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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs OWEN R. HUNT, JR., M.D., 00-004714PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Nov. 20, 2000 Number: 00-004714PL Latest Update: Jan. 04, 2002

The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license.

Findings Of Fact Dr. Hunt is and has been at all times material, licensed by the Florida Board of Medicine. His license number is ME 001081. The Department of Health is charged with regulating the practice of medicine. The Department of Health may contract with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to provide investigative and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards, as appropriate. In this case, ACHA provided those services to the Department of Health. The Board of Medicine is an administrative body statutorily situated under the Division of Medical Quality Assurance. On the evening of June 28, 1999, Dr. Hunt was on duty in the emergency room of the Memorial Hospital-West Volusia. Memorial Hospital-West Volusia subsequently became known as Florida Hospital Deland (Hospital Deland). At 9:35 p.m., on June 28, 1999, Patient V.V., a 22-month-old female, was brought by her father to the emergency room of Hospital Deland with a complaint of fever and shortness of breath. It was reported to emergency room personnel that V.V. had experienced shortness of breath for many hours before she was brought to the emergency room. V.V. was born on August 29, 1997. V.V. had a history of multiple congenital deformities including panhypopituitarism and a severe cleft lip and palate, among other medical problems. V.V. had visited Hospital Deland at least 68 times previous to her visit of June 28, 1999. Panhypopituitarism means that the part of the brain that regulates all of the glands and hormones that the body requires to function, is not functioning. This gives rise to a host of problems, including hypothyroidism, retarded growth, and holoprosencephaly. This latter term means that the brain does not progress or develop much beyond the fetal stage. V.V. also experienced seizures and sodium imbalances which would range from very high to very low. V.V. was described by her Board-certified pediatrician, Dr. Susan Griffis, as being very difficult to manage medically. Dr. Griffis described V.V. as being basically in a vegetative state. She noted that V.V.'s deformities were not compatible with long-term existence. V.V.'s prognosis at birth was a life span of two years. By June 28, 1999, she had attained the age of 22 months. At 9:35 p.m., Nurse Hilbun noted a respiration of 60 and determined, through the use of a pulse oximeter, that V.V.'s concentration of oxygen was 60 percent. V.V. was placed on 100 percent oxygen along with an aerosol medicine through the application of a nonrebreather mask. V.V.'s skin was dry and pink which indicated that she was getting sufficient oxygen. Dr. Hunt, on June 28, 1999, first saw V.V. at 10:00 p.m. He conducted a physical examination which revealed, among other things, that the child had shortness of breath and a temperature of 101.8 degrees. The child was diagnosed with bilateral pneumonia. At 10:16 p.m., Dr. Hunt ordered diagnostic studies including a chest X-ray and laboratory studies, which include an RSV test for virus, and a complete blood count (CBC). The CBC could not be obtained because blood could not be drawn. Blood could not be drawn because V.V.'s veins were very small and because of scarring from numerous previous extractions of blood. Dr. Hunt attempted to contact Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician, for advice on a course of treatment but was unable to reach her. Dr. Hunt then contacted Dr. Reinertsen, the pediatrician on call who advised Dr. Hunt to intubate the patient and transfer her to Arnold Palmer Hospital in Orlando. It cannot be determined from the record exactly when this telephone call transpired. Dr. Reinertsen did not come to the emergency room. Arnold Palmer Hospital had an intensive care pediatrics unit. No intensive care pediatrics unit was available at Hospital Deland. Dr. Hunt did not transfer the child because he determined that V.V. was not stable to the point where she would survive the trip. He also did not follow Dr. Reinertsen's advice to immediately intubate the child, nor was he required to follow his advice. At 9:35 p.m., V.V.'s oxygen saturation was 60 percent and she had a heart rate of 160. At 9:45 p.m., she had an oxygen saturation of 85 percent. At 11:00 p.m., V.V's oxygen saturation was 98 percent and her temperature had improved to 100.6 degrees. At 11:40 p.m., respiration had improved to 52 and her heart rate was down to 140. At 1:40 a.m., June 29, 1999, respiration was 52, her heart rate was 142 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. At 2:30 a.m., respiration was 52 and her heart rate was 142. At 3:00 a.m., respiration was 60, her heart rate was 146 and oxygen saturation was 95 percent. During this period, from 9:35 p.m. until immediately before 3:00 a.m. on June 29, 1999, V.V. was not sufficiently stable for transfer but her condition was not deteriorating. At approximately 4:00 a.m., V.V.'s condition took a dramatic turn for the worse. The child began to have difficulty breathing and was experiencing apnea. When the child's condition began to deteriorate, Dr. Hunt asked for and received permission from V.V.'s parents to intubate V.V. Although V.V. had been placed on oxygen shortly after arrival, an oxygen mask will only put oxygen into the lungs. It will not facilitate exhalation. Intubation, if successful, provides a clear passage to the lungs and facilitates both inhalation and exhalation. Dr. Hunt was unsuccessful in intubating V.V. An anesthesiologist was called in and eventually succeeded in intubating V.V. Nevertheless, V.V. continued to rapidly deteriorate, and suffered cardiac and respiratory arrest at approximately 5:00 a.m. Unsuccessful efforts were made to defillibrate V.V. with electric paddles at 5:12 a.m., 5:13 a.m., and 5:14 a.m., but the child could not be resuscitated. Intubating any baby is a difficult and dangerous task. Intubating a baby with the deformities that characterized V.V. is particularly dangerous because the tube could easily penetrate the brain instead of going down the back of the throat as it should. V.V. had been hospitalized at Shands Hospital for a repair of her cleft palate and cleft lip when she was approximately 18 months of age. Shands is a well-known research hospital with a superb reputation. Before the repair could be accomplished, it was necessary to intubate V.V. and the surgeons at Shands were unable to do it. Dr. Hunt was aware of this. Because of these factors, Dr. Hunt was reluctant to intubate V.V. The testimony of the State's Expert Mark Slepin, M.D., testified as an expert witness in the area of the delivery of emergency medical care. He is the chief operating officer and chief compliance officer for ECS Holdings. ECS Holdings is a company which provides quality assurance services, among other things, to hospitals throughout Florida and to hospitals in many other states. Dr. Slepin served a residency in emergency medicine at the University Hospital, Jacksonville. Dr. Slepin practiced emergency medicine for ten years at hospitals in the southeastern Virginia area. He practiced at St. Mary's and Good Samaritan Hospitals in West Palm Beach, and at hospitals in Milton and Sarasota, prior to joining ECS. He is Board-certified in emergency medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the practice of emergency medicine. Dr. Slepin reviewed V.V.'s hospital records and statements made by Dr. Hunt. He opined that Dr. Hunt, for the most part, practiced within the standard of care that is expected of a reasonably prudent emergency physician with regard to his evaluation of the patient, his work-up of the patient, and his initial management of the patient in the early stages of the patient's course in the emergency room. Dr. Slepin thereafter opined that the plan of care was not a plan that a reasonably prudent emergency physician would take. There was no written "do not resuscitate" order. He opined that under those circumstances Dr. Hunt should have either admitted V.V. into the hospital or transferred her to a hospital with appropriate resources. Moreover, Dr. Hunt failed to provide appropriate airway management, in his opinion. He opined that Dr. Hunt left the patient in limbo for five hours and, therefore, the patient eventually succumbed because there was no definitive airway intervention in a patient who needed airway intervention. Dr. Slepin opined that the medical records adequately documented the patient's response to therapy and progress, except that there should have been additional physician's notes regarding the patient's progress filed between the initial evaluation and the eventual demise. The testimony of the Respondent's Experts Donald Hilbun, Jr., is a registered nurse who has a bachelor of science degree in nursing from the University of South Alabama. He was a medic in the military for three years and practiced in the labor and delivery unit of a military medical facility in Alaska where he delivered health care to babies. He is certified by the American Heart Association in advanced cardiac life support. Nurse Hilbun had worked at the Hospital Deland for one year on June 28, 1999. He was accepted as an expert on the practice of nursing. Nurse Hilbun prepared nurses notes for V.V., which were part of the overall medical record of V.V.'s care. It is Nurse Hilbun's opinion that V.V. was never stable enough to permit a successful transfer to the Arnold Palmer Hospital. He does not believe Dr. Hunt withheld appropriate treatment. Jay Edelberg, M.D., is a Board-certified emergency room physician. He has a degree in dentistry and received his medical degree in 1975. He did a surgical internship for one year at St. Francis Hospital in Hartford, Connecticut, and did an emergency medicine residency from 1976 to 1978 at what is now called Shands of Jacksonville. He is currently in private practice. He also works in the emergency room of Flagler Hospital which is similar in size to Hospital Deland. Dr. Edelberg has had a contract with the AHCA for the last seven or eight years. The contract provides that he is to review cases relating to emergency room physicians. He gives written opinions, when asked, to the probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine. He was accepted as an expert in the field of emergency room medicine. Dr. Edelberg reviewed V.V.'s hospital records. He opined that when treating a patient who is having shortness of breath, intubation is done only as a last resort. He opined that Dr. Hunt's decision to intubate V.V. at the time he did was the correct decision and that it would have been a mistake to have done it earlier. Dr. Edelberg opined that the events of the evening of July 28, 1999, and the morning of July 29, 1999, were adequately documented by Dr. Hunt. Dr. Edelberg pointed out that Dr. Reinertsen was on-call for Dr. Griffis, V.V.'s pediatrician. He was not on- call for the emergency room. He also pointed out that when someone like Dr. Reinertsen is consulted, unless that person comes in and takes over the case, it is the emergency room physician who must ultimately make all of the decisions with regard to care. Dr. Edelberg stated that it was his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the care provided to V.V. met the required standard of care. Conclusion On the whole, the expert testimony of Dr. Edelburg and Nurse Hilbun, was more persuasive than that of Dr. Slepin.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

Florida Laws (3) 120.57456.073458.331 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B8-9.003
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ROBERT H. HUNSAKER, M.D., 03-001954PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 27, 2003 Number: 03-001954PL Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2004

The Issue This is a license discipline case in which Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent, a licensed medical doctor, on the basis of alleged violations of paragraphs , (m), (t), and (x) of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes. The alleged violations are set forth in two administrative complaints, both of which were docketed as a single case when they were referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings.1

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert H. Hunsaker, M.D., is now, and was at all material times, licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0051546. Respondent, a board certified plastic surgeon, was employed by the Premiere Center for Cosmetic Surgery ("Premiere Center") in Coconut Grove, Florida, when the surgeries that led to the matters at issue in this proceeding were performed. All acts of alleged sexual misconduct at issue in this proceeding are alleged to have occurred in the recovery room at the Premiere Center following surgery by Respondent. The recovery room at the Premiere Center is a small area with walls on three sides and a curtained entrance. Just outside the curtained portion of the recovery room there is a large reclining chair. There are two beds in the recovery room. The bed against the left wall can be tilted up or down, and both patients E.R. and S.C. were placed in the bed on the left side of the room with their heads toward the rear wall and their feet toward the curtained entrance. This bed has railings, which are raised at all times when a patient is in the bed to prevent the patient from falling out. The recovery room is adjacent to the operating room. To benefit the patient, the recovery room is kept dimly lit. People frequently walked through the area just beyond the curtained portion of the recovery room. Any of 8 or 10 Premiere Center employees would have occasion to walk through this area at one time or another. Furthermore, the only ingress and egress to the operating room and recovery room was through the door located in the area just beyond the curtained recovery room. When a patient at the Premiere Center was transferred from the operating room to the recovery area, the patient routinely was placed in the middle of the bed, with the bedrail up to prevent the patient from falling out of the bed. Any patient at the Premiere Center routinely had an I.V. line in his or her left arm or hand, with a pulse oximeter clipped to a finger on the left hand. If the pulse oximeter clip were to become detached from the patient’s finger, an alarm would sound. The pulse oximeter monitors heart rhythm with an audible “beep” sound, and monitors oxygen saturation with a steady tone that lowers in frequency if oxygen saturation drops. Thus, if the surgeon is in the room immediately adjacent to the recovery area, the surgeon can be aware of the status of the pulse and the oxygen saturation of a patient in the curtained recovery area. During, as well as immediately following, all of the surgical procedures that led to the matters at issue in this proceeding, Respondent was wearing surgical garb, including scrub pants that did not have a fly. The scrub pants he wore were fastened at the waist by a drawstring, which consisted of a piece of non-elastic stout cord or lace, similar to a very long shoelace. It was Respondent's practice then (and still) to tie the drawstring in the same type of bow as is typically used to tie shoelaces. At all times pertinent to the issues in this case, Respondent tried to be one of the last people the patient saw before going under anesthesia and one of the first people the patient saw upon waking up. He did this in an effort to provide each patient with a sense of reassurance and to relax the patient. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent employed a post-operative practice of establishing physical contact with a patient while the patient was regaining consciousness following surgery. This practice was applied to both male and female patients. This contact usually consisted of holding the patient's hand or touching the patient's arm or shoulder. The purpose of the contact was to reassure and relax the patient. As part of this routine, Respondent would speak to the patient in soft and reassuring tones, asking the patient how he or she felt and telling the patient that the surgery was successful.6 Both patients E.R. and S.C. were administered general endotracheal anesthesia. Among the anesthetic agents administered to E.R. and S.C. were: Brevital, Fentanyl, Forane, Inapsine (also called Droperidol), and Nitrous Oxide. In addition, both E.R. and S.C. were pre-medicated with a drug belonging to the benzodiazepine class – Valium, in the case of E.R., and Versed (also called Midazolam), in the case of S.C. Experts for both Petitioner and Respondent agree that the purpose of anesthesia is to alter the sensory perception of the patient so that noxious stimuli will not be processed, and the patient will not remember the surgical event. Some anesthetic agents are strong amnesics, meaning that they cause the patient to not remember the noxious stimuli for a time following administration. Other anesthetic agents are analgesic, altering the patient’s sensation to noxious stimuli. Versed is a strong amnesic, as is Valium. Both Versed and Valium are in the same class of drugs known as benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines can cause post-operative hallucinations, and dreaming during emergence from the effect of the drug. Nitrous Oxide, Forane, and Fentanyl all change the patient’s perception of touch. Inapsine provides a state of mental detachment. Inapsine can cause post-operative hallucinations, as is stated in the drug package insert. The effects of all of these drugs can be enhanced when they are taken in combination. These anesthetic agents can contribute to a confabulation, and cause an environment ripe for confusion. The anesthesia used on these patients greatly altered their ability to perceive sensory input, including touch.7 While in the recovery room following their respective surgeries, both E.R. and S.C. were on the verge of unconsciousness, could not stay awake, and could not judge time.8 Although it was Respondent's practice to monitor his patients post-surgery by listening to the equipment and visually checking on the patient “at least two times,” this monitoring was supplemental to the monitoring activities of the Premiere Center employees whose primary job was to monitor the patients’ recovery and make the recovery room notations on the patients’ charts. Respondent often did this type of supplemental patient monitoring while making notes in medical charts or dictating operative reports at a work area in the room immediately outside the curtained portion of the recovery area. While doing these other tasks, he could also be aware of any significant change in the sounds made by the monitoring equipment. The Premiere Center employees primarily responsible for recovery room monitoring and notations were the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist ("CRNA") and the “circulator.” In May of 1996, Patient E.R., a female patient who was 43 years old at that time, met with Dr. Hunsaker to discuss plastic surgery to modify the shape of her nose. Following this consultation, E.R. consented to rhinoplasty surgery, and after a pre-operative workup, E.R. presented to the Premiere Center early in the morning on May 21, 1996. E.R. met with Dr. Hunsaker, and was then prepped for surgery. E.R. was pre- medicated with intravenous Valium (2.5 mg) and taken to the operating room, where she was administered general anesthesia. Dr. Hunsaker performed the surgery without incident and Patient E.R. was then moved to the recovery room. There was a lady in the bed next to her in the recovery room. In the recovery room, Patient E.R. awoke briefly from the anesthesia and called out for Suzanne DeRibeaux. No one answered her call and E.R. then fell asleep again. When Patient E.R. awoke again, she recalled being very frightened because she could not see. Dr. Hunsaker was standing at her bed, on the left side, and holding her left hand. Patient E.R. asked why she could not see and if she had lost her eyesight. Dr. Hunsaker told her not to be scared and that she could not see because she had ice packs on her eyes. The ice packs blocked Patient E.R.’s vision directly in front of her face. However, she was able to look underneath the pack and see her feet and the wall to the right of her bed. She was not able to see to her left without turning her head to the left. She did not turn her head to the left while Respondent was in the recovery room. Although Patient E.R. could not see Dr. Hunsaker, she could hear his voice. He asked her how she was feeling and if she could feel what was in her hand. Dr. Hunsaker pressed her hand around his fingers and she answered that she could feel what was in her hand. Dr. Hunsaker then asked Patient E.R. what was in her hand and she answered, “Those are your fingers.” When Patient E.R. awoke again, Dr. Hunsaker was still present at her bedside and had his hand underneath her left hand. Patient E.R. still had ice packs on her eyes, but was able to hear members of the Premiere staff walking and talking. Respondent held her hand and she believes he was trying to get her to squeeze something with her hand. Patient E.R. was frightened and did not say anything at the time. Patient E.R. was afraid to turn her head to the left to look at Respondent.9 After Dr. Hunsaker left Patient E.R. in the recovery room area, a nurse came into the room and helped Patient E.R. out of the bed and into a wheelchair. At that time, Patient E.R.’s friend, Carmen LeClair, was at the surgery center to pick up Patient E.R. and drive her to her mother's home. Ms. LeClair helped Patient E.R. to get dressed. Eventually, E.R. sat up, was put into a wheelchair, and, assisted by a nurse and by Carmen LeClair, walked to Ms. LeClair’s car. Ms. LeClair then drove Patient E.R. to the home of E.R.'s mother. At some time while she was in the bed in the recovery room, Patient E.R. began to think that perhaps Respondent might have placed his penis in her hand or might have placed her hand on his penis. During the time she was in the recovery room and shortly after she left the recovery room, Patient E.R. was not certain whether the sexual misconduct she believed might have occurred had in fact occurred or was instead something she had dreamed or hallucinated.10 More than a year later, Patient E.R. still could not be certain whether her recollection of sexual misconduct by Respondent was a recollection of an event that actually happened, or was a recollection of a dream or a hallucination. More than a year after the her surgery by Respondent, when Patient E.R. discussed the matter with Valerie McAllister for the first time, Patient E.R. was more inclined to believe that she had been hallucinating, rather than to believe that the misconduct had actually taken place.11 In May of 1997, Patient E.R. returned to the Premiere Center for some additional plastic surgery on her nose. Until that time, Patient E.R. had not told anyone at the Premiere Center anything about any alleged sexual misconduct by Respondent. In May of 1997 when she presented to the Premiere Center for the second surgery, Patient E.R. made a request to the Premiere Center’s CRNA, Valerie McAllister, that she not receive the same anesthesia as the previous year. She told Ms. McAllister that the reason for this request was because the last time, in E.R's own words, "I believe I was hallucinating that the doctor had put his penis in my hand." Ms. McAllister told Patient E.R. that she should discuss the matter with Suzanne DeRibeaux. Suzanne DeRibeaux was an employee of Premiere Center who had testified against Respondent in the 1997 hearing. About a week later, Patient E.R. discussed her concerns about the 1996 surgery with DeRibeaux. At that time, Ms. DeRibeaux informed E.R. that there were several other women (perhaps as many as six) that, in Ms. DeRibeaux's words, Respondent “had done this to.” Ms. DeRibeaux handed E.R. a business card for AHCA investigator, Susan DeCerce. E.R. met the investigator at the State Attorney’s Office (“SAO”) on June 4, 1997, where E.R.’s statement was taken by DeCerce. Patient E.R. was informed by both DeCerce and by personnel from the SAO that there were other women making the same allegations against Dr. Hunsaker. In her statement to DeCerce, Patient E.R. told DeCerce she thought she was squeezing a “pressure gauge” and not Dr. Hunsaker’s penis. Patient S.C. is a female who was 19 years old when she went to the Permiere Clinic seeking plastic surgery services. After initial and pre-operative consultations with Dr. Hunsaker, Patient S.C. presented on May 7, 1996, at the Premiere Center for bilateral breast augmentation. The patient's mother and boyfriend took her to the Premiere Center on the morning of the surgery. Patient S.C. was duly prepped, pre-medicated with Versed, and taken to the operating room where she was administered general anesthesia, consisting of the same anesthetic agents that were administered to E.R. Surgery was performed without incident by Dr. Hunsaker and Patient S.C. was then moved to the recovery room. While in the recovery room, Patient S.C. woke up and fell asleep again at least three times that she remembers. On at least two of those times when she woke up in the recovery room, her mother was standing beside her bed. On at least one of the occasions when she woke up in the recovery room, Respondent was standing beside her bed.12 Patient S.C. recalls that shortly after she woke up she heard Respondent asking how she felt and asking if she was O.K. Patient S.C. also recalls that at some point in her recovery room experience, Respondent held her hand. Consistent with his usual practice, Respondent held S.C.'s hand as she was emerging from anesthesia in the recovery room and asked how she was feeling. Respondent never held Patient S.C.'s hand against his penis, nor did he place Patient S.C.'s hand inside his surgical scrub pants. At some time while she was in the bed in the recovery room, Patient S.C. began to think that perhaps Respondent might have held her hand and then might have placed her hand on his penis. During the time she was in the recovery room and during the period shortly after she left the recovery room, Patient S.C. was not certain whether the sexual misconduct she believed might have occurred had in fact occurred, or was instead something she had dreamed or hallucinated.13 When she woke up the last time, Patient S.C. recalls that her mother was at S.C.'s bedside. S.C.'s mother assisted her in getting dressed, and S.C.'s mother and boyfriend took S.C. home. S.C. did not say anything to her mother about any alleged sexual misconduct by Respondent until many months later, following a television newscast about Respondent. S.C. did mention something vague to her boyfriend as he was carrying her to the car in the Premiere Center parking lot, which was to the effect that, "I thought something had happened in the room."14 Well over a year after her surgery, Patient S.C. saw a television newscast on Channel 10 in which it was stated that a number of other women had come forward with allegations that Respondent had manipulated their hands onto his penis during their recovery from anesthesia. The newscast also stated that anyone else who had been through a similar experience should come forward. Patient S.C. contacted the news station. The newscaster took Patient S.C.'s name and telephone number, and shortly thereafter AHCA field investigator Susan DeCerce contacted S.C. Respondent emphatically denied that he engaged in sexual misconduct with any of his patients.15 Respondent's testimony, including his denial of any sexual misconduct, is found to be credible.16 During the course of his treatment of Patient L.P., Respondent did not engage in any sexual misconduct of any kind with the patient. Specifically, Respondent did not at any time, in the recovery room or elsewhere, place his penis in Patient L.P.'s hand or cause Patient L.P.'s hand to come in contact with his penis.17 During the course of his treatment of Patient A.V., Respondent did not engage in any sexual misconduct of any kind with the patient. Specifically, Respondent did not at any time, in the recovery room or elsewhere, place his penis in Patient A.V.'s hand or cause Patient A.V.'s hand to come in contact with his penis. During the course of his treatment of Patient E.R., Respondent did not engage in any sexual misconduct of any kind with the patient. Specifically, Respondent did not at any time, in the recovery room or elsewhere, place his penis in Patient E.R.'s hand or cause Patient E.R.'s hand to come in contact with his penis. During the course of his treatment of Patient S.C., Respondent did not engage in any sexual misconduct of any kind with the patient. Specifically, Respondent did not at any time, in the recovery room or elsewhere, place his penis in Patient S.C.'s hand or cause Patient S.C.'s hand to come in contact with his penis. During the course of his treatment of Patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C., Respondent did not keep a post-anesthesia record tracking the recovery of any of these four patients while they were in the recovery room. Respondent learned for the first time that vital signs were not recorded during the recovery of patients E.R., S.C., A.V., and L.P. only after the Administrative Complaints in this case were filed. None of the four patients suffered any harm from the absence of recordation of vital signs during the recovery period. During the time period in which Respondent was treating patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C. (calendar year 1996), in a private office surgery setting, in the normal course of events, the anesthesia provider (either anesthesiologist or CRNA) would chart the patient’s immediate post-anesthesia recovery. Further recovery room charting would normally be the responsibility of the person assigned to take over the recovery from the anesthesia provider. During that time period and under those circumstances, the surgeon's responsibility to make a record of events in the recovery room existed only where the surgeon actually intervened during the recovery room period to provide some form of treatment (such as changing I.V. fluid or administering medication) or if there were a dramatic or unusual event during the course of the recovery. With the exception of Respondent's administration of Droperidol to Patient S.C. (which was noted in the medical record), there were no such events in the recoveries of Patients E.R., S.C., A.V., and L.P., and, consequently, no requirement that Respondent make recovery room notations during the recoveries of these patients. During the time period in which Respondent was treating Patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C. (calendar year 1996), and under the circumstances in which Respondent was treating those patients (in an office surgery setting in which the facility was providing the CRNA anesthesia provider and was also providing an employee to recover patients in the recovery room), Respondent was not responsible for preparing the record of the patient's recovery room experience. Rather, at that time and under those circumstances, the person responsible for preparing the recovery room record was either the person who administered the anesthesia (the CRNA) or the employee of the facility who was assigned to monitor the patient in the recovery room and who was the person to whom the CRNA would entrust the patient's recovery room care once the CRNA was satisfied that the patient was sufficiently stable. During the time period in which Respondent was treating Patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C. (calendar year 1996), and under the circumstances in which Respondent was treating those patients, a reasonably prudent similar physician under the same or similar circumstances would have recognized Respondent's failure to keep a post-anesthesia record tracking the recovery of any of these four patients while they were in the recovery room as being acceptable, because such a reasonably prudent similar physician would have expected the recovery room record to have been prepared by the anesthesia provider or other person assigned to monitor the patient in the recovery room. During the time period in which Respondent was treating Patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C. (calendar year 1996), and under the circumstances in which Respondent was treating those patients, Respondent's failure to keep a post- anesthesia record tracking the recovery of any of these four patients while they were in the recovery room was not a failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. During the time period in which Respondent was treating Patients L.P., A.V., E.R., and S.C. (calendar year 1996), and under the circumstances in which Respondent was treating those patients, Respondent's failure to keep a post- anesthesia record tracking the recovery of any of these four patients while they were in the recovery room was not a failure to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, because the responsibility for the preparation of such records was a responsibility of the anesthesia provider or other person assigned to monitor the patient while the patient was in the recovery room. In such time and circumstances the surgeon was not responsible for the preparation of such records in the absence of some unusual circumstances, which unusual circumstances did not occur in any of the recovery room experiences following the surgeries at issue here.18

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case to the following effect: Adopting all of the findings of fact in this Recommended Order, Adopting all of the conclusions of law in this Recommended Order, Concluding that the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the charges in either of the administrative complaints at issue in this case, and (3) Dismissing all charges contained in both of the administrative complaints at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57456.073458.329458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs RICHARD CARLTON FLEET, 02-002293PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jun. 10, 2002 Number: 02-002293PL Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2003

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1996, a Florida-licensed registered nurse. He holds license number 3109442. From September 11, 2000, to March 28, 2001, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse by the North Broward Hospital District and assigned to the emergency room at Imperial Point Medical Center (IPMC) in Broward County, Florida. IPMC is a division of the North Broward Hospital District. It serves as a designated Baker Act receiving facility where persons are "brought involuntary[ily] for psychiatric evaluation" and referral. Some of these persons are "dangerous and violent" and have "cause[ed] injuries to the staff of the emergency room." In early 2001, Respondent was involved in two separate incidents in which he mistreated a patient in the emergency room at IPMC. The first incident occurred on or about February 23, 2001. On that day, K. N., a 21-year-old female, was admitted to the emergency room suffering from "acute intoxication." Pursuant to emergency room policy, upon her admittance to the emergency room, K. N. was "completely undressed . . . to make sure that [she was] not hiding any drugs, contraband, weapons, [or other] things of that nature." K. N. was lying, "passed out" and completely naked, on a stretcher in an examining room with Respondent by her side, when one of the hospital's emergency room technicians, Robert Russo, walked into the room to assist Respondent. Respondent greeted Mr. Russo by making the following comments about K. N.: "Look at those tits. Wouldn't you like to get a piece of that?" Mr. Russo left the room to get a hospital gown for Respondent to put on K. N., as Respondent was required to do, in accordance with hospital policy, so as "to preserve [K. N.'s] dignity." Mr. Russo returned with a gown and gave it to Respondent, but Respondent did not put it on K. N. or otherwise use it to try to cover K. N. Respondent, though, did continue making comments about K. N.'s body. Referring to K. N.'s genitals, he remarked to Mr. Russo, "That's sweet," or words to that effect. Feeling "uncomfortable," Mr. Russo left the room. By allowing K. N. to remain completely naked and by making the remarks he did to Mr. Russo about K. N.'s body, Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. The following month, Respondent was involved in another incident in which he acted inappropriately toward an IPMC emergency room patient. This second incident occurred on March 18, 2001. The patient Respondent mistreated on this day was F. L., a 17-year-old male with a history of drug abuse. F. L. was brought to the IPMC emergency room by the City of Pompano Beach Fire/Rescue at the request of F. L.'s mother, J. L., who accompanied him to the emergency room and remained there for the duration of F. L.'s stay. J. L. had "called 911" after F. L. had come home from a night of drinking and, in her presence, had had a seizure. By the time fire/rescue arrived at their home, F. L. was conscious, and he remained conscious during the ambulance ride to IPMC. J. L. wanted F. L. to be involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. She did not think she would be able to handle his coming back home because he "was on drugs at the time" and she thought that he would "go crazy" if he did not receive treatment. F. L. was aware of his mother's desire. In the past, he had attempted to "fight" (verbally, but not physically) efforts to have him "Baker Acted." F. L. was admitted to the IPMC emergency room at 3:49 a.m. on March 18, 2001. At the time of his admittance, F. L. was conscious, "somewhat calm," and able to stand up and walk "with a wobble" and to speak coherently (although his speech was slurred). He was asked to give a urine sample for a "urine screen," and with the help of his mother, who accompanied him to bathroom "[s]o he wouldn't fall or miss the cup," he complied. F. L. soon became upset and "verbally abusive to the staff" on duty, including Respondent. Respondent decided that F. L. needed to be restrained. With the help of others, including Mr. Russo, Respondent restrained F. L. "with Velcro restraints on the wrists and the ankles." Respondent then requested that F. L. give another urine sample. F. L., in turn, "asked for a urine bottle." Respondent refused F. L.'s request. Instead, he took out a Foley catheter. A Foley catheter is a thin, flexible rubber tube that is threaded through the urethra and into the bladder. It is used to drain urine from the bladder. It should be sterile and lubricated when inserted. F. L. went "totally beserk" when he saw the catheter, letting it be known in no uncertain terms that he did not want to be catherized and again requesting that he be given a "urine bottle." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "hit[ting] [F. L.] in the face with the catheter numerous times," while telling F. L. two or three times, "I'm going to shove this hose down your dick." This caused F. L., understandably, to become even more loud and boisterous. Respondent enlisted the assistance of three or four others, including Mr. Russo and George Austin, a Wackenhut security officer on patrol at the hospital, to place F. L. in four-point leather restraints (one for each ankle and wrist) on a stretcher in Room 6. 1/ F. L. resisted, but was eventually subdued and restrained on the stretcher. Given F. L.'s out-of-control behavior, placing him in four-point restraints was warranted. After F. L. was restrained on the stretcher, Respondent, against F. L.'s will, inserted the Foley catheter (that he had used to hit F. L. and that was therefore not sterile) in F. L. 2/ Respondent did so in a rough and negligent manner, without using lubricating jelly or any other type of lubrication. Subsequently, while F. L. was still in four-point restraints on the stretcher, he became "more upset, more verbally abusive," and "tried to sit up." Respondent responded, inappropriately, by "grabb[ing] [F. L.] by the neck," "slapp[ing] him back down onto the stretcher," and "choking [F. L.] until [F. L.] was almost blue." Respondent "let go" of F. L. only after an observer intervened. After Respondent stopped choking him, F. L. "asked for his mother." 3/ Respondent responded, again inappropriately, by telling F. L. three times, "I got your mother right here," as he "grabbed his own testicles." 4/ As could be expected, this "further upset" F. L., and he again tried to sit up. Respondent's response was, again, an inappropriate one. He "climbed up on the stretcher," "put his right knee on [F. L.'s] chest," "cover[ed] F. L.'s face" with his left hand, and with his right hand "grabbed" F. L.'s penis and scrotum and "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]." Respondent, without any justification, "squeeze[d] and twist[ed]" F. L.'s penis and scrotum "two or three times" while F. L. was in four-point restraints on the stretcher. On one of these occasions, he told F. L. (as he was "squeeze[ing] and twist[ing]") "something like," "What are you going to do now?" During his encounter with F. L. on March 18, 2001, Respondent used more force against F. L. than was reasonably necessary to properly discharge his nursing duties and to protect himself and those around him. 5/ By physically, and also verbally, abusing F. L., Respondent failed to conform to the minimal acceptable standards of prevailing nursing practice. 6/ When J. L. was finally reunited with her son, she noticed that he had red marks on his face and "bruise[s]" on his extremities. The IPMC emergency room physician who evaluated F. L. determined that there was reason to believe that F. L. was "mentally ill as defined in Section 394.455(18), Florida Statutes" (based upon an "initial diagnosis" of "acute agitation"), and that F. L. otherwise met the "criteria for involuntary examination" under the Baker Act. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 18, 2001, F. L. was discharged from IPMC and transferred to Florida Medical Center. Sometime after the March 18, 2001, incident involving F. L., a security officer and nurse working at IPMC expressed to Beverly Gilberti, the nurse/manger of IPMC's emergency room, their "concerns" regarding Respondent's "practice." On March 26, 2001, Ms. Gilberti contacted Gayle Adams, IPMC's human resources specialist, and told her about the security officer's and nurse's "concerns." Ms. Adams began an investigation into the matter. Ms. Gilberti telephoned Respondent and advised him that he was being suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into alleged wrongdoing on his part. Respondent was given "very little information as to what type of complaint[s]" were being investigated. On March 28, 2001, before the investigation had been completed, Respondent telephoned Ms. Adams and "verbally resigned over the phone."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order in which it dismisses Count Three of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts One and Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, as punishment for having committed these violations, permanently revokes Respondent's license and requires him to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00, as well as the "costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case." 16/ DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57394.455456.072464.018
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs BENJAMIN P. DELGADO, 91-000869 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 07, 1991 Number: 91-000869 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 1991

The Issue An administrative complaint dated November 9, 1990 alleges that Respondent violated Chapter 458, F.S., governing the practice of medicine, by failing to conduct a complete history and medical examination, failing to order an EKG, failing to admit for cardiac observation and failing to keep adequate written medical records of a patient which he treated in a hospital emergency room in Kissimmee, Florida. The issue is whether those violations occurred and if so, what discipline is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Benjamin P. Delgado, M.D., is now and at all times relevant has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0029222. Dr. Delgado has been licensed in Florida since 1982, and for the last nine years has maintained a private practice of internal medicine in Kissimmee, Osceola County. Dr. Delgado has also provided emergency room services, under contract, at Humana Hospital in Kissimmee. He came on duty at the emergency room on February 23, 1989, at 8:00 p.m. The patient, identified as "Patient #1" in the administrative complaint, checked into the emergency room on February 23, 1989 at approximately 8:19 p.m., accompanied by his wife. Patient #1 was a 56-year old male, approximately 6'1", weighing 181 lbs. He complained of severe upper abdominal pain. After the emergency room clerk recorded the patient's name, address, relevant insurance information and chief complaint, the patient was seen by the emergency room staff nurse, Janet Kusser, R.N. The nurse noted on her chart that the patient had complained of severe pain in his upper abdomen on and off since 3:00 a.m. She recorded his temperature, pulse, respiration rate and blood pressure; she inquired about allergies and any medications he might be on. She also completed an emergency room assessment sheet, which involved circling relevant answers on a questionnaire form addressing a brief medical history, and current physical condition. The patient was ambulatory, had normal respiration, was alert and cooperative, had warm skin with pink extremities. He exhibited tenderness in his upper abdomen, and that is where he said the pain was -- centered beneath his chest. Two attempts to notify the patient's family physician, at 8:25 and 8:55 p.m., were unsuccessful. When the nurse completed her assessment, she introduced Dr. Delgado and gave him the chart. The emergency room was not crowded, although staff was busy. A patient vocally complaining of chest pains was being seen around the same time that patient #1 checked in. Still, Dr. Delgado was able to devote full attention to Patient #1 in his examination. He went through the same questions as the nurse did on the emergency room assessment form and substantially agreed with her findings. He also found the upper abdomen to be tender. The patient clutched his stomach and was doubled over. He was not grasping his arm and he denied having pain in any extremities. The patient denied having prior medical conditions as heart disease, asthma, hypertension or diabetes. Negative findings were not recorded by Dr. Delgado on the chart. For example, he noted tenderness in the epigastrium, but did not note the lack of pain in the extremities. Dr. Delgado considered the complaints to be related to gastritis and ordered a complete blood count, urinalysis, SMA-7 and X-rays of the abdomen. The results of those tests are attached to the emergency room chart for the patient. The total time Dr. Delgado spent with the patient was approximately 30 minutes. Dr. Delgado also inquired of the patient from time to time as to how he felt, as the other emergency room patients being attended were on stretchers nearby. The patient's wife remained in the waiting room and was not interviewed by the nurse or physician. After reviewing the laboratory reports and X-rays, Dr. Delgado diagnosed the problem as gastritis and released the patient with Donnatol for his stomach and suggested he contact his family physician in the morning. The patient checked out around 10:10 p.m. The patient returned home with his wife. He died in bed early in the morning at approximately 2:30 a.m., on February 24, 1989. After an autopsy, the medical examiner, G.V. Ruiz, M.D., determined the immediate cause of death was cardiac arrhythmia due to arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. This is also referred to as sudden death due to clogging or hardening of the arteries. In this case the patient had severe occlusion, up to 75% in some areas, in all three main coronary arteries. Based on a reading of the medical record, the pathologist's report and deposition of the pathologist, Petitioner's expert witness, Jay W. Edelberg, a Board-certified emergency room physician, opined that the patient's chart was not adequately documented and that the patient should have been worked up for the possibility of cardiac problems. From ten to twenty percent of people with cardiac problems present symptoms that mimic gastrointestinal complaints. A variety of risk factors needs to be documented to rule out or minimize the risk of a complaint being cardiac- related. Those risk factors include smoking, family history, history of hypertension, blood sugar problems, sedentary lifestyle, overweight, and high cholesterol. Dr. Edelberg was unaware that Dr. Delgado did pursue questions with regard to those risk factors and simply did not note the negative findings. Dr. Delgado did observe that the patient was a smoker -- he had his cigarettes with him -- and did not note that on the record. The other risk factors identified by Dr. Edelberg were essentially negative. Moreover, Dr. Delgado had no substantial clue from his examination that cardiac problems should be suspected: there was no prior history of heart disease, no reported pains in the neck or arms, no observed sweating or shortness of breath. For that reason, the EKG or other cardiac work-up was not ordered. David John Orban, M.D., Medical Director at Shands Teaching Hospital at the University of Florida, Board certified in emergency medicine, testified as an expert witness on behalf of Dr. Delgado. Dr. Orban agreed that the complaints and symptoms of the patient pointed to gastritis rather than heart disease, and that the medical record adequately reflected the basis for the diagnosis. Although brief, the notes focus on the problem at hand. The patient's vital signs were normal. An EKG is not generally indicated for patients who present abdominal pain. The chart is typical of charts found in busy community emergency departments. Reasonable, competent, expert physicians simply disagree on whether Dr. Delgado's treatment and his medical records violate a standard of care. Dr. Edelberg stops short of saying that any 56 year old male who appears in an emergency room with upper abdominal pain should receive a cardiac work-up. On the other hand, Dr. Orban concedes that a reasonable prudent physician does not simply rely on what a patient tells him without further inquiry and observation. Dr. Delgado's conduct falls between those two extremes. He conducted a physical examination and an inquiry into the patient's history and symptoms. He made cursory notes without duplicating the information already obtained by the emergency room staff nurse. He failed to document that the patient was a cigarette smoker, but in other respects documented relevant positive findings, such as tenderness in the epigastrium. The patient's external physical signs, his history, and the complaints he articulated reasonably led Dr. Delgado to conclude that the patient was suffering from gastritis. The patient's age and his smoking habit did not, given his other signs and symptoms, require a cardiac work-up, and Dr. Delgado reasonably did not suspect nor pursue possible cardiac complications. Dr. Delgado's failure to record the fact of cigarette smoking does not alone make his medical records of the patient inadequate. Essential information was noted, albeit briefly, and was consistent with standards for community emergency facilities.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Benjamin P. Delgado, M.D. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 16th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. Rejected as contrary to the evidence or immaterial. Rejected as immaterial or contrary to the evidence. The questions were asked or the conditions were observed and primarily positive findings were recorded. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 7.-8. Rejected as immaterial. Evidence indicates the examination and tests were sufficient for the symptoms presented. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. See Joint Exhibit #1, where the test results are found attached. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted by implication in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. 13.-14. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 9. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 7. 23.-24. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 3. 4.-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 12. 9.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. Adopted in substance in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted by implication in paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Nickell, Sr. Atty. Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert Rao, Esquire 20 S. Rose Avenue Kissimmee, FL 34741 Mark Dabold, Esquire Suite 1550, Firstate Tower 255 South Orange Avenue Orlando, FL 32801 Dorothy Faircloth, Exec. Director DPR-Board of Medicine 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68455.225458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs BABAK SAADATMAND, M.D., 16-004346PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 28, 2016 Number: 16-004346PL Latest Update: Feb. 23, 2017

The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D. (Respondent or Dr. Saadatmand), has violated section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2013), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner, the Department of Health, is the agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to chapters 20, 456, and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Saadatmand holds Florida license number ME 114656. Respondent graduated from the University of Maryland, College of Medicine, in 1988, and completed his residency at Case Western Reserve. He then completed a residency in emergency medicine at Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent was board-certified in internal medicine, but no longer holds that certification because at the time it was due for renewal, he was no longer eligible because his practice was devoted to emergency medicine as opposed to internal medicine. He remains board-certified in emergency medicine. Respondent has held positions that required him to supervise residents and give lectures at Yale University, New York College of Medicine, and Indiana University. Dr. Saadatmand chose to practice emergency medicine as a traveling physician for the last three years, because of the financial benefits available by doing so while he gained additional experience in emergency medicine. However, he has since or now accepted a position as the assistant program director of the emergency medicine residency program at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida, where his job responsibilities will include the supervision of residents. Dr. Saadatmand holds a medical license in several other states in addition to Florida, and has not been disciplined in any state where he is licensed. Dr. Saadatmand’s Treatment of R.D. In June and July of 2014, Respondent was working as a traveling physician at Parrish Medical Center in Titusville, Florida. While most of his assignments in various emergency facilities have been six months long, the assignment at Parrish Medical Center was for approximately one month. Respondent treated patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, at Parrish Medical Center emergency room. R.D. was accompanied by his wife, C.D. R.D. was a 52-year-old male when he presented to Parrish Medical Center. He had a history of T-cell lymphoma and had been treated for his cancer through the Space Coast Cancer Center. Just days before his presentation to the emergency room on June 27, 2014, he had been cleared to return to his place of employment. However, on June 27, 2014, R.D.’s supervisor called R.D.’s wife, C.D., and asked her to come get R.D. as he was too ill to be at work. R.D. arrived at Parrish Medical Center in the early afternoon, and was triaged by a nurse at approximately 2:13 p.m. The notes from the triage nurse’s assessment recorded, among other things, R.D.’s vital signs upon arrival; his chief complaint, including its duration and intensity; a brief medical history; a list of his current medications; and a drug/alcohol use history. Registered Nurse Sharon Craddock was the emergency room nurse who completed the initial assessment, or triage assessment, of R.D.’s condition. According to her triage notes in the Parrish Medical Center records, R.D.’s chief complaint upon arrival was constipation, which was described as constipation for three days, with bilateral abdominal pain. The pain was described as aching, pressure, shooting, and throbbing, and R.D.’s pain level was reported in Ms. Craddock’s notes as being an eight on a ten-point scale. Her description of his abdomen was “soft, non-tender, round, and obese.” Nurses are directed to record the pain level reported by the patient, and not to alter the pain level based on the nurse’s observation.1/ R.D.’s vital signs were taken upon his arrival at Parrish Medical Center and were recorded in the electronic medical records as follows: temperature, 98.4F; pulse, 127H; respiration, 20; blood pressure, 120/70; and pulse oximeter, 95. The only abnormal reading reflected in R.D.’s vital signs was his pulse, which was above 100, considered to be the upper limit of normal. R.D. reported that he had a medical history which included T-cell lymphoma and that he did not smoke or drink. His current medications were listed as aspirin, Zyrtec, Amaryl, Metformin, Prilosec, Percocet, Pravastatin, and a multivitamin. The Percocet dosage was listed as one tablet, three times daily, as needed for pain. Ms. Craddock also recorded a nursing note for R.D. at 3:37 p.m., and she was in the room when Respondent first went in to see R.D. Ms. Craddock’s nursing note indicates, “Pt with a hx of stomach CA with a recent ‘clean bill of health’ presents with ABD pain and constipation. Occasionally takes Percocet for pain. Wife at BS. Pt. sleepy, states he normally takes a nap this time of day. Pending MD eval with orders.” The Parrish Medical Center chart documents that R.D. was calm, cooperative, and asleep at 15:37 hours (3:37 p.m.). This presentation is generally inconsistent with a patient who is in severe abdominal pain. Dr. Saadatmand saw R.D. at approximately 3:56 p.m. Consistent with the custom at Parrish Medical Center, he worked with a scribe who took Respondent’s dictation for notes during his visit with the patient, and then loaded those notes into the electronic medical record. Respondent would then have the opportunity to review the notes as transcribed and direct the scribe to make any necessary changes. Dr. Saadatmand’s notes indicate that R.D. presented with abdominal pain, and was experiencing moderate pain that was constant with cramping. The description of R.D.’s pain as moderate was based upon Dr. Saadatmand’s observation of R.D. The chief complaint listed was constipation. Dr. Saadatmand took a history from R.D., who reported that he had been diagnosed with gastric lymphoma in 2013, and was treated with radiation and chemotherapy. R.D. and his wife, C.D., reported to Respondent that they feared his cancer might be returning, as his current symptoms were similar to those he experienced when his cancer was first diagnosed. He had returned to Space Coast Cancer Center for some additional screening two to three weeks before the emergency room visit, which included a CT of the abdomen and an upper and lower endoscopy. R.D. and his wife both believed that the results of the screening were normal. Respondent recorded this conversation in the electronic medical record as “[R.D.] had a recent follow up with Dr. Rylander and had normal EGD and colonoscopy. [R.D.] had recent CT scan with cancer center.” Space Coast Cancer Center does not use Parrish Medical Center to perform its CT scans or other testing, so the results of the recent CT scan were not available for Respondent to view. Respondent believed that R.D. and C.D. had followed the directions of R.D.’s oncologists, and R.D. had been a compliant patient. Respondent asked R.D. about his use of Percocet. He did not ask how much he was taking, but how often and whether the use had changed. He considered the answer to this question to be important, because a change in the use could indicate a change in R.D.’s pain intensity. R.D. did not report any change in the amount that he was taking, which was generally an “every other day thing for him.” Respondent testified that, given that the type of Percocet that R.D. was prescribed was an extra-strength as opposed to a standard version of Percocet, it was highly likely that R.D. would suffer from opioid-induced constipation. R.D. reported to Respondent that he had not attempted any laxatives. R.D. also denied having any nausea or surgical history. The lack of a surgical history is significant because patients with a recent surgical history and abdominal pain may be experiencing complications related to the surgery, which would account for the patient’s pain. There is no reference to R.D.’s diabetes in either the nursing triage notes or Dr. Saadatmand’s notes. The only reference in the past medical history is the report of cancer. The list of medications R.D. was taking at home includes Metformin HCI. No evidence was presented to establish whether Metformin is a drug prescribed only for diabetes or whether it is an accepted treatment for other conditions. Moreover, there is no evidence presented to establish how Respondent was to know that R.D. was diabetic if R.D. did not report the condition. In addition to taking R.D.’s medical history, Respondent performed a review of systems and a physical examination, including palpation of his abdomen. In his chart, the electronic medical record states under “review of systems,” “All systems: Reviewed and negative except as stated.” Under the category “Gastrointestinal,” the record indicates “Reports: Abdominal pain, Constipation. Denies: Nausea, vomiting, Diarrhea.” In the physical examination section of the electronic medical record, it is noted that R.D. was alert and in mild distress. The cardiovascular examination indicates that R.D. had a regular rate, normal rhythm, and normal heart sounds, with no systolic or diastolic murmur. With respect to his abdominal exam, Respondent indicated, “Present: Soft, normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” The notation that the abdomen was soft with normal bowel sounds is another way of noting that the abdomen is non-tender. Because R.D. was tachycardic upon presentation to the emergency room, Dr. Saadatmand noted R.D.’s anxiety about the possibility of his cancer returning, and checked his pulse a second time. When Respondent checked R.D.’s pulse, it had slowed to 90, which is within a normal range. In light of R.D.’s normal vital signs, normal abdominal examination, and the length of his pain and constipation, Respondent determined that the most likely cause for Respondent’s pain was constipation, and communicated that determination to R.D. and C.D. He asked whether R.D. had used a laxative and was told he had not. Dr. Saadatmand told R.D. and his wife that the pain medication that he took could be a source for his constipation, and that it would be prudent to try a laxative and see if that produced results before considering any further diagnostic tests. Respondent did not order any lab tests for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, because his vital signs and abdominal examination were normal. He did not order an EKG for R.D. because there were no symptoms to indicate a cardiac issue. Respondent also did not order a CT scan of the abdomen or pelvis for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014. He felt that, in terms of R.D.’s concern about cancer recurrence, there were tests available to R.D.’s oncologist that would be more useful in detecting any recurrence of R.D.’s cancer that are not available through an emergency room visit. For example, a PET scan would be the most helpful, but is not something that Respondent could order through the emergency room because it is not considered an emergent study. The Department has not alleged, and the evidence did not demonstrate, that R.D. suffered from any emergency condition that additional testing would have revealed and that went undetected by Dr. Saadatmand. Respondent did order a prescription-strength laxative, i.e., Golytely, for R.D., which is a laxative commonly used to treat constipation and to prepare patients for a colonoscopy. Dr. Saadatmand communicated his recommendation to R.D. and C.D., who seemed relieved that the problem might be limited to constipation. He also advised them to return to the emergency room should R.D.’s symptoms get worse or if he developed a fever, because those developments would indicate a change in his condition. R.D. received discharge instructions that are consistent with Dr. Saadatmand’s discussion with R.D. and his wife. The discharge instructions referred R.D. to his primary care physician, noted the prescription for Golytely, and provided information related to the community health navigator. The Patient Visit Information sheet received by R.D. specifically noted that the patient was acknowledging receipt of the instructions provided, and stated, “I understand that I have had EMERGENCY TREATMENT ONLY and that I may be released before all my medical problems are known and treated. Emergency medical care is not intended to be a substitute for complete medical care. My Emergency Department diagnosis is preliminary and may change after complete medical care is received. I will arrange for follow-up care.” R.D. also received printed materials about constipation and how to address the problem. These instructions stated that the patient should contact his or her primary care provider if the constipation gets worse, the patient starts to vomit, or has questions or concerns about his or her condition or care. It also instructed the patient to return to the emergency room if he or she had blood in his or her bowel movements or had a fever and abdominal pain with the constipation. R.D. signed the acknowledgment that he had read and understood the instructions given to him by his caregivers. The acknowledgment specifically referenced the instructions regarding constipation. The written instructions are consistent with the verbal advice provided by Respondent. R.D.’s Subsequent Treatment Unfortunately, R.D.’s symptoms did not improve. He developed a fever and his pain level increased significantly. As stated by his wife, his pain the following day was “way worse” than when he saw Dr. Saadatmand. After a call to her niece, a nurse that worked in the emergency room at Parrish Medical Center, C.D. took R.D. back to the hospital on June 28, 2014, at approximately 6:30 p.m. At that point, he had a heart rate of 125, a temperature of 101.6 degrees, and tenderness in the lower left quadrant of his abdomen. Testing indicated that R.D. had intra-abdominal masses and small collections of extra-luminal gas that suggested the possibility of a contained micro-perforation. There is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint that the micro- perforation existed at the time R.D. saw Respondent. R.D. died on August 23, 2014, as a result of end-stage T-cell lymphoma. The Expert Witnesses The Department presented the expert testimony of Annie Akkara, M.D. Dr. Akkara is board-certified in emergency medicine and has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida for approximately nine years. All of her practice has been in the greater Orlando area in the Florida hospital system. She worked full-time for one year when she first moved to Florida, and since that time approximately 80 percent of her practice has involved reviewing medical charts for Veracode Associates, to determine whether diagnostic codes are fully supported in the medical records. She takes emergency room shifts on an as-needed basis, and has supervisory responsibility over patient extenders, such as nurses and physicians’ assistants, but not over other physicians. Dr. Akkara has never served on any committee for a medical staff at a hospital or helped develop protocols for an emergency room, and has not conducted any type of medical research. Although her position requires her to review electronic medical records, she was not familiar with the program used by Parrish Medical Center. Dr. Akkara reviewed the medical records for the emergency room visits for both June 27 and 28, 2014, as well as the records from the inpatient admission after the June 28 visit. She also reviewed the expert witness reports of Drs. Orban and Smoak. Dr. Saadatmand presented the expert testimony of David Orban, M.D. Dr. Orban practices emergency medicine in the Tampa area. He attended medical school at St. Louis University and completed residencies in orthopedics and emergency medicine. Dr. Orban has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1982 and has been board-certified in emergency medicine since 1981. Before he practiced in Florida, Dr. Orban served as an instructor in surgery at the Washington University School of Medicine, and from 1970 through 1983, was an assistant professor of medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). In that position, he supervised residents in the emergency medicine program and helped to develop the program’s curriculum. Dr. Orban left UCLA in 1983 and moved to Florida, in order to help establish the emergency medicine residency program at the University of Florida. Currently, Dr. Orban is the director of emergency medicine for the University of South Florida (USF), College of Medicine, and the Medical Director Emeritus for the Tampa General Hospital Emergency Room. The USF emergency medicine residency program is a competitive program which receives approximately 1,200 applications each year for ten residency positions. Dr. Orban continues to spend approximately 20-24 hours each week practicing in the emergency room, in addition to his teaching responsibilities. He both sees patients on his own and supervises residents who are seeing patients. He has extensive experience in evaluating non-traumatic abdominal pain in the emergency room.2/ Allegations Related to the Standard of Care Dr. Akkara testified that in her opinion, Dr. Saadatmand’s care and treatment departed from the standard of care in a variety of ways. She agreed that Respondent assessed R.D.’s abdomen, but believed that he erred in not specifically documenting that the abdomen was not tender. In this case, the patient record specifically states, “Abdominal exam: Present: Soft, Normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” In Dr. Akkara’s view, the notes should have been more specific, and she found fault with the fact that the notes did not use the words “tender” or “non-tender.” Dr. Orban, on the other hand, noted that Respondent specifically documented the absence of guarding, rigidity and rebound tenderness, and described the abdomen as “soft, with normal bowel sounds.” Dr. Orban testified that assessing an abdomen for guarding, rigidity, and rebound are all forms of checking for abdominal tenderness. He did not hesitate to interpret Respondent’s medical records for R.D. as reflecting a normal exam, meaning no tenderness was discovered. Dr. Orban’s opinion is supported by the differences in the medical records from R.D.’s June 27 and 28 emergency room visits, and what options are provided in the electronic medical record when a positive finding for tenderness is chosen. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. The Administrative Complaint alleges and Dr. Akkara opined that Respondent departed from the appropriate standard of care by failing to obtain a complete set of normal vital signs before R.D. was discharged from the hospital. The only vital sign that was ever abnormal during R.D.’s June 27 visit was his heart rate, which upon arrival was 127. Respondent rechecked R.D.’s heart rate when he examined him, and upon re-examination it was 90, well within normal limits. Dr. Orban did not believe that the standard of care required the physician, as opposed to possibly supportive staff, to obtain a complete set of vital signs prior to ordering a patient’s discharge. The evidence established that while there is sometimes a nursing standard in emergency rooms requiring a nurse to obtain a second set of vital signs before a patient is discharged, there is no corresponding standard that requires the physician to repeat all of the vitals as well. Dr. Akkara admitted that while she attempts to get a complete set of vital signs before she discharges a patient, she does not always succeed in doing so. The evidence did not demonstrate a departure from the standard of care for not obtaining a second set of vital signs prior to discharge, especially where, as here, all of R.D.’s vital signs were normal when he arrived at the emergency room, except for his heart rate, and Dr. Saadatmand did, in fact, re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent fell below the standard of care by not ordering routine lab work for R.D. The Administrative Complaint does not allege what purpose the routine lab work would serve in the emergency treatment of R.D. Dr. Akkara testified that routine lab work should have been completed before discharge, and that it was a departure from the standard of care not to do so. She stated that the labs were necessary to assess white blood cell count, glucose levels, and kidney function, and in those cases where tenderness was noted in the upper right quadrant of the abdomen, also could indicate issues with the patient’s liver enzymes. Dr. Akkara acknowledged, however, that it is possible for a CBC (complete blood count) to be frequently misleading in patients with abdominal pain, and is often normal with patients with appendicitis. Blood work often cannot distinguish between serious and benign abdominal conditions, and Dr. Akkara admitted that with respect to R.D., given the records from the subsequent admission, any results from a CBC ordered on June 27 would not have altered the treatment of the patient or changed his ultimate outcome. Dr. Orban testified that in the majority of cases where a CBC is ordered in the emergency room, it is not helpful. Ordering a CBC is helpful where a patient has a fever because it would help identify infection, or where a patient appears anemic. Other than those instances, it is not all that useful and is over-utilized. A chemistry panel measures a patient’s serum levels for things like sodium, creatinine, and glucose. Dr. Orban testified that, even with a diabetic patient, unless the patient is experiencing vomiting, mental status changes, blurred vision, frequent urination, or other symptoms associated with diabetes, a blood chemistry panel would not be helpful for assessing a patient with non-traumatic abdominal pain. Records for R.D.’s June 28 visit (the day after Respondent saw R.D.) note that he was diabetic, while the June 27 records do not. However, it was not established that either R.D. or his wife ever told anyone, whether nursing staff or Dr. Saadatmand, that he was diabetic. There is no testimony that his prescription for Metformin was to treat diabetes, as opposed to some other condition, and there was no evidence to indicate that diabetes is the only condition for which Metformin can be prescribed. Dr. Akkara repeatedly referred to R.D.’s diabetes as a basis for her opinions, but never identified the records that formed a basis for her knowledge of R.D.’s diabetic condition. The evidence presented does not establish that ordering a blood chemistry or CBC was required by the appropriate standard of care related to the care and treatment of R.D. in the emergency room on June 27, 2016. Dr. Akkara also testified that Respondent departed from the standard of care by failing to obtain a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. Her opinion is based, at least in part, on her belief that Respondent failed to document that R.D.’s abdomen was non-tender. She agreed with Dr. Orban that if a patient has no abdominal tenderness, then a CT scan is probably not warranted. In addition, Dr. Orban testified credibly that over the last ten years, there has been a trend toward over-utilization of CT scans, with the concomitant increased risk of radiation- induced cancer. In this case, R.D. had reported having a CT scan just weeks before this emergency room visit. His abdomen was not tender. In a case such as this one, where the patient presents with non-traumatic abdominal pain and a normal abdominal examination and no fever, a CT scan is not warranted. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. There is not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the standard of care required Respondent to order a CT scan under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Akkara testified that Respondent also violated the standard of care by not ordering an EKG for R.D. However, she acknowledged that R.D. did not present with any cardiac-related symptoms and denied chest pain. The purpose of an EKG is to explore any cardiac-related symptoms, and R.D. did not present with any. Dr. Akkara did not provide any protocols that dictate when an EKG should be ordered. Dr. Akkara also acknowledged that ordering an EKG would have no impact on the care provided to R.D., and that a patient does not need an EKG just because he or she walks in the emergency room with tachycardia.3/ The Department did not establish that the failure to order an EKG violated the applicable standard of care in this case. The Department also has charged Respondent with failing to arrange for follow-up care and failing to discuss follow-up care, as well as reasons for R.D. to return to the emergency room, if necessary. However, as noted in paragraphs 32-34, Dr. Saadatmand discussed follow-up care with R.D. and told him what circumstances would require a return visit to the emergency room. Dr. Akkara acknowledged that the discharge instructions given to R.D. were adequate. As stated by Dr. Orban, the role of an emergency room physician with regard to the assessment of patients is to identify emergency situations and treat them. Emergency situations are those that are acute, rapidly decompensating, and that require either medical or surgical intervention, with most likely a hospital admission for more definitive care. It is not the emergency physician’s responsibility to manage a patient’s chronic conditions. It is routine to advise patients with non- acute conditions to follow up with their established physicians and to provide written instructions to that effect. Dr. Saadatmand’s actions in providing instructions, both in terms of follow-up and possible return to the emergency room, were consistent with the standard of care. Finally, the Administrative Complaint finds fault with Dr. Saadatmand for not conducting another abdominal examination and not re-assessing R.D.’s vital signs prior to discharge. As noted previously, the only vital sign that was abnormal when R.D. arrived was his heart rate. Respondent did re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge, and it was normal. With respect to a second examination of Respondent’s abdomen, the Department did not establish that one was necessary. Here, Respondent’s initial examination was normal, and there was a reasonable explanation for his discomfort that Respondent believed needed to be addressed before going any further. Dr. Akkara offered no protocol or other authority other than her own clinical experience to support the opinion that serial examinations of the abdomen were required. On the other hand, Dr. Orban testified that where, as here, where the first examination was normal and there was no fever or vomiting, no second examination would be required.4/ Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. In summary, the Department did not establish that Respondent violated the applicable standard of care in his care and treatment of R.D. Further, his medical records, while not perfect, justify the course of treatment provided in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2016.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57456.072456.073456.50458.331766.102766.202
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LINDA MANCINI-TAYLOR vs PINELLAS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL DIRECTOR, 03-001274 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Apr. 08, 2003 Number: 03-001274 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 2003

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner committed the alleged violations and, if so, should her paramedic license be revoked.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed as a paramedic by the City of Gulfport and worked as a paramedic for the Gulfport Fire Department. In this capacity, Petitioner worked under the auspices of the medical director for Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (Pinellas County EMS). Petitioner was a paramedic from 1997 until March 2003. Prior to that time, from 1991 until 1997, she worked as an emergency medical technician (EMT). On February 20, 2003, Petitioner, along with Lt. Brian Campbell and Firefighter/EMT Dennis Jackson, were called to respond to the scene of a shooting. Petitioner was the only paramedic on the scene and, therefore, the only person on the scene certified by the Office of the Medical Director (OMD) to provide advanced cardiac life-saving treatment. Petitioner received the call at 12:22 a.m., and arrived at the patient's side at 12:30 a.m. When Petitioner arrived at the patient's side, she observed a white male, approximately 20 years old, lying on his back in the street. His skin color was ashen, his mouth and eyes were wide open, and his pupils were fixed and dilated. Upon physical examination, Petitioner could not detect a pulse and observed two small holes in the patient's trunk. At that point, Petitioner did not know whether the two holes represented two separate entry wounds or one entry and one exit wound. Petitioner observed a trail of blood, at least a block long, leading to the patient, but there was not a lot of blood around the patient. Petitioner attached an electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor to the patient to monitor the electrical activity of his heart. When Petitioner first turned on the ECG monitor, she observed four ticks of electrical activity within a 14-second span. Petitioner testified that based on her observation and physical examination of the patient, she believed that the electrical activity exhibited on the ECG monitor was not pulseless electrical activity (PEA), but rather "artifact" caused by her manipulation of the patient. Petitioner further testified that, thereupon, she stopped touching the patient and observed that the ECG read-out went mostly flat, showing only occasional ticks. Petitioner testified that these occasional ticks, as observed on the ECG monitor, indicated to her that the patient was in asystole. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner declared the patient dead. After Petitioner declared the patient dead, she prepared a Patient Care Report (Report or Patient Care Report) while still on the scene. In the Report, Petitioner wrote that she found a white male laying on the ground with an apparent small entrance wound in his upper chest and a possible small exit wound near his back rib. She further noted that the patient's temperature was normal, that his eyes were fixed and dilated, that he was not breathing (apneic), and that he had no discernible pulse. Petitioner also noted in the Report that the patient was in asystole within one minute after the ECG pads were attached, but she failed to note the initial four ticks she observed, which may have represented PEA. In the Report, Petitioner noted that at 12:30 p.m., the patient was hooked up to the monitor; at 12:31 p.m., he was asystolic; and at 12:32, she confirmed the patient dead. Upon completing the Report at the fire station, Petitioner attached to the Report the last of several ECG strips she had intermittently printed while at the patient's side. The ECG printout that Petitioner attached to the Report depicted a classic "flat line" indicative of asystole or no electrical activity. Petitioner discarded each of the ECG strips that contained some indicia of electrical activity. A Patient Care Report is a legal document that Petitioner is required to complete by law. By signing the Report, Petitioner acknowledged that the information contained in the Report was true and accurate. Later, on the morning of February 20, 2003, when the employees' shifts at the fire station were changing, Petitioner and Toni Lanahan (Lanahan), a firefighter/paramedic coming on duty, talked about the shooting incident. That such conversation occurred is undisputed. However, there was conflicting testimony as to what Petitioner told Lanahan during that conversation. According to Lanahan, Petitioner told her that when she (Petitioner) arrived at the scene, the patient looked dead but she hooked him up to the ECG monitor, that he had a rhythm but she did not work him, and that she turned off the monitor. Petitioner testified that she did not tell Lanahan that the patient had a heart rhythm, but only that the patient "was dead" and that she did not work him.1 About two hours after her conversation with Petitioner, Lanahan retrieved stored ECG code summary data of the patient described above.2 When Lanahan reviewed the ECG code summary, she saw that the patient had a presenting ECG rhythm showing approximately 40 beats per minute of PEA with gradually slowing PEA for the entire seven minutes depicted in intervals on the ECG summary. Based on her review of the ECG record of the gunshot wound patient, Lanahan believed that in this situation, the OMD protocols mandated that immediate resuscitative treatment be administered. Lanahan then reported these concerns to her emergency medical services (EMS) Coordinator, Lt. Marenkovic, who in turn, reported the incident to Gulfport Fire Chief Brian Brooks. Chief Brooks notified the OMD of the possible violations of its protocols by Petitioner. The OMD initiated an investigation, which included reviewing the written statements of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson; the ECG code summary for the incident; Petitioner's Report; and the transcripts of the sworn interviews of Petitioner, Lt. Campbell, and EMT Jackson taken by the Gulfport Fire Department. After reviewing the above-referenced documents, Dr. Laurie Romig (Dr. Romig), the medical director of the Pinellas County EMS, decided to revoke Petitioner's certification. This decision was based on Dr. Romig's determination of the following: (1) Petitioner violated numerous protocols in the Medical Operations Manual, both administrative and direct patient care protocols; and (2) Petitioner attempted to make the situation appear differently from what it turned out to be, and that, apparently, she did that on purpose. Specifically, Dr. Romig charged Petitioner with violating Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Protocol 2.3, Sections 5 and 6, and Protocol 10.8 and the following Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services Rules and Regulations: Sections XIII-3-b, related to falsification or inappropriate alteration of emergency medical services records; XIII-3-e, related to theft or dishonesty in performance of duty; XIII-3-i, related to demonstrated ability, failure or refusal to adhere to established protocols and standards as established by the authority; and XIII-3-k, related to just cause, including unbecoming behavior or unprofessional conduct reflecting a poor system image. The Pinellas County emergency protocols are written requirements that paramedics must follow when administering emergency treatment to patients. The protocols are published in a document entitled Pinellas County Medical Operations Manual, which is approved by the medical director and distributed to all Pinellas County EMS paramedics. Petitioner received a copy of the most recent medical operations manual in January 2003. EMS Protocol 5.10 prescribes treatment for patients presenting with PEA. As defined in Protocol 5.10, PEA is "any semi-organized electrical activity that can be seen on a monitor screen although the patient lacks a palpable, radial, brachial, or carotid pulse." When PEA is present in a patient, Protocol 5.10 mandates that immediate life-saving treatment be implemented. The patient initially had electrical activity. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not follow Protocol 5.10. According to Petitioner's testimony, she believed that the patient was asystolic and, thus, the protocol related to PEA was inapplicable to the shooting victim. Petitioner's belief was not supported by the ECG report. Protocol 5.4 delineates the procedures to be followed in the treatment of asystole. In the book utilized for Pinellas County EMS paramedic training, "asystole" is defined as a cardiac arrest rhythm associated with no discernible electrical activity on the ECG ("flat line"). Significantly, Protocol 5.4 and Protocol 5.10, discussed in paragraph 21, require that resuscitative efforts be started immediately and that such resuscitative efforts and treatment be terminated by the paramedic only "after 10 minutes of continuous asystolic arrest with appropriate interventions." Even if Petitioner's assertion that the patient was asystolic is accepted, she failed to provide the required resuscitative efforts and/or treatments prescribed by Protocol 5.4. Petitioner did not prematurely terminate resuscitative efforts, she never implemented them. Protocol 5.15 prescribes the treatment and transport considerations for "patients with cardiac arrest secondary to trauma, regardless of presenting cardiac rhythm." The protocol provides that such patients should be transported to the closest hospital emergency facility. Contrary to the requirements in Protocol 5.15, the patient was not transported to a hospital emergency facility. Protocol 2.3 requires paramedics, when possible, to contact and consult with On-line Medical Control (OLMC) in any case in "which a deviation from protocol has been made intentional or otherwise." The OLMC is a system which allows paramedics to contact the OMD and consult with a medical doctor regarding a situation in the field. Petitioner clearly deviated from Protocols 5.4 and/or 5.10, by failing to initiate and implement the resuscitation procedures required by both protocols, and Protocol 5.15, by failing to have the patient transported to a hospital emergency facility, yet she never contacted the OLMC as mandated by Protocol 2.3. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not follow either Protocols 5.4 or 5.10, both of which required immediate resuscitative efforts. Petitioner testified that instead, she followed Protocol 10.8, which provides an exception to the protocols that require initiation of resuscitative efforts. Petitioner contends that Protocol 10.8 provided the basis for her withholding resuscitation from the patient. Protocol 10.8 requires that cardiopulmonary cerebral resuscitation (CPCR) be initiated "in all cases when the patient is found in cardiopulmonary arrest unless one of the exclusion or special situation criteria applies." The exclusion criteria provides that CPCR may be withheld if the patient has, "in conjunction with apnea, pulselessness and asystole on the ECG," an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." If CPCR is withheld, Protocol 10.8 requires that exclusion criteria be fully documented and described. Protocol 10.8 does not define "obviously unsurvivable trauma." However, according to Dr. Romig, the term connotes catastrophic injuries observable by an untrained eye. Dr. Romig, an expert in emergency medicine and traumatic cardiac arrest, testified that nothing about this patient, based on her review of the records and documents, indicated that the patient had suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma." Also, Lt. Campbell, an EMT certified for 12 years, who was at the scene, testified that although the patient "looked dead," he could not say that the patient suffered an "obviously unsurvivable trauma" because the patient showed only a small bullet wound to the chest and a "little bit" of blood on his (the patient's) clothing. The weight of the evidence showed that the patient had not suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma. However, even accepting Petitioner's testimony that she believed that the patient had suffered an obviously unsurvivable trauma, she failed to comply with Protocol 10.8. If Petitioner, in fact, relied on Protocol 10.8 in deciding to not administer CPCR, she was required to document and describe the exclusionary criteria, which was the basis of her decision to withhold CPCR. Petitioner failed to provide any such documentation and, thus, violated Protocol 10.8. In addition to violating the above-noted protocols, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties as a paramedic and also falsified EMS records. The ECG summary showed that despite the patient's having electrical cardiac activity of at least 40 beats, Petitioner turned off the ECG machine and pronounced the patient dead. After pronouncing the patient dead, she then turned the ECG machine on again, and intermittently printed activity on four separate occasions until reaching a reading showing no electrical cardiac activity. By engaging in this conduct, Petitioner was dishonest in the performance of her duties. Paramedics are required to truthfully and accurately complete the Patient Care Records of patients for whom they provide emergency medical services. Here, the ECG summary showed PEA of over 40 beats per minute initially and diminished electrical activity for over eight minutes total, six minutes of which were after Petitioner had already pronounced the patient dead. Petitioner initially saw a rhythm of four beats or ticks in a 14-second period, which was a beat rate of 40 and showed on the ECG strip as 42. Although the initial reading of approximately 40 beats and PEA was clearly visible during the entire nearly eight minutes depicted on the six-second intervals shown on the ECG code summary, this was omitted from Petitioner's Report. Petitioner omitted from the patient's Record the ECG readings that showed electrical activity. Instead, Petitioner reported that at the time she declared the patient dead, he was in "asystole" when, in fact, the ECG summary showed PEA. Moreover, Petitioner documented the Report with an asystole ECG strip reflecting a "flat line" reading printed some six or seven minutes after the reported time of death.3 Petitioner admitted during her sworn statement and at this proceeding that she deliberately did not attach to the Report any part of the ECG strip that reflected the interim electrical activity. Petitioner testified that the ECG strips showing interim electrical activity could raise doubts about the propriety of the treatment she gave this patient in a future criminal trial or other investigation.4 The medical director is required by law to ensure that Pinellas County EMS personnel provide quality care and are not a danger to the safety of the county's citizens, residents, or visitors. Here, Petitioner violated the protocols related to the standard of care for patients and completion of reports and rules and regulations related to dishonesty in the performance of duties and to falsification of records. These infractions are a possible threat to public health and safety of residents of and visitors to Pinellas County. As such, they constitute just cause to conditionally revoke Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. The conditional revocation allows Petitioner to reapply for a paramedic certificate in two years. Such recertification may include a one-year probationary period, with monitoring by the medical director to include a review of all trauma-run reports. Petitioner's Pinellas County Emergency Medical Technician Certification was not revoked and she retains that certification.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Revocation dated March 28, 2003, and upholding revocation of Petitioner's Pinellas County Paramedic Certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2003.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68401.265
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INDIAN RIVER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 97-004794 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Vero Beach, Florida Oct. 15, 1997 Number: 97-004794 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1999

The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.913 Florida Administrative Code (1) 59G-1.010
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