial were the following: (1) "Your organization does not provide, nor does it raise funds for charitable institutions which provide one or more of the charitable services listed in the statute [Subsection 212.08(7)(o)2.b, Florida Statutes]."; and (2) "Your organization fails to meet the qualification for exemption from sales and use taxation, as set forth in Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes." Currently, Petitioner’s sole function is the raising of funds to enable Petitioner to rehabilitate people and dwellings. All of Petitioner’s activities are conducted by non-paid volunteers. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner rehabilitates any person or dwelling, or holds religious services. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner governs or administers any office within any hierarchy of a larger organization. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner participates with or controls another organization. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner expends more than 50 percent of its expenditures toward any charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner disburses more than 50 percent of its expenditures directly for a charitable service or to any entity that directly provides or performs any charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner directly provides or performs any charitable service for any entity or person; or that Petitioner provides any goods or services as a charitable service. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner directly provides a reasonable percentage of any charitable service free or at a substantially reduced cost to persons, animals, or organizations that are unable to pay for such services. No evidence was presented to show that any charitable service was provided free or at a substantially reduced cost. No evidence was presented to show that persons, animals, or organizations actually received any charitable service and that those persons, animals, or organizations were unable to pay for such service(s). Petitioner does not currently provide any of the services listed in Subsection 212.08(7)(o).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying a consumer's certificate of exemption to Unto Others, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1998.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Spiritual Kingdom of God the Creator of All Universes, should receive a consumer's certificate of exemption.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. On or about February 4, 1999, the Petitioner submitted an application for consumer’s certificate of exemption. Such application sought exemption as a religious organization. On February 17, 1999, the Department issued a letter to the Petitioner acknowledging receipt of the application and requesting additional information about the Petitioner in order to complete the application review. On March 15, 1999, the Department issued a second notice to the Petitioner that mirrored the prior request for additional information. On April 26, 1999, the Department issued a third letter that advised Petitioner that it had failed to demonstrate that it meets the criteria as a religious institution as defined by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. This letter outlined the criteria that would support the approval of the certification sought by the Petitioner. On June 11, 1999, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption. Thereafter the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the agency’s decision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the Petitioner’s application for a consumer’s certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Wendell Phillips Spiritual Kingdom of God the Creator Post Office Box 331228 Coconut Grove, Florida 33233-1228 George C. Hamm, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a consumer certificate of exemption as a religious or charitable institution.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has submitted seven (7) exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order. Exceptions 1, and 3 through 6 filed by Petitioner are rejected. Exception 2 is accepted to the extent it states that Petitioner does not hold worship services. The remainder of this exception is rejected. Exception 7 is rejected, except for the first sentence which indicates that the date of purchase of the vehicle was 1995, not 1993. Petitioner's First Exception-- Finding of Fact No. 1: Petitioner's statements as to how Petitioner was advertised are not relevant and, therefore, are rejected. Petitioner's Second Exception-- Finding of Fact No. 2: Accepted that Petitioner does not have worship services. This determination has been made by the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact. See Findings of Fact No. 2 and 3. The remainder of this exception is rejected as being irrelevant. Petitioner's Third Exceptions-- Finding of Fact No. 3: The Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact, Paragraph 3 of the Proposed Recommended Order, that Christian-Muslim Church of God (ALLAH) is not part of any established religion is supported by substantial competent evidence. Thus, Petitioner's exception to this finding is rejected. The statement that Petitioner's founder will write a "Consolidated Moral Bible" is not relevant, and is therefore rejected. The Hearing Officer's finding that Petitioner has generalized plans to establish regular religious services, but has not yet done so, is supported by substantial competent evidence. Therefore, Petitioner's exception to this finding is rejected. The statement as to how assemblies of the church will be organized by Petitioner in the future is not relevant, and is therefore rejected. Petitioner's Fourth Exceptions- Finding of Fact No. 4: Petitioner's statements as to where Petitioner's funds are deposited is not relevant, and therefore is rejected. Petitioner's statements as to the type of donations its founder, Mr. Savas, personally makes are not relevant and, therefore, are rejected. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner does not qualify as a "religious institution" under s212.08(7)(o) 2.a., Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer's finding is supported by substantial competent evidence. Thus, Petitioner's exception to this finding is rejected. Petitioner's statement as to why Petitioner needs the sales tax exemption is not relevant and, therefore, is rejected. Petitioner's Fifth Exceptions-- Finding of Fact No. 5: The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner is not registered as, or classified as, any type of legal entity. The Hearing Officer also found that the Petitioner is not a church or charitable institution as those terms are defined under s212.08(7), Florida Statutes for purposes of sales tax exemption. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by the record and by substantial competent evidence. The remainder of Petitioner's exceptions are not material. Therefore, all of Petitioner's exceptions to Paragraph 5 are hereby rejected. Petitioner's Sixth Exception-- Finding of Fact No. 6: The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner is not registered as, or classified as, any type of legal entity and that Petitioner does not qualify as a "charitable institution" pursuant to s 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. These findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. Therefore, Petitioner's exception to this paragraph is rejected. Petitioner's Seventh Exceptions-- Finding of Fact No. 7: Accepted that Petitioner's founder purchased his car in 1995, and applied for a consumer's certificate of exemption at that time. The statements as to the beliefs of Petitioner's founder are irrelevant or immaterial, and are rejected accordingly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying a consumer certificate of tax exemption to Petitioner, the Christian-Muslim Church of God (Allah). DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4076 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. - 11. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 John Savas 1416 Hill Drive Largo, Florida 34640 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue for determination in this cause is whether petitioner is entitled to a refund in the amount of $6,306.32 paid into the state treasury as sales tax. More specifically, the issue is whether the registration or participation fee charged by petitioner to its members at the 1975 summer national bridge tournament is taxable as an "admission" under Florida Statutes 212.02(16) and 212.04.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner, the American Contract Bridge League, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of New York in 1938. Its membership is approximately 200,000, representing areas all over the North American continent. Its purposes include educational, cultural and charitable pursuits. Among other things, petitioner annually sponsors three national tournaments in various areas of the United States. In August of 1975, petitioner held its summer national tournament at the Americana Hotel in Bal Harbour, Dade County, Florida. Over 1,000 tables for approximately 5,500 members were in operation for the nine-day event. Many of these 5,500 members played in two or more events. In order to participate in each event, the member was required to pay a registration fee ranging from $3.00 to $4.50. No sales tax was included by petitioner in its registration fee. While spectators at the tournament were permitted, it was not intended as a spectator event. No special provision was made for the seating of spectators, whose number rarely exceeded one hundred and who were composed primarily of relatives or friends of the actual players or participants. No admission charges were made to spectators. On previous occasions, petitioner has held bridge events in Florida. On no such occasion has the State of Florida attempted to assess the sales tax on petitioner's registration or participation fees. No other state in which petitioner has held its tournaments has assessed petitioner for sales or other taxes on this fee. The respondent Department of Revenue informed petitioner that the registration fees collected at the 1975 summer national tournament constituted a taxable event, subject to the Florida sales tax, and petitioner, under protest, forwarded a check in the amount of $6,306.32. Thereafter, petitioner applied for a refund pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 215.26. The Comptroller denied the refund application.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's request for a refund in the amount of $6,306.32 be denied. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Comptroller Gerald Lewis The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Patricia Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Bloxham Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Paul J. Levine, Esquire 2100 First Federal Building One Southeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent took "agency action" when it certified the Okaloosa-Walton College Foundation, Inc. as its direct support organization and endorsed the Foundation's decision to sell the Mattie Kelly property; and whether Petitioners have standing to request an administrative hearing on those issues.
Findings Of Fact The Foundation was incorporated and first certified as a direct support organization in 1988. The Mattie Kelly property is approximately 13 acres of waterfront property on Choctawhatchee Bay in Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida. It includes the former residence of Mattie Kelly and the real property surrounding the residence. Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida, is a municipality, bounded on the north and west by Choctawhatchee Bay, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico, and on the east by Walton County, Florida. On August 17, 1992, Mattie Kelly executed her Last Will and Testament (will). Article VIII of the will states as follows: I give, devise and bequeath my personal residence located a 1200 Indian Trail Road, Destin, Florida 32541, including all real property surrounding the residence and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) to Okaloosa-Walton Community College for the establishment of the "Mattie Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College." The purpose of the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College" shall be: To provide a meeting place for literary societies, fine arts groups, and small performing groups. To provide a location for conferences and seminars offered through Okaloosa-Walton Community College. To provide a location for biology studies and marine science studies associated with Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. To provide a location for displaying the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida. The Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) endowment which forms part of this gift shall be used only for maintenance and operating costs in furtherance of the above purposes, including the perpetual care, maintenance and upkeep of my mausoleum. A Personal Representative's Warranty Deed dated March 6, 1997, conveyed the property to the Foundation. At some point in time, the Foundation decided to sell the property to a real estate developer and entered into a contract to do so. On March 15, 2004, Petitioner Hammet filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with the Board. The petition questioned whether the Board should support, endorse, and/or not oppose the sale of the property for private real estate development purposes, accept the college president's recommendation about the sale, and certify the Foundation to be operating in the best interest of the state. The Board's March 16, 2004, minutes state as follows in relevant part: ACTION AGENDA DSO Certification/IRS 990 The District Board of Trustees certified that requirements of Direct Support Organization under FS 1004.70 have been met and that the OWCC Foundation is in compliance with the procedures as herein described and accepts Form IRS 990 as submitted. Further, the District Board of Trustees supports and endorses the Foundation Board of Directors in its endeavor to sell the Mattie Kelly Property (Motion: Henderson; Second Rainer. Vote: 6 yes; 2 no (Smith, Wells). Motion carried. On April 22, 2004, the Board referred Petitioner Hammet's petition to DOAH, together with the Board's Motion to Dismiss. DOAH assigned this case DOAH Case No. 04-2049. On June 15, 2004, the Board referred the following to DOAH: (a) Petitioner Coastkeepers' Petition for Administrative Hearing; (b) Petitioner's Motion and Suggestion for Disqualification of Joseph Henderson and James R. Richburg; and the Board's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Administrative Hearing. DOAH assigned the case DOAH Case No. 04-2141. On July 8, 2004, some of Ms. Kelly's relatives filed a suit against the Foundation in Circuit Court. In Count I of the complaint, the relatives sought a declaratory judgment that the Foundation's proposed sale violates Ms. Kelly's will and that the relatives had reversionary rights to the property. In Count II of the complaint, the relatives sought injunctive relief to restrain the Foundation from selling the property to a third party in accordance with a written contract of sale. On April 20, 2005, the Florida Attorney General issued an Advisory Legal Opinion, stating that the Foundation is subject to Florida's Sunshine Law. On May 5, 2005, the Foundation voted to ratify the contract to sell the property and to confirm the prior decision to sell the property. On June 3, 2005, the First Circuit Court entered a "Final Judgment for Defendant" in L. Bernarr Kelly, Carol Kelly and Lowell B. Kelly v. The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc., No. 2004-CA-405 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. June 3, 2005), which states as follows in pertinent part: . . . The Court is convinced by the nature of the Will, and the testimony and evidence that Mattie Kelly had legal advice in her estate planning, that if Mattie Kelly intended for the subject property to be placed in a trust, and if she desired to put restrictions on the subject property to prevent Defendant Foundation from selling it, that she knew how to accomplish this, and that she chose not to do so. The Court finds . . . that Mattie Kelly did not intend to limit or restrict the sale of the subject property in the future to fulfill her desires for the creation of a cultural and environmental institute. . . . The Court finds that the deed dated March 6, 1997, . . . does not contain a reverter clause or language creating any right of reversion. . . . The Court finds that the deed conveyed a fee simple title to the OWCC Foundation with no right of reversion. The Court further finds that this deed was in accordance with the intent of Mattie Kelly at the time she executed her will. The Court finds that Article VIII of the Will which devised the subject property contains no language of trust and no language of reverter, and did not create a charitable trust . . . . The Court further finds that Defendant's proposed sale of the subject property does not include the "mausoleum property." . . . Since the mausoleum property is not being conveyed, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs no longer have standing as to the remaining property, and would deny Plaintiffs relief on this basis, in addition to the foregoing reasons. Therefore, the Court finds for the Defendant, The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc. and against the Plaintiffs, and ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows: Defendant Foundation's proposed sale of the subject property is not in derogation of Article VIII of the Last Will and Testament of Mattie Kelly, or the deed which conveyed the subject property to Defendant Foundation. Therefore, Defendant Foundation is not prohibited from selling the subject property, excluding the mausoleum property as described in Addendum #4 to the Contract for Sale and Purchase, in order to fulfill the intent of Mattie Kelly in creating the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute;" however, all monies received from the sale of the subject property, including any matching funds, are to be used in the establishment and operation of the Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute. [Emphasis added.] On June 8, 2005, Petitioners filed a Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing, stating as follows regarding standing: Petitioner Hammet's substantial interests will be affected by Respondent's determination because she and her family live within close proximity to the Mattie Kelly property and have often used and enjoyed the property for viewing the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, and she wishes to continue to use and enjoy the property in the future. The Mattie Kelly property is a special place for Hammet and her family, where they have many pleasant memories and regularly have benefited from this public property being in their neighborhood. Hammet and her family will no longer be able to use and enjoy this accessible public resource if it is sold for private development. Petitioner Coastkeepers' substantial interest will be affected by Respondent's determination because it is a Florida non-profit corporation dedicated to protection of the environment in an area of the Gulf of Mexico Coast that includes Okaloosa and Walton Counties and Choctawhatchee Bay. Preservation of environmentally sensitive lands such as the Mattie Kelly property, and having the Mattie Kelly property as a location for biological studies, marine science studies, and studies of the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, are vitally important to protecting Choctawhatchee Bay and the interest of Petitioner and its members, who include a substantial number of members who reside in Okaloosa and Walton Counties and have the present intention to use, visit, enjoy, and study biological, marine science and cultural heritage issues associated with Choctawhatchee Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mattie Kelly property at the Mattie Kelly property. The Mattie Kelly property is ideally suited to provide waterfront environmental education in an otherwise highly urbanized environment, including education of local residents, which is vital to controlling urban runoff, and for highlighting, encouraging, and educating the public of the need to protect Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. The Mattie Kelly property would no longer be available for such intended pursuits were the proposed sale of the Mattie Kelly property to private development interest go forward. Moreover, the proposed development of the very property set aside by Mattie Kelly would itself directly contribute to the urban runoff known to be causing problems in Choctawhatchee Bay. Choctawhatchee Bay has many examples of waterfront subdivision development and very little opportunity for environmental protection education in a local setting near where waterfront residential owners already live. These purposes will not be as well-served by educational efforts at OWC's main campus in Niceville, which is not waterfront and miles away from Choctawhatchee Bay. If properly managed, the Mattie Kelly property should be the field trip every school-age child in Okaloosa and Walton County takes, which would be a lasting legacy to Mattie Kelly that would truly be consistent with her express purposes. This opportunity will be forever destroyed if the property is developed as proposed. On June 24, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. On July 5, 2005, Petitioners filed a Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. Neither of the Petitioners holds any title interest in the property.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Richburg, President Okaloosa-Walton Community College 100 College Boulevard Niceville, Florida 32578-1295 Joseph D. Lorenz, Esquire 1270 North Elgin Parkway, Suite C-12 Shalimar, Florida 32579 Steven A. Medina, Esquire Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Echsner & Proctor, P.A. 316 South Baylen Street Post Office Box 12308 Pensacola, Florida 32581
The Issue Whether Petitioners " . . . provide[d] direct services in a local fiscal agent's area (so that they may) . . . receive the same percentage of undesignated funds as a percentage of designated funds they receive . . . ", Section 110.181 (2)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), in relation to the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign (the 2006 Campaign).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts The Florida Legislature created the Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign in 1993 ("Campaign"). § 110.181(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). The Act requires the Department to "establish and maintain" an annual Campaign, which "is the only authorized charitable fundraising drive directed toward state employees within work areas during work hours, and for which the state will provide payroll deduction." § 110.181(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). State employees are provided annually with a pledge card that allows them to direct their donations to particular charities. Each employee is given a booklet containing a list of those charities that have qualified to participate in the Campaign. Each employee can either pick from the pre-qualified list, or the employee can give "undesignated funds" that go to no particular charity. The Act requires the creation of a Statewide Steering Committee ("Committee") of seven members appointed by the Administration Commission, and two members appointed by the Department Secretary, all serving staggered terms. § 110.181(4), Fla. Stat. In addition to the Committee, the Act calls for the creation of several other steering committees, one "in each fiscal agent area," whose purpose is to "assist in conducting the campaign and to direct the distribution of undesignated funds" ("local steering committees"). § 110.181(2)(d), Fla. Stat. The Department is required to select through the competitive procurement process a "fiscal agent" or agent whose duties are limited to "receiv[ing], account[ing] for, and distribut[ing] charitable contributions among the participating charitable organizations." § 110.181(2)(a), Fla. Stat. United Way of Florida, Inc., served as the state wide fiscal agent during the 2006 Campaign. Petitioners are 21 charities that were approved by the Committee and participated in the 2006 Campaign. Petitioner Community Health Charities is a "federation" or "umbrella" agency within the meaning of Rule 60L-39.0015(j), Florida Administrative Code, representing each of the other Petitioners in the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign ("2006 Campaign" or "FSECC"). Each Petitioner is either a charity or a federation within the meaning of the Act that participates in the annual statewide campaign and has a direct interest in the proper administration of the Act, including the distribution of designated and undesignated charitable funds generated thereby. Additional Facts Section 110.181(3), Florida Statutes, grants rulemaking authority to the Respondent in association with the time and manner for charitable organizations to participate in the Campaign. This process is undertaken upon the recommendations of the Committee. In accordance with those opportunities Respondent had adopted administrative rules to implement Section 110.181, Florida Statutes. Among the rules in the Florida Administrative Code were the following: 60L-39.001 (scope and purpose); 60L- 39.002 (general requirements); 60L-39.003 (Statewide Steering Committee); 60L-39.004 (Eligibility Criteria for Participation by Charitable Organizations); 60L-39.005 (Application Procedures); and 60L-39.006 (Duties and Responsibilities of the Fiscal Agent). None of these rules defined the term "direct services" in a "local fiscal agent's area", referred to in Section 110.181(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), as that statute controls the opportunity for a charitable organization to receive undesignated funds from the 2006 Campaign. This has been explained as the "first tier distribution" of undesignated charitable contributions made by state employees. After the 2006 Campaign commenced, Respondent adopted a rule that defined the term "direct services." Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.0015(1)(i) provided that definition. The rule was effective January 23, 2007. It defined the term "direct services" as: Direct services. Identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served. The 2006 Campaign began in the summer of 2006. December 22, 2006, was the deadline for applying for first tier undesignated funds. Application was made upon a form created for use in the 2006 Campaign. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. On October 17, 2006, by e-mail, Petitioners were made aware of the direct local services certification form and its guidelines, contained in one document, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 2. Explanations were provided. The e-mail came from John Kuczwanski, Committee Chairman. This document referenced distribution of the first tier undesignated funds for the 2006 Campaign. It said in pertinent part: As a result of recent changes to the FSECC Law (s. 110.181(2)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes), the Statewide FSECC Steering Committee is in the process of implementing rules and a process by which federations and unaffiliated/independent organizations will submit information, regarding provision of direct local services in each fiscal agent United Way area, in order to receive a pro- rata share of undesignated funds. The final process and rules will take effect in 2007, and will become a part of the 2007 FSECC application cycle and are a result of input during our rules promulgation process. Because these formal rules will not be implemented until 2007, an interim process will be in place for the 2006 FSECC. As such, the following process will be utilized by federations and unaffiliated/independent organizations to determine where direct local services are being provided, and thereby eligibility for a pro-rata share of 2006 undesignated funds. Attached is a spreadsheet, which you must complete and submit to the Statewide FSECC Steering Committee no later than close of business on Friday, December 22, 2006. Instructions for Federations: On the attached spreadsheet, please enter the requested information for your federation and each of your member agencies (that have been approved to participate in the 2006 FSECC) that provide direct local services in the appropriate Fiscal Agent United Way sections. Each section identifies which county(ies) are included in that fiscal agent area. Only enter agencies in the fiscal agent section(s) in which that agency provides direct local services, as defined on the spreadsheet. The attached spreadsheet (form), in relevant part contained the following: 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form GuidelinesDEADLINE: December 22, 2006 [Forms received after the deadline will result in ineligibility for a pro-rata share of undesignated funds.] Federation Name: OR Unaffiliated/Independent Organization Name: Contact Person: Email Address: Telephone Number: INSTRUCTIONS: Please enter the requested information below for each of your federation's member agencies (that have been approved to participate in the 2006 FSECC) that provide direct local services in the appropriate United Way Fiscal Agency sections below. Unaffiliated/independent organizations should provide the requested information in the appropriate sections for the areas in which your organization provides direct local services. Name of Organization Organization Address Address(es) where the direct service(s) were delivered in the previous calendar year (2005) Description of the type of direct service(s) delivered ["Direct services" is defined as identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served.] # of people served/Population served * * * The form goes on to describe the areas served by the United Way fiscal agents, as examples United Way of the Big Bend, with its respective counties and the United Way of Brevard County, with its respective counties. It was contemplated that the charities seeking participation in distribution of first tier undesignated funds identify the organization by name, its address, addresses where direct services were delivered in the previous calendar year, etc., in relation to all of the United Way fiscal agent areas. Petitioners and other charities seeking participation in the first tier distribution of undesignated funds were expected to proceed without further direction from the Committee or Respondent when completing the 2006 Direct Local Services' Certification Form. Concerning the rule adoption process referred to in the e-mail, on October 16, 2007, the Committee had met to review proposed rules under consideration that supported the process of charitable campaigns recognized in Section 110.181, Florida Statutes. Prior to that date, the Respondent had held meetings and conducted workshops related to rule development. As a result, Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.015, and an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005, were adopted and became effective January 23, 2007. The amendment within Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005(5), incorporated by reference Form DMS-ADM-102, effective January 23, 2007, the same date the overall Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005 was amended. The incorporated form differed in appearance when compared to the 2006 Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines that had been provided in relation to the 2006 Campaign. The difference was that the Form incorporated by reference was titled "Agency Direct Local Services Certification Form". It spoke of a March 1 deadline with no specific year. It spoke of a need to provide the federation name, contact person and telephone number. It carried the same headings in the five columns related to the provision of the information about direct services in the 27 United Way fiscal agent areas. In its instructions it stated: Each federation is required to submit this form for all member agencies that provide direct local services, as defined in Rule 60L-39.0015(i), Florida Administrative Code, in the appropriate local fiscal agent sections below and provide with their annual application package. Independent or unaffiliated agencies must provide this form with their annual application. Gwen Cooper, president and CEO of Community health Charities of Florida (CCH), helped the members of the federation, the other Petitioners in this cause, complete the 2006 Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines. This included contacts by telephone and e-mails to address the proper response to the form on the part of the member charities. In addition, Ms. Cooper prepared a different form, designed to assist the member charities in presenting needed information. That form called for a deadline of December 5, 2006, for submission to her of information provided by the member charities on the form prepared by Ms. Cooper. The return information was then edited and utilized in her preparation of the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines that had been made available by the Committee on October 17, 2006. An example of the instructions for a member charity as filled out by the charity on the form created by Ms. Cooper is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 6 pertaining to the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, Palm Beach Chapter. The completed Direct Local Services Certification Forms with guidelines for the 2006 Campaign for all CHS member charities is Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A. Importantly, the instructions provided in the Cooper form directed to the CHC member charities, stated: INSTRUCTIONS: Please enter the requested information below for each fiscal agent regional area where your agency provides direct local services. Simply recording the office in that region is not enough. Please keep your descriptions concise and general. There is no need to give lengthy details for each region. If you know the number of people served in that region, please record it. If not, please provide an estimate or put NA. If you do not provide services in a particular regions (sic), please put NA in the Description column. If you have more than one office in a particular region, please list all the offices. We will review all submissions and call with questions. Feel free to add lines as needed. This record is for services rendered in Calendar Year 2005. As can be seen, this was a departure from the instructions provided by the Committee in the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines previously described, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A representing the completed form for all CHC member charities. The Committee met on February 14, 22, and 28, 2007, to consider the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms with guidelines completed by Petitioners and other charitable groups. Dr. Kenneth Armstrong, Jr., Executive Director of the United Way of the Big Bend, attended the February 14, 2007, Committee meeting. At the meeting he presented the Committee members with a document intended to express his opinion concerning the basis for deciding whether Petitioners and other charitable organizations were entitled to receive first tier undesignated funds. Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 4. In this document, Dr. Armstrong critically comments on the entitlement of Petitioners, unaffiliated and independent charitable agencies to receive first tier undesignated funds. In his written remarks, he opposes the right for some Petitioners to receive the first tier undesignated funds, while explaining his reasons. These suggestions were favorably received by Respondent's counsel who advised the Committee during the meeting. In particular, counsel stated that he found Dr. Armstrong's approach created an " . . . incisive analysis of the kind of activities that could not reasonably be considered direct services . . . ". While the Committee was left to arrive at its own decision concerning Petitioners' entitlement to receive first tier undesignated funds, Dr. Armstrong's ideas given credence by Respondent's counsel were accepted as part of that process. The work was not completed on February 14, 2007, and the Committee reconvened on February 22, 2007, to continue consideration of the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms. The Committee met again on February 28, 2007, to consider the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms. By then the forms had been divided among the Committee members, with each Committee member being responsible for review and recommendation in relation to his or her part of the assignment. The discussion in the session was at best abbreviated concerning the decision to include or reject a charity in a locale in relation to receiving first tier undesignated funds. One Committee member left the meeting and his portion of the assignment was dealt with by the remaining Committee members reviewing the annotations of the missing member indicating denial or approval of a given charity. There were other notes as well on these materials assigned to the Committee member who left the meeting. The remaining Committee members approved the recommendations by the missing Committee member. On March 8, 2007, the Committee made its decision and e-mailed Petitioners concerning its position on the "2006 FSECC Direct Local Services Certification" spreadsheets (forms). The e-mail is Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 10. The reference line in the e-mail is "Distribution of 2006 FSECC undesignated funds -- Direct Local Services Certification". The reason for this preliminary decision was: After three meetings, the FSECC Statewide Steering Committee has completed its review and voted on all 2006 FSECC Direct and Local Service Certification spreadsheets previously submitted for its consideration. Attached is the final spreadsheet that lists all charitable organizations that were approved by the Committee and deemed, based on the information submitted, to be providing direct local services in at least one United Way fiscal agent area. Charitable organizations not included on the attached list were not deemed to be providing direct local services, based on the information submitted. Direct local services, as defined on the certification form and in Rule, are "identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served." The 59 charitable organizations included on the attached list will receive a pro-rata share (based on their local designation percentages in 2006) of the 2006 undesignated funds, in the Fiscal Agent United Way areas within which they were deemed to be providing direct local services, as indicated on the attached by an "X" in specific United Way fiscal agent columns. Thank you, The FSECC Statewide Steering Committee The above-quoted language in the e-mail notification that refers to the certification form is understood to mean the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines. The comment in the e-mail concerning the "rule" where it says "identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served" is taken directly from Florida Administrative Code Rule 60-39.0015(1)(i), effective January 23, 2007, with its definition of "direct services." As the March 8, 2007, e-mail summarizes, CHC had 16 member originations approved. At the time the preliminary decision was communicated, the Committee had approved approximately 18.64 percent of Petitioners' individual submissions. The basis of the denial of the remaining submissions seeking receipt of first tier undesignated funds was not explained. This led to the original petition challenging the decision to deny rights to receive first tier undesignated funds filed on March 30, 2007. The history of the case beyond that point has been explained in the Preliminary Statement, to include the basis for proceeding before DOAH. On August 24, 2007, after the case had been referred to DOAH for hearing, Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 33 No. 34, to this effect: The Florida Department of Management Services announces a public meeting to which all persons are invited. DATE AND TIME: September 10, 2007, 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon PLACE: 4050 Esplanade Way, Room 101, Tallahassee, Florida GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED: Review and Approval of Local Steering Committee Members. Community Health Charities lawsuit and re-visit on direct services determinations. A copy of the agenda may be obtained by contacting: Erin Thoresen, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 235, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950, (850)922-1274. If any person decides to appeal any decision made by the Board with respect to any matter considered at this meeting or hearing, he/she will need to ensure that a verbatim record of the proceeding is made, which record includes the testimony and evidence from which the appeal is to be issued. * * * Respondent's Exhibit numbered 24. The notice by its terms did not explain in any detail what might be achieved during the course of the meeting to consider the pending "lawsuit" and revisit issues in relation to direct services determinations. The "lawsuit" related to the pending administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 07-3547. Barton Cooper, CHC Director of Corporate Development, attended the meeting with Petitioners' counsel. No presentation was made by Petitioners, as they were uncertain of Respondent's intentions when the meeting was advertised in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and understood that litigation was ongoing before DOAH. Nonetheless, Mr. Cooper expressed his appreciation for the Committee's willingness to revisit the issue of the remaining Petitioners' entitlement to receive first tier undesignated funds. On this occasion the Committee conducted an additional review of material provided by Petitioners. Those materials were constituted of Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A, the original December 22, 2006, Direct Local Services Certification Forms for the rejected applicants for first tier undesignated funds and Exhibit 2 to the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed March 30, 2007, with the Respondent. (Exhibit 2 became Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12B, admitted at the final hearing.) This exhibit provides additional information concerning member charities within CHC and supporting argument for their inclusion in the distribution of first tier undesignated funds. As a consequence of the Committee's efforts, approximately 77 percent of Petitioners' applications made originally were approved, leaving 21 Petitioners denied the ability to receive first tier designated funds in one or more of the United Way fiscal agent areas. On September 12, 2007, the Committee made known its "Amended and Revised FSECC Direct Services Determinations for the 2006 Campaign" in correspondence directed to Petitioners. Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 13. In explanation, the written communication stated: On September 10, 2007 the Statewide Steering committee decided to re-visit issues on direct services determinations. In accordance with Exhibit 2 of the Second Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, the participating Community Health Charities, within the fiscal area listed, were revisited. The Direct Local Services Certification Forms submitted on behalf of your organization and/or your member agencies were reexamined for compliance with the eligibility criteria for a receipt of undesignated funds based upon the provision of direct services. Direct services are defined as "[i]dentifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served." Rule 60L-39.0015(1)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Applicant organizations named above that did not meet the criteria for direct services were denied by the FSECC Statewide Steering Committee. This explanation referred to the definition of direct services found within Florida Administrative Code Rule 60-39.0015(1)(i), effective January 23, 2007. It also mentioned reliance upon Exhibit numbered 2 to the Second Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Exhibit 2 accompanied the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing as well). The memorandum decision pointed out a spreadsheet attached describing those charities whose application forms had been reexamined on September 10, 2007, noting approvals and disapprovals. The attachment to the September 12, 2007, amended revised FSECC Direct Local Services determination for the 2006 Campaign breaks out the agencies approved as to locations within United Way fiscal agents areas, those approved earlier and those approved by actions taken on September 10, 2007. Those approvals are noted by marking the letter "X" in the column for each agency earlier approved or approved on September 10, 2007, as to each charity and every United Way fiscal agent area. Concerning the remaining requests to receive first tier undesignated funds by those 21 Petitioners, information necessary to decide entitlement is found within the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines (Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A); the explanations found within Exhibit 2 to the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, which became Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12B and a series of exhibits admitted at hearing, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 21 through 38. Those latter exhibits provide explanations pertaining to the 21 disappointed Petitioners, expanding what is known about the charities, their services, the manner that the services are provided, who receives the services and where the services are received, together with the address(es) of the respective organizations. In addition, the depositions of Paul Andrew Ledford of Florida Hospice and Palliative Care (Joint Exhibit numbered 2); Susanne Homant, National Association of Mentally Ill in Florida (Joint Exhibit numbered 3); Deborah Linton, Association for Retarded Citizens of Florida, Inc. (Joint Exhibit numbered 4); Suzanne Earle, Children's Tumor Foundation (Joint Exhibit numbered 5); Pamela Byrne, Leukemia & Lymphoma Society (Joint Exhibit numbered 6) and Tracy Tucker, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation (Joint Exhibit numbered 7) afford additional insight on the subject of who is served, where they are served etc., pertaining to the subject. Without recounting the details from the various sources previously described, all that information is accepted for purposes of this Recommended Order, as to the facts represented in the exhibits. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Association for Retarded Citizens/Florida, CHC, Florida Hospices and Palliative Care and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Florida do not provide direct services in fiscal agent areas without intervention between the services offered and persons served in any location. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, ALS Association provides direct services in the Heart of Florida United Way fiscal agent area, contrary to the impression held by the Committee before the final hearing. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation provides direct services in the United Way fiscal agent areas in Lake and Sumter, Okaloosa-Walton, Santa Rosa, and Volusia-Flagler, for reasons comparable to the practice of the Committee when making its earlier determinations. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Lupus Foundation of America, Southeast Florida Chapter, provides direct services in the United Way fiscal agent areas in Broward and Palm Beach counties. Of the unapproved requests for first tier undesignated funds made by remaining Petitioners in other specific United Way fiscal agent areas, the facts do not support those requests.
Recommendation Upon consideration, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that allows Petitioners to receive first tier undesignated funds in relation to the 2006 Campaign to the extent identified and denies any additional relief requested in the Third Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: David C. Hawkins, Esquire David C. Hawkins, PLLC 3141 Brockton Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Matthew F. Minno, Esquire Gerard York, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David Andrew Byrne, Esquire Phillips Nizer LLP 666 5th Avenue New York, New York 10103-0001 James A. Peters, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda South, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive Florida Retirement System (FRS) benefits from her deceased spouse’s retirement account, pursuant to FRS Option 3 (lifetime monthly benefit to joint annuitant).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lettie Jones, is the wife of FRS member, James Jones, and a designated beneficiary of his FRS account. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency with the responsibility to administer the FRS. Background Findings Mr. Jones applied to the State of Florida for disability retirement on July 13, 1994. On his application, Mr. Jones noted that the “[m]uscles in [his] feet and legs [were] deteriorating.” In response to a question regarding any other physical impairments, Mr. Jones answered, “Losing strength in right hand.” The record does not reflect the effective date of Mr. Jones’ retirement. Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in April 1996. On January 27, 1997, Mr. Jones obtained from the state an “Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits” listing the approximate monthly benefit payment amounts for all four FRS payment options. On that date, Mr. Jones also obtained Form 11o, the FRS retirement benefit election option form, and Form FST 12, the FRS beneficiary designation form. On March 18, 1997, Mr. Jones executed Form 11o, choosing Option 2 for payment of his monthly retirement benefits, and Form FST 12, designating Petitioner as primary beneficiary, and his daughter as contingent beneficiary, of his retirement account. Form 11o provides the following explanation of Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 payments. No further benefits are then payable. Form 11o requires the spouse’s signature acknowledging the member’s election of Option 2. The spousal acknowledgment section appears in a box on Form 11o following the description of Options 1 and 2. The first line inside the box reads, in all capital letters, “THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2.” On March 18, 1997, Petitioner signed the box on Form 11o acknowledging her husband’s election of Option 2. Mr. Jones received more than 120 monthly retirement benefit payments prior to his death in 2013. Petitioner’s Challenge Petitioner alleges that Mr. Jones lacked the capacity to make an informed election of benefit payments on March 18, 1997, because he had reduced cognitive function. Both Petitioner and her daughter testified that they accompanied Mr. Jones to the FRS office on March 18, 1997, but were not allowed to “go back” with him when he met with an FRS employee to select his retirement option and execute Form 11o.2/ Petitioner admitted that she did sign the box on Form 11o, which acknowledges spousal election of Option 2, but testified that the form was blank at the time her husband presented it to her for signature. Petitioner signed the spousal acknowledgment on Form 11o the same day her husband executed the form. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than the testimony of her daughter, that Mr. Jones suffered from reduced cognitive function on March 18, 1997. The fact that Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in 1996 is insufficient evidence to prove that he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed retirement option selection on the date in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the relief requested in the Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2016.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., is entitled to the issuance of a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the State of Florida, has applied to the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for the issuance of a series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. This license is described in Rule 7A-1.13, Florida Administrative Code, as a club license to sell to members and nonresident guests only. The terms and conditions for the issuance of such a license are as set forth in Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes. The Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco has denied the application of the Petitioner premised upon the assertion that the Petitioner has failed to meet the requirements set out in the aforementioned sections of the Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has disagreed with that interpretation and a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing was scheduled and held on April 10, 1979. The crucial language to be considered in determining whether or not the Petitioner should be extended the privilege of operating under a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license is found in the Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: "(7)(a) There shall be no limitation as to the number of licenses issued pursuant to 565.02(4). However, any licenses issued under this section shall be limited to: Subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associations; Golf clubs and tennis clubs municipally or privately owned or leased; Nonprofit corporations or clubs devoted to promoting community, municipal, or county development or any phase of community, muni- cipal, or county development; Clubs fostering and promoting the general welfare and prosperity of members of showmen and amusement enterprises; Clubs assisting, promoting, and de- veloping subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associa- tions; and Clubs promoting, developing, and main- taining cultural relations of people of the same nationality." (Although the introductory phrase in the above-quoted Subsection makes reference to Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, as being involved in the process of issuing a license, Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, true function is the establishment of the requirement that chartered or unincorporated clubs pay an annual state license tax of $400.00, and it is this Subsection 561.20(7)(a), -- Florida Statutes, which establishes those categories of candidates who may receive a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.) Of the possible categories for licensure, the one which appears to be the focal point of the controversy is that provision found in Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. In support of its request, the Petitioner presented certain witnesses and items of evidence. Among those items was the testimony of Mrs. E. R. Atwater, Social worker Supervisor with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Management Division, assigned to the Blodgett Community in Jacksonville, Florida. The Blodgett Community is a housing development of some 53 acres which contains 628 housing units with a breakdown of that population containing 301 senior citizens and 1,069 juveniles, with cost of the heads of the households being female. Those persons living in the Blodgett development are described as having a poor economic circumstance. Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had on occasion sponsored girls softball teams and boys basketball teams for those young persons living in the Blodgett Community and she had expressed her appreciation in the form of correspondence of January 17, 1979, which is the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. In addition, Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had provided transportation for a trip for the residents of the Blodgett Community to Six Gun Territory located near Ocala, Florida. Arrangements were made for three busses; two of the busses which transported residents on July 16, 1977, and the third bus transported them on August 11, 1977. The trips involved both young people and adults as participants. The letters requesting the assistance of the Conduces Club, Inc., and the confirmation of that request may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, admitted into evidence consecutively. The president of the Conduces Club, Inc., Mr. Cornell Tarver, testified in support of the petition. He indicated that the club had been originally formed as the Pacesetter Club but its name was changed in September, 1976, because of a conflict concerning the utilization of the name, which had been preempted by another club. The club was chartered as a nonprofit corporation by the State of Florida on September 22, 1976, under the name, "Conduces Club, Inc." A copy of the Articles of Incorporation may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Mr. Tarver indicated that the purpose of the club was to help the youth and senior citizens and principally the kids of the Blodgett Community, to include organizing softball and baseball and providing uniforms. He also testified that a certain banquet was hold for these young persons and the parents of those children were invited to attend, and enough food was prepared to food cost of the individuals who reside in the Blodgett Community. He produced certain plaques and trophies awarded to the club. The plague was given by the mothers of the children in the sports programs and the trophy was presented by an unaffiliated club that the Conduces Club had helped to organize. The witness, Tarver, indicated that the club was financed by functions such as dances, fish fries, food sales in their club house, dues of the members and fines. The club itself has twenty-seven members. Other projects the club has participated in, were the contribution of money to local churches and the donation of an organ to one of those churches. On December 16, 1977, the club contributed $500.00 to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The club house is open every day and there are certain activities through the week, to include club meetings and entertainment for the benefit of club members. The members run the club without compensation and the club does not maintain any regular employees. The official statement of the club's purposes may be found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. This is a composite exhibit which contains part of the application for the license and a copy of the Bylaws. The objectives of the corporation may be found in Article II of the Bylaws and the activities of the corporation may be found in Article VIII of the Bylaws. Article II states: "The objectives of this organization shall be as follows: To unite fraternally all persons who the membership may from time to time take into the club. To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families. To strive at all times to promote and protect the welfare of every member. To promote a spirit of cooperation between its members and the public. To honor outstanding individuals in the City of Jacksonville for their achievement. To do anything necessary, including, but not limited to, the ownership of property, real and personal, for the accomplishment of the foregoing objectives, or those which may be recognized as proper and legal objectives of this club, all of which shall be consistent with the laws, the public interest and the interest of its mergers. To sue or to be sued as a natural person. To bear a seal to be placed on all of the club's official correspondence." Article VIII states: "COMMITTEES Section 1. The following standing committees and such other committees as the directors may, from time to time deem necessary, shall be appointed by the president of the association. Social Committee Athletic Committee Scholarship Committee The duties of the standing committee shall include the following, which shall not, however, prelude other activities by such committees. Section 2. The social committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this canted to supervise the use of club room and to plan such club meetings of a purely social nature as it may deem necessary. These may include parties, picnics, and other such social or athletic events sponsored by the organization. Section 3. The athletic committee shall be composed of three members. It shall be the duty of this committee to supervise and manage all athletic activities for the association, including but not limited to management of various athletic teams sponsored by the club. Section 4. The scholarships committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this committee to screen applicants for scholarships and deserving students in Duval County, Florida, and to make recommendations to the general membership of its findings of worthwhile recipients of scholarships, or awards." It can be seen that the Petitioner's members have a commendable concern for the community in which the club has its principal base of operation and this concern has been expressed through the activities of the club members which have been described in the course of this Recommended Order; however, it appears from an examination of the testimony in this hearing and the official statement, that is, the Bylaws of this corporation, that the principal purpose of the club is as stated by the Article II B. of the Bylaws, which language states, "To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families," and this attitude carries over to foster good relations between those members and the members of the general public. Therefore, the Petitioner is not perceived as being a club which meets the criterion, "devoted to promoting community, municipal or county development or any phase of community, municipal or county development." See Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. This conclusion is reached in examining the definition of the word "devoted," as found in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition. That definition states that to be devoted one must be, "1. vowed; dedicated; consecrated. 2. very loyal; faithful." and although the community concern of the Petitioner is very high, it does not reach the level of devotion. Consequently, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco was correct in denying the application for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco deny the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc.'s request for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jennings H. Best, Esquire 3410 North Myrtle Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Francis Bayley, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. M. Ogonowski Richard P. Daniel Building, Room 514 111 East Coast Line Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on marital status in determining his monthly retirement benefits in violation of the provisions of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Kenneth Fritz (Petitioner or Mr. Fritz) has been a firefighter with the City of Pembroke Pines (Respondent or the City) since 1991. His date of birth is June 6, 1948, and he entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) on December 1, 2006, at age 58.5 years old. As Respondent's employee, Mr. Fritz participated in the City's Pension Plan for Firefighters and Police Officers (the Plan). The DROP option that Mr. Fritz chose allowed him to name a joint annuitant and contingent survivors. Mr. Fritz, who has been divorced since 1986, chose his daughter who on December 1, 2006, was 32.25 years old, and his son who was 29.333 years old, as his surviving beneficiaries. Each will receive a 50 percent share of the retirement income upon his death payable for the remainder of their lives. Mr. Fritz alleged that the pension fund benefit system discriminates against him based on marital status. There is no factual dispute that his benefits, with a 32-year-old daughter are $3,938.12 a month, as compared to $4,366.59 a month if he had a 32-year-old wife. The benefits are not affected by his having named his son as an additional beneficiary. Mr. Fritz brought his concerns to the attention of Patricia Shoemaker, the Benefits Administrator for Municipal Police Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement Funds for the State of Florida Department of Management Services. On January 29, 2008, March 17, 2008, July 9, 2008, and September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker sent letters to Mr. Anthony Napolitano, Chairman of the Pembroke Pines Firefighter's Pension Plan, requesting an explanation of the apparent violation of the following statutory provisions: § 175.333. Discrimination in benefit formula prohibited; restrictions regarding designation of joint annuitants. For any municipality, special fire control district, chapter plan, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter: and (1) No plan shall discriminate in its benefit formula based on color, national origin, sex, or marital status. § 175.071(2) Any and all acts and decisions shall be effectuated by vote of a majority of the members of the board; however, no trustee shall take part in any action in connection with the trustee's own participation in the fund, and no unfair discrimination shall be shown to any individual firefighter participating in the fund. (Emphasis added.) In her letter of September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker noted that she had received no responses to her previous letters and that "[W]hile state premium tax moneys were released this year based on our understanding that the Board was researching this matter, future state tax moneys will not be released unless the plan is determined to be in compliance with Chapters (sic) 175, F.S." On October 15, 2008, Deputy City Attorney Julie F. Klahr finally responded to Ms. Shoemaker as follows: Your letter to the Pembroke Pines Police and Fire Retirement Plan has been referred to this office for reply. The issue is whether a spouse only benefit is discriminatory on the basis of marital status. For the reasons which follow, the benefit is fully in compliance with Florida law. Section 175.333(2)(a), Florida Statutes, clearly recognizes the propriety of a plan offering a spouse only survivorship benefit that alone should resolve this issue. The benefit at issue in Pembroke Pines is a spouse-only benefit, which not only exceeds the minimums required by Chapter 175, but also pre-dates the enactment of Ch. 99-1, Laws of Florida (1999). The complaining employee sought to designate a child as a beneficiary but without an age appropriate actuarial reduction. Nothing in Chapter 175, or any other law, mandates a retirement plan to provide a costly, generation skipping benefit without providing for actuarial equivalence. To the extent that your view is that the plan provision must be altered, it is a "minimum benefit" which is required, only if unencumbered Chapter 175 insurance premium tax rebates are present to pay the full cost as provided in §175.351. The City does not concede this is a correct interpretation, nor does any such Chapter money exist. Any required action to the contrary is an improper unfunded mandate. Moreover, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding regulations of the Department of the Treasury mandated the use of the actuarial factors at issue. Nothing in Chapter 175, Florida Statutes, directs a plan to violate tax provisions necessary to maintain qualification. It is the City's position that according a benefit to a spouse of a deceased member, provided the plan otherwise exceeds minimum benefits under Chapter 175, is a matter reserved to the City under its home rule powers in the Florida Constitution and Chapter 166, Florida Statutes. If any member feels aggrieved by the structure of the Ordinance Code, that person may seek remedies under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It should be observed, however, that the status at issue is that of the purported survivor and not the member. As a result, no violation of Florida's civil rights law is presented. See, Donato v. AT & T, 767 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 2000). Further §760.10(8)(b), Florida Statutes, exempts bona fide retirement plans from coverage under this law. The first provision cited as support for the City's position is as follows: § 175.333(2)(a) If a plan offers a joint annuitant option and the member selects such option, or if a plan specifies that the member's spouse is to receive the benefits that continue to be payable upon the death of the member, then, in both of these cases, after retirement benefits have commenced, a retired member may change his or her designation of joint annuitant or beneficiary only twice. Although the Deputy City Attorney asserted that this section alone should resolve the matter, Mr. Fritz observed the subsection does not authorize discrimination based on marital status but only limits the number of times that a joint annuitant or beneficiary may be changed. The City also relied on the fact that the Plan predates Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida, but the statement of legislative intent indicates that the law is applicable to existing plans, and reads as follows: Legislative declaration. It is hereby declared by the Legislature that firefighters, as hereinafter defined, perform state and municipal functions; . . . and that their activities are vital to the public safety. It is further declared that firefighters employed by special fire control districts serve under the same circumstances and perform the same duties as firefighters employed by municipalities and should therefore be entitled to the benefits available under this chapter. Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of firefighters as hereinafter defined and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal and special district firefighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retirement systems or plans be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the firefighters' pension trust funds . . . This chapter hereby establishes, for all municipal and special district pension plans existing now or hereafter under this chapter, including chapter plans and local law plans, minimum benefits and minimum standards for the operation and funding of such plans, hereinafter referred to as firefighters' pension trust funds. The minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter may not be diminished by local charter, ordinance, or resolution or by special act of the Legislature, nor may the minimum benefits or minimum standards be reduced or offset by any other local, state, or federal law that may include firefighters in its operation, except as provided under s. 112.65. (Emphasis added.) The City claimed, but Ms. Shoemaker's reference in her letter to the release of state premium tax moneys appears to contradict its claim, that it does not have to pay minimum benefits required by Chapter 175, although not conceding its applicability, because it has no unencumbered insurance premium tax money, a prerequisite the imposition of the following requirement: § 175.351. Municipalities and special fire control districts having their own pension plans for firefighters. For any municipality, special fire control district, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter, in order for municipalities and special fire control districts with their own pension plans for firefighters, or for firefighters and police officers, where included, to participate in the distribution of the tax fund established pursuant to s. 175.101, local law plans must meet the minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter. * * * However, local law plans in effect on October 1, 1998, shall be required to comply with the minimum benefit provisions of this chapter only to the extent that additional premium tax revenues become available to incrementally fund the cost of such compliance as provided in s. 175.162(2)(a). (Emphasis added.) Apparently, not satisfied with the answer, on January 20, 2009, Ms. Shoemaker wrote again, this time to Ms Klahr, as follows: Dear Ms. Klahr This is to acknowledge receipt of your October 15, 2008 letter in response to my July 9, 2008 letter to the Board of the Firefighters' Pension Plan. While we appreciate your response regarding the propriety of a plan offering a spousal benefit and the appropriateness of an age appropriate actuarial reduction, our question for the Board was a different one relating to the plan's compliance with the provisions of ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071(2), F. S. as they relate to discrimination based on marital status. Based on our understanding of the issue relating to the calculation of the member's benefits, Mr. Fritz does not have a spouse, but wishes to designate his daughter as his beneficiary. He understands and agrees that it is appropriate to actuarialty [sic] adjust his benefit based on the age of his daughter. The actuary provided two calculations, one based on a spouse that was his daughter's age and one based on a beneficiary that was his daughter's age. His benefit when calculated with a young age spouse was greater than his benefit when calculated with the same young age beneficiary. It appears that the only difference in the two calculations is the marital status of the member and not the age of the joint annuitant. If our understanding of the facts relating to this issue are incorrect, please let me know. We have asked that the Board review the plan provisions with their plan attorney and actuary and provide an explanation as to how the plan meets the statutory provisions, specifically ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071 (2), F. S. Mr. Fritz pointed out that, in addition to the statutory provisions cited in Ms. Shoemaker's letter and various others that he cited, the City's Employee Handbook also includes a statement that the City does not discriminate based on marital status. The City's actuary noted that, however outdated, the additional benefit is based on the assumption that a firefighter's spouse is more dependent on the employee's income and pension then any other adult relative. In addition, the deputy city attorney testified that the Plan was adopted in the firefighters' collective bargaining agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding that Respondent did not commit an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cherof, Esquire Goren, Cherof, Doody & Ezrol, P.A. 3099 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Kenneth R. Fritz 16389 Malibu Drive Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33326 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
