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PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs GLENN D. CROMARTIE, 00-002011 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida May 12, 2000 Number: 00-002011 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 2000

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of violating Petitioner's rule requiring that all employees Respondent's job classification submit to random drug testing.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver. On January 12, 1995, Petitioner's representatives conducted a Drug Free Workplace Employee Training Session, which was attended by Respondent. This training session was one of many such sessions at which Petitioner's representatives explained to each covered employee the provisions of Petitioner's drug policies. These provisions include a provision that a refusal to take a random drug test is tantamount to failing a drug test and a basis for termination. The Employee Information on Drug and Alcohol Testing, which is the handbook distributed to Petitioner's school bus drivers, including Respondent, informs each driver that Petitioner will annually administer random drug tests to half of the driver positions and that, if selected for a random drug test, the driver must report immediately to the testing laboratory. The employee handbook informs drivers that a refusal to submit to a random drug test is prohibited. The employee handbook explains that engaging "in conduct that clearly obstructs the testing process" constitutes a refusal to submit to a random drug test. The employee handbook notes that conduct obstructing the testing process includes a "failure to immediately report to the testing facility after notification." Finally, the employee handbook warns that Petitioner may terminate drivers who have engaged in prohibited behavior. Article 32, Section 2, of the 1998-2000 Agreement Between the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida, and School Employees Union, Local 1221, Firemen & Oilers, An Affiliate of Service Employees International Union, AFL/CIO, CLC, contains the same requirements as those set forth above in the employee handbook. Section 3 warns that a violation of any of these requirements by a covered employee may result in termination. On March 21, 2000, Petitioner's Transportation Clerk Specialist II summoned Respondent to the transportation offices. When Respondent reported to her office, the clerk informed Respondent that she had selected him for random drug testing. Obviously, element of surprise is an important feature of random drug testing. Equally important to random drug testing is the control of the subject between the point at which he is informed that he is to take a random drug test and the production of the sample or samples to be tested; given enough time between the notification and the test, a subject might be able to ingest substances that could interfere with the ability of the test to detect drugs. Also important to random drug testing is the confirmation that the person presenting himself at the testing laboratory is the person who has been randomly selected for testing. Each of these elements plays a role in this case. Petitioner's clerk checked Respondent's identification, including his driver's license, and explained to him the procedures that he was to follow. Respondent had undergone random drug testing in the past while employed by Petitioner. In brief, Petitioner's clerk told Respondent that he had to report immediately to the testing laboratory, which is a short drive from the office. The clerk instructed Respondent to sign in upon arrival at the laboratory and, when called, to present all of the paperwork that she was giving him, as well as his driver's license. Petitioner's clerk warned him that he could not leave the laboratory premises until he had completed the drug test. Respondent reported immediately to the laboratory and signed in, as instructed. When called, Respondent presented his paperwork to the laboratory clerk, but he did not produce his driver's license, claiming that he did not have it with him. Respondent is not the first employee to appear at the laboratory without suitable identification. Petitioner's procedure is to maintain a photocopy of each employee's driver's license and fax the photocopy to the laboratory when employees report to the laboratory without identification. If the laboratory clerk cannot positively confirm the identification of the employee from the photocopied identification, then the laboratory employee detains the employee while Petitioner sends the employee's supervisor to the nearby laboratory to confirm the identity of the employee. Once done, the drug test proceeds. Pursuant to this procedure, the laboratory clerk telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that Respondent had failed to produce his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk and Petitioner's clerk diverges at this point; each claims that the other clerk spoke to Respondent. However, the laboratory clerk testifies that she summarized the instructions given Respondent over the telephone by Petitioner's clerk. Just before Respondent left the reception room to search the bus for his driver's license, the laboratory clerk told him that he could go to the bus to look for his driver's license, but he was to return to the reception room. In any event, the clerks agree that Respondent received permission to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license--a deviation from established procedure that prohibits the employee from leaving the laboratory once he has reported for a random drug test. The testimony of the clerks establishes that Respondent was permitted to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk establishes that she clearly directed Respondent to look for his driver's license in the bus and return to the reception room. The discrepancy in the testimony of the clerks as to who conveyed the substance of the additional instructions to Respondent is, ultimately, immaterial; the possibility that one of the clerks could have given Respondent permission to leave the laboratory parking lot to search for his driver's license, or the possibility that Respondent could have misunderstood the clerk to have given him this permission, is negated by Respondent's later conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation, as set forth below. Following his conversation with the laboratory clerk and possibly Petitioner's clerk, Respondent left the laboratory and went to his bus, ostensibly to search for his driver's license. Respondent did not return to the laboratory, but, instead, drove his bus back to the bus compound. Evidently, Respondent went home after returning his bus. One to one and one-half hours after leaving the laboratory, Respondent telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that he had not found his license and had instead become sick, so he had gone home to eat something and take his medicine. Respondent told her that he had retraced his steps, but had not found his driver's license. At this point, Petitioner's clerk transferred the call to her supervisor, who is the Assistant Director of Transportation. The Assistant Director of Transportation started their conversation by stating her understanding that Petitioner had sent Respondent for a random drug test, but he had not completed it. Respondent answered that he could not find his driver's license and believed that Petitioner's clerk may have failed to return it to him earlier in the morning when she had examined it. The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that the clerk had looked for the driver's license and failed to find it, so that they were sure that she had not failed to return it to Respondent. Pausing for about five seconds, Respondent answered, "I wasn't feeling well. I had to go home and take my medication." The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that she would treat this as a refusal to submit to a drug test. They spoke for a few moments more, confirming that Respondent was calling from his home and that the bus was at the compound. The Assistant Director then directed Respondent not to report to work and told him that a personnel employee would be contacting him. Respondent concluded the conversation by repeating that he had not been feeling well. At no point in the conversation with Petitioner's clerk or the Assistant Director of Transportation did Respondent ever claim that he left the laboratory parking lot with the permission of Petitioner's clerk or the laboratory clerk or that he left the laboratory parking lot thinking that he had the permission of one of the clerks. It appears that he had ample opportunity in his conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation to make this claim. Instead, Respondent merely repeated his claim that he became ill. Thus, it is very likely that Respondent clearly understood the final directions of the laboratory clerk: Respondent was to search his bus for the driver's license and then return to the laboratory reception room. It is thus not difficult to determine that it is considerably more likely than not that Respondent left the laboratory parking lot, knowing that he did not have the permission of either clerk to do so. Petitioner's witnesses testified candidly. The Assistant Director of Transportation did not appear overbearing or intimidating, so as to deter Respondent from presenting all of the facts in his defense, such as a claim that he had left the parking lot with the accurate or mistaken impression that he could do so in an effort to find his driver's license. It is only a little more difficult to determine that Respondent's claim of illness as the cause for his departure from the parking lot is more likely than not to be a fabrication. The coincidence of a random drug test, misplaced driver's license, and sudden onset of debilitating illness is unlikely. Presumably, the illness would have arisen after Respondent had spoken to the laboratory clerk, or else Respondent would have mentioned something to her when he was in the reception room. Even if Respondent had been suddenly struck by some illness while on his way to search the bus or while searching the bus, he would have been able to return to the reception room and tell the laboratory clerk either that he had fallen ill and had to go home immediately or that he had fallen ill and needed to produce a urine sample immediately, with or without further identification. Obviously, the illness had not been so debilitating to have prevented Respondent from returning to the reception room and telling the laboratory clerk of the illness; after all, Respondent was able to drive the bus to the bus compound and then drive himself home. Based on all of the facts, Petitioner properly treated Respondent's acts and omissions as the equivalent of refusing to submit to a random drug test and, as authorized by the collective bargaining agreement, properly terminated Respondent's employment as a school bus driver.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Howard Hinesley, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Largo, Florida 33770 Jacqueline M. Spoto, Staff Attorney Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Honorable Tom Gallagher, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Glenn Cromartie 1639 26th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs JAMES L. JACKSON, 90-007860 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Dec. 14, 1990 Number: 90-007860 Latest Update: May 21, 1991

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent failed to maintain the qualifications set forth in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, which require that a correctional officer in the State of Florida have good moral character.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the formal hearing, the following facts are found: The Respondent, James L. Jackson, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer in 1981. At all times relevant and material to these proceedings, the Respondent was a correctional officer sergeant employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Department. In late July or early August of 1989, during the course of investigating illegal conduct by other employees of the Broward County Sheriff's Department, a Detective Dansky, then working in the Internal Affairs Office of the Broward County Sheriff's Department, was told by one of the admitted wrongdoers that he had heard that several employees of the Sheriff's Department, including the Respondent, were involved in criminal activity related to the possession, use, or distribution of controlled substances. Shortly after receiving that information, Detective Dansky contacted the Respondent and requested that he provide a statement in response to the allegation that he had been involved in illegal drug activity. On August 8, 1989, the Respondent reported to the Internal Affairs Office, where he met with Detective Dansky. After being advised of the specific allegations that had been made against him, the Respondent gave a statement to Detective Dansky. The Respondent's statement consisted of a denial of all allegations of misconduct. After taking the Respondent's statement, Detective Dansky offered the Respondent the option of furnishing a urine sample for drug testing in order to resolve the issue. The Respondent voluntarily agreed to provide a urine sample. Detective Dansky initiated the drug testing process by asking the Respondent if he had been using any drugs that might show up on the test. The Respondent stated that he had not used any drugs. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent provided a urine sample. The sample was collected under circumstances which verified that the sample was actually provided by the Respondent and the sample was promptly sealed in a manner which made it highly improbable that the sample could be tampered with without the tampering being obvious. The sample was also given a unique identifying number. The urine sample was properly protected until it was turned over to the forensic laboratory, where it was received in good condition with no evidence of tampering. At the laboratory the Respondent's urine sample was kept in a secure manner during the testing process. At the laboratory, adequate procedures were used to ensure that the Respondent's urine sample was properly identified, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that the sample had not been tampered with. A portion of the Respondent's urine sample was submitted to an immunoassay screening analysis. The screen analysis indicated the presumptive presence of benzoyleconine, a unique metabolite of cocaine. Following the screen analysis, a second portion of the Respondent's urine sample was submitted for analysis by means of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, which is the most reliable and accurate method for confirmatory drug testing. The gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis of the Respondent's urine sample was positive for the presence of benzoyleconine in a concentration of 4903.5 nanograms per milliliter. That concentration of benzoyleconine is consistent with, and indicative of, the Respondent's voluntary ingestion of cocaine within a time frame of approximately one to four days prior to the collection of the urine sample. The Respondent's positive drug test results were received by the Internal Affairs Office of the Broward County Sheriff's Department on August 15, 1989. On that date, Detective Dansky again met with the Respondent. Detective Dansky told the Respondent that the Respondent's urine sample had been confirmed positive for cocaine. The Respondent told Detective Dansky that he does not do things like that and that it could not be him. 1/ As a result of the positive drug test results, the Respondent was suspended and ultimately terminated from his position as a correctional officer sergeant with the Broward County Sheriff's Department. At the time of his suspension, the Respondent had worked for the Broward County Sheriff's Department for approximately nine and a half years. Prior to August of 1989, the Respondent had an excellent work record with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.

Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order in this case concluding that the Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character and revoking the Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of May, 1991. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1991.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.00225
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. BRUCE E. WALKER, 86-002183 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002183 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1987

The Issue In his Proposed Recommended Order, counsel for Petitioner concedes that the crime to which Respondent pleaded guilty is classified as a federal misdemeanor, not a felony. For that reason, Count II of the Complaint is no longer in issue. The remaining issue for determination is whether the crime to which Respondent pleaded guilty involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are adopted, verbatim, from both parties' Proposed Recommended Orders: Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the Rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Bruce E. Walker is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0110184 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license to Respondent was as a salesman, Quest and Company, LTD, 13829 - 80th Avenue North, Seminole, Florida 33542. On September 27, 1985, in federal court, Respondent was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the criminal offense of conspiracy involving adulterated and misbranded medication. Respondent was sentenced to be imprisoned for one year but the imprisonment was suspended. Respondent was placed on probation for 18 months of community service, fined $1,000.00 and a $25.00 special assessment was imposed. The crime of which the Respondent was convicted is classified as a federal misdemeanor by law. The Respondent was convicted of the federal misdemeanor as a result of a plea to a charge of conspiracy although the Respondent quite candidly still denies that he conspired to do anything wrong, other than to provide unused free medication samples received from various drug manufacturing companies such as Pfizer, Upjohn, or whoever else called upon his office. The unused medication samples are quite often provided to the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) or other charitable health care providing services. When the Respondent was approached by an individual offering to take one or more several [SIC] large sackfuls of the free medical samples and dispose of them, the Respondent was more than willing. Previously, the Respondent had been able to have the unused medicine samples incinerated by a friend at a funeral home. The Respondent in fact provided medicines to this individual on two occasions, one of which was after he had received payment from his "Cocon- spirator." (Transcript pages 25-29.) The parties concur in the official recognition of Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Procedure Code, in particular Section 20.30, Chapters 20, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent was one of a large number of practicing physicians in Florida and elsewhere who were drawn into a scheme for the sale of free sample medications. While Dr. Walker solicited some free drugs from companies, he either used those personally or gave them to patients whom he knew could not otherwise afford them. The samples he sold were unsolicited surplus. None were "controlled substances." Dr. Walker sold the samples on two occasions. On the first occasion he was approached by an individual whom he did not know; he gave the individual two garbage bags full of the samples, without any discussion of payment. Later, an envelope with money was left with his secretary. He had some misgivings about the money but did not question the individual when the second collection of samples was made. When the F.B.I. contacted him regarding their investigation, he cooperated fully. This was acknowledged and taken into consideration by the Government when he was sentenced. Dr. Walker was released from probation on March 26, 1987. The suspension of his medical license has been stayed pending the outcome of an appeal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint in this case be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2183 The following constitute my rulings on the parties' Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact #1-7 Adopted in Paragraph #1. (no paragraph #3 provided.) Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact #1-7 Adopted in Paragraph #1. (no paragraph #3 provided.) #7-14 Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. #15 Adopted in Paragraph #2. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Gardner W. Beckett, Jr., Esquire 123 Eighth Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.225475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs JOHN G. RETURETA, 03-003659PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 23, 2003 Number: 03-003659PL Latest Update: Mar. 07, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether, as provided by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, Petitioner may discipline the correctional and law enforcement certificates of Respondent due to his failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is subject to discipline, an additional issue is the penalty that Petitioner should impose.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer, holding certificate number 200241, and a certified correctional office, holding certificate number 182381. Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer in 1998 and as a law enforcement officer in 2001. As a correctional officer, Respondent has worked at the South Florida Reception Center and Broward Correctional Institution. In December 2001, the Town of Golden Beach Police Department hired Respondent as a law enforcement officer. Respondent was employed at the Town of Golden Beach Police Department until December 31, 2002. He is presently unemployed. On December 12, 2002, Respondent visited a local lounge while off-duty. Sitting by himself, Respondent ordered a drink and visited the restroom before the server delivered the drink. Upon returning from the restroom, Respondent found the drink where he had been sitting. Respondent consumed the drink and went home. The next morning, Respondent reported to the police station and performed his usual duties, which included transporting witnesses to the State Attorney's Office, appearing in court, and picking up uniforms. Upon his return to the office, a fellow officer informed Respondent that the police chief had received a tip that Respondent had been smoking crack cocaine the prior night and had ordered Respondent to undergo a urinalysis. As directed by the chief, Respondent and the fellow officer immediately drove to the laboratory so that Respondent could provide a urine sample. Four days later, on December 17, 2002, the chief told Respondent that the urinalysis had returned a positive result for cocaine and placed Respondent on administrative leave. Two weeks later, Respondent resigned. The laboratory that conducted the urinalysis is certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse as a forensic toxicology laboratory and is authorized by the Agency for Health Care Administration to perform drug-free workplace testing. On December 16, 2002, the laboratory screened the urine sample and found a positive result for a cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. As is typical with initial screens that produce positive results, on December 20, 2002, the laboratory retested the urine sample by gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC/MS), which is a sophisticated, sensitive test. The GC/MS confirmed the presence of benzoylecgonine at the level of 36,900 nanograms/milliliter (ng/ml). This level of cocaine metabolite is indicative of a large amount of cocaine ingested not long before the production of the urine sample. At the request of Respondent, the laboratory retested the urine sample a few months later and detected significant levels of a wide range of cocaine metabolites. At the request of Respondent's attorney, the laboratory sent part of the urine sample to a second, independent laboratory, which, performing GC/MS on December 10, 2003, reconfirmed the presence of cocaine metabolites. The reported level, presumably of benzoylecgonine, was over 10,000 ng/ml. The second laboratory reported a lower level because this was the maximum threshold of its testing equipment and protocol and possibly because the cocaine metabolites decompose over time, even in urine that has been frozen, as the first laboratory had done in preserving Respondent's urine sample. The only anomaly in the confirmatory test performed by the first laboratory appears at page 16 of Petitioner Exhibit 2. This document concerns the confirmatory testing performed on several samples, including Respondent's. In reporting testing parameters, the document states that the "ion ratio int. std." for Respondent's sample was 3.67. The bottom column suggests that the permissible range is 2.44-3.66. The form contains a statement at the very bottom: "REVIEWER: RESULTS OF GC/MS WERE WITHIN THE TOLERANCES ACCEPTABLE UNDER OUR SOP [STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE] FOR RETENTION TIME, QUANTIFICATION OF CONTROLS, MASS RATIOS, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH THE FULL SCAN MASS SPECTRUM." After this preprinted statement, the reviewer added in handwriting: "except 326340." This is the number assigned to Respondent's sample. Unfortunately, the parties did not address this anomaly in the confirmatory test, and the record does not explain the meaning of the reviewer's note or the out-of-range ion ratio. The only unusual feature of the first laboratory's confirmatory test, as revealed in the record, is that the laboratory used a smaller sample size because the results were so high that, absent a diluted sample, the first laboratory's equipment could not produce a concentration level. However, the process by which this adjustment is made is not unusual, and the first laboratory performed the necessary calculations to produce a correct result. The uncertainty introduced by the reviewer's note is eliminated, though, by the extremely high levels of cocaine reported by the second laboratory a few months later, and the wide range of cocaine metabolites reported by the first laboratory in its reconfirmation testing one year after the initial screening. Respondent's defense is that, unknown to him and while he was in the restroom, someone at the lounge poured a large amount of cocaine into his drink. This defense is unworthy of belief. Respondent claims that he conducted a personal investigation into his case after the drug test showed cocaine metabolites in his urine. In the course of this investigation, Respondent interviewed a bartender at a lounge some distance from the one that Respondent had visited on December 12, 2002. During this interview, a woman at the bar, Stacie Dalgleish, who had once been an inmate at a correctional facility at which Respondent had served as a correctional officer, overheard him talking about the facts of this case and interrupted Respondent's conversation to tell him that she had witnessed what happened to Respondent that night. As Ms. Dalgleish testified at the hearing, she told Respondent that, on the night in question, she had been at the same lounge and had seen another woman, Lisa Binger, who had been incarcerated with Ms. Dalgleish. While in a stall behind a closed door, Ms. Dalgleish witnessed Ms. Binger and another woman snort cocaine. Ms. Dalgleish explained that she had been able to see Ms. Binger because she was lined up perfectly with the crack between the stall door and the frame. Ms. Dalgleish testified that she then heard Ms. Binger tell her friend that she was going to get Respondent because he had gotten her friend. Later, while seated near the bar, Ms. Dalgleish testified that she saw Ms. Binger pour the white powdery contents of an envelope into Respondent's drink, while Respondent had left his drink unattended. For his part, Respondent "explained" that he had caused a friend of the Ms. Binger to lose her job as a bartender when he had reported to the bar owner that Respondent had seen the woman stealing cases of beer. The improbability that Ms. Binger would part with a large amount of cocaine to incriminate Respondent is moderate. The improbability of the chance encounter between Respondent and Ms. Dalgleish, while Respondent was conducting his investigation is high. The improbability that, in a public restroom, Ms. Binger would theatrically announce her plans to surreptitiously pour cocaine into Respondent's drink, as she recklessly snorted cocaine with another woman--all while observed by Ms. Dalgleish sitting in a closed stall, but peering through a crack in the door that happened to reveal the scene that she described--is incalculably high. Exacerbating these credibility problems was Ms. Dalgleish's performance as a witness. She was an eager witness who, upon concluding her testimony, quickly walked over to Respondent to obtain his approval of her unconvincing performance. Respondent is lying about how he came to ingest a large amount of cocaine a short time before his drug test.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's correctional officer and law enforcement officer certificates. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James C. Casey, Esquire Slesnick & Casey, LLP 2701 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134-6020 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professional Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

Florida Laws (6) 120.56120.569120.57893.03943.13943.1395
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THE SCHOOL BOARD OF HERNANDO COUNTY, FLORIDA vs DOUGLAS WISEMAN, 20-000612 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Feb. 03, 2020 Number: 20-000612 Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent (“Douglas Wiseman”) violated Petitioner, the School Board of Hernando County’s (“the Board”),1 drug-free workplace policy; and, if so, whether his employment with the Board should be terminated.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record in this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Section 381.986, Florida Statutes (2019)2, pertains to the medical use of marijuana and allows patients suffering from chronic, nonmalignant pain to receive marijuana if they have been added to the medical marijuana use registry by a qualified physician. However, section 381.986(15)(a), provides that “[t]his section does not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy.” Also, 2 All statutory references shall be to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes. section 381.986(15)(b), states that “[t]his section does not require an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace or any employee working while under the influence of marijuana.” The Board operates 24 schools, employs over 3,000 people, and has approximately 24,000 students. The Board maintains a drug-free workplace. On August 27, 2019, the Board revised its drug-free workplace policy in order to explicitly prohibit medical marijuana. The revised policy states, in pertinent part, that: [m]arijuana is considered a controlled substance under the Federal Controlled Substance Act. The Board does not distinguish between marijuana and medical marijuana for its policies. Use of marijuana in any form is prohibited. If a drug test result is positive for marijuana, the employee will be subject to disciplinary action per Board Policy 4139.01. The Board adopted the above-quoted revision in order to resolve any ambiguity regarding its position on medical marijuana following the passage of section 381.986. The Board’s revised policy mandates that employees who perform “safety-sensitive functions with Board-owned and/or operated . . . vehicles must be mentally and physically alert at all times while on duty.” Accordingly, the Board requires “the Superintendent to establish a drug and alcohol testing program whereby each regular and substitute bus driver, and any other staff member who holds a CDL license, as well as any staff member performing safety-sensitive functions, is tested for the presence of” alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, opioids, amphetamines, and PCP. (emphasis added). The revised policy further provides that drug tests can be conducted prior to employment, for reasonable cause, upon return to duty after drug or alcohol rehabilitation, after an accident, on a random basis, and on a follow-up basis. The revised policy states that “[t]he term safety-sensitive functions includes all tasks associated with the operation and maintenance of Board- owned vehicles.” The revised policy is silent as to whether maintenance employees or those operating power tools perform safety-sensitive functions. The Board also revised its disciplinary policy on August 27, 2019, to classify a positive drug test as a “Group IV” offense punishable by termination. However, that same policy also provides that [t]he Superintendent and the School Board retain the right to treat each incident of employee misconduct or performance deficiency on an individual basis without creating a precedent for other similar incident cases which may arise and to determine the appropriate disciplinary [measure] on a case-by-case-basis. The Board has a department responsible for maintaining its buildings and its fleet of approximately 50 vehicles. Mr. Wiseman has been employed with the Board for nearly 14 years as a Carpenter III. Mr. Wiseman is the Board’s head roofer and thus used ladders up to 36 feet in height on an almost daily basis. In addition, he performed carpentry work such as putting up drywall, installing ceiling tiles, and repairing doors and shelves. In the course of his duties, Mr. Wiseman regularly used power tools such as electric drills, circular saws, and nail guns that have the potential to cause injury if not properly handled. The Board assigned one of its fleet vehicles to Mr. Wiseman, and it was stocked with equipment and tools. He drove that vehicle every workday. While Mr. Wiseman had no responsibilities relating directly to students, the Board considered him to be in a safety-sensitive position due to the nature of his duties and because he drove a Board vehicle. Mr. Wiseman injured his back approximately two years ago, and the incident resulted in a workers’ compensation claim. Mr. Wiseman initially used muscle relaxers and pain medication to deal with the pain associated with his injury, but he could not tolerate the side effects. As a result, he became certified to receive medical marijuana in 2018. Mr. Wiseman has benefited greatly from this treatment and plans to continue using medical marijuana until he can live without pain. Mr. Wiseman only uses medical marijuana to treat his pain and did not use it during school/work hours. The Board convened a meeting of the maintenance staff on the morning of September 19, 2019, in order to discuss the revisions to the Board’s drug-free workplace policy. Because the Board considers maintenance to be a safety-sensitive function, the maintenance staff was put on notice that they would be subject to random drug testing and that random testing would start in 60 to 70 days. The Board did not impose immediate random testing because it wanted to give employees taking medical marijuana an opportunity to confer with their physicians and make arrangements to bring themselves into compliance with the revised policy. Mr. Wiseman attended the September 19, 2019, meeting, and he was required to give a urine sample on November 20, 2019. The Board received the positive test result on December 2, 2019, and immediately prohibited Mr. Wiseman from working on roofs and driving the Board-owned vehicle that had been assigned to him. The Board leveled several allegations against Mr. Wiseman and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the following polices: (a) Policy 4124 which prohibits the use of any controlled substance by any staff member at any time while on Board property or while engaged in Board-related activities; (b) Policy 4139.01 Group II (6) which prohibits violations of known safety rules or practices; (c) Policy 4139.01 Group IV (2) which subjects a Board employee to termination for a positive drug or alcohol test; and (d) Policy 4162 which prohibits any Board employee with a positive drug test from driving any school vehicle or using Board-owned equipment.” The Board failed to prove the remaining allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Wiseman worked for the Board in a safety-sensitive position.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Hernando County issue a written reprimand to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North Clearwater, Florida 33761-1526 (eServed) Gregory A. Hearing, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Suite 2700 401 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 3299-0400 (eServed) John Stratton, Superintendent The Hernando County School District 919 North Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34601-2397

Florida Laws (8) 1001.401012.221012.231012.271012.33120.57120.68381.986 Florida Administrative Code (1) 6A-10.081 DOAH Case (1) 20-0612
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ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs PATRICIA GADSON, 98-002713 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jun. 12, 1998 Number: 98-002713 Latest Update: Apr. 02, 1999

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Board's termination of Respondent's employment should be upheld.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Patricia Gadson, age 51, was employed as a department secretary by Petitioner, the Escambia County School Board. She worked for the School Board of Escambia County from April 12, 1968, through January 27, 1998.1 She was employed by the Board for twenty-nine years and nine months. Throughout this period of time, Ms. Gadson worked as a school or administrative secretary at various locations throughout the school system. Prior to 1994, Ms. Gadson was a successful employee who received good evaluations of her work. However, sometime prior to January, 1994, several departments were consolidated as a result of downsizing. Ms. Gadson was assigned as the sole administrative secretary for six departments working for four different supervisors. Ms. Gadson found her new job very stressful. The stress resulted in her missing work frequently due to illness and medical treatment. After being examined by her own and the School Board's psychiatrists, Ms. Gadson was diagnosed with depression and took a six-week leave of absence to recuperate. She was not involved with drugs at this time. However, sometime in 1996, approximately two years before her discharge in 1998, Ms. Gadson was introduced to crack cocaine by her sister. She did not refuse the drug and eventually became addicted. She used the drug with full knowledge of the Board's drug-free workplace policy and its policy of zero tolerance for such use. As a result of her addiction, Ms. Gadson's life spiraled downward. She had increased absences from work and deteriorating job performance. In fact, her supervisors had already decided to terminate her for her poor performance. However, her supervisors recognized that she was exhibiting the symptoms of someone suffering from substance abuse and instructed her to take a drug test on November 3, 1997. Ms. Gadson fully cooperated in taking the test. On the way home, Ms. Gadson volunteered to Dr. Larry Reed, one of her supervisors, that the test would be positive. The test came back positive for crack cocaine since Ms. Gadson had last smoked crack on November 2, 1997, the day before her drug test. As a result she was terminated on January 27, 1998, retroactive to December 5, 1997, for violation of the School Board's drug-free workplace policy and for having tested positive for an illegal drug. Ms. Gadson has not smoked crack since November 2, 1997. With the assistance of Dr. Reed, her supervisor, Ms. Gadson was admitted to an out-patient rehabilitation program at the Pavilion Chemical Dependency Hospitalization Program on November 12, 1997. She was discharged from that program on November 26, 1997. She continued the recommended program of treatment in the Aftercare Program until approximately February 1998. She stopped attending the aftercare program in order to care for her grandmother who is an invalid. Ms. Gadson is willing to voluntarily undergo regular drug testing in order to demonstrate her continued abstinence should she be reinstated. The School Board maintains and strictly follows a "zero tolerance" policy for use of illegal drugs. When an employee or student is found to have used illegal drugs, they are automatically terminated or expelled after exhaustion of any due process procedures available irrespective of any mitigating factors. The discipline which would be imposed on an employee for violation of the Board's drug policy was set forth in a memo from the superintendent. The memo was given to all employees, including Ms. Gadson. Additionally, the drug policy was made part of an employee's contract. This policy was applied to Ms. Gadson in this case. The School Board has not adopted the disciplinary part of the drug policy as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1997). However, the Board has adopted a disciplinary rule and has incorporated that rule in the contract it has with the union. The zero tolerance policy is generally applicable to all employees and, as stated in the School Board's answer, it implements the School Board's drug-free workplace policy, authorized under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and School Board Rule 6Gx17-2-62. The severity of the discipline is meant to emphasize the serious nature of drug use in relation to education, the students and the school, and its employees must set an example. Indeed, the very intent of the zero tolerance rule is to announce to all concerned that the sole penalty for illegal drug use is termination. Illegal drug use in a school setting is a serious misconduct warranting termination. The Board's "policy" of termination for illegal drug use by an employer falls within the disciplinary rule of the Board. Therefore the School Board's zero tolerance drug use policy is already implemented by Board rule. The rule adequately defines the discipline imposed for employee misconduct and need not define specific instances which warrant termination of any other type of discipline. Respondent's use of cocaine violated the Board's policy and her employment contract. The District has consistently terminated employees found in possession of or using controlled substances with or without evidence of prior disciplinary problems. No exceptions have ever been allowed with one exception related to arbitration. Violation of the Board's drug-free workplace program constitutes cause for termination. Additionally, even without the Board's zero tolerance policy, the use of crack cocaine over an extended period of time by a school employee which causes the employee's performance to fall below acceptable levels constitutes cause for termination. Therefore, superintendent's recommendation for termination of Respondent should be upheld.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent, Escambia County School Board, terminating the employment of Patricia Gadson. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1999.

Florida Laws (9) 112.0455120.52120.54120.57163.01186.50420.04440.101440.102
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs RICHARD D. BEACH, 99-002824 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jun. 24, 1999 Number: 99-002824 Latest Update: May 23, 2001

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's corrections officer license is subject to suspension, revocation or other discipline.

Findings Of Fact On August 29, 1996, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent's corrections officer license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, which was indicative of the illegal ingestion of a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On September 5, 1996, Respondent filed an Election of Rights in which he disputed the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requested an administrative hearing. Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on June 23, 1999. The Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Volusia Correctional Institution (VCI) in early 1991. A corrections officer is a special risk employee in a safety sensitive position. At the time of licensure Respondent passed his drug screen. In 1996, the month of February had 29 days. In February 1996, Warden Bruce Scherer received allegations of possible drug abuse by Respondent from Connie Beach, Respondent's (then) wife. Respondent's wife was also a corrections officer. Ms. Beach had been in the Warden's office asking for a day off to retrieve her belongings from the marital home due to personal problems with Respondent. Upon inquiry of the Warden, the Warden learned that Ms. Beach's brother Carroll Bradshaw had smoked marijuana with Respondent. The Warden called the brother by telephone. The brother confirmed he had smoked marijuana with Respondent several occasions. In response, the Warden asked Respondent to submit to a drug test. Respondent was cooperative and agreed to submit to the drug test. Volusia Correctional Institution does not conduct random drug testing. At no time did Respondent question why he was being asked to submit to a drug test. Bolton accompanied Respondent to the Halifax Hospital facility to submit a urine specimen for drug testing. In testing specimens for marijuana, two tests are conducted; the first of these is an immunoassay screen, and the second is a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) test. The GCMS test is the more definitive test which specifically identifies THC, the major metabolite of marijuana. THC is also the part of marijuana which gives it its psycho-active properties. Cut-off levels are used in the testing process in order to exclude positive test results for persons who may have had accidental (or second-hand) exposure to marijuana. Respondent submitted his first urine sample for drug testing on February 28, 1996. On March 4, 1996, the results on the immunoassay screen came back positive for cannabinoid (marijuana). The sample first tested positive. It then tested about 300 nanograms of THC in the GCMS test. On March 19, 1996, a second test was conducted on Respondent's original urine sample. On March 20, 1996, the results of that test were received and reviewed by Dr. Hung Doan. The GCMS test showed 259 nanograms of THC. The result was confirmatory of the first as positive for marijuana. Dr. Hung Doan is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO). He is certified as to his knowledge of drugs, their medical usage and ingestion. Dr. Doan is an expert in the field. Dr. Doan was the MRO who reviewed and certified the results of Respondent's two positive drug tests in 1996. The high levels of marijuana detected in the two positive tests of Respondent's urine sample conclusively establish that the results could not have been caused by accidental or passive inhalation of marijuana. The results did not rule out ingestion of marijuana since the evidence showed that about two cigarette sized amounts of marijuana would produce results similar to those found on Respondent's tests. However, the evidence did not show that Respondent had eaten any marijuana. Only multiple "accidental" exposures to, in conjunction with "accidental" ingestion of marijuana could possibly have resulted in the nanogram levels detected in Respondent's urine without his knowledge. Respondent did not produce any evidence beyond speculation to suggest that this might have occurred in his case. Mr. Beach was notified of the first positive test on March 4, 1996, by Mary Yochum, Dr. Doan's assistant. Respondent's response to being told that he tested positive for marijuana was "okay." He was concerned with the result but could not go into detail over the phone because other officers were present. On March 6, 1996, Respondent submitted a separate urine sample for the purposes of having an independent drug test. The results of that test were negative for marijuana. However, this second test occurred seven days after the first urine sample was given. The test only shows Respondent's level of cannabinoid on the latter date had decreased or diluted sufficiently to fall below the cut-off point for such tests. Marijuana can clear the human body's system within days. However, a chronic user of marijuana may take up to 75 days before the drug clears the persons system. It depends on the persons individual metabolism. Carroll Bradshaw is the ex-brother-in-law of Respondent. Mr. Bradshaw is a known drug user and convicted felon. He was last released from incarceration in 1998 after serving time for a cocaine charge. He continues to use drugs to date. Mr. Bradshaw regularly socialized, and smoked marijuana with Respondent. However, he had not smoked marijuana for quite a while before receiving the telephone call from the Warden. Respondent admittedly was familiar with the smell and appearance of marijuana. Respondent would typically supply and prepare the marijuana which he and his brother-in-law smoked while socializing. Respondent kept his stash of marijuana on a "paraphernalia" tray underneath his couch in his home. Respondent's former mother-in-law, who was also familiar with the look and smell of marijuana because of her son's problems, witnessed Respondent smoking marijuana with her son and others. She confirmed the testimony of her son and her daughter as to Respondent's use of marijuana. Given these facts Petitioner has shown clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Chapter 943, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 John Stanton, Esquire 121 1/2 North Woodland Boulevard Suite 3 Deland, Florida 32720 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

Florida Laws (4) 120.57893.13943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (3) 11B-27.001111B-27.0022511B-27.005
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. ARTHUR W. QUICKSALL, 88-004000 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004000 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1989

Findings Of Fact 1-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-8, respectively. 9-24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8-23, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Arthur W. Quicksall, Pro Se 2123 Raiford Road Starke, FL 32091 Jeffery Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the seriousness of the offense as it relates to the public trust placed in a correctional officer who guards those incarcerated by society, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order revoking Respondent, Arthur W. Quicksall's correctional officer certification. Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4000 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57943.13943.139943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs JAMES C. NORMAN, 96-004653 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Raiford, Florida Oct. 01, 1996 Number: 96-004653 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1997

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent failed to maintain the good moral character requisite to continued certification as a Correctional Probation Officer in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is James C. Norman, holder of Correctional Probation Certificate 152252. Respondent was employed in the capacity of correctional officer at the Union Correctional Institute. Bruce M. Fitzgerald, personnel manager at Union Correctional Institute, supervises drug screening of correctional officers at the Institute. Fitzgerald set up a drug screen to be administered to Respondent on October 16, 1995. Respondent came to Fitzgerald’s office on that date where Fitzgerald explained the process to Respondent, provided Respondent with a chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423, and obtained Respondent’s signature on a Employee Drug Testing Notice. Respondent was instructed to go to Bradford Hospital in Starke, Florida for the collection of his urine sample and submission of that urine sample for the drug screening process. Pamela Langham, a licensed practical nurse for the past 20 years, was working on October 16, 1995, in the Acute Care Office at Bradford Hospital where obtaining specimens for drug screening was a part of her duties. On October 16, 1995, Langham received from Respondent the chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423. Langham then followed standard protocol in obtaining Respondent’s urine sample by having Respondent empty his pockets, turn the pockets inside out, take off any loose fitting garments, wash his hands and clean his fingernails, and remove his footwear. Langham then had Respondent go into the restroom and obtain his urine specimen in a container. Respondent returned from the restroom with the container where Langham then gave Respondent the lid for the container. The specimen container was then sealed in Respondent’s presence. Langham had Respondent sign the specimen container. The container was then sealed in a plastic bag upon which Respondent placed his initials. Respondent’s specimen container was then refrigerated for later pick up by a courier and transportation to the laboratory in Tampa, Florida, for analysis. Langham completed a portion of the chain of custody form number 09A664423 which was sent along with the specimen to the laboratory. Michael Dean Miller, an expert in the field of forensic chemistry, is the toxicology manager and records custodian at the laboratory where Respondent’s specimen was received. The laboratory is certified by the State of Florida and nationally accredited by the College of American Pathologists. At the final hearing, Miller presented the documents prepared in the reception and testing of specimen number 09A664423. Respondent’s specimen was received in a sealed package by Enoris Moore at the laboratory on October 16, 1995. The specimen seal was intact and bore no indication that the specimen had been contaminated in any way. The specimen was analyzed and handled in accordance with the requirements of the laboratory and the State of Florida. Respondent’s specimen was tested in accordance with standard and accepted procedures in the industry. The specimen was examined by Mark Bartalini. The specimen tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolite. Compared to a minimum cut off for testing for drug presence in urine of 150 nanograms, Respondent’s urine sample contained 11,649 nanograms which is considered a high level. This result indicated the actual presence of cocaine metabolite in Respondent’s system. Respondent denied usage of any other compound which may have affected the level of cocaine metabolite found to exist in his urine sample. His additional denial of cocaine consumption prior to the collection of his urine sample is not credited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 488-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 James C. Norman Post Office Box 651 Raiford, FL 32083 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57893.13943.13 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.00225
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