The Issue Whether Petitioner's arbitration request was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased his vehicle, a 1991 Ford F-350 Supercab XLT Lariat from Bartow Ford in Bartow, Florida on September 4, 1990. At the time of purchase, the odometer read less than 100 miles. Petitioner applied for arbitration on April 8, 1994. At the time of Petitioner's arbitration request, the vehicle had been driven approximately eighty-three thousand (83,000) miles. Petitioner's problems with his vehicle center around the automatic transmission. Respondent's vehicle reached twenty-four thousand (24,000) miles on or about December 15, 1991. On April 18, 1994, Respondent notified Petitioner that his arbitration request was untimely filed and was being denied. The Motor Vehicle Sales Warranty Enforcement Act a/k/a the "Lemon Law", which is set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, is administered jointly by the Respondent and the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Department of Legal Affairs. Respondent is responsible for initially reviewing an application to determine whether or not it is facially appropriate and to make a determination as to whether the applicant is, or is not, "potentially entitled to relief". Based on Respondent's determination that Petitioner's request was untimely filed, the request was denied on April 18, 1994. Petitioner's vehicle initially developed a transmission problem within six thousand seven hundred and seven (6,707) miles. The first service repair came on or about January 15, 1991. Petitioner returned the vehicle with the same problem on or about August 14, 1991 at which time the vehicle odometer read twenty-two thousand one hundred six (22,106) miles. Petitioner took the vehicle for repairs on three subsequent occasions and on each occasion the manufacturer rebuilt or replaced the transmission. Petitioner continues to have problems with his transmission and the manufacturer repairs the vehicle whenever it is brought in for service under the waranty. James D. Morrison, Respondent's supervisor for its "Lemon Law" section, reviewed Petitioner's file and acted on Petitioner's arbitration request. As noted, the request was filed on April 8, 1994. Morrison's review confirmed that Petitioner purchased his vehicle on September 4, 1990. Based on Morrison's calculations, Petitioner had to timely file his arbitration request within eighteen months of the date of purchase or twenty-four thousand (24,000) miles. Morrison used the most extended filing period by referring to the date of purchase and counting forward eighteen months which derived the date of March 6, 1992. Morrison granted Petitioner an additional extension of six months in compliance with extensions allowed if a defect occurs during the "lemon law" period. By granting Petitioner these extensions and the most extended allowable filing period within which the filing had to have been made, all arbitration requests by Petitioner, to be timely filed, had to occur on or before December 4, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for Lemon Law arbitration as it was untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul G. LaPlaca Post Office Box 787 Valrico, Florida 33594 Barbara R. Edwards, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners’ request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law was timely.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners took delivery in Florida of a 1995 Saturn automobile on September 16, 1994. Thirteen months after taking delivery, Petitioners returned the car to a Saturn dealer for repairs to the cruise control. At this time, the car had less than 9000 miles on it. About 12 months later, Petitioners returned the car to the dealer twice more in the same week with problems with the cruise control. The mileage at the time of the third repair attempt was 17,298. By letter dated March 13, 1997, and received four days later, Petitioners notified the manufacturer of the problems with the cruise control. Petitioners then filed a claim with the manufacturer’s informal dispute settlement program on April 28, 1997. The program operator, BBB Autoline, issued a decision on May 9, 1997, denying the claim because it was untimely filed. Petitioners filed their request for arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law on May 21, 1997. Respondent has determined that the request is untimely, and this hearing addresses that determination.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioners’ request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: H. R. and T. J. Reagan, pro se 5601 Duncan Road, No. 96 Punta Gorda, Florida 33982-4754 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law, concerning his 1994 Ford Explorer, purchased on May 17, 1994.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, DOA, was the state agency responsible for the receipt, evaluation and, when appropriate, forwarding of consumer RFAs to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board conducted by the Attorney General of the State of Florida. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner, Kenneth P. Williamson, purchased a new 1994 Ford Explorer sport utility vehicle from Gator Ford in Tampa, Florida. Almost from the beginning, Petitioner experienced a vibration of the entire vehicle when a speed of more than fifty miles per hour was achieved. After several repair attempts, when the Petitioner had driven the vehicle for 12,000 miles without any relief from the problem, he took it back to Gator Ford for repairs. Gator’s efforts did not detect the cause of the problem or correct it. At some later point in time, when sought, no paper work relating to that service call could be found at Gator Ford. Thereafter, however, Petitioner took the vehicle to Carl Flammer Ford in Tarpon Springs for the same problem. Neither the problem’s cause nor a solution to it could be found. On or about June 23, 1995, the odometer on the vehicle in question indicated it had been driven 24,990 miles. Based on that fact, it is found that as of June 22, 1995, Petitioner had exceeded 24,000 miles of operation in the vehicle. This was recognized by Petitioner in his answer to question 17C on the RFA, when he indicated he had reached 24,000 miles on his vehicle in “5/95 OR 6/95.” On May 30, 1996, when the vehicle had 37,800 miles on it, Petitioner forwarded a motor Vehicle Defect Notification Form to Ford Motor Company advising of the vibration problem. That notice, sent by certified mail, was received by Ford on June 5, 1996. Petitioner claims, and Respondent admits, that his vehicle was out of service at least 21 days due to one or more substantial defects, and that there have been three or more repair attempts made to correct the same defect or condition. Because of these factors, and because Petitioner filed a notice of non-conformity with the manufacturer, albeit late in the proceedings, the DOA considered Petitioner to be entitled to the extension period within which his RFA may be filed. The times in this case pertinent under Florida’s Lemon Law are: Date of purchase of vehicle 5/17/94 Eighteen months from date of purchase 11/16/95 24,000 miles of operation reached 6/22/95 Initial Lemon Law limit reached 6/22/95 Six month extension due to Notice of Non-compliance filed 12/22/95 Six month deadline to file after expiration of 6 month extension 6/22/95 Date RFA filed with DOA 7/24/96 Excessive delay 32 days. On the basis of the above chronology, the DOA concluded that Petitioner’s RFA was not timely, and by letter dated August 23, 1996, rejected it. Petitioner submitted his Petition for Formal Proceedings on September 5, 1996, and it was received by the DOA on September 19, 1996. As of the date of this hearing, the unacceptable condition of the vehicle still exists. Ford Motor Company has contended that the condition is not serious, and when the vehicle had 16,000 miles on it, offered Petitioner $1,000 toward the purchase of a new vehicle. The dealer has now indicated it can do no more to correct the condition in issue. Petitioner claims he was misled by Ford Motor Company into waiting until the time limit for filing the Lemon Law RFA had expired. He did not know of the time constraints under the Lemon Law and believed Ford would correct the problem. He also claims that notwithstanding his signature appears on all the pertinent documents herein, his wife took care of all the paperwork. Ms. Williamson believes that the RFA was sent in on or around the time it was dated - June 5, 1996, but she cannot be sure. She is also not sure if it was sent by certified mail, but she has no receipt to demonstrate it was. She contends the RFA could not have been held by her as long as would be required for it to not be delivered until July 24, 1996, and suggests the DOA’s date stamp might be in error. The likelihood of that is remote. Petitioner and his wife admit to having been given a Lemon Law pamphlet when they bought the vehicle but also admit they did not study it timely to determine the criteria for filing a RFA. They want an opportunity to exercise their rights under the Lemon Law through arbitration and though they are not prepared to give this up because they cannot afford to replace the vehicle, they are very uncomfortable regarding its safety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida this 14th day of January, 1997. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth P. Williamson 3732 Meridian Pace Land O’Lakes, Florida 34536 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration on his claim under the Florida Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Naples, Florida. He has resided in Naples since December 1992. Petitioner formerly resided in the New York City area. When he became interested in purchasing a new automobile, Petitioner contacted a friend of his son. The friend worked at North Shore Oldsmobile in Flushing, New York. Petitioner soon entered into negotiations with a sales representative of the Flushing dealership for the purchase of a new 1993 Oldsmobile Cutlass Cierra. Petitioner conducted these negotiations, which took place in April 1993, exclusively by telephone with Petitioner in Naples and the sales representative at the dealership in New York. Petitioner wanted a stationwagon, and the dealership had one car of this type in stock. It was the right color and had most of the options that Petitioner wanted. After a week or ten days of negotiating the price over the telephone, Petitioner, satisfied with the price, agreed to purchase the car, and North Shore Oldsmobile agreed to sell the car. Petitioner and representatives of the dealership then discussed by telephone financing arrangements. After they finished working out the details, Petitioner agreed to come to Flushing, New York to pick up the car. They agreed that Petitioner would take delivery of the car on May 3, 1993. Prior to Petitioner's departure, North Shore Oldsmobile sent him by mail in Naples various papers that Petitioner needed to complete prior to taking delivery. A North Shore Oldsmobile representative informed Petitioner that he was required to obtain insurance and sent him sufficient information so that he could obtain insurance in Florida prior to traveling to New York to get the car. North Shore Oldsmobile also sent Petitioner a copy of the retail instalment sales contract. Petitioner and some friends drove to New York, and, on the appointed day, Petitioner visited North Shore Oldsmobile in Flushing and either signed the closing papers at the dealership or delivered already-signed closing papers to the dealership. Petitioner also paid the necessary amounts to North Shore Oldsmobile at the dealership. North Shore Oldsmobile did not charge Petitioner any New York sales tax, but disclosed the amount of Florida use tax that Petitioner would be required to pay on registering the new car in Florida. Petitioner then took possession of the automobile, which he claims did not satisfactorily operate on the trip back to Florida or thereafter. Upon his return to Florida, Petitioner registered the new car in Florida and paid the Florida use tax, as well as title, tag, and registration fees imposed under Florida law.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's request for arbitration under the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. ENTERED on May 22, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 22, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Carmine Cavaseno 2722 Fountain View Circle Apartment Number 104 Naples, Florida 33942 Attorney Rhonda Long Bass Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department").
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1993, the Petitioner took delivery of a new 1993 Volvo (the subject vehicle) from Gold Coast Volvo in Pompano Beach, Florida. The Petitioner put 24,000 miles on the subject vehicle on or before October 2, 1995. The Petitioner had problems with the subject vehicle, the most serious of which were that on an intermittent basis the vehicle would stall at slow speeds or would hesitate and stall when acceleration was attempted. During the first 18 months following delivery of the subject vehicle, the dealer made several (more than three) unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems. The Petitioner's initial Lemon Law rights period ended on November 19, 1994. As a result of the unsuccessful attempts to repair the hesitation and stalling problems during the initial Lemon Law rights period, the Petitioner was entitled to a six month extension of the Lemon Law rights period. That extension ended on May 19, 1995. Consumers are entitled to file for relief under the subject statutory provisions for a period of six months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period. In this case, that filing period ended on November 19, 1995. Prior to the expiration of the filing period that ended on November 19, 1995, the Petitioner had a copy of the pamphlet titled "Preserving Your Rights Under the Florida Lemon Law." The Petitioner attempted to comply with the instructions contained in that pamphlet. Following the expiration of the initial Lemon Law rights period, and following the expiration of the six month extension of that period, the dealer continued to make attempts to repair the continuing intermittent problems and continued to make assurances that eventually the problems would be resolved. In reliance on these attempts and assurances, the Petitioner postponed taking action to enforce his rights under the Lemon Law. On January 10 or 11, 1996, representatives of Volvo told the Petitioner they were unable to fix the intermittent hesitation and stalling problems on the subject vehicle. On January 15, 1996, the Petitioner filled out and signed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. The Petitioner sent the request for arbitration to the Department, where it was received on January 26, 1996. By letter dated February 7, 1996, the Department advised the Petitioner that it intended to deny his request for arbitration because his "application was not submitted in a timely manner." Volvo does not have a certified procedure for the resolution of consumer complaints. The Vehicle Defect Notification form and the Request for Arbitration form are separate documents with separate functions.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Louis E. Martucci 5100 North Springs Way Coral Springs, Florida 33076 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of the General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact In 1991, Petitioner owned a new 1991 Ford conversion van which he felt was a lemon as that term is defined in the Florida Lemon Law. In pursuit of his legal rights under the Lemon Law, Petitioner made a request for arbitration of his automotive problem. Petitioner first applied for arbitration pursuant to the Lemon Law on December 31, 1991. Petitioner's application was incomplete because it failed to show that Petitioner had properly addressed and mailed Ford Motor Company a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification. The Department returned the arbitration request to Petitioner on January 14, 1992. The accompanying letter informed Petitioner that he was required to submit, by certified mail, a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the "Ford Motor Company, Attention: Customer Relations, Post Office Box 945500, Maitland, Florida 32794 Petitioner was instructed to supply the Department with evidence of his compliance with the Notice requirement providing a proper receipt along with his application within 30 days of Petitioner's receipt of the January 14, 1992, letter. Petitioner failed to respond or return his application within the 30 days. No evidence was ever submitted to the Division to show that Mr. Thomas mailed the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification Form to the Ford Motor Company as instructed by the January 14, 1992, letter from Respondent and as required by statute. Similarly, no evidence was presented at the hearing that the form was ever mailed to the appropriate entity. After 30 days had lapsed from the January 14, 1992 letter, the Department could have "rejected" Petitioner's request for arbitration by sending him a notice of rejection as required by Rule 2-32.009(c)(2), Florida Administrative Code. However, the Division did not send a rejection notice to Petitioner at that time. Instead, Petitioner's file was closed on March 13, 1992, with no further action taken. Therefore, the time period for amending Petitioner's first application did not expire and remained open at least through January, 1993. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that he did not respond to the Division's request for more information because he was mentally disabled and was hospitalized for 45 days between December 1991, and October 1992, and that the American's with Disabilities Act requires that an exception to compliance with the Rules and Statutes be given to him. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner was disabled during the entire period of time after the Division's request for information. Additionally, Petitioner did not request an extension of his response time as is required by the Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, since neither the rules nor the statutes provide for such an ADA exception, the Division cannot unilaterally fashion such an exception without engaging in rulemaking under Chapter 120. Such an exception must be addressed by the Florida Legislature or in rulemaking. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any exception to the Lemon Law requirements because of his disability or hospitalizations. Ten months later, On October 5, 1992, Petitioner again applied for Lemon Law arbitration. Petitioner's application was again incomplete and the Department requested more information. However, because the Division did not send Petitioner a formal rejection letter, the October 5, 1992, application related back to the first application filed December 31, 1991. Petitioner supplemented the second application with information showing that his vehicle had reached 24,000 miles in September of 1991. On November 13, 1992, Respondent notified Petitioner that his request for arbitration was untimely because his request did not fall within the statutory period allowed once his vehicle reached 24,000 miles. A rejection notice was contained in the Department's letter of November 13, 1992, thereby beginning the 30 day time period for any amendments to either of Petitioner's applications. As indicated earlier, the 30 day time period expired without Petitioner submitting any evidence that he had mailed Ford Motor Co. a Vehicle Defect Notification form. Therefore, Petitioner's application remained incomplete at the time any request for arbitration could have been made expired. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law. Finally, after Petitioner had requested arbitration, Petitioner sold and replaced the conversion van prior to the hearing. Therefore, Petitioner can not present the van to Ford Motor Co. for one last opportunity to repair. Such presentation is a condition precedent to arbitration which Petitioner cannot meet. Additionally, by selling his vehicle, Mr. Thomas has abandoned his Lemon Law Claim, in that he no longer has an ongoing dispute with Ford Motor Company that requires arbitration and his request for such is moot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services denying Mr. Andrew Thomas' request for Lemon Law arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1994.
