Findings Of Fact In April, 1993, Respondent took over operation of a residential facility known as the Linton Group Home. From that date until May 31, 1995, Respondent and her staff cared for developmentally disabled children in that facility on a permanent basis. The facility was located in Marion County, Florida. The facility operated in accordance with Chapter 393, Florida Statutes and in Chapter 10F-6, Florida Administrative Code. Historically, Respondent had assisted her mother in running the group home in the years 1987 and 1988 on a part-time basis. Respondent's involvement with the group home became permanent in 1989. The group home was opened by Respondent's mother in 1985. Respondent began operating the group home when her mother died. Respondent and two or three employees routinely worked at the group home. Respondent's principle income in the time period at issue was derived from the operation of the group home facility. Following a facility inspection by Petitioner's employee conducted on May 8, 1995, to consider license renewal, the group home was granted a conditional license for the period June 1, 1995 through June 30, 1995. The license was not renewed beyond June 30 based upon the allegations previously described. The decision not to renew the facility license for the annual period was made on June 29, 1995 and notice was provided to Respondent. As of June 30, 1995, seven boys were in residence in the group home ages 13 to 18, with varying levels of disability concerning their level of function both physically and mentally. The clients residing in the facility required and had been given constant supervision. However, they were not a threat to run away from the home. At relevant times, in the event that a client was home from school someone was available to supervise the client. At relevant times Respondent's personal residence was one and a half miles from the group home. Respondent lived there with her children and husband, Willie Smith. The children were not those of Respondent and Mr. Smith. When Respondent took over ownership and operation of the group home she and other existing employees at the facility had been qualified to provide direct services to the clients through a background screening process. To successfully complete the background screening a prospective direct service provider must submit a fingerprint card, and affidavit on good moral character, undergo screening by local law enforcement, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the FBI through use of the fingerprint card and prior to October 1, 1995 scrutiny by the Petitioner concerning the State child abuse registry. At relevant times Respondent understood that she was responsible for securing all the necessary information to do a background screening. She further understood that she had seven days from the time at which a person was employed at the group home to submit the background screening information for assessment. For a time she did not realize that the operator was responsible for paying a fee for processing the fingerprint card. When the May 8, 1995 inspection was made Respondent became aware that a fee was assessed for that process. At relevant times Respondent was aware that appropriate background screening was necessary to maintain the group home license to operate the facility in Florida. Respondent understood that if background screening information was not submitted that an existing license to operate the facility could be revoked or the license could be denied upon the annual request for renewal. In relevant times to the proceeding Hilda Spotts worked in the Petitioner's Developmental Services Program Office. That office serves developmentally disabled children ages 3 to adult and is involved with group homes in which those children reside. Ms. Spotts was involved with the licensure of group homes in District 13, to include Respondent's group home. In June, 1994, Respondent called Ms. Spotts to inform Ms. Spotts that Respondent had married Mr. Smith. In that conversation Ms. Spotts asked Respondent for information to perform a background assessment on the husband to include a fingerprint card and a completed HRS Form 1651 which is associated with the screening process. Ms. Spotts did not receive the information to perform the background screening in 1994. Instead, there was a second conversation in which Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband would not be involved in the daily activities of the group home as an employee of the home. On that occasion Ms. Spotts gave a packet to the Respondent that would be needed to perform the background assessment. However, Ms. Spotts told the Respondent that Ms. Spotts would check with another employee of Petitioner to see if the husband needed to complete those forms. The conversation was concluded on the basis that Ms. Spotts would inform the Respondent concerning the necessity for Mr. Smith to undergo background screening. Within the first six months of the marriage between Respondent and Mr. Smith, the husband did not work at the group home. His employment began before the May 8, 1995 survey at which the Respondent stated that the husband was doing lawn work and maintenance at the group home. At that time Respondent held to the opinion that the situation with her husband was no different than other maintenance people who worked at the group home and who were not required to have background screening conducted. Later Ms. Spotts called the Respondent to tell her that the husband did not need screening but Ms. Spotts reminded the Respondent that the husband needed to be listed for purposes of the annual license review. The next annual review beyond that point in time was performed on May 8, 1995. Ms. Spotts had made the determination that the husband did not need screening at that time based upon her analysis and conversations with personnel at Petitioner's District 3 office in Gainesville, Florida. Ms. Spotts had further stated that if the husband began working in the home he would need to be screened. Respondent added Mr. Smith to the list of employee names on Form 1651 in the annual renewal application dated April 20, 1995 and signed by Respondent. This was consistent with the request by Ms. Spotts that Respondent report Mr. Smith's name on the annual renewal request. Beyond those persons who were working at the group home when Respondent became the owner/operator, Respondent submitted three additional names for background screening. Among the persons who were screened was Brenda Wilson whose screening information was submitted to Pat Joyner an employee of Petitioner at District 3 who is responsible for background screening compliance in that district and District 13. Ms. Wilson was qualified and there exists no dispute concerning her background. Ms. Joyner performs background screens based upon the availability of the person's name, date of birth, social security number and fingerprints. Another employee for whom Respondent submitted background screening information was Sam Graham. This information was sent to Ms. Spotts. Mr. Graham worked for only one week at the facility. No response was received concerning his background screening. Before information was submitted for background screening on Mr. Graham Respondent was told by Ms. Spotts that the Petitioner's Districts had been separated. That referred to Districts 3 and 13. In fact in approximately the spring of 1994 five counties were separated from District 3 and placed within District 13. Marion County was among those counties. After the District separation, Ms. Spotts told Respondent that in the future that the Linton Group Home would not have any dealings with District 3 and that Respondent should deal with District 13. At that time Ms. Spotts did not tell the Respondent where to send screening requests. Respondent assumed that the screening requests should be forwarded through Ms. Spotts in that Ms. Spotts, had provided Respondent with forms needed to perform the background screening. Another employee for whom information on background screening was submitted was Michael Ivey. The information for Michael Ivey was sent to District 13. Before that information was sent Respondent did not call Ms. Spotts to ask where to send the information. Respondent again operated on the assumption that the Linton Group Home was no longer under the regulatory auspices of District 3 in Gainesville as Ms. Spotts had indicated. Therefore Respondent thought that the information for Mr. Ivey should be sent to Ms. Spotts in Belleview, Florida, where Ms. Spotts had her office. Ms. Spotts has no record of receiving the background screening information on Mr. Ivey, nor does the Petitioner. Prior to the submission in the Ivey case requests for background screening had been sent to the District 3 office in Gainesville, Florida, responsible for background screening. Mr. Ivey worked at the Linton Group Home as a direct service provider from late December, 1994 until mid May, 1995. The record of submission of materials to perform the background screening on Mr. Ivey are as reflected in the files maintained by the group home and examined by Ms. Spotts in the May 8, 1995 inspection for license renewal. In that file there is a copy of a document referred to as a law enforcement check which establishes that Mr. Ivey's record was cleared by the Alachua County Sheriff's Office. Mr. Ivey had also executed an affidavit contained in his personnel file at the group home related to his good moral character. In the group home the files is a copy of the Form 1651 shows that Michael Ivey signed as a applicant for the background screening check and included his name, date of birth and social security number together with his present address. The second part of Form 1651 that is "to be completed by employer, HRS representative or facility requesting background check" and characterizes the nature of the employment was not executed nor signed. Moreover, the requestors name, telephone number, street address, county in which the requester is located and the date upon which the applicant had been employed was not executed. There are occasions in which Petitioner's employees and counselors submit requests for background screens as opposed to that information being requested by the employer. However, it was necessary for Respondent to execute the Ivey documents as the requesting employer in that no prior arrangement had been made to have Ms. Spotts or some other employee for the Petitioner execute the form as a requesting entity. Although it may have been appropriate to assume that the proper place to transmit the request for background screening for Mr. Ivey was through Ms. Spotts, it would be inappropriate to assume that Ms. Spotts would understand or be expected to complete Form 1651 to include information as the requestor for background screening. The practice of not executing Part II to Form 1651 which calls for the employer or an HRS representative or the facility to request the background screening check and sign that request was a practice that Respondent had learned from her mother who formerly operated the Linton Group Home. That practice was carried forward in the submission of the Ivey request for background screening. Respondent did not believe that she needed to indicate that she was requesting the background screening for Mr. Ivey by indicating that Respondent was the employer. Notwithstanding the fact that Part II to Form 1651 was not routinely executed, it was the custom by the Linton Group Home to send other information with the request for background screening to indicate that the screening request related to employment with the Linton Group Home. Related to the request for background screening Respondent acknowledges that the expectation was that information would be returned from Petitioner indicating whether the employee had cleared screening. Within the group home files inspected on May 8, 1995, was found a copy of Mr. Ivey's fingerprints. The law enforcement check made by Alachua County bore an address for Petitioner in Wildwood, Florida. The fingerprint card bore an address for Petitioner in Gainesville, Florida. Both addresses were affixed to forms provided by Petitioner. Although information for Mr. Ivey's background screening had Petitioner's address at Wildwood, Florida, and Gainesville, Florida, on the forms provided by the Petitioner, Respondent recognized that the information for background screening on Mr. Ivey was to be sent to one location. She chose to send it to Ms. Spotts. Respondent was aware that compliance information concerning the background screening request was customarily received from the background agencies notifying the Respondent whether an employee had a "cleared" background. Nonetheless, Respondent did not receive information concerning clearance for Mr. Ivey beyond the clearance by the Alachua County Sheriff's Office which was received on December 7, 1994, the same date that the law enforcement check form provided to that department was signed by Mr. Ivey. In the May 8, 1995 inspection the information that was found concerning background screening for Mr. Ivey did not indicate that he had been cleared by appropriate authorities by placing a stamp on all pertinent requests with the word "clear". The exception being the return from Alachua County Sheriff's Office. When Ms. Spotts conducted the May 1995 inspection at the group home, she asked Respondent about the person or persons who was responsible for conducting repair work at the home. Respondent answered that her husband performed those duties. Respondent indicated that her husband worked both inside and outside the group home, to which Ms. Spotts responded that the husband needed to be screened during this relicensure. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband cut grass at the group home. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent's husband was repairing walls and halls inside the house. In discussion concerning the need to do a background check for the husband the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband did work at the home when the children were not there. In response Ms. Spotts told the Respondent that children might come back from school while the husband was there. Following this conversation about the need to have the husband checked for his background Ms. Spotts was persuaded that the Respondent had agreed to those arrangements. Those remarks were followed by correspondence dated May 16, 1995, in which Ms. Spotts informed Respondent that the Respondent needed to have a complete background screening check performed on the husband. With this correspondence Ms. Spotts enclosed a local law enforcement check form and advised the Respondent to sign the background check form and have her husband sign and return the executed information within ten days with an appropriate fee of $32.00 for processing the fingerprint card. The correspondence reminded the Respondent that the issue of background screening for the husband was important and needed prompt attention. Respondent received the correspondence. Respondent did not send Ms. Spotts the background screening information as requested. Ms. Spotts had in mind promptly processing the information on the husband to facilitate granting the Respondent a 90-day license pending the processing of information about the husband's background. When Ms. Spotts conducted her inspection Mr. Ivey was present on that day. After Ms. Spotts had examined the information in the personnel file for Mr. Ivey that has been described she asked the Respondent about Mr. Ivey's employment status. Respondent indicated that Mr. Ivey had been employed since January, 1995. Ms. Spotts noted that there was no abuse registry clearance information or local information other than Alachua County Sheriff's Office information or FBI information concerning clearance of Mr. Ivey available in the records at the group home. The group home is expected to maintain clearance information. Petitioner does not maintain clearance information concerning group home employees. In response to Ms. Spotts' questions about Mr. Ivey's status Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent had sent the clearance request forms to Ms. Spotts. The information sent by Respondent to Ms. Spotts when seeking background screening for Mr. Ivey included an application form provided by HRS, an affidavit of good moral character, a Sheriff's statement, a fingerprint card, HRS Form 1651 and information concerning rules of the Linton Group Home. On May 8, 1995, when Ms. Spotts informed Respondent that the information related to Michael Ivey's background screening was incomplete this was the first time that Respondent realized the deficiency. Ms. Spotts' view is that information concerning background screening and clearance for employees in a group home is sent to Ms. Joyner in District 3, whereas information concerning the owner/operator clearance goes to Ms. Spotts at District 13. It is not clear that Respondent understood this distinction. It is not clear whether the Ms. Spotts eventual instruction to Respondent to send background information to screen employees to Ms. Joyner occurred before or after information was sent to Ms. Spotts related to screening for Mr. Ivey. Notwithstanding the special disposition of the background screening for the husband which was requested in May, 1995, to be processed through Ms. Spotts to accommodate the issuance of a 90-day license to the Respondent, earlier in 1995 Ms. Spotts had told the Respondent that the background screening for employees at the group home should be processed through Ms. Joyner. Ms. Spotts was not sure what the Respondent's understanding of the appropriate place to send background screening information for employees prior to this 1995 conversation. Not finding sufficient information concerning Mr. Ivey, Ms. Spotts asked the Respondent to re-submit the request for clearance for that employee. As with the information pertaining to the husband, Respondent was instructed to send the information to Ms. Spotts to accommodate the issuance of a 90-day license pending the processing of information about Mr. Ivey's background. Respondent did not re-submit information for background screening for Mr. Ivey. Ms. Spotts provided Respondent with necessary forms to submit for background screening for employees. At the end of May, 1995, Ms. Spotts called Respondent to inquire concerning the submission of background screening information for the husband and Mr. Ivey. Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband had gone to Nevada around May 19, 1995, and that Mr. Ivey had quit on that date. During this conversation at the end of May, Respondent told Ms. Spotts that Respondent was not sure when the husband would return from Nevada. In fact, Respondent knew that her husband was in jail based upon the domestic violence complaint that Respondent had placed against her husband. In this conversation Respondent did not wish to talk with Ms. Spotts because Respondent had visitors in her home. She did not tell Ms. Spotts about the husband's incarceration in this conversation because she did not want the people who were visiting and standing in the room where she was on the phone to hear that her husband was in jail. In the conversation in late May, 1995, Ms. Spotts told Respondent that Respondent had 30 days to "rectify the problem" or loose the license for the group home. This is taken to mean obtaining background information for the husband and Mr. Ivey. In a subsequent conversation around June 7, 1995, the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the husband had been in jail and was no longer living in the family home. Respondent also told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent was involved with paying for a motel in Ocala, Florida, for the husband's residence. In this conversation, Respondent informed Ms. Spotts that her husband had been in jail because of a domestic dispute. Respondent also told Ms. Spotts that she did not know when she could get the necessary information from the husband to process the background screening requested by Ms. Spotts. The problem which Respondent explained to Ms. Spotts concerning the background screening for the husband was the inability to get a copy of the husband's fingerprints. Respondent remarked in that conversation that the husband had been doing a little work around the house and working in the yard. Respondent also remarked that she did not think that it was necessary to have background screening but she would have it done when her husband was released from jail. Respondent made no mention concerning the possibility that her husband would return to work at the group home. The husband was released from incarceration on June 8, 1995 and returned to jail on June 13, 1995 and was released again on August 25, 1995. In the June 7, 1995 conversation, Respondent asked if Elsa Alvarez from the Petitioner agency had contacted Ms. Spotts about the pending investigation of Respondent and her children associated with the domestic violence case. In the conversation the Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent had a restraining order against her husband but that the restraining order did not pertain to the husband and his ability to access the group home. Ms. Spotts suggested that the restraining order be modified to place the additional prohibition on the husband. Respondent indicated that she would pursue this suggestion with her lawyer. The restraining order was never modified to prohibit the husband from having access to the group home. Once Ms. Spotts found out that the Respondent had acted to restrain or enjoin the husband from acts directed to the Respondent she asked that a copy of the injunction be posted at the group home. Respondent complied with that request. In addition to placing the May 31, 1995 restraining order on a bulletin board at the group home, Respondent told the staff members that her husband was not to "come around". Given the pendency of the background screening for the husband, a conditional license was issued to the group home effective June 1, 1995, with a 30-day license period. The basis for this decision was premised upon Ms. Spotts' belief that the husband would return from his trip to Nevada and be employed at the group home. On June 5, 1995, Ms. Spotts sent Respondent correspondence indicating that the license for the group had been renewed for the 30-day period pending completion of the background information on Respondent's husband. That correspondence indicated that a meeting would be held with the Respondent on June 13, 1995, to discuss the future licensing of the group home beyond the expiration of the conditional license. Respondent received this correspondence. The correspondence was sent before Ms. Spotts became aware that Respondent's husband had been placed in jail. Ms. Spotts continued to insist on a background check on Mr. Smith because she was persuaded by the June 7, 1995 conversation with the Respondent that the Respondent and the husband would reconcile their differences. Throughout the licensing process Ms. Spotts is without knowledge concerning the husband staying in the group home or serving or supervising the clients at that home. Ms. Spotts is not aware of any complaints about Mr. Ivey while he served as a provider at the group home. Respondent's husband never stayed at the group home or had any direct contact with the residents clients. In addition to the work previously described, the work that he did at the group home included changing air- conditioning vents, and light bulbs and one plumbing repair. The husband also moved a bed at the group home while the Respondent was in attendance. On June 13, 1995, Ms. Spotts was informed that the Respondent was getting a dissolution of the marriage to Mr. Smith. In that conversation Respondent told Ms. Spotts that the Respondent did not want the husband around her daughters in their family home. In that connection, the husband's background had been checked in association with the domestic violence situation in the Respondent's home, during which it was discovered that the husband was on the child abuse registry for sexual abuse. Before that time Respondent was unaware that her husband had been named in the abuse registry. That discovery contributed to the decision by the Respondent to seek dissolution of their marriage. Ms. Spotts in conjunction with Carole Perez, Program Administrator for Developmental Services at District 13, decided to not hold the June 13, 1995 meeting to discuss further licensure in view of problems perceived with the background screening related to Mr. Ivey and Respondent's husband, having in mind the high level of dependency by the clients that were served by the group home, some of whom were unable to communicate. In their opinion those circumstances demanded providers who met all necessary requirements to include background screening. In determining to deny license renewal Ms. Spotts and her supervisor Carol Perez were concerned about Respondent's honesty in cooperating with Petitioner in having a background screen performed on the husband, and whether the cooperation was not forthcoming as a means by Respondent to avoid the possibility that the husband would not be cleared and the possibility that Respondent's husband would have continuing contact with the group home. The Petitioner in the person of Ms. Spotts and Ms. Perez decided to cancel the June 13, 1995 meeting to consider license renewal after consultation with representatives of the children and families program who were conducting an investigation about the group home. Respondent was notified of the cancellation. The children were removed from the home and placed in other licensed facilities or returned to their respective homes on June 20, 1995. At hearing Respondent admitted that there was a possibility that the husband would have returned to her personal home following his incarceration. That possibility ended when the Respondent learned for the first time that her husband was a confirmed child abuser as recognized by the child abuse registry in Florida. This knowledge came about based upon an investigation into the domestic violence situation that has been described. Respondent's husband had been incarcerated based upon the alleged domestic violence against Respondent. That circumstances arose in May, 1995, before Respondent's husband was served with an injunction for protection. The service was made on May 22, 1995. On May 31, 1995, an injunction order for protection was entered in the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida. In operative terms the injunction enjoined and restrained the husband from threatening, assaulting, harassing or otherwise physically or mentally abusing the Petitioner. The order was not intended to enjoin the Respondent's husband from contact with her. The order describes that those parties (husband and wife) could have peaceful, non-threatening, nonviolent contact. The court had entered a preliminary injunction on May 20, 1995, as modified by the May 31, 1995 order. On June 19, 1995, Respondent petitioned for dissolution of marriage from Mr. Smith. On August 14, 1995, the final judgement of dissolution was entered. The final order dissolving the marriage kept in place the injunction entered on May 31, 1995, and awarded exclusive possession of the personal residence to Respondent and enjoined her former husband from coming to that premises. Respondent assumed that the necessity to obtain background information ended when the Respondent made the decision to seek dissolution of the marriage. At present Respondent does not have the Linton Group Home in her control.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which grants Respondent permission to renew the group home license upon the payment of a $750.00 fine. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 95-3741 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraph 1 is acknowledged in the preliminary statement to the recommend order. Paragraph 2 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the sentence pertaining to the affidavit of good moral character. The affidavit was available. Paragraphs 4 through the first two sentences in Paragraph 16 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence in Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 17 through 23 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 9 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 10 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 11 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire HRS District 13 Legal Office 1601 West Gulf-Atlantic Highway Wildwood, FL 34785 Frederick E. Landt, III, Esquire 445 NE 8th Avenue Post Office Box 2045 Ocala, FL 34478 Sandy Coulter, Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether to deny Petitioner's application to renew her registration to operate a family day care home for the reasons stated in the Notice of Denial dated April 7, 2017.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of licensing and registering family day care homes. See § 402.313, Fla. Stat. A family day care home is an "occupied residence in which child care is regularly provided for children from at least two unrelated families and which receives a payment, fee, or grant for any of the children receiving care." § 402.302(8), Fla. Stat. In order to operate a family day care home, the home must be licensed or registered by the Department. § 402.312(1), Fla. Stat. Unlike a licensed home, which is subject to more regulatory oversight, a registered home is not subject to periodic inspections, and the home is only required to undergo an annual evaluation during the registration process. § 402.313(1), Fla. Stat. Petitioner has operated a registered family day care home under the name of Little Bright Stars of Orlando at 4419 Fairlawn Drive, Orlando, for several years. Her most recent registration expired on March 9, 2017. This proceeding concerns Ms. Rosado's application for renewal of her registration. Unless a complete renewal application is filed, the application will be denied. § 402.313(1), Fla. Stat. This is because the Department has no authority to approve an incomplete application conditioned on an applicant filing the missing items at a later time. On March 9, 2017, Petitioner filed her renewal application with the Department. The application did not have the following required items: the application fee; a list of children in her care; a copy of the current immunization record for each child in her care; a copy of a training certificate, an in-service training record form 5268, or a continuing education unit certificate documenting ten clock hours of annual in- service training; a copy of the completed Registered Family Care Home Health and Safety Checklist; a copy of the tear-off section signed by the parent or legal guardian for each child in her care; a copy of the completed Child Abuse & Neglect Reporting Requirements form, signed and dated by the substitute(s); and a Level 2 Background Screening (livescan) for the operator, adult household members, and substitute(s). Petitioner was sent an email the following day informing her that she must file the incomplete and missing items. When the application was filed, Petitioner had several health-related issues, which required her to temporarily stop caring for children in her home. At that time, she was forced to make a choice between paying her medical expenses or the costs associated with renewing her application. She chose the former and submitted an incomplete application without a filing fee. Once the Notice of Denial was issued, Petitioner decided there was no reason to incur the costs associated with the missing items until she knew whether her application would be approved. As of the date of the hearing, the application was still incomplete. Pursuant to section 39.201(6), Florida Statutes, information in the Department's central abuse hotline and automated abuse information system may be used in its evaluation of a registration application. In May 2016, the Department received a complaint that Petitioner's home was "operating illegally," and she had forced a three-year-old child to clean up his urine when he had an accident. Petitioner characterizes the complaint as "false" and asserts it is based on erroneous information provided by a disgruntled parent who just removed her two children from the home. The Department's subsequent investigation belies this contention. In response to the complaint, a Child Institutional Investigation was conducted by a Department Licensing Counselor and a Child Protective Investigator on May 23, 2016. While investigating the urine incident, the investigators observed an unscreened person, Petitioner's 17-year-old daughter-in-law, living in the home and assisting with the care of the children. They also observed children sleeping on the floor with no mats, a leaking ceiling in the area where the children play, and paint cans that were accessible to the children. These conditions violate Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010, which establishes health and safety-related requirements for family day care homes. The Department closed the investigation on July 4, 2016, with verified findings of inadequate supervision and environmental hazards. See Dep't Ex. B. The report concluded that based on the confirmed findings, the safety assessment was "low," meaning the deficiencies did not present a high risk of injury to the children. Petitioner was notified by letter dated August 16, 2016, that the investigation was closed and she could request a copy of the report. Petitioner did not request a copy, and she saw the report for the first time when the Department pre-filed its exhibits. At hearing, most of Petitioner's evidence addressed the confirmed findings in the abuse report. She questioned why she was never offered a hearing to contest those findings, but there is no statutory requirement that the Department conduct a hearing to allow a perpetrator to challenge a confirmed report. In any event, Petitioner was allowed to respond to the findings in the report and to provide evidence to mitigate or contradict the observations of the investigators. Petitioner also questioned why a second inspection was never conducted by the Department to determine if the violations observed during the May 23 investigation had been corrected. An abuse investigation, however, differs from a licensing inspection, and there is no requirement that the Department conduct a second inspection to verify that abuse violations have been corrected. At hearing, Petitioner explained that her 17-year-old daughter-in-law was a temporary occupant of the home while her husband (Petitioner's son) was on active duty in the military. She admitted, however, that the daughter-in-law was not screened, which is a requirement for all persons having contact with the children in a family day care home. She also acknowledged that her husband resides in the home but is not screened. At hearing, Petitioner denied that she had forced a child to clean up his urine. She explained that the child had actually spilled water on the bathroom floor while washing his hands and she made the child clean up the spilled water. During the investigation on May 23, 2016, however, Petitioner admitted to the investigators that the child had continued to urinate on himself and she required the child to clean up the urine in the hope that he would not do this in the future. This is a Class 1 violation of rule 65C-20.010(6)(a), which prohibits humiliating a child as a disciplinary measure. It also meets the definition of "abuse," as defined in section 39.01(2), and "harm," as defined in section 39.01(30). For these reasons, the abuse report confirmed the finding of inadequate supervision. Petitioner further explained that on May 23, 2016, her husband was in the process of making repairs to the leaking roof and the damaged ceiling in the home, and these repairs were completed shortly after the investigation. After being told that sleeping mats were required for the children, Petitioner purchased ten mats for the children. Even so, these deficiencies were observed on May 23, 2016, are confirmed by testimony and photographs received in evidence, and are grounds to verify the abuse allegations. Two parents who have used Petitioner's services attested to her good character and the quality of care that their children receive. They urged that the home be allowed to remain open. Even if the abuse report is not considered, the Department would still be required to deny the application because it is incomplete. According to a Department witness, if a complete application had been filed, denial would still be required based on the confirmed abuse report.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying Petitioner's application to renew her family day care home registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa M. Eilertsen, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Cynthia Rosado 4419 Fairlawn Drive Orlando, Florida 32809-4409 (eServed) Rebecca Falcon Kapusta, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Brian Christopher Meola, Esquire Department of Children and Families. Suite S-1129 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1707 (eServed) Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue The issue presented is whether case management and homemaker services for Petitioner should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact In June 2004, the Department determined that Petitioner was eligible for services pursuant to its Community Care for Disabled Adults Program. Pursuant to its contract with the Department, Gulf Coast Jewish Family Services, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Coast Community Care began delivering those services. Petitioner's apartment was dirty and cluttered, and she was in danger of being evicted from her Section 8 federally- subsidized housing. Petitioner began receiving case management and homemaker services, with the stated goal of cleaning and organizing her apartment so that she could avoid eviction. The case management services consisted of determining and managing the appropriate services for Petitioner. The homemaker services consisted of a helper going to Petitioner's apartment once a week for three hours to teach and assist her in keeping her apartment clean and uncluttered. The services rendered to Petitioner were helpful and encouraged her to gradually discard much of her clutter so that it was easier to keep the apartment clean. When Gulf Coast employees came to her apartment, she was involved in sorting and discarding unneeded items and the apartment appeared much neater. Although it was difficult for her, Petitioner was able to get the apartment ready for her Section 8 inspection, primarily by herself. In August 2004, Gulf Coast determined that the stated goal of organizing and cleaning Petitioner's apartment so that she could avoid eviction had been achieved. Both Petitioner's case manager and her homemaker services supervisor visited her apartment and determined that Petitioner was able to keep the apartment up to standards. Based upon the achievement of the stated goal, the Department notified Petitioner that the case management and homemaker services were being terminated. Although Petitioner testified at the final hearing that she had developed a "heart condition" and was being enrolled in a cardiac rehabilitation program, no evidence was offered, either expert or non-expert, that her "heart condition" would prevent her from keeping her apartment clean and uncluttered. Rather, Petitioner admitted that no doctor had told her she should not perform housework.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner is no longer eligible for services and terminating the case management and homemaker services provided to her. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellen Nichols 2501 Seaford Circle Apartment No. 1 Tampa, Florida 33613 Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 9393 North Florida Avenue, Suite 902 Tampa, Florida 33612 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Dwight E. Leslie, is entitled to the exemption sought.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing exemption requests for persons disqualified to serve as foster parents. Petitioner was disqualified for licensure as a foster parent based upon his past criminal record. Petitioner does not dispute the accuracy of the Respondent's information regarding his past disqualifying criminal record but has sought an exemption based upon the current state of his life. Prior to moving to Florida, Petitioner had an extensive criminal history due to his involvement in drug-use and possession. Petitioner was charged with and convicted on numerous drug-related offenses in New York and New Jersey. Petitioner has satisfied all requirements of the authorities in those states and made payments for the court costs incurred in the proceedings which were pending. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was off probation for the offenses from New York and New Jersey, and had worked for a drug-free employer, Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department, for three years. No evidence suggests Petitioner has engaged in any illegal conduct since his employment in Miami, Florida. Petitioner is married to Rona Leslie, formerly known as Rona Elliott. Mrs. Leslie was a licensed foster parent prior to her marriage to Petitioner. She was licensed as a single foster parent in 1995. There are no reports of any improprieties in the care Mrs. Leslie gave to the foster children placed in her home. Additionally, Mrs. Leslie has worked at the VA hospital for approximately ten years. Petitioner credits his relationship with his wife as the determining factor in his ability to change his former way of life. He maintains that he sought the license for foster parenting because he did not want her to have to give up something she had enjoyed because she married him. Petitioner was straightforward regarding his criminal past at all phases of the licensing process. When he attended orientation, throughout the MAPP class program, and when completing all documents requested by the Department, he fully disclosed his criminal past. In response to questions from the Department which arose from the background check and screening, Petitioner resolved all issues of outstanding costs owed on the criminal cases as well as an outstanding weapons charge which was dismissed. Petitioner acknowledged that while he cannot fight his background, he has done everything within his power to assure his future is different. The Department based its decision to deny the exemption, in part, on Mrs. Leslie's alleged misrepresentation to a case worker regarding Petitioner's presence in the home during her renewal in 1996. The case worker did not testify. Nor did any witness who had been in Petitioner's home. It is undisputed that the Department placed at least one child in the Leslie home after it had notice, actual knowledge, of the Petitioner's past criminal record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a Final Order approving the exemption sought by this Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Leah M. Pollard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Dwight E. Leslie 4602 Northwest 180th Street Miami, Florida 33055
The Issue The issues in this case are: (a) Whether Petitioner's license as a family day care home should be renewed; (b) Whether Petitioner was required to list her son, Stephen Randall, as a household member on her annual registration application for a family day care home for 2000 and 2001; and (c) Whether Stephen Randall was a member of Petitioner's household at any time in 2000 and 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses and the documentary evidence presented, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner's application for license for a family day care home dated October 20, 1997, was received by Respondent on November 20, 1997. Listed among the "household members" on the application was Petitioner's son, Stephen H. Randall, whose date of birth is March 28, 1981. On January 10, 1998, Petitioner submitted her application for registration for a family day care home; the application was received by Respondent on January 14, 1998. Stephen Randall is also listed as a household member on this application. On January 15, 1998, Respondent wrote a letter to Petitioner acknowledging her desire to withdraw her application for license as a family day care home. On February 18, 1998, Petitioner was registered as a family day care home for one year effective February 28, 1998. The letter advised: To maintain your registration in accordance with Section 402.313, Florida Statutes, you must do the following: * * * (3) Send in background screening forms including fingerprints for household members who become 18 years of age, or for adults who move into your home, or when your substitute changes and has not been screened. On October 26, 1998, Petitioner forwarded a renewal application for registration as a family day care home which listed Stephen Randall as a "household member." As a result of a December 9, 1998, inspection by Respondent, it was determined that an adult who had not been screened was living in the registered day care home and, therefore, Petitioner was notified that screening was to be accomplished "ASAP." On January 12, 1999, Respondent sent Petitioner a Certified Letter reminding her that "Adult members residing in the family day care home must go through a background screening process in accordance with Florida Statutes, " On January 28, 1999, Petitioner telephoned Respondent indicating that she "changed her mind about daycare." This telephone call was followed by a letter from Respondent to Petitioner dated January 29, 1999, indicating, "Per your request January 28, 1999, we have withdrawn your Family Day Care license application and closed your registration effective this date." On April 9, 1999, Petitioner submitted an original registration application which listed her 18-year-old son, Stephen Randall, as living in the home which was to become the registered family day care home. On July 6, 1999, Petitioner, by letter, advised Respondent that "My son Stephen H. Randall is no longer living with me (Maxine Torres)." On July 20, 1999, Respondent mailed Petitioner a letter advising that "The Department of Children & Family Services has registered your Family Day Care Home for one year effective July 30, 1999." The letter also advised Petitioner of the necessity of advising Respondent when unscreened adults move into the home in the same language as contained in paragraph 4, supra. On September 23, 1999, Respondent sent Petitioner a Certified Letter which stated: We have received your letter dated July 7, 1999 in reference to your son, Stephen Randale [sic], moving out of your home. Should he return, he must be background screened within ten (10) days. Please remember that all household members must be screened in accordance with F.S. Section 202.303 and 402.305. Failure to do so in a timely manner may result in administrative action, which could result in a fine, suspension, or revocation. On October 31, 2000, the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida, in Case Number CR-O-00-4737/A adjudicated Stephen Henry Randall, Petitioner's son, guilty of violating the following criminal statutes: Subsections 806.13(1)(b)1, 810.02(3), and 812.014(2)(c)5, Florida Statutes, two of which offenses are felonies, and sentenced him to one day in jail and three years' probation. Stephen Randall had been arrested in April 2000 for the criminal offenses he committed. The offenses occurred at a residence two residences away from Petitioner's home, the registered family day care home. Petitioner submitted an application for re-licensure dated May 14, 2000, in which she was required to disclose the name of "everyone who lives in your home." By signing the application, Petitioner attested that the information on the application was "truthful, correct, and complete." Stephen Randall was not listed as living or residing at Petitioner's home. Respondent's investigators and independent witnesses presented credible testimony indicating that Stephen Randall was residing in Petitioner's residence (the registered day care home) during the calendar year 2000. In particular, an abuse report of an incident in January 2000, indicates that Petitioner reported that she "left her teenage son in the home" purportedly to supervise the children left in Petitioner's care; in June 2000, Petitioner again told an investigator, that if she wasn't there her son, Stephen Randall, her daughter or husband watch the children. In addition, independent witnesses, whose children were at the day care home, reported repeatedly seeing Stephen Randall there. Stephen Randall was living in the residence of Petitioner, which was a registered day care home, during the calendar year 2000 and had not been screened as required by Florida Statutes because Petitioner did not advise Respondent that he had returned and was residing in the home. Respondent investigated two Florida Protective Services abuse hotline complaints against Petitioner and determined the complaints to be well-founded. In both instances, Petitioner failed to properly supervise children left in her care and, as a result, failed to ensure the safety of the children. Independent witnesses confirmed the abuse hotline complaints and presented other complaints, all confirming that Petitioner failed to properly supervise children left in her care and failed to ensure their safety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services deny Petitioner's application for re-licensure of her family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 James Sweeting, III, Esquire 506 West Washington Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues are whether the alleged actions of the respondents demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2004) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance agents in Florida. The respondents, Crain and Carll, are licensed as Life and Health insurance agents pursuant to respective license numbers A056967 and A040734. The respondents have known each other for approximately 13 years. During that time, the two engaged in the business of selling health insurance. Mr. Carll was an independent contractor, but Mr. Crain was Mr. Carll's only boss. Mr. Crain wholly owns two Florida corporations that he operates as insurance agencies. The two corporations are identified in the record as International Life and Health Services of Manatee County, Inc. (Manatee), and International Life and Health Services of Sarasota County, Inc. (Sarasota). Mr. Crain owns two other Florida corporations. They are identified in the record as Independent Living Home Care Agency, Inc. (Home Care Agency), and Independent Living Home Care Membership Association, Inc. (Home Care). Home Care promises in a plan written by Mr. Crain to provide plan purchasers with access to discounted in-home care (the plan). Approximately 44 Florida residents purchased the plan in 2005 and 2006 from insurance agents, including Mr. Carll, who, as agents for Mr. Crain, Manatee, or Sarasota, previously sold health insurance to some of the plan purchasers. Mr. Crain is personally and fully liable for the acts of the selling insurance agents within the meaning of Section 626.839. Mr. Crain is a health insurance agent who is the president and sole shareholder of a health insurance agency. Mr. Crain directly supervised and controlled the insurance agents who sold the plan in Florida. Mr. Crain wrote the plan and trained the insurance agents in the content of the plan, sales techniques, how to exclude impaired customers, and how to determine whether a customer was an appropriate candidate to purchase a plan. Mr. Crain did not obtain a legal opinion concerning his final version of the plan. The plan satisfies the statutory definition of insurance. However, the plan is not health insurance that the legislature has expressed its intent to regulate.1 The plan promises Home Care will provide a purchaser of a membership with access to in-home care from a third-party provider, denominated as a "caregiver," at a cost substantially less than the market rate caregivers normally charge for such services (discounted home care services). The plan promises to refund 120 percent of the membership fee if Home Care were unable to provide access to discounted home care services. The plan excludes medical care from the definition of home care services. Home care services include companion and homemaker services; housekeeping and laundry services; transportation services for doctor visits, groceries, and visits with friends; meal preparation; assistance with dressing and undressing; organizing files and bills; not burdening loved ones; protecting assets and heir's inheritance; gaining respect; and preserving one's legacy while gaining respect and dignity. The plan offers memberships for four, six, and eight years. Only four and six-year memberships are pertinent to this proceeding. The respective cost for each four and six-year membership is $2,475 and $3,475. Home Care promises each member will have access to discounted home care services for respective benefit periods of 1.5 and 2.5 years. The cost of membership does not apply toward the cost of discounted home care services. Services are not available at the discounted rate for the first 90 days after the date a purchaser requests services (the elimination period).2 The elimination period is 180 days "for pre-existing conditions".3 An additional payment of $1,395 reduces the normal elimination period from 90 to 60 days, extends the membership period an additional two years, and extends the respective benefit periods by one year. The plan charges an additional 25 percent if a purchaser elects installment payments. The plan promises home care services at substantial discounts below the market rate. The discounted plan rates are $94 for 24 hours of service; $72 for eight hours of service; and $36 for four hours of service. Market rates in the community range from $204 to $480 for 24 hours of service and from $16 to $18 an hour for shorter periods.4 The 44 plans sold in Florida generated approximately $192,000 in membership fees for Home Care. Mr. Crain deposited the fees into a bank account he created for Home Care and for which Mr. Crain is the sole authorized signatory. Home Care paid commissions to insurance agents ranging from 50 and 60 percent of the sale proceeds. The allegations in this proceeding pertain to four of the 44 plan purchasers. Ms. Janet McClurkin purchased the plan in April 2005 in two installments totaling $2,112. Ms. Ruth Frakes purchased the plan in February 2005 in two installments totaling $4,870. Ms. Carin Clareus purchased the plan in February 2005 for one payment of $1,953. Ms. Eva Muller purchased the plan in March 2005 for one payment of $3,475.5 A finding of guilt requires proof of one or more of five essential allegations, the first of which alleges the four plan purchasers are elderly women who, at the time of purchase, were "disabled" and suffered from "diminished mental capacity." The four sales allegedly violated the plan prohibition against sales to anyone "not of sound mind or body." The four plan purchasers are clearly elderly women. At the time of the hearing, Ms. McClurkin was 94 years old.6 Ms. McClurkin is Canadian, has been widowed for approximately 35 years, has no children or nearby family, and lives alone. Her nephew had power of attorney at the time of the hearing. Ms. McClurkin suffered from hearing and memory loss. She had worn two hearing aids for about a year, was recovering from surgery for breast cancer two years earlier, and had functioned for over 15 years with two artificial hips. Ms. Frakes was 90 years old at the time of the hearing.7 Ms. Frakes had been widowed for approximately 26 years and had no children and no surviving relatives. Ms. Frakes wore a Life Alert alarm, had been wearing two hearing aids for approximately seven years, had been reading through a magnifying glass for approximately five years, was taking medication for high blood pressure, and suffered from arthritis. Ms. Clareus was 97 years old at the time of the hearing and resided in a community of about 200 senior citizens.8 She immigrated to the United States in 1928, had been widowed for approximately four years at the time of the hearing, and had no children and no nearby relatives. Ms. Clareus had been legally blind for approximately eight years but was able to read through an assistive device in her residence. Ms. Muller was approximately 85 years old at the time of the hearing. She immigrated from Germany and then became a U.S. citizen, all in a time frame not disclosed in the record. Ms. Muller had been divorced early in her life and lived alone in a mobile home community. She had no nearby relatives and experienced memory problems. Ms. Muller owns an automobile but does not drive. Friends drive for her. After purchasing the plan, Ms. Muller executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Ingrid Eglsaer as her general power of attorney. At the time of the hearing, the four witnesses demonstrated confusion and difficulty in recalling specific facts. However, their confusion and impaired memory at the hearing was not clear and convincing evidence that the witnesses were incompetent when they purchased the plan. The allegation of incompetence at the time of purchase may be supported by inference or surmise, but inference and surmise do not satisfy the requirement for clear and convincing evidence.9 Petitioner submitted no expert testimony concerning the mental capacity of a purchaser at the time of the purchase. Petitioner next alleges the respondents misrepresented that Home Care would provide home care services and home medical care without further charge. Each Administrative Complaint admits the alleged misrepresentation conflicts with the terms of the plan.10 The plan promises access to discounted home care services and states that the membership fee does not apply toward charges for discounted home care services.11 The evidence is less than clear and convincing that the respondents misrepresented the contents of the plan in a manner that led purchasers to believe they would receive home care services or home medical care without additional charge. Testimony of the four purchasers concerning verbal representations by insurance agents during sales transactions is confused, is not precise and explicit, and is less than clear and convincing. Each purchaser may have inferred that she was purchasing insurance for either home care services or home medical care without an additional charge. Some purchasers had previously purchased such insurance from the same insurance agent. Each sale included a consultation in which the insurance agent reviewed other insurance held by the purchaser. The plan included terms that sounded to elderly women like familiar insurance terms. For example, the plan requires the purchaser to apply for coverage and employs terms such as "Eligible Persons," "Effective Date," "Elimination Period," "Limitations and Exclusions," and "Benefit Discount Period." The plan extends the elimination period when "pre- existing conditions" exist, describes home care providers as "caregivers," and discusses "co-payments." The plan includes a disclosure form and a medical release form. The evidence is less than clear and convincing that the respondents made promises or representations, other than those in the plan, to induce a purchaser to infer that the plan entitled her to discounted home care or medical care at no additional charge. Rather, the terms of the plan were purposefully confusing and induced the four elderly women to draw the desired inference. Petitioner also alleges the respondents made false and worthless promises that defrauded the purchasers. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the allegations of fraud in this case.12 This case can be resolved if the evidence supports one of two remaining allegations. First, the respondents allegedly misrepresented the access to discounted caregiver services that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. Second, the promises of access to discounted caregiver services that the respondents made to each of the four plan purchasers were false and worthless.13 The plan misrepresented the access to caregivers that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. The plan provides, in relevant part: If a member joins the association they are guaranteed the homecare discounts provided for in the contractual agreement. Respondent Crain, Exhibit 1, at 4. The plan does not name or otherwise identify a caregiver responsible for supplying the discounted caregiver services "guaranteed" in the plan. In that regard, the plan is factually distinguishable from a home care plan that passed judicial scrutiny in an unrelated proceeding.14 Neither Mr. Crain nor Home Care possessed a legal right to require a caregiver to provide discounted services in accordance with the terms of the plan. Neither Mr. Crain nor Home Care possessed the practical ability to ensure that a caregiver would provide home care services at any price, much less the discounted prices promised in the plan.15 The absence of either a legally enforceable right or practical ability to ensure that a caregiver would provide the discounted home care services promised in the plan were material facts that Mr. Crain did not disclose to purchasers. The failure to disclose material facts was willful and misrepresented the access to discounted caregiver services that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. Testimony from Mr. Crain concerning his practical ability to ensure delivery of discounted caregiver services was neither credible nor persuasive to the fact-finder. Mr. Crain discussed home care services with a number of caregivers. Based on those conversations, Mr. Crain developed a list of caregivers he said he could call in the future to request discounted caregiver services promised in the plan if and when one of the 44 purchasers requested services (the list).16 The list evolved between January 2005 and September 2006. Mr. Crain advertised for caregivers in local newspapers. The collective responses numbered between 100 and 200. Mr. Crain or a staff-member collected the contact information for each responder and questioned each responder concerning, among other things, their qualifications and experience. The final list identified 15 caregivers. Mr. Crain described the list of 15 in answers to questions from the fact-finder: [Q] Well, I want to make sure I understand clearly. So, you ran an ad. People called in, you took down their contact information, and did you run [abuse registry] screens on these people? [A] Yes, I did. [Q] Okay. You mentioned earlier 200 responded. Did all 200 make the list? [A] The list? . . . [Q] . . . The list I'm referring to is the list referred to in testimony of . . . [insurance] agents of yours that said you maintained a list of contract individuals . . . Did you maintain a list? [A] I had a list of potential caregivers from the original ad, yes. * * * [Q] So you ran two ads. You had some responses to the first ad, and overwhelming responses to the second ad, and when you talked to the person, what did [you] do . . . ? [A] They call in -- I briefly qualify them. * * * [Q] And what kind of information do you collect? [A] Name, address, phone number, work history, educational history ethical behavior . . . . [and abuse] screening . . . . [I]f the agency they work for currently or in the past could not fax me a copy of . . . screening . . . by AHCA [Agency for Health Care Administration], then I could then screen them myself. [Q] [H]ow many of these people did you actually either screen or get faxes of their screen? [A] About seven. [Q] Out of how many? [A] Altogether, I had spoken to no less than a hundred people. [Q] From both ads? [A] Correct. . . . [Q] How many of the seven did you screen yourself? [A] Three. . . . [Q] Okay. Now, you talked to a hundred. Did you compile a resource list? [A] Yes, I did. [Q] And how many . . . , of the hundred, made the resource list? [A] I had at least 15 potentially eligible people that could work for me, but I had seven that could go at any moment. Or not at any moment but that were available, already screened with experience and ready to go. Or around seven. Transcript (TR) at 581-585. Mr. Crain did not bond or insure any of the 15 potentially eligible caregivers. Mr. Crain explained the bonding procedure in the following testimony: [Q] [The plan] . . . talks about having people bonded, insured, and fully screened, correct? [A] Yes. [Q] Now, we've already talked about screening. How would you make arrangements to bond and insure someone? [A] If they were employed, to bond a person is a one-page form . . . [y]ou deliver to this insurance agency . . . down the road from my office . . . and putting a hundred dollars for every ten thousand dollars of bonding you want. . . . [Q] So, when in the process would you bond and insure someone? [A] The day or the day before they went out to the actual care. [Q] So actually, prior to having a request for services and actually arranging for somebody to go out, you wouldn't have gone through the trouble or expense of bonding or insuring, correct? [A] Correct. [Q] Who actually bears the expense of bonding and insuring? [A] The provider. [Q] You mean the worker? [A] Yeah. . . . TR at 585-586. The plan promised that access to discounted services included a guaranteed refund equal to 120 percent of membership if Home Care were unable to provide access to the discounted caregiver services promised in the plan. Mr. Crain wrote the refund language to state: 17. 120% money back guarantee. If [Home Care] cannot provide homemaker and companion services at the discounted rate as governed by this contract, the company shall pay the member all the fees paid plus an additional 20%. Due to severe, unprecedented, skyrocketing costs for caregivers, or an unforeseen increase in the demand for personnel, the company will make this refund. [Home Care] has a big responsibility to provide quality home care services to all of it's [sic] members. Even though management owners and outside professionals have thoroughly though [sic] out almost every variable in making this contract both beneficial to the customers and profitable for [Home Care], no one can predict the future. Therefore it is agreed by both parties that by entering into this contract that the legal remedy for [Home Care's] possible inability to provide the service at the discounted rate, is for [Home Care] to refund 120% of the member's fee after reviewing the case with legal counsel as provided for by [Home Care] regarding the unusual circumstances of the said member. Respondent Crain, Exhibit 1, at 7. The promise that access to discounted caregiver services includes a guaranteed refund of 120 percent of the membership fee is a false promise. The promise is not conditioned on any discernable legal standard or any other standard capable of objective measurement. Rather, the applicable standard is a subjective standard to be interpreted at the sole discretion of Mr. Crain. Mr. Crain willfully included the false refund promise in the plan. As Mr. Crain explained: The right to get a refund? After five days, they don't have a right to get a refund. [Q] Do you or have you, on behalf of the company, given refunds to persons beyond the five-day period? [A] Yes. [Q] Is that at your discretion? [A] Yes. [Q] Is there any particular policy or plan regarding when and how to give a refund and how much? [A] No. TR at 614. Mr. Crain is the sole arbiter of the entitlement to a refund and the amount of the refund to be paid. For example, Mr. Crain paid Ms. Muller 120 percent of her membership fee but paid only a prorated amount to Ms. Clareus.17 The promise to refund 120 percent of the membership fee is worthless. Mr. Crain willfully included the worthless promise in the plan. The refund obligation is owed solely by Home Care, and Home Care has not retained sufficient reserves to fund its contractual obligation.18 Mr. Crain withdrew virtually all of the $192,000 in membership fees to pay commissions, operating costs, and similar expenses. On June 19, 2006, Home Care had $946 in its bank account. The last refund obligation Home Care owes to the two unpaid purchasers in this proceeding will not expire until sometime in 2011. The corporate promise to refund 120 percent of the membership fee is worthless because it is an unfunded obligation to pay refunds from non-existent reserves. Mr. Carll did not exercise ordinary diligence, much less the reasonable skill and diligence required of an insurance agent, to examine the plan for misrepresentations and false promises. Mr. Carll willfully failed to independently examine the plan. As Mr. Carll explained during his testimony: Jim was constantly on the phone interviewing people, prospective caregivers, talking to -- even to home health care agencies that provide homemaker services, and it's my understanding that he had compiled a list of people who could be called in the event if someone requested for [sic] service. * * * [Q] When you had meetings with Mr. Crain, did you ask him questions? [A] Yes. [Q] What questions did you ask about the plan? [A] Oh, how does the elimination period work. You know, when do services begin? What do people have to do to get services? Questions of that nature. [Q] Anything else? [A] Just questions about, you know, well how to talk to these people and, you know, what to look for when you walk into a house. [Q] Did you ask Mr. Crain what ability he had to ensure that these third party contractors would provide their services for the fees he guaranteed in the plan? [A] Yes. [Q] Okay. What did you ask him? [A] I said, Well, how can we be sure that these people will get the services that they need when they ask for them? [Q] And? [A] He said that he had interviewed numerous people. He had a list of people that he could call . . . to provide [discounted services]. . . . [Q] Did you ask Mr. Crain what ability he had to . . . enforce that representation from them if, at some future time, he asked them to provide that service, and they said they no longer would? [A] I didn't ask him that question. [Q] So you didn't ask him if he had these people under legal contract for the term of the plan? [A] No. . . . I have a lot of faith in Jim Crain. TR at 358 and 422-424. Mr. Carll knew, or should have known, that the plan he sold included misrepresentations. Mr. Carll knew, or should have known, from the language of the plan that the refund promise is false. Each of the respondents is an insurance agent who enjoyed a fiduciary relationship which arose from previous sales of health insurance. Mr. Carll also enjoyed a fiduciary relationship that arose during the previously discussed consultative role he performed when he reviewed with plan purchasers their existing insurance. As Mr. Carll explained during his testimony: Well, a lot them, some of them were referrals, some of them were people we already knew. [Q] How did you know them? [A] That they had purchased insurance with us before. You know, a lot of them called the office. [Q] For what purpose did they call? [A] Well, they called the office looking for the agent that sold them insurance. TR at 360-361.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding the respondents guilty of violating Subsection 626.611(7), for the reasons stated herein, and suspending their licenses for 24 months from the date the proposed agency action becomes final. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's decision to deny the Petitioner's application for a renewal license for a home health agency on the basis of Section 400.471(10), Florida Statutes (2009),1 constitutes an agency statement of general applicability that has not been adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and, therefore, violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the entire record of this proceeding, the following facts are undisputed and found to be true: My Friend Home Care submitted its application to renew its home health license on or about November 7, 2009. On January 11, 2010, AHCA issued a Notice of Intent to Deny My Friend Home Care's application for a renewal license pursuant to Section 400.471(10)(d), Florida Statutes, which became effective on July 1, 2009. Section 400.471(10), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The agency may not issue a renewal license for a home health agency in any county having at least one licensed home health agency and that has more than one home health agency per 5,000 persons, as indicated by the most recent population estimates published by the Legislature's Office of Economic and Demographic Research, if the applicant or any controlling interest has been administratively sanctioned by the agency during the 2 years prior to the submission of the licensure renewal application for one or more of the following acts: * * * (d) Failing to provide at least one service directly to a patient for a period of 60 days. On May 13, 2009, a Final Order was entered by AHCA finding that My Friend Home Care failed ensure that at least one service was directly provided to a patient in a 60-day period. An administrative fine of $1,000.00 was assessed against My Friend Home Care, which paid the fine. My Friend Home Care operates a home health agency in Miami, Florida, and is subject to the provisions of Section 400.471, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon Petitioner’s race in providing home repair assistance to Petitioner under Respondent’s State Housing Initiatives Partnership (SHIP) Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Zoe McLendon, is an African-American. Respondent, Citrus County’s Department of Development Services, is the department of Citrus County responsible for administering money received from the SHIP Program. Under the SHIP Program, Respondent administers available construction funds to pay for repairs or replacements in homes of applicants who qualify for the program. In deciding whether claimed housing deficiencies qualify for funds available under the SHIP Program for repairs or replacements, Respondent applies criteria established under Respondent’s Local Housing Assistance Plan. Only certain housing deficiencies that threaten the health or safety of applicants qualify for funding; SHIP funds are not available for the provision of routine maintenance. In addition, under Respondent’s Local Housing Assistance Plan, recipients who have received home repairs under the SHIP Program cannot reapply for SHIP Program repairs for a period of ten years. Respondent solicits bids and selects only licensed and insured contractors who submit the lowest bids for construction projects under the SHIP Program. Contractors who are awarded bids under the SHIP Program enter into separate contracts with the recipients of their services, and it is the responsibility of recipients to address any workmanship issues directly with the contractor. In 1998, Petitioner’s residence qualified for a number of repairs under the SHIP Program, including the replacement of Petitioner’s roof, replacement of windows, the installation of a new door, and water pipe repairs. Donle Enterprises, Inc., was the successful bidder for those repairs in 1998, and performed the work. Petitioner testified that she was not happy with the work done by Donle Enterprises, Inc., and that, in 1998, she notified Respondent’s employees who worked in the SHIP Program of her dissatisfaction with the quality of the work. There is no evidence, however, that Petitioner complained about discrimination at the time. There is also no evidence that Petitioner ever contacted Donle Enterprises, Inc., to complain about the work. Almost ten years later, in May 2008, Petitioner submitted another application for home repair assistance under the SHIP Program and Respondent placed Petitioner’s name on a waiting list. Due to the length of the waiting list of applicants before her, as well as the fact that Petitioner had received assistance from Respondent less than ten years earlier, Petitioner was not contacted until January 2009 for intake to complete her home repair assistance application. Respondent set up an appointment with Petitioner for January 7, 2009, which Petitioner failed to keep. The appointment was rescheduled for January 28, 2009, on which date Petitioner met with Respondent’s Housing Coordinator, Ms. Lynn Clark, who explained the terms and conditions of the home repair assistance program to Petitioner. On that same date, Petitioner signed acknowledgements of those terms and conditions. Included in the terms and conditions acknowledged by Petitioner was the following language contained in a document entitled, “Information about Rehabilitation Work,” signed by Petitioner on January 28, 2009: Rehabilitation contracts are awarded to the contractor with the lowest bid. our purpose in providing repairs to your home is not to increase the value of your home or improve your equity position, but to provide repairs that promote the structural integrity of your home. . . . * * * The primary purposes of our Rehabilitation program are:To abate any health and safety problems in your home.To provide safe electrical and mechanical systems.To stop weather penetration to make your home more energy efficient.To improve the general condition of your home’s structure. Interior cosmetic type work may not be addressed on your project. . . . In any case, funds available for cosmetics are very limited and must be combined with the rehabilitation approved. * * * The work performed is an agreement between you, the homeowner, and the contractor who receives the award. Any questions or concerns should be addressed with the contractor. (Emphasis in original) Petitioner was further advised in a letter from the housing accountant for Respondent’s Division of Housing Services dated February 5, 2009, that in order to complete Petitioner’s application for housing assistance, Petitioner would need to submit a copy of her 2008 tax return, and that Petitioner’s daughter, who was living with Petitioner at the time, would need to submit affidavits and other paperwork. Petitioner failed to respond to the February 5, 2009, letter and the housing accountant sent another letter to Petitioner dated February 16, 2009, advising Petitioner that if the required paperwork was not received by March 3, 2009, Respondent would consider that Petitioner was no longer interested in pursuing her application for housing assistance. Petitioner finally provided the requested documentation on March 5, 2009. Thereafter, on March 25, 2009, Ms. Clark and Housing Rehabilitation Specialist Michael Appino, both of whom hold housing rehabilitation inspector certifications, conducted an inspection of Petitioner’s home. During the inspection, Mr. Appino turned on Petitioner’s air conditioner, which Petitioner claimed was not working, and immediately it began cooling the home. Both Ms. Clark and Mr. Appino inspected the ceiling in the area where Petitioner claimed the roof was leaking and noted that, while there were small water stains on the ceiling, the stains were small and dry, indicating that there were no active roof leaks. Ms. Clark inspected a window which Petitioner advised was not working and found that, although the window would not stay open due to a maintenance issue, the window pane was not broken, and the window was suitable for its main function in keeping out the weather. The only item that fell within the replace or repair criteria established by Respondent’s Local Housing Assistance Plan was a bathroom sink that had fallen off the wall. Ms. Clark informed Petitioner at the time that Respondent would be willing to pay for replacement of the sink. Petitioner declined the offer on the grounds that she did not want to have a lien placed against her residence and did not want to have to wait another ten years to qualify for SHIP Program repairs. On April 27, Respondent’s Housing Director, Joe Monroe, wrote a letter to Petitioner offering to have her roof inspected by a County building inspector. Petitioner did not accept the offer, and on June 9, 2009, Mr. Monroe closed Petitioner’s file. In addition, at the final hearing, Petitioner complained that water had leaked under her kitchen sink and soaked the bottom of the cabinet below. In her testimony, Ms. Clark explained that such water leakage was a maintenance issue for which SHIP Program funds were unavailable. Ms. Clark further explained that, although there were funds available earlier in the year, due to funding cuts, SHIP Program funds are not currently available for any repairs or replacements under the SHIP Program administered by Respondent. Ms. Clark’s testimony is credited. In her Petition for Relief and her testimony at hearing, Petitioner complained about discrimination by Respondent in its selection of Donle Enterprises, Inc., to do the work. According to Petitioner, Donle Enterprises provided inferior work and was sent only into minority neighborhoods. Other than Petitioner’s unsupported testimony to that effect, Petitioner produced no evidence to support that allegation. In addition, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that Respondent’s actions in administering the SHIP Program, or declining to perform maintenance not covered by the SHIP Program, were discriminatory. On the other hand, Respondent, through the testimony of Ms. Clark and documentary evidence in the form of SHIP Program tracing reports from 2000 through 2007, demonstrated that Respondent regularly selects Donle Enterprises, Inc., as the contractor for non-minority SHIP Program clients. Further, Respondent provided evidence that Respondent offered and declined SHIP Program services to Petitioner within the parameters for administering the SHIP Program. Petitioner failed to rebut this evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2009.
