The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Respondent violated Subsection 112.3148(8), by failing to report a $2,606.25 gift of Disney World and Universal Studios tickets on a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Form, CE Form 9; and (2) if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the proceedings, Respondent, Alan Keen, served as chairman of the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Chapter, Part III, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions as chairman of the Expressway Authority. See §§ 112.311(6) and 112.313, Fla. Stat. In April 2006, Respondent was contacted by a family friend, James Stanley, who resides in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley indicated that his father-in-law was paying for the family, consisting of four children and eight adults, to travel to the Orlando area in the Fall of 2006 and requested that Respondent see if he could obtain theme park tickets for their use. Mr. Stanley called Respondent and asked him to obtain theme park tickets so that the tickets could be in-hand prior to Mr. Stanley and his family arriving in Orlando. This request was made purely for the purposes of convenience.2 Respondent has known Mr. Stanley for more than 20 years and considers to him to be a friend. Mr. Stanley described Respondent as his mentor and a close friend. Respondent and Mr. Stanley and their respective families socialize and have visited with each other in the United States and in Costa Rica. Mr. Stanley never asked for or expected Respondent to obtain free theme park tickets. In fact, it was Mr. Stanley's understanding and belief that his father-in-law, Rodrigo Esquivel, was going to pay all the costs associated with the trip. Respondent contacted Bryan Douglas, the then director of marketing for the Expressway Authority and asked Mr. Douglas if he had access to complimentary tickets to Universal Studios and Disney World theme parks.3 In response to this request, Mr. Douglas told Respondent that he did not know if he had access to complimentary tickets, but indicated that he would check. As chairman of the Expressway Authority, Respondent had no supervisory authority over Mr. Douglas and never signed any of his paychecks. Approximately two or three weeks after his initial telephone call to Mr. Douglas, Respondent requested that his personal assistant, Sherry Cooper, follow-up on whether Mr. Douglas had any success in obtaining any complimentary tickets. Respondent understood that Ms. Cooper, at the request of Mr. Douglas, had inquired of Mr. Stanley how many adult and how many children tickets were needed. In 2006, Ronald Pecora was the owner of Pecora and Blexrud, a marketing communications and public relations firm that had a contract to do work the Expressway Authority. In or about May 2006, Mr. Pecora became aware of the request for theme park tickets from Christy Payne. Ms. Payne was the representative of Pecora and Blexrud who was assigned to work with the Expressway Authority. According to Mr. Pecora, Ms. Payne reported to him that she was contacted by Mr. Douglas, the marketing director for the Expressway Authority in regard to theme park tickets. Based on the above-referenced conversation between Mr. Pecora and Ms. Payne, it was his (Mr. Pecora's) understanding that the subject theme park tickets were for Respondent. However, Mr. Pecora had no idea who would be using the theme park tickets and never spoke to Respondent about those tickets. During Mr. Pecora's conversation with Ms. Payne regarding the theme park tickets, he authorized her to purchase the theme park tickets with her corporate credit card. As a result of Mr. Pecora's authorization, a total of 12 theme park tickets having a value of $2,606.25 were purchased using the Pecora and Blexrud credit card. At the time Mr. Pecora authorized Ms. Payne to purchase the 12 theme park tickets, he anticipated being repaid for the tickets. Mr. Pecora's actions after he received the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets are consistent with that belief and expectation. In mid-May 2006, the 12 theme park tickets and receipt for payment invoice ("invoice") were delivered to Mr. Pecora's business address in Winter Park, Florida. The invoice indicated that the $2,606.25 payment for the theme park tickets had been charged to Mr. Pecora's credit card.4 A few days after receiving the tickets and invoice, Mr. Pecora had one of his employees deliver the theme park tickets and the original invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties. The reason Mr. Pecora sent the invoice to Keewin Properties, whose principal was Respondent, was so that the recipient would know how much to pay him for the tickets. At the time that Mr. Pecora had the theme park tickets and invoices sent to Keewin Properties, he knew that Respondent was the owner of that business. At or near the time Mr. Pecora directed his employee to deliver the theme park tickets and invoice for those tickets to Keewin Properties, he memorialized that transaction. In a hand-written note dated May 18, 2006, Mr. Pecora indicated that the original invoice had been sent to Keewin Properties. Mr. Pecora understood that theme park tickets were not for official business purposes of the Expressway Authority. Accordingly, he did not send the invoice for the theme park tickets to the Expressway Authority, but to Respondent's privately-owned business. On or about mid-May 2006, Respondent received the theme tickets and the invoice that were delivered to him in a small brown envelope. When he received the tickets, Respondent was surprised that Mr. Pecora was involved in obtaining the tickets because he had merely asked Mr. Douglas whether he had access to complimentary theme park tickets. However, Respondent was not surprised to have received an invoice. Upon receipt of the tickets, Respondent telephoned Mr. Stanley and advised him that he had obtained the theme park tickets and the invoice for the purchase of those tickets. Because Respondent would be in Costa Rica in a few weeks, he told Mr. Stanley that he would deliver the tickets and the invoice when he arrived in Costa Rica. As he had promised, a few weeks after speaking to Mr. Stanley, Respondent traveled to Costa Rica and, while there, personally delivered the theme park tickets and the invoice to Mr. Stanley. When Mr. Stanley received the theme park tickets and the invoice, he reviewed them. Soon thereafter, Mr. Stanley gave both the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel. Prior to giving the tickets and the invoice to Mr. Esquivel, Mr. Stanley highlighted the name of the individual printed on the invoice who was to be paid for the tickets. On or about September 23, 2006, Mr. Stanley and his family, including Mr. Esquivel, began their visit to the Orlando area. During this trip, the theme park tickets were used by Mr. Stanley's family. Respondent did not use any of the theme park tickets. Mr. Esquivel did not pay for the theme park tickets prior to the time that Mr. Stanley's family used the theme park tickets. About ten days after Mr. Stanley's family, including Mr. Esquivel, returned to Costa Rica from Orlando, Mr. Esquivel suffered a stroke. As a result of the stroke, Mr. Esquivel was hospitalized for about a week, but later returned to most of his usual activities. Respondent first learned that the theme park tickets had not been paid for in December 2006, after reading an article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Until that time, Respondent had assumed that Mr. Stanley or his father-in-law had paid for the theme park tickets. Soon after reading the above-referenced newspaper article, Respondent called Mr. Stanley to ask if they had paid for the theme park tickets. Mr. Stanley told Respondent he believed that his father-in-law had paid for the tickets, but indicated that he would check on the matter. Upon checking, Mr. Stanley determined that his father-in-law had not paid for the tickets. Based on his personal knowledge of his father-in-law, Mr. Stanley concluded that his father-in-law simply forgot to pay for the tickets.5 Soon after discovering that Mr. Esquivel had not paid for the theme park tickets, Mr. Stanley also learned that criminal proceedings related to the theme park tickets were pending against Mr. Pecora. Therefore, Mr. Stanley, in consultation with his attorneys, decided that payment for the theme park tickets should be made after the criminal proceedings were over. About a month prior to this proceeding, Mr. Stanley received wiring instructions from Mr. Pecora's attorney. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Stanley wired the full payment for the theme park tickets to Mr. Pecora's attorney, on behalf of Mr. Pecora. Mr. Stanley's father-in-law gave him the funds which were wired to Mr. Pecora's attorney. Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure, CE Form 9, regarding receipt of the theme park tickets. The reason Respondent did not file a Quarterly Gift Disclosure Statement was that the theme park tickets were not for him and were not used by him. Therefore, Respondent did not believe that the tickets were a gift. Mr. Pecora, the procurer of the theme park tickets, did not consider the theme park tickets as a gift. Moreover, he never intended to make those tickets a gift.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a final order and public report finding that Respondent, Allen Keen, did not violate Subsection 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Complaint filed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th of November, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery, discriminated against the Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, on account of his race in denying him equal opportunity for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave, retention and advancement?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, is an Afro-American. His race is black. The Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. District 2 of the Department. In the fall of 1987 the Department created a district office in Panama City, Florida. The Panama City office of the Department was part of District 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). The District consisted of Bay, Calhoun, Gulf, Jackson, Holmes and Washington Counties. Steve Sumner was hired as the District Manager for the District in October of 1987. Mr. Sumner hired the staff of the District in November of 1987. The District had the following type of positions: District Manager. The District Manager was in charge of the District office and was the immediate supervisor of the employees in the District. Among other things, the District Manager was responsible for: (1) the assignment of the geographic areas LSRs were responsible for including the designation of retailers located therein that the LSRs were to service; (2) the approval of leave; and (3) the assignment of vans. Lottery Sales Representative II (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR II"). LSR IIs were responsible for inventorying lottery ticket stock sold at retail locations, settling accounts with retailers for all lottery tickets sold, ordering lottery ticket books, reviewing settlement calculations, training retailers, completing paperwork necessary for retailers to become a lottery outlet, completing paperwork upon the termination of a retailer as a lottery outlet, ensuring that retailers operated within Department rules, soliciting, conducting and monitoring retailer promotions and recruiting new retail accounts. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR II's job description. Lottery Sales Representative I (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR I"). LSR Is were responsible for delivering lottery tickets, picking up redemption envelopes from retailers and comparing them with issuance/settlement forms, assisting retailers, maintaining paperwork and daily activity reports and filling in for, and assisting, LSR IIs. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR I's job description. Each LSR I was assigned to work with one particular LSR II. Storekeepers. Storekeepers were responsible for receiving, verifying and sorting incoming orders for lottery tickets, receiving and verifying ticket redemption envelopes and ticket returns, and insuring that materials were distributed. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of a Storekeeper's job description. A Receptionist. An Accountant I. An Administrative Assistant I. Clerical positions. Relevant History of Mr. Jacobs' Employment at the District. In November of 1987, Mr. Sumner hired three LSR IIs (Sandra Doll, Linda Gray and Debra Chason). All three are white. Mr. Sumner also hired two LSR Is. On November 15, 1987, Mr. Sumner hired the Mr. Jacobs as an LSR I. John Stevens was the other LSR I. Mr. Stevens is white. Danny Edwards was hired in 1987 as the Storekeeper, and Mary Jane Silcox was hired as an Administrative Assistant. Mr. Edwards and Ms. Silcox are white. At the time that Mr. Jacobs was hired, he was married. Mr. Jacobs' wife's race is white. Although Mr. Jacobs subsequently separated and eventually obtained a divorce from his wife, Mr. Sumner was not aware of these events until sometime after he had hired Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner was responsible for evaluating Mr. Jacobs' performance. For the fiscal years November 16, 1987 to November 16, 1988, November 16, 1988 to November 16, 1989 and November 1989 to November 1990, Mr. Sumners rated Mr. Jacobs' performance with an overall rating of "Exceeds At Least One Standard." The possible ratings, from lowest to highest, were "Below Standards," "Achieves Standards," "Exceeds at Least One Standard," "Exceeds Most Standards," and "Sustained Superior Performance." In April of 1988, Mr. Edwards was promoted by Mr. Sumner from Storekeeper to LSR I. In May of 1988, Larry Kissinger was hired by Mr. Sumner as the Storekeeper. Mr. Sumner also hired Hannah Davis as an LSR I. Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Davis are white. In March of 1990, one of the LSR IIs, Sandra Doll, went on maternity leave. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs to fill the LSR II position of Ms. Doll during her absence. Mr. Jacobs was selected out of the three LSR Is then working for the District. Mr. Sumner arranged for Mr. Jacobs to receive a 10 percent increase in pay. The increase in pay was to be payable while Mr. Jacobs temporarily filled the LSR II position. At about the same time that Ms. Doll went on maternity leave, another LSR II, Ms. Gray, resigned. Mr. Sumner assigned Ms. Gray's duties jointly to one of the other LSR Is, Ms. Davis, and the Storekeeper, Mr. Kissinger. Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger did not receive any increase in pay for their services. During the time that Mr. Jacobs served as a temporary LSR II, he performed satisfactorily, with assistance from other District staff. Prior to August of 1990, Ms. Doll resigned. In August of 1990, Mr. Sumner decided to promote Mr. Jacobs permanently to the position of LSR II. The Department's Personnel Office, however, informed Mr. Sumner that Mr. Jacobs did not appear to meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Therefore, Mr. Sumner assisted Mr. Jacobs to supplement his resume by expanding the description of his prior sales experience in order for Mr. Jacobs to meet the minimum requirements. Mr. Jacobs was subsequently determined to be qualified and Mr. Sumner's decision to promote Mr. Jacobs was accepted. Mr. Jacobs' salary was reduced to the amount he had been paid before he was given the temporary 10 percent increase. Mr. Sumner recommended, and Mr. Jacobs received, a permanent 7 percent increase, the maximum pay increase he could be awarded upon his permanent promotion to LSR II. As of August of 1990, Mr. Jacobs became the highest paid LSR II in the District. Mr. Jacobs remained the highest paid LSR II while he was employed as an LSR II and as an LMR. Mr. Kissinger, the Storekeeper, was promoted in August of 1990 to fill the LSR I position vacated by Mr. Jacobs. Ms. Davis was promoted in September of 1990 to fill the other LSR II position. Ms. Silcox, the Administrative Assistant, was promoted to fill Ms. Davis' LSR I position in September of 1990. Charles Frederick, whose race is black, was hired by Mr. Sumner in February of 1991, as the Storekeeper. In December of 1990, Mr. Jacobs remarried. The woman that Mr. Jacobs married in December of 1990 was white. From the time that Mr. Sumner hired Mr. Jacobs until approximately May of 1991, Mr. Sumner was satisfied with Mr. Jacobs' performance. In March of 1989 Mr. Sumner nominated Mr. Jacobs to the Department as the District employee of the month. In approximately May of 1991, however, Mr. Sumner began to lose faith in Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs believes that Mr. Sumner's attitude toward him began to change in 1991 and he attributes this change to the fact that he had married a white woman in December of 1990. Mr. Jacobs' belief is not, however, supported by the record. In light of the fact that Mr. Jacobs was married to a white woman when Mr. Sumner initially hired him and during at least part of the time that Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be satisfactory, Mr. Jacobs' belief is unfounded. A more logical explanation for the change in the relationship of Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs is Mr. Jacobs' decline in performance and Mr. Sumner's criticism of Mr. Jacobs' performance as an LSR II. After being promoted to the permanent LSR II position, Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be lacking. In September of 1990, Mr. Sumner wrote four critical memorandums to Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs, based upon these memoranda and other comments from Mr. Sumner, began to believe that Mr. Sumner was treating him unfairly. This combination of lesser performance and criticism at least contributed to the rift between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs. By approximately May of 1991 Mr. Sumner concluded that Mr. Jacobs' performance had noticeably deteriorated and he seemed to lose interest in his job. In September of 1991 Mr. Jacobs and his wife became foster parents of two infants. The infants both suffered from severe medical problems. Mr. Jacobs' relationship with Mr. Sumner became more strained as a result of the stress on Mr. Jacobs caused by the children's condition. In the summer of 1991, a new sales director for the District was hired by the Department. SEE 23. For the November, 1990 to November, 1991 fiscal year, Mr. Sumner evaluated Mr. Jacobs' performance as "Achieves Standards." This rating was one rating lower than the previous ratings Mr. Jacobs had received from Mr. Sumner. The rating was for Mr. Jacobs' first full year as an LSR II and reflected the drop in his performance as an LSR II. The following comment, among others, was made by Mr. Sumner on the evaluation: Over the past years Jake has been an enthusiastic and productive worker. This previous year has seen a deterioration of skills that he is normally capable of doing. I feel this maybe [sic] in part to environmental pressures outside of work. Many changes have been made to improve work environment, yet employee doesn't appear to enjoy his work. This change became more evident after first full year as an LSR II. Petitioner's exhibit 11. At the time of the 1990-1991 evaluation of Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Sumner was not aware that changes in the number of LSR positions in the District would be made by the Department in 1992. Effective January 1, 1992, the Department eliminated the LSR I and LSR II classifications. A single classification, Lottery Marketing Representative (hereinafter referred to as "LMR"), was created. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the decision to make this change. Mr. Jacobs, Ms. Chason and Ms. Gray were reclassified from LSR II to LMR. Mr. Edwards, Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Silcox were reclassified from LSR I to LMR. In March of 1992 Mr. Sumner was notified by the Department that the sales staff of the District was being reorganized. As a consequence, the District LMR positions were to be reduced from six positions to four. As a part of the reorganization, the District was to receive one new position: a Telemarketing Representative, a newly created employee classification. As a result of the reorganization, Mr. Sumner was faced with reclassifying/demoting one LMR and possibly terminating one LMR. Mr. Sumner was only given two weeks to make the changes. In order to minimize the impact of the reorganization on employees of the District, Mr. Sumner successfully convinced the Department to locate the new Telemarketing Representative position at the District office. Mr. Sumner informed the LMRs of the reorganization and sought volunteers to take the Telemarketing Representative position in a meeting of all LMRs. Ms. Silcox subsequently volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. At the time that Mr. Sumner was deciding how to comply with the Department's reorganization, the Administrative Assistant position in the District became vacant. Ms. Silcox subsequently agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position when Mr. Sumner asked her to. As a result of Ms. Silcox taking the Administrative Assistant position, Mr. Sumner did not have to terminate any LMR. The person in the other LMR position eliminated could move into the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner spoke to the remaining four LMRs seeking a volunteer to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Edwards indicated that he would consider taking the position but delayed a decision over night. Mr. Jacobs did the same. Ultimately, none of the remaining five LMRs volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner was required to select one of the five LMRs (Ms. Chason, Mr. Edwards, Ms. Gray, Mr. Jacobs or Mr. Kissinger) to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner decided that Mr. Jacobs should be reassigned/demoted to the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Jacobs was informed of the decision and was given the choice of accepting the Telemarketing Representative position with no reduction in salary or moving to Gainesville or Tampa as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs elected to take the Telemarketing Representative position so that he would not have to move. Mr. Jacobs was placed in the Telemarketing Representative position and continued to be paid the same salary he was receiving as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs received no reduction in pay or benefits. The Basis for Mr. Sumner's Decision to Reassign/Demote Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner's decision to place Mr. Jacobs in the Telemarketing Representative position was based on his perception of the performance of the four other remaining LMRs (after Ms. Silcox had agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position) under Mr. Sumner's supervision compared to Mr. Jacobs' performance. Mr. Sumner took into account the past performance of each of the five LMRs and their progress in the various positions they had held under Mr. Sumner's supervision. Mr. Sumner did not base his decision on or consider seniority. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs based upon the decline in Mr. Jacobs' performance since being promoted to LSR II, and his perception of the relatively slower development of Mr. Jacobs' abilities as an LSR II when compared with the other LMRs. All of the LMRs (while employed in the various positions under Mr. Sumner's supervision) had experienced problems in their performance and had been criticized by Mr. Sumner. There were no exceptions. Except for Mr. Jacobs, all of the LMRs had received consistently high evaluations of "Exceeds at Least One Standard" or "Exceeds Most Standards" each year while under Mr. Sumner's supervision. These ratings were based on their overall performance and the evidence failed to prove that the ratings were not reasonable. Only the rating given to Mr. Jacobs for his last evaluation period prior to his assignment to the Telemarketing Representative position had declined below those ratings. Two of the five LMRs had held LSR positions for a shorter period of time than Mr. Jacobs: Mr. Edwards: Storekeeper from 1987 to April of 1988, LSR I from April of 1988 to January of 1992, and LMR from January of 1992; and Mr. Kissinger: Storekeeper from May of 1988 to August of 1990, LSR I from August of 1990 to January of 1992 and LMR from January of 1992. Mr. Edwards and and Mr. Kissinger were not selected to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position because of their consistently high evaluations and because they had both continued to progress and improve in their performance consistently after being employed in the District. Mr. Jacobs had not continued to progress and improve. The Impact of Routes on Mr. Jacobs' Performance. In the fall of 1987, the District was divided into three geographic areas (hereinafter referred to as "Routes"), by Mr. Sumner. Each LSR II was assigned to one of the three Routes and was responsible for servicing the retailers located therein. Each of the three Routes contained a part of Panama City, the largest city in the District, and a part of the rural areas of the District. Ms. Doll was assigned the eastern portion of the District, Ms. Gray was assigned the western portion and Ms. Chason was assigned the rest. Mr. Jacobs was assigned to work with Ms. Chason on the Route assigned to her. When Ms. Doll left the District and Mr. Jacobs was temporarily assigned to replace her, Mr. Jacobs took over Ms. Doll's Route plus a part of Ms. Gray's Route. Mr. Jacobs satisfactorily performed his duties as an LSR I on Ms. Chason's Route and while temporarily replacing Ms. Doll as an LSR II on Ms. Doll's Route. These Routes did not adversely affect Mr. Jacobs' performance. In September of 1990, when Mr. Jacobs was permanently promoted to LSR II and Ms. Davis was promoted to an LSR II position, the Routes were restructured by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs continued to serve the eastern portion of the District previously serviced by Ms. Doll and by him as a temporary LSR II, Ms. Chason was assigned Panama City Beach and the accounts along part of the Florida border with Georgia and Alabama, and Ms. Davis was assigned the western portion of the District. All three Routes continued to include portions of the greater Panama City area (Lynn Haven, Parker, Callaway and Springfield). The accounts on Panama City Beach were more productive during the summer months. The accounts along the Florida border also tended to be more productive. Ms. Chason was assigned these more productive accounts because she had evidenced greater skills in sales/marketing than the other LSR IIs. Not because she was white. The Routes were not totally restructured again until the January, 1992 consolidation of LSR positions. Prior to January of 1992 changes were, however, made to the Routes. These changes were made because of frequent changes in retailers participating in lottery sales and, on a few occasions, when Mr. Sumner was requested to make changes by the LSR IIs, including Mr. Jacobs. The Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs in September of 1990 was more rural than the other Routes and Mr. Jacobs was required, on average, to drive more miles than the other LSR IIs. The last relevant restructuring of Routes took place in January of 1992 after the consolidation of LSR I and II positions. At that time, the three Routes served by the LSR IIs were divided essentially in half, creating six Routes, one for each LMR. Each LSR II was allowed to select the half of the Route he or she was previously responsible for and the other half was assigned to the LSR I that had previously been assigned to the Route. Immediately prior to January of 1992, Mr. Jacobs was assisted by Ms. Silcox. When their Route was divided, Mr. Jacobs selected the half of the Route he desired and Ms. Silcox was assigned the other half. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs was unfairly affected by the Route he was assigned to or that Mr. Sumner treated Mr. Jacobs unfairly in the assignment of Routes based upon his race. Sales figures contained on evaluations performed by Mr. Sumner were not always seen by Mr. Sumner when he completed an evaluation. In at least one year, those figures were added to the evaluation after Mr. Sumner completed his part of the evaluation. The suggestion that Mr. Jacobs' Route adversely impacted his evaluations was contradicted by the fact that for three years, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Chason, who allegedly had the most favorable Route, received the same overall evaluation: "Exceeds at Least One Standard." In the first full year that Mr. Jacobs served as an LSR II, although his overall evaluation declined, the "Other Category," which included Route statistics, on Mr. Jacobs' evaluation was rated "Exceeds at Least One Standard." The suggestion that some LSRs were able to dictate their Routes was also not supported by the evidence. All of the LSRs had some input into the Routes that they handled. For example, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Davis both requested the assignment of retailers near the Florida border. These requests were honored by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was assigned Bascom and Malone, Florida, and Ms. Davis was assigned Campbellton, Florida. Mr. Jacobs accepted the new accounts despite the fact that the mileage he was required to travel increased. All of the LSRs were also allowed to choose between half of their prior Routes in 1992. These incidents did not prove that white LSRs were allowed to select their Routes. Sales generated in each Route had minimal impact on Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs or the other LSR's performance. No sales quotas were established and LSRs were not compensated on the basis of their sales during the period of time relevant to this proceeding. While sales had to be taken into account to some extent, performance was evaluated based upon each person's general marketing skills and efforts. Sales goals were established during the summer of 1991 by the new sales director. Each LSR was assigned a sales quota based upon a percentage increase from their last year sales figures. If an LSR failed to meet the quota, there was no consequence. Employees were commended if they did achieve their quota. LSRs were given quotas of new retailers they were to attempt to add each month. All LSR Is were given a quota of one new retailer and all LSR IIs were given a quota of two new retailers. Recruitment of retailers was not necessarily a product of the length of a Route. See Petitioner's exhibit 36. The evidence failed to prove that the Routes assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely impacted Mr. Sumner's evaluation of his ability to recruit. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Mr. Jacobs failed to prove that the assignment of Routes was made in a discriminatory manner or that Mr. Jacobs' Routes adversely affected his performance because of difficulty caused by the Routes in meeting sales or recruitment quotas. Leave Policies. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning requests for annual leave made was that District employees should request approval at least two weeks in advance of when the employee intended to be off work. The two week notice policy was well known to all employees, including Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner issued several memoranda setting out the policy. Mr. Sumner also notified employees that a telephone call was all that was necessary to take annual leave if there was an emergency. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning giving two weeks notice was not strictly adhered to or enforced. Mr. Sumner recognized there were reasonable circumstances when an employee was not able to request permission to take annual leave two weeks or more in advance. As long as an employee made a reasonable effort and the operation of District would not, in Mr. Sumner's opinion, be harmed by an employee's absence, Mr. Sumner approved leave even when two weeks notice was not given. The two week notice requirement was waived for virtually every employee, including Mr. Jacobs. On one occasion Mr. Sumner denied a request by Mr. Jacobs for annual leave. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner denied the request without just cause or based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. During the period between April of 1990 and April of 1992, Mr. Sumner approved approximately 400 hours of leave, annual and sick, for Mr. Jacobs. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was treated differently because of his race with regard to leave requests he made while employed by the Department. Part of the leave taken by Mr. Jacobs was attributable to the illness of his two foster care infants. Mr. Jacobs had taken time off on numerous occasions due to their poor health. Mr. Jacobs had been required to take annual leave, rather than sick leave, for the infants because the Department's personnel office had informed Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs that State leave policies did not allow sick leave for foster care children. Mr. Sumner did not strictly enforce the notice policy for annual leave when Mr. Jacobs took annual leave for the foster care children. Nor did Mr. Sumner give Mr. Jacobs any reasonable reason to expect that Mr. Sumner would not approve the use of annual leave when the children were ill because Mr. Jacobs had not given two weeks advance notice. Nor was it reasonable for Mr. Jacobs to not realize that a simple telephone call to the office to inform the office of an emergency with the children would not be sufficient. Between March 17, 1992 and March 18, 1992, one of Mr. Jacobs' foster care infants became extremely ill. This was not the first time that the child had experienced the type of problem experienced at that time, but the problem was more severe. Although Mr. Jacobs could have simply telephoned the office the next morning and reported that there was an emergency, Mr. Jacobs reported to work. Mrs. Jacobs took the infant to a hospital where it was to be determined whether the child would be admitted to the hospital. After arriving at the office, Mr. Jacobs, who was visibly shaken, spoke with Mr. Sumner. What took place during that discussion was disputed by Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs testified that Mr. Sumner was clearly informed that he wanted to go to the hospital to be with the child but was told he had to attend to his Route first. Mr. Sumner testified that Mr. Jacobs did not specifically request time off, that he had indicated he might be require to go to the hospital sometime during the day, and that Mr. Sumner told Mr. Jacobs to service his five biggest accounts scheduled for that day and then take the rest of the day off even if it was not necessary for him to go to the hospital. Shortly after the conversation between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs, and after Mr. Jacobs had left on his Route, the child died. Mr. Jacobs was informed at his first stop and he left for the hospital. Based upon the weight of the evidence, it is concluded that Mr. Jacobs, who was tired from the events of the night before and under a great deal of stress because of his concern for the child, was not denied approval of leave by Mr. Sumner to immediately go to the hospital and was not told that he had to complete his Route. At most, there appears to have been an unfortunate miscommunication between Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner about the urgency of the situation. Mr. Sumner's belief that the matter was not as urgent as it turned out to be was supported by the fact that the infants had experienced similar difficulties in the past; the fact that the child had not been taken to the hospital earlier; the fact that Mr. Jacobs had come to the office that morning instead of telephoning; and the fact that Mr. Mr. Jacobs did not insist on going to the hospital immediately. Assignment of Department Vehicles. LSRs were assigned Department vehicles, (vans) for use in servicing Routes. In approximately November of 1987, the District was temporarily assigned one less van than needed. Mr. Jacobs volunteered to drive his personal vehicle, for which he was reimbursed by the State. Mr. Jacobs drove his personal vehicle until approximately December 24, 1987, when he received a new van. Other LSRs were required to use their personal vehicles on occasion, for which they were also reimbursed by the State. Pursuant to a replacement schedule instituted by the Department, 1/3 of all vans were to be replaced every year. In this way, every van would be used a maximum of three years. This schedule was based upon estimates of the time necessary for vans to have accumulated sufficient mileage (80,000 miles) to warrant replacement. To insure that a van was ready for replacement at the end of three years, it was Department policy to assign vans with lower mileage after a year or two years use to high mileage drivers. In November of 1991, five vans in the District exceeded 80,000 miles and were to be replaced with new vans. The District, however, only received three new vans. The other two vans were replaced with two lower mileage vans scheduled to be replaced the next fiscal year. Consistent with Department policy Mr. Sumner was suppose to assign the new vans to persons who drove less miles and the older vans should have been assigned to persons who drove greater miles. In November of 1991, the mileage driven in the previous year by each LSR was as follows: Silcox 16,327 miles Chason 16,426 miles Davis 21,000 miles Jacobs 23,717 miles Edwards 24,000 miles Kissinger 30,000 miles Pursuant to Department policy, the new vans should have been assigned to Ms. Silcox, Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis. The new vans, however, were assigned to Ms. Chason, Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger. The vans assigned to Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis were assigned consistent with Department policy. Ms. Silcox, Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards were assigned older vans. The assignment of an older van to Ms. Silcox was inconsistent with Department policy. The assignment of older vans with less mileage to Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards was consistent with Department policy. Had Department policy been followed completely and the third new van had been assigned to Ms. Silcox and not Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Jacobs would still not have received a new van. Mr. Sumner asked Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Edwards if they would drive to another district to pick up two vans. Mr. Sumner indicated that one of the new vans would be assigned to one of them if they agreed. They agreed, and Mr. Sumner awarded a new van to Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Sumner did not give Mr. Jacobs or Ms. Wilcox the opportunity to pick up the two vans located in another district. Marketing Promotions. LSRs, as part of their marketing responsibility, could conduct various types of promotions at retailers intended to increase sales of lottery tickets. LSRs were expected to conduct promotions. Quotas were assigned to each LSR II. They were expected to conduct one promotion per month. Promotions generally did not require much of a financial investment by the retailer and smaller retailers were generally as interested in conducting promotions as larger retailers. The evidence failed to prove that the Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely affected his ability to conduct promotions. The evidence also failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluations of Mr. Jacobs' performance while supervised by Mr. Sumner were adversely impacted by a lack of promotions caused by Mr. Jacobs' Route. Mr. Sumner believed that Mr. Jacobs performed a sufficient quantity of promotions but that he was slow about doing them. Conducting some promotions required overtime. Overtime, however, was required to be requested and approved in writing. Approval of overtime came from the Department and not Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was aware of this requirement. In December of 1991, Mr. Jacobs requested permission to conduct a promotion which involved the giving away of coffee mugs with the Department logo on them to each customer that bought a minimum number of lottery tickets. This promotion did not involve overtime and none was requested by Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs claimed that the promotion was changed to one that would require overtime, and that he was told by Mr. Sumner that approval would be obtained from the Department. The weight of the evidence failed to support this claim. In August of 1991, Ms. Chason sought approval to conduct a promotion at a seafood festival to be held in October of that year. The festival required overtime for two employees plus Ms. Chason. Ms. Chason asked for volunteers and accepted the first two persons. Mr. Jacobs did not volunteer and, consequently, was not one of the two persons selected by Ms. Chason. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the failure to select Mr. Jacobs, that the failure to select Mr. Jacobs was somehow unfair or that Mr. Jacobs was not selected by Ms. Chason because of his race. Mr. Jacobs also claimed that he was not given credit for two new retailers he obtained because the forms signing up the retailers were lost. The evidence, however, proved that, although the retailers were lost as Department customers, Mr. Jacobs was given credit for signing them up by Mr. Sumner. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved with the loss of the forms signing up the retailers or that they were lost to cause Mr. Jacobs to fail to meet his quota for new retailers. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner or the Department awarded bonuses or that Mr. Jacobs was denied bonuses because of his race. Miscellaneous Charges. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied training provided to white employees because of his race. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied the use of new equipment provided to white employees because of his race. Mr. Jacobs' Charge of Discrimination. Mr. Jacobs filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Mr. Jacbos alleged that he had been discriminated against based upon his race. On March 29, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Mr. Jacobs filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission requesting a formal administrative hearing. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Mr. Jacobs alleged, in response to questions 3, 4 and 5 on the Petition for Relief, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: My supervisor, Steve Sumner has systematically and intentionally denied me equal opportunities because of my race (black) for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave and retention and advancement in my position as an LSR. See the attached charge of discrimination incorporated herein. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Mr. Sumner allowed every other LSR (all who are white) to pick their own routes which were the best routes, leaving the most difficult to me. He has also allowed other LSR's to work for bonuses during promotions but has not allowed me to do so. Mr. Sumner has misplaced some new applications for lottery retailers that I obtained so that my quotas of achievement would be lower. Mr. Sumner retained a coworker in the LSR position when he had been promoted to LSR long after me. Mr. Sumner denied my taking leave when one of my foster children was critically ill and the child died while I was at work. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: I wish to have a formal post-investigative proceeding. I wish to be reinstated in my LSR position with seniority back to the date of my demotion or receive adequate compensation for the harms I have suffered and reasonable attorneys fees and costs. I am a member of a protected class and Mr. Sumner has singled me out for arbitrary and negative treatment based on my race (black). All the responses Mr. Sumner has provided are pretextual or simply not true. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Mr. Jacobs. At the commencement of the proceeding, Mr. Jacobs indicated that he was seeking a "general injunction", an apology from the Department, monetary compensation for damages in the form of payment for pain and suffering, attorney fees and reinstatement as an LSR II. Alleged Race Discrimination. The evidence in this case failed to prove that any action of Mr. Sumner or the Department was based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. He was not held to any standard or requirement based upon his race and he was not treated in a manner different from the treatment afforded employees of other races. The evidence proved that Mr. Sumner had hired Mr. Jacobs, that Mr. Sumner had given him high evaluations for the first three years he worked, he had temporarily promoted Mr. Jacobs to a higher position with a temporary increase in pay not afforded white employees, he had promoted him with a permanent increase in pay which made Mr. Jacobs the highest paid employee in his class at the District, and he had assisted Mr. Jacobs in insuring that he was qualified for the promotion. Only after Mr. Jacobs' performance began to decline did Mr. Sumner take actions which were somewhat adverse to Mr. Jacobs. Those actions did not take place until after three years of working together. The reasons for taking those actions were reasonably explained by Mr. Sumner and the Department. Mr. Jacobs was unable to explain the foundation for his belief that Mr. Sumner began treating him differently in 1991 on the basis of his race.
Findings Of Fact Respondents hold license 23-3237 COP and at all times here relevant were so licensed. On 7 November, 1977, Respondent, Juan Rodriguez, sold less than five grams of marijuana to Rocco Delio, an undercover policeman, on the licensed premises. Delio paid Rodriguez $11 for the marijuana and two beers. When arrested in December 1977 on a warrant charging him with the sale of marijuana, Rodriguez had an old lottery ticket in his possession as well as a list of numbers which the arresting officers thought to be lottery numbers. Rodriguez testified that the lottery ticket was an old one he bad obtained in Puerto Rico and that he had forgotten the ticket was in his wallet. He further identified the list of numbers as measurements he had taken for a building. Rodriguez denied ever selling any lottery tickets. At his trial on the charge of possession and sale of marijuana and possession of lottery paraphernalia Rodriguez pleaded guilty, upon the advice of counsel, to unlawful sale of marijuana, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. (Exhibit 1). Rodriguez testified that he paid a $300 fine and was told by his attorney that the plea and subsequent withholding adjudication of guilt would not affect his business. At this hearing Rodriguez denied selling marijuana to the policeman who had testified to the contrary. The Petitioner's witness is deemed a much more credible witness and it was this testimony, plus the guilty plea entered in Circuit Court that resulted in the finding that Respondent possessed and sold marijuana on the licensed premises. No evidence was submitted with respect to Counts 3, 4 and 7 of the Notice to Show Cause. The admissions of Respondent with respect to the facts alleged in Counts 5 and 6 were rebutted by Respondent's testimony, which was not contradicted by Petitioner's witness, that the lottery ticket was old and that the list of numbers found on Rodriguez' person was not a list of lottery numbers.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are true, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the pari-mutuel wagering industry in Florida, including persons licensed under Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was licensed as a cardroom employee occupational license number 1395921-1181, issued by the Petitioner. On May 20, 1998, the Respondent was working as a teller in the cardroom at Tampa Jai-Alai. The evidence establishes that on May 20, 1998, the Respondent provided wagering tickets to a patron of the facility without obtaining cash or a cash voucher in exchange for the tickets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order revoking the cardroom employee license number 1395921-1181 of Bobbie J. Manning. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan C. Felker-Little, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bobbie J. Manning 3007 Spillers Avenue Tampa, Florida 33619 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for a Pari-Mutuel Wagering occupational license and request for a waiver should be granted or denied for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's letter dated August 20, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to employees of pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. See § 550.105(1), Fla. Stat. On or about April 2, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering license, specifically for a cardroom license that would allow her to be a dealer in the poker room of a pari-mutuel facility. Ms. Jennings indicated on the application form that she had never held a pari-mutuel license in Florida. In the section of the license application entitled "To Be Completed by Cardroom Applicants Only," Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of, or had adjudication of guilt withheld for, a felony or misdemeanor involving forgery, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud or filing false reports to government agency, racing or gaming commission or authority, in this state or any other stated under the laws of the United States?" In the section of the application entitled "Background Information", Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of or had adjudication withheld for any crime, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to any criminal charges against you? If yes, give details in the space provided below." In the space provided, Ms. Jennings wrote: "Had adjudication; As part of a prosecution of someone else, I cooperated and gave testimony. However, I was personally not convicted of any wrongdoing." Upon investigation, the Division learned that Ms. Jennings had been adjudicated guilty of one count of grand theft in the third degree on January 26, 1995, in Brevard County, Florida. She was sentenced to two years' probation and required to report monthly to her probation officer. Ms. Jennings spent approximately three months in jail prior to her conviction because she could not pay for her bail. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted a request for a waiver from the Division so she could obtain her pari-mutuel wagering license. A waiver must be obtained by, among others, any new applicant for a Florida pari-mutuel license who has been convicted of any felony. Ms. Jennings was 27 years of age when she was convicted of grand theft. She explained that, at the time of the offense, she was involved with a boyfriend who had threatened to kill her and her family when she first became involved with him. She stated that she became "brainwashed and co-dependent on him and basically scared for my life."2 As a result, Ms. Jennings did whatever her boyfriend wanted her to do. According to Ms. Jennings, she was charged with grand theft because, at her boyfriend's direction, she obtained a cell phone under a false name. Ms. Jennings testified that she answered "no" to the question asking if she had been convicted of a crime because she was told by a federal prosecutor named Larry Turner that she would "have a clean record" if she testified against her boyfriend, who had been charged with murder.3 Ms. Jennings testified, and her boyfriend was convicted. Ms. Jennings assumed, therefore, that she would not have "anything in [her] background as a criminal record."4 Ms. Jennings gave the following testimony at the final hearing: She told the Division's investigators about the circumstances of her criminal conviction but did not tell them that she believed her criminal record had been sealed. She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found records of her conviction: "I was like, Huh?"5 She had to go look up the records of the conviction and then her recollection of the arrest and conviction "came back to [her] . . . eventually."6 She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found this conviction because she thought the conviction had been erased. Ms. Jennings has a high school education. After her conviction, Ms. Jennings tried to go to school, but she did not finish. For a time, she worked at a restaurant as a waitress; she had a part-time job doing promotional work for night clubs; and she also worked as a blackjack dealer at a nightclub where blackjack was played for entertainment. When asked what she had done with her life, Ms. Jennings responded: "I had boyfriends and long-term relationships and basically I was taking care of them."7 Ms. Jennings's current boyfriend, her sister, and her best friend testified that Ms. Jennings had always been honest with them. The totality of the evidence presented by Ms. Jennings is insufficient to establish she is rehabilitated and possesses good moral character: She failed to disclose her conviction for grand theft in her application for licensure; her explanations of the reasons for failing to disclose the conviction are inconsistent; her explanation of the act underlying her conviction of grand theft, procuring a cell phone under a false name, is unconvincing; and her vague description of her life since the conviction fails to demonstrate any accomplishments or any positive change in her circumstances since her conviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying the application of Soon Young P. Jennings for a pari-mutuel wagering license. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2010.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent set up, promoted or conducted a lottery for money or other thing of value in violation of Section 849.09, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 26, 1998, the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., d/b/a Personal Investments (Respondent) held license no. 77-00008, Series 2-COP, authorizing it to sell alcoholic beverages. On that date Mr. Stockton Hess was a corporate officer (Vice President). Mr. Hess was also a corporate officer of the Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. (WCKC) on the above date (President). The Respondent is a business regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division) because it sells alcohol. The Washington County Kennel Club (Club) is regulated by the same Department's Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, because it operates a pari-mutuel wagering facility at the Ebro Greyhound Park Dog Track. The Ebro Greyhound Park is owned and operated by the Club. The Club is in the business of selling pari-mutuel tickets, programs and tip sheets. Personal Investments, Inc., sold alcohol at its concession stands and in the lounge and restaurant at Ebro Greyhound Park, located in Ebro, Washington County, Florida. The Respondent served as concessionaire for food and beverage services through its contract with the Club. The Club has held its pari-mutuel wagering permit and annual pari-mutuel licenses continuously for some forty years. They authorize greyhound racing operations at the Ebro track facility. On August 26, 1998, the Club conducted a game promotion at its greyhound track in which any person entering the facility, regardless of whether he or she paid an admission fee, was provided a split-ticket free of charge. One half of the ticket went into a drum located by the entrance way and the other half of the ticket was retained by the patron. Located next to the drum, and on the Club premises, was a wheel which contained representations of prizes such as t-shirts, magnets, key chains and so forth. Subsequent to the tenth race a Club employee, the front gate hostess, would draw a ticket and another employee, the track announcer, would announce the number drawn. The patron holding the other half of the selected ticket would then present himself to the front gate hostess to verify the number. The patron would then spin the wheel and win whatever prize was reflected at the point where the wheel stopped. The Club bought the wheel, paid for the prizes and its employees operated the game in question. Mr. Hess, an officer of both the Club and the Respondent corporation had knowledge of and intentionally participated in the running of the above-described game. On August 26, 1998, a drawing was conducted after the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth races. No patron responded to the number called out following the tenth race, but patrons responded after their announced numbers were called after the twelfth and thirteenth races. Each of those patrons presented a ticket, spun the wheel, and each won a T-shirt. The Division offered no evidence and was unaware, on August 26, 1998, or thereafter, including at hearing, whether those patrons entered the dog track premises by paying an admission ticket price. On August 26, 1998, three hundred ninety-one patrons attended the track. Two hundred eighty-eight of those patrons or approximately 75% attended the track for free, utilizing free passes made widely available by the Club throughout its market area. On a typical racing day or night in excess of 60% to 70% of the patrons entering the Ebro Greyhound Track facility enter utilizing such free passes, the availability of which is a matter of fairly common knowledge in the track's market area. In accordance with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering requirements, the Club maintains a separate turnstile for patrons entering daily with free passes from those paying an admission fee. Respondent's Exhibit B in evidence is a daily report, submitted to the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, of patrons entering for free as opposed to those who paid an admission fee, including the report for August 26, 1998. It was further the Club's policy that any patron who asks for a free pass at the cashier's window is given one and permitted to enter the track premises free. On August 26, 1998, Division Agent Lee went to the Ebro Greyhound Track, paid a $2.00 admission fee, and used his split- ticket to enter the game promotion. He observed the two patrons who had each won a T-shirt following the twelfth and thirteenth races. He made no attempt to obtain a free admission nor did he inquire as to whether the two patrons who won T-shirts had entered for free. Agent Lee testified that he was unaware at the time he visited the greyhound track on that date that the Club owned the track and conducted the Pari-Mutuel Wagering permit and license, despite the fact that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, a part of the same department, as the Division, was the source of the request to review the game promotion. Agent Lee thought that the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., was conducting the game promotion. In fact, that was not the case, the game promotion was conducted solely by the Club and its employees. Agent Lee testified that on August 26, 1998, as well as on the date of hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence that any agent, servant or employee of the Respondent had set up, promoted or conducted the game promotion or a lottery for money or "other thing of value." Agent Lee also testified that on August 26, 1998, and on the date of the hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence to offer to the effect that Personal Investments, Inc., or its agents, servants or employees attempted to operate, conduct or advertise any lottery scheme or device. Agent Lee was unaware of Division Training Bulletin 93-18 concerning game promotions. This was a memorandum to all District Supervisors of each district office of the Division noting that Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, authorizes game promotions in which the patron must be present to win, provided that the game promotion does not require an entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entering the game promotion. Tickets to enter the game promotion are given away without charge by the Club to any patron attending the facility. It is the Division's apparent position that, since Agent Lee paid a $2.00 admission fee to the track and thereafter received his game promotion ticket, that such admission fee constitutes a fee, payment or proof of purchase required as a condition precedent to entering into the subject game promotion. Since almost 75% of the patrons attending the track on the date in question entered free, and since every person entering the track on that date received, without charge, a game promotion ticket, the game promotion ticket cannot be determined to have, as a condition precedent, any fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entry into the game promotion. The "Bud Bowl '99 Sweepstakes" is a common type of game promotion used as an exemplar by the Respondent, the rules of which are depicted in Respondent's Exhibit C, in evidence. That game promotion is approved by the Florida Department of State pursuant to its authority in Section 849.094, Florida Statutes. It is a game promotion in which some but not all participants in fact pay a purchase price and, as part of the purchase, receive a game promotion ticket or piece. The rules of the game contained in Respondent's Exhibit C, reflect that of the 4,429,350, entry forms made available, approximately half are contained within specially marked packages of Anheuser-Busch beer products, which can only be obtained through purchases at stores holding alcoholic beverage licenses. However, one may also enter the "Bud Bowl '99" contest without a purchase and thus in accordance with Section 849.094(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the game promotion does not require, as a condition of entry into it, a fee, payment or proof of purchase. The Ebro game promotion did not award prizes greater than $5,000.00. Thus, unlike the "Bud Bowl '99" game promotion, it did not have to meet applicable requirements for a game promotion offering prizes in excess of such value, including registration with the Florida Secretary of State. It did, however, share the same common requirements as the "Bud Bowl '99" promotion, which is that any entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition of entering the game promotion was not required. Mr. Hess, who testified at hearing for the Respondent, paid $7.48 for a twelve-pack of Anheuser-Busch beer, which contained a "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion ticket therein. He did so without that game promotion being in violation of Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, as determined by the Secretary of State in registration of that promotion. Similarly, Agenct Lee paid $2.00 to enter the Ebro Greyhound Track, and in doing so acquired no more or no less right and opportunity to participate in the Ebro game promotion than did the majority of patrons who entered without having to pay an admission fee. The rules of the "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion submitted to or approved by the Department of State clearly reflect that approximately 50% of entry fees would be contained within Anheuser-Busch product packages which can only be obtained by purchase. The remaining 50% of the entries were made available without a purchase requirement.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative action against Personal Investments, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire 210 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bart Schneider, Esquire Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
