The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of Motor Vehicle Repair, is responsible for enforcement of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act. 737 Trans Service Inc. is a corporation doing business as AAL Transmission World (AAL) at 737 Northwest Sixth Street in Winter Haven, Florida. AAL is registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as a transmission repair shop, registration number MV-13472. Fred Crisante is the president of 737 Transmission Service, Inc. Mr. Crisante signed the Department registration forms for 1994 and 1995. AAL advertised a $14.95 transmission special with a coupon in the local telephone book. The special included a transmission tune-up, including new fluid, cleaning of the pan and screen, replacement of gasket, adjustment of bands and linkage, check of U-joints, a road test, and check for leaks. Several witnesses testified that the reason they brought their vehicles to AAL was because they'd seen the telephone book advertisement for the $14.95 special. In October 1994, Shirley Howland Dominy had her 1988 Chevy towed to AAL. The vehicle was not shifting properly into reverse gear. She had the car taken to AAL for diagnosis of the problem. A few days after the car was towed to AAL, she received a telephone call from a man identified as Larry Brinkman, who told her that the transmission repair would cost $1,577. Mrs. Dominy declined to authorize the repair. When Mrs. Dominy went to AAL to retrieve the car, she was told that she had to pay $189 cash to have the vehicle returned. AAL advertised that cash, credit cards and checks would be accepted. Not having the payment in cash, Mrs. Dominy offered to pay by check or credit card, but was told that cash only was required. Mrs. Dominy obtained the cash and made the payment. She was required to sign an estimate statement indicating she had authorized the work. After she paid the bill and signed the authorization, she received her disassembled transmission in a box. Mrs. Dominy was told by the next repair shop that AAL had not returned all the parts to her transmission. The shop repaired her transmission for $350. In December 1994, Robin Beaumont drove his car to AAL to have his 1991 Plymouth transmission serviced. Mr. Beaumont requested a $14.95 service special which AAL had advertised. Mr. Beaumont had no problems with the transmission when he took the car to AAL. Two weeks previously, the car had been inspected at the dealership and no problems had been reported.. After arriving at AAL, MR. Beaumont met Larry Brinkman who test drove the vehicle before Mr. Beaumont left it at the shop. Mr. Brinkman did not report any problems after the test drive. Mr. Beaumont went to lunch with his wife. A few hours later, he returned to AAL and discovered his transmission had been disassembled. He was shown metal shavings, supposedly from his transmission. Mr. Beaumont had received no written estimate or disclosure prior to the disassembly. He had not authorized the disassembly. Larry Brinkman told Mr. Beaumont that his transmission repairs would cost $1,490. Mr. Beaumont refused to authorize the work and demanded that his transmission be reassembled. Mr. Brinkman then began reducing the charge until he offered to do the work for $900. None of the estimates were reduced to writing. Mr. Beaumont continued to refuse the repair and demand that the transmission be reassembled. Mr. Brinkman took Mr. Beaumont into the office of Fred Crisante. Mr. Crisante eventually offered to do the work for $490. Mr. Beaumont refused to authorize the work. Mr. Beaumont was forced to sign a repair estimate for $490 in order to secure the return of his vehicle. Eventually, Mr. Beaumont paid AAL approximately $460 to have his transmission reassembled. He received no written invoice or parts list. The day after the car was taken to AAL, Mr. Brinkman retrieved the vehicle and began driving. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle broke down, apparently due to a transmission part which was improperly attached. In November 1994, Lucinda Shelby and her husband, Garrett, had their 1987 Oldsmobile towed to AAL. The vehicle transmission was not shifting correctly and a hose appeared to be leaking. A few days after the car was towed, Mr. Shelby received a call from a man identified as Larry Brinkman, who advised that the transmission needed to be disassembled and pressure cleaned at a cost of not more than $350, before the problem could be diagnosed. Mr. Shelby advised the caller to contact his wife when she returned home later that day. When Mrs. Shelby returned home, she contacted AAL and was told that the repair cost would be $1,400. Mrs. Shelby went to the AAL facility and found that the transmission had been disassembled. She was shown a transmission pan and instructed to feel the metal shavings in the pan. She did as she was told, but felt no shavings. Mrs. Shelby declined to pay $1,400 for repair of the vehicle. The Shelbys received no written estimate or disclosure prior to the disassembly of their transmission. Mrs. Shelby was told that it would cost $240 to have the transmission reassembled without repair. She declined to pay the amount. Mrs. Shelby posted a bond with the Polk County Court and had her vehicle returned to her custody. The disassembled transmission was returned to her in a box. Mrs. Shelby eventually had her bond returned to her. The vehicle transmission was repaired at another shop for $829. In November 1994, Hubert Fields took his 1985 Chrysler to AAL after hearing a thumping sound coming from what Mr. Fields believed was the vehicle differential. At AAL, Mr. Fields met Larry Brinkman. Mr. Fields left the vehicle with Mr. Brinkman for diagnosis. When Mr. Fields returned, he was shown sediment, and told that the transmission needed repair. Mr. Fields was given an estimate of $1,198 to repair the vehicle. Mr. Fields authorized the repair. When Mr. Fields returned to AAL to get the vehicle, he did not receive an invoice listing parts replaced or repaired and the cost of such parts. He requested the parts list several times, but it was never received Within five days of retrieving the vehicle from AAL, and while Mr. Fields was driving the vehicle, the transmission failed and had to be replaced by another repair facility. In May 1995, based on consumer complaints, the Department began an investigation in cooperation with the Polk County Sheriff's Department. Investigators obtained a 1987 Lincoln Town Car without transmission problems and in good operating condition. The car was taken to a reputable transmission shop where it was examined. The transmission was disassembled and transmission parts were marked using a metal stamp with the initials ("BB") of the qualified mechanic doing the examination. The transmission was reassembled. On May 31, 1995, the Lincoln Town Car was taken by a civilian employee of the Sheriff's Department to the Respondent's location. The employee wore a body wire. Investigators monitored the conversation. The employee met with Mason Benfield, an AAL service manager, and asked for the $14.95 special and to have the transmission checked. After waiting for a time, Mr. Benfield returned and told the employee that there were metal slivers in her transmission pan, indicative of an internal transmission problem. Mr. Benfield showed a transmission pan to the employee and asked her to feel the metal slivers. He also indicated that the transmission was leaking and needed to be disassembled. Metal slivers or particles in a transmission pan are not unusual and do not indicate existence of transmission problems or the need for repair. The employee left the shop and returned with an investigator, who posed as the employee's brother. Another investigator continued to monitor the listening device. At that time, both the employee and her "brother" were introduced to Fred Crisante. Mr. Crisante took the pair into the shop and told them the transmission required extensive work. According to him, the oil pressure was poor and numerous parts required replacement. The employee authorized the work. On June 1, 1995, the employee returned to the shop to retrieve the vehicle. She paid $1,126.56 for the "repair." She asked for the used parts and was told they'd been discarded. The AAL invoice listed the following parts as having been used in the repair: master overhaul kit without steel plates; pump body with gears or rotor; band front or intermediate; band rear or reverse; small parts kit thrust washers; small parts kit bushings; valve body assembly service and reuse; ATF fluid and gear oil; rebuilt torque converter. The vehicle was immediately driven to the reputable transmission shop where it was originally checked. The transmission was disassembled and transmission parts were examined. The examination revealed the following: used clutches were installed although new ones would have been included in the master overhaul kit; the pump body and stator (which is bolted to the pump body) were the originals marked BB and had not been replaced; the band front or intermediate was marked "BB" and had not been replaced; and the band rear or reverse was a used, rather than new, part. The torque converter did not need rebuilding. The thrust washers and bushings did not need replacement. The transmission did not need to be rebuilt. There were no problems with the vehicle prior to being taken to AAL. The Petitioner presented testimony and evidence related to additional transactions between the Respondent and Sharon Gutterson, Robert Wilkes, Frances Wright and Darlene Smith. The additional evidence establishes that the incidents identified herein were not caused by mistake or accident, but were part of the plan of operation for the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order revoking the Respondent's registration number MV-13472 as a motor vehicle repair shop DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1996 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5030 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 9. Rejected as to reference to AAL facilities not charged in the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding. 37-46. Rejected, subordinate. 67. Rejected as witness recollection of others shown metal shavings, cumulative. 74. Rejected, hearsay. 89-94. Rejected, subordinate. 105-123. Rejected, subordinate. Respondent The Respondent did not submit a proposed recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Lawrence Davis, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John Woodward, Esquire 320 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite A-6 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Tony Meehan's Auto Repair, Inc., is a Florida corporation doing business as Burnie's Auto Service. Essentially, it is the family business of a man and woman who are husband and wife, Anthony and Cheryl Meehan. Before moving to Florida to begin doing business as Burnie's Auto Service, the Meehans lived in New Jersey. In New Jersey, Anthony Meehan worked as an auto mechanic for approximately 15 years. He is an ASE-certified master mechanic and also holds several other auto mechanic and repair competency certifications. Prior to leaving New Jersey, he was half owner of a small auto repair business. He and his partner did all of the work in the two-bay shop. Over the years, he built up a $15,000 equity in the business. In addition, he had an auto repair manual worth about $30, which he planned to contribute to the new business, and he had his own personal tool box worth about $10,000 to $15,000, which he planned to use in connection with the operation of the business. Cheryl Meehan was not in the auto repair business in New Jersey. She worked for several different employers in an office administrator capacity. In her most responsible position, she essentially reported to a business executive daily and received daily assignments. During her employment, the company grew. Cheryl was exposed to, and gained valuable experience, in several areas of bookkeeping, accounting, banking, finance and personnel matters. Burnie's Auto Service was a relatively large ongoing auto repair business in Tampa, Florida. It had five employees and 14 work bays. In approximately September, 1989, the Meehans negotiated to buy the business for $275,000, $50,000 down and the balance amortized over a period of years at ten percent interest. The seller took back a purchase money mortgage on the business property to secure payment of the balance. Both of the Meehans are liable, jointly and severally, on the note and mortgage to the seller. The Meehans used the $15,000 Tony got for the sale of his interest in his New Jersey auto repair business as part of the down payment. In addition, they used a certificate of deposit in the amount of approximately $30,000. The CD had been obtained by use of funds that had been paid to Cheryl before their marriage as a result of a personal injury lawsuit. It is not clear whether the CD was held solely in Cheryl's name or in the names of both of the Meehans. In addition, $10,000 from the sale of Cheryl's automobile also went towards the purchase of the business. It was not clear from the evidence whether the automobile was titled in the name of Cheryl only, or in the name of both of the Meehans. Nor is it clear whether the automobile was purchased by Cheryl before the marriage. The purchase of the business was to close in November, 1989, but the closing was postponed to January, 1990. The Meehans incorporated Tony Meehan's Auto Repair, Inc., as a Florida corporation on or about December 20, 1989. The Meehans were named as the sole members of the initial board of directors of the corporation. The Meehans moved to Tampa on Christmas day, 1989. The initial meeting of the board of directors of Tony Meehan's Auto Repair, Inc., was held on December 28, 1989. At the meeting, the Meehans were confirmed as the sole members of the board of directors. Tony was named chairman of the board, and Cheryl was named secretary. 500 shares of stock were issued, all to "Anthony R. Meehan and Cheryl A. Meehan, husband and wife." In addition, Tony was made president of the corporation, and Cheryl was made secretary/treasurer. When the Meehans took over the business, they decided to keep the shop foreman, master mechanic and two auto mechanics already employed there. They decided to use suppliers Tony had used when he was in business in New Jersey. They decided to contract out towing and transmission service to companies in Land O' Lakes, Florida. These were joint decisions based in large part on Tony's expertise. Cheryl has practically no training or experience in auto mechanics or auto repairs. She has no auto mechanic certifications. She has only recently begun to learn something about auto mechanics and about how to do certain auto repairs. Hiring and firing continued to be joint decisions made by the two of them. To the extent that they were made based on an evaluation of the employee's skills in auto mechanics, they were based in large part on Tony's expertise. Since the beginning of the business, they have had to fire one employee, and they have hired two. Tony's primary role in the daily operations of the business is to generally supervise the quality and efficiency of the auto repair work. He also sometimes diagnoses (or helps diagnose) mechanical problems, directs (or helps direct) the performance of repairs, and test drives vehicles after repairs are done. In connection with these functions, he sometimes orders (or directs the ordering of) parts. Sometimes, he will estimate repair costs. Cheryl is the office administrator for the business. In this role, she handles all bookkeeping, accounting, banking, payroll and personnel matter details. She often bills jobs and operates the business cash register. She physically places orders for parts, at the direction of Tony or the employees, and pays for them. She generally will not countermand a parts order but may ask her husband or, if he is not there, the master mechanic to verify an order if she questions it. She makes sure parts get billed. As she became more familiar with the auto repair business, she began to estimate some jobs by reference to standard estimates manuals and was able to say which parts would have to be ordered for some jobs. The corporation opened a business bank account with a local bank. Both Cheryl and Tony have signature authority on the account. Cheryl writes virtually all checks on the account and does all the banking. Tony only writes a check on the account on the rare occasions when Cheryl is not available when one has to be written. Initially, the Meehans decided that Tony would be paid approximately $700 a week and that Cheryl would be paid approximately $300 to $350 a week. Tony did not have as much Social Security credit as Cheryl from their work in New Jersey, and they wanted to try to equalize their credits. Otherwise, as a practical matter, the relative size of their salaries did not matter to the Meehans. Cheryl deposited both checks into their joint personal bank account for the use of both of them, as needed. The business pays for a $200,000 whole life insurance policy on the life of Cheryl, and one on the life of Tony. It is not clear from the evidence who are the beneficiaries under those policies. The business also pays for a $2 million major medical insurance policy for Cheryl, and one for Tony. As the business continued, Cheryl assumed increasing duties and responsibilities, and Tony assumed fewer. Cheryl worked harder, and Tony worked less. Also, Cheryl's mother persuaded Cheryl that she should have a greater share of the equity in the business to reflect her greater initial financial contribution. Tony agreed. In January, 1991, additional stock in the company was issued. 135 shares went to Cheryl and 65 went to Tony. No changes were made in the constitution of the board of directors or in the officers of the corporation at that time. Tony Meehan's Auto Repair, Inc., d/b/a Burnie's Auto Service, applied to the Department 3/ for certification as a minority business enterprise on or about May 13, 1992. By letter dated September 16, 1992, the Department denied the application. The denial was based, in part, on the Department's determinations (1) that Cheryl's compensation was not commensurate with her ownership interest in the business and (2) that minorities (i.e., Cheryl) did not make up more than 50 percent of the board of directors. In reaction to the denial letter, and to improve their company's chances of being certified as a minority business enterprise, the Meehans decided to alter their respective salaries. Starting no earlier than December, 1992, Cheryl has been paid $725 a week, and Tony has been paid $450 a week. As before, as a practical matter, except for the Social Security credit, the relative size of their salaries does not matter to the Meehans. Cheryl deposits both checks into their joint personal bank account for the use of both of them, as needed. Also in reaction to the denial letter, and to improve their company's chances of being certified as a minority business enterprise, the Meehans met as the board of directors on or about March 18, 1993, to change the constitution of the board of directors and to change the officers of the corporation. They made Cheryl the chairman and sole member of the board of directors, and the president of the corporation. They made Tony the vice-president, secretary, and treasurer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a final order denying the application of Tony Meehan's Auto Repair, Inc., d/b/a Burnie's Auto Service, for certification as a minority business enterprise. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1993.
The Issue 1. Whether the applications which are the subjects of DOAH Case Nos. 96-4970 and 96-4971 should be granted. 2a. Whether the respondents in DOAH Case No. 96-5525 committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued in that case. 2b. If so, what sanctions should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency, which, among other things issues motor vehicle retail installment seller (MVRIS) licenses. Jack Bowshier Buick-Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc. (Bowshier Buick) is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. Bowshier Buick formerly operated an automobile dealership at 2445 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart, Florida, and held a MVRIS license issued by the Department. At all times material to the instant cases, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., in his capacity as owner/director/president, and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., in his capacity as general manager/director, exercised control over the policies and practices of Bowshier Buick. On or about October 25, 1995, the Department began an investigation into the business affairs of Bowshier Buick. The Department's investigation revealed, among other things, that Bowshier Buick engaged in the practice of reselling "trade-ins" without timely satisfying the existing liens on the vehicles. Such practice, which was the product of cash flow problems the dealership was experiencing, adversely affected the credit ratings of those who had "traded-in" these vehicles and prevented the ultimate purchasers of the vehicles from timely obtaining new certificates of title. In the "deal jackets" that the dealership created to place the paperwork relating to the transactions involving these "traded-in" vehicles, the Department's investigators found copies of checks which were made payable to those who held the liens on these "trade-in" vehicles. The investigators subsequently discovered, however, that these checks had not been timely sent to the lienholders, but instead had been placed in the desk drawer of the dealership's office manager, Christine Casale. On several occasions, when customers who had "traded-in" vehicles complained to the dealership that the liens on their vehicles had not been satisfied, they were told by Casale that the checks to satisfy the liens had been mailed to the lienholders, when in fact they had not been. Such misrepresentations were made in an effort to mislead and deceive these complaining customers. In making these fraudulent misrepresentations, Casale acted pursuant to instructions that had been given to her by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr. On November 3, 1995, the Department issued an Emergency Immediate Temporary Final Order to Cease and Desist and Suspension of [Bowshier Buick's] Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License (Emergency Order) in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195. Bowshier Buick, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., were named as respondents in the Emergency Order. The Department alleged in the Emergency Order that they had committed the following violations of the law for which they are subject to the penalties as set forth in Section 520.995, Florida Statutes: Violation of Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes, in that they have perpetrated fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or gross negligence in retail installment transactions, regardless of reliance by or damage to the buyer. Violation of Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes, in that they have committed criminal conduct in the course of their Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sellers business. Violation of Section 520.995(3)(d), Florida Statutes, in that they have demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility. On November 13, 1995, an Administrative Complaint for Imposition of Sanctions was filed against Bowshier Buick, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr. Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., subsequently engaged in negotiations with William Chamberlain, the owner and president of WAFC Holdings, Inc. (WAFC) concerning the sale of the assets of Bowshier Buick to WAFC in return for, among other things, the assets of two Chamberlain-owned corporations, South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., d/b/a Palm Beach Motors, and Stuart Motors, Inc., d/b/a Stuart Motors, that were in the business of selling pre- owned motor vehicles in the West Palm Beach and Stuart areas, respectively. On December 5, 1995, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Chamberlain signed paperwork (Sale/Purchase Agreements) in which their corporations agreed to consummate such a transaction. On that same date, they also, on behalf of their corporations, executed Interim Management Agreements, pursuant to which WAFC took over the management of Bowshier Buick's dealership at 2445 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart and Bowshier Buick assumed responsibility for the management of Palm Beach Motors and Stuart Motors, effective December 5, 1995. Later that month, WPAS, Inc. (WPAS) and DAB, Inc. (DAB) were formed. At all times material to the instant case, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., has been the sole owner, president and director of WPAS, and, as such, has directed the operations of the corporation. At all times material to the instant case, WPAS maintained its principal place of business at 2815 Okeechobee Boulevard in West Palm Beach, the location of Palm Beach Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., was the general manager of Palm Beach Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., has been the sole owner, president and director of DAB, and, as such, has directed the operations of the corporation At all times material to the instant case, DAB has maintained its principal place of business at 2695 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart, the location of Stuart Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Todd Bowshier, has been the general manager of Stuart Motors. A Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195 (Stipulation) was executed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., on behalf of Bowshier Buick and on his own behalf, and by Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., on January 31, 1996, and by Thomas Stouffer, the Regional Director of the Department's Southeast Florida Regional Office, on behalf of the Department, on February 2, 1996. It provided as follows: The State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (hereinafter "Department"), and Respondents Jack Bowshier Buick-Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc. (hereinafter "Bowshier Buick"), Jack A. Bowshier (hereinafter "JA Bowshier"), and Jack D. Bowshier (hereinafter "JD Bowshier"), in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained and other good and valuable consideration hereby agree to enter into this Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order as follows: At all times material hereto Bowshier Buick has been a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 2445 SE Federal Highway, Stuart, FL 34994. On or about December 25, 1988 Bowshier Buick was issued a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License by the Department, which remains active to date. At all times material hereto JA Bowshier has been a Director, owner and control person of Bowshier Buick. In these capacities JA Bowshier creates, controls, formulates, directs and personally participates in the acts, practices and affairs of Bowshier Buick. At all times material hereto JD Bowshier has been a Director and General Manager of Bowshier Buick. In these capacities JD Bowshier creates, controls, formulates, directs and personally participates in the acts, practices and affairs of Bowshier Buick. On or about October 25, 1995, the Department received information that it believed indicated that Bowshier Buick had accepted motor vehicles as "trade-ins" and resold these vehicles without first satisfying their existing liens. The Department was concerned that purchasers of these motor vehicles could not be issued Certificates of Title. As a result of this information, Department examiners/investigators, on three occasions, visited Bowshier Buick's principal office pursuant to Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. They concluded that Bowshier Buick was engaging in acts and/or practices constituting violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. On November 3, 1995, the Department filed an Emergency Immediate Temporary Final Order to Cease and Desist and Suspension of Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License (hereinafter "Emergency Order") which was followed, on November 13, 1995, with an Administrative Complaint for Imposition of Sanctions and Notice of Rights (hereinafter "Complaint"). Respondents agree that they have been duly served with both the Emergency Order and Complaint and that the Department has jurisdiction over them and this case. The Department agrees that Respondents timely filed their Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Petition for Formal Proceedings in response to the Complaint. The Department herein makes the following findings of fact, upon which the penalties imposed are based, but which findings Respondents neither admit nor deny: There were approximately thirty trade-ins taken by Bowshier Buick for which the dealership had not satisfied existing liens. Some of these vehicles were resold without first satisfying their existing liens. Some customers who traded in their motor vehicles suffered adverse credit ratings because of the failure of Bowshier Buick to pay off the existing lienholders. Bowshier Buick was experiencing severe cash flow problems. For the month of September, Bowshier Buick incurred a monthly bank charge of $5,000 for dealership bank overdrafts. A total estimated amount of $125,000 in outstanding insufficient funds checks was evident as of November, 1995. Bowshier Buick did not remit premiums collected to the insurance company for credit life, accident & health insurance policies which had been purchased by Bowshier Buick customers. They had not forwarded said premiums for policies purchased by customers since January, 1995. Bowshier Buick records were misleading in that copies of checks made payable to lienholders and in the amount due to satisfy liens were contained within the files for months, when the checks were never delivered and/or funds were never disbursed to the payee. Respondents maintain that subsequent to the Department's filing of its Emergency Order, Bowshier Buick has cooperated with the Department to resolve the lien, title, and premium problems. In an effort to avoid litigation and costs associated therewith, the Department and Respondents now voluntarily agree to enter into this Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order (hereinafter "Stipulation") addressing the violations raised by the Emergency Order and the Complaint. The Respondents and the Department agree as follows: Respondents will bring and keep all books and records up to date and maintain them accurately and in compliance with the law. Respondents will maintain and keep current all forms required by the automobile dealer's manual, Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department, including the title log. Respondents will keep all title work and registrations current and in compliance with the law. Respondents will write any and all insurance policies and remit all premiums in compliance with the law, including but not limited to credit life, accident and health insurance. Respondents will dismiss with prejudice any and all actions pending in Circuit Court and the District Court of Appeal, not file any further actions in any court which in any fashion or respect arise or tend to arise out of the facts presented by the Emergency Order or the Complaint (see paragraph 6 herein) and, indemnify and hold the Department harmless if such further actions are filed. Respondents shall, within 30 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, reimburse any and all customers who made payment(s) on past due liens which they did not owe. Within 45 days, verifiable proof of reimbursement shall be provided to the Department. Respondent shall, within 90 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, assist any and all customers who have been affected by Respondents untimely payment of liens in repairing their credit. Their assistance shall include, but shall not be limited to, sending letters to lenders wherein Respondents assume all responsibility for the late lien payments. Within 105 days, verifiable proof of such assistance shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall, within 30 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, reimburse any and all customers due refunds on credit life, accident and health insurance. Within 45 days, verifiable proof of such assistance shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall, immediately upon execution of this stipulation, pay off any and all outstanding past due customer liens, as well as all liens that have been improperly levied upon customers. Upon repayment, verifiable proof thereof shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall operate the dealership, at all times in compliance with the law. Respondents shall pay to the Department by cashiers check, within 30 days of the date of execution of this stipulation, $5,000, representing costs of the Department's examination/investigation in this case. Respondents agree to sell Bowshier Buick to WAFC Holdings, Inc., its agents, nominees or assigns. If the sale is cancelled or not consummated within 6 months from the date of the Final Order herein, for any reason: 1.) Respondents will immediately notify the Department, Diane Leeds, Esq., in writing via certified mail, return receipt requested, of that fact. 2.) Respondents' Departmental license(s) shall be placed upon and remain on probation for a period of three (3) years, commencing on the date the sale is cancelled or not consummated. For the duration of the probationary period, Respondents agree to: Provide the Department, on a monthly basis, prior to the 10th day of each month, a copy of the dealership "finance log" attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A." Allow the Department to make unannounced visits to the dealership, as frequently as the Department deems necessary, to assure that Respondents are operating in compliance with the law. Prior to the termination of the probationary period the dealership shall have, in reserve, a minimum of three (3) weeks supply of operating capital, to be computed based upon the operating expenses of the dealership at that time, and provide verifiable proof thereof to the Department. The Final Order incorporating the terms of this stipulation constitutes final agency action by the Department for which the Department may seek enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapters 120 and 520, Florida Statutes, and Respondents knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive any right to: 1. A formal hearing; 2. To contest the finality of the Final Order; 3. To contest the validity of any term, condition, obligation or duty created hereby; 4. To separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and 5. To administrative or judicial review hereof. Respondents acknowledge, concur and stipulate that their failure to comply with any of the terms, obligations and conditions of this stipulation and the Final Order adopting it, shall result in their being deemed to be in violation of a written agreement and Final Order issued pursuant to the provisions of Chapters 120 and 520, Florida Statutes, and Respondents stipulate and agree to the issuance of an emergency suspension of their license(s) and a cease and desist order. Respondents waive all rights to prior notice and hearing before entry of such order. However, nothing herein limits Respondents' right to contest any finding or determination made by the Department concerning their alleged failure to comply with any of the terms and provisions of this stipulation or of the Final Order. Respondents waive and release the Department and its agents, representatives, and employees from any and all causes of action they may have including without limitations, any right to attorney fees arising out of this proceeding; libel; slander; violation of a constitutionally protected right; intentional tortious interference with advantageous contractual relationship and the like; arising prior to or out of the filing of the Complaint, Emergency Order, the execution of the stipulation and entry of the Final Order. The Department agrees to accept this release without acknowledging, and expressly denies, that any such causes of action may exist. Respondents further agree that nothing contained herein shall be construed to waive or restrict the Department's right to initiate any legal action based upon facts or information which come to the Department's attention subsequent to the execution of this stipulation and the Department further agrees that nothing contained herein shall be construed to waive or restrict the Respondents' rights to defend any subsequent legal action. The Department and Respondents each agree to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this proceeding and entry of the Final Order, except as stated in paragraph 11k. herein. The Department and Respondents represent that the officer(s) executing this stipulation are authorized to act on behalf of the corporations and agency for settlement purposes. The Department and Respondents acknowledge that they have read this stipulation and fully understand the rights, obligations, terms, conditions, duties, and responsibilities with respect to its contents. Execution of this stipulation by the Department shall not be construed as a final acceptance of its terms and conditions absent entry of a Final Order by the Comptroller adopting same, however, the existing Emergency Order shall be null and void immediately upon entry of the Final Order by the Comptroller. The undersigned parties hereby acknowledge and agree to the terms and conditions of the foregoing stipulation by written consent on the last date executed below, subject to final approval by the Comptroller. On February 16, 1996, a Final Order was issued in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195 adopting the parties' Stipulation and requiring the parties to comply with the Stipulation's terms and conditions. The purchases of the assets of Bowshier Buick, South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., and Stuart Motors, Inc., were finalized in March of 1996. On March 18, 1996, WPAS filed with the Department an Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License (WPAS's Application). In its Application, WPAS indicated that it was doing business as Palm Beach Motors at 2815 Okeechobee Boulevard in West Palm Beach. In response to Question 10 on the application form, which read as follows, WPAS answered "yes" and appended to its completed Application a copy of the Stipulation filed in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F- 11/95, and 4287b-F-1195: Has the applicant, any of the persons listed herein, or any person with power to direct the management or policies of the applicant had a license, registration, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against? Yes No (If yes, list such persons, give details, and provide a copy of the allegations and documentation of the final disposition of the case.) WPAS's Application was signed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr. On April 8, 1996, DAB filed with the Department an Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License (DAB's Application). In its Application, which was signed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., DAB indicated that it was doing business as Stuart Motors at 2695 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart. In response to Question 10 on the application form, DAB mistakenly answered "no." Neither a copy of the Stipulation filed in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195, nor a copy of the Final Order entered in these proceedings, was appended to DAB's completed Application. The Department granted DAB's Application and issued DAB a MVRIS license, effective April 11, 1996. On May 1, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., sent the following letter to the Department: I am voluntarily surrendering my license from the Department of Banking and Finance issued to DAB, Inc., D/B/A Stuart Motors to you today due to the fact that we have made an honest mistake in the application for the license. I apologize for this mistake. I am reapplying for the license for this corporation. I ask that you please reconsider your position. On that same day, May 1, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., on behalf of WPAS, and William Chamberlain, on behalf of South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., executed an agreement (WPAS Use of License Agreement), which provided as follows: AGREEMENT made this 1st day of May, 1996 by and between SOUTH FLORIDA AUTO EXCHANGE, INC., DBA PALM BEACH MOTORS, INC., a Florida corporation ("PBM") AND WPAS, INC., a Florida corporation ("Operator"). WHEREAS, PBM and Operator, or Operator's affiliate, entered into an agreement for sale and purchase of assets dated December 5, 1995 (the "Asset Purchase Agreement") for the purchase and sale of certain assets of PBM located at 2815 Okeechobee Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida (the "Dealership"); and WHEREAS, PBM and Operator closed on the sale and purchase on or about the 19th day of March, 1996; and WHEREAS, Operator has submitted an application (the "Application") to the State of Florida, Comptroller's Office, Department of Banking (the "Department") for a license to originate financing in connection with the sale of automobiles at the Dealership, which Application remains pending with the Department; and WHEREAS, Operator has not yet received a license from the Department pursuant to the Application; and WHEREAS, Operator has requested PBM to allow Operator to continue to use PBM's license (the "PBM License") from the Department at the Dealership pending the Department's action on Operator's Application; and WHEREAS, PBM, after obtaining the verbal approval of the Department, has agreed to allow Operator to utilize PBM['s] License at the Dealership on a temporary basis. NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of Ten dollars ($10.00) paid by Operator to PBM, as well as other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged by PBM, the parties agree as follows: The foregoing recitals are true and correct and incorporated herein by reference. PBM hereby authorizes Operator to originate finance paper under the PBM license at the Dealership until the earlier of: PBM notice to Operator of the revocation of such authority, which notice may be given [by] PBM, in PBM's sole and absolute discretion, at any time upon three (3) days prior notice to Operator, upon the Department's disposition of Operator's application, whether such disposition is a granting of a license or the denial of a license, any demand by the Department that Operator cease the use of the PBM license, upon the infraction of any rule or regulation by Operator applicable to the PBM License. Operator agrees to utilize the PBM License only in strict compliance of all applicable rules and regulations, including, but not limited to the rules and regulations of the Department. Operator does hereby agree to indemnify and hold PBM harmless against any claim arising out of the Dealership or Operator's use of the PBM License. This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties and may not be changed or modified orally, but only by written instrument signed by the parties hereto. Any notice required or permitted to be given under this Agreement shall be in writing, delivered by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by a national overnight courier service, such as Federal Express, and mailed to the parties at the following address: PBM: c/o Stuart Buick Pontiac GMC 2445 S.E. Federal Highway Stuart, Florida 34994 Operator: 2815 Okeechobee Blvd. West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 This agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their successors and assigns. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida. In the event litigation is instituted in connection with the enforcement of the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees, including attorneys fees and costs on appeal. The "PBM License" referenced in the WPAS Use of License Agreement had an "expiration date" of December 31, 1996. An agreement between DAB and Stuart Motors, Inc. (DAB Use of License Agreement) containing provisions substantially identical to those in the WPAS Use of License Agreement was executed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr. (on behalf of DAB) and Chamberlain (on behalf of Stuart Motors, Inc.) also on May 1, 1996. The MVRIS license which was the subject of the DAB Use of License Agreement, like the "PBM License," had an expiration date of December 31, 1996. The WPAS and DAB Use of License Agreements were both drafted by Chamberlain's attorney, Michael Botos. Before drafting these agreements, Botos had spoken to Diane Leeds, an attorney with the Department. Botos erroneously believed that Leeds, acting on behalf of the Department, had given the "verbal approval" referenced in the agreements. On May 6, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., filed a corrected Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License on behalf of DAB (DAB's Second Application). Department investigators visited Palm Beach Motors on July 19, 1996. They discovered, from an examination of WPAS's records, that WPAS (acting through Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., the general manager of Palm Beach Motors) had been involved in retail installment transactions with retail buyers of its vehicles, notwithstanding that it did not have a license from the Department authorizing it to engage in such activity. Ten retail installment contracts (signed by Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., on behalf of WPAS) were found and reviewed. In four of these ten retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate in excess of 18 percent per annum. By letter mailed on July 19, 1996, the Department notified WPAS of its intention to deny WPAS's Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its notice, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, WPAS's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes. Department investigators visited Stuart Motors on July 22, 1996. They discovered, from an examination of DAB's records, that DAB (acting through Todd Bowshier, the general manager of Stuart Motors) had been involved in retail installment transactions with retail buyers of its vehicles, notwithstanding that it did not have a license from the Department authorizing it to engage in such activity. Ten retail installment contracts (signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB) were found and reviewed. In all of these ten retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of 19.95 percent per annum. On or about July 26, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., met with Department representatives, including Diane Leeds, to discuss the Department's proposed action. At the meeting, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., was told that "he could not finance without a license at that time under anybody's license." Nonetheless, following the meeting, WPAS (doing business as Palm Beach Motors) and DAB (doing business as Stuart Motors), relying on the legal advice of their attorney (and acting through their general managers), continued to operate as motor vehicle retail installment sellers without having MVRIS licenses of their own (as they had done since May of that year, following the execution of the WPAS and DAB Use of License Agreements). In addition, they continued to knowingly charge buyers simple interest rates in excess of 18 percent per annum. Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., was at all material times aware of these activities, which continued at Palm Beach Motors until approximately September or October of 1996, when the used car operation was sold,1 and continued at Stuart Motors until early 1997. By letter mailed on October 1, 1996, the Department notified DAB of its intention to deny DAB's Second Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its notice, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, DAB's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes. Department investigators returned to Stuart Motors on October 6, 1996, to examine DAB's records. Their examination revealed nine retail installment contracts that DAB had entered into since the investigators' July 22, 1996, visit. These contracts were signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB. In all but one of these retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of more than 18 percent per annum. In late January of 1997, personnel from the Office of the State Attorney, 19th Judicial Circuit, assisted by Department personnel, conducted a search (pursuant to a search warrant) of the records maintained by DAB at Stuart Motors. Sixty-four retail installment contracts (signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB) that DAB had entered into from August 10, 1996, to January 25, 1997, (including eight of the nine contracts that Department investigators had discovered during their October 6, 1996, visit to Stuart Motors) were seized. Thirty-seven of these 64 retail installment transactions took place from August 10, 1996, to October 16, 1996. In all but one of these 37 transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of more than 18 percent per annum. In all of the post-October 16, 1996, transactions (including eight which occurred after the expiration of the MVRIS license which was the subject of the DAB Use of License Agreement), the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of 17.99 percent. It was not until the Bowshiers received a copy of the following letter, dated February 13, 1997, the Office of the State Attorney, 19th Judicial Circuit, sent to the Department regarding the "Jack Bowshier investigation" that DAB stopped engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller: This letter is in response to your investigation of DAB, Inc. d/b/a Stuart Motors etc. As you are aware I have spent the last three weeks reviewing the events between your Department, which began on March 18, 1996, and the above named suspect. It is apparent from the outset of your investigation that Mr. Bowshier and associates have done everything in their power to continue operating a business and finance automobiles without the appropriate Retail Installment Sellers license. However, it is my opinion that I would have insurmountable proof problems in a criminal prosecution based on the events that have occurred to date. Mr. Bowshier maintains that he can continue writing installment loan contracts because the validity of the denial of his application continues to be the subject of litigation. Mr. Bowshier continues to suggest that this is his position at the advi[c]e of his attorney, Mr. Ronald LaFace. After speaking with Mr. LaFace regarding the above I can see why the suspect would reasonably rely on his attorney's advice. Even to me, Mr. LaFace continues to maintain the position that the denial of the licensure application is "nonfinal." While we know this position is irrelevant to both the Department of Banking and Finance, and the criminal prosecution, it still creates the appearance of a defense which would remove the "criminal intent" aspect of our case. I have an ethical obligation to only prosecute cases in which I believe, based on my training and experience, there is a reasonable chance for a conviction at trial. Because this case has become so diluted in "my attorney told me" and "my understanding was . . .," I cannot ethically go forward with a criminal prosecution and still meet my burden of proof at trial. However, I understand the frustration in wanting to go forward in a case of this nature. With that in mind this letter will serve two purposes. While my declination to prosecute this case up through the date of this letter is final, it is not absolute. This letter will be sent to both Mr. Bowshier (and associates) and Mr. Ronald LaFace. In doing so, it will serve a very particular purpose. It will inform the above (including Mr. LaFace), that I will not prosecute the criminal acts that Mr. Bowshier and associates have committed to date because of the above explained proof problems. However, I will prosecute from this date forward any and all financing that occur[s] by the suspect and his associates without a license. I should make it perfectly clear to Mr. Bowshier and his attorney that it does not matter what their position is regarding the "appeal" of the denial of license, they cannot finance automobiles. Mr. Bowshier and associates should also know that the advice of their attorney to continue writing contracts during the pendency of the licensure "appeal" is wrong. If the suspect and his associates continue to write contracts, it will constitute a criminal act despite the advice of his attorney. I will prosecute Mr. Bowshier and associates if he continues to write contracts without the appropriate licenses pr[e]scribe[d] by law. The "appeal" referenced in the letter was taken after the Department, by letter mailed October 1, 1996, advised DAB of its intention to deny DAB's Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its letter, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, DAB's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the Bowshiers guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; (2) directing the Bowshiers to cease and desist from committing such violations; (3) imposing jointly and severally upon WPAS, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., an administrative fine in the amount of $7,000.00; (4) imposing jointly and severally upon DAB, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Todd Bowshier an administrative fine in the amount of $61,500.00; and (5) denying WPAS's and DAB's applications for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed the offenses described in an Administrative Complaint entered by Petitioner on or about January 10, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for enforcing the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Respondent, Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Adam's Street Muffler"), is a dissolved Florida corporation. Adam's Street Muffler is located at 1401 South Adam's Street, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Adam's Street Muffler is registered with the Department under the Act as a motor vehicle repair shop. The Department has assigned registration number MV-15484 to Adam's Street Muffler. Respondent, Tim Tanner, is the owner and operator of Adam's Street Muffler. At the time that Adam's Street Muffler register pursuant to the Act, a registration packet, including a copy of the Act, was provided to Adam's Street Muffler. On July 24, 1995, Robert Dan Drake, an investigator with the Department's Bureau of Motor Vehicle Repair, went to Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake performed a compliance audit to determine whether repair estimate statements and invoices for services were in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. A copy of the repair invoice provided by Adam's Street Muffler personnel to Mr. Drake was determined not to be in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9. Mr. Drake discussed the requirements of the Act pertaining to repair estimates and invoices with Peggy Folsom, the secretary for Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake also provided an On-Site Inspection Report/Citation (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), and a Compliance Checklist/Citation (Petitioner's Exhibit 8), to Ms. Folsom. These forms described the deficiencies with the repair estimate and invoice form being used by Adam's Street Muffler. Adam's Street Muffler was given thirty days to correct the repair estimate and invoice. A revised form was submitted to the Department. See Petitioner's Exhibit 10. The corrected form was accepted by the Department. On July 1, 1996, Mr. Drake returned to Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake discovered that the repair estimate and invoice used by Adam's Street Muffler for a complaining customer was the same form that he had found to be deficient on July 24, 1995. See Petitioner's Exhibit 12. Mr. Drake issued a second On-Site Inspection Report/Citation to Adam's Street Muffler as a result of the July 1, 1996 visit. Petitioner's Exhibit 11. The report again described the specific deficiencies with the repair estimate and invoice form being used by Adam's Street Muffler. On October 1, 1996, Mr. Tanner paid a $300.00 fine for violating Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. On December 1, 1996, two months after Mr. Tanner paid the fine, and approximately six months after the second violation of the Act, Dan Keller, an employee of the Department, visited Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Keller examined forms titled "Repair Orders" in the files of Adam's Street Muffler. The forms discovered by Mr. Keller were determined not to be in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5. The forms copied by Mr. Keller on December 1, 1996, were used as repair estimates and invoices for services performed. The evidence failed to prove when the vehicles at issue were brought to Adam's Street Muffler, that they were not brought to Adam's Street Muffler by person other than the owner, or that Adam's Street Muffler did not notify the customer pursuant to Section 559.909(1), Florida Statutes. None of the owners of the vehicles to which Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 relate have filed a complaint with the Department concerning work performed by Adam's Street Muffler. The repairs evidence by Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 were for repair work costing in excess of $50.00. The forms taken from Adam's Street Muffler on July 24, 1995, July 1, 1996, and December 1, 1996 are incorporated into this Recommended Order by reference. On or about January 10, 1997, the Department entered an Administrative Complaint against Adam's Street Muffler and Mr. Tanner. The Administrative Complaint contains two counts against Respondents: one for alleged violations of Section 559.905, Florida Statutes, and one for alleged violations of Section 559.911, Florida Statutes. Both counts relate the forms obtained by the Department in December of 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Tim Tanner, individually and as Director of Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc., violated Section 559.911, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint entered January 10, 1997. IT IF FUTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 within thirty days of the date that the Final Order becomes final and the motor vehicle repair shop registration, MV-15484, issued to Respondents be suspended for a period of two weeks. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Davis, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 J. Joseph Hughes, Esquire 1017-A Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6221 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Bureau of Licensing and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Petitioner seeks to have the title to a specific motor vehicle cancelled and reissued to himself. The title at issue is currently in the name of John W. Klingerman. The central issue before the Hearing Officer is whether the title at issue was "improperly issued" by the Department so as to require cancellation of the certificate of title pursuant to Section 319.25(1), Florida Statutes. It was clear from the nature of the relief sought by the Petitioner that the disposition of this case might adversely affect the substantial interests of John W. Klingerman, the person to whom the disputed certificate of title is presently issued. Accordingly, an order was issued requiring that Mr. Klingerman be notified of the pendency of this case and of his right to file a petition to intervene in this case. Mr. Klingerman was so notified more than two months prior to the final hearing in this case. Mr. Klingerman did not seek to participate in this case. The only witness at the hearing was the Petitioner. Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 were received in evidence by stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 10 were received in evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit 9 was received with the caveat that it might later be disregarded by the Hearing Officer if, upon further consideration of the issues, the Hearing Officer determined it was not relevant. The Hearing Officer reserved ruling on the admission into evidence of Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 12. Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 13 were rejected, but Petitioner was permitted to proffer them for inclusion in the record as rejected exhibits. Petitioner's Exhibit 11 was withdrawn by Petitioner. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was received in evidence. Rulings on Petitioner's Exhibits 8, 9 and 12 Upon consideration of all of the legal issues in this case, as set forth in the Conclusions of Law hereinafter, it is clear that Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 12 are irrelevant to the disposition of the issues in this case. Accordingly, the objections to those two exhibits are sustained and both exhibits will be treated as rejected exhibits proffered for inclusion in the record. Upon further consideration, it is also clear that Petitioner's Exhibit 9 is irrelevant to the disposition of the issues in this case. Accordingly, even though Exhibit 9 has been received in evidence, no findings of fact have been based on that exhibit.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony presented at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: During November of 1986, Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service embarked upon the process of enforcing a mechanic's lien on Petitioner's 1963 Ford Stationwagon, vehicle identification number 3T24F155323 (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner's vehicle.") The owner of Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service arranged for the paperwork regarding the mechanic's lien to be handled by an agent, Title Clearing Service. Title Clearing Service is operated by John Boesch and Carol Boesch. On November 21, 1986, John Boesch mailed a document titled Notice of Claim of Lien And Proposed Sale of Vehicle to Petitioner at two different addresses. The documents were sent via certified mail. Both of the documents were returned to John Boesch because they were not delivered to the Petitioner. The documents mailed on November 21, 1986, contain all of the information itemized at Section 713.585(1)(a) through (i), Florida Statutes. On December 17, 1986, a notice of sale was published in the Fort Myers News-Press, a newspaper circulated in Lee County, Florida. The notice published in the newspaper read, in its entirety, as follows: LEGAL NOTICE OF SALE Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service, 5371 McGreagor Blvd., Fort Myers, Florida 33907 will hold a private sale on the following vehicle to satisfy lien pursuant to Chapter 713:585 of Florida Statue (sic) on January 5, 1987, at 8 a.m. 1963 Ford SW VIN #3T24F155323 Amount of Lien $2,027.95 (813) 549-0631 Dec. 17 No. 5247 Thereafter, on January 5, 1987, a private sale was conducted at which time John W. Klingerman purchased Petitioner's vehicle from Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service for $200.00. On January 13, 1987, John W. Klingerman applied to the Respondent for issuance of a certificate of title in his name, based on his purchase at the January 5, 1987, sale. On January 30, 1987, the Respondent issued a certificate of title to Petitioner's vehicle described above to John W. Klingerman of 1824 Coronado Road, Ft. Myers, Florida 323901-7008. Title Number 43916166 issued by the Respondent now shows John W. Klingerman as the owner of the 1963 Ford stationwagon bearing vehicle identification number 3T24F155323. The issuance of the certificate of title to John W. Klingerman was in reliance upon the application for certificate of title filed by John W. Klingerman and various supporting documents. The supporting documents included a copy of the certificate of compliance and the report of sale certified by the clerk of the court. Other supporting documents certified by the clerk of the court included copies of the Affidavit of Publication, the Notice Of Claim Of Lien And Proposed Sale of Vehicle, the vehicle repair order, and envelopes reflecting efforts to mail notices to the Petitioner. The Petitioner's vehicle was previously titled in the state of South Carolina.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issue a final order in this case cancelling certificate of title number 43916166 issued to John W. Klingerman and that the Department thereafter notify John W. Klingerman of the cancellation of the certificate as provided in Section 319.25(1), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2613 The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The paragraph numbers below correspond to the paragraph numbers of the parties' proposed findings. Rulings on Petitioners Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1 and 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance with exception of vehicle identification number, which is incomplete. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Paragraph 6: First sentence rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7: First sentence rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Second sentence is accepted in substance, i.e., that publication of the notice was less than 20 days prior to scheduled sale and the newspaper publication contained insufficient information. Paragraph 8: First two sentences are rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Last sentence is rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 9: First two sentences are rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Last two sentences are rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10: Entire paragraph rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 11: Entire paragraph rejected as primarily constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact. To the limited extent this paragraph contains factual matter, it is rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted with exception of proposed purchase date. Greater weight of the evidence shows purchase date as January 5, 1987. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance, but with most details omitted as irrelevant or subordinate. Paragraph 4: Rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraphs 6 and 7: Rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 8: First sentence rejected as not fully consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence rejected as argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard R. Mellon Executive Director Department of Highway and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Department of Highway and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Mr. Ocie C. Allen, Jr. Post Office Box 10616 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Some time after February 19, 1983, and before March 23, 1983, Wayne W. Hickey opened for business as an auto mechanic under the name Auto Tech at 2350 Fernwood Drive in Pensacola, Florida. He was employed by, but had no ownership interest in the auto repair business known as Motor Exchange that occupied the premises before him. After he had opened his own business, he undertook employment for Lloyd Linville, a principal of Motor Exchange, who asked him to repair a car that belonged to David H. Weinstein which Motor Exchange had been unable to repair. Mr. Hickey could not fix the engine knock, either, and was never paid for his work. While the car was in Mr. Hickey's custody, vandals did $700 damage to it. Mr. Hickey refused to repair this damage or pay Mr. Weinstein money to have it done elsewhere. On February of 1983, while still employed by Motor Exchange, Mr. Hickey signed a warranty on behalf of Motor Exchange covering an engine rebuilt for Jose L. Rodriguez. A week later Mr. Rodriguez discovered that the cam and the lifters were bad, and brought this to Mr. Hickey's attention. Mr. Hickey referred Mr. Rodriguez to Motor Exchange at their new location. The last time that Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Hickey spoke before the hearing in this cause, Mr. Rodriguez told Mr. Hickey that all was well. At hearing for the first time, Mr. Hickey learned that other problems had developed with the engine since. After she got her income tax refund, Anita Diane Frye took her 1974 Chevrolet to Auto Tech on February 28, 1983. She considers the car hers even though it is registered in her boyfriend's name. He signed the work order authorizing respondent to rebuild the engine. Auto Tech worked on the engine and gave a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. When Mr. Hickey returned the car after working on the engine, he told Ms. Frye, "You better buy a new set of back tires," because it would go so fast, he claimed. In fact, the car smoked from the time they got it back from Mr. Hickey and he was unable to correct the problem when they took it back for lifters to be installed or when they took it back the second time. The third time they took it back they found the shop closed and no indication of how to get in touch with Mr. Hickey. At the time of the hearing, the car had been driven less than 3,000 miles since the engine had been rebuilt, but the engine spat and sputtered and the car could not be driven faster than 20 or 30 miles per hour: "You sit in a cloud of smoke whenever you stop." After James Clyde Odom heard respondent's radio advertisement, he brought his 1974 Dodge truck to Auto Tech on May 3, 1983, to have the engine rebuilt. Mr. Hickey told him he would rebuild the engine "from the ground up" and guarantee his work. As agreed, Mr. Odom returned for the truck on May 7, 1983, paid Mr. Hickey $644.09 and received a written "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Mr. Odom had driven the truck approximately three miles when his wife, who was following in another car, honked her horn. Steam was rising from the engine. They turned around and went back to the garage where Mr. Hickey supplied a bolt that had been left out of the water pump housing. The Odoms set out again and made it all the way to Mrs. Odom's father's house, where they noticed oil leaking. They determined that a quart and a half had been lost. They took the truck back to the Auto Tech shop again and left a note describing the problem. A week later Mr. Odom picked his truck up from Auto Tech a third time and drove it about two and a half miles to a friend's house, where oil leaked from the truck again and formed a puddle in the friend's driveway. This time when Mr. Odom returned, Mr. Hickey said he could not work on it right away, that Mr. Odom would have to bring it back at Mr. Hickey's convenience, and he refused Mr. Odom's proposal that another mechanic he asked to repair the engine with the bill being sent to Mr. Hickey. The compression in the truck's engine ranged from 107 or 114 pounds in one cylinder to 160 pounds in another. Mr. Hickey also undertook to repair the brakes on the Odom truck, and was paid for this job. He did not turn the drums or replace the brake cylinders although he did install new brake shoes. The brakes did not hold after the work was done. On May 27, 1983, Ishmael White took a 1974 Dodge engine to Hickey for rebuilding. The job was to include "rings, mains, rod bearings, timing gear, timing chain, lifters, push rods, oil pumps, all new gaskets, complete valve job and" cam bearings. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. On June 1, 1983, Mr. White paid Mr. Hickey $624.75 for this work and he picked the engine up the next day. The head bolt had not been replaced. On June 10, 1983, the engine was reinstalled in Mr. White's pick-up truck. It made the whole truck vibrate. When Mr. White took it to be tuned, the mechanic said he could not tune it because the valves were not closing. When Mr. White reported this to Mr. Hickey, Mr. Hickey said he would not be able to work on the engine until June 15, 1983. On June 15, 1983, Mr. White left the truck with Mr. Hickey and returned to pick it up on June 21, 1983, as they had agreed. The truck was not ready then, so Mr. White inquired again on June 23, 1983. At that time Mr. Hickey told him that the water pump leaked and would cost $70 to replace, but Mr. White refused to buy a water pump from Mr. Hickey since a new one had been installed less than three months before he took the engine to Auto Tech. On July 12, 1983, Mr. Hickey told Mr. White that everything had been fixed except the water pump and that if he towed the truck away without buying another water pump the warranty was "no good." The warranty Mr. Hickey had earlier given Mr. White was a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. White took the truck nevertheless. Bolts were loose. A brand new air filter was wet. Four of the eight cylinders had little or no compression and the engine ran so rough the hood shook, but the water pump was not leaking. Mr. White took the truck elsewhere to be repaired at his expense. On April 2, 1983, James Fisher took his Ford pick-up to Mr. Hickey and Auto Tech and asked that a rebuilt 400 cubic inch engine be substituted for the 351 cubic inch engine it had at the time and that its C-4 transmission be replaced with a C-6. The Fishers retrieved their truck on April 14, 1983, and drove it home. The next day they set out on a camping trip. They had driven 20 miles when the engine "blew up." Smoke came back into the cab and billowed out from under the hood. Employees of Mr. Hickey came for the truck. On April 25, 1983, the Fishers left Auto Tech in the Ford truck a second time. The engine ran rough, the transmission "growled," and they spotted a stream of transmission fluid, so they turned around before they had gone a mile and drove the truck back to Auto Tech. On April 29, 1983, Mr. Hickey said everything was fine and the Fishers set out again. The transmission was better, but the engine was worse, and the car broke down near their son's place of business, a block or so from Auto Tech. The truck was taken back to the Auto Tech garage. Again on May 6, 1983, the Fishers set out in the truck and got all the way to Pace, Florida, this time, notwithstanding problems with the transmission. A mechanic in Pace discovered worn valve guides, worn rings and worn bearings; and that only one bolt attached the engine to the frame; and that the drive shaft had been jammed in without being properly fitted. The Fishers were unable to find Mr. Hickey after he closed down his Auto Tech shop. Without objection, the following affidavit was received in evidence at hearing: I Took The Engine To Wayne Hickey at Auto TECH to be Rebuilt. He was To Rebuild The Engine For $395.00 Plus Taxes, I Paind Him by check $414.75 I took The Engine Home and Installed it in The Car.The engine was Smokeing Real bad. I went back to Wayne Hickey with The Car and he informed me That The Engine Should be Ran For up To 500 miles If IT didn't stop smokeing & useing oil To bring it back. The Engine Froze up. I Towed The car back to AUTO TECH. Wayne Hickey said he would Need to Keep The Car for 3-4 days. My daughter called after 7 days and they haden't Touched The car. They Said to Call back ON The 16 July 83. My daughter Called back on The 16 July 83 and could get no anser, I called back on The 19th & the Recording Said The Phone was Temperoley out of order, I came over here to Auto TECH and talked to Wayne Hickey, 7-28-83. He had not done anything to the Engine, I ask him To give me my Money back and I would get The Engine Fixed Myself. He stated For me to Take The car Home, Take the Engin back out and bring the Engine back To him and He would Fix IT, he didn't say anything about Removeing The Engine when He Told me To bring The car back to Him, A Mr. Watha L. Clayton wrote out the foregoing statement on a form furnished by petitioner's office. The form affidavit was notarized July 28, 1983.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 2d day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2d day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Wayne Hickey Motor Exchange 5672 Avondale Road Pensacola, Florida 32506 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: Respondent holds a license issued by Petitioner which permits it to engage in the business of a motor vehicle dealer at 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C, Hialeah Gardens, Florida. On Friday, September 9, 1988, during normal business hours, Karen Reyes, who is employed by Petitioner as a License and Registration Inspector, visited this location to attempt to conduct an annual inspection of Respondent's records. The doors to the warehouse where the business was supposed to be located were closed and locked and no one was around the dealership. Reyes left a note requesting that a representative of the dealership contact her. She then-departed. Reyes returned to the location on Tuesday, September 20, 1988. Although it was mid-morning, the warehouse doors were closed and locked and there was no one present. Before departing, Reyes left a second note asking that she be contacted by someone from the dealership. The following day Reyes attempted to telephone the dealership. No one answered the phone, however, when she called. Reyes reported her findings to her supervisor. As a result, on October 20, 1988, Respondent's President, Javier F. Rodriquez, was sent a letter in which he was advised that Petitioner proposed to revoke Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license on the ground that Respondent had closed and abandoned its licensed location. The letter further advised that Respondent had the right to request a formal hearing before any final action was taken against it. Rodriquez responded to the letter by requesting a hearing at which he would have the opportunity to present proof that the dealership had not been closed or abandoned. In view of this response, Reyes was instructed by her supervisor to pay another visit to the dealership. She made this visit on Tuesday, November 8, 1988. This time she encountered two men at the location. There were also a couple of cars there as well. One of the men, who claimed to be a representative of the dealership, telephoned Rodriquez's wife and had her speak with Reyes. During their telephone conversation, Mrs. Rodriquez informed Reyes that her husband was still active in the automobile sales business, but that he was conducting his business at their home. At the conclusion of their discussion, Reyes asked Mrs. Rodriquez to have her husband call Reyes' office. Mr. Rodriquez telephoned Reyes' office on November 16, 1988. Reyes was not in, so Rodriquez left a message. Later, that day, Reyes returned the call, but was unable to reach Rodriquez. The following day, Reyes went back to the dealership, where she found the same two men she had met there on November 8, 1988. Rodriquez, however, was not at the dealership. Reyes therefore left. She came back later in the day. This time Mr. Rodriquez was present and he spoke with Reyes. When asked by Reyes why there was no business activity nor records at the licensed business location, Rodriquez responded that the dealership was now open every day from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He provided Reyes with no additional information. Reyes revisited the dealership on Friday, January 13, 1989, Wednesday, January 18, 1989, Thursday, January 19, 1989, and Monday, January 23, 1989, during normal business hours. On each of these occasions, she found no one at the location and the doors to the warehouse closed and locked. She made another visit on Monday, January 30, 1989. Although it was during normal business hours, there was no indication of any activity at the dealership. Furthermore, the sign which had identified the business had been removed. This prompted Reyes to speak with the leasing agent at the warehouse complex. The leasing agent told Reyes that Respondent was no longer occupying space at the complex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Javier F. Rodriquez, President Inrodar Auto Sales, Inc. 9901 N.W. 80th Avenue, Bay 3C Hialeah Gardens, Florida 33016 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Department of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to the issues herein, petitioner Davis was an automotive equipment repair foreman at respondent's Pinellas County Maintenance plant. In addition to this employment, petitioner also had a pecuniary interest in the Sunshine Speedway in St. Petersburg. A steel pole was located on private property belonging to Sunshine Speedway. Because persons and/or vehicles had been injured by this pole, petitioner and a heavy equipment operator employed by respondent decided to remove it. They went to respondent's maintenance yard at 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. after their hours of employment, got a crane truck belonging to respondent, drove it to the Speedway, removed the steel pole to another area and returned the truck to the maintenance yard after dark. Petitioner neither asked for nor received permission to use respondent's equipment for this purpose. At a time when petitioner was leasing the Sunshine Speedway, and during his hours of employment with respondent, he filled a dump truck belonging to respondent with limerock or scrap materials. After his hours of employment with respondent, petitioner drove this truck to the Speedway and dumped its contents near the entranceway for the purpose of making a culvert or crossover. While there was some evidence that petitioner had the permission of his immediate supervisor, Mr. William Dasher, to use the respondent's scrap culvert material, petitioner admitted that no one gave him the authority to improve the entranceway to the Speedway or to use the respondent's truck for this purpose. As a result of the facts described in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, respondent found that petitioner had violated state rules and regulations and departmental policies with regard to the unauthorized use of state equipment outside of his regular assigned duties and responsibilities and for other than state purposes. The disciplinary action taken was demotion of petitioner from automotive equipment repair foreman at Pinellas Maintenance to automotive equipment mechanic II and reassignment to Tampa Maintenance. Petitioner thereafter appealed this disciplinary demotion and reassignment to the Career Service Commission. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing, and the undersigned was designated to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the Commission affirm the demotion and reassignment of petitioner inasmuch as the same was based upon good cause and was in accordance with established rules and regulations. Respectfully submitted and entered this 23rd day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Horace E. Davis Post Office Box 375 Pinellas Park, Florida 33565 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Administration Department of Transportation Room 530 Carlton Building Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
